Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk



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Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk C., GOURIEROUX (1), J.C., HEAM (2), and A., MONFORT (3) (1) CREST, and University of Toronto (2) CREST, and Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution (3) CREST, and University of Maastricht. October 2013 Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reect those of the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution (ACPR). 1/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

1. Introduction : two features of nancial risks 2/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Diversication & Non Linearities Diversication may diminish but cannot eliminate risk. Due to the existence of common risk factors (called systematic risk factors) such as : longevity risk, business cycle, prime rate aecting all adjustable rate mortgages (ARM)... These factors introduce a dependence between risks. Nonlinearities drive the nancial world. Nonlinearities can be due to : the design of derivatives (call option), the banking regulation (provision rules), the individual events, such as default, prepayment, lapse (for life insurance)... Some nonlinearities are hidden in the balance sheet of the banks and insurance companies as seen from Merton's model (Value-of-the-Firm model). 3/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Value-of-the-Firm model Stylized balance sheet : Asset (A), Liability (L) and value (Y ) Bondholders' interest : L nominal value of the debt Shareholders' interest (with limited liabilities) : initial equities transformed into the net value of assets over liabilities Bondholders Shareholders L < A L A L L > A A 0 L = min(a; L ) Y = (A L ) + NB : Y = (A L ) + is equivalent to Y = (A L) +. 4/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Implications In nonlinear systems, small shocks can have a major impact. Examples : A small shock can make a risky interest rate lower than a risk-free interest rate ; then perfect arbitrage opportunities appear, amplied by leverage eects. A switch of the correlation sign between two risks turns a diversied portfolio into a risky portfolio. 5/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Perimeter of a system Balance sheet Matrices of exposures Example 2. 6/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Perimeter of a system Balance sheet Matrices of exposures Example Two approaches in academic literature A reduced form based on market returns of the banks and insurance companies, with descriptive measures of systemic risk : CoVaR [Adrian, Brunnermeier (2010)] Marginal Expected Shortfall [Acharya et alii (2010), Brownlees, Engle (2010), Acharya, Engle, Richardson (2012)] A structural approach considering the risk exposure hidden in the balance sheets of banks and insurance companies. A lack of data, which explains why this part of the literature focused on the clearing systems and the short term interbank lending [Upper, Worms (2004), Eisenberg, Noe (2001)]. Since the exposure data are collected by the regulators for nancial stability (and also independently for hedge funds), the structural approach will likely be largely applied rather soon. We give an example of such a structural implementation. 7/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Perimeter of a system Perimeter of a system Balance sheet Matrices of exposures Example The perimeter is dened with respect to : Institutions : banks, insurance companies, hedge funds... Consolidation : banking group, with/without o-balance sheet... Currency : Euro (after conversion), Dollars... Financial contagion channel : stocks, lending+loans, derivatives, mutualization features... However, one may understand a banking system as : i) The set of banks ii) A virtual bank obtained by consolidating all the existing banks (see e.g. BIS data) 8/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Perimeter of a system Balance sheet Matrices of exposures Example Balance sheet of a bank i Liability : all type of bonds (or loans) for a nominal value L i Asset : Cross-participation : π i,j is the proportion of the value of bank j owned by bank i Interbank lending : γ i,j is the proportion of total lending granted to bank j owned by bank i Other assets : Ax i gathers the assets of all other counterparties : depositors, retail, corporate, banks and insurance companies out of the perimeter... Value of bank i : Y i 9/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Perimeter of a system Balance sheet Matrices of exposures Example Balance sheet of a bank i Asset π i,1 Y 1. π i,n Y n γ i,1 L 1. γ i,n L n Ax i Liability L i A i L i 10/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Matrices of exposures Perimeter of a system Balance sheet Matrices of exposures Example Cross-participation : Interbank lending : Π = Γ = π 1;1... π 1;n.. π n;1... π n;n γ 1;1... γ 1;n.. γ n;1... γ n;n 11/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Perimeter Introduction : two features of nancial risks Perimeter of a system Balance sheet Matrices of exposures Example In the paper, we consider a network of 5 large French banking groups. This set accounts for : the various business model of French groups, namely mutual banks some local/international activity We keep 5 banks to have reasonable size of vectors and matrices. We used the public nancial statements of these banks to estimate an illustrative network. 2/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Perimeter of a system Balance sheet Matrices of exposures Example Example of interconnections between banks and insurance Source: public nancial statements of Groupe Laposte 13/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Perimeter of a system Balance sheet Matrices of exposures Example Example of interconnections between banks and insurance Source: public nancial statements of Groupe Laposte, SG, Groupama, CDC, CNP. 14/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Exposure Matrices Perimeter of a system Balance sheet Matrices of exposures Example At 12/31/2012, exposure matrix: Π = Source: public nancial statements 0 0 0 2.5 0.19 40 0 0.3 0 0 0 0.11 0.23 17.8 0 0.31 0 0 0 0.34 0.18 17.8 0 0.57 0 0 2 4 0.32 0.01 0 0.82 0 0 0 0.27 3 0.15 0 5 0 0 2 1 0.12 0.89 0 0.35 0 0 2 2.5 0.01 0.12 0 0.45 0 0 0 0.05 5 0.56 0 0 5/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Network from Π Perimeter of a system Balance sheet Matrices of exposures Example 16/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Equilibrium conditions Case of two banks Impulse response analysis Stochastic shock 3. 17/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Equilibrium conditions Equilibrium conditions Case of two banks Impulse response analysis Stochastic shock Assumptions : n banks the portfolios are crystallized : Π, Γ and L are xed. The liquidation equilibrium is dened by the 2n-dimensional system : + n n Y i = (π i,j Y j ) + (γ i,j L j ) + Ax i L i, j=1 j=1 n n L i = min (π i,j Y j ) + (γ i,j L j ) + Ax i, L i, for i = 1,..., n. j=1 8/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk j=1

Equilibrium solution Equilibrium conditions Case of two banks Impulse response analysis Stochastic shock Proposition 1 : If π i,j 0, γ i,j 0, i, j, i π i,j < 1, j, i γ i,j < 1, j, the liquidation equilibrium (Y, L) exists and is unique for any choice of Ax and L. The "inputs" (shocks) are the Ax i and the equilibrium concerns both the values of the rms and the values of the debts : L i, Y i, for i = 1,..., n. This system is nonlinear due to threshold eects. 9/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Case of two banks Equilibrium conditions Case of two banks Impulse response analysis Stochastic shock Let us consider the basic network composed of two banks : bank 1 and bank 2. Bank 1 Bank 2 Asset Liability Asset Liability π 1,1 Y 1 L 1 π 2,1 Y 1 L 2 π 1,2 Y 2 π 2,2 Y 2 γ 1,1 L 1 γ 2,1 L 1 γ 1,2 L 2 γ 2,2 L 2 Ax 1 Ax 2 A 1 L 1 A 2 L 2 20/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Case of two banks Equilibrium conditions Case of two banks Impulse response analysis Stochastic shock Each bank can be either alive, or in default. Therefore, there are 2 2 = 4 possible regimes : Regime 1 : both bank 1 and bank 2 are alive Regime 2 : both bank 1 and bank 2 default Regime 3 : bank 1 defaults while bank 2 is alive Regime 4 : bank 1 is alive while bank 2 defaults The previous proposition states that, under portfolio crystallization, only one of the four previous regimes can arise. 21/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Equilibrium conditions Case of two banks Impulse response analysis Stochastic shock Regimes of default without interconnections Ax 2 default of bank 1 only no default L 2 joint default default of bank 2 only L 1 Ax 1 22/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Equilibrium conditions Case of two banks Impulse response analysis Stochastic shock Regimes of default with interconnections Ax 2 default of bank 1 only no default Ax 2 joint default default of bank 2 only Ax 1 23/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk Ax 1

Equilibrium conditions Case of two banks Impulse response analysis Stochastic shock Regimes of default with/out interconnections Ax 2 default of bank 1 only no default Ax 2 joint default default of bank 2 only Ax 1 24/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk Ax 1

Impulse response analysis Equilibrium conditions Case of two banks Impulse response analysis Stochastic shock An exogenous shock aects the asset out of the banking network, Ax. Let us consider a linear shock of magnitude δ and direction β that aect the initial exogenous assets Ax 0 : Ax = Ax 0 + δβ. For given β, the equilibrium can be computed for any value of δ (whenever Ax is positive). β can be seen as a factor of loss in a xed scenario (GDP, market index, or individual loss) and δ as the severity of the scenario. 25/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Equilibrium conditions Case of two banks Impulse response analysis Stochastic shock A common adverse deterministic shock Ax 2 β ( Ax 0 1 Ax 0 2 ) Ax 2 Ax 1 26/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk Ax 1

Equilibrium conditions Case of two banks Impulse response analysis Stochastic shock A common adverse deterministic shock 27/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Stochastic shock Equilibrium conditions Case of two banks Impulse response analysis Stochastic shock Alternatively, we can consider Ax as stochastic. The regimes dened in Proposition 1 are characterized by sets dened on Ax. Therefore the multidimensional distribution of Ax can be used to compute the probability that each regime arises. Equivalently, we get the probability of default (PD) of a given bank, or of a set of banks. Explicit formulas can be very complicated, but simulations can easily be carried out. 28/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

How to disentangle the direct and contagion eects? Reverse Stress-Tests Stochastic shocks 4. 29/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Identifying the contagion eect How to disentangle the direct and contagion eects? Reverse Stress-Tests Stochastic shocks Let us consider a shock of magnitude δ and direction β aecting external assets : Ax = Ax 0 + δβ. By Proposition 1, we can dene the values of the rms and the values of debts at equilibrium as functions of the shock (δ, β) and the balance sheet characteristics S 0 = {Π, Γ, L, Ax 0 } : Y (S 0 ; δ, β) L(S 0 ; δ, β) 30/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Identifying the contagion eect How to disentangle the direct and contagion eects? Reverse Stress-Tests Stochastic shocks Let us assume that in the initial situation the banks transform their crossholding into cash. We get a new balance sheet with external asset components equal to : and zero interconnections : The system becomes : Ãx 0 i = Π i Y 0 + Γ i L + Ax 0 i, Π = Γ = 0. S 0 = {0, 0, L, Ãx 0 i }. Finally, we compute the associated equilibrium values : { Y ( S 0 ; δ, β), L( S 0 ; δ, β). 31/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Basic statistics How to disentangle the direct and contagion eects? Reverse Stress-Tests Stochastic shocks One can use basic statistics to compare the two situations : i) The number of non-defaulted banks : n n N 0 = 1 Yi >0 = 1 Li L, =0 i i=1 i=1 where 1 A denotes the indicator function of A. ii) The total value of the banks : n n Ȳ = Y i = Y i 1 Yi >0; i=1 i=1 iii) The total value of the debt : n n n L = L i = L i 1 Yi >0 + L i 1 Li <L. i i=1 i=1 i=1 2/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Direct eect and contagion eect How to disentangle the direct and contagion eects? Reverse Stress-Tests Stochastic shocks For instance, let us consider the number of non-defaulted banks computed in the two situations : N 0 (S 0 ) and N 0 ( S 0 ). The decomposition between direct eect and contagion is : ( ) N 0 (S 0 ) = N 0 ( S 0 ) + N } {{ } 0 (S 0 ) N 0 ( S 0 ). } {{ } Direct Eect Contagion Eect 33/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Direct eect and contagion eect How to disentangle the direct and contagion eects? Reverse Stress-Tests Stochastic shocks 34/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Reverse Stress-Tests How to disentangle the direct and contagion eects? Reverse Stress-Tests Stochastic shocks In our framework, a reverse stress-test exercise looks for the smallest magnitude δ of shock that triggers a specic event, say the rst default. Let us consider a shock specic to bank i : Ax = Ax 0 δ(0,..., 0, Ax i, 0,...0), and compute the δ 's with and without contagion. The dierence between the two gives an insight of the eect of the interconnections on bank's resilience. 5/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Reverse Stress-Tests How to disentangle the direct and contagion eects? Reverse Stress-Tests Stochastic shocks Specic shock on A B C D E First bank to fail A B C D E δ (with contagion, %) 5.810 4.544 3.073 4.559 4.340 δ (without contagion, %) 5.810 4.544 3.085 4.635 4.353 1 L i /Ax i 0 (%) 1.77-0.98-5.36 1.76 3.19 Table: Reverse Stress-Tests for the Banking Sector (at 12/31/2010) ; δ in percent Based on this perimeter and on this shock, we illustrate that : two banks are not aected by the interconnections, generally speaking, interconnections has a positive impact. 6/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Stochastic shocks How to disentangle the direct and contagion eects? Reverse Stress-Tests Stochastic shocks The decomposition can also be used with stochastic shocks. It is dicult to compare the whole distribution of the values of the rms and of the debts in the two situations. However, we can focus on some summary statistics. An appealing one in the framework of Basel regulation is the individual probability of default (PD). 37/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Stochastic shocks : a simple model How to disentangle the direct and contagion eects? Reverse Stress-Tests Stochastic shocks We introduce stochastic shocks on the exogenous asset components as in the standard Vasicek extension of the Value-of-the-Firm model : log(ax i ) = log(axi 0 ) + u i, ( ) u i N 0; σ 2 Id, i = 1,..., n. The PD with and without connection can be estimated by simulations. Let us consider the French banking sector with independent Gaussian shocks (σ = 0.0141). 8/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Stochastic shocks : a simple model How to disentangle the direct and contagion eects? Reverse Stress-Tests Stochastic shocks PD (in %) PD (in %) Without connection With connection PD A 0.001 0.000-0.001 B 0.056 0.025-0.003 C 1.348 1.391 +0.043 D 0.052 0.001-0.041 E 0.091 0.002-0.089 Table: Simulated Probabilities of Default for the Banking Sector (at 12/31/2010) ; 100,000 simulations Being interconnected lowers the probability of default. The interconnections can be seen as an ecient diversication of risk since the stochastic shocks u i 's, are independent in our exercise. 9/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

5. 40/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Introduction : two features of nancial risks Contagion phenomena are analyzed by a structural model based on the balance sheets of the nancial institutions. This framework is appropriate for stress-test exercises with "second round" eects, based on either deterministic, or deterministic shocks. Moreover, the model includes the possibility to disentangle the direct impact of a shock from the contagion eect. 41/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Liquidation Equilibrium with Seniority and Hidden CDO The analysis can be extended to account for dierent levels of seniority of the debt : Gouriéroux, Héam, Monfort : "Liquidation Equilibrium with Seniority and Hidden CDO" This allows for a careful analysis of the prices of the junior and senior tranches written on a single bank, that is, on a single name. Since the balance sheet of the bank include junior and senior debts of other institutions, these tranches are in fact written on a portfolio of junior and senior debts, that is, are written on several names : "hidden CDO". 42/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk

Liquidation Equilibrium with Seniority and Hidden CDO The price of this hidden CDO has to account for the joint defaults and recovery rates at liquidation equilibrium. price of a tranche written on a single name = price of a hidden CDO = "standard price of such a CDO" + "price of contagion" 43/43 C., Gouriéroux, J.C. Héam and A., Monfort Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk