JOURNAL for NONPROFIT MANAGEMENT

Volume 15, No. 1 2012 JOURNAL for NONPROFIT MANAGEMENT Nonprofit Management Practice Articles Antecedents to Nonprofit Advocacy: Which is More Important - Governance or Organizational Structure? A Grounded Model for More Accurate and Useful Evaluation of Contracted Social Services Historical Look at Lifecycle Thought: Downward Lessons Learned on Conducting the Strategic Planning Process for a Nonprofit: What Went Right and What Could Be Improved More than a One-Trick Pony : Exploring the Contours of a Multi-Sector Convener Tertiary Diversity Management: A Critical Success Factor in Modern Nonprofit Human Services Leadership Volunteers, Nonprofits, and Community Capacity: A Case Study in Preparing for Disaster Response and Recovery To Merge Wisely, Ensure a Proper Takeoff

PUBLISHED BY 390 George Street, 5 th Floor New Brunswick, New Jersey 08901 Phone: (732) 932-8758 Ext. 10 http://socialwork.rutgers.edu/centersandprogram s/nonprofit.aspx 305 Seventh Avenue at 27 Street, 11 th Floor New York, New York 10001-608 Phone: (212) 924-6744 www.supportcenter.org EDITORS-IN-CHIEF Ronald Quincy, PhD Director, Center for Nonprofit Management and Governance School of Social Work Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey John Brothers, MBA, MPA, LP.D, CFRE Senior Fellow, Support Center for Nonprofit Management SUPPORT STAFF Alexis Biedermann, MSW, LSW Operations Editor Da aga Hill Bowman, Ed.M, JD Publications Editor Meaghan Flaherty Editorial Assistant EDITORIAL BOARD Dwight Denison, PhD Professor of Public and Nonprofit Finance, Martin School of Public Policy and Administration, University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky Area Shauwea Lynn Hamilton, MBA Manager of Community Affairs and State Public Affairs Operations for Public Service Enterprise Group (PSEG) Greater New York City Area Jason Patnosh Associate Vice President, National Association of Community Health Centers Washington D.C., Metro Area Anne Sherman, MPA Vice President, Growth Philanthropy Network Greater New York City Area Karun Singh, PhD, CSWM Director, Newark MSW Program and Lecturer Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey Greater New York City Area Copyright 2012 by Rutgers School of Social Work and Support Center for Nonprofit Management. All authors retain the rights to their articles. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, without permission from the individual authors. Authors retain the rights of their articles. For further information please contact the editors at jnmsubmissions@ssw.rutgers.edu. 1

Nonprofit Management Practice CONTENTS FROM THE EDITORS IN-CHIEF............................................ 4 HISTORICAL LOOK AT LIFECYCLE THOUGHT: DOWNWARD......................... 6 AN EXCERPT FROM HIS BOOK, BUILDING NONPROFIT CAPACITY Editor-in-Chief, John Brothers ANTECEDENTS TO NONPROFIT ADVOCACY: WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT-.............. 21 GOVERNANCE OR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE? Katrina L. Miller-Stevens and Matthew J. Gable A GROUNDED MODEL FOR MORE ACCURATE AND USEFUL........................ 40 EVALUATION OF CONTRACTED SOCIAL SERVICES Christopher S. Horne LESSONS LEARNED ON CONDUCTING THE STRATEGIC PLANNING.................... 50 PROCESS FOR A NONPROFIT: WHAT WENT RIGHT AND WHAT COULD BE IMPROVED Elvira Teller VOLUNTEERS, NONPROFITS, AND COMMUNITY CAPACITY:........................ 65 A CASE STUDY IN PREPARING FOR DISASTER RESPONSE AND RECOVERY Jessica K. A. Word and Ralph S. Brower MORE THAN A ONE-TRICK PONY :....................................... 84 EXPLORING THE CONTOURS OF A MULTI-SECTOR CONVENER Madeleine W. McNamara and John C. Morris TERTIARY DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT: A CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTOR................ 104 IN MODERN NONPROFIT HUMAN SERVICES LEADERSHIP Karun K. Singh and Patricia D. Lundgren 2

A PRACTICE CASE STUDY:.............................................112 TO MERGE WISELY, ENSURE A PROPER TAKEOFF Max Kleinman ABOUT THE EDITORS IN-CHIEF......................................... 117 ABOUT THE EDITORIAL BOARD.......................................... 119 ABOUT THE AUTHORS................................................ 121 CALL FOR PAPERS FOR THE NEXT EDITION.................................. 123 CONTACT INFORMATION.............................................. 125 3

FROM THE EDITORS-IN-CHIEF Dear Readers, We are excited to give to the nonprofit community the new and improved Journal for Nonprofit Management. Through an innovative partnership between the Support Center for Nonprofit Management and the Center for Nonprofit Management and Governance at Rutgers University School of Social Work, we are producing the only peer-reviewed journal where nonprofit practitioners and academics studying the sector can come together and produce quality written material that can both advance the work of sector leaders while also advancing the research and writing of those in the academic world. This open-themed issue includes articles and topics that are dominant in the nonprofit sector today; including leading thinking on strategic planning, connecting advocacy and governance, and evaluation in the social service world. Lessons Learned on Conducting the Strategic Planning Process for a Nonprofit: What Went Right and What Could Have Been Improved by Elvira Teller: A case example detailing the steps taken by a nonprofit organization embarking on a year-long strategic planning process using project management tools and techniques. Volunteers, Nonprofits, and Community Capacity: A Case Study in Preparing for Disaster Response and Recovery by Ralph Brower and Jessica Word: A case example describing the importance of volunteer management in strengthening the preparedness of volunteers and communities to respond to disasters. A Grounded Model for More Accurate and Useful Evaluation of Contracted Social Services by Christopher Horne: This article presents the use of the grounded theory approach in evaluating contracted social service programs and offers recommendations that administrators and evaluators may use to better pursue program improvement, accountability, and social betterment goals. Antecedents to Nonprofit Advocacy: Which is More Important - Governance or Organizational Structure by Katrina Miller-Stevens and Matthew Gable: The article examines the impact of two crucial facets of nonprofit organizations on advocacy: processes of governance such as board activity, and organizational structure such as staff and budget size, age, and membership. 4

More than a One-Trick Pony: Exploring the Contours of a Multi-Sector Convener by Madeleine McNamara and John Morris: McNamara and Morris explore ways to identify and sustain relationships within multi-sector collaborative relationships using the case of Virginia s Coastal Zone Management Program. Tertiary Diversity Management: A Critical Success Factor in Modern Nonprofit Human Services Leadership by Karun Singh and Patricia Lundgren: The article explores the implications for executive directors and board members of a new type of diversity, tertiary diversity, to be included as well as prioritized when applying diversity management best practices for maintaining and enhancing organizational performance. To Merge Wisely, Ensure a Proper Takeoff is a unique practice case study on the merger of Jewish Federations of MetroWest and Central New Jersey written by the Executive Vice President of United Jewish Communities of Metro New Jersey, Max Kleinman. The case study describes lessons learned on the merging process. The above articles, threaded together, outline the essential areas that both nonprofit and academic leaders will need to help advance practice and thought. We look forward to the partnership between the Support Center for Nonprofit Management and the Center for Nonprofit Management and Governance to continue to produce this vital resource for professionals, nonprofit organizations and academics involved in the important work of the nonprofit sector. We look forward to your continued readership. Best Regards, Dr. Ronald Quincy Editor-in-Chief Center for Nonprofit Management and Governance Dr. John Brothers Editor-in-Chief Support Center for Nonprofit Management 5

HISTORICAL LOOK AT LIFECYCLE THOUGHT: DOWNWARD AN EXCERPT FROM THE BOOK NONPROFIT CAPACITY BUILDING John Brothers, MBA, MPA, LP.D, CFRE is a Co-Editor-in-Chief of the Journal for Nonprofit Management, Senior Fellow with the Support Center for Nonprofit Management. O rganizations that are in crisis are commonly discussed in all three nonprofit lifecycle models. In Susan Kenny Stevens lifecycle model, the downward phase is most commonly referred to as the decline and the turnaround phases. In the decline phase, organizations may have the following challenges: Program participation has been reduced and there are other programs in the marketplace that are both appealing to and relevant to the service community. As signs surface regarding organizational challenges, leadership has ignored the problem, denied it, or assigned blame to other places. The Board of Directors is disconnected from the challenges of the organization until the challenges become much too big. The organization s budget is not versatile and not well thought out, usually revisiting past efforts and not steeped in current realities. Organizational processes often steer the organization into ineffective practices and infrastructure severely limits the organization. Overall, Stevens believes that in the decline stage organizations make decisions based on internal interests that are continually repeated rather than an understanding of the needs of their program participants. This challenged dichotomy eventually strains the organization s financial model, causing significant challenges to the organization s cash flow. The turnaround phase, also outlined by Stevens, outlines an organization that is in a special place in its history. As the organization has declined, so too has its place in the market significantly driven down both its demand and its revenue. Stevens believes that in this space, organizations become self-aware and use determination to reverse themselves through the lifecycle and into a more favorable position in the market, thus driving up revenue to become more supportive of their new status. According to Stevens, organizations in the turnaround phase commonly reflect the following attributes: A reassessment of programs occurs and due to this assessment programs are recast or realigned to more closely meet the needs of the market. An organizational leader grabs control of the organization, utilizing a variety of skills needed to move it through the crisis and into a healthier environment. A subsection of the committed board members re-engages to help propel the organization to a better place. The organization is utilizing a more realistic budget, showing a greater relationship between expenses and income. 6

Current organizational processes do not match the needs of a changing organization, and work might begin toward bringing them more in alignment. In Simon s book, the organization in the downward phase of the nonprofit lifecycle might be placed in Stage Five, or the Review and Renew stage. Essentially Simon believes that at this stage the organization is feeling the need to remake or redesign itself. Organizations that are in this stage begin by reviewing their efforts and subsequently use that review to redesign new areas. These redesigns can be significant or minimal, but once fulfilled the organization begins to recognize its ability to have an impact in its community. HIGH-ARC AND LOW-ARC: HOW ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DOWNWARD PHASE ARE IMPACTED As stated in earlier sections, the nonprofit lifecycle should not be viewed as a model that can be applied equally to all organizations. While there might be indicators that can give a safe assessment of where an organization may fall on the lifecycle spectrum, overall this usage of the lifecycle is flawed, specifically when trying to understand organizations that are in the downward phase of the lifecycle. For example, when looking at an organization that is over 50 years old and has an annual operating budget of over $75 million, the downward phase might be much different than a much smaller organization with a less-developed history. Can you apply the same board development techniques to the larger organization as you would to the smaller organization? Is the financial management different between the two? How agile is the larger, how advanced in its procedures, compared to the smaller group? In all of these cases, the organization s DNA is much different and therefore requires a much different look as it relates to its lifecycle. To this, we have created the concept of high-arc and low-arc organizations, where high-arc organizations follow a different set of circumstances and therefore a different set of solutions than do low-arc organizations. The arc relates closely to how the organization will move along the trajectory. We will begin by highlighting the decline phase in high-arc organizations followed by a similar analysis with low-arc organizations. It is important to note (and is discussed further in the closing chapter) that movement along the organizational trajectory is not based solely on impact; impact actually might be one of many factors that represents the organization s place on the lifecycle. While movement of the organization along the lifecycle closely relates to impact and those organizations that are obtaining a high level of impact probably are moving through the lifecycle successfully, there are a number of organizations that, while they may have more significant program impact than another organization, the organization with less impact does better in other areas like fundraising and public relations, thus possibly helping it navigate the lifecycle more successfully. Again, the debate between growth and impact will be an important closing point relating to the inherent contradictions that exist for nonprofit organizations. 7

High-Arc Organizations Decline Phase Figure 1 High-Arc Organizations High-arc organizations are those that had a long period of growth and a short period during which they sustained the organization in a constant state. Essentially organizations grow to reach a state in which they can deliver a product that works. For instance, an arts organization might find that it has established a firm footing in its community, has a consistent buying audience, has a stable facility for which to display its product and is not necessarily looking to become larger. It just wants to continue to develop and refine the effort that it spent years growing into. In high-arc organizations, this period is often the shortest time for the organization on the lifecycle, as seen in the above diagram. The sustain phase is the period of an organization s life in which building its infrastructure is supremely important. In a successful sustain phase, an organization typically engages in the following capacity building activities: Recalibrating its board of directors, creating relevant committees that establish infrastructure, solidify resources, and align closer to the organization s services. Executive leadership takes on a different form, whether through new leadership or through a new amalgam of the current leadership. Either way, executive leadership is committed to developing systems, processes, and structures. As jogging takes over for sprinting, so does sustaining for growing. It is what happens in the sustain phase that dictates the organization s trajectory; oftentimes fastgrowing organizations do not have the metabolism for a long sustain phase and quickly find themselves on the downward side of the lifecycle. Per the arc shown above, the organizational cycle is long on both startup/growth and on the downward phase of the lifecycle. There might be many reasons for this arc structure, but more than likely the start-up develops an idea with great energy that outpaces the needed infrastructure to support the organization. The organization is likely a relatively new organization circling through its first time within the lifecycle. As an example, the organization could be a microfinance group that has recently been inspired by the recent upsurge in focus on this area. Building on the public momentum of this cause, there may be an effort that is an offshoot of other like-programs that exist in other like-areas. People become excited, programs are created and implemented, resources and momentum are generated, all causing the organization to feel that the demand for its mission far exceeds the supply. There is a downside to this growth, but often the downside might not be significantly felt for a long while. The work toward growth can often overtake all other functions. Some call this growth for growth s sake. Usually the growth is a part of additional funding 8

resources that can often determine decisions, referred to by some as chasing dollars. Because of the initial high demand of the product, building internal infrastructure often takes a secondary role to the work of harnessing growth. The easy test to see where there are cracks in the organizational infrastructure might be to look at whether the organization has relevant job descriptions that somewhat match the roles being performed by staff or whether financial management reports reflect current status but do not project a longrange financial direction. These two only reflect a few of a much larger number of infrastructural cracks that could be appearing. Bypassing these cracks, or putting Band-Aids on bullet holes, is a fatal mistake that many organizations in fast or high growth commit. Bypassing these important areas is a large reason why organizations experience a shortened sustain phase and a rapid and longer-term downward phase. The infrastructure that the organization needs to assist it in the downward cycle is unfortunately not available. This lack of infrastructure often causes the challenges of the downward phase to become much more difficult, so that this phase, along with growth, dominates the organization s history. In traditional writings on the lifecycle, the sustain phase is the longest period in the organization s lifecycle, potentially lasting up to 30 years. Without a long sustain phase, organizations are forced to build needed capacity during the challenges of a downward movement. It is also important to note that while the organization may be building infrastructure during this time, it might also be re-addressing infrastructure that was either designed or implemented ineffectively. Long-serving organizations especially might have been using certain systems for decades. You might hear, We have always issued an annual appeal at the end of the summer or the standard operating procedure is one that was designed years ago and seems to work just fine. The trick to this is to understand which areas need updating and which areas are void of the proper infrastructure and need a new system. The following are important areas of capacity that high-arc organizations must build while also managing a downturn. Many of these areas are often practiced only when a crisis is presented, but high-level organizations look at these areas below as part of their ongoing organizational assessment process. They are as follows: Cash Flow Planning Often for organizations in crisis, the first time they see a cash flow statement is when cash flow becomes a serious issue. Getting an overview of an organization s cash position should not be an activity that is only reserved for organizations experiencing a cash crisis. Like many things, cash flow planning is a function that takes time to master. In addition, looking at a cash flow document when in immediate crisis is not the best time to be introduced to such a document or process. Organizations should introduce a cash flow document as a normal part of financial reporting and certainly no later than when the organization realizes that it is entering a downward phase. Enhancing Board Bench Strength - When a Board of Directors finds itself in the midst of a downward trend, a variety of challenges occurs relating to the board s connection to the 9

organization. Boards may enhance their involvement in day-to-day activities or they may begin to personally move away from the organization as the efforts become more challenging. One of the major reasons is that the skill set represented by the board members in the room is not the skill set needed to help the organization through a crisis. The board member who is great at visioning and partnerships through growth might not have the transferable skills to help during a more challenging time. Managing financial resources or human resources might be a skill set that is more needed during this time, and therefore it is important to find board members that can complement these needs. The earlier Board Report Card example is a great tool to use and would be an exercise that could help the board see glaring gaps that exist within both the board as a whole and with individual board members. Contingency Planning As an organization starts to accept that it is in challenging times, it must plan for the work needed to help itself to successfully move out of the downward phase and figure out what mechanisms will be needed to eventually lead it out of this crisis. In all parts of the lifecycle, the movement along the continuum happens in phases. These phases look different depending on the decisions happening in the prior phase. This is especially true in the downward phase. For example, say an organization decides to approach its closest funders in an attempt to obtain needed revenue to help it get through a difficult time. It has estimated a certain amount of money that will be obtained 10 through this work. If it receives 50% less than planned, its next steps will be significantly altered depending on the original plan. Scenario planning in a downward phase involves looking at major actions that will be employed during the crisis and assigning levels of possibilities, or triggers that will dictate the next steps of the organization. On the following page is a simple example of a scenario planning tree. THE MIND FRAME OF HIGH-ARC ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DECLINE PHASE An organization that is in the deep decline phase may be suffering from many infrastructure challenges, but the overwhelming challenge is one that might be entitled organizational self-esteem. The decline phase of high-arc organizations often hits the organization like a ton of bricks. It is shocking and unexpected because just a short time ago the organization was in the midst of rapid growth. Board members, community partners, and funders are often the most shocked at the infrastructure challenges because the organization publicly is still regarded as a growth organization. The buffer between an organization in the growth phase and an organization in decline is the sustain phase. When that phase is shortened, it is common for the feelings of the growth phase to still be very present as the decline starts. These feelings at some point come into direct conflict with the realities of the decline phase and ultimately organizational self-esteem begins to plummet. Like the infrastructure issues that significantly challenge the organization, organizational self-esteem becomes a major challenge that the organization must both deal with and overcome to be able to successfully navigate this phase.

1. Organization obtains 100% of goal in 2 months 1. Goal met, continue with traditional programs 2. Goal met, redesign program structure for more effectiveness 1. Organization obtains 100% of goal in 2 months 1. Goal met, continue with traditional programs 2. Goal met, redesign program structure for more effectiveness Organization has a major short-term deficit. Organization decides to approach key, long-term donors. 2. Organization obtains less than 100% but more than 75% of goal in 2 months 3. Organization obtains less than 50% of goal in 2 months 1. Cut programs with smaller numbers and funding bases 2. Approach new tier of funders to obtain the remaining 25% 1. Cut additional programs and/or shrink existing programs, cut admin 2. Approach new tier of funders to obtain the remaining 25% 4. Organization obtains less than 25% of goal in 2 months 1. Cut majority of programs, holding on to flagship initiative. 2. Outside of additional funders, try alternative fundraising efforts Figure 2 The Planning Tree Understanding organizational self-esteem is not that much different than understanding individual self-esteem. According to leadership expert Mitch McCrimmon, those suffering from low self-esteem might feel the following: Feeling like a failure relative to everyone else and doubting they can achieve anything Playing it safe, not trying anything new Overly depending on others to look after them Escaping unpleasant realities Putting themselves down constantly Feelings of Failure/Doubt The shock of being in this downward stage can immediately cause organizations to feel both failure and doubt. These feelings can easily become the dominant feelings within the organization. Risk-Averse The current trajectory has caused the organization to be in this stage. The organization must change. The organization may realize that change is needed but moving away from even standard organizational practices proves to be difficult. You might hear the phrase, This is the way things have always been done uttered repeatedly. Applying the same characteristics to high-arc organizations in the decline phase, these organizations often exhibit the following relating to those characteristics: 11 Dependency Dependency relates directly to the organization s relationship to leadership. If the board has been the dominant voice within the organization and its decisions have largely contributed to the organization s challenges, logic might lead someone to think

that there must be a change in the dominant leadership individual or group. But often the organization recommits to the challenged leadership structure because it has developed a level of dependency on that model that clouds the necessary steps needed to change the leadership structure. Reality Aversion One of the biggest challenges in the downward phase, especially for groups in high-arc organizations, is that the time of organizational growth is still so fresh in their minds that it can often blind them to current realities. The challenge comes when organizations don t accept that they are facing tough times and act as if they were still in the high growth phase. Negativity In tough times it is common for individuals to start to abandon the teamwork that they may have experienced in growth and start assigning blame to those they feel are responsible for the current challenges. This causes the organization to shift its focus from alleviating the structural issues to concentrating on the emotional and relational issues. Focusing on these is very important, but the negativity will force the emotional and relational challenges to expand rather than to contract, requiring now more time and energy. As you can see from the above outline of the organizational self-esteem characteristics of high-arc organizations in the downward phase of the lifecycle, the challenges of the feelings and confidence of an organization can have a major impact on its future. The following are individual solutions relating to each characteristic that an organization can use to help change negative self-esteem to positive, a Tony Robbins-esque approach to dealing with low organizational self-esteem. The solutions are as follows: Overcoming Feelings of Failure/Doubt When the organization starts to get down on itself, an activity that allows the organization to look at itself in its current form can be very valuable. One way to do this is to conduct a SWOT analysis, which is the Ghost of Christmas Present exercise that allows the organization to see how it looks at the current day and time. In the appendix is a standard SWOT Analysis template, which helps the organization outline its challenges and strengths to build a common understanding of the issues, remind itself of its strengths, and work out solutions to current issues. Risk-Averse Risk-averse does not mean that at the time of crisis the organization is going to take a radical turn in an opposite direction. If you re a community gardening organization, don t all of a sudden become an association of scientists. Risk-averse is more about letting go than about moving forward. The practices that have gotten the organization into trouble are the practices that need changing. One of the best ways to move out of current ineffective practices is to see how others are performing and latch onto the practices that are effective and make most sense for the organization to adopt. Organizational shadowing or mentoring is a great way for an organization to see the inside functioning of another organization and then adopt the best practices from those visits. It becomes less risky of a proposition if the risk is being practiced by like-minded groups. Dependency One of the major reasons an organization might experience a sharp decline along the lifecycle is when their executive leaves suddenly. The organization s dependence on the leader is showcased strongly when the organization falters in his or her absence. A strong board of directors that embeds itself into the day-to-day operations of 12

the organization, especially in times of crisis, does so to the potential detriment of staff buying into the direction of the organization laid out by the board. Both situations outline the levels of dependency of the organization on its leadership and relate to the organization not diversifying its leadership. Later in the chapter we will outline a tool, entitled the Internal Management Dashboard (IMD), that addresses the issue of diversifying both leadership and management approaches while concentrating tactics and perspectives on the most pressing and relevant issues facing the organization. Reality Aversion Reality aversion deals mainly with two different scenarios. The first scenario is that individuals within the organization are unknowingly avoiding the organization s current reality because they are generally unaware of the state of the organization. In this situation there are dual views of the organization s reality. The second scenario is that there is a common understanding of the organization s current challenges but one or more of the individuals or parties does not subscribe to the reality and operates according to a prior reality. As we discussed earlier, many individuals within a high-arc organization in decline may not want to admit that the organization is in decline, particularly when the organizational growth is still in recent memory. The solution to dealing with the first scenario, having multiple viewpoints on the status of the organization, is having the organization go through an assessment like the CCAT assessment. The results of an organizational assessment can help all within the organization gain clear footing on what the status of the organization is. The second situation becomes more difficult because there is knowledge of the organization s challenges but one party disagrees with the assessment and wants to act counter to the necessary path for the organization. The solution to this is to center on the creation of avenues for dialogue and discussion. Through communication, having a goal aimed at finding common ground on the organization s current reality can help the organization move forward toward new realities. Negativity It is easy in an environment of challenges, some of them major, for individuals not only to begin to feel negative but also to convey this negativity to small and/or large groups of individuals. This negativity can start among a small group of people and grow to be felt among more and more people each day. It is important that this negativity is addressed through an open process, that organizational values are established that address the base, and that those individuals having a hard time use the mechanisms in place to talk about their negative feelings or perceptions. The solution to creating this environment is to have a facilitated discussion on the values of the organization during organizational change. Creating norms that outline how difficult feelings and perceptions will be discussed and dealt with will create avenues of accountability and mechanisms to deal with the negativity before it impacts the effort. LOW-ARC ORGANIZATIONS DECLINE PHASE Figure 3 Low-Arc Organizations 13

As we have explained, organizations might be operating from a variety of different organizational trajectories and arcs. We previously discussed the attributes of a higharc organization, whose organizational history has been concentrated in high growth and steep decline. The central difference between high-arc and low-arc organizations is the sustain phase. As we ve noted about high-arc organizations, the sustain phase is the shortest time in the history of the organization. In lowarc organizations, the sustain phase occupies the longest part of the organization s recent trajectory. Low-arc organizations are often much older and have probably cycled through the lifecycle more than once. Movement within the low-arc organizations can appear to be much slower because most of the work is being done within the sustain phase, when the organization programmatically is close to a central theme or premise and is essentially delivering on that premise. High-arc organizations and low-arc organizations are often similar in one large respect, usually apparent during the time when the organization realizes that it is in decline. They both most likely feel surprised by their current state. The difference is that high-arc organizations are surprised by the infrastructure issues that were never addressed because of a lack of a sustain phase while the low-arc organizations are surprised that there has been a slow tearing of the infrastructure of the organization that has suddenly been revealed. The best example of this can be seen in program effectiveness. A low-arc organization may have a series of programs that have been delivered for a long period of time. Human service agencies with storied histories might have one or more signature programs that have been within their program mixture for years. Using the human service example, the program upon creation might have been unique, high-impact, and innovative. As times and communities change, perhaps the program became less relevant, or the evaluation criteria became stale, or the impact was reduced. Many times the organization is delivering a program simply because the program has always been delivered. As this happens over time, competitive programs become more effective in meeting the needs of the same population and the funding community shifts along with the competitive programs. The end result is that the organization s key programs have found themselves on the outside looking in as they relate to the funding community and program participants have made the transition to the organization with the more effective delivery system. If the organization s primary programs represent 40% of the budget, because of the shift by funders and the community there might be a 10% or more shift in program funding. This can present a major challenge to the direction of an organization. The above challenge can also apply to a lowarc organization s Board of Directors. As anyone who has visited a number of Board of Directors meetings would note, they often can be steeped in ritual. Members sit in the same seating arrangements; certain people deliver the same messages, and the agenda that was created is exactly the same with only the date updated. In this type of organization, you might see board members with over 10 or 20 years as part of the group. Like performing certain program activities because they have always been performed, board members fit into patterns that are replicated at every board meeting. Bob is the financial expert and Jean is the individual with direct experience in our program areas and they will perform these roles in the play called Board of Directors. As the programs begin to tear and the board 14

continues to perform the same play, there becomes a widening gap between the product and the governing structure. The long period that is the sustain phase for the low-arc organization eventually causes the Board of Directors to become very far removed from the mission of the organization, which in turn affects its ability to both obtain resources and publically advocate for the organization. A far-removed Board of Directors can have major challenges for an organization in the decline phase of the lifecycle, including having a significant impact on future funding and a frayed role in guiding the organizational leader. The prime advantage that a low-arc organization has over a high-arc organization is that low-arc organizations have time to make adjustments to their trajectory whereas high-arc organizations are reacting to a steady decline along their trajectory. Similar to the organizational self-esteem characteristics experienced by high-arc organizations, lowarc organizations experience characteristics often seen in those that are complacent. Characteristics of complacency might include: Trusting to a Flaw Trust is at the base of routine. Using the same hairstylist or buying fruit from the same farmers market for years are examples of how routine filters into our daily lives. We trust that we will receive a good haircut or fresh fruit each time we visit. The same trust applies to leadership in the organization. As the organization looks and feels the same each and every day, over time everyone develops a sense of trust that the organization will look and feel the same tomorrow. This blind trust can have a lasting negative impact on the organization because it does not shift even though outside the organization there are a variety of factors changing every day, including philanthropy, community needs, and socioeconomic demographics. Not Broke, Don t Fix It - If the impulse arises by some to tinker under the hood and fix certain areas within a low-arc organization, there might be push back among others who argue, If it s not broke, then don t fix it. The challenges with this notion are twofold. The first is that there are differing views on what broke means. This viewpoint assumes that the organization must be in a much more challenging position before the organization should fix it, essentially advocating for the organization to nearly be broke financially or broken structurally before taking action. The second challenge, which is more cultural, is that the leadership has taken a position of not dealing with issues as they become issues. The ability to deal with organizational issues is important for all levels of leadership, and tabling these efforts limits the leadership s ability to address challenges. The ability to effectively deal with organizational challenges is a muscle that needs to be worked out or the ability to eventually deal with challenges will be jeopardized. Macro, Macro, and More Macro Oftentimes organizational leaders believe that a macroperspective is the primary perspective they are able to adhere to. Numerous books, management schools, and leadership theories encourage leaders to enhance their ability to look at an organization from a macro-level. Aside from theory, a macro-level overview dissuades leaders from using energy to look at efforts from a micro-level. Micro-level analysis takes a great deal of time and energy, and leadership often resorts to focusing solely on a macro-level viewpoint. Board members also fall victim to this, deciding that a microlevel view might mean that they are involving themselves too closely in the day-to-day or 15

that there are not opportunities for board members to have a micro-level view. Passion to Mission Equation One of the main differences between growing organizations and those efforts in the sustain and decline stages is that organizations in the growth stage often exhibit a high level of energy toward their mission. This is the main reason why these organizations are growing-- the momentum and excitement that is felt causes partners, staff, and funders to continue to be engaged. If you are sitting in a board meeting or walking into the lobby of an organization in the sustain phase, you would never suspect that the effort is geared toward a specific mission. There is minimal excitement for the effort and one might feel that the organization is merely going through the motions. The loss of energy or the perception that energy is lost, around the mission of an organization poses a variety of potential challenges to the organization, including the negative impacts to staff morale and negative interactions with partners and clients. The above characteristics of organizational complacency outline how a low-arc organization can leave the sustain phase and enter the decline phase because of the organization s inability or unwillingness to step up and address minimal issues that later become much larger. The following are individual solutions relating to each characteristic: Trusting to a Fault Having trust in an organization is an earned status. Getting to this point was an awesome but difficult journey and having enough faith in the organization without having to be embedded in its every fiber is a great experience due to much hard work. Essentially, the engine has been built and now the organization can drive. 16 The challenge is that every once in a while you have to take the car in for a diagnostics. Low-arc organizations should create a battery test that outlines the functioning of the organization, an internal audit that outlines a variety of areas. An example of an organizational diagnostic is attached in the appendix. Not Broke, Don t Fix It This can almost be equated to a disease or a syndrome. The symptoms include consistently repeating the same patterns and blocking new ideas or efforts at the expense of these patterns. The solution to this problem is to break up the process that dictates the patterns. If board members sit in the same seats in board meetings or flow through the same agenda patterns, then have a standing policy that board meetings will have features that change with each meeting, like an issue speaker or a client presentation. Change the meeting location. If an executive comes in each morning and immediately goes to the office to pour through e-mails, have the executive step out of the office each day and spend some time walking through the programs and visiting with staff. The walk-through can change both the perspective and approach to the executive s work. Macro, Macro, and More Macro When a low-arc organization realizes that it is beyond the sustain phase and is in decline, the worry of many executives is the reaction of the board. A board may immediately become more hands-on--or it may decide to be more hands-off. Finding the right mix of involvement becomes the work of both the board and the executive. One of the signs that a low-arc organization is in the decline phase is that there has been a gradual peeling off of board members. The organization is different from when they started and their roles have

become stagnant. Boards often replace these board members with exact replicas of the previous person, meaning we lost a zookeeper and so we need to find another zookeeper to fill this gap. This is a flawed strategy and misses an opportunity at a critical time to gain the board member that the organization truly needs. The board member that you needed in the growth phase is much different than the board member you need in decline, and therefore having someone who is a specialevent expert might not be as relevant as you watch your cash flow more closely. Maybe someone who is an expert in human resources or real estate financing might be more optimal in the current state. A board matrix is a common tool used to gain understanding of what the organization s board needs in terms of members versus what the board currently has in terms of membership skills and resources. Attached is a common board matrix. One solution to moving from an entirely macro perspective on the board is to change the board roles, allowing new member roles that look closely at specific areas that are most pertinent to the organization in the decline phase. The board is an amoeba-like entity, changing to best meet the needs of the organization, and therefore should change to meet the needs in the decline phase. Passion to Mission Equation A common statement that one might hear from groundlevel staff during a crisis is that the board and the executives don t care about the work of the organization. Attend a board meeting during times of decline and ask individual board members what the organization is doing on the ground: if it is an 11-member board you will probably get 11 different responses. The problem here is not a question of passion, but a problem of connection--a connection to the work, a connection to the staff, and a connection to the mission. This disconnect 17 can be seen as a lack of passion. The disconnect can be solved, but being regarded as dispassionate is a hard challenge to overcome. The solution becomes taking those regarded as dispassionate and creating space for them to again become connected and to develop relationships to those who are probably mischaracterizing them. It is always hard to find ways to showcase the great strengths and qualities of board members to others outside of senior leadership. During times of crisis or decline, the solution to the passion challenge is to shrink the space between those on the front line and those at the executive and board levels to show that there is a common affinity toward the mission. THE ARC DURING CRISIS In September of 2008 the United States economy began to experience a very serious economic crisis. This economic downturn changed the landscape of a number of arenas, including the nonprofit and philanthropic landscape. Philanthropic giving has shifted, foundations have re-prioritized, and government contracting has become more burdensome. This has caused major financial challenges for a majority of nonprofit organizations. This has also changed the arc of nonprofit organizations, especially those approaching the decline phase. The length of time that an organization can be in the decline phase can be anywhere from 3 to 10 years. During tough economic times, because of the challenges mentioned above and others, this time frame can be significantly reduced, for reasons outlined below. In addition, several solutions are offered within each of the challenge areas. The challenges and solutions are as follows: Cash Flow Challenges When a funder changes its giving strategy due to the economy, it often has to make very difficult

decisions that can have a sweeping impact on a nonprofit organization. Similarly, when a government agency, many times a state agency, is forced to alter its payment structure or reduce payments toward its contracts, this can have a huge negative impact on the organizations the agency contracts with. These revenue challenges can force organizations to confront tough financial decisions, and if cash flow is in a position that is very serious, decisions often reserved for the turnaround phase are forced to be discussed much earlier. Low-arc organizations may have had arcs that show a much higher arc during times of crisis, and high-arc organizations have an arc that looks more like a cliff, mainly due to cash flow challenges presented by negative revenue changes. In looking at an organization s cash flow, one of the areas in which significant resources are allocated is payroll. In fact, the majority of organization expenses go toward human capital. While staffing cuts can be expected, the staffing allocations should also be revisited to see if there might be areas of movement that could be considered to help alleviate the need for future cuts. For example, administrative and technical staff are often left out of the program staffing mix when in fact these staff members do spend their time working directly on behalf of the programs. Work with a government contract to re-shift the contract to include these staff members might prove fruitful to the organization. Board Readiness As discussed earlier, boards in low-arc organizations that are approaching or are in decline may not have either the skill set or the makeup to fully take on a decline that is now more rapid. Essentially, they got out of shape during the sustain phase and now are being asked to compete in the 400M sprint. It is just not going to go well. The board needs to be a real asset in helping the 18 organization navigate a decline phase that is at a steeper arc, and often as the tough times have pushed the arc up, the board is left flatfooted. A potential solution to this issue might be to have a board re-orientation that reacquaints board members to the state of the organization and what their role or responsibility needs to be to help the organization in this new economic climate. If a strategic plan exists for the organization, have a working session that revisits the assumptions laid out in the strategic plan; discuss the new assumptions and realities that exist and decide how the strategic plan should be operationalized based on this new view. Staff Readiness While staff may not have become complacent during the decline phase, the way they went about their work is much different during the sustain phase than it is during the decline phase. The sudden movement from one phase to another can bring a great level of confusion to a staff that may align more closely to the phase that they were most recently in. This becomes exacerbated when the phase they are moving into is the decline phase, in which the organization is cast in a challenging light. Where staff members were once talking about program efforts they are now talking about staff cuts. This sudden shift can bring a number of challenges ranging from staff morale and trust of leadership to the reshifting of roles and limited resources to implement. Similar to the solutions offered regarding the board, staff should also be engaged in a process that discusses how their work should change, understanding the new economic realities in play. In addition, because often the majority of staff may have not been involved in some of the top-level discussions, create an

open space where staff can discuss their current feelings about the organization and have an opportunity to offer feedback about its future. Oftentimes leadership closes up the lines of communication, essentially feeding the staff information as if they were feeding a bird, offering a small pellet of food when needed. Leadership should take the opposite approach by creating avenues for staff dialogue and feedback that will allow them to recommit themselves and create buy-in to the tough decisions necessary to make it through difficult times. Mission Impact If you re a doctor and you re going into surgery, one would assume that the surgery table has all the tools necessary to perform that surgery. Now imagine taking away the scalpel or the EKG machine. Can you do the work as effectively? In times of crisis, the use of all the tools that were available during the sustain phase is naturally recalibrated during the decline phase; when an economic crisis is thrown on top of the decline phase, the tools that an organization has to achieve its mission are reduced even more. In thinking about the solution, move the medical team to a community where the same surgery is routinely conducted with much less of the resources that are seen in resource-rich communities. For instance, say you ship the operating room at the Mayo Clinic to a less resourced hospital. The doctors in the lessresourced community may be amazed at the resources that are available at the Mayo Clinic room, but they ultimately will resort to a majority of the tools in their room because they have been able to successfully meet the needs of their patients with these tools. Sure, they may be able to use some of the resources offered by the Mayo Clinic room, but as they are able to meet the immediate needs of the community and have been successful with their model, they may adjust only slightly with 19 the addition of the new tools. Organizations should not be thinking about achieving less impact during tough times but about recalibrating the way in which the work is conducted to achieve the same level of impact and potentially achieving even greater impact. Funder and Partner Relationships When guests are scheduled to come and visit, it s a common practice for the hosts to clean up the house to give the impression that the house always looks immaculate. The same follows suit for when organizations are in the decline phase. When a funder does a site visit, many nonprofits put on their Sunday best as staff members may stand a little straighter, hallways look a little cleaner, and programs look a little crisper during these visits. The discussion of an organization s challenges becomes a risky proposition due to the potential of funding being lost. This is not a situation entirely created by the nonprofit organization. In fact, it is a problem that has been created by funders as real dialogue has often been punished later by a funder s decision. The same also holds true when we meet with community partners, partly for the same reasons as the funders but also because the organization must sustain an impression that it is strong and that all is well. The inability of organizations to engage in a peerto-peer dialogue on organizational challenges cuts out important best-practice exchanges and opportunities for mentorship. In addition, as funders are hubs for many like-minded organizations, funders are often missing the opportunity to engage organizations in real peer-to-peer learning. Solutions to this issue are numerous, but one of the main solutions is to allow partners and funders into the conversation about successfully pulling through this tough economic environment. In relation to

partners, outline all the resources of both partner organizations to discover potential gaps that exist between each partner and how the partners might be able to assist in meeting each other s needs. For example, one partner might outline a real need in technology staffing while the other might suggest that it has a great full-time technology manager that has time that could be dedicated to the needs of the partner. The partner could essentially share in the costs and abilities of this previously underutilized technology staff. resources. One of their resources is their access to information. If a funder receives a couple dozen mid-year reports on the progress and results of their grantees, is it possible that this information might be of interest to other like-minded organizations. Foundations could develop a mechanism to share this information while also facilitating dialogue among their grantees on best practices and approaches to tough economic times. Funders can be an excellent matchmaker for organizations looking for new approaches to their work. Much has been discussed about the resources that funders have outside of financial THIS EXCERPT IS FROM THE BOOK, NONPROFIT CAPACITY BUILDING You May Visit Amazon for Purchasing Details at: http://www.amazon.com/building-nonprofit-capacity-organizational- Lifecycles/dp/0470907770/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1344312802&sr=8-1&keywords=building+nonprofit+capacity Visit the Book s Website to Find Out More Information: www.buildingnonprofitcapacity.com 20

ANTECEDENTS TO NONPROFIT ADVOCACY: WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT GOVERNANCE OR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE? Katrina L. Miller-Steven, PhD is an Assistant Professor of Urban Studies and Public Administration at Old Dominion University. Matthew J. Gable is a doctoral student in the Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration at Old Dominion University. N onprofit advocacy is a common reality in today s policy arena, but there is limited research on the antecedents to nonprofit advocacy activities. This study examines the impacts of two crucial facets of nonprofit organizations on advocacy: processes of governance, such as board activity; and organizational structure, such as staff and budget size, age, and membership. The study incorporates a nationwide survey of state nonprofit associations that are registered with the National Council of Nonprofits, interviews with leaders in these organizations, and a case study of an association influential in the policy arena. The authors explore nonprofit governance and organizational structure individually and in tandem by asking: Which is more important to nonprofit advocacy, governance or organizational structure? INTRODUCTION Over the last 30 years the number of nonprofit organizations in the United States has more than doubled, and citizens have developed a dependence on the nonprofit sector to provide public goods and services (Hall, 1992; Salamon, 2002; Berry & Arons, 2003). With this increasing responsibility, many nonprofit organizations have taken on the role of advocate for the public s welfare. Indeed, according to LeRoux (2009, p. 504), Private nonprofit organizations represent a substantial group of third-party agents that deliver public services. As a result, nonprofit organizations have established an influential position in the implementation and formulation of public policies at the national, state, and local levels (Child & Grønbjerg, 2007). With the fast-paced growth of the nonprofit sector, scholars have become increasingly interested in nonprofit organizations use of advocacy to influence agenda setting and the policy process (Berry, 2007). Previous literature on nonprofit advocacy has largely explored external motivation, such as the political environment, and internal mission as factors that influence the nature in which nonprofit organizations advocate. Fewer studies have examined the impacts of nonprofit organizations institutional characteristics and resources on their advocacy activities (Hale, 2004). This study delves into this line of research by exploring the relationships between organizational structure, governance, and the nature of advocacy activities of nonprofit organizations. The study examines governance processes and organizational structure individually and in tandem as antecedents that influence the nature in which nonprofit organizations choose to advocate on a policy issue. To explore this topic, the authors interviewed and surveyed 21

individuals working in state nonprofit associations that are members of the National Council of Nonprofits. The study is organized into several sections. The early sections define state nonprofit associations, advocacy, governance, and organizational structure within a nonprofit context. Next, the methodology and tools for gathering data are explained, including a case study of one prominently influential state nonprofit association,¹ a nationwide survey of state nonprofit associations, and follow-up interviews of individuals working in the associations. The results discuss the findings based on the case study, survey analysis, and follow-up interviews. Finally, the conclusions provide interpretive insight for the importance of this research to nonprofit organizations that are active in policy advocacy. National Council of Nonprofits seeks to expand the capacity of state-based and regional associations of nonprofits and grantmakers via public initiatives and the promotion of a cohesive vision that emphasizes the importance of nonprofits and philanthropy (Abramson & McCarthy, 2002, p. 336). The National Council of Nonprofits membership consists of state nonprofit associations that provide advocacy and member assistance functions on sectorwide issues that are pertinent to the regions where the state nonprofit associations are located. The National Council of Nonprofits represents its members, state nonprofit associations, on national and state levels (National Council of Nonprofits, 2011) while the state nonprofit associations represent their nonprofit members on a state or local level (National Council of Nonprofits, 2011a). This study seeks to answer the following questions: Is there a relationship between processes of governance, organizational structure, and nature of advocacy activities? More specifically, how does governance impact the nature in which an organization chooses to advocate? How does organizational structure impact the nature in which nonprofit organizations advocate? Finally, which is more important to nonprofit advocacy, governance or organizational structure? The overall goal of this research is to present a perspective on nonprofit advocacy activity that can serve as a canvas within which nonprofit governance and organizational structure can be framed. STATE NONPROFIT ASSOCIATIONS This research explores state nonprofit associations that are members of the National Council of Nonprofits. The 22 State nonprofit associations are umbrella organizations with memberships primarily consisting of 501(c)(3) organizations (Young, 2001). The associations act as a means for collective action and a vehicle to shape the nonprofit sector. Nonprofit umbrella organizations represent the nonprofit sector as a whole by providing advocacy and fostering relationships between the nonprofit community and policymaking, promoting research on the nonprofit sector, providing and improving technical assistance of nonprofit organizations, and providing education and training services to leaders and workers in the nonprofit sector (Abramson & McCarthy 2002; Phillips, 2006). According to Phillips (2006, p. 5), The distinctive value of infrastructure [umbrella] organizations is their ability to communicate among a broad diversity of community actors, and to bridge the set of actors.

Abramson and McCarthy (2002) remark that as the nonprofit sector in the United States has grown, the strength and importance of nonprofit umbrella organizations has grown as well. However, there has been little systematic analysis of these organizations and few data sources or previous studies from which to draw information. This study fills this gap in the literature by exploring state nonprofit associations from an organizational perspective as it applies to the broader context of nonprofit advocacy. The National Council of Nonprofits (2011, sec. 4) writes that state nonprofit associations are formed to advance the role of nonprofit organizations to help them engage in critical policy issues affecting the sector, manage and lead more effectively, collaborate and exchange solutions, and achieve greater impact in their communities. At the time of this study, the National Council of Nonprofits membership included 40 active state nonprofit associations in the United States with a collective membership of over 20,000 nonprofit organizations. State nonprofit associations are of particular interest to scholars studying advocacy strategies of nonprofit organizations in that, unlike the majority of nonprofit organizations, policy advocacy is a primary goal stated in the missions of most associations. Because state nonprofit associations are active in the policy arena, they provide a representative sample of nonprofit organizations engaged in advocacy activities. NONPROFIT ADVOCACY DEFINED When referring to nonprofit advocacy, it is important to note the interpretation of this 23 concept as used in this study. The nonprofit literature offers many definitions of advocacy. Boris and Krehely (2002, p. 299) note that advocacy is a vital, traditional role of nonprofit organizations. According to Ferris (1998, p. 145), Policy advocacy nonprofits aim to influence the outcomes of the public policymaking process by shaping the policy agenda, offering and analyzing policy options, and monitoring the implementation of adopted policies. Advocacy has also been defined by Reid (2000) and Fox (2001) as influencing public opinion, defending the interests of entire groups of excluded or disenfranchised people, and encompassing efforts to defend against abuses of public power. Reid (2000) argues that advocacy strategies are intended to impact agenda setting, policy design, implementation, monitoring, and feedback. Berry and Arons (2003) suggest nonprofit organizations choose to advocate for a number of reasons: they utilize the political system to pursue or protect important social programs that will benefit society, or they may be motivated to defeat a policy that will have negative impacts on the nonprofit sector. In another study, Child and Grønbjerg (2007, p. 259) note nonprofit organizations advocate when changes in tax rates modify incentives for charitable contributions, or when regulations require nonprofits to disclose financial information or refrain from certain types of financial or political activities. Or finally, Nicholson- Crotty (2007) concludes nonprofit organizations may advocate due to their close political ties to a legislator working on a specific issue on the policy agenda that is of interest to the nonprofit sector. Taking these definitions and interpretations into account, this study defines advocacy as influencing public opinion and policymakers

through grassroots and direct efforts with the goal of shaping the policy agenda. PROCESSES OF GOVERNANCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE DEFINED In a broad sense, a governance infrastructure is the collection of technologies and systems, people, policies, practices, and relationships that interact to support governing activities (Johnston, 2010, p. s122). Governance often represents a flat, networked, multi-sector governing arrangement (Bingham, Nabatchi, & O'Leary, 2005). In the nonprofit sector, however, a more intraorganizational focus of governance is often employed; one that focuses on boards and the policies resultant of their decision making a process approach. This approach focuses on the decision-making apparatuses, groups, and actors that are realities for nonprofit organizations. Herman (2009) notes that both U.S. law and widely accepted norms about nonprofits hold that boards of directors are ultimately responsible for the organizations they oversee (p. 387). According to Laughlin and Andringa (2007, p. 1), there are almost two million nonprofit organizations in the United States, all of which have boards and most of which have someone functioning as the CEO. Indeed, in many cases, governance within a nonprofit organization is regarded as the board-and-chief executive officer relationship. Governance used in this study s nonprofit association setting includes the organization s political decision-making procedures most often established and administered by a board and staff. The study also applies Stone s (1996) interpretation of nonprofit governance in 24 which she explores the roles of the board of directors and executive directors in developing interorganizational and external advocacy efforts on behalf of social service agencies. In her study based on a review of documents spanning over 40 years, she concludes that the board of directors, the executive director, and associate director have consistently been involved with external advocacy efforts of the organization over time. Similar to Stone, the current study explores the processes in which state nonprofit associations determine whether or not to advocate for a policy issue. This research will identify specifically the processes of governance of the board of directors and other leadership positions within state nonprofit associations in their efforts to engage in advocacy activities. The official and unofficial interactions between nonprofit boards and their chief executive officers and staff frame processes of governance. The authors assert that these processes of governance are at the heart of decision making within nonprofit organizations, and the policies and procedures resulting from this process directly impact how and when a nonprofit organization will advocate for a policy issue. Research on governance and advocacy is a critically important facet of nonprofit studies, yet there is a dearth of literature on this topic. Contrasted with processes of governance, organizational structure represents a more tangible if not more quantifiable facet of nonprofit existence. There have been a limited number of studies that focus directly on the impacts of specific organizational characteristics of nonprofit organizations on advocacy activity, and many of these studies are dated. For example, in a study by Rees

(1999), representatives from the twelve most influential nonprofit organizations in the policy arena as rated by Congressional members and White House staff were asked to report on their organizational characteristics including budget, staff, and membership size. Rees then asked respondents to report on the tactics the organizations employ for public policy and advocacy communications. Rees concludes that staff size, budget, and membership did not have an impact on the types of advocacy strategies the organizations employed, but these factors did have an impact on how often the tactics were employed. A second study by McNutt and Boland (1999) surveyed 54 state affiliates of a national social work professional association to determine the types of electronic advocacy techniques employed by the organizations in their efforts to influence state-level policy agendas. Participants were asked to report on their organizational characteristics including the number of paid staff, percentage of time that staff spent working on policy change, and electronic advocacy techniques employed by the organization. Contrary to Rees (1999), McNutt and Boland (1999) found that staff size and budget do impact the types of advocacy strategies employed by the organization. In a more recent study of advocacy activities of nonprofit human services agencies in the Washington, D.C. area, Donaldson (2007) examines the correlation between organizational factors such as budget and staff size, age of the organization, and leadership as they relate to advocacy behavior. Through her survey and followup interviews, Donaldson concludes these organizational factors do influence the 25 tactics chosen when engaging in advocacy activities. This research applies the methods and characteristics presented in the aforementioned studies for exploring the impacts of organizational structure on advocacy activities of state nonprofit associations. Conceptually, if processes of governance represent a democratic will of the organization (or board) manifest in policy, organizational structure represents tangible realities or characteristics of the organization. Both of these factors are studied here, in tandem, combining diverse literatures and incorporating a somewhat novel approach in the context of state nonprofit associations advocacy activities. Of course, governance decision-making processes and organizational structure are interconnected in a myriad of ways (Stone, 1996). The interconnectedness of the will of an organization through governance and its characteristics described via organizational structure are another crucial reason to study these concepts in tandem. As Donaldson (2007, p. 156) notes, organizational models that support advocacy include a budget line item for advocacy, a dedicated staff person to coordinate advocacy functions, and agency leadership, embodied in the Executive Director and Board members, who support the advocacy functions of the agency, thus emphasizing elements of both organizational structure and processes of governance. METHODOLOGY Data for this survey was collected by distributing 138 surveys to nonprofit leaders and staff members of the 40 state nonprofit associations that were members of the

National Council of Nonprofits in 2009. The survey was sent via email and hard copy to the director/chief executive officer/president (titles vary by association) of each state nonprofit association and to other staff members working on advocacy activities. Surveys were distributed to an average of three individuals per state nonprofit association. The majority of state nonprofit associations include a paid staff of 32 individuals or less with some state nonprofit associations employing one staff member. Therefore, a limited number of individuals at each association work on advocacy activities, which limits the sample size. The data for this survey focuses on one particular element of advocacy: that of nonprofit lobbying. Lobbying activities are a facet of greater advocacy activities, and these activities are restricted in 501(c)(3) organizations.² The survey s emphasis on lobbying activities has advantages for this study. Lobbying activities are distinctly categorized into direct and grassroots tactics rather than the broader and more nebulous concept of advocacy, which makes participation in this activity easier to measure and analyze, and thus provides a more coherent slice of advocacy. Direct and grassroots lobbying tactics specifically aim to influence public policy, whether directly or indirectly. Direct tactics include activities designed to persuade policymakers (e.g. legislators, staff members of legislators, governors) on a policy issue, while grassroots tactics include activities designed to persuade the general public on a policy issue. The survey asked participants to report on the frequency of use and perceived effectiveness of lobbying tactics employed by their association from 2008-2009. Participants rated the frequency of use of 48 lobbying tactics³ on a scale of zero to four with 0= Never, 1= Relatively infrequent, 2= Sometimes, but not often, 3= Often, but not ongoing, 4= Ongoing. Participants then rated their perceived effectiveness of each tactic (tactics not used were omitted from this part of the survey) on a scale of one to four with 1= Low effectiveness, 2= Moderate effectiveness, 3= High effectiveness, 4= Very high effectiveness. The survey did not offer an option of 0= Not effective based on the assumption that use of the tactic indicated some perception of effectiveness. Participants were also asked to report on their individual associations organizational characteristics, including year founded, number of nonprofit members, total number of staff and volunteers, annual expense budgets, number of staff and volunteers that work on lobbying, percent of overall budget spent on lobbying-related activities, and percent of overall time spent on lobbying activities. Of the 138 surveys administered to individuals working on advocacy activities in the state nonprofit associations, 47 surveys were returned with a 34 percent response rate. Respondents and nonrespondents of the survey do not differ significantly. Thus, the authors conclude the results can be generalized across the 40 state nonprofit associations. More importantly, the 47 individuals who returned surveys represent 27 (68 percent) of the 40 associations that were members of the National Council of Nonprofits at the time of this study. Follow-up interviews were also conducted to gain a more in-depth understanding of state nonprofit associations use of lobbying tactics, organizational structures, and processes of governance of the associations. Thirteen 26

interviews were conducted representing eleven state nonprofit associations. It is important to note the unit of analysis for this study is the organization, not the individual. Therefore, survey responses from states with more than one respondent were averaged to have one response per state in the data set. This approach is consistent with previous research using surveys to explore organizational levels. Survey responses within associations were very similar, thus the authors feel this approach is appropriate for the analysis. It must also be noted that one respondent s survey was thrown out due to the respondent s error. Therefore, data analyzed from the surveys are based on 26 associations, not 27. A case study was also conducted on one state nonprofit association that is perceived by its employees and the National Council of Nonprofits as highly successful in its use of advocacy and lobbying tactics to influence policy agendas. The association ranks as one of the largest state nonprofit associations in terms of paid staff and nonprofit membership. As indicated previously, the identity of the association in the case study will not be revealed in order to honor requests for anonymity. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION PROCESSES OF GOVERNANCE AND ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES Regardless of the differences in staff size, each state nonprofit association caters to the traditional nonprofit governance structure with a board of directors developing and approving the policies by which the organization runs with a director/chief executive officer/president implementing and evaluating those policies. Many of the boards of directors have committees, 27 including the executive committee or policy committee, that provide decision-making processes on particular issues of the association. In some cases, the associations are large enough to have a chief financial officer or department directors. Others consist of a small board of directors with no committees; a director/chief executive officer/president and in some cases no other staff members. While the associations are similar in the nature of their purpose, it is interesting, then, to explore how the processes of governance determine whether or not the association will employ advocacy activities on a policy issue. The following discussion explores the question of how the processes of governance of state nonprofit associations impact the nature in which an organization chooses to advocate. The process of deciding on policy actions was discussed at length during the case study interviews. The case study reveals a strong and thorough governance process between the board of directors and president of this particular organization to decide whether to advocate for a policy issue. When a policy issue arises, the president, manager of public policy, and other pertinent staff members meet to discuss the relevance of the issue to the association s mission, goals, and membership. If the staff determines that the policy issue is relevant to the association, the manager of public policy presents information on the policy issue to the chair of the public policy committee, a committee of the board of directors. The public policy committee of the association consists of the president, manager of public policy, a contract lobbyist, and members of the community that have been asked to serve on the committee due to their individual expertise on issues affecting the nonprofit sector. The

association ensures a level of statewide representation and services of the individuals serving on the committee. At the public policy committee meeting, the chair presents the policy issue to the committee, and the manager of public policy presents a recommendation of the position that the association may want to take on the issue. This recommendation is open for discussion. The public policy committee generally addresses three to five policy issues per meeting. When deciding whether to take action on a policy issue and what advocacy strategies to employ, the committee takes the following issues into consideration: 1. Whether the issue is relevant to the association s mission 2. Understanding which party has control over certain chambers in the legislature and how this will impact the policy issue 3. Understanding which legislators have influence or expertise over the issue. 4. Whether the association can remain nonpartisan in its support of the issue 5. Whether the association can work on the policy issue with legislators of both parties If the public policy committee decides to take action on a policy issue in the form of advocacy activities, recommendations for these actions are taken to the full board of directors. If the public policy committee decides not to take action on a policy issue, the committee may discuss the issue again at a future meeting. In some cases, legislation may be in its premature stages when the public policy committee first addresses a policy issue. Therefore, the committee will readdress an issue as legislation changes and progresses over time. 28 The full board of directors is responsible for asking the following questions of the public policy committees recommended actions on a policy issue: 1. Is the policy related to a group in favor of, or opposing, the association s mission? 2. Does the association want to be aligned with the policy? 3. Will alignment reflect negatively on the association? 4. Will members agree or not agree with the alignment? 5. Does the policy agenda align with the association s mission? As one member of the board of directors notes, The mission is used as a compass in deciding whether to approve the public policy committee s recommendation. In some cases, the board of directors is unable to meet to discuss a recommendation of the public policy committee. If this is the case, the manager of public policy will email the board of directors asking for their approval or objection within 48 hours to the committee s recommendation on a policy issue. In cases of emergency, the public policy committee will take action on a policy issue without the complete board of directors approval, although this is rare. In this case, the executive committee of the board of directors is informed of the public policy committee s plan of action. The executive committee will vote on the issue over email or telephone and will inform the public policy committee of its decision. While a decision has been made regarding the policy issue, the executive committee will bring the issue to the attention of the full board of directors at the next meeting so that the full board can vote on the issue. According to the chair of the board of directors, the full board often agrees with the

executive committee s decision on the policy issue. In other cases, a policy issue may be in an early stage of development with the state legislature, yet it has to be addressed in the board of directors meeting due to the fact that the board of directors only meets once every other month. In this case, the board of directors may approve action on a piece of legislation that is still in the very early stages of development in the legislature. As one board member notes, It s a bit dicey because the board of directors has to decide whether to endorse the bill, have a neutral stance, or oppose the bill based on little information. Members of the board of directors then revisit the legislation at each board of directors meeting to update the board on any changes to the bill and to vote again on whether they continue to approve or disapprove of the actions recommended by the public policy committee. The chair of the board of directors explains, Since legislative bills change frequently, it s important for the board of directors to stay updated on how the bills have changed and whether [the association] should continue to support those bills. If the board of directors approves action on a policy issue recommended by the public policy committee, the president, manager of public policy, and contract lobbyist will start the process of implementing grassroots and/or direct advocacy tactics. The manager of public policy typically initiates grassroots tactics such as emailing the association s membership or developing and scheduling town hall meetings. The manager of public policy may ask other staff at the association to assist him in creating logistics for certain events such as trainings or rallies. The contract lobbyist typically implements direct advocacy tactics such as one-on-one meetings and networking with legislators. The contract lobbyist for the association explains, Out of the 100 legislators here, it s my job to know how they [each legislator] feel [about policy issues]. The contract lobbyist also educates stakeholder groups in the business and nonprofit communities that may be impacted by the policy issue the association is advocating for or against. The contract lobbyist provides emails with information to these groups or provides information to other advocates who work with nonprofit organizations. The follow-up interviews reveal that many of the state nonprofit associations utilize public policy committees to decide whether or not to act on a policy issue, and a number of the associations hire contract lobbyists. The associations depend on contract lobbyists for their expertise on the policy process and their abilities to network with legislators. Finally, the follow-up interviews reveal one other element of governance that impacts the nature of advocacy activities of state nonprofit associations; that is the involvement of the director/chief executive officer/president in policy-related activities. State nonprofit associations with higher involvement of the director/chief executive officer/president report more frequent use of advocacy tactics and a higher emphasis in policy activity in general. One respondent in particular notes their current executive director is a visionary founder, and someone who from the beginning believed in the role of nonprofits engaging in policy, so it s always been a part of what the association does. Associations with less involvement from the director/chief executive officer/president tend to have a 29

smaller emphasis on policy and advocacy activities. In answering the question of how processes of governance impact the nature in which an organization chooses to advocate, it is clear from the information presented above that state nonprofit associations benefit from having strong leadership and governance processes in place to lead them through the difficult task of decision making. A streamlined process for deciding whether to take action on a policy issue is essential for nonprofit organizations intending to make a high impact on the policy agenda. Without these processes in place, nonprofit organizations will be less likely to act on policy issues in their communities, and thus may lose credibility as an important and influential player in the policy process. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES We now turn to the second question which examines whether the organizational structure of a state nonprofit association impacts the nature in which the organization advocates. The findings for this question are based primarily on an analysis of the survey and follow-up interviews. In the survey, respondents were asked to report on characteristics of their association s organizational structure including: year founded (age); number of nonprofit members; number of full-time, part-time, and volunteer staff and consultants; annual expense budgets, number of full-time, part-time, and volunteer staff and consultants who work on policy activities; percent of overall budget spent on advocacy-related activities; and percent of overall time spent on advocacyrelated activities. Results from the survey illustrate that state nonprofit associations organizational structures vary significantly in terms of budget size, staff size, number of volunteers, whether they employ consultants, and whether they allocate funding and staff time towards advocacy activities. Table 1 details the characteristics of the 26 state nonprofit associations organizational structures as reported by survey respondents. The states are organized from highest to lowest in terms of overall average use of advocacy strategies during the period of 2008-2009. As indicated in the table, the states with the largest annual expense budgets, number of full-time staff, and number of nonprofit members tend to engage in advocacy activities more frequently than states with smaller annual expense budgets, number of full-time staff, and number of nonprofit members. 30

State Nonprofit Association (SNA) Year Founded Nonprofit Members Annual Expense Budget Overall Staff Mean of Overall Use of Advocacy Tactics Staff Working on Advocacy Tactics Hired Consultants Volunteers Working on Advocacy Activities % of Budget Spent on Advocacy Activities % of Time on Advocacy Activities SNA 1 1990 1,200 > $1 million 41 3.07 2.5 1 30 25% 26-50% SNA 2 1992 1,700 > $1 million 23 2.86 3 0 0 25% 26-50% SNA 3 1987 1,925 > $1 million 25.5 2.29 9.5 0 0 26-50% 26-50% SNA 4 1997 1,200 > $1 million 25 2.1 2 1 0 25% 26-50% SNA 5 1990 1,575 > $1 million 17 2 1 1 0 25% 25% SNA 6 1978 1,100 > $1 million 22 1.92 3 0 0 25% 25% SNA 7 1986 1,300 > $1 million 10 1.92 1.5 1 3 25% 25% SNA8 1987 725 $500,001-$1 4.5 1.87 1.5 0 0 25% 25% million SNA 9 1994 800 $100,001-7.5 1.82 1.5 0 2 25% 25% $500,000 SNA 1977 515 > $1 million 9.5 1.71 4 3 0 25% 26-50% 10 SNA 1992 500 $100,001-6 1.6 1 0 0 25% 25% 11 $500,000 SNA 1994 660 $500,001-$1 7.5 1.51 2 0 10 25% 25% 12 million SNA 1992 1,730 > $1 million 6 1.47 3 4 3 25% 25% 13 SNA 2001 550 $100,001-4.5 1.43 1 0 0 25% 25% 14 $500,000 SNA 1976 225 > $1 million 8.5 1.39 3 0 0 25% 25% 15 SNA 1990 515 $100,001-2.5 1.38 0.5 0 0 25% 25% 16 $500,000 SNA 1984 1,800 $500,001-$1 8 1.33 2 1 0 51-75% 51-75% 17 million SNA 1927 1,257 > $1 million 23.5 1.21 0.5 0 0 25% 25% 18 SNA 1985 500 $500,001-$1 6.5 1.16 0.5 0 0 25% 25% 19 million SNA 2006 270 $100,001-4.5 1.14 0.5 1 10 25% 26-50% 20 $500,000 SNA 2007 415 $100,001-2 1.12 0 0 0 25% 25% 21 $500,000 SNA 2003 225 $100,001- - 1.04 1 2 15 25% 25% 22 $500,000 SNA 1981 360 $500,001-$1 9.5 0.96 0 0 40 25% 26-50% 23 million SNA 1997 145 < $100,000 1 0.78 0.5 0 12 25% 25% 24 SNA 2007 165 $100,001-2.5 0.73 0 1 0 25% 25% 25 SNA 26 $500,000 2004 165 $100,001- $500,000 2.5 0.6 1 0 10 25% 26-50% Table 1: Advocacy Activity and Organizational Characteristics of State Nonprofit Organizations Scale of Frequency of Use: 4=Ongoing; 3=Often, but not ongoing; 2=Sometimes, but not often; 1=Infrequently; 0=Never 31

On further investigation of the relationships between these variables and the ten most frequently used tactics, chi-square analysis reveals a significant relationship between overall annual expense budget and frequency of joining coalitions, one of the tactics listed on the survey. Table 2 shows that state nonprofit associations with annual expense budgets greater than $500,000 are more likely to join coalitions as an advocacy tactic than state nonprofit associations with budgets less than or equal to $500,000. A likely explanation for this relationship is that participation in coalitions may require specific funding allocated towards the coalition s advocacy activities. Therefore, state nonprofit associations with larger annual expense budgets may be more likely to join coalitions. meetings with legislators when advocating for a policy issue than state nonprofit associations with budgets equal to or less than $500,000. The results could indicate that state nonprofit associations with larger budgets are often larger organizations in general, and therefore may be more well known in the community and thus have easier access to legislators. Variable Meeting with Legislators High Use Low Use (n= 15) (n=11) X 2 P * Budget Size 6.00.014 >$500,000 67% 18% $500,000 33% 82% Variable Frequency of Joining Coalitions High Use Low Use (n= 15) (n=11) X 2 P * *p<.05 Table 3: Chi-square Analysis of Relationship between Budget Size and Frequency of Meeting with Legislators Budget Size 3.93.047 >$500,000 77% 27% $500,000 23% 73% *p<.05 Table 2: Chi-square Analysis of Relationship between Budget Size and Frequency of Joining Coalitions Similarly, chi-square analysis reveals a relationship between state nonprofit associations annual expense budget size and having personal meetings with legislators. As table 3 illustrates, state nonprofit associations with budgets larger than $500,000 are more likely to engage in A relationship is also revealed between overall size of staff and use of email to contact staff members of legislators. Table 4 illustrates that state nonprofit associations with larger staff sizes are more likely to email staff members of legislators as a frequent method of advocacy. State nonprofit associations with smaller staff sizes are less likely to email staff members of legislators. This result could be a reflection of the resources available to coordinate and write emails where associations with larger staffs will have more time to dedicate to this activity. 32

Variable Emailing Staff Members of Legislators High Use Low Use (n= 12) (n=14) X 2 P * Staff Size 6.00.014 Staff > 13 83% 36% Staff < 13 17% 64% *p<.05 Table 4: Chi-square Analysis of Relationship between Staff Size and Frequency of Emailing Staff Members of Legislators obligation to participate in advocacy activities, or conversely that nonprofit organizations are more likely to join state nonprofit associations with higher participation in advocacy activities. Variable Use of Advoacy Strategies High Use Low Use (n= 13) (n=13) X 2 P * Membership 1.25.000 Large 85% 15% Chi-square analysis on the relationship between age of the organization and frequency of use of advocacy strategies revealed no statistical significance. However, as illustrated by the mean of overall frequency of use in table 1, there appears to be a trend that younger state nonprofit associations participate in advocacy activities with less frequency than older state nonprofit associations. The associations with the lowest mean of overall use of advocacy strategies tend to have been established in the last ten years. In contrast, state nonprofit associations with a high mean of overall use of advocacy strategies tend to have been established in the last 20 to 30 years. One finding to note is the relationship between the size of an associations membership and overall use of advocacy tactics of an association. As indicated in table 5, state nonprofit associations with larger memberships engage in advocacy activities more frequently than state nonprofit associations with smaller memberships. This relationship could indicate that state nonprofit associations with larger memberships have a higher 33 *p<.05 Small 15% 85% Table 5: Chi-square Analysis of Relationship between Nonprofit Membership and Frequency of Use of Advocacy Strategies The second finding to note is the relationship between annual expense budget and frequency of use of advocacy strategies. Table 6 illustrates that state nonprofit associations with budgets larger than $500,000 are more likely to use advocacy strategies than state nonprofit associations with budgets equal to or less than $500,000. This result seems logical in that state nonprofit associations with larger annual expense budgets will have more resources for engaging in advocacy activities.

Variable Use of Advocacy Strategies High Use Low Use (n= 15) (n=11) X 2 P * whereas state nonprofit associations with a low emphasis on policy advocacy tend to employ grassroots advocacy strategies more frequently than direct advocacy strategies. Budget Size 7.72.005 >$500,000 73% 18% $500,000 27% 82% *p<.05 Table 6: Chi-square Analysis of Relationship between Budget Size and Frequency of Use of Advocacy Strategies Follow-up interviews offer additional insight on the relationship between organizational structure and the nature of advocacy activities. Respondents of the follow-up interviews explain that organizational structure does have an impact on the nature of advocacy activities employed by state nonprofit associations, but the more notable and unexpected factor impacting the nature of these activities is the mission of each association. Interviews illustrate that each state nonprofit association is dedicated to advancing policy issues of the nonprofit sector, but the level of commitment to this endeavor varies among associations. For example, one respondent notes her association has a low level of commitment to advocacy activities since the association is newly formed and has minimal resources. In contrast, an association that has existed for over 30 years greatly emphasizes the association s role in its mission to advance nonprofit organizations in the policy arena and therefore dedicates more staff, time, and funding towards these activities. Furthermore, state nonprofit associations with a heavier emphasis on policy advocacy in their missions tend to employ a blend of grassroots and direct advocacy strategies, 34 One final factor to consider is whether an association s membership is highly representative of the overall number of nonprofit organizations in that particular state, and whether this factor impacts the association s likelihood to advocate. Table 7 illustrates state nonprofit associations memberships compared to the total number of nonprofit organizations in each state. When comparing overall representation to the mean of overall use of advocacy strategies per state, there is little indication that membership representation of total nonprofit organizations in the state has any impact on how likely the state nonprofit association is to engage in advocacy activities. For example, the state with the highest number of nonprofit members (1,800) and total nonprofit organizations (N=156,937), with a 1.1 percent representation of membership to the total nonprofit organizations in the state, has a mean of 1.33 for overall use of advocacy strategies. In comparison, to the state with the highest mean of overall use of advocacy strategies (mean of 3.07) which has a total of 1,200 nonprofit members, 48,351 total nonprofit organizations in the state, and a 2.5 percent membership representation of total nonprofit organizations in the state. This result indicates that the number of nonprofit members, the total number of nonprofit organizations in the state, and the membership representation of the state s total number of nonprofit organizations does not impact the frequency with which state nonprofit associations engage in advocacy activities.

States Mean of Overall Use of Advocacy Strategies* Nonprofit Members Total Nonprofit Organizations in the State** Membership Representation of Total NPO s in the State SNA 1 3.07 1,200 48,351 2.5% SNA 2 2.86 1,700 19,786 8.6% SNA 3 2.29 1,925 33,083 5.8% SNA 4 2.10 1,200 19,397 6.2% SNA 5 2.00 1,575 42,185 3.7% SNA 6 1.92 1,100 66,477 1.7% SNA 7 1.92 1,300 27,985 4.6% SNA8 1.87 725 21,489 3.4% SNA 9 1.82 800 66,335 1.2% SNA 10 1.71 515 20,138 2.6% SNA 11 1.60 500 12,284 4.1% SNA 12 1.51 660 9,205 7.2% SNA 13 1.47 1,730 31,647 5.5% SNA 14 1.43 550 9,730 5.7% SNA 15 1.39 225 36,818 0.6% SNA 16 1.38 515 8,712 5.9% SNA 17 1.33 1,800 156,937 1.1% SNA 18 1.21 1,257 98,566 1.3% SNA 19 1.16 500 7,841 6.4% SNA 20 1.14 270 7,465 3.6% SNA 21 1.12 415 21,944 1.9% SNA 22 1.04 225 12,991 1.7% SNA 23.96 360 19,171 1.9% SNA 24.78 145 5,834 2.5% SNA 25.73 165 34,186 0.5% SNA 26.60 165 7,510 2.2% Table 7: Membership Representation of Total Nonprofit Organizations Per State *Scale of Frequency of Use: 4=Ongoing; 3=Often, but not ongoing; 2=Sometimes but not often; 1= Infrequently; 0= Never Source: National Center for Charitable Statistics (2008). Number of registered nonprofit organizations by state. Retrieved from nccsdataweb.urban.org/pubapps/reports.php?rid=2 35

In summary, the survey and follow-up interviews reveal that organizational structure does impact the nature of advocacy activities of state nonprofit associations, but only to a certain extent. Budget and staff size appear to have the largest impact on the nature of advocacy activities of state nonprofit associations, followed by age and nonprofit membership. Two additional findings were also evident: first, the emphasis of policy activity in an association s mission can greatly determine the level of involvement of that organization in advocacy activities, and second, the association s membership representation of total nonprofit organizations in the state appears to have no impact on an association s level of participation in advocacy activities. CONCLUSION To conclude, the authors explored the relationship between governance and organizational structure to determine their importance to the nature of advocacy activities of state nonprofit associations. From the case study and follow-up interviews, it is clear that leadership and mission drive the level of involvement each association has with advocacy activities. The board of directors and its committees provide an overarching and authoritative level of decision-making expertise on whether to act on a policy issue, while staff including positions of the director/chief executive officer/president and manager of public policy provide both internal knowledge of the organization s capacity to engage in advocacy while also making an initial judgment as to whether these activities are appropriate as related to the organization s mission and membership. Aside from assessing whether the 36 association should engage in advocacy activities on a policy issue, the board of directors ultimately approves or rejects the recommendations of the director/chief executive officer/president on the level of resources such as budget and staff that will be provided for advocacy activities by the association. The board of directors can hold substantial authority in nonprofit organizations, as noted in the case study above. While many of the antecedents leading to these decisions may be subjective, the authority to make the decision to advocate falls empirically within the purview of the board. Thus, it is clear that processes of governance and organizational structure both impact the nature of advocacy activities of state nonprofit associations. The aforementioned exploration thus raises the question: Which factor is more important to a nonprofit organization debating whether to engage in advocacy activities: the organization s processes of governance or its organizational characteristics? This study argues that in order for a nonprofit organization to succeed at influencing the policy agenda, both elements are of equal importance and should be considered heavily by nonprofit leaders wishing to participate in advocacy activities. Nonprofit leaders with a desire to engage in advocacy will be well served to find an executive officer willing and able to work alongside the board of directors in an effort to provide resources towards their advocacy efforts. Furthermore, a nonprofit organization s budget size, staff size, and mission must be understood as the underlying drivers of advocacy. Are the budget and staff resources available to engage effectively in advocacy activity? Is the mission designed to serve a public good while also providing

enough substance for the Board of Directors advocacy decisions? While there is much room to explore these questions further, this study offers a fundamental exploration of the relationships between processes of governance, organizational structure, and the nature of advocacy activities of state nonprofit associations. Many studies research nonprofit advocacy by primarily focusing on nonprofit governance (Brown, 2007; Enjolras, 2009; Stone, 1996) or organizational factors (Rees, 1999; McNutt & Boland, 1999; Donaldson, 2007), or even the effects of governance factors such as board characteristics on organizational performance (Gazley, Chang, & Bingham, 2010), but governance and organizational concepts are rarely discussed in tandem as they relate to nonprofit advocacy. Much of the value in this examination involves fusing and comparing literatures that are rarely combined. This study offers greater insight into how and why nonprofit organizations advocate. NOTES 1 Requests for anonymity have been honored throughout this paper. State nonprofit associations will not be referred to by name. Instead, the associations have been assigned generic identities as illustrated in the tables. 2 For more information on lobbying restrictions of 501(c)(3) organizations, see Hopkins (1992) or Avner (2002). 3 The survey instrument was created specifically for this research study. The survey utilized questions from previously administered surveys related to advocacy, lobbying, and the policy process including McNutt and Boland s (1999) survey of social work associations use of electronic advocacy strategies, Berry and Arons (2003) survey of a random sample of nonprofit organizations on the impacts of tax law on political participation, and Wilson s (1981) survey of interest groups use of advocacy strategies in the federal policy arena. 37

REFERENCES Abramson, A., & McCarthy, R. (2002). Infrastructure organizations. In L. M. Salamon (Ed.), The State of Nonprofit America (pp. 331-354). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Avner, M. (2002). The lobbying and advocacy handbook for nonprofit organizations: Shaping public policy at the state and local level. St. Paul, MN: Fieldstone Alliance Wilder Foundation. Berry, J.M. (2007). Nonprofit Organizations as Interest Groups: The Political Passivity. In A. Cigler and B. Loomis (Eds.), Interest Group Politics (7 th ed.). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Berry, J.M., & Arons, D. (2003). A voice for nonprofits. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Bingham, L. B., Nabatchi, T., & O'Leary, R. (2005). The new governance: Practices and processes for stakeholder and citizen participation in the work of government. Public Administration Review, 65(5), 547-558. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2005.00482.x Boris, E., & Krehely, J. (2002). Civic participation and advocacy. In L. M. Salamon (Ed.), The State of Nonprofit America (pp. 299-330). Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. Brown, W. A. (2007). Board development practices and competent board members: Implications for performance. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 17(3), 301-317. doi: 10.1002/nml.151 Child, C. D., & Grønbjerg, K. A. (2007). Nonprofit advocacy organizations: Their characteristics and activities. Social Science Quarterly, 88(1), 259-281. Donaldson, L. P. (2007). Advocacy by nonprofit human service agencies: Organizational factors as correlates to advocacy behavior. Journal of community Practice, 15(3), 139-158. Enjolras, B. (2009). A governance-structure approach to voluntary organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 38(5), 761-783. Ferris, J. M. (1998). The role of the nonprofit sector in a self-governing society: A view from the United States. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 9(2), 137-151. Fox, J. (2001). Vertically integrated policy monitoring: a tool for civil society policy advocacy. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 30(3), 616-627. Gazley, B., Chang, W. K., & Bingham, L. B. (2010). Board diversity, stakeholder representation, and collaborative performance in community mediation centers. Public Administration Review, 70(4), 610-620. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02182.x Hale, K. (2004). Nonprofit Organizations and Information Networks: Understanding Relationships to State Capacity and Policy Implementation. Prepared for delivery at the 2004 annual meeting of the State Politics and Policy Conference: Cuyahoga Falls, OH. Hall, P.D. (1992). Inventing the nonprofit sector and other essays on philanthropy, voluntarism, and nonprofit organizations. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press. Herman, R. D. (2009). Are public service nonprofit boards meeting their responsibilities? Public Administration Review, 69(3), 387-390. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2009.01986.x Hopkins, B. (1992). Charity, advocacy, and the law. New York, NY: Wiley. Johnston, E. (2010). Governance Infrastructures in 2020. Public Administration Review, 70, s122-s128. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02254.x Laughlin, F. L., & Andringa, R.C. (2007). Good governance for nonprofits: Developing 38

principles and policies for an effective board. Broadway, NY: AMACOM. LeRoux, K. (2009). Paternalistic or participatory governance? Examining opportunities for client participation in nonprofit social service organizations. Public Administration Review, 69(3), 504-517. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2009.01996.x McNutt, J., & Boland, K. (1999). Electronic advocacy by nonprofit organizations in social welfare policy. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 28(4), 432-451. National Council of Nonprofits. (2011). About us. Retrieved from http://www.councilofnonprofits.org/who -we-are National Council of Nonprofits. (2011a). Find your state association. Retrieved from http://www.councilofnonprofits.org/abo ut-us/our-network Nicholson-Crotty, J. (2007). Politics, policy, and the motivations for advocacy in nonprofit reproductive health and family planning providers. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 36(1), 5-21. Phillips, S. 2006. Policy Analysis and the Voluntary Sector: Evolving Policy Styles. In L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett, and D. Laycock (Eds.), Policy analysis in Canada: The state of the art (pp. 272-284). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Rees, S. (1999). Strategic choices for nonprofit advocates. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 28(1), 65-73. Reid, E.J., (Ed.). (2000). Nonprofit advocacy and the policy process: Structuring the inquiry into advocacy. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Salamon, L. M. (2002). The resilient sector: The state of nonprofit America. In L. M. Salamon, (Ed.), The State of Nonprofit America (pp. 3-61). Washington D. C.: Brookings Institution Press. Stone, M. M. (1996). Competing contexts: The evolution of a nonprofit's governance system in multiple environments. Administration & Society, 28(1), 61-89. Wilson, G.K. (1981). Interest groups in the United States. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Young, D. R. (2001). Organizational identity and the structure of nonprofit umbrella associations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 11(3), 289-304. 39

A GROUNDED MODEL FOR MORE ACCURATE AND USEFUL EVALUATION OF CONTRACTED SOCIAL SERVICES Christopher Horne, is an Associate Professor of Public Administration at University of Tennessee at Chattanooga as well as an independent program evaluation consultant. T o better understand the increasingly common evaluation context of nonprofit social service programs provided under government contract, 30 indepth interviews with a broad range of government and nonprofit administrators were analyzed, following the grounded theory approach, to identify factors that affect respondents' program outcomes. Some of the most important factors are specific to contracting and would not be captured in conventional evaluations focused narrowly on programs. The most important of these factors can be categorized as components of either the formal or emergent governmentnonprofit relationship. If program evaluations are to contribute to the improvement and accountability of contracted social services, evaluation program models should broaden to include these key factors, which may otherwise be overlooked. This paper presents one such model and accompanying recommendations, grounded in data that administrators and evaluators may use to better pursue program improvement, accountability, and social betterment goals in evaluations of contracted social service programs. Contracting with nonprofit organizations has become the preferred delivery method for government-funded social services (Austin, 2003; Smith and Lipsky, 1995), and scholars and practitioners have come to recognize that managing such cross-sector contract arrangements requires a different skill set than that required for management within a single hierarchical organization (Brown and Potoski, 2003; McGuire, 2006; Smith, 2008; Stoker, 2006; Van Slyke, 2002; Young, 1999). This paper considers how social service contracting affects program evaluation and reporting specifically. Indepth interviews with a broad range of government and nonprofit social service contract administrators were conducted to explore three interrelated questions: (1) What characteristics of the contracting relationship affect program outputs and outcomes? (2) How would ignoring these characteristics distort program evaluation? (3) How would ignoring these characteristics impede use of program evaluation for program improvement? Employing a grounded theory approach, analysis of the interviews revealed that many factors that strongly shape program outputs and outcomes are specific to purchase-of-service contracting and would not typically be captured in the conventional program logic models frequently used to design program evaluations. Some of the most important factors are external to the program itself, but are, instead, components of either the formal or emergent government-nonprofit relationship. If program evaluation is to contribute to 40

improvement of contracted social services, we should broaden program models to include these key factors, which may otherwise be overlooked. The remainder of this paper develops one such model accompanied by a set of recommendations, both grounded in data that may be used to better pursue the goal of improving contracted social service programs through program evaluation. RESEARCH DESIGN This research followed a grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2006; Locke, 2001; Strauss and Corbin, 1990) to develop a model depicting the lessons articulated explicitly and implicitly by expert public and nonprofit managers. In-depth interviews, lasting an average of 45 minutes, were conducted with 30 managers, 15 from nonprofit organizations and 15 from government agencies. A purposive network sampling strategy focused the study on lessons learned by practitioners who have developed expertise in managing government-nonprofit contracts through direct experience. Participants were selected based on the authors' personal knowledge of the managers' expertise, their recommendations, and the recommendations of trusted, knowledgeable colleagues. The first 20 interviews were conducted in the same mid-sized Southern United States city. By first concentrating on one city and its government-nonprofit social services contracting network, the initial findings that emerged reflected the views of government and nonprofit managers on both "sides" of multiple government-nonprofit contracts. During the course of these initial interviews, analysis of data gathered during earlier interviews was used to develop questions 41 and probes for later interviews relevant to the same implementation context and, often, with reference to the same contract relationships. Ten additional interviews were conducted with managers from all regions of the United States. This second wave of data collection shifted from exploratory to confirmatory interviews, yielding findings very similar to the first wave, attesting to the robustness of the lessons learned and strengthening confidence in their generalizability outside of the original geographic area. The interviews pursued two main lines of questioning. Following questions about their background and their organizations, the managers were asked to describe examples of particularly successful and particularly unsuccessful government-nonprofit social service contracts. The participants were prompted to explain why they selected their examples, to define success, and to identify factors that contributed to or detracted from successful contract outcomes. Next, the managers were asked to describe what they wish more managers in the "other" sector (public or nonprofit) better understood about their own sector, how their own formal education prepared them to manage government-nonprofit collaboration, and what they believe students of administration ought to learn in preparation for government-nonprofit collaboration. These questions elicited the managers' tacit theories those theories of practice developed through experience but rarely formally stated used to explain positive and negative outcomes in governmentnonprofit social services contracting. This somewhat "backdoor" approach to learning about program evaluation in the

government-nonprofit contracting context was taken instead of asking about program evaluation more directly to avoid biasing interviewees toward "program-evaluationby-the-textbook" responses, though followup questions were used to steer interviews toward the topic of program evaluation. The first 15 interviews were open coded, with these codes then organized into a provisional coding scheme. To increase the reliability of the data analysis, a second trained coder duplicated this process, and, after discussing the codes resulting from our individual efforts, we developed a coding scheme that we agreed captured the breadth of meaningful data in the interviews. Employing the grounded theory practice of "constant comparison," this coding scheme was modified as needed to accommodate additional themes emerging from the remaining transcripts, and the resultant set of codes was applied across the entire dataset by both coders individually and then jointly with discussion to resolve any discrepancies. This final set of codes, with further validation drawn from previous research (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 48 55), form the basis of the findings and recommendations presented in the following sections. FINDINGS Contract Managers' Expanded Logic Models Analysis of the interview data culminated in a grounded model of the governmentnonprofit contracting relationship, presented in Figure 1. Figure 1: A grounded model of government-nonprofit social service contracting 42

The upper portion of the model depicts a standard logic model to represent the contracted social service program using the inputs activities outputs outcomes sequence familiar to most social service practitioners and analysts. (This particular formulation of a program logic model has been popularized by United Way.) Program logic models with these components are a common starting point for developing program evaluation plans and specific performance measures (McLaughlin and Jordan, 2004; Poister, 2003; United Way, 1996), and rightly so; a well-developed logic model provides a straightforward guide for systematically identifying key performance measures and the theory of change underlying the program. The key contribution of this paper is placing the standard program logic model in the context of the larger government-nonprofit relationship, depicted by the remainder of the diagram. Building the model began at an obvious, uncomplicated starting point: The written contract itself and the broader contracting process strongly influence available inputs, the range of permissible activities and outputs, and, in turn, program outcomes. This may be an obvious statement, but the neglect of this tenet in designing program evaluations is a source of frustration, particularly for nonprofit contract managers. In explaining successes and, especially, failures, nonprofit managers are adamant that their contracted programs be viewed in light of the formal structures established both in their contracts and through the contracting process. Three nonprofit managers' examples convey typical frustrations: 43 because of the structural changes in the way we get referrals from the state, we went through about a year and a half of not getting any referrals, and we were supposed to be serving people referred by the state. They were blaming us for not getting enough referrals but you guys are the ones that are supposed to give us the referrals. What more can we do? [Government agencies] keep adding on these little tidbits of things that just make it more difficult to do your job when your purpose is supposed to be helping clients. [Government funding] has continued to get worse, to decrease and decrease and decrease over time, every year. You can only do that for so long without quality being affected. Performance-based contracts, specifically, were featured in stories of both positive and negative effects of contract arrangements on program outcomes. Some performancebased contracts were structured to reward nonprofits for client outcomes aligned with the organizations' missions while giving the nonprofits significant latitude to tailor services to individual clients and to engage in experimentation in how services were delivered. These contracts allowed the nonprofit organizations to realize their potential strengths, such as innovation and personalized service. As one nonprofit manager described it, they are not breathing down our necks about how we do it. We're getting paid based on results. That's the best. Other performance-based contracts though, stifled innovation by specifying and reimbursing for a narrow range of service delivery methods, a known pitfall in

performance-based contracting (Behn and Kant, 1999). One nonprofit manager offered a poignant example of contract-dictated performance measures working against program goals: So, if you can move more kids into adoption quicker, you get a little financial reward kids get moved too fast there's lawsuits pending because the kids got moved too early and they were abused further. The commissioner of [the state] wants to reduce the number of kids in care, in state custody. We want to keep kids safe. It sounds like the same thing. It's not. These quotes exemplify a recurring theme of the interviews: attributing program outcomes solely to the program itself is often inaccurate because it ignores the powerful effects of aspects of the government-nonprofit relationship outside the program (see also Ansell and Gash, 2007; Bryson et al., 2006; Stoker, 2006). Such aspects identified by the managers include requirements to "innovate," data collection requirements introduced in the course of contract monitoring, staff training requirements, stagnant funding levels in multi-year contracts, shifting client eligibility rules and changes in characteristics of clients referred by government to nonprofit service providers. Informal Relationships Help and Hinder the Use of Program Evaluation A focus on the mechanical details of contracts is notably lacking from the managers' explanations of why contracting succeeds or fails and their advice for future managers. Instead, much of their explanation and advice emphasizes the importance of informal relationships the patterns of interpersonal interactions 44 governed by unwritten rules and unofficial roles that emerge in the context of the formal contracting arrangement. The managers commonly described and assessed informal relationships in terms of the degree of open communication and trust. When explaining successful contracting experiences, several managers traced long histories of shared experiences with their cross-sector counterparts, building mutual regard and trust. Participants were adamant about the necessity of positive informal relationships: Collaboration is about relationship building. It's being open, transparent and communicative in appropriate ways, constantly, continually. I ultimately rely on my relationship building to really get through. A strong theme emerged to suggest why informal relationships figure so significantly in participants' stories and advice: Organizational and systemic learning are facilitated by, hindered by and filtered through the informal aspects of governmentnonprofit relationships. Fiol and Lyles offer a simple definition of organizational learning: the process of improving actions through better knowledge and understanding" (1985, p. 803). Building this "better knowledge and understanding" is, of course, a primary goal of program evaluation. The concept of systemic learning is appended to describe the type of learning that requires sharing of information throughout the collaborative system here, between the government agency and nonprofit organization and has the potential to improve the overall collaboration, beyond improvements isolated to a single organization. Based on participants' examples, organizational and systemic learning is conceptualized as

following reflection on the experience of engaging in program activities and producing program outputs and upon observing programs' outcomes (hence the two starting points for the learning feedback loop in Figure 1). Instances of organizational and systemic learning that led to improvements in the structure of the government-nonprofit relationship inevitably occurred in the context of informal relationships characterized by trust and open communication. One nonprofit manager described the learning that takes place in an informal setting hosted by a government agency: they have a luncheon, and they invite this kind of ever-growing group together to share ideas and information and say "hey, we've been doing this," and "hey, here's this training opportunity." Another nonprofit manager described how having a positive informal relationship with her government counterparts makes all the difference," again, providing the context for systemic learning: We had a question about a grant that we are working on right now, and the executive director picked up and dialed the cell phone number for the lady at the state level. And our other programs? There's no way we would have picked up and dialed a cell phone! Most examples, however, explained the lack of or even distortion of organizational and systemic learning as due to distrust and the lack of regular, informal communication. The instances of distrust hindering learning mostly follow the pattern predicted by principal-agent theory, with the agent here, the nonprofit managers withholding or 45 distorting information from the principal the public manager (Van Slyke, 2006). Two nonprofit managers told similar stories: We are really, really careful of our relationships with our state contractors. They are, you know, they're our bread and butter. There's a lot of things that we don't talk to them about, such as, do you realize this program ain't doing what it's supposed to be doing. We don't want to say that to them. For one thing for some of them, it's a very personal thing. We don't have the kind of relationship that would allow us to be that frank. I don't know if we feel empowered to go to [the state agency] and say what we're doing here is not working, it's not the best program for the population we are trying to serve, we need to look at something else. But it's not in our best interest to rattle that cage, because we have people, good employees that have been working with us for many years In these and several additional examples, the nonprofit managers indicated their distrust of their government counterparts and, frequently, they described their communication with them as limited, strictly formal, or sporadic. In some instances, the only communication occurred through written performance reports and annual contract renewal processes. Perhaps, the public managers in these cases assume that the "invisible hand" of competitive market forces obviates the need for ongoing communication and learning (Behn and Kant, 1999). In any case, in the absence of trusting, open interpersonal relationships across the contract, some nonprofit managers resort to manipulation and distortion of evaluative data. Nonprofit contract managers reported withholding

client cases from "the denominator," strategically assigning cases to client groups retrospectively, referring hard-to-serve clients to other organizations just before performance measures would be registered and other similar tactics in an effort to bolster evaluation results. In every case, the nonprofit managers' defense rested on the lack of trust they had in their government counterparts, whom they suspected of watching for every opportunity to cut program funding, coupled with a commitment to keep their programs running for the sake of their clients and employees. Ironically, the government respondents, with one exception, did not describe program evaluation and reporting as tools for mechanistically allocating and withholding funding, but for program improvement and accountability to the public. By their failure to engender trust among contractors, though, the government contract managers unwittingly introduce systematic distortion and manipulation of performance measures, precluding full use of program evaluation for program improvement. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EVALUATING CONTRACTED SOCIAL SERVICE PROGRAMS The effects of the formal and informal government-nonprofit relationship on the outputs and outcomes of contracted social services programs suggest at least five recommendations for improving program evaluation in that context. The first recommendation is foundational to the recommendations to follow: Developing evaluation plans for government-nonprofit social service contracts should begin with a model of the entire government-nonprofit social service delivery system (such as that presented in Figure 1), not only the more limited model of the program itself. By expanding the scope of the program model, program evaluations would still capture the typical measures of program activities, outputs, and outcomes, but they would also capture system-level factors that affect program outputs and outcomes. The managers participating in this study might recommend measuring, for example, timeliness in reimbursement for services, changes in the characteristics of referred clients, adherence to contract monitoring plans and cost of program evaluation and reporting itself. Second, the recognition that output and outcome measures themselves affect how programs operate and what outcomes are pursued suggests that nonprofit managers those most directly involved in service delivery should be involved in the development of such measures. A recurring theme in the interviews was that predefined performance measures were measuring the "wrong thing," eliciting one of two responses: Delivery of services considered less than ideal for clients to adhere to the "wrong" measures or delivery of the services considered best for clients followed by "gaming" the data collection and reporting process. All of the nonprofit managers and several of the government managers agree that seeking consensus on output and outcome measures (and, by the same token, consensus on intended outputs and outcomes) at the onset of a contract arrangement would go a long way toward preventing inconsistency between program activities and evaluation reports, paving the way for program evaluation that is actually useful for program improvement and accountability. Third, evaluators and government and nonprofit contract managers need to clearly 46

articulate and understand the intended uses of program evaluation. In several instances, nonprofit managers were fearful that weak performance would automatically result in funding cuts while their government counterparts expressed a desire to use evaluation for improving programs delivered in long-term partnerships with nonprofit organizations. Whether or not these intentions reflect reality is uncertain, but making a clear, formal, explicit commitment to how evaluation results would be used would alleviate pressure on nonprofit managers to distort performance reporting and, again, enable the use of program evaluation for program improvement. These first three recommendations can only be successful if pursued along with the fourth: Government and nonprofit managers must develop positive informal relationships characterized by trust and open communication. One of the clearest findings of this study is that the program evaluation fidelity and the likelihood that program evaluation can lead to program improvement are heavily contingent on having open, trusting relationships among government and nonprofit actors in the service delivery system. Developing such relationships does not require the intervention of a group therapist. Evaluators and contract managers may draw more practical application from another theme recurrent throughout the interviews: Positive informal relationships those that facilitate consequential organizational and systemic learning between government and nonprofit managers usually emerge from formal structures of the government-nonprofit relationship outside the contract itself. In describing the value of monthly meetings with the contracting government agency, a nonprofit manager provided quite an explicit example of this theme: Well, the structure just allows us to kind of get to meet once a month in an informal setting and bring different issues to the table so we actually have a relationship with different people representing the government. I would say that's an important factor. Other public and nonprofit managers described relationships, often in very amiable terms that developed in task forces, board meetings, technical assistance seminars and learning circles. These positive informal relationships, then, did not develop spontaneously in informal settings, but in the context of formal structures built around (or, in some cases, without any reference to) the actual contract. These formal structures provide the time and space necessary for informal relationships to emerge. In turn, emergent, positive informal relationships provide the trust and open communication necessary to identify and address problems with formal collaborative arrangements (as suggested by the double arrows between formal and informal in Figure 1). Similarly, Ansell and Gash (2007) found opportunities for face-to-face dialogue to be necessary preconditions for successful collaboration, stressing their value for breaking down stereotypes and other barriers to communication (p. 558). Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and Van Slyke (2006) add that these structured interactions that provide opportunities for building trust must be sustained throughout the duration of the collaborative arrangement. In view of these lessons, government and nonprofit contract managers should seek opportunities to develop lasting, formal structures surrounding the government-nonprofit contract to encourage the emergence of 47

sustained positive informal relationships across sectors. Fifth, the lessons learned by contract managers (and their frustrations) point to the need for a fundamental shift in how we understand the role of program evaluation in promoting accountability in governmentnonprofit contracting. The dominant mode of program evaluation emphasizes accountability of the nonprofit organization to the government agency, frequently resulting in an us-versus-them mentality, gaming of data collection systems, and managers' inability to use program evaluation for program improvement (whether they are aware of it or not). Notably, this conceptualization of the accountability function of program evaluation does not typify contract arrangements identified by respondents as most successful for clients. Instead, the accountability function in successful contract arrangements is conceptualized as promoting accountability of the governmentnonprofit social service delivery system to the public. These contract managers spoke of being good stewards of public resources and maintaining a constant focus on program outcomes for clients. The adoption of this perspective from a narrow focus on the program itself to a broader focus on the government-nonprofit service delivery system by evaluators and government and nonprofit contract managers seems to be a prerequisite for using program evaluation as a tool for program improvement rather than self-defense. CONCLUSION This research represents an effort to identify factors that affect the validity and utility of program evaluation in government-nonprofit social services contracting. That the formal structure of the government-nonprofit service delivery arrangement affects program inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes is not surprising. Neither is it entirely surprising that the quality of the informal relationships among government and nonprofit managers facilitates or hinders meaningful learning and program improvement. What is more surprising is how little these principles appear to have pervaded program evaluation practice. Additional research is needed to determine whether the findings presented here generalize across social services contracting, other contracting domains and other forms of cross-sector collaboration, but these exploratory findings suggest routes for crafting program evaluation plans in contracting arrangements to better promote accountability, program improvement, and, ultimately, the social betterment goals of social service programs. 48

REFERENCES Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2007). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. Journal of Public Affairs Research and Theory, 18, 543-571. Austin, M. J. (2003). The changing relationship between nonprofit organizations and public social service agencies in the era of welfare reform. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 32(1), 97-114. Behn, R. D., & Kant, P. A. (1999). Strategies for avoiding the pitfalls of performance contracting. Public Productivity and Management Review, 22(4), 470-489. Brown, T. L., & Potoski, M. (2003). Contractmanagement capacity in municipal and county governments. Public Administration Review, 63(2), 153-164. Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. M. (2006). The design and implementation of cross-sector collaborations: Propositions from the literature. Public Administration Review, 66 (December, special issue), 44-55. Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative analysis. London: Sage. Fiol, C. M., & Lyles, M. A. (1985). Organizational learning. The Academy of Management Review, 10(4), 803-813. Locke, K. (2001). Grounded theory in management research. London: Sage. McGuire, M. (2006). Collaborative public management: Assessing what we know and how we know it. Public Administration Review, 66 (December, special issue), 33-43. McLaughlin, J. A., & Jordan, G. B. (2004). Using logic models. In Wholey, J. S., Hatry, H. P., and Newcomer, K. E. (Eds.), Handbook of practical program evaluation, pp. 7-32. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Poister, T. H. (2003). Measuring performance in public and nonprofit organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1994). Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational relationships. Academy of Management Review, 19(1), 90-118. Smith, S. R. (2008). The increased complexity of public services: Curricular implications for schools of public affairs. Journal of Public Affairs Education, 14(2), 115-128. Smith, S. R., and Lipsky, M. (1995). Nonprofits for hire: The welfare state in the age of contracting. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Stoker, G. (2006). Public value management: A new narrative for networked governance? American Review of Public Administration, 36(1), 41-57. Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative research. Newbury Park, California: Sage. United Way. (1996). Measuring program outcomes: A practical approach. Alexandria, Virginia: United Way. Van Slyke, D. M. (2002). The public management challenges of contracting with nonprofits for social services. International Journal of Public Administration, 25(4), 489-517. Van Slyke, D. M. (2006). Agents or stewards: Using theory to understand the government-nonprofit social service contracting relationship. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 17, 157-187. Young, D. R. (1999). Nonprofit management studies in the United States: Current developments and future prospects. Journal of Public Affairs Education, 5(1), 13-23. 49

LESSONS LEARNED ON CONDUCTING THE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS FOR A NONPROFIT: WHAT WENT RIGHT AND WHAT COULD BE IMPROVED Elvira Teller, PhD is a Lecturer in the College of Business Administration and Public Policy at California State University Dominguez Hills. W omen At Work (WAW), a nonprofit career and resource center in Pasadena, California, suffered financially in 2009 due to the economic downturn. WAW depends on grants to finance the majority of its. The economic downturn limited the number of grants that the organization received. Also, the nationwide loss of jobs, changes in the types of jobs available, and dependence on the use of information technology affected WAW. In addition, WAW experienced greater client demand for its resources. Embarking on a strategic planning process, which is a costly endeavor, was daunting because of the limited funds to finance the much needed project. However, Women At Work did embark on a one-year strategic planning process with a limited budget and resources. This article describes the use of project management tools and techniques used in the strategic planning process for WAW from initiation to completion. With any project, good project management reviews the lessons learned from the process, noting those events that went well and those that can be improved. The paper documents 11 lessons learned in the strategic planning process. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS This article highlights the 11 areas in the strategic planning process where lessons are delineated. They are: use project management methodology; trust the process; outline a clear process; obtain clear objectives and deliverables; use money wisely; engage the board and staff; engage the committee; write the strategic plan without delay; tackle preconceived ideas; communicate often; and be persistent. In times of shrinking budgets, limited resources, and higher demands for services, nonprofits are challenged to realize their mission, vision, and values. The strategic planning process allows the organization the time to reflect and plan for the future. Strategic planning is important because of its ability to help organizations and communities anticipate and respond to change in wise and effective ways (Bryson, 2011, p. 26). There are multiple models that exist in the for-profit, government, and nonprofit sectors when conducting a strategic plan (Moore, 2000), but the literature in this area remains sparse (McHatton, Bradshaw, Gallagher, & Reeves, 2011). Women At Work (WAW) embarked on a strategic planning process in January 2010 that took one year to complete. This article details the reasons for the project s success, including knowledge of project management methodology; dedication by the executive committee; commitment by the strategic 50

planning committee; knowledge on running a strategic planning process; and perseverance of the process through to completion. Many of the principles of project management as identified by the Project Management Institute (PMI) were utilized while facilitating the strategic planning process. A few of the important principles are: to set clear goals and expectations; define tasks; use a project schedule; manage scope creep; regulate the team members workload; and control the budget. Using project management principles to manage the strategic planning process requires taking a global view. This perspective differs from other articles written on strategic planning. Many texts and articles written on strategic planning discuss concepts, procedures, and tools to assist in the strategic planning tasks (Craft, 2006; Kerzner, 2003; Koteen, 1997). This article illustrates the tools and techniques that were used to aid planning and controlling project activities. One technique in project management methodology is to review those lessons learned in a project; a review of what went right and what could be improved. BACKGROUND Women At Work was founded in 1979 by three visionaries; Betty Ann Jansson, Marge Leighton and Barbara Burke. The organization began by offering a resource room equipped with job listings and library books on women s employment, as well as holding seminars and workshops on career fields and career planning. Over the past three decades, WAW has provided job skills training, employment preparation and job search services to thousands of job seekers. The primary function of WAW is to serve as a job counseling and resource center. The 51 organization kept a pulse on evolving times by offering women services that were not available elsewhere in the community. Early on, the development of employer forums provided a way for women to network with human resource professionals in a private and safe environment. Program funding was targeted to help women obtain information on employment opportunities, to start their own businesses, and to compete effectively in the workplace. The organization continued to evolve to meet the demands of a growing technological society. Paper-based systems of the past began to be replaced with computer information systems. As the Internet emerged as a significant tool for job searches, programs expanded to include computer classes and workshops that would fill the need for basic information and training in the technical arena. WAW provides individualized employment services to clients that emphasize selfappreciation, self-determination, confidence and capabilities. The resource room and career planning library continue to provide information on current job openings provided by local businesses and industries. The economic downturn in 2009 had a negative financial impact on WAW. Funding from government and private organizations dwindled while the demand for WAW services increased. Embarking on a strategic planning process, while expensive, was necessary due to a change in economic factors. LITERATURE REVIEW The literature on strategic planning may be divided into three categories: for-profit, nonprofit, and government organizations (Moore, 2000). What sets them apart from one another is the organizational purpose usually defined by its mission statement and

the ability to deliver value in form of products, services, or social programs. Whether forprofit, nonprofit or governmental, the seminal writers on strategy agree that organizations benefit from developing a strategic plan (Moore, 2000). Moore states that all three sectors need strategies to remain purposeful and effective (Moore, 2000). There are effective strategic planning processes and models designed for nonprofit organizations. Texts and workbooks exist on how to run a strategic planning process for nonprofit organizations (Allison & Kaye, 2005; Barry, 1997; Mintzberg & Quinn, 1996). Also, literature in the form of journal articles and research exist on strategic planning designed for nonprofit organizations (Bradach, Tierney, & Stone, 2008; Craft & Benson, 2006; McClamroch, Byrd, & Sowell, 2001). The literature identifies a number of factors critical to the success of a strategic planning effort. One factor associated with the success of strategic planning is leadership (Moxley, 2004; McClamroch, Byrd, & Sowell, 2001). Moxley (2004) and McClamroch, Byrd, and Sowell (2001) attribute successful strategic plans to strong leaders who value a collaborative approach to planning. McClamroch, Byrd, and Sowell (2001) analyzed the strategic planning process in a large university library system. Their model emphasized consensus, buy-in, and collaboration as indicators of success. Mittenthal (2004) lists ten keys to successful strategic planning from nonprofit organizations whose plans proved effective. The 10 keys are: uncover opportunities and challenges; assess strengths and limitations; use an inclusive approach; create an empowered planning committee; involve senior leadership; share responsibility; learn from best practices; establish clear priorities and an implementation plan; have patience; and commit to change. Another factor important to strategic planning is to monitor implementation progress (Craft & Benson, 2006). An analysis of hundreds of strategic plans developed by school districts, schools, and central office departments, revealed that the monitoring techniques of the strategies, goals and objectives contributed to the success of the plans. What does not appear in the literature is the use of project management principles and practices to facilitate the strategic planning process. Several articles on linking strategic planning with project management practices discuss using the practice after the planning process is completed (Knutson, 2003); using the practice to build a project office (Kerzner, 2003); or the fit between an organization s strategy, the project management system it chooses to implement, and the type of project that it executes in implementing its strategy (Cooke-Davies, Crawford, & Lechler, 2009). The Project Management Institute (PMI) defines project management as the application of knowledge, skills, and techniques to execute projects effectively and efficiently to tie project results to business goals (PMBOK, 2008). The objective of a practitioner experienced in the art of project management is to move projects from inception to completion using a methodological process while controlling the risks that often impact successful implementation. PMI defines a successful project as meeting the published schedule, controlling the project s budget and accomplishing the project s requirements (PMBOK, 2008). 52

LESSONS LEARNED IN THE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS 1. Use Project Management Methodology Project management methodology describes the phases, activities, and tasks required to undertake a project from start to finish. The methodology is based on a standard framework for undertaking projects. Project management methodology bridges the gap between company strategy and individual projects, between setting goals and achieving those goals (Leemann, 2003, p. 2). The technique of effective project management implies that a project can be controlled. The focus on resource allocation, budgets, schedules, quality and risk can all be controlled if the project is managed effectively. The use of project management methodology in the strategic planning process was beneficial to the organization. First, the methodology provides structure to manage the strategic planning project. Projects typically pass sequentially through the stages of initiating, planning, executing, monitoring and controlling. In managing the strategic planning process, the various phases of the project management process parallel the strategic planning process; define where the organization is, where it wants to be, and how it will get there. Second, the project management methodology has known tools and techniques that are used on projects which save time and enhance the process. These tools and techniques are described in subsequent lessons learned throughout the article. Finally, project management methodology views all aspects of a project; this includes: project integration management, a coordinated effort to view the entire project not just the individual parts of a project; project scope management, ability to capture all of the requirements for a project; time management, ensures that the project is completed as scheduled; cost management, ensures that the project is completed on budget; human resources management, includes all of the processes used to develop, manage, and put the project team together; communications management, determines what information is needed, how that information is sent and managed, and how project performance is reported; risk management, involves identifying, managing, and controlling risk of a project; and finally, procurement management, the processes used to acquire the materials and services needed to complete the project (Project Management Institute, 2008). The Project Management Institute defines the term lessons learned as the learning gained from the process of performing the project (PMBOK, 2008), such as the activities of a project that went well or could be improved. Several lessons learned through the strategic planning process were alleviated because of knowledge of project management tools and techniques. These lessons learned are incorporated in the article because if missed or left out of the strategic planning process, implications for future strategic planning projects could be compromised. 53

2. Trust the Process There is a fundamental approach to the strategic planning process. Regardless of the books or texts written to facilitate effective strategic planning, various tasks must be incorporated within the phases of the process to be successful. The committee, board, and staff must trust the strategic planning process, even though at times it is daunting. The length of time allotted for the plan and the lack of individuals on the board and staff familiar with a strategic planning process can stall the process and leave people feeling frustrated. There are multiple models on how to run a strategic planning process (Allison & Kaye, 2005; Barry, 1997; Mintzberg & Quinn, 1996). The fundamental approach includes assessing what the organization is doing now; what is happening in the environment to impact the organization; what are the organization s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and challenges; and finally, what the organization should be doing. The issue is not which approach to use but to choose an approach and follow through. Identifying the steps in a strategic planning model informs those involved that strategic planning is a process. As the tasks of the plan are identified in the work plan, the participants can see the prerequisites, dependencies, and dates of the identified tasks. The strategic planning process is given structure thus providing confidence in the process. Once the strategies, goals, and objectives are accepted by the board, identifying which specific objectives the organization will focus on in the next fiscal year is a relatively easy task. The executive director and president of the board usually have a sense as to the direction of the organization and of the tasks that must begin within the year. The strategic planning process highlights those 54 activities that must be addressed as soon as possible and those that can wait for another year or two. This is because the issues facing the organization are highlighted during the strategic planning process and cannot be ignored. For example, one immediate goal for the organization was to develop a fee system to ensure access for all income levels to participate in WAW programs and services. This goal is directly in line with the mission and values of the organization. On the other hand, a goal to develop and implement an enhanced financial fund accounting system was postponed for two years. The strategic plan is then translated into an annual operating plan. The operating plan must be monitored at the end of each year to ensure the organization is following the strategic direction set by the board (Craft & Benson, 2006). 3. Outline a Clear Process One tool that project managers depend on is a work plan. A work plan for managing the strategic planning process was created and followed from inception through to implementation. The work plan was written and managed in Excel and lists the activities of the strategic planning process. The columns of the work plan included: Activities, Activity Descriptions, Activity Start Date, Activity End Date, Responsibility (persons responsible for executing or overseeing the activity), and Activity Status (in progress, completed, or canceled). The work plan was divided into five phases outlining the strategic planning process: (1) Get Organized and Plan, (2) Take Stock, (3) Set Direction, (4) Refine and Adopt the Plan, and (5) Implement the Plan. The

phases of the work plan corresponded to the phases of the strategic planning process that the committee followed as outlined by Bryan W. Barry in 1997, Strategic Planning Workbook for Nonprofit Organizations. This is a simple, straightforward, and easyto-use process for any group unfamiliar with strategic planning. In Scott Berkun s book (2005), The Art of Project Management, he explains traditional project management skills such as planning, scheduling, and requirements gathering and people management skills such as leadership, trust and communication that successful project managers possess. According to Berkun, the absence of a project manager creates dysfunction. Without a person whose primary job is to shepherd the overall effort, individual biases and interests can derail the directions of the team (Berkun, 2005, p. 8). The first goal when embarking on a strategic planning process is to assign a leader or co-leaders. This person s responsibility is to move the planning process forward by having a clear process outlined. A comprehensive, detailed roadmap is essential to the strategic planning process and its successful completion. Although a good plan is critical it must be flexible. That is, the plan must be updated and modified based upon the nuances of the committee and process; for example, sometimes meetings were canceled due to conflicting activities and there were times when additional meetings were scheduled because more discussion on specific topics were required. Therefore, it is important to be organized but at the same time flexible to enable an effective and workable process. 55 4. Obtain Clear Objectives and Deliverables To start the strategic planning process, commitment from the executive director and board president are vital. The executive director and the board president s support and involvement are needed to keep the strategic planning process moving forward, to generate support among board members, and to provide resources. Michael Allison and Jude Kaye in Strategic Planning for Nonprofit Organizations state that chief among the prerequisites [for successful planning] is a true commitment to the planning process by the executive director and board leadership (Allison & Kaye, 2005, p. 31). McClamroch, Byrd, and Sowell (2001) agree by stating: The planning model, through its inclusive approach, encourages consensus, buy-in, and collaboration. Such a change effort, however, will not succeed without effective leadership. Koteen dedicates several chapters in his 1997 text Strategic Management in Public and Nonprofit Organizations on the role of the chief executive as manager of strategy. He explains that the chief executive is the change agent within the organization. It is the role of the chief executive to provide the leadership for the importance of the strategic planning process and the success of the organization s future. Creating the proper organizational climate and attitude and modeling behaviors to get involved with the process, rather than resist formal strategic management, is the role of an effective change agent (Koteen, 1997). Alternatively, Bryson views directing the strategic planning process as a team effort (Bryson, 2011). The executives, leaders, managers, and key stakeholders have an opportunity to sponsor, facilitate, and foster the strategic process to make and implement strategies for the benefit of the organization.

While the strategic planning process is a team effort, having a chair of the planning committee with the support of the executive director was significant in completing the project on time and within budget. There were various times throughout the strategic planning process where the momentum dwindled due to committee members personal schedule conflicts for meetings, WAW events that conflicted with meetings, and lack of attention paid to document submission and review due dates. The executive director was able to step in and maintain scheduled dates for meetings, and obtain continued commitment on deliverable dates. In project management methodology, development of a project charter and project scope statements are completed when a project begins. The purpose of the documents is to collect information on the purpose of the project and why it is being undertaken. Information to identify the project stakeholders and the person(s) empowered to make decisions regarding project deliverables, schedule, and budget are fundamental to project success. It was important that the executive director and board president achieved a common understanding of the project s expected outcomes, what was in scope and what was out of scope. The formality of writing the project charter and project scope statement was not done. However, obtaining the information that would have been contained within these documents was completed. I met independently with the executive director and board president at the beginning of the year, February 2010, to determine their commitment, expectations, and support for the strategic planning process by asking the questions in Table 1. Questions Pertaining to the Strategic Planning Process 1 What is the budget for the strategic planning process? 2 What is the time frame for the strategic planning process? 3 How many years is the strategic plan to focus? Three or five? 4 What is your ultimate goal for the strategic planning process? What are your expectations for the outcome? 5 Do you agree on a strategic planning committee to set the strategy and present it to the board for approval? 6 What are the roles and expectations of the strategic planning committee? Who is writing the strategic plan? 7 Do you know a consultant who specializes in strategic planning? What is the role of the consultant? 8 Do you have an expectation on how to organize the SWOT (obtaining information for the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats/challenges of the organization)? 9 How much involvement on the part of the board and staff members do you want or expect? 10 Who is available to put together the background information on the organization? For example: budget reports, annual plans, current projects, etc.? 11 What worked or did not work in the previous strategic planning process? 12 How do you want to keep the board and staff informed on the strategic planning process? Table 1 Questions Pertaining to Strategic Planning 56

After completing the interviews there was no need for assumptions, since it was clear that the objectives and deliverables would include: the strategic planning document, the budget to complete the task, and the timeline to accomplish the goal. Documentation on both meetings was written and distributed to the executive director and board president for final acceptance before the process began. 5. Use Money Wisely Women At Work was impacted by the economic crisis, as a result funding for the strategic planning process was minimal. Initially, WAW sent requests for proposals to various consulting agencies to conduct the strategic planning process. But the proposed costs were more than the organization was willing or able to spend. To keep costs down, the executive director and president of the board took the following steps: a. Ask a board member with experience to lead the strategic planning process b. Hire a consultant for specific tasks; facilitate the board retreat, facilitate focus group, prepare questionnaires, and synthesize the information from focus groups and questionnaires c. Solicit help from past board presidents or board members with experience. WAW asked the previous board president to facilitate a focus group and assist in writing the strategic plan document. Funds allocated to the strategic planning process were used to hire a consultant who added considerable value (both guidance and insight). The consultant was familiar with the organizational culture and nonprofit organizations. Every organization has a specific culture. Working within an unknown culture can present obstacles to get the job done effectively and efficiently. Therefore, 57 someone who is familiar with the culture or can grasp the nuances of the organization quickly can begin working successfully within the environment. It is also important to get an outsider s viewpoint on the organization when conducting a strategic planning process. The issues that the organization faces can be clouded by those attached to the organization due to familiarity. Also, the consultant can bring unknown issues to the attention of the strategic planning committee. The consultant hired was attentive to these issues, plus she completed the most laborious and time-consuming tasks. Compiling the SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) assessment for the initial board and staff retreat, preparing questionnaires for distribution to the various communities with which the organization interfaces and synthesizing the results for interpretation is a vital part of the process for which she was responsible. In large part, the success of the project was attributable to her work. 6. Engage the Board and Staff The strategic planning committee scheduled a board and staff retreat to initiate the strategic planning process. Committee members discussed the importance to create a forum focused on issues important to the organization, where they brainstormed and shared ideas. Prior to the retreat, an initial SWOT assessment was administered to the board and staff soliciting topics worthy for discussion at the retreat. The five topics identified for discussion at the retreat were: Fundraising, Facilities and Technology, Programs, Operations and Administration, and Governance.

The first board and staff meeting set the tone for the strategic planning process. The board and staff were engaged because the information culled set the priorities for discussion while engaging all of the members. At the retreat, the members were divided into five groups based upon individual background and level of interest of the topic. The strategy was to have small breakout sessions to discuss each of the five topics with specific objectives on how to move the organization forward in that area. Presentation to the larger group followed to solicit input from all members on each topic. The output of the session was a workable list of activities when deciding the strategies, goals and objectives of the organization to incorporate in the strategic plan. 7. Engage the Committee The executive director, executive team, board, and staff were committed to the strategic planning process. After discussing the strategic planning approach with the executive director, board president, board and staff, the tenor of the organization was positive and there was no indication of barriers to impede the process. The organization seemed ready to embark on the strategic planning process. The first plan of action was to select members of the planning committee who know the organization well, are committed to attending meetings, and are willing to participate. The intent was to keep the committee small, six or seven in number, so all committee members would feel engaged. The primary responsibility of the planning committee is to manage and facilitate the planning process (McClamroch, Byrd, & Sowell, 2001). The members of the committee were: executive director, president of the board, vice president of the board, a member of the staff, a member of the board, a consultant, and a staff consultant. The executive director, president of the board, and vice president of the board, who have a real interest and commitment to the strategic plan, were naturally on the committee. The board member was chosen due to familiarity with the strategic planning process. The staff member was chosen due to her familiarity with the organization. The staff consultant was chosen to write the strategic plan. The consultant prepared the questionnaires, facilitated board and staff sessions, facilitated the focus groups, and synthesized all data. One major issue with the committee was frequent absences of members from meetings and drop-outs of committee members. The committee needs enough people to cover absences and drop-outs, but too many members will hinder committee engagement. Also, nonprofit organizations rely on volunteers to fill gaps of the employee. Because volunteers are not paid employees, motivation to contribute over time must be sustained by recognition, praise, and flexibility to schedules. Expectations on committee involvement were expressed and discussed. However, participation was erratic. It was not clear whether it was the number of people on the committee or the people on the committee, but the enthusiasm for information exchange was not there until the end of the process when the entire team began to attend the meetings. Regardless, the synergy and momentum of the meetings are lost if the committee members do not attend regularly scheduled meetings. The people on the 58

committee need to be engaged in the strategic planning process and express opinions; people selected should be visionaries and thinkers. Members should be encouraged to engage in debate on the direction of the organization without feeling inhibited. Overall, the members worked hard on the strategic plan process. The work plan was consistently reviewed so there was a clear understanding of activities that were completed, in process, or yet to be accomplished. 8. Write the Strategic Plan Without Delay A good approach to writing a strategic plan document is to begin immediately. Several sections include: mission, vision, and values statements; and history and profile of the organization. This information can be compiled and written quickly with the first draft of the strategic plan document distributed to the committee for review. Meanwhile, the SWOT analysis and information gathering process is conducted. The second draft is distributed after information analysis and the strategies, goals, and objectives are written. By the time the strategies, goals, and objectives are completed, the committee is looking forward to wrapping up because collection, analysis, and synthesis of the data involve a long and intense process. Therefore, it is a good idea to start writing the strategic planning document early because the energy of the committee becomes depleted at this point in the process. Another condition for success is clarity in the roles and expectations for all participants in the planning process and on the committee. One of the key roles in the strategic planning process is the person to write the strategic plan. Initially, a staff consultant who was the grant writer for the organization was recruited to write the strategic plan. Her knowledge of the organization and proficient writing skills made her an excellent choice. Due to other commitments within the organization, the grant writer had to back out of the committee, and thus the writing of the plan. That left a void and delay in the process regarding who was going to write various sections of the document. A better idea is to have several people write different sections of the document and several people edit the document after completion to ensure consistency and readability. This way, the burden of writing the document is not left to one person and selection of an editor could be postponed until the end of the process. 9. Tackle Preconceived Ideas The vision, mission, and values statements of an organization are important to the strategic planning process and must be in alignment with the strategies developed (Moore, 2000; Moxley, 2004). A review of vision, mission, and values statements of the organization, what they are and how they relate to the organization, should be conducted early in the process. Changes to the vision, mission, and values statements of the organizations should be done after the SWOT analysis and the direction of the organization is agreed upon by the board. Strategic planning has a specific language all its own. The individuals on the board, staff and committee may not be familiar with strategic planning language. Those individuals who have participated in a strategic planning process probably used different terminology. The terms that are used in strategic planning have different meanings to different people. It is extremely important that everyone is educated on the strategic 59

planning process and uses the same terminology. A terms document was created to define vision, mission, and values for the board and strategic planning committee. Research on various local organizations vision, mission, and values statements was presented to the board and committee. Familiarity with organizations in the area reinforced the definition of terms and usage for our organization. Terms such as strategy, goals and objectives are not standard in the strategic planning process. Defining and agreeing on essential terms in the process is critical. Terminology is important only to make the planning process productive (Craft & Benson, 2006, p. 24). If critical terms are not agreed upon and defined then time is wasted on discussing the terminology rather than reaching the strategic planning objective. The language of the strategic planning process must be used and corrected when misused. This facilitates the board, staff, and committee using a common and familiar strategic planning language over time. The strategic planning language must be defined and used by everyone involved in the same way with the planning. Even when strategic planning language is presented, discussed, and reviewed it is not accepted by committee until it is time to write the strategic plan. This is usually when issues with the strategic language surface. Michael Allison and Jude Kaye (2005) in Strategic Planning for Nonprofit Organizations emphasize that everyone involved in the strategic planning process should use the same definitions, because there is no agreement on the definition of planning words in the profit or nonprofit sectors. They continue to support the fact that speaking the same language is important when preparing a strategic plan. Early on in the process, the terms document was presented and reviewed by the committee and used throughout the process when disagreements occurred. Frustration was exhibited by one committee member during the process because the definitions of terms used in this organization were different from those she had used in strategic planning for other nonprofit organizations. What ensued was a change to the conventional terms used in strategic planning. The term goal was changed to target. The term strategy was changed to goal. The chaos of the meeting escalated to other areas of the strategic planning process. Instead of the conventional three to five strategies over a period of three to five years the number of strategies escalated to eight. As a leader of the process, I politely commented on the unconventional use of terms and the number of strategies in trying to steer the committee members back to using conventional terms. However, I could tell there was significant frustration exhibited by the committee members at this time. Therefore, I did not pursue the discussion further. At a subsequent meeting, the original document was presented where the terms were defined. As this document was used at the beginning of the process it was familiar to the committee. After a quick review with the committee, the conventional language and process were adopted without further resistance. 10. Communicate Often One aspect of the project management methodology is communications management. There are a number of groups 60

and people who must be informed on the strategic planning progress. The following areas note the managed effort in communicating with those involved with the process. a. Make a presentation to the board and staff. A presentation to the board and staff on the five-phase strategic planning process was scheduled. The idea was to communicate the various phases of the strategic planning process, verify that the people involved in the process received the same information, and field questions regarding the budget, time frame, and resources for the project. b. Create a work plan. A work plan outlining the various phases, complete with activities and dates associated with the activity, was created and maintained. The work plan was brought to meetings to review and monitor status. The work plan should be updated before each committee meeting and reviewed at each meeting--what was accomplished, what is in process, and what still needs to be completed. The work plan along with a status report is to be distributed monthly to the board and staff. Also, the work plan must be brought to all meetings; strategic planning committee meetings, board meetings, and staff meetings to update the committee, board and staff continually on the status of the project. Because of the various phases of the strategic planning process and activities within each phase, it is easy to lose focus as to the phase and activity in process and what is left to complete. Reviewing the work plan also provides an opportunity to reinforce the non-familiar terminology associated with the strategic planning process. 61 c. Provide an update to the board and staff. Creating status reports for distribution to the board and staff each month is also wise. Even though the committee was well aware of the status of the project, they were included in distribution. The board meetings at Women At Work went to using a consent agenda. A consent agenda is a practice by which repetitive board action items are organized apart from the rest of the agenda and approved as a group. Status reports, on the repetitive action items, are distributed prior to the meeting to expedite formal board approval. One of the negatives to a consent agenda is not guaranteeing board preparation on the issues. It is unknown if all board members read the various group status reports prior to the board meetings. Even if a consent agenda is practiced, suggestions and feedback from the board on the strategic planning process are important. The strategic plan must be added as an agenda item at each board meeting. Each month, the board should be informed of major accomplishments, and provide time to discuss issues and ask questions relevant to the process. The board needs to feel engaged in the process over the course of events and knowledgeable as to the content of the strategic plan before it is first presented for review. The staff should be updated on a monthly basis as well. A good idea is to have the person who represents the staff on the strategic plan committee provide an update at staff meetings and to field questions. d. Document all meetings. Documentation on meetings was written and distributed to the committee prior to the next scheduled meeting. The meeting notes were

reviewed at the beginning of the next meeting. While taking meeting notes is a tedious task, notes are needed when decisions made at a meeting need verification. 11. Be Persistent The strategic planning process can be overwhelming. We planned for the process at WAW to take a year; however, there are obstacles that can prolong the process which organizations need to consider. If the work plan is set up and followed consistently, then the committee members should be aware of the process, meetings and events. In our case, the work plan was followed and adjustments were made when indicated. There are times when one or two committee members could not attend meetings. The meetings were rescheduled only when an organizational event would have interrupted a scheduled meeting. Because of inconsistent attendance, notes on all meetings were logged, distributed to the committee after the meeting, and reviewed at the beginning of the next meeting. Good meeting etiquette is essential. The committee members knew a meeting agenda was written and followed which included beginning and ending meetings on time. The strategic planning process is a significant time commitment for those involved on the committee. It is important to recognize the committee members time and meetings should be scheduled only when there is a purpose to meet. FINAL NOTES The result of the strategic planning process provides an organization with a number of advantages. First, the organization identifies the core strategies for the work ahead including goals and objectives. Work plans are included in the strategic plan to outline the timeframe for meeting the goals and objectives. Aligning capable individuals to fill the positions needed to implement the plans is vital to achieving the goals and objectives. The individuals, once hired, know what the job entails and can be measured effectively against specific goals and objectives. Second, a change of leadership should not shift the focus of the organization. A structure has been put in place and the future work identified. The board, staff, and stakeholders were involved in the strategic planning process and must be involved with the evaluation of the plan over the five-year implementation period. Lastly, the strategic plan is a compilation of countless hours of input and ideas proposed by board, staff, volunteers, community leaders, clients and many others who care about the organization and want the good work done by WAW to continue. As the implementation of the plan begins, there will be challenges and hurdles ahead. There is much more to accomplish, and there is a much greater impact that the organization can have on both women and men. Bettering the lives of many and reaching out to help and assist is the major cornerstone of WAW. The strategic plan should be viewed as a working document. Many people are interested in the success of the organization and as the environment changes or key issues affect the organization, the process should be strong enough to incorporate flexibility. 62

The use of project management methodology in the strategic planning process that WAW followed might benefit other nonprofit organizations by presenting the lessons learned. The methodology is based on learning and applying the practices of project initiation, planning, monitoring, controlling and formally closing all activities. The use of the methodology recognizes the whole process and not just the individual parts; methodology provides structure to limit chaos and help the project manager focus on all aspects of the project. For example, often there is a tendency to dive right in and start activities rather than to take the necessary time to plan and discuss all the activities first. It is important to understand the entire scope of the project to ensure the goals of the project will be met. Next, project management tools and techniques are routinely used by project managers. Some of the tools discussed in the article were questionnaires to determine the scope of the project, use of a work plan to manage the project activities, and methods available to facilitate effective communication with the project s stakeholders. In conclusion, the successful close of a project should not be overlooked. A proper conclusion would include: verifying all activities in the work plan are completed, communicating to stakeholders that all deliverables are acceptable, and conducting a project s lessons learned session; identifying successful project activities and those that could be improved. Project management is a process that guides the project to achieve the desired goals. It is not an exercise in generating more work or overhead. With project management methodology, it is necessary to plan, stay focused, and persevere through the phases of the strategic planning process and the result will be a successful and necessary venture. 63

REFERENCES Allison, Michael & Kaye, Jude. (2005). Strategic planning for nonprofit organizations. (2 nd ed.). John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Barry, Bryan W. (1997). Strategic planning workbook for nonprofit organizations. St. Paul, MN: Amherst H. Wilder Foundation. Berkun, Scott. (2005). The art of project management. O Reilly Media, Inc. Bradach, J. L., Tierney, T.J., & Stone, N. (2008). Delivering on the promise of nonprofits. Harvard Business Review, 86(12), 88-97. Bryson, John. (2011). Strategic planning for public and nonprofit organizations: A guide to strengthening and sustaining organizational achievement. (4 th ed.). Jossey-Bass. Cooke-Davies, Terence J., Crawford, Lynn H., & Lechler, Thomas G. (2009, March). Project management systems: Moving project management from an operational to a strategic discipline. Project Management Journal. Craft, R. C., & Benson, R. G. (2006). Needed: A better grasp of strategic planning. Nonprofit World, 24(5), 24 26. Kerzner, Harold. (2003, June). Strategic planning for a project office. Project Management Journal, 34(2), 13 25. Koteen, Jack. (1997). Strategic management in public and nonprofit organizations: Managing public concerns in an era of limits. (2 nd ed). Praeger Publishers. Knutson, Joan. (2008, April). Aligning strategic planning with project management. PM Network, 17(4), 66 68. Leeman, T. (2002, Sept/Oct) Managing the chaos of change. The Journal of Business Strategy, 23(5), 11-15. McClamroch, J., Byrd, J.J., & Sowell, S.L. (2001). Strategic planning: Politics, leadership, and learning. Journal of Academic Librarianship, 27(5), 372 378. McHatton, Patricia Alvarez, Bradshaw, Wendy, Gallagher, Peggy A., & Reeves, Rebecca. (2011). Results from a strategic planning process, benefits for a nonprofit organization, Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 22(2). Mintzberg, Henry & Quinn, James Brian. (1996). The strategy process. (5 th ed). Simon & Schuster Company. Mittenthal, Richard. (2004, June). Don t give up on strategic planning: 10 keys to success, Nonprofit World, 22(3). Moore, M. H. (2000, March). Managing for value: Organizational strategy in forprofit, nonprofit, and governmental organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 29(1), 183 204. Moxley, D. P. (2004). Factors influencing the successful use of vision-based strategy planning by nonprofit human service organizations. International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior, 7(1), 107-132. Project Management Institute. (2008). A guide to the project management body of knowledge (PMBOK) (4 th ed.). 64

VOLUNTEERS, NONPROFITS, AND COMMUNITY CAPACITY: A CASE STUDY IN PREPARING FOR DISASTER RESPONSE AND RECOVERY Jessica K. A. Word, is the Director of the MPA Program and Director of Certificate Programs for Public Management and Nonprofit Management in the Department of Environmental and Public Affairs, Greenspun College of Public Affairs, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Ralph S. Brower, is the Director of the Center for Civic and Nonprofit Leadership in the College of Social Sciences and Public Policy, Florida State University. A lthough professional emergency managers often regard disaster volunteers as a crowd control problem, Florida s 2004 hurricane season demonstrated that well-trained and preaffiliated volunteers can offer substantial assistance to professionals and strengthen the community s preparedness in meaningful ways. Our study shows that the three-year Operation Step Up program helped volunteer centers in Florida enhance their volunteer management capabilities for disaster response and recovery. Initial findings suggested that the involvement of professional volunteer managers could enhance the ability of communities to respond to disasters and provide a better link between government and community organizations. Follow up interviews revealed that, even after the grant funds expired, most programs had succeeded in mainstreaming the disaster volunteer management skills into their organization s ongoing programs and their interactions with community partners and other Florida volunteer centers. 65 INTRODUCTION Disasters occur every day in a myriad of settings and scales across the globe. One of the common traits all disasters share is the need to respond more effectively and to find ways to ease the human suffering associated with these events. Traditional response systems rely primarily upon professional responders from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), state and local governments in the United States, as well as international aid organizations. Large scale disasters, such as Katrina, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and the Gulf BP Oil Spill, have tended to overwhelm the ability of traditional organizations to respond. This type of disaster requires the engagement not only of national and international governmental resources but also successful cross-sector collaboration. Our study examined the role that volunteer managers and nonprofit entities can play in integrating volunteers into disaster and emergency response. In particular, we examined the role of the volunteer manager in training, pre-planning, and relationship building to support the use of volunteer and local resources in emergency response. The dynamic events that take place in a disaster strain and challenge traditional volunteer management practices, but minor modifications and extensions to the role of the traditional volunteer manager can help create positive outcomes for both communities and volunteers. Adaptations to traditional practices can include empowering communities and individuals to respond to disasters, the creation of local communities

of support, and bridging the gap between traditional institutional response and identifying local needs and capabilities. For the purpose of this research project, a volunteer manager or administrator is defined as an individual who may be a paid or unpaid staff member who is responsible for coordinating the responsibilities of individual volunteers to help achieve an organizational or mission related goal (Connors, 2011). Volunteer managers are employed in a variety of organizations and settings but this project focused predominantly on volunteer managers who worked in volunteer centers engaged in promoting and coordinating volunteerism actively across communities. In particular, many of the volunteer initiatives in this project focused on recruiting senior and youth volunteers and engaging them in response to disasters. TRADITIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE SYSTEMS Traditional disaster response systems are managed by large governmental and nongovernmental organizations and rely upon the capacity of smaller governmental agencies and community organizations for the coordination of local networks of support. The importance for coordination was demonstrated in the failures of Katrina where cross-sector collaboration and volunteer deployment lagged because of a lack of communication and comprehensive pre-planning (Simo & Bies, 2007). Under normal circumstances volunteers require a unique type of psychological contract in order to fulfill their expectations and retain their services (Farmer & Fedor, 1999); consistent procedures ensure stability for the volunteer experience. In disasters, participants find themselves in a dynamic process that tests their capacities to learn, innovate, and adapt to changing conditions, informed by timely, valid data (Comfort, 2007, p. 189). Preparing volunteers for disaster work, therefore, holds many challenges for volunteer managers and communities. Thus, despite the ostensive value of volunteer and community organizations in disasters, few programs have been able to maximize the benefits of volunteers while minimizing barriers to their participation. This article examines a unique program, Florida s Operation Step Up (OSU), which demonstrated significant strides in achieving these goals by employing organizations already embedded in local communities. Operation Step Up was initiated by a threeyear grant totaling $650,600 received by Volunteer Florida from the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS). The program engaged volunteer management and recruitment competencies of existing nonprofit organizations dedicated to supporting and encouraging volunteers. Utilizing this approach to address the challenges of emergency management, OSU was able to harness a network of interested individuals and nonprofit agencies that could contribute local resources and knowledge to emergency response (Lavely & Legters, 2009; Brennan 2005). VOLUNTEERS IN DISASTER RESPONSE The need to employ community resources effectively becomes more urgent in disasters. The participation of volunteers in disasters has a long tradition in the United States (Lohmann, 1992) with many affiliated volunteers involved annually in responding 66

with the American Red Cross and other disaster relief agencies on a daily basis. Volunteers in disaster situations have the potential to create linkages through involvement between professional response personnel and the impacted community (Borden & Perkins, 2007). This allows professionals from outside the affected area to access information more rapidly which aids in designing an effective response. One critical need following a disaster is effective deployment of community resources to address emerging problems while limiting risks to both professionals and volunteers. Often professionals responding to disasters are brought into communities from other jurisdictions or higher levels of government and have limited local knowledge. Volunteers and volunteer managers have the potential to bridge the gap between response professionals and the community. Disaster volunteers can be classified in two general categories: affiliated volunteers, and unaffiliated or spontaneous volunteers (FEMA, 2003). Affiliated volunteers are those with recognized agencies that have trained them for disaster response and have mechanisms in place to address their use in an emergency (FEMA, 2003, p.17). Unaffiliated or spontaneous volunteers are those who show up in the immediate aftermath of a disaster or emergency. The ability of communities to employ both types of volunteers requires preplanning by emergency and community officials (NVOAD, 2006; Volunteer Florida, 2005). The FEMA guide on the use of volunteers (2003, p. 114) explains that volunteers enhance response capabilities in emergencies because they supply extra or immediate assistance as needed. Moreover, volunteers represent a willing workforce that is either already trained or skilled, or can be trained and used in future disasters. However, using affiliated volunteers effectively requires emergency managers and volunteer managers to establish a relationship before disasters and make agencies aware of their roles in emergencies. The establishment of relationships between traditional emergency management professionals and volunteer managers allows for more effective communication and trust when faced with critical decisions and rapidly changing response needs that are common in emergencies. In contrast, self-deployed, spontaneous volunteers often create barriers that interfere with response and create additional work for emergency personnel who have to direct and oversee their involvement. At worst, spontaneous volunteers have the potential to create danger and casualties if poorly managed (FEMA, 2003). Additional complications arise from the involvement of spontaneous volunteers because they lack screening and training, require close supervision, and often hamper access to an area. Most emergency response personnel are not formally trained to work with spontaneous volunteers, however, volunteer managers employ a skill set to work with these types of volunteers on a daily basis. Finally, the involvement of volunteers in disasters poses unique challenges due to exposure to physical and emotional stress (FEMA, 2003). Disasters have potential to produce extreme stress reactions in situations such as coming in contact with death and injury, property devastation, and extreme emotional reactions from victims. 67

METHODS AND DATA Initial data collection for this study was based on program documents and records, surveys and interviews with stakeholder groups, and site visits between December 2005 and April 2006. The researchers distributed survey instruments to numerous stakeholder groups and conducted interviews with program directors, staff members, partner organizations, emergency managers, volunteers, and state program staff. Site visits were conducted with four of the volunteer centers across the state. Each of the sites had various levels of involvement in providing both program development and actual hurricane response. Each program contained unique program elements or experiences that were intended to create a deeper understanding of the program s elements. Since the work of volunteers in emergency management hinges on the role accorded to them by local government emergency managers, we also examined transcripts from interviews conducted with 15 county emergency managers in July and August 2011. 1 Data from these interviews permitted us to construct a more coherent picture of the overall role of volunteers and nonprofit organizations in emergency management. Finally, we were concerned, with whether volunteer management organizations were able to sustain their enhanced emergency response capabilities over time. One possible outcome was that volunteer capabilities and the enhanced relationships with professional emergency managers would retract once the federal funding had expired. To examine the sustained capability and explore lessons learned, the researchers conducted additional interviews in January and February 2012 with program directors and staff in Volunteer 68 Florida, 2 the organization that conceived and implemented the statewide program. Nine individuals, all of whom had been involved in the Operation Step Up activities, participated in this final phase of data collection. 3 ROLES AND COLLABORATION IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT The Florida Division of Emergency Management (FDEM) is the primary government entity in Florida in charge of emergency management. FDEM is responsible for coordination with other departments and agencies in state government, FEMA, county and municipal governments, school boards, and private and nonprofit organizations that have roles in emergency management. Volunteer management for emergencies is a component in this system of vertical and horizontal collaboration. Throughout most of the U.S., county governments typically take the lead in firstlevel emergency response (Waugh, 1994; Choi & Brower, 2006). The model deployed by FDEM follows primarily a bottom-up process in which the local emergency manager requests services, extra support, and resources from regional or state coordinators when the situation demands a response that exceeds the local government s capabilities. One county emergency manager explained vertical coordination with state and federal governments this way: Generally based on the local priority, the federal government and state government is not going to come in, take over an incident, or manage the disaster for a county dailybase[work], falling in more of a supporting role providing resources and expertise, or personnel or whatever you need based on the

request from that local jurisdiction. At the local level, emergency managers depend on horizontal collaboration -- among local government units, between local governments, and with nonprofit organizations. Emergency managers described collaboration in various ways in their interviews: Collaboration is about building the relationship with people, especially in the pre-disaster environment. It [collaboration] is the development of interrelationships with critical partners to accomplish the mission of emergency management. Collaboration does not happen spontaneously when emergencies arise. It requires a lot of planning and careful preparation, relationship building, and forging of formal agreements that lay out who provides each critical service component. Typically, local emergency managers need to educate their own government leaders and others in the community about the practical realities of emergency response and recovery. As one emergency management director explained: I think it is our job to educate and inform the administration with the local government on what could happen, what needs to be done, should that occur, and who needs to help to do that. Because, honestly, the community cannot do this and government cannot do this on their own. It has to be a community-wide effort... One of our tasks is trying to bring different entities within the community together by using collaboration and coordination to address whatever did happen. Other emergency management directors described how relationship-building is a center-piece in setting up collaborative partnerships: Collaboration is about building the relationship, especially in the predisaster environment. Nobody wants to meet somebody for the first time when the worst disaster came in, especially in this small rural community such as we are. The relationship, you re going stay in touch with them and become friends with them. I would say we are good friends with most communities, people from organizations we deal with. So you have friendship more than just a business association. So it is about going from business partnership to actual relationship. And staying in touch in the off time even when we are not meeting. Many emergency managers emphasize their role in providing advice to local businesses and nonprofits for improving their capabilities and preparedness for emergencies. Several emergency managers explained why nonprofit organizations are a critical collaborative resource: I will ask help from non-profit [organizations] if I don t have enough manpower. Like if I had the family that lost their home we don t even have a clothing store here, so we may have to have the United Way four miles away and send them [the family] the clothes or whatever to help the families or send furniture to help the family, not relying on the staff from other [public] agencies. The non-profits we have the network and they all work together and try to get the supplies you need to victims. There are lots of churches 69

within our communities. They have large followings that is a huge resource there in the way of manpower and facilities. (These organizations) know the neighborhood. They know the people. They get out there more than we do. And then we can t do it all, so we need them to be able to help to respond [to the disaster] with us. One county emergency manager observed that agencies do compete with each other for limited federal funding and other support. Sometimes this competition weakens collaborative relationships. Sometimes agencies compete similarly for media attention, because media attention helps agencies maximize their budgets and stimulate charitable donations. Several emergency managers observed that each agency has its own unique characteristics, and this compounds the difficulties that emergency managers face when dealing with these networks of participants, especially when the agencies themselves are competing with each other. In these situations interpersonal skills among emergency managers and their corresponding nonprofit partners -- and interagency relationships are vital for collaboration to succeed. One emergency manager asked: Are they [non-governmental organizations] easy to work with? No. They probably say that We are easy to work with. No, because they have different institutional structures than government s way to do business. That s one of the reasons why we have to collaborate, and have good relationships with players who oversee these things. Thus collaborations among professional emergency managers, professional volunteer managers, nonprofit organizations, private businesses, and other community groups are vital to emergency management -- but enacted on contested terrain. It was against this context that Volunteer Florida undertook its Operation Step Up initiative. BUILDING A NETWORK OF VOLUNTEER AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT As part of a grant program designed to increase preparedness and response capabilities of volunteers and volunteer centers statewide, Operation Step Up provided training to volunteer centers on a variety of emergency management related topics, including continuity of operations, disaster mitigation, long-term recovery, and management of spontaneous volunteers. The grant program joined local volunteer centers and emergency response agencies to: (1) develop the roles of volunteer centers in local emergency management plans; (2) mentor emergency response agencies to develop volunteer programs; (3) unite volunteer centers and emergency response agencies to use volunteers in disaster response; (4) engage and enable volunteers in urban areas to lead in preparation and response to disasters; and, (5) utilize volunteers to mitigate disasters locally. Most of the volunteer centers at the outset of the program were locally based nonprofit agencies with missions that focused on promoting volunteerism in their communities through recruitment and referral of volunteers to other nonprofit agencies. A small handful of volunteer centers were offices in local government. Volunteer centers in general were formed to promote civic engagement and volunteer participation in their local communities, especially targeting youth and 70

seniors. All the volunteer centers were relatively small agencies or were programs nested within larger organizations in the community. In designing Operation Step Up, Volunteer Florida specified what they expected to accomplish from the program. These outcomes measured how well programs complied with accepted best practices in volunteer management and levels of involvement between volunteer center managers and emergency management officials. In general, our surveys showed that volunteers believed the volunteer organizations implemented sound volunteer management practices, with the exception of recognition or thanks that volunteers received. The interview and survey results highlighted how the program was also successful in other ways, including increasing coordination and cooperation among nonprofits and governmental agencies in response and preparation for a disaster. RESULTS FROM VOLUNTEER SURVEYS Research related to volunteer retention and satisfaction suggests that nine components are key to volunteer management: supervision and communication with volunteers, liability coverage, screening and matching volunteers to jobs, documentation of volunteer involvement, written policies and job descriptions, recognition, measurement of volunteer impact, training and professional development of volunteers, and training paid staff to work with volunteers (Hager & Brudney, 2004; Lammers 1991). A total of 67 volunteers from nine volunteer centers responded to our survey. 4 The volunteers interviewed generally expressed that the work we are doing here is 71 important. The survey results further illustrated that nearly 90% of volunteers intended to continue volunteering for at least another year (see Table 1), which is slightly better than the national average of 80% volunteer retention (Hager & Brudney, 2004). Responses Frequency Percent No Answer 1 1.5 Highly Unlikely 6 9.0 Unlikely 1 1.5 Undecided 1 1.5 Likely 19 28.4 Very Likely 39 58.2 Table 1 Likelihood of Continuing to Volunteer Hager and Brudney (2004) found activities most closely tied to retention were regular recognition of volunteers, volunteer training and professional development, and screening volunteers to match them to appropriate tasks. Unlike many other sporadic volunteering opportunities, Operation Step Up included these as key program elements. The grant set forth a requirement that grantees provide volunteer recognition events for participants. Another key requirement was that volunteers receive training ahead of disasters to prepare for activation for direct response or registering and screening other volunteers. Previous studies have identified the quality of volunteer opportunities as an important component of creating satisfying experiences for volunteers (Jamison, 2003). In our sample, nearly 80% felt either satisfied or very satisfied with the amount and quality of service opportunities

(see Table 2). Our interviews with volunteers suggested that one reason volunteers saw their experience as worthwhile was that they viewed disaster relief work as particularly important to their communities and families. Responses Frequency Percent No Opinion 12 17.9 Very Satisfied 26 38.8 Satisfied 26 38.8 Unsatisfied 3 4.5 Responses Frequency Percent No Answer 3 4.5 Not At All 1 1.5 Rarely 3 4.5 About Average 25 37.3 Often 16 23.9 Very Often 19 28.4 Table 3 How Often Tasks Provide Opportunity to Develop New Skills Table 2 Satisfaction with the Amount and Quality of Service Opportunity More than half of our respondents reported that they either often or very often felt their assigned tasks permitted them to develop new skills; another 37% reported that such tasks offered average opportunities to develop new skills (see Table 3). Previous research also suggests that volunteers are more satisfied (Jamison, 2003) and more likely to continue volunteering (Hager & Brudney, 2004) if their tasks are challenging and provide opportunity for growth. This suggests that assigned tasks play a significant role in increasing volunteer satisfaction. Our interview data supported the idea that the nature of emergency preparedness and response reinforced satisfaction for these volunteers. Many volunteers had first-hand experiences and leadership roles alongside first responders. Often these new tasks required significant training and required volunteers to perform duties with which they had no prior experience, such as registering volunteers and/or performing support functions for emergency workers. 72 The commitment of volunteers to their host organizations missions is also revealed in survey results. Nearly 93% responded that they were either somewhat likely, likely, or very likely to seek advanced training offered by host organizations (see Table 4). Responses Frequency Percent No Answer 3 4.5 Very Likely 29 43.3 Likely 28 41.8 Somewhat Likely 5 7.5 Unlikely 1 1.5 Very Unlikely 1 1.5 Table 4 Likelihood of Taking Additional or Advanced Training Nearly 70% of volunteers indicated that they would be willing to accept greater responsibility with their host agency (see Table 5).

Responses Frequency Percent NA 8 11.9 No 13 19.4 Yes 46 68.7 Table 5 Willingness to Accept a Position of Greater Responsibility Another important program outcome was to understand how volunteers viewed their participation. Thus volunteers were asked to report on several aspects which spoke to their feelings of efficacy in volunteer situations and adequacy of training for these situations. Volunteers were asked to report on their sense of growth in ability to perform disaster-related volunteer tasks. Their responses confirm their confidence in being able to perform well; as 92.5% responded that they had been either adequately or very adequately trained for their volunteer roles (see Table 6). Responses Frequency Percent No Answer 1 1.5 Very Adequately 20 29.9 Adequately 42 62.7 Inadequately 3 4.5 Very Inadequately 1 1.5 Table 6 Adequacy of Training to Prepare for Volunteer Functions these volunteers felt confident to deal with emergency situations with new skills they received through the program. Interviews also suggested individuals acquired new skills as volunteers but had taken proactive steps to become more prepared at home as well. Responses Frequency Percent No Answer 2 3.0 Increased 25 37.3 Increased Greatly Stayed about the Same 28 41.8 12 17.9 Table 7 Acquisition of New Skills/Knowledge for Emergency Situations SIX YEARS LATER: SUSTAINED CAPABILITIES AND SYSTEM CHANGES In early 2012, our interviews with volunteer managers sought to acquire hindsight perspectives from their participation in Operation Step Up and to learn about their organizations ongoing capabilities in emergency management. We asked them to tell us about what they perceived to have been their agencies successes and challenges from the program, what roles their agencies had retained in local ESF15 5 activities, and changes they observed in their organizations and in their roles in state or national level systems. Finally, volunteers were asked to report on how Operation Step Up training affected their personal competence in emergency preparation and response (see Table 7). Nearly 80% reported that their skills and knowledge increased or increased greatly. Clearly 73 Successes and Challenges All of the volunteer managers reported that their agencies had either initiated Volunteer Reception Center (VRC) activities or had enhanced what they were already doing. One manager reported that we have a tighter

process in that we have a full-scale intake procedure, we have done exercises with phone lines and everything, and we have continued to test it by having volunteers come in and do mock interviews with us. All of the managers reported that they had trained staff within the agency to run the VRC processes. Several managers reported that as they created and experimented with their VRC capabilities, they became sensitized to the potential contributions of other nonprofits and community groups and to the needs that these groups would have during disasters. Several reported these activities led them to form a Community Organizations Active in Disaster association, or COAD. As one explained: I think the greatest area of success was learning about the capabilities of other agencies in the community. We learned a lot more about the impact that non-response organizations can have. So we created COAD. They already had VOAD [Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters] at the state level, but there was a huge gap locally. Churches complained. If we needed a licensed daycare to step up to the plate, we needed first responder kits, so that they can be comfortable doing their job knowing that their families are taken care of. Space? Where can we put a VRC if the library s roof is blown away? So those connections, we made and created the COAD because there were so many of them. For example, the Florida Baptists had a disaster relief team. And we were able during (Tropical Storm) Fay when trees were falling on people s houses. We d pass it along to them, they d go take a look, get the tree off the roof, and tarp the roof.... A little bit of tarp goes a long way, and if you re in your 80s and you don t have any relatives, you need that help. Our interviewees reported that approximately two-thirds of Florida s volunteer centers now have active COADs or Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters (VOAD) associations, many of which are multi-county structures. Several volunteer center directors cited their successes in reaching out to individual households in their communities, especially in getting families prepared for disasters. One observed that initially, as they began meeting with families in neighborhood groups, they were amazed at the numbers of households that were totally unprepared with plans or go-kits if they were called on to have to evacuate. Toward the end of the threeyear program those meetings hosted much larger numbers of families that were fully prepared and knowledgeable about evacuation. Two of the volunteer managers described their efforts to get special populations prepared for disasters; such as, the elderly, disabled, poor, and Spanish-speaking households. One, noting that her volunteer center has continued to make community presentations on household preparedness even after Operation Step Up money expired, described recent projects directed toward special populations: One of the big problems in our county is that not everybody has the resources to put a kit together, so we worked with a community group to put together 75 to 100 emergency kits to be delivered to seniors or folks who had limited resources. We also put together a list for a disaster preparedness kit for people who are sight and hearing impaired, and we did that in English and Spanish. We did large print and also worked with our community college to get it 74

translated into Spanish on a CD and a cassette that, with all the preparedness information, how to register for a special needs shelter, what sorts of things you d need to gather. We did it for three counties because we were also working with one of the sight impaired organizations and we would go in and teach their clients. So that was very rewarding, that collaboration with the college and the other organization as well. Some volunteer center directors also noted the response and recovery activities that their agencies had been able to provide to individual households under actual disaster conditions. One, describing a situation in another county, observed that during Hurricane Charlie, down in Sarasota, they had people going house to house because the police couldn t get to everybody. There were people who couldn t get medication. This experience was well known within the statewide network, but it was clearly an account that bolstered volunteer centers selfesteem. They saved lives, she continued, just walking the doors as trained volunteers. So when they saw this, old emergency management people started to get it that volunteers could really be an asset. Most of the volunteer center directors reported successes in promoting business continuity planning, but not without some difficulties. One manager described how their business continuity initiative had fallen short of expectations. She reported that her agency had planned to get community volunteers to take the training and to become facilitators in the community... but the volunteers did not want to put the time in that we thought was necessary. Apparently, the vision that most volunteers had was to go in and give businesses a little overview. Then they d 75 come back a couple of weeks later to see how much progress the business had made. But most businesses were so busy just trying to keep their businesses afloat, that to have the volunteer come and say, give me half an hour, and let me go over that with you together for next time, just totally missed what the businesses could do on their own. Several interviewees identified a challenging mismatch between the goals that volunteer centers want to achieve in emergency management and requirements that the funding source had attached to the funding. One described it this way: The National Corporation, who provided the funding, required the recruitment and training of a certain percentage of seniors.... So you train, and recruit, and orient, and the storm may or may not come. But that was the struggle, to demonstrate the value of the program through volunteers with boots on the ground, and that was a function of where the funding came from. If it had been from another source, that didn t have that piece as such a priority, then I think we in the volunteer centers could have focused more on the relationship building and building programs that met local needs better. Several volunteer managers also found the paperwork requirements to be a significant challenge. One of them captured a sentiment of her counterparts with this observation: There was a lot of paperwork, especially related to recording how many new volunteers we recruited, how many hours they put in, and so on. We met the hour requirements with the VRC exercises, but that felt a little disingenuous. In an actual disaster, we would have been running a volunteer reception center anyway,

but the paperwork really didn t make us any more efficient and accountable at it. At times, we questioned why we were jumping through those hoops for such a small chunk of money. Two of the volunteer center directors described significant challenges in getting their county emergency management directors to take them seriously as participants in ESF15 activities. One described her frustrations in interactions with the county emergency management officials. I know every county is different, but for me, I didn t have a good experience with the county. She described how basic communications often broke down. I d send volunteers, for example, to where they d say the truck is coming with ice, and we sent volunteers fifteen miles, only to find out they d called county employees and they were doing it. She concluded that she wasn t the only one experiencing these difficulties: We had multiple meetings with the United Way, my executive director and the committee chairs, and everybody felt the same way. They felt it was lack of complete cooperation. It was just difficult to get answers or cooperation. And I think it was the county didn t want to deal with unaffiliated volunteers, they thought it should be strictly our problem. These managers were quick to acknowledge the efforts of Volunteer Florida to advocate for them. One observed, they tried to step in and help, but I was hemmed in by the county. Their experience reminds us that not all professional emergency managers routinely acknowledge the value of volunteers in emergency management, and that professional volunteer managers must continue to educate government leaders and others in the 76 community about their potential contributions to emergency management. Formal and Informal Roles in ESF15 All the volunteer center directors we interviewed acknowledged that their agencies had either formal or informal responsibilities within their counties ESF15 activities, although those roles varied considerably. Several acknowledged that their agencies had had formal responsibilities to lead ESF15 even before Operation Step Up, but that participating in the program had enhanced their capabilities and reputations for performing the role. Another described having her agency undertake the role as a result of their enhanced capabilities from Operation Step Up. One manager observed: When we originally were identified, because we were not part of government per se, there was a skepticism that we would be able to do what needed to be done. And we would go to briefings and we would do things, and we d say, when we re here, we re like employees, we re here to do a mission, and that gradually grew. And I think Operation Step Up helped us even more firmly become entrenched in the emergency preparedness and response in our community. Two agency managers observed that their organizations at one time had ESF15 lead responsibility but had recently given it up due to insufficient resources. Another described having had ESF15 lead responsibility, but transferred most of the responsibilities to the Red Cross, and then re-established responsibility when the Red Cross underwent a significant leadership change. Those that retained ESF15 leadership all described how Operation Step Up gave them the resources,

time and focus to learn about their potential community partners. Having gained this awareness, several of them recounted their efforts to form COAD or VOAD structures, as we described above. All the volunteer managers acknowledged that their organizations retained the capability to offer a Volunteer Reception Center and that they and their community partners fully expected them to do so. Many described having Memoranda of Understanding that formally cemented this expectation. Finally, several described other official duties related to disaster recovery. One observed that her agency was part of: the long term recovery committee for our county, and so we had tropical storm Fay four years ago, and there are still families the county is working with from that flooding, with money from community development block grants. And with that, we make sure the volunteers have adequate instructions about what they should be doing, what they shouldn t be doing, and they trust us to do that. Organizational and System Change Our interviewees identified an array of organizational and system changes that occurred at various levels. We have organized the changes into three levels or categories: organizational/operational changes; changes in emergency systems in counties and communities; and changes within federal level systems. 1. Organizational/Operational Changes As many of our interviewees emphasized, Operation Step Up caused their volunteer agencies to focus energies on emergency management, an emphasis that many had 77 always acknowledged but not adequately addressed. At a basic level, some organizations were motivated to write their own internal emergency plans and plans for collaboration with external partners. One manager described how her agency wrote a plan jointly with an adjacent county that permitted it, if our buildings were impacted, and theirs wasn t, we could go and operate out of their facility. Another manager reported on how her agency was compelled to cut back its activities after the Operation Step Up funding had expired, but they retained five go bags ready to go for our two counties, and we have paid staff who are trained and can run volunteer reception centers if they re needed. All of the managers described the organizational learning that their volunteer centers experienced, an idea aptly expressed in the words of one interviewee: Going though the exercises showed people, including us and the emergency management professionals, the potential for chaos when nobody is prepared to manage unaffiliated volunteers. I and the others in the organization are better prepared personally and professionally to do what s needed. It also caused us to think about and plan for the practical realities. Another volunteer manager noted how the attention her agency directed toward emergency management from Operation Step Up caused them to weave our preparedness into our program of work, so that when the money went away the program didn t go away, because it was mainstreamed into the projects. 2. Community and County Systems One of the conspicuous system changes in many counties was the creation of COAD and

VOAD structures as single- and multiplecounty structures. In addition, some counties volunteer centers instituted noteworthy system changes by creating services focused on special populations such as the elderly, poor, disabled and Spanish-speaking families. In a few instances, as volunteer centers established their reputations through solid performance in simulations and actual disasters, emergency managers were impressed enough to help support the ongoing volunteer missions with emergency management funds after Operation Step Up money expired. In numerous counties, emergency managers displayed their newfound confidence in the volunteer centers in other ways. In several counties, for example, the volunteer centers have regularly been invited to participate in annual or bi-annual disaster simulations. One volunteer manager explained that: Emergency managers still contact us, even in peace time. We were just involved in an airport exercise last month. It s a triennial exercise and they engaged us to help with recruiting volunteers. They wanted to have 50 or 100 volunteers to have sufficient volunteers on hand to simulate the exercise they wanted to do, which was an active shooter situation at the airport. So we recruited volunteers and signed in all the volunteers that day. And they know that we will give adequate orientations to the volunteers when they have an event that comes up, and be sure that we re not going to put volunteers in harm s way. In another county, the emergency plans were modified so that county employees are potentially on call to help fulfill duties within ESF15. The volunteer manager described how we put their information in the system by department or division. We send the director the information, they tell us who s available that shift, whose on vacation, and so on. This policy demonstrates a whole new level of internal support from county government for the volunteer system. Having established that level of confidence in her agency s performance, she found it increasingly less difficult to find alternative funding after the Operation Step Up funds expired. I just applied for more grants, she explained. If you have experience and you ve done a good job with it, people are more willing to give you dollars to support your efforts, she continued. In another county, the reputation and expertise built up by the volunteer center over the period following Operation Step Up encouraged officials at the local Coast Guard Station to seek them out for guidance in supervising volunteers involved in cleanup activities following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Central to all of these collaborative activities is the reservoir of reputation, and goodwill created by the volunteer centers from their Operation Step Up activities. At least three types of Operation Step Up projects appear to have died out after the initial funds expired. A few volunteer centers had undertaken projects for the Front Porch initiative 6, a pet project of then Governor Jeb Bush. Little, if anything, remains of the Front Porch initiative, which Bush had promoted in political speeches and appearances. Likewise, the Event Watch initiative, in which volunteers were trained to help police and security at special events, appears to have evaporated, perhaps largely from concerns about legal liability. Finally, an initiative to train ham radio operators and prepare them to assist with disaster communications, has apparently also gone moribund. A few 78

interviewees suggested that new communication modalities, especially cell phones assisted by portable generators, have diminished dependence on the ham radio operators. 3. State and Federal Systems Every interviewee emphasized the enhanced capacity of their statewide association of volunteer centers and their growing respect for Volunteer Florida s emergency management staff. Several managers noted that prior to Operation Step Up relationships between Volunteer Florida and some of the volunteer centers was not so great. But Operation Step Up allowed the relationships to develop on both sides. The funding was, among other things, a simple vehicle to build new and better relationships. When the money expired, Volunteer Florida then became more dependent on their partners in the counties. When they recently lost a staff position, they looked to the counties to develop people who could come to Tallahassee to assist in the state Operations Center. The statewide trainings and meetings also built relationships among individual volunteer center directors, while it also reassured everybody about their common stock of competence. One volunteer center director observed that: Before Operation Step Up the meetings of the state volunteer center association were a waste of time. It seemed like we did not have a common purpose. We didn t really work together, we just got together. And the couple years of Operation Step Up and intense hurricane activity really brought us together, and bonded us so that we care about each other and help take on each others problems.... We had to come 79 together and we did, and got to know each other a lot better. This statewide emphasis, carried out with the cooperation of the state association, created confidence, on the one hand, for volunteer managers in counties unaffected by a particular disaster to send personnel to help in other counties, feeling confident that these staff and volunteers were not being placed in harm s way. Thus one volunteer manager acknowledged: When Hurricane Charlie came in 2004 the folks down in Manatee, and Charlotte, and DeSoto counties there was a lot of stress on our colleagues in those counties, and I sent my person working in disasters down to help for two weeks to Charlotte County. I had full confidence that they would be treated professionally and competently. Meanwhile counties who received loaned staff in this way could be confident about what and who they were getting. So as one volunteer manager described how, when her county had real needs for outside help, we ended up calling people from other counties with whom they d gone through training. Not only could we trust their knowledge, we also had relationships already worked out with them. Importantly, this statewide professional competence has been retained in the years after Operation Step Up. One county volunteer director noted that: We re still doing those trainings on a statewide basis periodically. And the trainings have been tweaked through use and through exercises, as we continue to develop professionally. One volunteer center director was convinced that Operation Step Up was the impetus for similar volunteer disaster management activities elsewhere in the United States. As

her organization was a member of the national Hands On Network 7, she had had occasion to observe development in her network s sister organizations elsewhere in the country. She opined that: I truly believe the national network was strongly influenced by the work Florida did in 2004 and then 2005 in response to Katrina and to Ivan in 2005 in Florida. Florida was a leader in disaster preparedness and emergency response, and it all goes back to those little initial grants from the Step Up program. It really does go back to that, and to the leadership that Volunteer Florida put around the importance of disaster preparedness and their strong willingness to work with those of us who are boots on the ground. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Our evidence points to several findings that inform volunteer administration for emergency management. In the past, emergency managers often regarded volunteers as a crowd control problem rather than an aid to their efforts. The Operation Step Up experience shows that attitudes can be changed through appropriate volunteer management practices and preplanning for training, using, and screening volunteers. Operation Step Up created an emphasis on volunteering and volunteer management which had previously been absent in disaster situations. Those volunteer centers across the state of Florida that participated in Operation Step Up established relationships with local emergency management agencies and found ways to gain their trust. Often the greatest barriers were professionals attitudes toward volunteers, but as volunteer involvement in emergency 80 preparedness persisted or actual responses to hurricanes occurred, significant relationships began to form. As news of program successes spread, the third year of Operation Step Up saw new centers participating, and barriers to creating relationships decreased. Operation Step Up also had indirect benefits for emergency management and communities. Programs like Operation Step Up that engage individuals in preparing their communities for disasters offer the substantial byproduct of engaging volunteers in preparing themselves. Despite the study s limited scope, findings suggest that such efforts provide additional community capacity to recover from disaster by simply creating larger numbers of prepared individuals. Volunteers responses indicated that they felt better prepared to deal with the emergency situations after being involved in Operation Step Up. The real test of Operation Step Up came in Florida s multi-hurricane experiences in 2004. Volunteer centers that had prepared under Operation Step Up at that point for only a little over a year gained strong praise from their counties professional emergency managers. Moreover, in 2005, several of Florida s volunteer centers that had prepared through Operation Step Up sent teams to lead the creation of volunteer reception centers in the wake of Katrina. Operation Step Up demonstrated that volunteers have a useful place in emergency preparedness and response, and similar programs could provide necessary structure for positive volunteer experiences in other settings. Emergency volunteers who receive meaningful and challenging tasks find them rewarding. Preplanning for emergency volunteers can free up professionals from tasks that do not require extensive training.

Another positive side effect is that getting citizens involved, especially in less advantaged areas, makes them more aware of the resources available to them after a disaster. An Associated Press study (Bass, 2006) found that although poor and minority neighborhoods suffered the brunt of Hurricane Katrina s damage, residents in wealthy neighborhoods were three times as likely to seek state help in resolving insurance disputes. Taken in conjunction with our findings, this suggests that engaging volunteers from disadvantaged communities may empower them in ways that help level the distribution of post-disaster benefits. The historical perspective offered by our recent interviews suggests that sometimes planned change can be implemented by a few individuals when the right small systems are opportunely aligned. For, as Margaret Mead famously said, never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed, citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has. Those who participated in Operation Step Up might modestly propose that they succeeded in creating a small but important change in the use of volunteers in emergency management. We suggest that six key elements created the opportunity for Operation Step Up to succeed. First, the state of Florida was already known to be a leader in the field of emergency management. The state had learned the hard way from Hurricane Andrew, several wildfire events, and countless other natural disasters. Second, Volunteer Florida was well positioned to lead such an initiative because of its role as lead agency in the statewide ESF15. Third, the project contained a small but critical mass of knowledgeable and enthusiastic people at Volunteer Florida and several of the county volunteer centers. Fourth, serious storms in 2004 and 2005 created instant learning reinforcement for the training and systems that Operation Step Up created. Fifth, timing was critical, in that Operation Step Up permitted success to flow to Florida s volunteer participants in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and to the national Hands On Network. Finally, the initiative had the power of Florida s government leaders behind it. Governor Bush, a strong supporter of volunteerism, endorsed these activities, as did the state s Emergency Management Director, Craig Fugate, who currently serves as FEMA Director. As we noted in the previous section, three of the Operation Step Up initiatives fell by the wayside after funding expired: the Front Porch project, Event Watch, and the ham radio project. Two of these presumably expired because of technological and legal barriers. We suspect that the third initiative, Front Porch, succeeded temporarily on the basis of symbolic accountability (Brower & Word, 2009) to Governor Bush, but it could not be sustained as an instrumentally effective activity after the Operation Step Up funds expired. The confidence that emergency managers developed in Operation Step Up volunteer centers demonstrates the importance of funding continuity and stability for such programs. As it becomes apparent at all levels that government alone cannot deliver all disaster relief, it is reassuring that voluntary activities contribute in ways that are often more efficient and effective than the Federal government s response (The White House 2006, p. 63). It also becomes more urgent that we take volunteer management and the role of 81

nonprofits seriously as an integral part of emergency preparedness and response systems for communities. NOTES: 1 We are indebted to Kaiju Chang for access to interview data from her (2012) study of crosssector collaboration in emergency management. 2 Volunteer Florida is officially called The Governor's Commission on Volunteerism and Community Service. It was established in 1994 by the Florida Legislature to administer grants under the National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993. Volunteer Florida administers the state s AmeriCorps and National Service programs; encourages volunteerism throughout the state, especially with youth, seniors, and people with disabilities; promotes volunteerism in disaster preparedness and response; and helps strengthen and expand Volunteer Centers in Florida. It is part of the Office of the Governor, and Commissioners are appointed to it by the Governor. 3 Interestingly, all nine volunteer managers were women, whereas 13 of 15 emergency management interviewees were men. Statewide 55 of 67 county emergency managers are men, and all but one or two of the volunteer center directors are women. This gendered distribution invites future exploration, but is not within the scope of our study. 5 Emergency management in Florida and other states designate 17 distinct Emergency Support Functions (ESF). Emergency management plans for the state and local governments designate specific organizations to take the lead in coordinating the activities of each function. ESF15 coordinates the activities of volunteers and donations. 6 The Front Porch Preparedness (FPP) initiative focused on the revitalizing distressed communities by providing educational and technical assistance to help residents plan and implement projects that will make long-term changes (Florida Department of Community Affairs, 2006). The program involved 20 communities across the state. Through Operation Step Up, Volunteer Centers and local emergency management developed partnerships with these Front Porch Communities to identify and recruit volunteers to become leaders in community disaster preparedness and mitigation (Volunteer Florida 2003, p. 7). 7 The Hands On Network is a network of the 250 volunteer centers that aid individuals in finding and engaging in local volunteer opportunities. It is a Points of Light program. 4 The volunteer centers were not required to track participation of volunteers from year to year. This made it impossible to estimate how many volunteers had participated in each program over the length of the grant. The survey results for this reason are only used to illustrate general feelings about the program. 82

REFERENCES Bass, F. (October 24, 2006). Whites pursued Katrina insurance complaints more aggressively than minorities. New York: Associated Press. Brower, R. S. and Word, J. K. A. (2009). Nonprofit performance as signal and symbol. Paper presented at the annual conference of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action. Cleveland, Ohio, November 19, 2009. Chang, K. (2012). Understanding cross-sector collaboration in emergency management: The dynamics of vertical and horizontal networks. Doctoral Dissertation, Florida State University (Forthcoming). Choi, S. O., and Brower, R. S. (2006). When practice matters more than government plans: A network analysis of local emergency management. Administration & Society, 37, 651-678. Comfort, L. K. (2007). Crisis management in hindsight: Cognition, communication, coordination, and control. Public Administration Review, 67(Supplement), 189-197. Connors, T. (2011). The volunteer management handbook: Leadership strategies for success. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Farmer, S. M., and Fedor, D. B. (1999). Volunteer participation and withdrawal. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 9, 349-368. Federal Emergency Management Agency. (January 2003). Developing and managing volunteers: Student manual. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Hager, M. A., and Brudney, J. L. (2004). Volunteer management practices and the retention of volunteers. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Jamison, I. B. (June 2003). Turnover and retention among volunteers in human service agencies. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 23, 114-132. Lammers, J. C. (1991). Attitudes, motives, and demographic predictors of volunteer commitment and service duration. Journal of Social Service Research, 14, 125-140. Lohmann, R. A. (1992). The commons: New perspectives on nonprofit organizations and voluntary action. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster. (2006) National voluntary organizations active in disaster: The first 25 years. Retrieved February 22, 2006 from http://www.nvoad.org/history1.php. Simo, G., and Bies, A. L. (2007). The role of nonprofits in disaster response: An expanded model of cross-sector collaboration. Public Administration Review, 67(Supplement), 125-142. Volunteer Florida. (February 2005). Unaffiliated volunteer management: Florida s recordbreaking 2004 hurricane season. Tallahassee, FL: Author. Volunteer Florida. (October, 2003). Program resource information manual and reporting guidebook. Tallahassee, FL: Author. Waugh, W. L. (1994). Regionializing emergency management: Counties as state and local government. Public Administration Review, 54, 253-258. The White House. (February 2006). The federal response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons learned. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 83

MORE THAN A ONE-TRICK PONY : EXPLORING THE CONTOURS OF A MULTI-SECTOR CONVENER Madeleine W. McNamara, is a senior administrator for the U.S. Coast Guard. John C. Morris, is an associate professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration at Old Dominion University. T oday s managers must find ways to identify and sustain productive relationships within multi-sector collaborative arrangements. This paper explores empirically the activities of a convener based on tasks identified by Agranoff and McGuire (2001) and applies this framework to the case of Virginia s Coastal Zone Management Program (VCZMP). We find that the convener displays characteristics described by Agranoff and McGuire, as well as characteristics of traditional hierarchical managers. This research suggests that both sets of skills are necessary for effective multi-sector collaborative governance. INTRODUCTION The use of collaborative arrangements to accomplish public ends has captured the attention of scholars of both public administration and public policy for many years. From its rather humble roots as a means to describe policy formulation activities among a disparate set of actors, the use of collaboration models expanded to describe activities in broader areas such as health and human services, environmental planning, and governance. As more scholars adopt collaborative approaches in their quest 84 to understand these complex processes, the development of collaboration theory struggles to keep pace with the descriptive and explanatory demands placed upon it. While the literature places much emphasis on collaboration, the management of collaborative arrangements involving multiple levels of government, the nonprofit, voluntary and the private sector (Brooks, 2002) to achieve public goals is less understood. 1 Collaborative public management refers to a concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating in multiorganizational arrangements in order to remedy problems that cannot be solved or solved easily by single organizations (McGuire, 2006, p. 33). The success of multi-sector collaboration depends on leveraging efforts of actors across sectors. Differing missions, values, and responsibilities inherent in these sectors (Babiak and Thibault, 2009; Huxham, 2003; Isett and Provan, 2005) place additional burdens on the individuals managing these arrangements; they also require the development of new frameworks by scholars to better describe and explain the behaviors present in these arrangements. In their 2001 article, Robert Agranoff and Michael McGuire address several metaquestions (p. 295) related to collaborative management, including the exploration of functional processes for network management. 2 The implication of this approach is that multiorganizational arrangements can (and should be) manipulated in the same manner that

traditional hierarchical organizations are managed; indeed, the term management implies an authoritative relationship between the manager and the other members of the group. By the same token, Agranoff and McGuire provide a useful starting point for how to conceive of the ways in which public officials can employ collaborative arrangements to achieve public goals. The purpose of this paper is to explore differences between traditional conceptions of public management and collaborative management. Like Agranoff and McGuire (2001), we argue that the skills necessary to manage collaboration are fundamentally different from traditional conceptions of public management, and we require a fundamentally different framework to explore these skills. Unlike Agranoff and McGuire, however, we begin from the premise that collaborations can be multisectoral, and that collaborative management is thus not necessarily a function (or form) of traditional public management. We suggest that, rather than thinking in terms of collaborative managers, we should think in terms of conveners, a role that encompasses elements of both traditional management and network management. This paper develops a framework to describe the role of the convener, based on the tasks identified by Agranoff and McGuire, and applies that framework to the case of Virginia s Coastal Zone Management Program (VCZMP) to examine the veracity of this approach. This research is important for several reasons. First, it addresses a gap in the literature by exploring empirically the activities of a convener in a multi-sector collaboration and offers a framework that may be applied in other situations. Second, 85 the role of joint action in the formulation and implementation of public policy has long been recognized as an integral part of the policy process (see, for example, O Toole, 1991; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). As multi-sector collaboration becomes more commonly employed, the place for non-governmental actors in these arrangements becomes increasingly important for students and practitioners to understand (Selden, Sowa, and Sandfort, 2006). Third, as public organizations face increasing demands and scarce resources, managers must find alternative ways of addressing complex problems. Multi-sector collaboration offers a potentially useful mechanism to meet these resource needs, although the very nature of these arrangements defies the use of conventional management techniques and theories. As a new generation of public and nonprofit managers enters the workforce, they must be prepared to meet the challenges and opportunities presented by multi-sector arrangements and must be equipped to operate successfully in both traditional and non-traditional organizational environments (Crosby and Bryson, 2005; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000; Feldman and Khademian, 2001). TOWARD A THEORY OF COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT Collaboration theory has been a part of the vocabulary of public administration and public policy for several decades. Interactions between organizations were first acknowledged in Pressman and Wildavsky s (1973) Implementation, where ignorance of organizational interdependence in complex decision chains ultimately contributed to a mismatch between policy expectations and outcomes. Implementation inevitably

requires interactions across organizational boundaries (Hjern and Porter, 1981), and multiorganizational implementation occurs when two or more organizations work together to implement policy (O Toole, 1995). Since collective action lies at the heart of multiorganizational implementation (O Toole, 1991), researchers often use terms such as cooperation, coordination, or collaboration to describe interactions between participants (Jennings and Ewalt, 1998; O Toole and Montjoy, 1984). This paper focuses on the management of collaborative interactions during multiorganizational implementation. Managing collaborative arrangements is based on a participative approach that emphasizes shared power amongst all participants as the collective group establishes goals (Crosby, 1996). Since participant membership is fluid and the environment is often more complex, collaborative arrangements are subject to more variation and uncertainty than hierarchical organizations (O Toole and Meier, 1999). Rather than being arranged in a manner conducive to the application of traditional conceptions of legal-rational (organizational) authority, any participant within the arrangement may lead and mobilize resources in order to attain the objectives of the collective group (Crosby, 1996). In fact, interpersonal relations between group members can generate informal power that is of greater importance than formal sources of power (Keast, Mandell, Brown, and Woolcock, 2004). Collaborative management uses flexibility, shared power, and diverse perspectives to attain the goals established by the collective arrangement. However, little attention has been paid to the question of how to bring resources to bear across organizational boundaries when legal authority structures are lacking and the basis of membership is voluntary association. In his review of the state of collaborative public management, McGuire (2006) addresses both the structure of collaborative arrangements and the skills necessary for effective collaborative management. He opens the discussion of collaborative management by citing previous work by Agranoff and McGuire (2001). In this article, Agranoff and McGuire identify four categories of behavior for collaborative management, and identify a series of seven big questions of network management. A central tenet of these questions is that collaborations can be managed. While Agranoff and McGuire correctly ask whether the tasks of a network manager are similar or different from those of a traditional manager, the premise of a managed collaboration seems to be something of an oxymoron: if collaborations are fundamentally different in structure and operation from traditional hierarchical organizational forms (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982), does it even make sense to talk about managing such a structure? Complicating the issue are the apparent similarities between traditional management and Agranoff and McGuire s four tasks of network managers. If we find the same tasks present in traditional management, is collaborative management really different? Our position is that multi-sector collaborations by their nature defy management, and that attempts to employ the term management leads to conceptual opaqueness and confusion. Rather than playing a directive role, leadership in multisector collaborative arrangements plays something more akin to a facilitative role. 86

Therefore, the term convener, as opposed to network manager, may describe this role better. A convener is someone who works among equal partners to create conditions conducive to successful collaboration. This convener role is described by Takahashi and Smutny (2002, p. 165) as a collaborative entrepreneur who recognizes an opportunity and takes action to bring partners together. This is not to suggest that the resources, influence, or level of interest is equal across all members, but rather that all participate willingly and freely in the group, and are not subject to the formal authority or orders of other members of the group. The four tasks identified by Agranoff and McGuire (2001) include activation, framing, mobilizing, and synthesizing. These tasks provide a framework to view the role of a convener. Activation involves the identification of participants and stakeholders, and identifying the specific resources or skills each player brings to the group (2001). Conveners develop conditions that facilitate collaboration (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994) and provide opportunities for participants to pledge resources (Jennings and Krane, 1994) to the collective effort. In short, activation is about setting the conditions to make collaborative efforts worthwhile and productive for all participants. Framing is the process of establishing operating rules, influencing prevailing norms and values, and molding the perceptions of participants (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001) to promote collaborative spirit. While framing often takes place at the time of group formation, it can also be employed if collaborative performance diminishes. An important difference 87 between traditional management and the role of the convener in a multi-sector collaboration is that the convener s role is primarily to encourage the framing of values, norms, and rules, rather than offering a top-down imposition of these elements. We suggest that the process of framing must also include an ability to scan the environment (Honig, 2006), along with a sense of timing to determine when collaborative action is appropriate and useful. Mobilizing is the process through which the participants arrive at a shared agreement on goals, scope, and common objectives; it encompasses the inspiration and motivation of the group s membership (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001) in order to secure participation and support. We suggest that mobilizing also legitimizes the convener, the participants, and the broader vision and goals of the collaborative effort. In addition to having an appreciation for the potential for mutual exchange, the convener must be recognized as having a legitimate role in facilitating trust with and between participants (Gray 1985). Finally, synthesizing is the process of creating an environment conducive to cooperation and positive interactions, and minimizing or removing barriers to cooperation (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). Such activities involve reducing complexity and uncertainty, manipulating incentives to cooperation, and engendering communication between participants. In short, synthesizing is a process through which the participants are blended together in a common purpose. Agranoff and McGuire (2001, p. 301) note that all four of these tasks are nearly seamless in their applicability, an observation with which we are in full agreement.

At first glance, these tasks appear to be very different from the tasks of a traditional manager. Gulick s (1937) description of the tasks of a manager, known by its acronym, POSDCORB 3 has dominated discussions of public management for decades. All of the tasks identified by Gulick are inherent to management in a bureaucratic structure, and all can be accomplished through the application of formal organizational authority. However, the activities of a convener and POSDCORB functions of a traditional manager are not necessarily mutually exclusive. While the activation in a bureaucracy is generally predetermined by prevailing organizational structure, framing can be accomplished through the manipulation of organizational culture. Traditional managers can employ processes to inculcate members with a certain set of values and guide behavior through formal rules. Even though mobilization in a hierarchy is determined by political authorities outside the organization, inspiring members is a common element of leadership theory. Synthesizing bureaucratic activities is apparent when performance incentives are offered or dispute resolution is used to address conflicts among members. However, if these tasks are present in hierarchical structures, how is multi-sector collaborative management different from traditional management? We take the position that the most important difference between a traditional manager and a multisector collaborative convener is the relative balance of skills needed. Even a marginally enlightened bureaucratic manager is likely to show evidence of people skills the ability to use means other than legal-rational authority to compel people to achieve desired results. Indeed, discussions in preceding paragraphs indicate that 88 traditional managers use skills that go well beyond POSDCORB. Likewise, even in a collaborative setting, one can easily imagine that someone must plan meetings, write reports and memos, and track budget expenditures. Traditional managers rely more on POSDCORB skills because of the demands of legal-rational authority and accountability in bureaucratic organizations. Multi-sector collaborative conveners rely more on the activities identified by Agranoff and McGuire (2001) because they lack the legal-rational authority to compel members to act. Moreover, the inherent need to balance differing values, goals, and missions in a collaborative arrangement requires a fundamentally different management approach than the one provided by the prevailing literature. In short, successful management in multi-sector collaboration requires managers to be something more than one-trick ponies. This idea is explored using a case study approach. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE VCZMP The setting for this study involves a collaborative arrangement of public, private, and nonprofit organizations working together to implement coastal resource policies on the Eastern Shore of Virginia. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 created opportunities for coastal states to develop programs to manage environmental resources through protection, restoration, and enhancement (United States Congress, 1972). The Virginia Coastal Zone Management (VCZM) Program was established in 1986, by executive order, to protect Virginia s coastal zone from competing demands on land use and pressures from continued growth (Kaine, 2006). The executive order explained the program s mission, specified policy goals,

identified the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) as the lead agency, and required specific state agencies to participate in program implementation. The VCZM Program focused its resources and expertise on the Eastern Shore of Virginia beginning in 2002 (VCZMP, 2007). With the Chesapeake Bay to its west and the Atlantic Ocean to its east, the Eastern Shore is a peninsula that runs along the coast of Virginia and Maryland. The area is very rural and sparsely populated, with agriculture and tourism serving as the largest industries in the region. The primary goals of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program were to restore coastal habitats and replenish aquatic resources along Virginia s Eastern Shore while promoting sustainable economic activities such as ecotourism and aquaculture (2007). With a rural landscape, nonexistent government protections, and a difficult economy, aquatic resources were declining dramatically due to overharvesting, disease, and habitat loss (2007). In addition, farmers faced severe pressures to sell land to developers. The collaborative arrangement focused its efforts on purchasing land and developing sustainable industries dependent on the protection of coastal resources to prevent further habitat loss and minimize economic stress (2007). A collection of fifteen federal agencies, Virginia state agencies, local governments, and nongovernmental organizations worked together to implement the program. 4 Other than the designation of Virginia s DEQ as the lead agency, the executive order did not detail how or to what extent organizations should work together. Government partnerships with nonprofit organizations included The Nature Conservancy and Eastern Shorekeeper. Partnerships with private organizations included Cherrystone Aquafarms and Southeast Expeditions. Nonprofit organizations and private businesses, while part of the collaborative arrangement implementing the program, were not identified in the executive order. Two types of horizontal structures were used to establish linkages among partners. The Coastal Policy Team (CPT) created a forum for state and local government representatives to develop policies, allocate resources, and prioritize funding needs through consensus. 5 Each member had voting rights; decisions, such as prioritizing issues for future research and funding, were based on consensus and compromise. These decisions were typically guided by a desire to provide state policymakers and citizens with the information needed to make sound policy decisions regarding land-use on the Eastern Shore. The executive steering committee, a second type of horizontal structure, was comprised of personnel with field level expertise and responsibilities for managing projects on the Eastern Shore. Members of this committee had 20 to 30 years experience in studying ecosystems of the Eastern Shore. The use of the CPT and executive steering committee facilitated the involvement of two levels of personnel from each state agency resource administrators and field project managers. Representatives on the CPT typically supervised project managers on the executive steering committee. The VCZM Program Manager, a middlelevel administrator in the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), convened the collaborative arrangement and provided a significant source of leadership while serving as a mechanism to encourage 89

interactions between organizations. In bringing organizations from various sectors together, the convener ensured specializations needed to carry out the program s objectives were represented within the group. Five other personnel employed by the DEQ assisted the program manager and comprised the VCZM Program staff. Grant money funded by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) was administered by the VCZM Program staff. These funds were used to maintain ongoing programs, support a large program identified as a main focal area, or help smaller projects get started. The VCZM Program found it beneficial to fund a longterm project aligned with their main focal area which was selected every three years by the CPT based on input from all participants (OCRM, 2004; VCZMP, 2005). As Guo and Acar (2005) acknowledge, the potential for receipt of government funding was an important factor for nonprofit organizations to consider when deciding to engage in collaborative interactions (2005). Grant contracts were used to distribute money, define the scope of a particular project, and formally identify a single organization s responsibility for meeting the requirements in the grant. A lead organization was designated for each project and became legally responsible for implementing specifications within the contract. This organization had discretion to work with other government agencies and nongovernmental partners to achieve project goals. Partnering organizations were often involved in project implementation even if these relationships were not specified in the grant. Each project was assigned a grant coordinator and a project manager from the VCZM Program staff. The grant coordinator ensured grant money was used as intended. The project manager facilitated relationships between the program and the lead organization responsible for project implementation. Project management typically went beyond the terms specified in the grant contract. Collaboration is often used to address problems of great complexity-- implementation of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program was no exception. Complexity within this environmental landscape was based in part on the scale of the problem, inabilities of a single organization to obtain the physical and financial resources needed to resolve the problem, the number of organizations involved, and constant changes to the landscape. A broad range of resource issues also contributed to the complexity within relationships; for example, bird habitats were best protected by tracking predatory animals, purchasing undeveloped land, and controlling invasive plant species. Promoting ecotourism, creating trails for bird watching, and using public volunteers to plant sea grasses helped citizens understand the importance of protecting undeveloped land. Relationships within the collaboration were complicated by various legal authorities, missions, goals, and operational procedures that guided individual public agencies. These differences were overcome through the efforts of the convener. The following sections identify the methods used in this research and address the convener s involvement in activities pertaining to building and sustaining the collaboration. 90

METHODS A single case study design was used for this research and the VCZM Program was selected as the setting based on the following criteria: (1) the program was comprised of a collection of organizations which interacted frequently; (2) no organization had formal authority to direct a particular type of interaction with other organizations; and (3) a convener encouraged interaction between participants. In this study, textual data were collected through semi-structured interviews from administrators representing each of the organizations implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. Semi-structured interviews were conducted during April and May 2008 with 34 individuals representing 15 organizations to gather information-rich detail and explore multiple views on the program s convener. Snowball sampling was used to identify knowledgeable informants. Interviews began with members of the CPT involved with the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. An interview protocol guided conversations; questions asked of participants are listed in Table 1 and relate to the management and operations of the collaborative arrangement. Themes aligned with Agranoff and McGuire s four tasks for conveners emerged from the interviews as participants described the collaborative arrangement and the roles of various participants. These themes developed as part of a broader study on collaborative behavior. 1 Why do participants work with others to implement the VSHP? 2 How are relationships built between participants? 3 What administrative structure supports relationships between participants? 4 How are the roles/responsibilities for participants determined? 5 What individuals/organizations play a key role in bringing participants together? 6 What processes are used to sustain relationships between participants? 7 How do you communicate with others? 8 How are decisions made in regards to program implementation? 9 How are organizational resources reallocated to the collective arrangement? 10 How would you describe your commitment to the VSHP? 11 What incentives are provided to encourage participation? 12 How would you describe the level of trust between participants? 13 VSHP? Table 1 Semi Structured Interview Protocol Although the researcher took field notes throughout the interview process, audio recordings allowed the researcher to concentrate fully on interviewee responses and probe for clarification when needed. The researcher used audio recordings in post-interview reviews to ensure accuracy of data and recreate exact quotations and insights. Verbatim transcriptions were 91

developed and emailed to interviewees to provide them with an opportunity to make revisions to the document. As themes pertaining to activating, framing, mobilizing, and synthesizing the collaboration emerged, the researchers developed a coding scheme based on the operationalizations of these tasks by Agranoff and McGuire (2001). The coding scheme was used to further guide content analysis of the raw data. A qualitative methodology suited this research because it allowed for in-depth review of the roles played by the convener. IDENTIFYING THE ATTRIBUTES OF A CONVENER IN THE CZMP Activating In this setting, the activation of participants with an array of specialized expertise and diverse resources was needed to generate the capacity to address varied environmental issues on Virginia s Eastern Shore. An interviewee conveyed the necessity for variation among collaboration participants, The goals of the program were pretty broad so no one agency could do it themselves. You had to have that mix of expertise and disciplines to cover the bases of all the different resources that were on the Eastern Shore. For example, the Virginia Institute of Marine Science and the Virginia Marine Resources Commission spearheaded oyster restoration. The Department of Environmental Quality had expertise in grant and environmental management. Avian patterns and habitats were studied by the Center for Conservation Biology. The Department of Conservation and Recreation focused on controlling invasive species and developing walking trails. The Nature Conservancy had access to volunteers and could allocate money to quickly purchase land that was for sale. 6 The Eastern Shorekeeper provided informal enforcement to ensure restored areas remain undisturbed. The University of Virginia had expertise in environmental facilitation. The common thread among all participants was their commitment to protecting environmental resources on the Eastern Shore. Aligned interests facilitated connections among participants of this collaboration. An interviewee suggested, When we saw our missions cross, we worked together. The convener of this group played an important role in developing the foundation for a productive collaboration. This foundation was built by helping participants understand why the collaboration was important and how they could benefit by being a member. Sowa (2009) researched nonprofit managers involved in 20 interagency collaborations and identified a perceived benefit for the delivery of social services and individual organizations as motivation for interaction; the convener of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program also recognized this benefit. It was mentioned in an interview that the convener did a good job of bringing the right people in and helping them understand that creating this regional coalition was not only possible but beneficial to everyone. Participants indicated that they worked actively to tie their organizations and research together, because they were able to accomplish more by doing so. Several interviewees described this process as piggybacking. Like many public organizations, those involved with the VSHP had fewer resources and tighter budgets to face increasingly complex problems. An interviewee conveyed that 92

scarce resources brought organizations together. We had a huge mandate and little resources to accomplish it with. So we had a vested interest to work together. The convener showed participants how leveraging resources and money could help them achieve their goals. The need to leverage resources was described by an interviewee, The job that needed to be done was bigger than any one agency. And things like the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program gave you a vehicle for everyone to work together... to get in the same car and to get to the same place with somebody else providing the fuel. This theme of leveraging resources was especially prevalent when interviewees discussed the magnitude, scope, and successes of what they accomplished when working together. For example, the cost of land on the Eastern Shore often required organizations to pool various funding sources in order to purchase a piece of property. Since The Nature Conservancy could allocate funding in timely manner and utilize their money in ways that public organizations could not, this nonprofit often spearheaded the land purchase of desired property for ecosystem protection and restoration. The bureaucracy within public organizations made them unable to operate at the same speed. In these situations, the Virginia Department of Conservation and Recreation and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service worked together to repurchase the land from The Nature Conservancy and manage it in perpetuity. All three organizations owned and managed land on the southern tip of the Eastern Shore. The importance of working together was expressed by an interviewee: When you were faced with small pots of money, the only way to get anything done was through partnerships and leveraging people s efforts. The convener relied on skills such as persuasion and strategic problem-solving to activate collaboration among participants. In showing participants the scale and scope of what could be achieved by working together, the convener convinced them that it was a mutually beneficial relationship. As suggested in the literature (McGuire, 2006), the convener brokered relationships strategically to match problems with participants who could provide solutions. Therefore, projects needing resources were linked with participants who had the resources and were willing to share them. As a participant conveyed, It was an opportunity to be successful in a way that was impossible otherwise. It created opportunities to work with other agencies in a way where the whole was greater than the sum of the parts. While managers in hierarchical organizations also make staffing decisions (McGuire, 2002), their skills focus on centralized planning and commanding formal authority rather than persuasion and strategic problem-solving. Instead of centrally planned staffing decisions formulated through the chain of command, the convener of this group persuaded participants to work together voluntarily by identifying common ground. Framing While participants involved in this collaboration represented different organizations with unique missions and cultures, the convener played a critical role in building consensus and developing a shared vision among participants. As the convener facilitated group discussion among participants, opportunities developed for 93

them to learn about one another. Through this knowledge, participants focused on maximizing common ground by uniting behind the needs of the environmental resources on the Eastern Shore. In doing so, turf issues were minimized. An interviewee expressed recognition of this common ground, It s all different roads leading to the same destination. Another interviewee conveyed how a common goal united the organizations implementing the VSHP, When the bottom line was the protection of the resource, and that was what you were focused on, I think it was easier to resolve these issues. The convener facilitated group discussion in order for participants to become more knowledgeable about other perspectives. An interviewee conveyed the importance of listening to others, It was not enough to accurately hear what other people were saying; you actually had to understand why they were saying it, what their perspectives were, and what they really needed. Interviewees indicated that they spent great amounts of time discussing what programs to pursue on the seaside and how to implement them. When problems arose, they also spent a lot of time resolving them. There was great emphasis placed on identifying common opportunities that involved projects deemed valuable by a majority of participants. Through dialogue, the convener encouraged the exchange of ideas and development of creative solutions. According to an interview discussion, participants within the group used an ecosystem mentality when focusing on land management and habitat restoration on the Eastern Shore. In utilizing a regional approach, many participants engaged in discussion hoping to find ways to control phragmites, an invasive plant species that disrupts the seaside s natural landscape. Through discussion with partners, Virginia s Division of Natural Heritage began using low-elevation flights with helicopters and global positioning systems to map the phragmites. With personnel and resources from other organizations, the collaboration was able to track the locations of this invasive plant in order to eliminate it more effectively. Members of the group seemed comfortable with one another and knew their partners were committed to working together. It was an ethic of collaboration (Thomson and Perry, 2006, p. 25) that strengthened connections and supported the exchange of resources within this group. Participants believed that their partners would work in good faith to address the resource needs of the Eastern Shore. Managers in a hierarchical organization focus on executive-centered problem solving, providing clear direction, and administrative control. Instead of expecting participants to comply with orders from above, the convener negotiated common ground and generated goal alignment through shared values involving coastal resource protection. Mobilizing The convener helped collaboration participants form two groups where decisions were made based on shared agreement. One horizontal structure used to govern the collaboration was the Coastal Policy Team (CPT). This governing body was comprised of administrators representing Virginia s natural resource agencies and local governments from Virginia s coastal zones. Programmatic decisions were made through consensus and 94

compromise to guide the overall direction of the group. A transparent decision-making process was embraced to guide the direction of the program; each representative had an equal vote when making decisions. This process was described by an interview participant: Decision making was a collegial process. There were a lot of prioritizations to be made. It was an open, roundtable discussion. And we tried to come to consensus on what the priorities would be. It was common for interview participants to describe the process as a discussion among equal stakeholders. An interviewee explained the role of the CPT, Each time you looked at a project, it was a collection of partners that had all come together. And I don t know if those partners would have necessarily worked as well together if there hadn t been a structure to bring them together. The convener mobilized collaborative participation through the CPT and executive steering committee; connections were made at more than one organizational level-- resource administrators and project managers. Operations within the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program ran smoothly because resource administrators and project managers were linked vertically within their own organizations and horizontally with counterparts in other organizations. This combination of vertical and horizontal linkages helped foster increased communications and awareness for the group. Power was dispersed among numerous people within two governance structures so no one participant had authority over the group. Throughout the interviews, participants explained that the convener facilitated the group s evolution by initiating the program, involving stakeholders, and helping the group build trust. Based on expertise in facilitating relationships, the convener was seen as a legitimate person to bring the group together and had high levels of credibility with participants. An interviewee explained this relationship, The convener had a long history on the Eastern Shore so this was building upon or a reinvestment on past investments. Although sometimes outside the scope of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program, the convener spent a great deal of time working with these same organizations. The participative approach used by the convener emphasizing shared power among participants was far from the top-down approach emphasizing command and control used to manage within hierarchical organizations. The convener relied on flexibility, shared power, and diverse perspectives to attain the goals established by the group. Synthesizing Reliance on existing relationships helped the convener develop an environment conducive to cooperation. Almost 20 years ago, four of the organizations in this policy collaboration formed the Southern Tip Partnership in hopes of protecting the mid-atlantic migration corridor. Twenty years later, the organizations and people representing these organizations continued to interact in significant ways. Discussions during interviews suggested that the group s success was attributed to this stability. The secret of success was the continuity of the personnel over time. Another participant expressed agreement, The partners that were in it from the beginning were largely still in it. As a result, these organizations developed a deep understanding of the area and other organizations involved. Many 95

participants expressed a need for their commitment to continue in perpetuity. Through these long-standing relationships, informal communication channels developed as personnel saw one another through the course of daily operations. An interviewee discussed this personal involvement, It was the fact that you saw these folks all the time. The fact that it was a small landscape, very stable staff -- people were here for a long time. As partners learned more about one another, they knew who to call when they needed help. An interviewee described daily communications among organizations implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program, There was so much routine contact here that when it came time for all the partners to come together the only hard part was figuring out a date. Participants enhanced their understanding of other organizations and looked for opportunities to help one another. Since organizations focused on projects that addressed one piece of the larger ecosystem, a willingness to share information allowed them to become more knowledgeable in areas that addressed interrelated pieces of the ecosystem. Through two-way communication channels that the convener helped the group to establish and sustain, field-level personnel often worked on projects because other participants pulled them in. An interviewee described these connections, A partner recently called me and asked if we wanted to be involved in a particular project. I called the Coastal Zone Management Program and asked if they wanted to jump in on this as well. Participants understood the missions and interests of other organizations represented in this collaboration; this understanding helped sustain relationships. Having those long-standing relationships really helped in terms of pulling the partners together. The partners themselves pulled in extra people when they needed to. Partners worked together in overlapping ways on varying projects, and repetitive linkages among organizations in different venues created spill-over effects in terms of familiarity and trust (deleon and Varda, 2009, p. 68). The convener used interagency databases to support ongoing discussion by making information widely accessible to all participants. The coastal Geospatial and Educational Mapping System (GEMS) was funded by the VCZM Program and often cited by interviewees as a useful web-based tool. An interviewee explained this tool, Information was housed in one site the Coastal GEMS program. This helped keep the organizations aware of what was going on so we knew what the other organizations were doing. Participants viewed land use and resource management information through this program. In some instances, the VCZM Program required organizations receiving grant funds to produce a data layer to add into Coastal GEMS. Several interviewees explained that this approach encouraged participants to support the database and increased their willingness to share information with one another. With the complexity of this landscape and the varied tasks involved in accomplishing the goals of the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program, the convener helped participants communicate and recognize connections between their individual projects. There was a sense of reliance among participants as they worked collectively to achieve the project s deliverables. As suggested in some literature (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, 2006; Huxham, 2003; McNamara, 2008; Mandell, 96

1999), prior relationships and open communications helped partners cultivate trustworthy relationships. Instead of supporting dialogue among multiple participants, information management in a hierarchical organization is used to articulate clearly the organization s centralized objectives throughout all layers of the hierarchy (Agranoff, 2007). In this collaboration, the convener supported relationships between participants by establishing common channels that supported ongoing discussion and mutual understanding. Evidence of POSDCORB Activities Although attributes of a convener were emphasized in the case study of the Virginia Coastal Zone Management Program, there is evidence that the convener also engaged in POSDCORB activities. The convener staffed the collaboration based on the specialized expertise needed to address holistically the complex environmental protection and restoration issues on the Eastern Shore. However, the convener moved beyond the traditional staffing function in the sense that participants were invited to the table rather than directed to participate. Because many of the organizations in the collaboration were public organizations, accountability for public funds allocated by the group was important. The convener did not budget funds in the traditional sense, but the convener did track the allocation and expenditure of the funds. Much like traditional managers, this convener set up meetings among participants and documented progress through routine reports. At least once a year, the convener asked all program partners to attend a meeting to discuss status updates on 97 outstanding projects and allocate grant money for the following year. Notices were sent out for the meetings and minutes were kept. The convener moved beyond the traditional reporting role in the sense that the focus of the meeting minutes was more about keeping all partners informed of the discussion and less about informing supervisory personnel. CONCLUSION It seems inevitable that organizations will continue to work within multi-sector collaborative arrangements to achieve policy or program goals; thus managers in the public and non-profit sectors cannot be one-trick ponies. As managers continue to work within hierarchical organizations, it is important to maintain skills that focus on centralized planning, commanding formal authority, executive-centered problem solving, providing clear direction, administrative control, and communication (Brooks, 2002). This paper does not intend to minimize the necessity of these skills as they are important tools. However, 21st century governance also requires public managers to operate in collaborative arrangements that involve participants who fall outside legal-rational authorities. The skills needed to convene multi-sector collaborative arrangements are different from the skills needed to manage hierarchical organizations (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Bingham, Nabatchi, and O Leary 2005; Gazley 2008; McGuire 2006). The necessity for the convener to transition from a traditional, hierarchical organization to an organic, confederation of interested participants requires a range of skills and abilities to be effective in both settings. As a manager in a traditional bureaucratic setting, the primary skill set in

play is akin to Gulick s POSDCORB (see Gazley, 2008). In a multi-sector collaborative setting, the arrangement requires a different set of skills. Both skill sets are present simultaneously, but are perceived differently depending on the setting in which they are viewed. The four tasks identified by Agranoff and McGuire (2001) for collaborative management, provide one framework for exploring empirically the role of a convener in a multisector collaboration. Activating, framing, mobilizing, and synthesizing are important activities for conveners to master. Understanding differences between the two skill sets may be used to enhance training, education, and practical development of public managers. As training and education programs continue to emphasize hierarchical management (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O Leary, 2005), skills such as persuasion, strategic problem-solving, facilitation, negotiation, two-way communication, and active listening must not be ignored. At the very least, training opportunities and educational programs should help prepare managers to develop both skill sets (2005). In order to prepare managers for the complex problems they will face, future research should continue to bridge the gap between hierarchical management and convening collaborative arrangements. It is through continued research that the intersection of both can be strengthened. A common theme among interviewees is that nonprofit organizations play an important role in program implementation because they operate in ways that public organizations are unable to achieve. Evidence that this collaboration operates beyond command-and-control authority comes from the centrality of nonprofit organizations to the implementation structure. It is not a coincidence that the missions of The Nature Conservancy and Eastern Shorekeeper align holistically with the program s goals. This finding suggests that collaborative interactions not only require mission alignment among core organizations but that the presence of nonprofit organizations within this core may be essential in developing and sustaining collaborative interactions. Furthermore, resolutions to complex problems may require nonprofit organizations to work with the for-profit sector. It is through these partnerships that an organization may become more innovative (Stephenson and Chavez, 2006). In this case study, The Nature Conservancy s access to volunteers and purchase of ecologically sensitive land would have limited impacts on restoring the Eastern Shore without assistance from private industries focused on ecotourism and aquaculture. In bringing the public, private, and nonprofit sectors together to address the environmental issues on the Eastern Shore, the convener of this group was best able to achieve public goals. While we prefer the term convener to network manager, the questions raised by Agranoff and McGuire (2001) remain relevant to our understanding of collaborative activities and outcomes. It is necessary to determine the degree to which multi-sector collaborations might help minimize the less desirable aspects of traditional bureaucratic structures, without compromising either the core values of American governance or the ability to achieve collective goals. Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of collaborative arrangements, and their compatibility with 98

both core societal values and existing governance structures, will help us to delineate better both the opportunities and limitations offered by multi-sector collaborations. NOTES 1 Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006, p. 44) define multi-sector collaboration as the linking or sharing of information, resources, activities, and capabilities by organizations in two or more sectors to achieve jointly an outcome that could not be achieved by organizations in one sector separately. 2 Agranoff and McGuire (2001, 296) refer to networks as multiorganizational arrangements for solving problems that cannot be achieved, or achieved easily, by single organizations. Agranoff (2006) uses the term network to refer to collective action. Public management networks are, in every sense, collaborative connections like social networks, although they not only comprise representatives of disparate organizations but also go beyond analytical modes (56). While the authors recognize that there is a welldeveloped network literature, the focus of this paper is placed on characteristics of a convener within a variety of interorganizational entities rather than networks specifically. According to Agranoff (2006, 57), networks are not the be-all and end-all of collaborative management. They share a place in many cases, a small place alongside literally thousands of interagency agreements, grants, contracts, and even informal contacts that involve issues such as seeking information or some form of program adjustment. 99 3 Gulick (1937) defines these activities as Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting. Responsibility for these functions effectively defined a person as a manager. 4 The following organizations formed a collaborative multi-sector network to implement the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program: College of William & Mary Institute of Marine Science, College of William & Mary Center for Conservation Biology, University of Virginia, The Nature Conservancy, Eastern Shorekeeper, Southeast Expeditions, Cherrystone Aquafarms, Accomack County, Northampton County, Accomack-Northampton Planning District, Virginia Department of Environmental Quality, Virginia Marine Resources Commission, Virginia Department of Conservation & Recreation, Virginia Department of Game & Inland Fisheries, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 5 The following state agencies were represented on the Coastal Policy Team and were involved with implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program: Environmental Quality, Conservation and Recreation, and Game and Inland Fisheries. State agency representatives were resource administrators or managers selected to participate by the head of their agency. In addition, local government

representatives for the Accomack Northampton coastal area were represented on the team. 6 Research by Stephenson and Chaves (2006) acknowledges that The Nature Conservancy faced public and political fallout as a result of a series of Washington Post articles highlighting a lack of perceived accountability and transparency regarding real estate transactions. It is important to note that the newspaper articles focused on such transactions that involved the nonprofit selling ecologically sensitive land to private citizens, who had a professional connection to the organization, for a personal gain. In this research, the purchase and management of land only occurred between The Nature Conservancy and personnel representing federal/state government agencies in a professional capacity. 100

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TERTIARY DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT: A CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTOR IN MODERN NONPROFIT HUMAN SERVICES LEADERSHIP Karun Singh, is the Director of the Masters in Social Work Program on the Rutgers Newark campus and Lecturer for the Rutgers School of Social Work. Patricia Lundgren, is a graduate of the Rutgers School of Social Work masters program and serves as a Field Education Associate for Rutgers School of Social Work. W ith the advent of globalization and increasing multiculturalism in society over the past 25 years, much attention has been paid to workplace diversity and its role in enabling nonprofit human service organizations to respond successfully to changes in society that affect their performance. From a strategic human resource management perspective, a strong focus on diversity has been associated with enhanced organizational effectiveness. Traditionally, the management of organizational diversity has concentrated on two forms of diversity, primary and secondary. In this article, we explore the implications for executive directors and board members of a new type of diversity, tertiary diversity, to be included as well as prioritized when applying diversity management best practices for maintaining and enhancing organizational performance. INTRODUCTION With the advent of globalization and increasing multiculturalism in society over the past 25 years, much attention has been paid to workplace diversity and its role in enabling nonprofit human service organizations (NHSOs) to respond successfully to changes in society that affect their performance (Judy & D Amico, 1997; Mor Barak, 2005). From a strategic human resource management perspective, a strong focus on diversity has been associated with enhanced organizational effectiveness, as a highly diverse workforce is better equipped to respond to the changing needs of an increasingly varied customer base (Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Delaney & Huselid, 1996). Indeed, in recent literature reviews examining the relationship between diversity, human resource management, and organizational outcomes in for-profit firms (e.g., Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, in press) and human service agencies (e.g., Mor Barak & Travis, 2010), diversity has been viewed as consistently giving an organization a competitive advantage over other organizations operating in its same industry and domain. Basic differences among people in an organization s workforce have always existed, e.g., variety in employee demographics by age, gender, ethnicity, and income, whether they are paid or volunteer staff, the level of difference in educational preparation, general job classifications, or attitudes towards the organization. Moreover, diversity management in organizations has typically concentrated on standard human resource functions such as paying attention to legal issues and creating a system of hiring, evaluating, motivating, 104

training, promoting, and terminating linelevel or subordinate employees (Kettner, 2002; Lewis, Packard, & Lewis, 2012; Parish, Ellison, & Parish, 2006; Watson & Abzug, 2010). However, the practice of managing diversity has not been nearly as concerned with the board of director s crucial role in developing and sustaining the performance of the agency through mentoring and training the executive director (ED) in accomplishing stellar performance under a range of complex internal and external conditions and at different stages of the organizational life cycle (Herman, 2010; Schmid, 2010). TRADITIONAL FORMS OF DIVERSITY According to Weinbach (2008), there are two major forms of diversity: Primary and secondary. Primary forms of diversity are those sociodemographic characteristics that usually cannot be changed at all or changed easily, e.g., age, ethnicity, physical ability/disability, sexual orientation, and gender. Secondary types of diversity reflect choices that a person has made and are in theory alterable relatively easily, e.g., marital status, parental status, socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, political affiliation, educational level, and choice of professional occupation. As evidenced from an analysis of the studies described in the Jiang et al. (in press) and Mor Barak & Travis (2010) reviews, most of the empirical research linking diversity with improved organizational performance has focused on the impact of primary diversity, and to a lesser extent, secondary diversity. diversity. The concept of tertiary diversity refers to the range of skills and competencies an individual possesses and which are required in varying degrees to perform different job functions in support of organizational excellence (Singh, 2011a, personal communication). Given the immense challenges of managing and leading complex agencies in the contemporary human service environment marked by increased environmental turbulence, hypercompetition, heightened funding uncertainty, constantly shifting rules and regulations regarding accountability and performance, a wide range of influential stakeholders with varied and often competing demands, and frequently changing client needs, we argue that to optimize organizational outcomes nonprofit human service entities should include as well as prioritize tertiary types of diversity over primary and secondary forms of diversity when engaging with issues related to diversity management. Moreover, attention to tertiary diversity helps to shape an organizational culture that not only appreciates, but also utilizes the unique contributions of each employee. NHSOs, which are heavily dependent upon using people as their fundamental resources and technology for social service delivery (Hasenfeld, 2010), will particularly benefit from such an approach. By drawing on the totality of an employee s characteristics and skill sets, an agency can coordinate, complement, and strengthen the abilities of the entire staff in an effort to ensure optimal effectiveness in the fulfillment of organizational responsibilities. TERTIARY DIVERSITY: A NEW CONCEPT In this paper, we introduce a third category of diversity, which we term tertiary 105 Prior authors have distinguished between the core tasks of management and leadership (e.g., Nanus & Dobbs, 1999; Genis, 2008). We assert that in the real world of managing

and leading complex human service organizations in the 21 st century, EDs need to possess a high level of knowledge and skills in both areas of interest, i.e., management as well as leadership. It is our contention that chief executives need to have deep and extensive preparation in a wide range of competencies related to these two domains. NHSOs, especially, no longer have the luxury of selecting as their chief executives persons who are highly competent in management but not in leadership, and vice-versa. Thus, in this article, when we refer to managers and leaders, both groups are synonymous with each other as the top executives of nonprofit organizations, and are distinguished from the board members of their agencies with whom they must work in concert to ensure organizational success. DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE Founded in 1985, an influential membership organization for social workers involved at all levels of management and across a wide and diverse array of human service organizations, The Network for Social Work Managers (NSWM), emphasizes that an effective human services leader is one who uses specific competencies in an effort to facilitate and enhance the functioning of their agency. Among NSWM s 16 competencies is the fourth competency, the ability to engage in culturally responsive management practices. This skill includes a commitment to the employment and promotion of diverse population groups based upon qualifying knowledge, skills, and resources, while fostering an organizational work environment that demonstrates appreciation of and respect for diversity (NSWM, 2012). The appreciation for diversity results in enhancing the effectiveness of the organization as employees are recognized and assigned tasks related to their specific competencies in working with diverse groups of internal and external stakeholders (for instance, clients and legislators from different racial and ethnic backgrounds). This facilitates a respectful work environment in which personnel from a variety of backgrounds reflective of primary and secondary forms of diversity are welcomed and sought out for their strengths in being capable of engaging with constituents whose backgrounds share these same forms of primary and secondary diversity. In such an environment underscoring the need for organizational cultural competence, these staff members can feel confident in drawing upon the appropriate diversity-specific resources in accomplishing organizational goals, in turn optimizing agency effectiveness. Further, the 10th competency outlined by NSWM is the ability to engage in human resource management and development. This competency refers to the ability to hire, train, develop, and place the appropriate individuals in the appropriate jobs while following organizational policy (NSWM, 2012). The ability to hire employees to fulfill specific tasks relevant to agency needs inherently warrants an appreciation for a particular employee s capacities. When analyzing a person s suitability and fit for a position, an effective leader must understand what personnel strengths already exist within the organization and which abilities are lacking or insufficient in number or depth. By conducting such a human resources capacity-gap audit, a manager who thinks and acts strategically will avoid the duplication of capabilities, while promoting diversity based primarily on tertiary skill 106

sets of individuals. This will, then, lead to more effective agency functioning through the recognition of staff strengths to fulfill organizational goals. Similar to the views expressed by NSWM, a seminal benchmarking study on achieving best practices in workforce diversity by the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) and the National Partnership for Reinventing Government (NPR) (2000) concluded that organizational leaders are responsible for employing effective diversity management policies, including creating a culture that uses diversity to the organization s advantage. This study stressed that the differences among workers are the most important resource an organization can have, and that valuing and recognizing diversity is imperative to maintaining a competitive advantage. The study broadly defined diversity as all characteristics and experiences that define each person as an individual and, based on the evidence, suggested that utilizing the diversity of the workforce leads to organizational success. The findings of this landmark study clearly speak to the value in identifying and strategically using the variety of characteristics and experiences of each employee. INCLUDING TERTIARY DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT AS A KEY TO SUCCESSFUL LEADERSHIP Upon a closer inspection of the perspectives propounded by NSWM (2012) and USDOC and NPR (2000), respectively, it was revealed that both of them highlight the role of primary and secondary characteristics of diversity, while neglecting or paying only a cursory glance at issues of tertiary diversity. This observation mirrors the concentration on issues of primary and secondary diversity that were highlighted in the empirical research by Jiang et al. (in press) and Mor Barak and Travis (2010). Additionally, even when examples of tertiary diversity in job functions were mentioned or measured, all but a few of them were focused on the type and quality of job functions performed by line level and subordinate employees. Almost none of the examples pertained to the need for EDs to possess a diverse set of advanced level skills and in sufficient depth required for leading superior performing organizations. Given these gaps in the practice and empirical literature on diversity management, we now present a checklist of recommended management competencies for EDs grounded in our review and synthesis of academic and practice resources on upper-level management competencies. 107

Human Service Management Competency Areas Level of Skill Development 1 Advocacy 4 3 2 1 0 2 Capacity Building 4 3 2 1 0 3 Collaboration and 4 3 2 1 0 Partnerships 4 Communication and 4 3 2 1 0 Interpersonal Relationships 5 Culturally Responsive 4 3 2 1 0 Management Practice 6 Ethics 4 3 2 1 0 7 Evaluation and 4 3 2 1 0 Performance Management 8 Evidence-Based 4 3 2 1 0 Management 9 Financial Development 4 3 2 1 0 10 Financial Management 4 3 2 1 0 11 Governance and Meta- 4 3 2 1 0 Governance 12 Human Resource Management and Development 4 3 2 1 0 13 Information Technology 4 3 2 1 0 14 Leadership 4 3 2 1 0 15 Legal Issues 4 3 2 1 0 16 Program Development 4 3 2 1 0 17 Organizational 4 3 2 1 0 Management 18 Public/Community 4 3 2 1 0 Relations and Marketing 19 Public Policy 4 3 2 1 0 20 Social Entrepreneurship 4 3 2 1 0 21 Strategic Planning 4 3 2 1 0 Note: In this scale, an executive director s level of skill development in each competency is evaluated accordingly: 4 3 2 1 0 Extremely Well Developed Well Developed Average Insufficiently Developed Table 1 Executive Director s Level of Skill Development in Management and Leadership Competencies Not Developed 108 RECOMMENDED MANAGEMENT COMPETENCIES FOR NONPROFIT HUMAN SERVICE EXECUTIVES To derive the list of 21 recommended management competencies for NHSO managers in Table 1, we referred to the following sources: Frahm and Martin (2009); Ginsberg (2008); Mirabella (2007); Motes and Hess (2007); NSWM (2012); Singh (2011b, personal communication; 2012, personal communication); and Waldman (2011, personal communication). Readers interested in comprehensive descriptions of each of these competencies are encouraged to consult the primary resources we used. We posit that although our checklist prescribes competencies that have been culled primarily from the social work administration literature for operating charitable human service agencies effectively, most if not all of these competencies are representative of the advanced skills necessary for successfully leading nonprofit organizations of other types, such as cultural, educational, religious, and scientific nonprofits. To make the checklist more helpful in gauging the match or mismatch between the current or prospective ED s repertoire and adequate level of skills and the number and depth of skills the organization s board requires of its leader, we included a simple five-point Likert-type rating scale numbered from 0-4 alongside each competency to measure its presence and level of development. On the scale, a zero score for a particular competency means that the ED has not developed any skills at all in this area of competency. Conversely, a 4 score signifies that the ED has extremely welldeveloped skills in that particular area of competency. The possible scores corresponding to an ED s overall level of

skill development in management and leadership competencies range from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 84 points. In other words, the closer an ED s overall score approaches 84 points would be an indication that their total level of talent is extremely well developed, and thus this executive would be highly valuable in the eyes of the board. Even though this scale is not scientifically reliable and enjoys only face validity, nevertheless, it can be deployed as a reasonable starting point to assess initially the current level of talent and future leadership development needs of a social service agency s ED. CONCLUSION In this article, we introduced the concept of tertiary diversity when applying diversity management principles for maintaining and enhancing organizational performance in NHSOs. Until this paper, primary and secondary forms of diversity were the only two types of diversity incorporated in assessments of the management of diversity in organizations. Based on our review of the literature associating diversity management with organizational effectiveness, we strongly suggested including as well as prioritizing tertiary diversity as an indispensable form of diversity that should be evaluated and systematically institutionalized as part of any organization s good diversity management practices. This is especially the case for human service agencies that use human beings as their major resource and mechanism for delivering social services to people in need. employees, we also highly recommended that an NHSO s board members exercise a much more active role in analyzing responsibly its current or prospective ED s level of skill development across a list of 21 management and leadership competencies considered vital for increasing organizational excellence. This is because in today s tough times, which have made it ever more difficult to produce sustained and superior performance, social service agency boards need to be vigilant and proactive in ensuring that they are grooming the talents of their ED strategically through a plan of regular mentoring and continuing skillsbased training. Finally, we urge nonprofit management researchers interested in the topic of tertiary diversity management to develop and test a more refined skill development rating instrument, high in reliability and validity, for the benefit of agency executives charged with leading NHSO organizations. Building upon the importance of facilitating and prioritizing tertiary diversity management with lower- and middle-level 109

REFERENCES Becker, B.E., & Gerhart, B. (1996). The impact of human resource management on organization performance: Progress and prospects. Academy of Management Journal, 39, 779-801. Delaney, J.T., & Huselid, M.A. (1996). The impact of human resource management practices on perceptions of organizational performance. Academy of Management Journal, 39, 949-969. Frahm, K.A., & Martin, L.L. (2009). From government to governance: Implications for social work administration. Administration in Social Work, 33, 407-422. Genis, M. (2008). So many leadership programs, so little change: Why many leadership development efforts fall short. Journal for Nonprofit Management,12(1), 32-40. Ginsberg, L.H. (2008). Management and leadership in social work practice and education. Alexandria, VA: Council on Social Work Education Press. Hasenfeld, Y. (2010). The attributes of human service organizations. In Y. Hasenfeld (Ed.), Human services as complex organizations (2 nd ed., pp. 9-32). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. Herman, R. D. (2010). Executive leadership. In D.O. Renz (Ed.), The Jossey-Bass handbook of nonprofit leadership and management (3 rd ed., pp. 157-177). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Jiang, K., Lepak, D.P., Hu, J., & Baer, J.C. (in press). How does human resource management influence organizational outcomes? A meta-analytic investigation of mediating mechanisms. Academy of Management. Judy, R.W., & D Amico, C. (1997). Workforce 20/20: Work and workers in the twentyfirst century. Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute. Kettner, P.M. (2002). Achieving excellence in the management of human service organizations. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon. Lewis, J.A., Packard, T.R., & Lewis, M.D. (2012). Management of human service programs (5 th ed.). Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole. Mirabella, R. (2007). University-based educational programs in nonprofit management and philanthropic studies: A 10-year review and projections of future trends. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 36(4), 11-27. Mor Barak, M.E. (2005). Managing diversity: Toward a globally inclusive workplace. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. Mor Barak, M.E., & Travis, D.J. (2010). Diversity and organizational performance. In Y. Hasenfeld (Ed.), Human services as complex organizations (2 nd ed., pp. 341-378). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. Motes, P.S., & Hess, P.M. (2007). Collaborating with community-based organizations through consultation and technical assistance. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Nanus, B., & Dobbs, S. (1999). Leaders who make a difference. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Network for Social Work Managers. (2012). Competency areas. Retrieved from https://socialworkmanager.org/?page_id =110. Parish, S.L., Ellison, M.J., & Parish, J.K. (2006). Managing diversity. In R.L. Edwards & J.A. Yankey (Eds.), Effectively managing nonprofit organizations (pp. 179-194). Washington, DC: NASW Press. Schmid, H. (2010). Leadership styles and leadership change in human and community service organizations. In Y. Hasenfeld (Ed.), Human services as complex organizations (2 nd ed., pp. 193-110

206). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. Singh, K.K. (2011a). Creating and managing staff diversity. In the lecture notes of 10/5/2011 on Human Resources. Available from the instructor. Singh, K.K. (2011b). Recommended management competencies. In the lecture notes of 9/21/2011 on Leadership. Available from the instructor. Singh, K.K. (2012). The evolution of competency development in social work management and leadership. In the lecture notes of 2/25/2012 on Social Entrepreneurship and International Social Work. Available from the instructor. U.S. Department of Commerce and National Partnership for Reinventing Government. (2000). Best practices in achieving workforce diversity. Retrieved from http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library /workforce-diversity.pdf. Waldman, W. (2011). Health and human service management competencies. In the lecture notes of 9/20/2011 on Leadership. Available from the instructor. Watson, M.R., & Abzug, R. (2010). In D.O. Renz (Ed.), The Jossey-Bass handbook of nonprofit leadership and management (3 rd ed., pp. 669-708). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Weinbach, R.W. (2008). The social worker as manager: A practical guide to success (5 th ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc.. 111

TO MERGE WISELY, ENSURE A PROPER TAKEOFF A PRACTICE CASE STUDY Max L. Kleinman, is the Executive Vice President, United Jewish Communities of Metro New Jersey. INTRODUCTION As a result of the Great Recession, many nonprofit organizations are facing extreme financial hardships. For many nonprofit organizations, the effects of the Great Recession have been so detrimental that merging or dissolution may be the only options. Therefore, the issue of whether to merge and how to merge has increasingly become a relevant topic of concern for nonprofit boards and executives. There are several different strategies a nonprofit organization can employ to ensure continued success during challenging times. These strategies may include, (1) forming collaborations, (2) consolidating administrative services, or (3) merging with other organizations. Collaborations are possibly the most common strategies utilized by nonprofits. Collaborations do not alter the organization s corporate, legal and governance arrangements. Collaborations are more informal and are usually undertaken for a specific occasion or a limited purpose. Examples of collaborations include joint marketing, procurement, and sharing of professional services. These strategic alliances permit organizations to integrate programs and cut costs while remaining independent. Mergers represent the most extreme form of consolidation, whereby two nonprofit organizations legally combine into one, with governance, staffing, programming, finances, marketing, and administration consolidated into one new entity. Mergers are defined as the combining of two or more organizations to create one organization, using friendly, rather than hostile strategies (Benton and Austin, 2010). Acquisitions are similar to mergers in the sense that two organizations are legally becoming one entity; however, with acquisitions one organization is obtained or acquired by another, regardless of friendly or hostile intent. The following is a case study detailing the merging of two Jewish Federations in New Jersey into one entity. The case study will discuss the lessons learned from the process. THE MERGING OF THE UNITED JEWISH COMMUNITIES OF METROWEST AND THE JEWISH FEDERATION OF CENTRAL NEW JERSEY Jewish Federations are fundraising organizations for Jewish communities. Similar to the United Way, Jewish Federations conduct an annual fundraising campaign to provide support for its local beneficiary agencies entailing family services, community centers, educational institutions and the like. In addition, Jewish Federations provide support for programs serving Jewish people in Israel, the former Soviet Union and throughout the rest of the 112

world. Therefore, the Federation s scope is local, national, and global. The critical groundwork for a successful merger resides in the preparations for the takeoff. If the takeoff is not successful, landing will not be successful. The following lessons emerged as a result of the merger of the Jewish Federations of MetroWest and Central New Jersey. LESSONS LEARNED IN THE FIELD 1. Focus on merging to achieve better results and greater synergy in fulfilling the agencies mission Based on previous literature, mergers are most successful when the merger is mission driven and the organizations involved have sufficient resources to share. As Benton and Austin (2010) state, The mission driven merger resulted in a more effective process because pro-active decision making and sufficient resources allowed for more time to be focused on program goals as well as more staff involvement. Accordingly, it is important to make sure that the missions of both organizations are closely aligned, otherwise ideological disputes may arise. Fortunately, in the case of the Metro West-Central New Jersey merger, the two organizations shared the same mission and values. To reinforce this and establish a platform for the future, the newly merged Federation plans to immediately launch a strategic planning process to guide the organization once the legal merger takes effect. 2. Shared administrative functions and cost and eliminate redundant expenses to achieve positive financial outcomes and increase effectiveness Mergers themselves may not necessarily achieve cost-savings. As David LaPiana (2010) has written, in the short term [mergers] actually require new money for one-time transactional and integration costs merged nonprofits can roll together annual audits, combine insurance programs and consolidate staffs and boards, but they become more complex and require more and better management, or course, that often exceeds the savings from combined operations. If two merged organizations under financial stress do not make the difficult decision necessary to resolve major challenges, the organizations will experience a crisis. 3. Develop and manage a team of leaders who have significant influence who can check their ego at the doorstep From the first instance, organizations involved in merging must project credibility that the merger is a serious and necessary endeavor by charging a quality and high caliber of leadership to lead the effort. The process will require champions who will assume responsibility viscerally, as well as functionally. 4. Use an anticipatory rather than reactionary framework When going through a merger, it is important that the two organizations involved engage in preplanning efforts, identifying upfront all issues which must be handled. Key areas to be addressed include governance, staffing, funding and 113

fundraising, operations, due diligence and program services. 5. Expect Setbacks There will be setbacks in the process, therefore it is important to prepare psychologically, as well as operationally. There will be a need to make midstream adjustments as new information or factors unfold, thus taking on a pragmatic approach rather than sticking to a preordained script. 6. Gain quick victories During the merger negotiation process, collaborating on some important program or issue can be conveyed as a quick victory to the organization s respective constituencies. In the example of the merger of the Jewish Federations of MetroWest and Central Jersey, it was decided that there would be a combined trip from both Federations to Israel. Leading educators from both communities engaged to spread the word about the benefits of merger. This early victory helped communicate the benefits of the merger and build confidence in the merger amongst the respective constituents. 7. Communicate, communicate, communicate Communications should be ongoing for all relevant constituents, both internal and external. Board members, major donors, members of the staff and other key stakeholders of the organizations should be informed on a regular basis of what is transpiring during the merger discussions. As part of the communication plan, it is imperative that the benefits of the merger 114 be constantly conveyed, building on the complementary strengths of the respective organizations. For example, in the instance of the merged Federation, one of the benefits for Central will be an investment in an underserved geographic area which it did not previously have resources to provide services. Furthermore, there are greater planned giving opportunities for MetroWest within the smaller Federation s service area. These benefits were frequently communicated during the merging process to ensure synergy and solidarity. 8. Create a buzz It is important that a high level of excitement is generated among the different constituencies to set the stage for the newly merged organization. The Federation did this by having an ongoing series of articles highlighting the benefits of the merger through the New Jersey Jewish News, which publishes a separate edition for MetroWest, as well as for Central. 9. Ensure the smaller organization lived on spiritually, as well as functionally within the new organization During the merger of the Jewish Federations, there were discussions about whether to continue to retain a physical presence in the headquarters of the smaller organization for the future. It is wise to maintain a physical presence (not only to be more accessible to constituents within that geographic area), but to ensure that its institutional memory is preserved. There will be a significant psychological loss for the smaller Federation. It is imperative that this be acknowledged as part of the merger discussions. Opportunities should be afforded to celebrate the accomplishments

of the smaller Federations, even as forces are joined in creating a new entity for the future. 10. Ensure leadership positions for the smaller organizations when merging Early on in the process, the merging organizations recognized the importance of involving leadership of each Federation after the merger. Accordingly, significant leadership positions were afforded to members of the smaller federations within the new merged Federation. The message conveyed was that the smaller Federation had a great talent pool to draw from that would significantly benefit the newly merged Federation. 11. Build upon prior relationships Fortunately, both Federations had been actively involved in state-wide activities and collaborations for many years preceding the merger, which served as a positive platform for future merger negotiations. As noted in a study of nonprofits experiences with mergers, the authors found that awareness and trust between participating organizations is a key ingredient for successful mergers (Benton and Austin, 2010). In this case study, the executives of both Federations worked on state-wide and regional marketing issues for years. Accordingly, with the chemistry established for excellent relations, a Central executive will serve as the second ranking professional for the merged Federation, reporting to MetroWest s Chief Executive Officer. 12. Plan to address differences in organizational culture One of the most ephemeral issues to deal with is managing the respective organizational cultures of both Federations and melding the best of them into the new and even better organization. Organizational culture can be defined as a pattern of basic assumptions invented, discovered or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (Shein, 1985). Examples of organizational culture issues can include: the business environment or strategy; the kinds of skills that are valued; the style of the staff; dress code; communication styles; the organizational structure; differences in core values; decision making; staff and management relations; the management style, among others (MAP for Nonprofits, 2009). CONCLUSION The key ingredient for ensuring an effective and successful merger is to institute a winwin strategy for merging groups. It is imperative that each merging organizations best assets and values, are highlighted respectfully, in merger discussions. Communications during the merger negotiating process, on a timely basis, is essential. Successful mergers begin with the best preparation, which sets the table for the long negotiations which will ensue. The goal is to design new merged institutions that reflect the best of the past and the future. 115

REFERENCES Benton, A.D. & Austin, M.J. Managing nonprofit mergers: the challenge facing human service organizations. Administration in Social Work, 34(4), 2010 La Pianna, D. (2010). Merging wisely, Stanford Social Innovation Review, Retrieved from http://www.ssireview.org/articles.entry/ merging_wisely. MAP for Non-Profits. (2009). Merge Minnesota, non-profit merger as an opportunity for survival and growth. St. Paul Minnesota: MAP for Non-Profits. Nye, J. (2011). The future of power. New York: Public Affairs. Shein, E. (1985). Organizational Culture and leadership. San Francisco, CA: Jossey- Bass Publishers 116

ABOUT THE EDITORS-IN-CHIEF Ronald Quincy is the Director of the Center for Nonprofit Management and Governance at the Rutgers School of Social Work. He teaches in the nonprofit and public management concentration, as well as a leadership course in the Rutgers School of Arts and Sciences Honors College Program. At the Center, he leads a team of professional and student staff that manage projects as diverse as advisory services for nonprofit organizations, research and advocacy on public policy issues, direct service programs for youth aging out of the New Jersey foster care system, and the AmeriCorps Healthy Futures Initiative. Earlier in his career, Dr. Quincy served as the Director of the Michigan Department of Civil Rights, Director of the Michigan State Office of Human Resources Policy and Special Projects, and as a member of the Cabinet for two Michigan Governors. His other previous positions include: Associate Vice President and Assistant to the President of Harvard University; Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer of the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change; Executive Director/President of the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, Inc.; President of the White House Fellows Association and Chairman, White House Fellows Foundation; Senior Management Consultant, Towers Perrin (the world's 11th largest management consulting firm); Special Assistant to the Secretary of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development; and Foreign Policy Advisor, United States State Department, Africa Bureau. Dr. Quincy earned his Ph.D. from the College of Social Sciences at Michigan State University. 117

John Brothers is a recognized leader in the nonprofit and philanthropic arena with over twenty years of sector experience and is a national expert in the field of capacity building, executive leadership, nonprofit effectiveness, sustainability and assisting organizations in both organizational growth and decline. Dr. Brothers is a Senior Fellow with the Support Center for Nonprofit Management where he is the Co-Editor of the Journal for Nonprofit Management. Dr. Brothers is a popular writer with the Stanford Social Innovation Review and the Huffington Post. Additionally, he is the author of a recent book entitled Building Nonprofit Capacity through Jossey-Bass and a collaborator on the handbook Leadership in Nonprofit Organizations with SAGE Publishing. He has been interviewed, referenced or quoted in dozens of local, regional, national and international media outlets including the Chronicle of Philanthropy, CRAINS, Washington Post, Newsweek-Japan, ABC News, The New York Post and the Wall Street Journal. Dr. Brothers, a Certified Fund Raising Executive (CFRE), is also the Principal of Quidoo Consulting, a social enterprise servicing nonprofit, philanthropic and government efforts throughout the U.S. and internationally. Quidoo Consulting has been contracted by hundreds of nonprofit and philanthropic organizations and Dr. Brothers has trained or spoken to thousands in all areas of philanthropy, public policy, capacity building and organizational development. Dr. Brothers began his career as a practitioner, serving in roles ranging from program management to executive roles and serves on a number of boards, including the Alliance for Nonprofit Management. Dr. Brothers has a Doctorate in Law and Policy from Northeastern University, an MPA in Nonprofit Management from New York University and an MBA in Public Policy from American Public University from which he started at Columbia University. He has taken additional studies at Georgetown University and the London School of Economics. He is an adjunct professor in social welfare policy at Rutgers University and in nonprofit and philanthropic studies at New York University. Dr. Brothers served as a Visiting Scholar at the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard University and has served in several fellowships, including the Higher Education Consortium for Urban Affairs, the Children's Defense Fund and the Rockefeller Foundation. 118

ABOUT THE EDITORIAL BOARD Dwight Denison is currently a Professor of Public and Nonprofit Finance at the Martin School of Public Policy and Administration at the University of Kentucky. He is the Director of Graduate Studies for the Masters in Public Policy program and the Masters in Public Administration program. His research has been published in a variety of journals, including the National Tax Journal and Public Budgeting and Finance. Shauwea Lynn Hamilton is the Manager of Community Affairs and State Public Affairs Operations for Public Service Enterprise Group (PSEG). In this role she is responsible for managing PSEG s engagement with multiple community stakeholder groups, including developing the strategy for the company s volunteerism efforts. She manages PSEG s participation in NJ s Neighborhood Revitalization Tax Credit program and serves as the portfolio manager for the PSEG Foundation s K-12 educational and economic and community development giving. Shauwea received her MBA in Marketing and Management with a concentration in Global Sustainability from Fordham University s Graduate School of Business. She is a member of the board of directors for Womanspace in Trenton, New Jersey. She earned her BA in Psychology from Rutgers University and holds a Graduate Certificate in Professional Communications from LaSalle University. Jason Patnosh is the Associate Vice President of the National Association of Community Health Centers. He is the National Director of Community HealthCorps, the largest health-care based AmeriCorps program in the nation. He is also a consultant in the field of program development and management for nonprofits specializing in volunteerism, AmeriCorps, and community health. Anne Sherman is the Vice President for Nonprofit Strategy at the Social Impact Exchange, an initiative of the Growth Philanthropy Network (GPN). Before GPN, she was the Director of Strategy at TCC Group, a consultancy that assists nonprofits, foundations, and corporate community involvement programs. Prior to TCC Group, she was Community Initiatives Manager at Minneapolis Way To Grow, a citywide school-readiness initiative. Sherman holds a master s degree in public affairs from the University of Minnesota Hubert H. Humphrey Institute for Public Affairs. Her volunteer work includes serving as chair of the governing body of the Center for Family Life in Sunset Park, Brooklyn, and as a member of the board of SCO Family of Services. She also serves on the selection committee of the New York Community Trust- New York Magazine Nonprofit Excellence Awards. Sherman is the co-author of Building Nonprofit Capacity: A Guide to Managing Change Through Organizational Lifecycles, published in 2011 by Jossey-Bass. Karun K. Singh is the Director of the Masters in Social Work Program-Newark and Lecturer at the Rutgers University School of Social Work. He has PhD and MS degrees from Columbia University. His teaching, research, and consulting interests focus on nonprofit and public human 119

services management, community organizing leadership, strategic planning, social entrepreneurship, grantwriting, and capacity building. He developed the Singh Strategic Planning Measure for Excellence to help nonprofit human service organizations achieve superior organizational performance. His volunteer activities include serving as Chair of the Network for Social Work Management-New Jersey Chapter and Editorial Board Member of the Journal for Nonprofit Management. 120

ABOUT THE AUTHORS Ralph Brower is the Director of the Center for Civic and Nonprofit Leadership in the College of Social Sciences and Public Policy, Florida State University. He has published in various public administration and nonprofit journals in the United States and internationally. He is a book review editor for the International Review of Public Administration and serves on the editorial board of the Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly. His research and teaching interests include organization theory, qualitative research methods, nonprofit management, international and comparative administration and nongovernmental organizations. Matthew J. Gable is a doctoral student in the Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration at Old Dominion University. His research interests include public finance issues and nonprofit governance. Christopher Horne is an Associate Professor of Public Administration at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, where he teaches graduate and undergraduate courses in research methods, evaluation, public policy, and nonprofit management and conducts research related to government-nonprofit relations. He also works as an independent program evaluation consultant and is currently evaluating youth development and informal science education programs with budgets of over $5 million. Dr. Horne holds a Ph.D. in public policy from Georgia Tech and Georgia State University and a Master of Science in Social Work from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville. Max Kleinman is a senior level nonprofit executive. He has served as President for the Jewish Communal Service of North America, and for the Association of Jewish Community Organization Professionals, both professional leadership organizations. He continues his work fostering professional connections worldwide, and is currently a member of the Board of the World Council of Jewish Communal Service. Mr. Kleinman has served as Executive Vice President of United Jewish Communities of MetroWest, New Jersey for 16 years, and now heads the Jewish Federation of Greater MetroWest NJ, the largest Jewish philanthropy in New Jersey, serving nearly 150,000 New Jersey residents. Max Kleinman holds a Master s degree in History from the City College of New York, and earned a Masters School of Social Work from Yeshiva University. Patricia Lundgren has her master s in social work from Rutgers University School of Social Work. She is currently employed as a Field Education Associate for the Field Education Office at Rutgers University School of Social Work, Newark campus. She is a vice-chair for the New Jersey Chapter of the Network for Social Work Management, and was the 2012 recipient of the Network for Social Work Management's Mark Moses Distinguished Fellowship Award. Madeleine W. McNamara is a Senior Administrator for the U.S. Coast Guard. Her research interests include policy implementation, collaboration, and multi-sector arrangements. She has published in Public Works Management and Policy, Nonprofit Policy Forum, and Virginia Social 121

Science Journal. She is a graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and received her Ph.D. from Old Dominion University in 2008. Katrina L. Miller-Stevens is an Assistant Professor of Urban Studies and Public Administration at Old Dominion University. Her research and teaching focus on management, advocacy, and influence mechanisms of the nonprofit sector. John C. Morris is an Associate Professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration at Old Dominion University. His research interests include privatization, water policy, federalism, and organization theory. He has published in journals such as Public Administration Review, Journal of Politics, Environmental Policy, Politics and Policy, and Public Works Management and Policy. He received his Ph.D. from Auburn University in 1994. Karun K. Singh is the Director of the Masters in Social Work Program-Newark and Lecturer at the Rutgers University School of Social Work. He has PhD and master degrees from Columbia University. His teaching, research, and consulting interests focus on nonprofit and public human services management, community organizing leadership, strategic planning, social entrepreneurship, grantwriting, and capacity building. He developed the Singh Strategic Planning Measure for Excellence to help nonprofit human service organizations achieve superior organizational performance. His volunteer activities include serving as Chair of the Network for Social Work Management-New Jersey Chapter and Editorial Board Member of the Journal for Nonprofit Management. Elvira (Vera) Teller, Ph.D. is currently on the staff at California State University Dominguez Hills as a Lecturer in the College of Business Administration and Public Policy. Her professional career spans over 25 years experience in business, management, and information systems as Director of Systems and Programming for Trader Joe's Company and Safeway (Vons), consultant for EDS, and Program Manager for WellPoint. Vera holds a position on the Board of Directors for Women At Work, a nonprofit career and resource center in Pasadena, California. She managed the 2011 strategic planning process, which will span three to five years, for Women At Work. Vera holds a Ph.D. and MA from the Fielding Graduate University in Human and Organization Development, an MBA from California State University, Los Angeles, specializing in business information systems and has certifications from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) in data communications, microcomputer and LAN support. She is PMI certified since 2000. Jessica Word is the Director of the Masters of Public Administration Program and Director of Certificate Programs for Public Management and Nonprofit Management in the Department of Environmental and Public Affairs, Greenspun College of Public Affairs, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. She has published in various public administration journals and has presented at academic meetings of the Academy of Management, American Society for Public Administration, and the Association for Research in Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action. Her research and teaching areas include nonprofit management, public management, program evaluation, organization theory and public policy. 122

Journal for Nonprofit Management Call for Papers The peer reviewed, biannual online Journal for Nonprofit Management (JNM) is a forum for the publication, dissemination, and discussion of all aspects of developing a common base of nonprofit management practice. Scholars, practitioners, and students are invited to submit their manuscripts for publication in the Fourteenth Volume of the Journal for Nonprofit Management. The journal welcomes submissions from all areas of nonprofit management practice. Examples of desirable submission areas include, but are not limited to, the following areas: Nonprofit board and governance issues Organizational change Succession planning Strategic and business planning Leadership Ethics of nonprofit management Theories of nonprofit management Philanthropic fundraising and marketing Performance management and evaluation Conflict management Human resource management Volunteer management Budget and finance Management of information technology Staff supervision Public relations media, community, legislative and other governmental relations Grant writing and contract management Managing corporate liability Manuscript Guidelines: These specific types of manuscripts will be published in the Journal for Nonprofit Management: Articles Shorter Contributions Case Studies Book Reviews 123

Format: Authors should review the electronic publication format appendix in the APA Style Guide, which is online at http://www.apastyle.org/. Submitted manuscripts must be written in English, double-spaced, using 12-point Courier or Times New Roman font in Microsoft Word. Include in the manuscript: an abstract of 100-150 words, a brief paragraph on the author, and a works cited page, with a maximum page length of 25-30 pages. Submissions: Manuscripts should be submitted via email to JNMsubmissions@ssw.rutgers.edu. You may also submit a hard copy to the address below: Ronald Quincy and John Brothers, Co-Editors Journal for Nonprofit Management Rutgers University Center on Nonprofit Management and Governance 390 George Street, 5 th Floor New Brunswick, NJ 08901 All submissions must be in by February 1, 2013 124

TO ACCESS THIS JOURNAL ONLINE Edition 15 of the Journal for Nonprofit Management is available online The Center for Nonprofit Management and Governance s website: http://socialwork.rutgers.edu/centersandprograms/nonprofit/journalfornonprofit.aspx The Support Center for Nonprofit Management s web site: www.supportcenteronline.org ACCESS TO FUTURE ISSUES To ensure that you receive notice of when future issues of the Journal for Nonprofit Management are available, please e-mail the editors at JNMsubmissions@ssw.rutgers.edu. CONTACT INFORMATION Please direct questions, comments and concerns to JNMsubmissions@ssw.rutgers.edu. 125