Lean Enablers for Systems Engineering

Lean Enablers for Systems Engineering Bohdan W. Oppenheim 1, *, Earll M. Murman, 2, and Deborah A. Secor 3 Regular Paper 1 Department of Mechanical Engineering, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, CA 90045-8145 2 Port Townsend, WA 98368 3 Rockwell Collins, Engineering & Technology, 400 Collins Road NE, Cedar Rapids, IA 52498 LEAN ENABLERS FOR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING Received 10 December 2008; Revised 13 June 2009; Accepted 11 November 2009, after one or more revisions Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI 10.1002/sys.20161 ABSTRACT Systems Engineering (SE) is regarded as a sound practice but not always delivered effectively, as documented in recent NASA, GAO, and DoD studies. Lean Thinking is the holistic work system credited for the extraordinary rise of Toyota to the most profitable and the largest auto company in the world. Lean Thinking has been successfully applied in other work fields such as general manufacturing, aerospace, healthcare, and service industries. The emerging field of Lean Systems Engineering (LSE) is the application of Lean principles, practices, and tools to SE and to the related aspects of enterprise management (EM) in order to enhance the delivery of value (which is defined as flawless delivery of product or mission with satisfaction of all stakeholders) while reducing waste. This paper contains four parts: (1) historical background of the new field of LSE and a review of the fundamental concepts of Lean Thinking; (2) the development process of a new product called Lean Enablers for Systems Engineering ; (3) a list of the Enablers organized into six Lean principles; (4) summary and conclusions. The Lean Enablers for Systems Engineering is a comprehensive checklist of nonmandatory practices and recommendations formulated as do s and don t s of SE, and containing tacit knowledge (collective wisdom) on how to prepare for, plan, execute, and practice SE and EM using Lean Thinking. Each enabler has the potential to enhance program value and reduce waste. The Enablers are formulated as a web-based addendum to the current SE Handbook published by the International Council for Systems Engineering (INCOSE), and do not repeat the practices made therein, which are regarded as sound. They should be an equally valuable addendum to other SE handbooks such as NASA, DoD, or company manuals. The enablers development followed a classical process: Concept, Alpha, Beta, Prototype, and Version 1.0. This paper reports on Version 1.0 of the enablers, which are regarded as mature enough for dissemination, but which are intended to be a living online document to be continuously improved by interested practitioners as new knowledge and experience are acquired. The enablers were evaluated by surveys in the Beta and Prototype phases. The Prototype version has also been benchmarked with recent NASA and GAO studies. This project has been carried out by two core teams involving 14 volunteers from the LSE Working Group of INCOSE. The teams included representatives from industry, academia, and governments from United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, with cooperation from the LSE Working Group membership at large. 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Syst Eng Key words: Lean; Lean Thinking; Lean Enablers; Lean Systems Engineering, systems engineering; Lean Product Development * Author to whom all correspondence should be addressed (e-mail: boppenheim@lmu.edu;dasecor@rockwellcollins.com). Ford Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA (retired). Systems Engineering 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 1

2 OPPENHEIM, MURMAN, AND SECOR ABBREVIATIONS AFIS Association Française d Ingénierie Système (French Chapter of INCOSE) AIAA American Institution for Aeronautics and Astronautics AR Acquisition Reform (of DoD) CAE Computer Aided Engineering CE Concurrent Engineering CI Continuous Improvement DoD Department of Defense EADS European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company EdNet LAI Educational Network ELOP Elbit Systems Electro-Optics, Israel EM Enterprise Management FBC Faster, Better, Cheaper GAO Government Accountability Office GE General Electric HALT/HASS Highly Accelerated Life Test/Highly Accelerated Stress Screen IPTs Integrated Product Teams ISO International Standards Organization INCOSE International Council on Systems Engineering JSF Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) LAI Lean Advancement Initiative, formerly Lean Aerospace Initiative, formerly Lean Aircraft Initiative LEfSE Lean Enablers for Systems Engineering LEM Lean Enterprise Model LMU Loyola Marymount University LPD Lean Product Development LSE Lean Systems Engineering LSE WG Lean Systems Engineering Working Group MAAC Major American Aerospace Company MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology MoD Ministry of Defense (in the United Kingdom) NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NBC National Broadcasting Company (TV channel) PD Product Development PDCA Plan, Do, Check, Act, improvement cycle PM Project Management RAA Responsibility, Accountability, Authority RASI Responsible, Approving, Supporting, and Informing RFP Request for Proposals RNVA Required Non-Value Added SBIRS Space Based Infrared System SE Systems Engineering, or Systems Engineer TQM Total Quality Management U.K. United Kingdom U.S. (US) United States USAF United States Air Force VA Value Added WG Working Group 1. INTRODUCTION This paper presents a group of practices named Lean Enablers for Systems Engineering (LEfSE) based on the holistic Lean Thinking paradigm. LEfSE are intended as a supplement to existing SE practices with the objective of improving the overall value delivered by Systems Engineering. In this context, Lean Systems Engineering does not mean less systems engineering, but rather better systems engineering. Lean Thinking, which originated from Toyota, has been applied in many fields including manufacturing, product development, healthcare, and more. The intent of this paper is to extend the application of Lean Thinking to Systems Engineering. Section 1 includes a historical note placing Lean in the context of earlier industrial paradigms starting with Total Quality Management, and proceeding Concurrent Engineering and Six Sigma. A summary of the basic principles of Lean Thinking is included. Lean in Product Development (PD) and the emerging field of Lean Systems Engineering (LSE) are then summarized. Also described is the organizational evolution of the team developing the Enablers: from the Lean Advancement Initiative s Education Network to the International Council for Systems Engineering (INCOSE). Section 2 presents the development process of LEfSE including the phases named Conceptual, Alpha, Beta, Prototype, and Version 1.0. Version 1.0 is presented in Section 3 using the framework of Lean Principles. The Beta and Prototype versions have been evaluated by surveys and the Prototype also by benchmarking with recent NASA and GAO publications. Version 1.0 is regarded as mature enough for presentation to the professional community. However, the intent is to continue involving the community of practice in gathering data and experiences and improve the product using formal online change process. Summary and Conclusions are included in Section 4. 1.1. From TQM to Six Sigma and Lean Lean Thinking, or more briefly Lean, as used in this work is an evolutionary industrial paradigm incorporating elements from earlier paradigms of Total Quality Management (TQM) and Concurrent Engineering (CE) as well as elements of Six Sigma. In common with TQM and CE, Lean focuses on designed-in/built-in quality, Deming continuous improvement cycles, and engagement of front line workforce in process improvement. It goes beyond TQM and CE to adopt a value stream focus and a relentless pursuit of waste elimination. While Lean, TQM, and CE all focus on process improvement, Lean particularly focuses on streamlining flow between the processes. Sharing with Six Sigma a data driven approach to elimination of process variation, it differs by being more bottom-up in its improvement strategy and less reliant on formalized qualification of improvement experts. As with the other improvement paradigms, successful Lean implementation relies on committed leadership and an enterprise-wide approach across all functions, including systems engineering. Three 1970s era events in the U.S. provided a fertile ground for subsequent dynamic changes of industrial paradigms: (1) the oil embargoes which made small cars attractive to consumers, (2) the overtaking of the consumer electronic and auto markets by the higher quality and less expensive Japanese imports, and (3) a widespread perception that the U.S. manufacturing was falling behind the international competition, particularly in quality. In 1980, NBC TV broadcast a 2-hour

LEAN ENABLERS FOR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 3 program titled If Japan can why can t we? opening U.S. eyes to a new management paradigm named Total Quality Management (TQM) which swept the industry by storm in the early 1980s. Led by Deming [1982]. it was an attempt to adopt the successful Japanese industrial management methods to the U.S. industry. A strong message of TQM was that pursuit of higher quality is compatible with lower costs. Inexpensive and high-quality automobiles and consumer electronic goods imported from Japan made this notion selfevident to U.S. consumers, but not necessarily to U.S. industry. TQM emphasized total approach to quality, integrating management, processes and tools, and developing business strategy focused on customer satisfaction. It promoted continuous improvement of all processes, and popularized improvement tools such as a bottom-up employee suggestion system, quality circles, quick reaction Kaizen teams, and process variability reduction using Statistical Process Control. TQM emphasized the importance of corporate culture based on respect for people and employee empowerment as prerequisites for continuous improvement, and relied heavily on self-motivation of employees. It also promoted designing quality into both products and processes, rather than relying on the final inspection. TQM received strong support from the U.S. federal government, including the Department of Defense [DoD, 1988]. Following the Japanese E. Deming Award, the Department of Commerce initiated the Malcolm Baldridge Award in 1987 as a motivational recognition of the best U.S. companies. The award used a point score which was based on the above TQM elements. The application of TQM to U.S industry had mixed outcomes. While quality improved, especially in the auto industry, profits did not follow proportionately. Even the quality improvements alone failed in many companies that tried TQM [Paton, 1994]. The earlier pessimism in the manufacturing industry continued, and contributed to the subsequent export of nearly 60% of commercial manufacturing to cheaper labor markets. About 8 years into the TQM period, Costello [1988], in his capacity as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, presented an alarming report to the Secretary of Defense about serious problems plaguing the U.S. commercial and military industrial base, including foreign competition, poor quality of both products and business management, fragmented research and development, low quality of public education, and declining numbers of engineers and scientists. Four years later, Costello and Ernst [1992] reinforced this report with a white paper about the state of U.S. industry, recommending wide-ranging improvement of the manufacturing sector, streamlining regulations, better means for technology sharing, and aggressive support for small business. The lack of widespread business success made TQM vulnerable to criticisms and opened the way to new ideas. Business Week [Byrne, 1997] declared TQM as a dead fad, blaming TQM s lack of teeth in implementation. While today the term TQM has receded, most of the key elements of TQM have endured and are integral to Lean Thinking [Murman et al., 2002]. In late 1980s the Concurrent Engineering (CE) industrial paradigm became popular and was proposed as a way to shorten the weapons system acquisition cycle [Winner et al., 1988]. CE promoted simultaneous and integrated design of product and subsequent phases (manufacturing, assembly, operations, etc.), replacing the traditional disjointed and serial effort. An important component of CE was multifunctional design teams, sometimes called Integrated Product Teams or IPTs, which included representatives from the subsequent phases in the upfront engineering design. CE when effectively implemented with electronic design tools and workforce training led to dramatic reduction in design rework and, consequently, cost and schedule (e.g., see Hernandez [1995]). CE contributed major improvements to U.S. product development and engineering, and spawned significant new design methodologies (e.g., see Clausing [1994] and Ulrich and Eppinger [2008]). TQM and CE made important contributions to major new aircraft products in the 1990s, such as the Boeing 777 and Cessna Citation-X [Haggerty and Murman, 2006]. As with TQM, CE principles are embedded in current day Lean Thinking [Murman et al., 2002; McManus 2004]. In the early 1990s TQM evolved into another quality initiative called Six Sigma, arguably with better teeth. According to Wedgewood [2007], Six Sigma is a systematic methodology to home in on the key factors that drive performance of a process, set them at the best levels, and hold them there for all time. Originating at Motorola and relying on rigorous measurement and control, Six Sigma focused on systematic reduction of process variability from all sources of variation: machines, methods, materials, measurements, people, and the environment [Murman et al., 2002]. Like TQM, Six Sigma aims to achieve predictable, repeatable, and capable processes and defect free production, where parts and components are built to exacting specs. But unlike the motivational TQM it achieves this by rigorous data collection and statistical analysis, as well as by rigorous training of leaders. 1 Six Sigma was not free of problems. It often was implemented with a costly bureaucracy, introducing the waste of measuring waste and was criticized for being too top-down, and for displacing two other critically important continuous improvement tools of TQM: Kaizen and the bottom-up employee suggestion system, which Toyota credits for a half of its success [Oppenheim, 2006]. Six Sigma can also be prone to suboptimization by focusing too narrowly on process improvement for a process that may not be needed. Murman et al. [2002] described this deficiency as a focus on the job being done right, but not necessarily on the right job. It was the next step in the industrial evolution, called Lean, that provided the integrated focus on the right job and doing the job right, and also on the corporate culture needed for both. Following a similar path as TQM and CE, the Six Sigma movement spawned new Design for Six Sigma methodologies [e.g., Yang and El-Haik, 2003]. The term Lean as an industrial paradigm was introduced in the United States in the bestselling book, The Machine That Changed the World, The Story of Lean Production published by the MIT International Motor Vehicle Program [Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990], and elegantly popularized in their 1 Following the ju-jitsu language, the Six Sigma leaders are designated by belts of various colors which denote different levels of training and experience.

4 OPPENHEIM, MURMAN, AND SECOR second bestseller Lean Thinking, [Womack and Jones, 1996]. The authors identified a fundamentally new industrial paradigm based on the Toyota Production System. The paradigm is based on relentless elimination of waste from all enterprise operations, involving the continuous improvement cycle that turns all front-line workers into problem solvers to eliminate waste. Lean strives for minimum waste to deliver high quality and defect-free products meeting customer demand just-intime, at the rate ordered, with minimum inventories, at minimum cost, and in the minimum time, and is driven by a unique corporate culture of respect, empowerment, openness, and teamwork. Factories adopting Lean observed direct and dramatic improvements of operations and increases in profits. Womack and Jones [1996] described six manufacturing case studies that demonstrated reductions of cost, lead time and inventory of up to 90%, with simultaneous improvements in product quality and work morale across a wide range of company types and sizes. More dramatically, leadtime and cost reductions on the order of 30 50% were realized routinely after only a few days of implementation on the factory floor, by simple rearranging of machines into the flow [LEI, 2007]. After the multiyear implementation efforts of TQM, CE, or Six Sigma, this was a revelation. Within a few years, Lean production has become the established manufacturing paradigm pursued by all competitive factories. Three concepts are fundamental to the understanding of Lean: Value, Waste and the process of creating value without waste captured into the so-called Lean Principles. Box 1 describes these Fundamentals. In the subsequent text, any enterprise process which follows the six Lean Principles will be regarded as Lean. As a corollary, any practice that enables the Value and follows the Lean process will be defined as a Lean enabler. As already mentioned, Lean incorporates many of the TQM, CE and Six Sigma principles and practices. However it goes beyond them to adopt a holistic value stream approach and relentless waste elimination. The value stream represents the linked end-to-end activities that turn raw material or information into products and services needed by the customer. Waste represents those activities that do not directly contribute to customer value. Often these are activities taking place between valued added activities, such as wait time or inspection. Lean strives for optimum flow with no blockages or unplanned rework. 2 Toyota s original father of Lean, Ohno [1988], summarized it thus: All we are doing is looking at the time line from the moment the customer gives us an order to the point when we collect the cash. And we are reducing that time line by removing the non-value added wastes. Ohno classified waste in manufacturing into seven categories: (1) Overproduction; (2) Transportation; (3) Waiting; (4) Overprocessing; (5) Inventory; (6) Unnecessary movement; and (7) Defects. Several 2 Some might ask how the focus on flow differs from Henry Ford s moving line mass production or from rhapsodized industrial engineering. Indeed there are common elements. However, there are important distinctions. Lean emphasizes the importance of the front line workers as problem solvers, unlocking the enormous human resource potential for process improvement. Lean also focuses on single piece flow, compared to batch and queue, which leads to cellular work arrangements. authors have adapted Ohno s seven production wastes to Product Development (see the following Lean in Product Development subsection). A number of lean organizations have added an 8th waste to Ohno s list the waste of human talent recognizing that front line workers are the most knowledgeable resource for improvement. The Toyota Lean extends over the entire enterprise, including not only manufacturing but also design and engineering, supply chain, and all supportive activities [Morgan and Liker, 2006]. In contrast, the initial successes of Lean in the U.S. were recorded mostly in manufacturing [Womack and Jones, 1996]. This created an unintended misperception that Lean applies only to high volume production. An important expansion of Lean outside of the manufacturing environment occurred in 1993, when, at the urging of the U.S. Air Force, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) initiated a consortium of aerospace and defense corporations and the U.S. military, named the Lean Advancement Initiative 3 (LAI) [LAI, 2007], to pursue research and application of Lean Thinking into enterprise architecting and transformation, engineering, product development, supply chain management, change management, and systems engineering. Since that time, LAI produced hundreds of Master s and Ph.D. theses, publications, conferences, and tools devoted to those Lean applications [LAI, 2007], and a comprehensive book Lean Enterprise Value [Murman et al., 2002]. The latter reference introduced the following definition of Lean Thinking, used in this paper: Lean Thinking: the dynamic, knowledge-driven, and customer-focused process through which all people in a defined enterprise continuously eliminate waste with the goal of creating value. The successes of Lean in repeatable manufacturing led to a popular misconception that Lean does not apply to one-off applications such as engineering projects or SE. In such projects, the deliverables and work content of engineering tasks are indeed one-off, but the processes and individual tasks should use repeatable logic based on best engineering practices. For example, the established process for a modal analysis of a structure involves the same steps: define geometry, boundary conditions, and material properties, perform final element meshing, calculate the modal eigenvectors and eigenvalues, compare the latter to the excitation spectrum, identify dangerous modes, design vibration mitigation, and report. Such established processes exist for the vast majority of engineering applications, including SE. Therefore, we propose that the basic principles of Lean Thinking apply to SE. Lean Thinking has been applied to diverse work environment applications from manufacturing [e.g., Womack and Jones, 1996] to product development [e.g., Ward, 2007] and engineering [e.g., McManus, Haggerty, and Murman, 2007] to supply chain management [e.g., Bozdogan, 2004] to healthcare [e.g., Graban, 2008] to educational [e.g., Emiliani, 2004], 3 Initially named Lean Aircraft Initiative, renamed Lean Aerospace Initiative in 1997 after the space industry joined the consortium, and in 2007 again renamed Lean Advancement Initiative after the remaining U.S. military services joined.

LEAN ENABLERS FOR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 5 Box 1. Lean Fundamentals (continued)

6 OPPENHEIM, MURMAN, AND SECOR Box 1. Continued and to enterprise management [Jones, 2006; LESAT, 2001]. This paper reports on application of Lean to Systems Engineering, and how that relates to lean product development. 1.2. Lean Six Sigma As mentioned above, Lean and Six Sigma both appeared in the post TQM mid 1990s era as seemingly competing process improvement approaches. Six Sigma, identified with Motorola and subsequently with GE, gained investor visibility and popularity. Lean identified with Toyota was incorrectly looked upon as limited to high volume manufacturing applications. While Six Sigma focuses on a disciplined, top-down approach to eliminating all forms of variation, Lean focuses on value streams and relentless elimination of waste through optimizing flow. The latter relies on the former to eliminate impediments to flow, and in fact the basic principles of the two approaches are synergistic. By the early 2000 period, most organizations adopted a blended version of the two bodies of knowledge and crafted them to meet their particular needs. Names such as Lean Six Sigma, Lean Sigma, and other less obvious combinations appeared. Today, most organizations have harmonized Lean and Six Sigma. In this paper, we will continue to use the Lean nomenclature, not to exclude Six Sigma thinking, but to treat Lean Enablers for Systems Engineering as integrated body of knowledge based on lean, Six Sigma, high performance work systems and other process improvement approaches. 1.3. Lean in Product Development (LPD) Toyota is widely recognized as the leader in LPD. Its practices have been described by a number of oft-cited articles and books: Ward et al. [1995a, 1995b], Sobek [1997a, 1997b], Sobek, Liker, and Ward [1998], Sobek, Ward, and Liker [1999], Liker et al. [1996], Kennedy [2003], Liker [2004], and Morgan and Liker [2006]. Clark and Fujimoto [1991] published a comprehensive approach to PD, introducing strategic metrics of automotive enterprise performance lead time, quality, and productivity and described PD project integration, strategy, planning, managing complexity, integrating problem solving cycles, and the Toyota and Honda project management style which they called heavyweight. The need for Lean Thinking in PD in aerospace programs was manifested by several LAI studies of waste in actual aerospace programs. They have been discussed at length in Murman et al. [2002] and Oppenheim [2004] and are only briefly summarized herein: The amount of waste in government PD programs has been estimated at 60 90% of the charged time, with about 60% of all tasks being idle at any given time [Browning, 1998, 2000; Chase, 2001; Joglekar and Whitney, 2000; McManus, 2004; Millard, 2001; Young, 2000]. Figure 1 illustrates the amount of wasted effort by individuals and time by work packages in aerospace programs [McManus, 2004]. The right-hand chart in the figure shows that a given task is only being worked on for 38% of its existence. By implication from the left-hand chart, of that 38% time, only about a third of it, or 12 13% of the total task lifetime, has any value-added actions. According to these authors, while the estimates arguably lack scholarly rigor, they are consistent enough across corporations, programs, and years, to yield a comfortable level of confidence. This large amount of waste implies a vast reserve of productivity in PD,

LEAN ENABLERS FOR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 7 Figure 1. Waste measured in aerospace programs [McManus, 2004]. Figure 2. Most frequently observed waste in 27 programs [Slack, 1998]. and an opportunity to make significant progress using Lean Thinking. The waste in traditional PD programs, not necessarily limited to aerospace, results from a number of causes: craft mentality of engineers, poor planning, ad hoc execution, and poor coordination and communication culture [Oppenheim, 2004]. Ward [2007] devotes an entire chapter to Seeing Waste in Product Development, grouping them all as Waste of Knowledge. Millard [2001] and Morgan and Liker [2006] have adapted Ohno s seven wastes of manufacturing to PD. The Morgan and Liker version is shown in Box 2. In government programs, additional reasons for wastes include the government and corporate practices which are contrary to Lean Thinking, which are discussed in Section 2. Figure 2 illustrates the most frequently observed waste in 27 aerospace PD programs [Slack, 1998]. It is interesting that the most frequently cited waste is waiting for information, while the second most cited waste is over processing. To paraphrase the finding, one person is waiting while another person is over processing the information. In the 2000s important contributions to LPD were made by the individuals associated with the LAI community: McManus [2004] published a manual for PD Value Stream Mapping; Oppenheim [2004] reformulated the Toyota manufacturing approach to the field of legacy-based product development using five Lean Principles; Rebentisch [2005] presented a seminal lecture on LPD which became a starting point for several subsequent studies of the field; Rebentisch and McManus [2007] developed a teaching simulation for Lean Enterprise Product Development, as well as a tutorial on LPD of complex products; Murman [2008] and Haggerty and Murman [2006] comprehensively described the use of Lean in specific aerospace engineering programs, although most of the programs were not set up to be Lean and demonstrated strong Lean characteristics only on post analysis. Lempia [2008] and Egbert et al. [2008] describe two PD programs which were set up using Lean principles. Private contacts of the authors with industry in the U.S. and Europe indicate that many more attempts to implement Lean into PD are ongoing, but no publications are yet available. In summary, at this time LPD is regarded as a body of knowledge which is needed, fast Box 2. Seven Categories of Waste [Morgan and Liker, 2006]

8 OPPENHEIM, MURMAN, AND SECOR growing, showing emerging successes, but not fully established yet. 4 1.4. Lean Expands into Systems Engineering SE has been called the nervous system of PD [Hitchens, 2007]. It is an inherent part of PD, strongly coupled to it both in time and throughout numerous enterprise nodes. Because of the significant effort to apply Lean Thinking in PD, and because Toyota s successes in PD, it is not surprising that SE became a challenge for Lean Thinking. The emerging body of knowledge has been named Lean Systems Engineering (LSE). The birth of LSE is traced to the first meeting of the LAI Educational Network in March 2003. In 2003, the LAI consortium invited universities to join the new LAI Educational Network (EdNet). The EdNet stated mission is to collaborate on the development and dissemination of lean curricula, including incorporation of research findings. Starting with LMU, at the time of this writing the EdNet has grown to 48 universities it the U.S., U.K., Mexico, Europe, and Brazil. The EdNet members soon organized themselves into a number of small working groups, one devoted to LSE, and another to LPD, intending to develop communities of practice in these new fields. Subsequently Murman included the LSE topic in two lectures of a graduate course on Aircraft Systems Engineering in the fall of 2003 [Murman, 2003]. The LAI team of Rebentisch, Rhodes, and Murman [2004] laid theoretical foundations for LSE. Additional concepts and case studies were contributed by a panel on LSE at INCOSE 2004 [Rhodes et al., 2004]. These early works defined the synergy of Lean and Systems Engineering as (paraphrased): Systems Engineering which grew out of the space industry 5 to help deliver flawless complex systems is focused on technical performance and risk management. Lean which grew out of Toyota to help deliver quality products at minimum cost is focused on waste minimization, short schedules, low cost, flexibility, and quality. Both have the common goal to deliver system lifecycle value to the customer. Lean Systems Engineering is the area of synergy of Lean and Systems Engineering with the goal to deliver the best lifecycle value for technically complex systems with minimum resources. This synergy gave rise to the subsequent definition of LSE: 4 When this paper was readied for final submission, the authors learned of the new book on PD flow by Reinertsen [2009]. The book formulates 175 principles of Lean PD organized into novel categories. Upon quick reading, there are similarities with LEfSE, as well as ideas which have not been included in the present work. Hopefully, the next release of LEfSE will be able to integrate both LEfSE enablers and selected new principles. 5 The modern discipline of SE was developed in the ballistic missile program by Si Ramo and Dean Woldridge in 1954, with the first formal contract to perform systems engineering and technical assistance (SETA). Under this contract, Ramo and Wooldridge developed some of the first principles for SE and applied them to the ballistic missile program considered the most successful major technology development effort ever undertaken by the U.S. government [Jacobsen, 2001]. Si Ramo told Brown [2009] that he thought the first use of systems engineering in modern times was at AT&T when they had to consider how to assemble a world-wide telephone system. However, AT&T did not consider it systems engineering and did not use that name. Lean Systems Engineering is the application of Lean principles, practices and tools to Systems Engineering in order to enhance the delivery of value to the system s stakeholders [INCOSE, 2009]. 1.5. The Home: The Lean Systems Engineering Working Group of INCOSE During 2004 2006, the LAI EdNet LSE group met several times and enjoyed interesting discussions; however, not much progress was made. In order to move the LSE project at a faster pace, at the end of 2005 a proposal was made to the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) to form a new Lean Systems Engineering Working Group (LSE WG), hoping to draw from the collective wisdom of the large membership of SE practitioners that belong to that learned society. 6 The proposal was accepted. The first meeting (rather poorly advertised) drew 30 people, which indicated a high level of interest in the idea of applying Lean Thinking into SE. Since that time, the Group has grown to over 100 individuals, all unpaid volunteers, and is currently one of the largest Working Groups of INCOSE. Most of the members are experienced industrial SEs, but the experience in Lean Thinking was less common. The individuals most experienced with Lean acted as leaders in this project (listed in the Acknowledgements). The use of term Lean in the context of SE occasionally met with concern that this might be an attempt to re-package Faster-Better-Cheaper 7 (FBC) initiative, leading to cuts in SE at the time when the profession is struggling to increase the level and quality of the SE effort in programs. Hopefully, this paper will categorically disprove these concerns. The WG challenge was to demonstrate that Lean SE does not mean less SE but better SE, leading to subsequent streamlined program execution. The LSE WG devoted the first 18 months to conceptual and administrative tasks (creation of website and mailing list, definitions, recommended readings, and formulation of the charter), as well as presentations and panels devoted to various ideas how to proceed. The dedicated web site contains these results to-date, [INCOSE LSE WG, 2008]. Box 3 contains the LSE WG Charter. Since October 2007, the main effort of the WG was devoted to the development of Lean Enablers for Systems Engineering. 6 Over 39 working groups are currently carrying out INCOSE s goals, which include the development and dissemination of SE knowledge, international collaboration, development of standards, improvement of professional status of SE practitioners, and encouragement of governmental and industrial support [www.incose.org]. 7 FBC was the NASA initiative. A similar initiative was named Acquisition Reform (AR) by the DoD. Both were blamed for numerous failures of space systems during the 1990s, which added up to $12 billion losses in space systems. The subsequent study sponsored by a the U.S. Congress [T. Young, 2000] diagnosed that FBC/AR removed much of government oversight, made prior mandatory standards optional, and permitted the contractors to cut Systems Engineering effort and many tests. These cuts, according to the study, led to the failures. The report recommended a stronger role of SE in programs, and a return to the oversight, standards, and testing as you fly. The time after this report was published is often referred to as the post- FBC/AR period, which has been continuing until the time of this writing.

LEAN ENABLERS FOR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 9 Box 3. Charter of the INCOSE Lean Systems Engineering Working Group 2. DEVELOPMENT OF LEAN ENABLERS 2.1. LSE WG Initial and Boundary Conditions SE applies to all engineering domains, but has been practiced under that name mostly in governmental programs. The record of these programs is mixed. The examples of successful programs include: the 60 successful military satellite lunches since the last major failures of the FBC/AR period [Horejsi, 2009], all but two successful space shuttle flights, continued construction of the space station, some well-known interplanetary flights, some successful missile defense tests, and numerous successes in air, ground, and water-borne systems. These examples indicate that the established SE process can be capable of delivering successful complex systems when practiced properly. 8 During the same period, abundant evidence indicates that SE was performed less then satisfactorily in the business sense, as follows. Some of the budget and schedule issues and compromised functionality of NASA and Department of Defense (DoD) missions have reached critical levels, as described in several governmental studies of recent programs [GAO, 2007, 2008a, 2008b]. These references blame, among others, both insufficient level of SE effort in the programs, and sufficient but poorly executed SE process, as summarized in Box 4, and illustrated in Figures 3 6. J. Young [2009], in his report to the Defense Secretary, published a critique of the active and recently terminated defense programs. Among the major factors causing the program cost growth and schedule delays Young listed excessive and unstable requirements and runaway requirements changes, discontinuous funding, notorious low-balling of the budget, schedule and risk driven by the desire to get the programs running, immature and exquisite technology, management and execution issues, and the DoD eyes [being] bigger than its stomach. The author did not parse the blame between the acquisition system and SE. Several recent rather spectacular failures raised controversies about SE, as follows. The collision of Russian and American satellites [Broad, 2009], which sent uncountable small objects into random trajectories that now jeopardize other space missions, raised the question whether the collision should be blamed on the lack of sufficient international cooperation in space or on inadequate SE for the monitoring of space objects in the US alone? A 8 Even among these successful programs, the demarcation between effective and ineffective SE is hazy: Some of the satellites launched during the post-fbc/ar period were designed during the FBC/AR period indicating that the FBC/AR was not all bad; and some of the recent launches designed in the post-fbc/ar period experienced problems indicating the FBC/AR was not the sole contributor to the failed systems. terminally aged military satellite was destroyed by a missile, arguably in order to avoid the risk of earth contamination [Ferster, 2008], raising the question as to why the satellite disposal problem was not included in the life-cycle SE of the program. The tragic end of the Columbia space shuttle was diagnosed by the investigation board as (paraphrased) the foam did it, but NASA culture allowed it [NASA, 2003]; and the misuse of O-rings in cold weather leading to the Challenger disaster [House of Representatives, 1986] provoke the question as to what degree the organizational culture and effective SE are/should be interrelated. The Coast Guard received 27 boats deemed unusable for service [O Rourke, 2008], and the matter is now litigated trying to allocate the fault among several disjointed parties (mis)conducting the SE. The list of failed programs is longer and these are only examples. A comprehensive program-by-program study of the effectiveness of SE and of the reasons for both successes and failures remains wanting at this time, and the confounding of SE and the government acquisition system is blurring the picture. In addition, the leaders of the present project shared the perception that the established SE practice, even when technically successful, is often burdened with waste. In view of these considerations, the team developing the enablers took the following positions: 1. The established SE process 9 (defined, e.g., in INCOSE [2007]) is regarded as sound if used and funded properly, but is often burdened with waste; therefore, it should benefit from Lean Thinking. In other words, the team decided to try improving a practice which has a lot of strengths, but is not as good as it can be. Since the work was performed under INCOSE organization, the team used the INCOSE SE Handbook [INCOSE, 2007] as the baseline. 2. The sizeable waste (as indicated in Fig. 1 and defined in Box 2) should be regarded as a vast productivity reserve in programs, to be exploited using Lean Thinking. 9 The standard SE process is described in a number of manuals: INCOSE SE Engineering Handbook, the ISO 15288 standard, NASA and Department of Defense SE Manuals, Defense Acquisition University manuals, and numerous manuals created by individual defense and civilian companies. None contains Lean Thinking explicitly, but they do include use of Integrated Product Teams whose origins can be traced to the quality movement. Arguably, the manuals describe essentially the same body of knowledge and the same SE process with varying degrees of detail, emphasis, and user friendliness. For this reason, and since the present project has been carried under the auspices of INCOSE, the present text only makes references to the INCOSE Handbook v.3.1, 2007.

10 OPPENHEIM, MURMAN, AND SECOR Box 4. Reports of Serious Problems in Governmental Programs 3. Both SE and Lean represent challenging areas for research as they are grounded in industrial and government practice rather than laboratory, or theory, or mathematics. In addition, many large programs that use SE are proprietary, classified, with discontinuities in execution, so it is extremely difficult to gather explicit data and test hypotheses from such programs. SE case studies are not available in the public domain with sufficient detail to enable development of Lean practices. Where data are available, it is often of inadequate resolution or quality. Therefore, the team concluded that project development had to be based on collective Figure 3. Initial and most recent estimates of the total program costs [GAO, 2008b]. Figure 4. Schedule overruns for five space programs [GAO, 2008b].

LEAN ENABLERS FOR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 11 4. There are benefits to an early exposure of Lean Enablers for Systems Engineering. The list and associated definitions can provide value to the SE community, and introduce Lean Thinking in systems engineering application and context. The development of LEfSE followed the established design phases including Conceptual, Alpha, Beta, Prototype, and Version 1.0. A formal online process has been set up for future improvements. These phases are summarized in Box 5 and briefly described next. 2.2. Conceptual Design of LEfSE Figure 5. Examples of reduced buying power and military capability [GAO, 2007]. wisdom and experience of the LSE WG members. Webb [2008] named such development based on tacit knowledge. In order to reduce subjectivity, the project results were endorsed by surveys, and compared with recent GAO and NASA recommendations. Consistent with the tacit knowledge approach, eight invited participants from industry, government, and academia 10 met to develop a conceptual framework for LEfSE. Based on their lifetime experiences, they were asked to identify the practices which deliver best value with minimum waste, the do s and don t s of SE and the relevant aspects of EM, applying Lean Thinking to the individual steps of the SE System Life Cycle Process Overview 11 [INCOSE, 2007], and aiming for the asymptote of SE excellence. Constraints such as the present acquisition system regulations and various company policies were to be ignored. In addition, the new enablers should not repeat information already covered in the INCOSE Handbook, which was regarded as sound but lacking Lean Thinking. The meeting demonstrated the power of creative team synergy, yielding 16 pages of captured notes. To the authors knowledge, two examples of Lean frameworks existed at the time: (1) The Toyota PD framework of 13 enabling Lean practices organized into People, Process, and Technology categories, each developed into several points [Morgan and Liker, 2006]; and (2) the LAI Lean Enterprise Model [LEM, 1996], 1 page long, organized into 12 overarching enabling practices. Guided by the lengths of these examples, the team initially expected that the final product might be in the form of a list of enablers short enough for graphical presentation as callout boxes in the INCOSE SE Handbook processes: Capture of Customer Needs; Programmatic Success; Requirements; Design Solutions; Effective Process Execution; Implementation; Integration; and Verification and Validation. 2.3. Alpha Version of LEfSE The editing of the candidate enablers involved tradeoffs between importance, completeness, brevity, and clarity. Mindful of the fact that SE is not and should not be a functional island but is like a nervous system interacting with the entire body, the team added enablers dealing with critical interfaces between SE and other enterprise management areas: PM, suppliers, and developmental engineering. The enablers were added from the following sources: Stanke [2001], LEM [1996], Leopold [2004], Oppenheim [2004], Rebentisch [2005], Morgan and Liker [2006], Rockwell Collins [2007], Figure 6. Weapon system quality problems and impact [GAO, 2008a]. 10 See the Acknowledgments for the names of the team members. 11 The process chart therein is credited to ISO 15288.

12 OPPENHEIM, MURMAN, AND SECOR Box 5. Development of Lean Enablers for Systems Engineering Gittell [2003], and others from the rich menu of the LAI and University of Michigan research products, and individual members experiences. The resultant list was judged too long for graphical presentation as callout text boxes in the Handbook. Also, different SE process steps turned out to require identical enablers; thus this approach would be repetitious. Instead, in the next draft, the team decided to try to edit the enablers as a supplement to the INCOSE Handbook, to be proposed to INCOSE management. The enablers were organized into eight following thematic groupings, strongly influenced by Lean Thinking in LPD: (1) Frequently Involve the Customer; (2) Build a Lean Organization; (3) Develop Perfect Coordination Mantra across People and Processes; (4) Promote Smooth SE Value Stream Flow; (5) Front Load Architectural Design and Implementation; (6) Pursue Excellence and Continuous Improvement; (7) Invest in Workforce Development; (8) Use Lean Tools. 2.4. Beta Version of LEfSE Numerous iterations yielded 160 enablers, named Beta, which was presented to the LSE WG on January 28, 2008. A survey was designed asking to rank each enabler Importance to the mission/product success in your recent programs, and to rank the Use of the enabler in your company, using the scales of 0 5, with 0 meaning useless or not at all, and 5 meaning critically important or implemented and used routinely, respectively. The Beta survey also asked for comments. Ten individuals from the WG who are regarded as experts in both SE and Lean responded to the survey with generous comments. In addition, a Major American Aerospace Corporation (MAAC) kindly offered to participate in the survey, providing 19 responses. MAAC allowed employees to fill out the survey on company time, but requested to eliminate 30% of the enablers from the survey in order to reduce the completion time. The MAAC population included mostly SEs ranging in seniority from recent hires to 30 years of experience in program management. A few weeks prior to this survey, most of the respondents completed a comprehensive course on Lean. Graphs of both separate and combined results of the 10 INCOSE and 19 MAAC responses are available for all enablers [Plotkin, 2008]. Figure 7 shows a typical graph indicating good agreement between the INCOSE and MAAC results, which is encouraging as the two populations had no common members. Figure 8a presents a summary of the Importance and Use rankings, with the bar heights representing the number of enablers. The average value of the Importance ranking for all enablers was 3.76 and of the Use 2.92. The high

LEAN ENABLERS FOR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 13 Figure 7. Rankings of importance and use of sample enablers (Beta version). (The numbers in parenthesis denote the number of Importance responses from INCOSE and MAAC, and Use from INCOSE and MAAC, respectively.) rankings of the Importance for most enablers indicated that the project is useful, and the lower rankings of Use indicated that the project is needed. The qualifiers in your recent program and in your company used in the survey instructions caused some confusion because many employees were involved in only short fragments of long programs, and several programs extended over several companies. The instructions were clarified in the Prototype survey as explained below. The majority of the LSE WG members endorsed most of the Beta enablers, but did not like the eight above headings. Instead the classical Lean Principles were suggested as better headings. Ten individuals 12 volunteered to carry on the subsequent development leading to the Prototype version. EM by promoting flawless mission/product assurance while reducing waste. The final Prototype included 194 enablers. It was presented to the LSE WG at the INCOSE Symposium in Utrecht, May 16 19, 2008. Several WG members decided to begin 2.5. Prototype Version of LEfSE The rankings and comments received from the 29 responses to the Beta survey were used to develop the Prototype version. The enablers with low average Importance rank were deleted. The remaining enablers were regrouped under the six Lean Principles. Four rounds of drafts and negotiations by the team followed. Given the tacit-knowledge approach to the development, the search for consensus during the drafts and negotiations was critical for success. 13 The work was guided by the spirit of Lean Thinking: to improve the practice of SE and Figure 8a. Survey rankings of enabler importance and use (Beta). 12 See the Acknowledgements for the names of the team members. 13 Most of the negative comments resulted from a perceived conflict between the given enabler and the current industrial practice or government acquisition regulation. Where the enabler appeared to suggest a better way, it usually prevailed, even if the immediate industrial or governmental implementation appeared difficult. The comments included rewording, different emphasis, deletions, different groupings of enablers, elimination of redundant points, movement to a different position on the list, and cosmetic changes. Some words were changed to accommodate language differences between the U.S. and U.K. Figure 8b. Survey rankings of enabler importance and use (Prototype).

14 OPPENHEIM, MURMAN, AND SECOR implementing the Prototype enablers in their companies without waiting for the final version. 2.6. Endorsement of the Prototype by Survey The LEfSE are intended for industrial practitioners. Ideally, they should be validated by comparing the performance (for example, the value delivered, stakeholder satisfaction, and program cost and schedule) between traditional programs and those following the LEfSE. This, of course, is not practical, because many recent governmental programs take years, some being as long as 20 years or more, because no two programs are repeatable, and also because implementing all LEfSE would be a challenge to most programs. Instead, a quick reaction from the SE practitioners was needed. Therefore, the Prototype team decided to repeat the Beta survey approach asking SE community at large to rank the enablers. A new survey was designed listing all Prototype enablers and asking again for the rankings of Importance and Use of each enabler. However, new instructions and scale were used, in order to clarify the Beta issues, as follows: Rank the Importance of the given Enabler to the effectiveness of SE based on your professional experience, not necessarily limited to current programs or company. 14 Rank the current Use of the listed practice in the industry, again based on your entire experience. Use the scale: 2 = strongly agree [with the given enabler Importance or Use], 1 = agree, 0 = neutral, 1 = disagree, 2 = strongly disagree. The Prototype survey was distributed to about 100 150 practitioners of Systems Engineering at large in several western countries; 26 surveys were completed, 15 many with comments (i.e., the response rate was about 17 26%). Figure 8b summarizes the Prototype survey results. The Importance in Figure 8b was ranked high, with most enablers ranked at the average of 2, some at 1, and none at 0 or below. In contrast, the Use ranking was the largest at 0, significant at 1, and small fractions at 1 and 2. It was gratifying that the respondents at large ranked the LEfSE Prototype as both important and needed for SE effectiveness. Comparing Beta to the Prototype indicates that the Importance rankings have shifted up in value by about 1 unit (even though their ranking scales were not identical). This confirms that the Prototype enablers are better formulated than the Beta version. Boxes 6 11 in Section 3 list the average Use value for each Prototype enabler. The low response rate (only 26 completed surveys) is a weakness of the project. For this reason, this paper makes an 14 The words not necessarily limited to current programs or company were added to overcome the need to have the survey approved by strict export controls required in some aerospace companies. 15 The fact that only 26 surveys were completed was a disappointment. The primary reason given for refusing to complete the survey was lack of time. Indeed, on average it took 2 3 hours to rank the 194 enablers on two axes, and enter comments. The vast majority of programs require that employees charge their entire work time to specific projects, leaving no time for filling out external surveys. This is a major obstacle in conducting extended surveys. appeal to the community to contribute effort to future validation of LEfSE, as described in the following section. 2.7. Version 1.0 of LEfSE and Future Changes The original plan called for keeping the Prototype enablers ranked on the Importance scale at 2 or 1 (with the cutoff value 0.5), and deleting or editing those with rankings of ( 2), ( 1), or 0. As shown in Figure 8b, all 194 enablers passed the trigger value. The LSE WG Co-Chairs decided that, after cosmetic changes, the Prototype can be released online as Version 1.0 (V.1.0), with the release date of the January 2009 INCOSE meeting in San Francisco. While V.1.0 represents the end of the intended development cycle, it cannot be regarded as final. Progress in the knowledge of SE and PM, experience learned from the use of LEfSE in actual programs, and future changes in acquisition policies by different governments will require continuous improvements. The following process has been implemented for making future changes. At any time any INCOSE member can propose a new enabler or an edit or deletion of an existing enabler using a special online form. It is recommended that the submitters be not only SE professionals but also have a good understanding of Lean Thinking. Once the form is activated, other WG members can use it to enter arguments for and against the change proposal. Biannually, an e-mail reminder will be sent to the entire LSE WG asking members to vote electronically on the active change proposals. The majority vote will accept the proposal for the next release of the LEfSE. At the time of this writing, the LSE WG is planning a broad dissemination of V.1.0 in industry, academia, and local IN- COSE chapters, 16 including a release of LEfSE by INCOSE to the entire membership. 17 3. LEAN ENABLERS FOR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING The LEfSE are organized into the six Lean Principles and listed in Boxes 6 11, one box per Principle. In order to emphasize that the LSE WG regards the SE process [IN- COSE, 2007] as sound, only lacking Lean Thinking, each Principle begins with the following enabler: Follow all [applicable to the Principle] practices in the INCOSE SE Handbook. In addition ; and this is followed by the enablers developed in this project. Most emphatically, all established SE process activities, including decision making, testing, verification, and validation, are fully embraced, as implied in a number of enablers below, consistent with the words from the definition of LSE Value:... the delivery of a flawless complex system, with flawless technical performance, satisfying all stakeholders... 16 A presentation used for workshops has been posted online [INCOSE LSE WG, 2008] in the pdf format. 17 By the time of this writing, workshops have been delivered at 14 venues, including INCOSE Chapters in Los Angeles (multiple presentations), Seattle, and Israel, AFIS and EADS in France, and seven university and corporate venues. AFIS and Israel decided to organize their own subgroups devoted to future work on LEfSE.

LEAN ENABLERS FOR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 15 The majority of the enablers are self-explanatory. A few enablers are explained with comments. Selected enablers list a few prominent examples of the programs or companies that have applied the given practice. The list of examples is based on the knowledge of the authors and surely is not complete or exclusive. There must be many more programs and companies practicing some enablers. The programs or companies are identified only by name (e.g., Iridium), and these names are listed in the References in {braces} at the end of the listing. The last column of Boxes 6 11 lists the average Use ranking from the Prototype survey. [The Importance rankings are not listed since all enablers in V.1.0 were ranked, on the average, as (paraphrasing) important or very important.] Selected striking observations from the Use values are discussed below. The Lean Fundamentals reviewed in Box 1 represent a general formulation of the Principles. In this section, additional specific interpretation is provided in the context of LEfSE. 3.1. Value The initial phase of every program should be devoted to the task of comprehensive unambiguous and detailed understanding of value to the customer, i.e., of all customer needs, requirements, and interpretations of value. Experience indicates that many programs rush through this phase without a robust process, ending in incomplete or incorrect requirements that burden the subsequent program execution with waste. The enablers listed under the Value Principle (Box 6) cover the practices required for developing a robust and effective process of capturing the complete customer value proposition, disseminating it among the program team, aligning the team, involving the customer and other stakeholders in the process, and doing it with sufficient breadth and depth to avoid later waste. Enabler 1.2.1 lists the definition of value-adding activities, which is fundamental to Lean Thinking. Note two striking observations from the Use column: (1) The Lean culture of right the first time is not widespread (Use = 0.09), enabler 1.2.1.c; and (2) the understanding of customer culture among program employees is poor (Use = 0.52), enabler 1.2.6. 3.2. Map the Value Stream (Plan the Program) The Value Stream Principle promotes excellent planning of the value delivery process, after value has been defined in Principle 1. Poor planning is a notorious reason for wasteful programs. Therefore, Principle 2 contains a comprehensive checklist of the practices for planning of all end-to-end linked streamlined actions and processes necessary to realize value without waste, including the planning for comprehensive decision making. The Principle integrates the planning of SE, PM, and other relevant enterprise activities to avoid the frequent waste that occurs at the interface of the disciplines and organizations. It emphasizes the benefits of old-fashioned but powerful colocation of personnel, and the need to use the most experienced individuals during the critical planning and conceptual phases, and who should look at a broad range of possible solutions. It promotes precise preparations for subsequent program execution: planning of the coordination and communication means between stakeholders throughout the program, preventing subsequent conflicts, especially with suppliers (critically important as modern programs have 60 90% of value delivered by suppliers), planning effective metrics to be used during the program management, and tailoring and planning of task precedence and content for smooth flow. It strongly promotes program frontloading. Box 7 lists the enablers. Box 6. Lean Enablers for Lean Principle 1: Value

16 OPPENHEIM, MURMAN, AND SECOR 18 SE is a part of PD. In this paragraph, the PD should be understood as denoting all PD activities other than SE, including design, development, manufacturing, integration, testing, etc.). 19 Queuing theory proves that the flow approaching 100% of capacity always slows down asymptotically due to the accumulation of variability, even in the absence of any bottlenecks. Box 7. Lean Enablers for Lean Principle 2: Value Stream (continued)

LEAN ENABLERS FOR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 17 Box 7. Continued Box 8. Lean Enablers for Lean Principle 3: Flow (continued) 20 Any fool can make anything complex but it takes a genius and courage to create a simple solution Albert Einstein.

18 OPPENHEIM, MURMAN, AND SECOR Box 8. Continued Note two striking observations from the Use column: (1) Programs do not scrutinize every step to ensure it adds value, and include steps because it has always been done (Use = 0.54), enabler 2.2.6; and (2) programs tend to reinvent the wheel rather than reuse proven solutions (Use = 0.13), enabler 2.4. 3.3. Flow The Flow Principle enables the value creation process to flow smoothly and continuously without the waste of stopping and waiting, rework, or backflow. In complex programs, opportunities for the progress to stop are overwhelming, and it takes careful preparation, planning, and coordination effort to overcome them. The Flow Principle contains a comprehensive checklist of the practices intended to help the flow. They include frequent clarification of requirements, frequent opportunities for decision making, frontloading the design and implementation, making progress visible to all, using the most effective communications and coordination practices, and effective tools. Most importantly, the Principle elevates the SE responsibility, authority, and accountability for coordination of all technical activities and for the overall technical program success. Box 8 lists the enablers. It is a sad commentary on the traditional programs that so many common sense enablers have earned the low Use value. 3.4. Pull The Pull Principle is a powerful guard against the waste of unneeded tasks, overprocessed tasks, task rework (not to be confused with legitimately needed and optimized iteration loops), and the tasks that are not needed but are left over from previous programs or company habits. Pull promotes the culture of tailoring tasks and their outputs to meet the legitimate needs of the internal or external customer, and rejecting other tasks or outputs as waste. Legitimate is always interpreted in the context of value: flawless mission assurance and satisfaction of stakeholders. This does not mean cutting legitimate SE; it means cutting those tasks which contribute to the waste and do not add value. Pull promotes proactive coordination of task scope and modalities between the output creator and the user prior to the task execution, for all transactions, to eliminate the waste of misunderstanding, defects, rework, and waiting. Box 9 lists the enablers. Again, the Use values indicate a poor implementation of these commonsense practices. 3.5. Perfection The Perfection Principle strives for excellence and continuous improvement (CI) of the SE process and related enterprise management. 21 The enablers assist in guarding against waste- 21 To reiterate a comment in Box 1, perfection refers to continual process improvement, not continual product or system improvement which can lead to gold plating.

LEAN ENABLERS FOR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 19 Box 9. Lean Enablers for Lean Principle 4: Pull ful processes and outcomes, in making all imperfections visible to all which is motivating to the immediate improvement, and in comprehensive capture and use of lessons learned from past programs. The enablers support best means of communication, coordination, and collaboration to enable the CI. The Principle elevates the role of Chief SE to lead and integrate the program from start to finish (the comment listed under enabler 5.5 addresses the controversy about the roles of PM and Chief SE in modern programs). Following an established Toyota practice, the Principle recommends driving out waste through design standardization, process standardization, and skill-set standardization. It calls for employing all three complementary CI methods (bottom-up suggestions by employees, quick reaction Kaizen teams for smaller local problems, and Six Sigma for larger challenges) important in the recent environment where the first two tend to be ignored. Box 10 lists the enablers. Arguably, the most telling may be enabler 5.2.2, Promote excellence under normal circumstances instead of hero-behavior in crisis situations, which earned only the ( 0.40) Use ranking. This confirms the anecdotal perception that traditional programs are perpetually in the crisis management mode. Box 10. Lean Enablers for Lean Principle 5: Perfection (continued)

20 OPPENHEIM, MURMAN, AND SECOR Box 10. Continued 3.6. Respect for People The People Principle promotes the best human relations at work based on respect for people: trust, honesty, respect, empowerment, teamwork, stability, motivation, drive for excellence, and healthy hiring and promotion policies. It calls for a vision which draws and inspires the best people and promotes such excellent human relations. It promotes a learning environment. Finally, it calls for treating people as the most valued assets, not as commodities. Box 11 lists the enablers. 22 A frequent practice in recent U.S. governmental programs is to have two program managers: the Program Manager, responsible for the program business success, and Chief Systems Engineer, responsible for Systems Engineering. Numerous functional engineers are responsible for various technical areas. In some programs this causes split responsibilities, authorities, and accountabilities, often with imperfect results. In contrast, many U.S. and overseas commercial programs use only one person fully responsible for the entire program success (both technical and business). The person is called by various names, e.g., Chief Engineer (very successful Toyota model [Morgan and Liker, 2006], Product Manager, Product Engineer, or similar. Early U.S. aerospace programs also used extremely successful single-person Chief Engineer role (e.g., early Jack Northrop, Howard Hughes, Kelly Johnson of the Skunk Works, early NASA space programs, and others). Murman [2008] discusses some more recent successful programs with a single top manager in the dual technical and business leadership role. Since this document is intended for INCOSE, a Council for Systems Engineering rather than entire program management, the editors have addressed only the technical role of the Chief Engineer, saying nothing whether that person should also be the overall manager of the program, or share the management with a separate business manager person. However, nothing in this document should be taken as promoting the dual-head model. The dual-head model is not required under the U.S. government acquisition policies, and is not promoted in the INCOSE SE Handbook [INCOSE, 2007].

LEAN ENABLERS FOR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 21 Box 11. Lean Enablers for Lean Principle 6: People 3.7. Benchmarking LEfSE with NASA and GAO Recommendations The V.1.0 of LEfSE was compared to the recommendations made in the recent studies by GAO and NASA of U.S. government programs, discussed in Box 4. NASA [2007] benchmarked the practices of major aerospace companies in an attempt to capture the key enabling factors and best practices that lead to successful programs. NASA chose industry leaders with proven outstanding achievements in producing complex systems. 23 Box 12 compares NASA s key enablers with LEfSE, and Box 13 compares NASA best 23 Raytheon Missile Systems, Army Aviation & Missile Research and Development & Engineering Center (R&M and Software Engineering Directorates), Boeing Commercial Aircraft Division, Boeing Satellite Development Center, and Lockheed Missile & Fire Control Systems. practices with LEfSE. It was gratifying to find that both NASA s key enablers and best practices are consistent with the LEfSE, but the LEfSE are much more comprehensive. Each NASA enabler and practice found several detailed LEfSE enablers. This convergence of thinking provides further endorsement of LEfSE. Similarly, the GAO [2008b] offered a summary of best practices from recent commercial space programs. Box 14 compares the GAO recommendations to the corresponding LEfSE. Again, the two are aligned, but LEfSE are more comprehensive. 4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Lean Enablers for Systems Engineering (LEfSE) have been presented, together with a historical note about the origin of this project, including a brief history of the emerging field of

22 OPPENHEIM, MURMAN, AND SECOR Box 12. Key Enablers for Successful Programs in Aerospace [NASA, 2007] Box 13. Best Practices of Top Performing Aerospace Companies [NASA, 2007] Box 14. GAO Study of Commercial Best Practices during Program Development, [GAO, 2008b]

LEAN ENABLERS FOR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 23 24 www.incose.org, click on Working Groups and click on Lean SE. Lean Systems Engineering (LSE) with roots in the Lean Advancement Initiative, and later hosted within INCOSE. The LEfSE are based on Lean Thinking which is a holistic paradigm aiming at the best delivery of value and elimination of waste. LEfSE deal with Systems Engineering and with other related aspects of the enterprise management in complex technology programs. The LEfSE add Lean Thinking to the established Systems Engineering process. All established steps of the process, including requirements development, decision making, implementation, verification, testing, validation, and supportive activities described in the INCOSE SE Handbook and other similar documents are regarded as sound but not always delivered effectively. In short, the LEfSE improve the current SE practice which has a lot of strengths, but is not as good as it can be. The LEfSE are formulated as 194 do s and don t s of Systems Engineering and related enterprise management practices, and organized into six Lean Principles (abbreviated as Value, Value Stream, Flow, Pull, Perfection, and Respect People). A training module intended for dissemination is included online. 24 The website includes other useful information. The LEfSE have been formulated for industry Systems Engineering practitioners, but the development benefited from academic depth, breadth, and rigor. The development included five phases called Conceptual, Alpha, Beta, Prototype, and Version 1.0. The product was validated by surveys in the Beta and Prototype phases and by comparisons with the recent recommendations by NASA and GAO. The surveys indicated high levels of the need for, and low levels of the use of, LEfSE by industry. The comparisons indicated that the LEfSE are consistent with the NASA and GAO recommendations, and are much more comprehensive. LEfSE were developed by 14 experienced practitioners organized into two teams listed in the Acknowledgments, some recognized leaders in Lean and System Engineering from industry, academia, and governments from the U.S., U.K., and Israel; with cooperation from the 100-member strong international Lean Systems Engineering Working Group of INCOSE. The LEfSE represent collective tacit knowledge and experience of these members. The large number of enablers (194) sometimes meets with a humorous comment that being this long, it is not Lean. However, the LEfSE cover a large spectrum of Systems Engineering and relevant enterprise management practices, with a general focus to improve stakeholder satisfaction and program value, and reduce delays, waste, cost overruns, and frustrations. The LEfSE promote the culture of trust, openness, respect, empowerment, teamwork, good communication and coordination, and drive for excellence. They promote healthy relationships between the customer and contractor, suppliers, and employees. They promote better coordination between the pairs of parties handling any transaction. They increase the flow of quality work and promote robustness and first time right. They place emphasis on good preparations, planning and frontloading of the programs, and preventive measures. They also promote process optimization, standardization, and continuous improvement. All of them are regarded as highly important to program success. In this context, the 2 hours or so required to read the LEfSE is judged a good investment of time. The value of LSE and the guiding goal for the project has been defined in the paper as flawless mission or product assurance and satisfaction of the stakeholders. It was shown that Lean SE does not mean less SE but better SE. Lean SE not only improves SE but also streamlines the subsequent program execution. The LEfSE practices promote, support, and streamline the value realization, but, of course, cannot guarantee it. Surveys indicated that the practices are both important and needed in technology programs. Benchmarking with NASA and GAO studies indicate total convergence of recommendations, with the LEfSE being more comprehensive and detailed. In short, the paper presented some evidence that the LEfSE represent a worthwhile addition to the traditional SE process. But the LEfSE should not be regarded as solution to all SE and PD problems, or to have the power to eliminate program failures. A formal process of continuous improvement and periodic releases has been set up, and the SE community is invited to contribute their experiences to the new releases. A number of panels are planned at future INCOSE conferences devoted to the challenge of implementing the LEfSE in industry. The LEfSE are not intended to become a mandatory practice. Instead, they should be used as a checklist of good practices in enterprises, programs, and at every level of work. Some are intended for top enterprise managers, some for programs, and others for line employees. Some are more actionable than others, and some are easier to implement than others. However, employee awareness of even those least actionable and most difficult to implement should improve the thinking at work. The authors and their WG colleagues believe that as many Systems Engineers and other engineers and managers in enterprises should be trained in the LEfSE as possible because this should lead to better appreciation of best practices. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This project was a team effort, with the following two teams developing the Lean Enablers. Beta Team: Earll Murman, Ford Professor of Engineering Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Chair; Col. James Horejsi, Chief Engineer, U.S. Space and Missile Command; Jim Zehmer, Vice President, Toyota ABC, Long Beach, California; Larry Earnest, Project Manager and Manager of Systems Engineering, Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems; Mike Schaviatello, Project Manager, Boeing Satellite Development Co.; Deb Secor and Ray Jorgensen, Systems Engineering Managers, Rockwell Collins; and Bohdan ( Bo ) Oppenheim, Professor of Mechanical and Systems Engineering, Loyola Marymount University. Prototype Team: Larry Earnest (vide); Ray Jorgensen (vide), Ron Lyells, Honeywell; Bohdan W. Oppenheim (vide); Uzi Orion, ELOP, Israel; Dave Ratzer, Rockwell Collins; Deb Secor (vide); Hillary G. Sillitto, UK MoD Abbey Wood; Stan Weiss, Consulting Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Stanford; and Avigdor Zonnenshain, Israel.

24 OPPENHEIM, MURMAN, AND SECOR They all contributed time, experience, and wisdom of SE, Program Management and Lean. The project could never be completed without frequent, intense, and enthusiastic coordination and consensus among the LSE WG Co-Chairs Ray Jorgensen (2007 2009, vide), and Deb Secor (vide); Dave Cleotelis, Raytheon (2006 2008); and Bo W. Oppenheim (vide), who served as the coordinating editor. Ray Jorgensen and Dave Cleotelis toiled to keep the LSE WG Internet sites current and attractive, interacted with INCOSE, and kept the mailing lists current. Dr. Donna Rhodes, MIT, one of the early pioneers of Lean SE, promoted this project, contributed valuable meritorious comments, and authored or supervised numerous research projects from which this project benefited. Dr. Eric Rebentisch and Dr. Hugh McManus from the MIT LAI and Dr. Stan Weiss of Stanford led important research in many Lean areas used throughout this project. Mr. Jeff Doyle and his team at Northrop Grumman shared their practical wisdom with the first author. The project contributed from the collective experience of the Lean SE WG members, too numerous to list by names (the membership of 100+ is available on the INCOSE site). The LSE WG team is grateful to the International Council on Systems Engineering, a most friendly and supportive professional society, for providing perfect home to the Group and enabling this project with workshops, symposia, web space, and administrative support. Gratitude is due to all individuals, too numerous to list by name, who participated in the lengthy surveys critically important in this project. Eugene Plotkin, Jeffrey Dorey, and Paulos Ashebir, Engineering graduate students at LMU, served as the capable and enthusiastic Research Assistants on this project. Figures 7 and 8a have been adopted from Plotkin s M.S. Thesis, and Jeff Dorey created Figure 8b. Most of the figures have been redrawn to journal standards by Jeff Dorey. The first author is grateful to his graduate students at Loyola Marymount University, too numerous to mention by name, who brought invaluable ideas, theses, and real-life examples to his attention, which stimulated many ideas presented in the paper. REFERENCES 25 {B-777, Citation X, F-117} see [Haggerty and Murman, 2006] K. Bozdogan, Supplier networks transformation toolset, Lean Advancement Initiative, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, http://lean.mit.edu, 2004. W.J. Broad, Debris spews into space after satellites collide, New York Times (February 12, 2009), Space and Cosmos page. F. Brown, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, private communication, 2009. T.R. Browning, Modeling and analyzing cost, schedule, and performance in complex system product development, Doctoral Thesis in Technology, Management and Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, December 1998. 25 The text {in braces} refers to the program or company names listed in the examples in Boxes 6 11. T.R. Browning, Value based product development: Refocusing lean, IEEE EMS Int Eng Management Conf (IEMC), Albuquerque, NM, August 13 15, 2000, pp. 168 172. J. Byrne, Editorial, Business Week (June 23, 1997), editorial page. J.P. Chase, Value creation in the product development process, Masters Thesis in Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, December 2001. {Citation X, HondaJet} see [Murman, 2008] K.B. Clark and T. Fujimoto, Product development performance; strategy, organization, and management in the world auto industry, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1991. D. Clausing, Total quality development: A step-by-step guide to world-class concurrent engineering, ASME Press, New York, 1994. R.B. Costello, Bolstering defense industrial competitiveness, Report to the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, July 1988. B. Costello and M. Ernst, Regaining U.S. manufacturing leadership, HI-4173, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, 1992. J. Cunningham, O. Fiume, and L.T. White, Real numbers, management accounting in a lean organization, Managing Time Press, Durham, NC, 2003 {Wiremold}. E. Deming, Out of the crisis, MIT Center for Advanced Engineering Study, Cambridge, MA, 1982. DoD, DoD Total Quality Management Master Plan, Accession Number ADA355612, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, August 1988. N. Egbert, P. McCoy, D. Schwerin, J. Jones, and A. Karl, Design for process excellence ensuring timely and cost-effective solutions, 26th Int Cong Aeronaut Sci, Anchorage, AK, September 16, 2008. M.L. Emiliani, Improving business school courses by applying lean principles and practices, Qual Assurance Ed 12(4) (2004), 175 187. {F/A-18E/F} see [Haggerty, 2004] W. Ferster, U.S. will try to destroy crippled satellite, Space News (February 14, 2008). GAO, Defense acquisitions: Assessments of selected weapon programs, GAO-07-4065SP, General Accountability Office, Washington, DC, March 2007. GAO, Best practices: Increased focus on requirements and oversight needed to improve DOD s Acquisition environment and weapon system quality, GAO-08-294, General Accountability Office, Washington, DC, February 2008a. GAO, Space acquisitions: Major space programs still at risk for cost and schedule increases, GAO-08-552T, General Accountability Office, Washington, DC, March 2008b. J.H. Gittell, The Southwest Airlines way, McGraw Hill, New York, 2003 {Southwest Airlines}. M. Graban, Lean hospitals, Productivity Press, Florence, KY, 2008. A.C. Haggerty, The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet as a case study in value based systems engineering, INCOSE 2004, Toulouse, France, June 20 24, 2004 {F/A-18E/F}, pp. 3 27. A.C. Haggerty and E.M. Murman, Evidence of lean engineering in aircraft programs, 25th Int Cong Aeronaut Sci, Hamburg, Germany, September 2006 {B-777, Citation X, F-117}, pp. 1 11. C. Hernandez, Challenges and benefits to the implementation of IPTs on large military procurements, SM Thesis, MIT Sloan School, Cambridge, MA, June 1995.

LEAN ENABLERS FOR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 25 D. Hitchens, Systems engineering: A 21st century systems methodology, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, 2007. {HondaJet} see [Warwick, 2007] J. Horejsi, Col., Chief Engineer Ret., USAF Space and Missile Command, Los Angeles, private communication, 2009. House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress, Investigation of The Challenger accident, Report of the Committee on Science and Technology, 64-420 0, Washington, DC, October 29, 1986. INCOSE, INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook, v.3.1, IN- COSE-TP-2003-002-03, Seattle, WA, 2007. INCOSE, INCOSE website: http://www.incose.org/about/index.aspx, Seattle, WA. INCOSE LSE WG, Lean Systems Engineering Working Group website, 2009, http://www.incose.org/practice/techactivities/wg/leansewg. {Iridium} see [Leopold, 2004] C.T. Jacobson, TRW 1901-2001, TRW Inc., Cleveland, OH, 2001 {JDAM} see [Murman et al., 2002] N.R. Joglekar and D.E. Whitney, Where does time go? Design automation usage patterns during complex electro-mechanical product development, LAI Product Development, Winter 2000 Workshop, January 26 28, 2000, Fulsom, CA. C.M. Jones, Leading Rockwell Collins Lean transformation, LAI Keynote Talk, April 9, 2006, http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/378/. M.N. Kennedy, Product Development for the Lean Enterprise, The Oaklea Press, Richmond, VA, 2003. LAI (Lean Advancement Initiative) website, http://lean.mit.edu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=395&itemid=3 36, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 2007. LAI Lean Academy Course, http://ocw.mit.edu/ocwweb/aeronautics-and-astronautics/16-660january--iap--2008/course Home/index.htm, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 2008. LEI (Editor), Reflections on Lean, Lean Enterprise Institute, Boston, 2007. LEM, Lean Enterprise Model, http://lean.mit.edu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&i d=349&itemid=303, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lean Advancement Initiative, Cambridge, MA, 1996. D. Lempia, Using Lean principles and MBE in design and development of avionics equipment at Rockwell Collins, 26th Int Cong Aeronaut Sci, Anchorage, AK, September 16, 2008 {Rockwell Collins}paper 6.7.3. LESAT, Lean Enterprise Self Assessment Tool, Version 1.0, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, Lean Advancement Initiative, August 2001. R. Leopold, The iridium story: An engineer s eclectic journey, Minta Martin Lecture, Massachusetts Institue of Technology, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, April 23, 2004 {Iridium}. J.K. Liker, The Toyota way, 14 management principles, McGraw Hill, New York, 2004. J.K. Liker, D.K. Sobek II, A.C. Ward, and J.J. Cristiano, Involving suppliers in product development in the US and Japan: Evidence for set-based concurrent engineering, IEEE Trans Eng Management 43(2) (May 1996), pp. 165 178. H.L. McManus, Product development value stream mapping manual, LAI Release Beta, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lean Advancement Initiative, Cambridge, MA, April 2004. H. McManus, A. Haggerty, and E. Murman, Lean engineering: A framework for doing the right job right, Aeronaut J 111(1116) (February 2007), 105 114. R.L. Millard, Value stream analysis and mapping for product development, Master s Thesis in Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, June 2001. M.J. Morgan, and J.K. Liker, Toyota product development system, Productivity Press, Florence, KY, 2006 {Toyota}. E.M. Murman, Lean systems engineering I, II, Lecture notes, Course 16.885J, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambrideg, MA, Fall 2003. E.M. Murman, Lean aerospace engineering, Littlewood Lecture AIAA-2008-4, Massachusetts Institute of technology, Cambridge, MA, January 2008 {Citation X, HondaJet}. E.M. Murman, T. Allen, K. Bozdogan, J. Cutcher-Gershenfeld, H. McManus, D. Nightingale, E. Rebentisch, T. Shields, F. Stahl, M. Walton, J. Warmkessel, S. Weiss, and S. Widnall, Lean enterprise value: Insights from MIT s Lean Aerospace Initiative, Palgrave, Hampshire, UK, 2002 {JDAM}. NASA, Columbia Accident Investigation, Final Report, CAIB PA 40-03, Washington, DC, August 26, 2003. NASA, NASA Pilot Benchmarking Initiative: Exploring design excellence leading to improved safety and reliability, Washington, DC, October 2007. M. Nizza, Satellite shootdown deemed a successful mission, The New York Times (February 25, 2008). T. Ohno, Toyota production system: Beyond large scales production, Productivity Press, Florence, KY, 1988. B.W. Oppenheim, Lean product development flow, Syst Eng 7 (4) (2004), 352 376. B.W. Oppenheim, Lean as a way of thinking, cover-story interview with, Qual Management J 5(3) (2006), 1 13 (in Polish). R.O Rourke, Coast Guard deepwater acquisition programs: Background, oversight issues, and options for Congress, Order Code RL33753, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, updated October 9, 2008. S.M. Paton, Is TQM dead? Qual Dig 14:24 (April 1994), 24 28. E. Plotkin, Lean Enablers for systems engineering, Master s Thesis in Mechanical Engineering, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, CA, September 2008. E. Rebentisch, Lean product development, LAI lecture, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, October 5, 2005. E. Rebentisch and H. McManus, Tutorial on Lean PD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lean Advancement Initiative, Cambridge, MA, 2007. E. Rebentisch, D. Rhodes, and E. Murman, Lean systems engineering: Research initiatives in support of a new paradigm, Conf Syst Eng Res, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, April 2004, p. 122. D.G. Reinertsen, The Principles of product development flow, 2nd generation LPD, Celeritas, Redondo Beach, CA, 2009 D. Rhodes, C. Dagli, A. Haggerty, R. Jain, and E. Rebentisch, Panel on Lean systems engineering, INCOSE 2004, Toulouse, France, June 20 24, 2004. {Rockwell Collins}see [Lempia, 2008] Rockwell Collins, Lean benchmarking event, Rockwell Collins, Cedar Rapids, IA, 2007. R.A. Slack, Application of Lean principles to the military aerospace product development process, Masters Thesis in Engineering and

26 OPPENHEIM, MURMAN, AND SECOR Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, December 1998. D.K. Sobek II, Principles shape product development systems: A Toyota-Chrysler comparison, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1997a. D.K. Sobek II, Toyota s product development process, Concurrent engineering effectiveness: Concepts and methods, M. Fleischer and J. Liker (Editors), Hanson-Gardner, Ann Arbor, MI, 1997b, pp. 461 480. D.K. Sobek II, J.K. Liker, and A.C. Ward, Another look at Toyota s integrated product development, Harvard Bus Rev 76(4) (July August 1998), 36 49. D.K. Sobek II, A.C. Ward, and J.K. Liker, Toyota s principles of set-based concurrent engineering, Sloan Management Rev 40(2) (Winter 1999), 67 83. {Southwest Airlines} see [Gittell, 2003] A. Stanke, A framework for achieving lifecycle value in product development, SM Thesis in Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 2001. Y. Sugimori, K. Kisunoki, F. Cho, and S. Uchikawa, Toyota production system and Kanban Systems materialization of just-intime and respect-for-human systems, Int J Prod Res 15(6) (1977), 553 564. {Toyota} see [Morgan and Liker, 2006] K.T. Ulrich and S.D. Eppinger, Product design and development, 4th edition, McGraw-Hill, New York, 2008. A.C. Ward, Lean product and process development, Lean Enterprise Institute, Cambridge, MA, March 2007. A.C. Ward, J.K. Liker, J.J. Cristiano, and D.K. Sobek II, The second Toyota paradox: How delaying decisions can make better cars faster, Sloan Management Rev 36(3) (Spring 1995a). A.C. Ward, D.K. Sobek II, J.J. Cristiano, and J.K. Liker, Toyota, concurrent engineering, and set-based design, Engineered in Japan: Japanese technology management practices, J.K. Liker et al. (Editors), Oxford, New York, 1995b. J. Warmkessel, Lean engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lean Aerospace Initiative, Cambridge, MA, 2002, http://lean.mit.edu, 2002. G. Warwick, Opening doors: Car maker Honda s aircraft research and development facility gears up for the HondaJet, Flight Int (December 1, 2007) {HondaJet}. L. Webb, Knowledge management for through life support, PhD Thesis in progress, private communication, RMIT University, Australia, 2008. I. Wedgewood, Lean Six Sigma, A practitioner s guide, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 2007. I.R. Winner, P.J. Pennell, E.H. Bertrand, and M.M. Slusarczuk, The role of concurrent engineering in weapons system acquisition, Report-R-338, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA, 1988. {Wiremold} see [Cunningham, Fiume, and White, 2003] J.P. Womack and D.T. Jones, Lean thinking, Simon & Shuster, New York, 1996. J.P. Womack, D.T. Jones, and D. Roos, The machine that changed the world, the story of lean production, The MIT International Motor Vehicle Program, Harper-Perennial, New York, 1990. K. Yang and B. El-Haik, Design for Six Sigma: A roadmap for product development, McGraw Hill, New York, 2003. J.J. Young, Jr. Reasons for Cost Changes for Selected Major Defense Acquisition Programs, USD, (AT&L), January 30, 2009. T. Young, Report on Mars Program failure, U.S. Congress, Science Committee, Washington, DC, April 12, 2000. Bohdan W. Oppenheim, born 1948 in Warsaw, Poland, earned his Ph.D. in System Dynamics from the University of Southampton, U.K. in 1980; his Naval Architect s degree from MIT in 1974; his M.S. in Ocean Systems from Stevens Institute of Technology in 1972; and his B.S. (equivalent) in Mechanical Engineering and Aeronautics (MEL) from Warsaw Technical University in 1966. Since 1981 he has been at at Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, where he is currently Professor of Mechanical and Systems Engineering and Graduate Director of Mechanical Engineering; he was Director of the US Department of Energy Industrial Assessment Center assessing 125 plants for productivity (2000 2007); Coordinator of the Lean Aerospace Initiative Educational Network, On the Steering Committee of the Lean Education Academic Network. His areas of specialization include Lean, productivity, quality, systems engineering, dynamics, signal processing, vessel moorings, and naval architecture. He has co-authored with S. Rubin the POGO simulator for liquid rockets, used by rocket industry and NASA, developed at The Aerospace Corporation. His inndustrial experience (full or part time and consulting) includes: Northrop-Grumman (2007 2008), Boeing (2001 2004), Aerospace Corporation (1990 1994), Northrop (1985 1990), Global Marine Development (1974 1977), Airbus (2005), Telekomunikacja Polska (2006 2008), Mars (2007 2008), and 50 other firms and governmental institutions in the U.S. and Poland. He is a member of INCOSE, LAI, PIASA, NPAJAC, and formerly of ASEE, ASME, ISOPE and SNAME. He is an IAE Fellow, and lives in Santa Monica, CA with two sons. He is a sailor and a collector of modern Polish art.

LEAN ENABLERS FOR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 27 Earll M. Murman, Ph.D., is Ford Professor of Engineering Emeritus at MIT. He served as Co-Director of the Lean Advancement Initiative (LAI) from 1995 to 2002, as Head of MIT s Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics from 1990 to 1996, and as Director of Project Athena from 1988 to1991. Since 2002 he has served as Director of the LAI Educational Network, a group of over 40 universities developing and deploying lean Six Sigma curriculum in healthcare, engineering, and management domains. In addition to his 26 years in academia, his career includes 13 years of industry and government experience. Dr. Murman is the lead author of the book, Lean Enterprise Value: Insights from MIT s Lean Aerospace Initiative, published by Palgrave in March 2002. Lean Enterprise Value, a definitive account of the past and future implementation of lean principles and practices in the aerospace domain, received the 2003 Best Engineering Sciences Book Award from the International Astronautical Academy. He has over 100 publications in lean thinking, aerospace engineering and engineering education areas. Dr. Murman graduated summa cum laude in Aeronautical Engineering from Princeton University in 1963 and received his Ph.D. in Aerospace Engineering from Princeton in 1967. He is a member of the U.S. National Academy of Engineering and the Washington State Academy of Sciences, a foreign member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences, an Honorary Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society, and a member of INCOSE and ASEE. Deborah A Secor, Principal Project Manager, Lean Master, Rockwell Collins. She is the key lead of enterprise Lean Electronics mentoring and implementation for Rockwell Collins; an initiative recognized throughout the aerospace industry. She has supported LAI Lean Now projects and training for the Air Force. She is an enthusiastic contributor in the improvement and delivery of the teaching simulation for Lean Enterprise Product Development, developed by McManus and Rebentisch. She has presented Lean Product Development and Knowledge Management Strategies papers at various LAI, AME, and AIAA conferences. Her areas of specialization include: Lean, engineering/intellectual property development and enterprise value stream mapping, business integration and process improvement, knowledge management, and change management. She is a member of INCOSE and LAI, and resides in Cedar Rapids, IA. Her interests include horses and all things outdoors.