Using the TPM: Data Protection and Storage



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Using the TPM: Data Protection and Storage Ariel Segall ariels@alum.mit.edu Day 2 Approved for Public Release: 12-2749. Distribution unlimited

License All materials are licensed under a Creative Commons Share Alike license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0

What We ll Be Covering The TPM s Tamper Resistance Using Storage Keys Using Binding Keys NVRAM

Revisiting the TPM s Tamper Resistance My most frequently asked question about TPMs: I can use it to protect my data if the machine is stolen, right? Reminder: TPM is tamper-resistant, not tamper-proof Not up to government standards Not designed for nation-state adversaries! Far better than software protection, but keys can be removed Expensive to break: $100,000+ for the publicized attack High failure rate: destroyed a dozen to remove keys from one Still not sufficient for sponsor high-value data with high theft risk

TPM s Storage Protection Scenarios Evil Maids Can t copy hard drive and pull keys out at leisure Combined with PCRs, can t reboot into evil OS and steal secrets Software data theft Can t freely vacuum data and send off machine Combine TPM keys and user passwords for best security Note: At-rest protection, not during use! Casual physical theft Not good enough for nation-states, plenty good against even competent thieves

What This Means For Use The TPM is strongest when protecting data at rest...... therefore, protecting data in bulk less effective than small, focused chunks Storage most effective when used in multi-part security: TPM as thing you have; authorization value as thing you know State verification one of the most powerful tools for data protection...... and can also cause self-inflicted DoS. Use with care.

What We ll Be Covering The TPM s Tamper Resistance Using Storage Keys Using Binding Keys NVRAM

Using Storage Keys TPM Seal: Encrypt data for later decryption with TPM Unseal Local platform only! Storage keys are also used to protect TPM keys Every TPM CreateWrapKey operation must provide a storage key parent When migrating keys, encrypted to storage key: new parent Note: The SRK is a storage key!

Key Storage Hierarchy Review Wrap Key (inc Storage) Identity Key Wrap Key (inc. Storage) Storage Key Storage Root Key

Sealing When sealing data, several options: Which storage key to use Whether to require authorization data (password) Whether to provide PCR constraints for decryption Whether to provide locality constraints for decryption Sealed data always contains unique TPM internal value Locked to this TPM even if the key migrates Sealing also records the current PCR state Ensure that decrypted data can be trusted Returns sealed blob

Unsealing Use same storage key to decrypt Verifies authorization, current PCRs, current locality against blob Note: two authorizations may be required! One for key, one for blob Verifies creation data to ensure real creation value matches public value Returns decrypted data Note: blob can be unsealed multiple times Note: Once unsealed, data is in the clear! Use PCR values and authorization to minimize risk of loss during use

Storage Key Summary Utility key for protecting secret data, including keys Directly protect user data with Seal Optionally additionally protect with password, PCR constraints Local system only Decrypt with Unseal

What We ll Be Covering The TPM s Tamper Resistance Using Storage Keys Using Binding Keys NVRAM

Binding Keys Another utility key for data protection Different paradigm than storage Anyone on any platform can Bind data Only TPM can decrypt, using TPM Unbind No fancy options just decryption PCR constraints and authorization still possible, but on key not blob

Storage vs. Binding Key Summary Storage Local use only Seals user data, optional extra constraints Can be used as key parent Only authenticates local data Binding Local or remote use Binds user data, constraints only on key Encrypts user data only Usable for machine authentication

What We ll Be Covering The TPM s Tamper Resistance Using Storage Keys Using Binding Keys NVRAM

NVRAM Summary Storage area inside TPM Very limited in size: only 1280 bytes required, though can be bigger No hard data on actual implementations Controlled by owner; permissions can be delegated Some sections reserved for specific purposes (e.g., root credentials) Customizable constraints per region for read or write access PCR contents Locality Authorization data Limited number of writes; can be burned out Order of 10,000; only a minor DoS issue for most applications

Why NVRAM is Useful Stores data that can serve as reference Much harder to modify than data on disk! Hashes for integrity checking Owner or trusted authority public key Very powerful for system sanity checking! Stores high-value data that should not be accidentally deleted Keys Certificates

NVRAM Use Case Examples Storing user-chosen pictures for trusted boot If correct picture retrieved, PCR values in known state Preventing attacks which replace trusted authority IT-approved CA key or DNS server in read-only NVRAM Integrity reference for software Put hash of file in write-limited NVRAM Current AV definitions? Most recent save file? Policy approved by owner? Approved OS list for boot loader? If file is public key, can use to verify owner signature. Resources for early boot, DRTM Limited space, but easy to constrain access

Using NVRAM Quick Summary Establish a region of NVRAM with desired size and permissions TPM NV DefineSpace Owner only, unless permissions delegated Separate commands for owner, non-owner access TPM NV WriteValue, TPM NV ReadValue for non-owner TPM NV WriteValueAuth, TPM NV ReadValueAuth for owner Note: Access control enforcement on NVRAM is not automatic! Manufacturers need ability to write certs into NVRAM without being owner Supposed to set flag enabling access control afterwards Don t always! How to check and set flag in next section.

Problems with NVRAM Space is very limited For one application, not a problem; if commonly used, potentially serious Many hashes; very few certificates or keys Limited number of writes in lifetime How many? Good question! Not suitable for applications with frequent updates

TPM Data Protection Review TPM designed for protection of data at rest Storage keys protect data on this platform Many protection options Binding keys protect data from anywhere NVRAM protects limited, high-value data Good for integrity verification and system checks

Questions?