2014 Annual Convention. Basic Insurance and Negligence Law Topics

2014 Annual Convention Basic Insurance and Negligence Law Topics Insurance Law Committee/Negligence Law Committee 1.5 General CLE Hours April 30 May 2, 2014 Columbus

Contributors Jennifer N. Brown Arthur, O Neil, Mertz, Michel & Brown Co. LPA Defiance, Ohio Ms. Brown received her BA from Bowling Green State University and her JD from the University of Toledo College of Law. Her professional memberships include the Ohio State Bar Association (Insurance Law Committee; Negligence Law Committee; Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee), Ohio Association for Justice, American Association for Justice, Million Dollar Advocates Forum, and Ohio State Bar Foundation (Fellow). Ms. Brown is a partner with her firm and practices in the areas of insurance law, personal injury law, Social Security disability, domestic relations, and general civil litigation. She is the recipient of the 2013 Community Service Award from the Ohio State Bar Foundation and a Distinguished Service Award from the Ohio Association for Justice. Ms. Brown is also a graduate of the OSBA Leadership Academy. For additional information, please visit www.lawbuilding.com. Steven P. Collier Connelly Jackson & Collier LLP Toledo, Ohio Mr. Collier received his BA from Wittenberg University and his JD from the University of Cincinnati College of Law. He is president of the Ohio Chapter of the American Board of Trial Advocates. Mr. Collier is a nationally known trial lawyer, certified as a Civil Trial Advocate by the National Board of Trial Advocacy, and an associate in the American Board of Trial Advocates. He focuses his practice in the areas of personal injury, wrongful death, and medical malpractice. Mr. Collier has also briefed and argued cases before the Supreme Court of Ohio. In 2005, he authored the Minority Report for the Ohio Medical Malpractice Commission, a nine-member panel appointed to study the effects of the Medical Malpractice Bill (S.B. 281). Mr. Collier has lectured extensively throughout Ohio for the Ohio Association for Justice, local bar associations, Ohio Legal Center Institute, and the National Business Institute in the areas of personal injury and medical malpractice. Also, he was appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio to serve on a task force to formulate guidelines for court reporter certification. Since 1992, Mr. Collier has been a member of the adjunct faculty at the University of Toledo Medical Center, where he teaches Law and Medicine. He has also taught trial practice at the University of Toledo College of Law for six years. Mr. Collier is the author of the book Ohio Personal Injury A Comprehensive Guide, which is available online at www.ohiopersonalinjuryguide.com. For additional information, please visit www.cjc-law.com. Steven R. Smith Connelly Jackson & Collier LLP Toledo, Ohio Mr. Smith received his BA from Miami University, his MA from The Ohio State University, and his JD from The University of Toledo College of Law. His professional memberships include the Toledo Bar Association (Chair of the Bench Bar, Kiroff Committee), Ohio State Bar Association, Ohio State Bar Foundation (Fellow), Toledo Bar Foundation (Fellow), Ohio Association for Justice, Toledo Women s Bar Association, and the Million Dollar Advocates Forum. Mr. Smith is a partner of his firm and devotes his time to business litigation, concentrating on the representation of policyholders in insurance coverage matters. He has asserted claims for coverage under commercial general liability, property, directors and officers, legal malpractice, and business interruption policies and obtained coverage for numerous clients, even when insurance companies first denied coverage. Mr. Smith has litigated insurance coverage issues, negotiated settlements with insurance companies for claims, and conducted coverage reviews for clients facing liability claims from third parties in both state and federal courts. He has briefed and argued cases in the Supreme Court of Ohio. Mr. Smith has also tried and prosecuted appeals of lawsuits involving construction, securities, lender liability, and shareholder disputes and has defended directors and officers against regulatory agencies. He is a frequent lecturer for the Ohio State Bar Association, the Ohio Legal Center Institute, the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, and the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. For additional information, please visit www.cjc-law.com.

Chapter 1: Avoiding P.I. Litigation Pitfalls: Things That Can Trip You Up! Steven P. Collier Connelly Jackson & Collier LLP Toledo, Ohio Table of Contents Introduction... 1 Service of Process... 1 John Doe Defendants... 2 Ohio Civ.R. 41(A) and Ohio Savings Statute (R.C. 2305.19)... 3 For What It s Wuerth... 3 Changing Deposition Testimony... 5 Ohio Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15d: Disposition of Funds... 5 Statute of Repose... 6 Subrogation and Right of Recovery... 7 Confidentiality Provisions in Settlement Agreements... 7 Other Issues to Ponder... 7 PowerPoint Presentation... 9 Avoiding P.I. Litigation Pitfalls i

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Chapter 1: Avoiding P.I. Litigation Pitfalls: Things That Can Trip You Up! Steven P. Collier Connelly Jackson & Collier LLP Toledo, Ohio Introduction In 1970, the Ohio Supreme Court embraced the concept that In a tort action, the measure of damages is that which will compensate and make the plaintiff whole. Pryor v. Webber, 23 Ohio St.2d 104 (1970). Making the plaintiff whole in a personal injury case was a concept that continued to flourish throughout the 1970 s and well into the next two decades. However, after the Ohio Supreme Court significantly extended uninsured-motorist coverage in corporate policies in Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 85 Ohio St.3d 660 (1999), there was a concerted effort to try to limit the make-whole ideal. Tort reform enactments through Senate Bill 97, Senate Bill 80, Senate Bill 281 and Senate Bill 120, to name a few; have severely restricted the right of a person to be made whole when they are injured through the fault of another. Therefore, the plaintiff practitioner in personal injury in Ohio now must be more careful than ever to avoid the perils and pitfalls of personal injury practice while attempting to achieve the best result for the client. Service of Process Notice pleading, sounds easy enough, doesn t it? Just follow Ohio Civ.R. 8(A) and make sure the complaint contains... (1) a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the party is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which the party claims to be entitled. Once the case is filed, the attorney may proceed with serving interrogatories, requests for admissions, requests for production of documents and scheduling depositions all the preparation needed for that first big trial. But, what about service of process, as governed by Ohio Civ. Rules 4, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, and 4.6? In Gliozzo v. University Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., 114 Ohio St.3d 141 (2007) in its syllabus, the Court stated that when the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process is properly raised and properly preserved, a party s active participation in the litigation of a case does not constitute waiver of that defense. (First Bank of Marietta v. Cline, 12 Ohio St.3d 317 (1984), applied.) In Gliozzo, the plaintiff filed a medical-malpractice action but failed to perfect service pursuant to Civ.R. 3(A) within one year from the date the complaint was filed. The defendant, through counsel, participated in the defense of the case and filed a motion to Avoiding P.I. Litigation Pitfalls 1.1

dismiss more than a year after the case was filed because service of process was not perfected. While the trial court denied the initial motion to dismiss, on the day of trial an oral motion was made to renew the motion to dismiss and it was granted. In citing to the Cline case, the Court determined that a properly asserted and preserved defense may be raised even after the trial has begun. As a result it is important for plaintiff s counsel to promptly address the service of process issue when it is routinely raised by the defendant in an answer containing numerous defenses, many of which do not apply. This can be accomplished pursuant to a 12(D) hearing if defense counsel will not voluntarily amend the answer to remove the service of process defense. Another area of concern that relates to service of process is the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Ohio Civ. R. 41(A). Laneve v. Atlas Recycling Inc., 119 Ohio St.3d 324 (2008) When a complaint is voluntarily dismissed by a plaintiff in order to be afforded the benefits of the savings statute (R.C. 2305.19(A)), the original action must have been properly commenced or attempted to be commenced. If Civ.R. 3(A) is complied with regarding the commencement or attempted commencement of the action, the savings statute will allow the case to be refiled within one year and extends by one year the time period in which to serve the defendant after the case is refiled. In Laneve, the Court determined that the cause of action was not attempted to be commenced because service was attempted by certified mail instead of personal service when attempting to serve a John Doe defendant. The Court determined that an attempt to commence an action must be pursuant to a method of service that is proper under the civil rules. Ohio Civ. R. 15(B) specifically requires personal service when attempting to serve a John Doe defendant. John Doe Defendants Not sure who did what? Fill in a few John Does in the complaint and maybe a Jane Doe to be extra careful and sit back and wait. Before you do so, you may want to read Erwin v. Bryan, 125 Ohio St.3d 519 (2010). In Erwin, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Court of Appeals and determined that Civ.R. 15(D) could not have been used to prosecute an action against a doctor in a professional corporation because the name of the doctor was known to the administrator of the estate. The Court also determined that even if the administrator did not know the name, the requirements of Civ.R. 15(D) were not met because there was insufficient information to permit a copy of the summons containing the words name unknown to be served on the doctor or the professional corporation. Therefore, the amended complaint did not relate back to the time of the filing of the original complaint. This ruling seemingly limits the use of John Doe defendants to situations where the plaintiff knows who the defendant is and where they reside or do business, but does not know the actual name of the defendant and therefore, can serve the defendant by the name John Doe with a copy of the summons containing the words name unknown. Mardis v. Meadowwood Nursing Home, 12th Dist. No. CA 2010-04-007, 2010-Ohio-4800 This is a medical-negligence case arising out of a claim that a nursing home patient s Coumadin level had not been properly monitored, and as a result, he fell out of bed, hit his head, suffered a subdural hematoma, and later died. The nursing home was sued, along with several John Doe defendants. When an amended complaint was filed which included a specific nurse who participated in the patient s care, a motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of the nurse, and the trial court granted it, determining that the statute of limitations had already passed. The court rejected the argument that the statute of limitations was tolled until the identity of the specific nurse was discovered. The court determined that once the negligent act upon which the complaint was premised was discovered, the plaintiff must act diligently to identify the person or persons responsible in order to sue them individually. The court determined that Civ.R. 15(D) cannot be used as a ceaseless placeholder to get around statute of limitations requirements. 1.2 Basic Insurance and Negligence Law

Ohio Civ.R. 41(A) and Ohio Savings Statute (R.C. 2305.19) Case not going as expected need more time no problem. Just file a 41(A) voluntary dismissal and refile again within one (1) year, right? While Ohio Civ. R. 41(A) has been a savior to many Ohio plaintiff attorneys who are faced with unexpected litigation problems, one should be cautious about its use. There are certain circumstances where a case can be dismissed without prejudice more than once under this rule, i.e., by stipulation of the parties or by court order. Even though the action may be dismissed otherwise than on the merits more than once, the Ohio Savings Statute (R.C. 2305.19) can only be used once, thereby substantially limiting the significance of a double or triple dismissal. Hancock v. Kroger Co., 103 Ohio App.3d 266 (1995); Romine v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 136 Ohio App.3d 650, 654 (2000); Columbus Bar Ass n v. Finneran, 80 Ohio St.3d 428, 430 (1997). Therefore, it is important to not to blur the distinction between a voluntary dismissal and the savings statute. While the voluntary dismissal rule seems to contemplate the ability to re-file more than once, a strict reading of the savings statue does not allow it. It would seem that the ability to re-file a case that has been dismissed more than once otherwise than on the merits is limited to a situation where the plaintiff is still within the original statute of limitations. For What It s Wuerth Have Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185 (2005) and Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth, 122 Ohio St.3d 594 (2009) turned vicarious liability in Ohio upside down? Although the Comer case has been around for just over nine years, it must now be read in connection with National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth, et al. Comer is a medicalmalpractice case and Wuerth is a legal-malpractice case. In Comer, the court determined that the Clark v. Southview agency by estoppel theory would not allow liability to be imposed upon the hospital where the independent contractor physician was not named as a defendant and the statute of limitations against him had expired. The court seemed to limit its opinion to cases involving Clark v. Southview agency by estoppel. However, in Wuerth the court had an opportunity to revisit Comer in the context of a legalmalpractice case. In Wuerth, the court held: [W]hether a law firm may be directly liable for legal malpractice i.e., whether a law firm, as an entity, can commit legal malpractice and two, whether a law firm may be held vicariously liable for malpractice when none of its principals or employees are liable for malpractice or have been named as defendants. Id. at 12. The Court answered both questions in the negative and drew an analogy to medicalmalpractice claims, stating that a hospital cannot commit medical malpractice because only individuals practice medicine. Further, Comer was cited with approval for the principle that a law firm may not be vicariously liable for legal malpractice when no individual attorneys are liable or have been named. After Comer and Wuerth, the question arises as to whether an employee (not just an agent) of a hospital must be named in a medical-malpractice case in order to maintain an action against the hospital. Additionally, is Comer limited to medical-malpractice cases involving agency by estoppel? Finally, can Comer and Wuerth be applied to address respondent superior outside of medical and legal malpractice claims? Avoiding P.I. Litigation Pitfalls 1.3

(1)Taylor v. Belmont Community Hosp., 7th Dist. No. 09 BE 30, 2010-Ohio-3986 The Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed a trial court grant of summary judgment to Belmont Community Hospital which was based upon the trial court s extension of the Ohio Supreme Court s Wuerth decision to a hospital in a medical-negligence case. In Taylor, the plaintiff sued the hospital but did not name individual employees. The court in Taylor distinguished Wuerth as being inapplicable because Wuerth dealt with the relationship between a law firm and its partners and not an employer-employee relationship that existed in the case before it. The court also noted that Justice Moyer twice stressed in his concurrence in Wuerth that it was a narrow holding. Therefore, the court in Taylor refused to extend the Wuerth case... regarding law firm liability for the acts of partners and associates to the arena of hospital liability for the acts of its employees. Id. at 18. (2)Stanley v. Community Hosp., 2d Dist. No. 2010 CA 53, 2011-Ohio-1290 In Stanley, the Second District Court of Appeals reversed a trial court decision granting summary judgment to Community Hospital in a medical negligence case where there were allegations of negligence against the hospital and its employee nurses. Jane and John Doe nurses and physicians were named as defendants in the lawsuit but the complaint was never amended to specifically name any specific nurse, physician, or other hospital employee as an individual defendant. The court in Stanley cited Taylor v. Belmont Community Hosp. with approval and determined that Wuerth was inapplicable to the case, and thus there was no dispute that the plaintiff s suit was timely filed against the hospital for the alleged negligence of its employee nurses under respondeat superior law. (3)Sawicki v. Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 198 (2010) This is a medical-negligence case where the doctor was determined to be a dual status employee of a state hospital and a private corporation. The Supreme Court of Ohio determined that a patient could sue a private corporation alleging that its physician employee was negligent under a theory of respondeat superior. No action was brought in the Ohio Court of Claims against the state hospital. The court rejected the argument that the private employer cannot be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior because the employee doctor is immune from personal liability. The court declined to extend Comer v. Risko to this case, and stated that it was decided narrowly and turned on the theory of agency by estoppel. In her dissent, Justice Lundberg Stratton objected to the majority s position that because the lawsuit was against the doctor s private employer and not the state or the doctor, that it was unnecessary to determine whether the doctor s conduct was outside the scope of his employment with the state, citing Theobald. Justice Lundberg Stratton also relied upon Wuerth and Comer to argue for dismissal of the case because the employee doctor was not named. The dissent goes on to reason that... whether the claim against the agent is extinguished by the expiration of the statute of limitations or by the agent s immunity, the result is that the agent may not be liable. When no liability may be imposed on the agent, there is no liability to flow through to the principal. Id. at 48. Other cases addressed by Comer and Wuerth include: A. Henry v. Mandell-Brown, lst Dist. No. C-090752, 2010-Ohio-3832, appeal not accepted, 2010- Ohio-376. B. Tisdale v. The Toledo Hosp., 6th Dist. No. L-11-1005, 2012-Ohio-1110. C. Dinges v. St. Luke s Hosp., 6th Dist. No. L-11-1051, 2012-Ohio-2422. D. Waikem v. The Cleveland Clinic Found., 5th Dist. No. 2011 CA 00234, 2012-Ohio 5620, appeal not accepted, 2013-Ohio-0065. 1.4 Basic Insurance and Negligence Law

Changing Deposition Testimony Picture sitting in a deposition of an expert witness to whom you have already paid a substantial amount of money for their time to review records and give testimony and the expert fails to adequately answer a question to satisfy the legal requirements of admissibility. Is it appropriate to sit and hope for the witness to miraculously realize the error, ask a follow-up question, or perhaps wait and later attempt to add to the deposition testimony with a subsequent affidavit from the expert? This issue is addressed in Pettiford v. Aggarwal, 126 Ohio St.3d 413 (2010) a medical-malpractice negligence case where the plaintiff s expert was deposed and provided an opinion regarding departure from the standard of care, but stated he did not intend to offer any opinions about causation. When the defendant doctor moved for summary judgment, the plaintiff obtained an affidavit from the plaintiff s expert providing an opinion on causation favorable to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed its ruling in Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St.3d 24 (2006), which held that a party could not use an affidavit that is inconsistent with or contradictory to the party s deposition testimony in opposing a motion for summary judgment. The court extended this rule to apply in the instant case to a non-party expert witness, unless the expert sufficiently explains the reason for the contradiction. The issue was remanded to the lower court. In his dissent, Justice Brown argued that the initial determination by the lower court needs to be whether the affidavit contradicted or only supplemented the deposition testimony. In that regard, it is interesting that the Court of Appeals opinion described the plaintiff s expert s deposition testimony as not intending to offer opinions about causation, but the Ohio Supreme Court s characterization was that the expert testified he could not give any opinions about causation. It seems like there is a distinction between would and could in determining whether a contradiction exists so perhaps the precise framing of the deposition question may be determinative of whether a supplemental affidavit is allowed. Ohio Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15d: Disposition of Funds What do you do if a client in a personal injury case wants to ignore subrogation? The consummate legal answer is easy: it depends. There are many reasons to address subrogation up front, ranging from Medicare s statutory rights (it can go against the attorney if its interest is ignored) to being able to substantially reduce the subrogation interest with attorney involvement. However, perhaps the most important reason for the attorney to properly address subrogation is it may give rise to an ethical violation in certain instances. For example, under Professional Rule of Conduct Rule 1.15(d) and (e), a lawyer may commit an ethical violation if disbursements of a settlement are made from the lawyer s escrow account without regard to a subrogated carrier who has put the lawyer on notice that it has a lawful interest in the settlement funds. Rule 1.15(d) and (e) are set forth below: (d)upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has a lawful interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. For purposes of this rule, the third person s interest shall be one of which the lawyer has actual knowledge and shall be limited to a statutory lien, a final judgment addressing disposition of the funds or property, or a written agreement by the client or the lawyer on behalf of the client guaranteeing payment from the specific funds or property. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client or a third person, confirmed in writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive. Upon request by the client or third person, the lawyer shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such funds or other property. Avoiding P.I. Litigation Pitfalls 1.5

(e)when in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of funds or other property in which two or more persons, one of whom may be the lawyer, claim interests, the lawyer shall hold the funds or other property pursuant to division (a) of this rule until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the funds or other property as to which the interests are not in dispute. The key parts of the above rules are determining what is a lawful interest, which includes a statutory lien, a final judgment, or a written agreement guaranteeing payment. Another key element is that the lawyer must have actual knowledge of the lawful interest. However, if there is actual knowledge of the lawful interest by a third party, then the attorney must not disburse the funds until the dispute is resolved. Statutory liens may include Medicare, Medicaid and the Ohio Bureau of Workers Compensation who have statutory rights of subrogation and have formulas that can be the starting point and, unfortunately, sometimes the ending point for negotiations. (42 U.S.C. 1395(y)(b)(2); R.C. 5101.58, 5105.59; R.C. 4123.93, 4123.931.) Contractual rights of subrogation may arise with provisions in health and auto policies. When subrogation claims are resolved, it is best to get a written statement from the subrogated carrier stating that the settlement is a full and final resolution of the subrogated claim. This can be done by obtaining a letter from the subrogated carrier to that extent or having a receipt signed by the subrogated carrier when it receives its settlement check. Having the former attached to the settlement or closing statement with the client is also a good idea as it is evidence of how the matter was resolved. Statute of Repose I have never fully agreed with the need for a statute of limitations, let alone statutes of repose. If the universe is roughly 13.798 billion years old, it seems a tad arbitrary to impose a one-year statute of limitations for medical claims or even two years for auto cases. Even the discovery rule doesn t seem to expand the statute of limitations in proportion to the expanding universe; enough Carl Sagan. And if the statute of limitations are not enough, there are two areas of personal injury law where there is another statutorily-imposed filing deadline separate from the statute of limitations. There is a statute of repose for medical claims and product liability claims, R.C. 2305.113(C)(1) and R.C. 2305.10(C)(1), respectively. In medical claims, the statute of repose is generally four years from the date of the malpractice, with an exception if the discovery is within the third year and there is also a tolling period for minors or persons of unsound mind. For product liability, the claim must generally be brought within ten years from the date that the product was delivered to its first purchaser or first lessee who was not engaged in a business in which the product was used as a component in the production, construction, creation, assembly, or rebuilding of another product. The statute of repose for medical claims was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court in Ruther v. Kaiser, 134 Ohio St.3d 408, 2012, and for product liability claims in Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008. While the medical claim and product liability claim practice is quite specialized, it is possible that the general civil practice attorney may take in a case, expecting to refer it out eventually. The holding penalty for missing the statute of limitations or statute of repose can be severe. 1.6 Basic Insurance and Negligence Law

Subrogation and Right of Recovery In the 1980 s, subrogation in Ohio could be covered in five minutes. It didn t even exist in workers compensation cases and was often not in auto policies for medical payments coverage. Now it can take a day or so to cover subrogation in its entirety, so the focus will be on just a few points. A. Obtain the subrogation language, if contractual. Carefully review the language to see the extent of the subrogated interest. Most of the time, the language prevents a reduction for attorney fees or states the make-hold doctrine does not apply. Even when those provisions are present, it is often still possible to negotiate a reduction of the subrogated claim. One thing to watch out for is whether the subrogation language attempts to cover future payments. Some policies have a provision that a future payment for medical bills under the policy after the thirdparty claim has been settled will not be made if the bills are related to the incident giving rise to a third-party recovery. B. There may also be right of recovery language, in addition to subrogation language. This language typically requires repayment if the insured recovers against a third party and can be more expansive than creating a subrogation right where the insurer is in the shoes of the insured. C. Most subrogation right of recovery clauses have a provision that the insurer is required to receive notice before there is a settlement with a third party. D. Sometimes a client may just want to have unpaid medical bills paid by a third party, but the problem that arises is that the receipt of funds for this purpose may be subject to the insurer s claim for right of recovery or subrogation. Confidentiality Provisions in Settlement Agreements Dennis Rodman was in the news again this year, with his trip to North Korea. While some viewed his visit as inappropriate, at least it did not affect the settlement of a personal injury claim. The same cannot be said for the impact of Dennis Rodman when he had an altercation with an individual named Amos, who was photographing a Bulls basketball game. As a result of the altercation, Amos pursued legal action, which resulted in a settlement that had a confidentiality provision. In Amos v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 2003 W.L. 22839795 (U.S. Tax Ct., 2003), the court found that a portion of the settlement was for the confidentiality agreement and it was not exempt from the general taxing statute. How does a lawyer become a defensive specialist like Rodman to avoid this problem? One way to address this issue is to have the confidentiality provision be mutual where the parties make reciprocal promises regarding confidentiality. This provision should also include language that a portion of the settlement is consideration for the promise of confidentiality. See What Does Dennis Rodman Have to do with Your Settlement Agreements?, by Matthew L. Garretson and Sylvius von Saucken, www.garretsonfirm.com. Other Issues to Ponder A. UM/UIM separate statute of limitations in policy. B. UIM written consent before settling with tortfeasor. C. Closing statement required by Ohio Code of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(c)(2) and (e). Avoiding P.I. Litigation Pitfalls 1.7

D. Probate Court approval of minor settlements, no exceptions. E. Bankruptcy of client can result in trustee taking over claim. F. Consideration of government preservation trust or qualified settlement fund in structured settlements. G. Medicare set-aside analysis. 1.8 Basic Insurance and Negligence Law

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