International Labour Organisation Powerless yet Important? The ILO and International Labor Standards Referat von Yuan-Juhn Chiao, Veronika Rott, Stephanie Klein, Iris Hadrossek, Juliane Georg
Presentation Plan 1. Introduction 2. The ILO 3. Conventions and Core Conventions 4. Role of the ILO in Globalization 5. Codes of Conduct 6. Internal and External Monitoring
Authority of Global Rules 3 Variables in determining whether rules will be followed by global actors (Rieth 2003) 1. Power: coercion, enforcement mechanism 2. Interests: actors self interests must be satisfied 3. Legitimacy: process participation and credibility of information
Principle objectives To promote better working and living conditions To support and protect peaceful industrial relations To support economic development by homogeneous standards To hinder war by ensuring social justice
The International Labour Organization is built on the constitutional principle that universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice.
Functions Creation of international labour standards Formulation of international policies Technical assistance Training, education, research and publishing activities
History 1919 founded, first annual International Labour Conference, constitution 1920 established headquarters in Geneva 1926 set up of the supervisory system on the application of its standards 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia 1946 became the first specialized agency associated with the UN 1960 creation of the International Institute for Labour Studies 1965 creation of the International Training Centre in Turin 1969 ILO awarded the Nobel Peace at its 50th anniversary 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and 8 core conventions
Structure The ILO has a unique tripartite structure with workers and employers participating as equal partners with governments in the work of its governing organs. worker 25% 25% employer government 50%
Three main bodies International Labour Conference - creates international labour standards - forum for discussion - elects the Governing Body Governing Body - executive council - decisions on ILO s policy - establish programme and budget The International Labour Office - permanent secretariat - research centre and printing house
Conventions normal conventions and core conventions Form of establishing labour standards Focuses on technical questions concerning actual working conditions
Core Conventions Forced Labour Convention / No. 29 The Freedom of Association and Protection of Right to Organize Convention / No. 87 Right to Organize and Collective Bargain Convention / No. 98 Equal Remuneration Convention / No. 100
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention / No. 105 Discrimination Employment and Occupation Convention / No. 111 Minimum Age Convention / No. 138 Worst Form of Child Labour Convention / No. 182
Ratification Majority of the core conventions have achieved the status of universally accepted human rights but: just 37 member states ratified the Worst Form of Child Labour Convention
Convention Total ratifications No. 29 No. 87 No. 98 No. 100 No. 105 No. 111 No. 138 No. 182 Forced Labour Freedom of Association Right to organize Equal Remuneration Abolition of Forced Labour Employment and Occupation Minimum Age Worst Form of Child Labour 153 131 147 148 146 144 99 37
Enforcement Enforcement mechanisms sunshine carrots sticks
Enforcement Power Sunshine = transparency ILO has mechanism for supervising the application of conventions Carrots and Sticks means Zuckerbrot und Peitsche Carrots ILO has regular technical cooperation programs Sticks ILO provides multiple avenues for workers, employer and government representatives to raise issues of alleged noncompliance (Article 26)
Global Role for the ILO? Recent Developments: 1. High profile cases of Third World labor conditions in the 1990s raised public awareness 2. Labor activists goal of inserting social clauses in trade agreements 3. Greater activism by the ILO in defining its role in globalized world
ILO initiatives: 1994 Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalization of International Trade an unbridled liberalization of trade can work against the social objectives of the ILO
1994 GATT Marrakesh Ministerial Founding of the WTO Debate over the linkage between international trade and labor Delegates agreed that the ILO instead of the WTO should address this matter
1995 Copenhagen UN World Summit on the Social Dimensions Fundamental labor standards first mentioned Commitment by member governments to safeguard the basic rights and interests of workers and to this end, freely promote respect for relevant International Labour Organization convetions, including those on the prohibition of forced and child labor, the freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively and the principle of non-discrimination
1996 Singapore WTO Ministerial Conference Polarization of industrialized countries and LDCs over the linkage between international trade and labor standards Compromise: WTO members are to commit to core labor conventions ILO referred to as the competent body that establishes these standards
Remarks: ILO motivated to act because there was an opportunity to be more relevant in the age of globalization; increased prestige Fundamental core conventions as opposed to a listing of conventions. Addressing the international trade and labor standards link?
1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work Defined certain labor standards as fundamental human rights Fundamental labor rights do not require ratification Universal applicability, irregardless of country conditions
codes of conduct Another approach to labor standards Companies policy statements defining ethical standards for their conduct Without authorized definition Completely voluntary involves self-regulation implementation depends totally on the company concerned
codes of conduct Can be internal (company itself drafts the code) Or external (ILO/OECD codes, South Africa case, Starbucks case) Can address any issue (e.g. workplace issues, workers rights or environmental issues)
Issues in company ethics statements 1991:
Why implement codes of conduct? In the 1990s: growing interest in multinational organizations behavior towards their employees NGOs request companies to act socially and ecologically responsible companies start publishing internal codes of conduct codes of conduct as a comfortable way to implement labor standards
The Starbucks case 1994: US labor rights advocacy group + US-Guatemala Labor Education Project start Campaign for Justice for Coffee Workers against Starbucks
They want Starbucks to establish a code of conduct requiring their business partners in Guatemala to: pay a living wage, respect freedom of association, provide sanitary housing, provide safe and healthy workplaces, and not practice discrimination
The Starbucks case Starbucks president refuses to establish code of conduct Public communication campaign starts Feb. 1995: Starbucks president agrees to adopt code of conduct but: They draft their own: something that works and something that we can live with
Problems with codes of conduct: Implemented to satisfy consumer/share-holder expectations + avoid brand image reputation Dependent on credibility credibility depends on extent of awareness of the code s existence and meaning on transparency, enforcement, and monitoring
Overview Systems for monitoring labor standards 1. Nongovernmental Monitoring Systems in connection with the codes of conduct 2. Monitoring System of the ILO and the tools for improving working conditions
Nongovernmental Monitoring Systems Internal monitoring by brands and retailers External monitoring by third-party organizations Independent investigations by NGOs, unions, and private individuals
For example: Nike
Code of Conduct 1992 On labor and environmental practices
Monitoring System Implementation of an internal compliance division Monitoring of the suppliers by Nike staff Review by external consulting firms
Evaluation System Performance rankings High scorers garner more lucrative orders Low scorers risk losing contracts
Effects of firm-led selfmonitoring Little research on the effects Most of the programs are confidential Accusation of using it for public relations
External Monitoring For example: Fair Labor Association (FLA)
Development and Governance Developed in 1996 by the Clinton administration 6 industry representatives 5 NGOs 1 university representative
Monitoring System Combination of internal and external monitoring External auditors and factories of monitoring are selected by the FLA Announced and unannounced visits
Certification Applies for an entire brand Developing of a service mark, with information on compliance
Public disclosure Summaries of audit results Participating companies are listed on the FLA website
Criticism Auditors in these programs are often paid directly by the brands or factories being monitored
Independent Investigations For example: Workers Rights Consortium (WRC)
Development and Focus In 1999 by the United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) Focus on factories that produce apparel with university logos The WRC model code (e.g. a living wage) should be adopted by participating universities
Strategies Inspection of factories due to worker complaints Proactive inspections in countries with low labor standards Information disclosure requirements
WRC goals Compliance with a base code of conduct of factories that produce universitybranded apparel Education of workers about university codes and reporting of code violations Collaboration with local NGOs and activists for investigative efforts
Public Disclosure All factory investigation reports are published
Criticism pointing out problems, instead of resolving them Inspection system: limited scope and coverage
Monitoring of the ILO Tools for improving working conditions
Tools of the ILO Supervision and Publication Technical assistance Enforcement mechanism
Supervision of compliance
International Labor Conference Annual meeting Adoption of new conventions Review of the implementation of existing conventions
Mechanisms for Supervision Article 22: requires member governments routinely reporting of ratified conventions Article 19: requires member governments periodically reporting of not ratified confentions and of efforts to ratify other conventions
Review of the governments reports Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) Compiles a report to the International Labor Conference individual observation of failure
Conference Committee on the Application of Standards Review of the CEACR report Selection of problem cases Invitation to the affected governments to respond in public session
Follow-up Mechanism Additional tool for implementing the 1998 Declaration Requires an annual reporting of countries that have ratified none of the eight core conventions, of what they are doing to promote the conventions
Public Disclosure of the ILO Publishes much of the information generated by ist supervisory mechanisms on its Website Increased the transparency of its Website in recent years
Criticism of affected countries Is concerning the public disclosure Affected countries convict the ILO of naming names
Technical Assistance Dissemination of knowledge through seminars Funding for less developed countries
Funding and Programs Since the late 1990s funding of many wealthier member stetes for ILO programs increased Initiation of technical cooperation programs
Enforcement of Conventions Article 33: gives the ILO authority to take action against states suspected of noncompliance
Mechanisms that could lead to Article 33 sanctions Article 24: right of any worker or employer organization to complain a member government of noncompliance Article 26: right of member governments to complain another member government
The Burma Case 2000: the ILO invoked Article 33 against Burma because of noncompliance to Convention 29 concerning forced labor First Article 33 invoking in ILO history Long-standing process, that started in 1996 with a complaint of worker delegates
Sanctions concerning the Article 33 invoking Requirement to member governments to review their relationship with the government of Myanmar (Burma) And to take measures that the relations do not facilitate the system of forced labor Requirement to other international organizations to review their activities in Burma and the effects concerning forced labor
Consequences of Article 33 2002: Burma accepted a permanent ILO officer to oversee implementation of the forced labor ban Unions, NGOs, and others concerned with forced labor in Burma stated that the problem continued No government, international organization, or workers or employers group had taken action against Burma under the Article 33 resolution
Summing up... Slow response to Burmese continuous failure underscores the unwillingness of ILO members to punish dissenters, which underlines the weakness of the ILO ILO authorizes member governments and other UN organizations to take action to remedy violations and does not impose them directly itself Main beneficiaries of compliance with ILO standards are workers in the countries charged with non-compliance, whereas no perceived benefits for governments or employers
Literature Block, r. N. / Roberts, K. / Ozeki, C. / Roomkin, M. J. (2001): Models of International Labor Standards. In: Industrial Relations, No. 2, Vol. 40, pp. 258-292 Compa, L. / Hinchliffe-Darricarere, T. (1995): Enforcing International Labor Rights through Corporate Codes of Conduct. In: Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 33, p. 663-689 Elliot, K. A. (2000): The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labor Satndards. In: Institute for International Economics, Number 00-6, p. 1-7. Monitoring International Labor Standards: Techniques and Sources of Information. Commitee on Monitoring International Labor Standards, National Research Council. 306 pages, 6 x 9, 2004 Scherrer, C. / Greven, T. (2001): Global Rules for Trade. Codes of Conduct, Social Labeling, Worker s Rights Clauses. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. ILO Actrav (Ed.): Corporate Codes of Conduct, online: <http://www.itcilo.it/actrav/ actravenglish/telearn/global/ilo/code/main.htm>. Download: 06.11.2004 ILO (Ed.): The Model Use of International Labour Standards, online: <http://www.ilo. org/public/english/standards/norm/howused/model/>. Download: 06.11.2004 Reichert (2002): Sozialstandards in der Weltwirtschaft, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (Ed.), online: <http://www.gtz.de/socialstandards/downloads/deutsch_ww_reichert.pdf>. Download: 01.11.2004 www.ilo.org www.bostenreview.net/br26.1/fung.html