Nation-Building in South Sudan: Past Struggles and Current Challenges

16 Nation-Building in South Sudan: Past Struggles and Current Challenges Caio César Paccola Jacon Leticia Raymundo Tavares Marcela Perillo Ferreira Rodrigo Santiago Juaçaba 1. Introduction 1 Before South Sudan s secession, Sudan agglomerated within its territory over five hundred ethnic groups and more than a hundred languages. However, since its independence in January 1, 1956, the country s administrators have sought to use Arabization 2 and Islamization 3 as ways of uniting Sudan under one religion and one culture. Other ethnic and religious groups in Sudan, especially those from the south, thus, have opposed such policies and several conflicts have emerged as a result of impasses among the Khartoum government governed by Arabic-speaking Muslims and minority groups (ADAR, 2001, p. 100). According to Adar (2001, p. 81), [w]hereas conflict in Sudan has acquired a multidimensional character over the years, the main belligerents have been the Arab-speaking Muslims of the north and the southern black Sudanese. At the core of the civil war are the inherently exclusive ethno-religious-centred 495 1 We are deeply grateful for the advices given by Prof. Wolfgang Döpcke, from the History Department of UnB, during the revision of this article. 2 Process of the integration and assimilation of individuals into the cultural values and beliefs of Muslims and Arabs in particular (ADAR, 2001, p. 83). 3 There are two contrasting thesis concerning the meaning of Islamization. On the one hand, the traditionalist one addresses Islamization as the process of reintroduction of past Islamic institutions and traditional law, concerning especially punishment. On the other hand, the reformers (neo-traditionalists) see Islamization as a dynamic process which encompasses both Islamic Tradition and foreign sources not contradictory to Islam (ADAR, 2001, p. 83-84).

496 policies, namely Islamisation and Arabisation pursued in various ways in successive Sudanese administrations since the 1950s. Taking that into account, one may infer that such policies represented the very obstacles standing in the way of establishing a Sudanese national identity, as the Southerners religious practices and language were derogated by the Arabic-speaking Muslims who have been in control of the Khartoum government since Sudan s independence (ADAR, 2001, p.81). The construction of a Sudanese national identity was made impossible by the referred policies (ADAR, 2001, p. 105) and secession was the only solution found to the north-south conflicts; thus on July 9, 2011 South Sudan seceded from Sudan. Although conflicts in Sudan are still current, this article turns its attention to the obstacles and challenges South Sudan will have to face and overcome through nation-building policies in order to consolidate itself as a country. This raises the question which should guide the development of this paper: is South Sudan capable of facing its historical structural problems and those ahead of its path and become a stable developing country? In the course of this article, other parallel questions should find answers. What reasons made the southern region of Sudan demand independence and what was the process through which it was acquired? Why was South Sudan different from Sudan? Is there a monolithic South Sudanese nationality? What are the concrete challenges and obstacles ahead of South Sudan? How are international entities acting to help consolidate South Sudan? By the end of the article, readers should be able to answer these questions and think critically about the issues facing South Sudan. As they do so, the need for respect among people should appear clear and the urge for consolidating trust among countries a good all countries cannot forgo would be compelling. 2. Brief History of Sudan 2.1. Roots of the rivalries and the Sudanese Civil War between North and South North Africa has been under a process of Islamization since the 8th century due to the process of Arab expansion, and despite being well successful in Northern Sudan, this process encountered some difficulties reaching the South not only due to the region s geography, but also due to the resistance of animist tribes in this area to conversion (SHARKEY, 2008). However, these geographic characteristics helped to contain the Islamization process in the North region of the country until the 19th century, but by the first half of the 19th century the Sudanese government started a series of campaigns to take control of the south of the country by a process of Islamic imposition. Furthermore, the existence of ethnic boundaries became clearer with the uneven economic development among the regions of Sudan. The north of the country benefited from large irrigation systems for cotton plantation for the British textile factories and the south was considered as having nothing worthy of investment (AHMAD, 2010, p.4). Besides, the periphery s relationship with the central government has been characterized by slave trade, exploitation and marginalization (AHMAD, 2010, p.3). During the late Turkish-Egyptian period of government (1821-1883) and through the administration of the Mahdist state (1883-1898) companies of ivory and slave-trading were established (JOHNSON, 2007, p.3). Egypt 4 was one of the countries that benefited the most from the slave trade (SIKAINGA, 1996, p.7). From 1870 on, humanitarian pressures started to be made on the Turkish-Egyptian regime in order to end the slave trade. The process dragged on for some time being important to notice the Anglo-Egyptian Anti-Slavery Convention in 1877 and was only completed in the last decades of the nineteenth century (SIKAIN- GA, 1996, p.14). The end of slave traffic led Sudan into a state of economic crisis, since the activity was the country s main income source, and this crisis led the government to raise taxes which was one of the causes of the insurrection of 1885 (QUEIROZ et al., 2011, p. 309). Mahdi, the leader of this insurgency, ineffectively tried to integrate the Sudanese regions through the imposition of the Islamic Legal System the al-sharia; however this decision failed to achieve the expected success in Sudan and only worsened the division between North and South (QUEIROZ et al., 2011, p. 309). With the Egyptian-British invasion in 1898, the Anglo-Egyptian condominium took place, in which Britain and Egypt shared sovereignty on Sudan after the collapse of the Mahdist State in 1899 (COL- LINS, 2008, p.33). This hybrid solution defended British imperial interests at Cairo and Suez by securing the upper Nile waters and also recovered to British control the former Sudanese provinces belonging to the Khedive of Egypt (COLLINS, 2008, p. 33). British rule, then, encouraged the arrival of Christian missionaries to the 4 In the eighteenth century, Dar Fur became Egypt s major trading partner and slave supplier. ( ) Slaves were carried off by the jallaba (travelling merchants) ( ). They were sent to Egypt through the desert routes and to the Middle East through the Red Sea (SIKAINGA, 1996, p.9). 497

498 south and the expansion of Islamic culture was barred. Christian missionaries were encouraged to convert the southern Sudanese from their traditional religions to Christianity, teach them English, discourage the use of Arabic, and even prohibit the wearing of Arab clothing (COLLINS, 2008, p.35). The educational monopoly held by these missionaries did not encourage the southerners participation in the politics of Sudan, contrarily to what happened in the north, where the elites engaged in maneuvers to defend the independence of the country (COLLINS, 2005, p. 269). The discrepancy remained even more pronounced because of the ways the two regions were governed. Besides, the British inability to deal with this situation contributed to the emergence in the South of the Southern Policy, in which military officers refused to learn Arabic, preferring to speak the local African languages, and ruled their provinces by the prestige of power and persuasion (COL- LINS, 2008, p.36). In this context of decentralization, the southern provinces developed autonomy in relation to Khartoum. Therefore, this parallel southern government could be characterized by individual initiative, isolation, and ad hoc administrative decisions [which] represented more a muddle than any coordinated and consistent policy (COLLINS, 2008, p. 36). Despite the nationalist movement that emerged in 1930s, the Sudanese independence occurred only in 1956 (COLLINS, 2008, p.45). The State-promoted policy of Arabization began in the 1950s, when the northern nationalists formulated plans to introduce Arabic in schools in the south, but the existence of some British policies that protected the southern Sudanese prevented this arbitrary action from taking place. The process of Sudanization 5 contributed to increase in the south the perception of injustice and inequality the Southerners were under, and fueled the uprising that began a few months before the declaration of independence. This uprising happened in the form of a rebellion of Southern Corps of Sudan s Defense Force a process initiated in August 15, 1955 in the city of Torit (AHMAD, 2010, p.4). The conflicts that followed represented the beginning of the first Sudanese Civil War which would end only seventeen years later. As Sudan became independent in 1956, Arabic became the official language and Islam, the state religion (SHARKEY, 2007, p.34). The Condominium ended and a parliamentary board took office, but this political maneuver quickly went wrong as in 1958 Major-General Ibrahim Abboud took over as new Prime-Minister. Abboud s regime was more concerned in making the country governable than introducing any radical economic and social changes (COLLINS, 2008, p.73). In 1959, Sudan nationalized the Southern mission schools. This nationalization came as a governmental policy to implement Arabic as the official language, and to construct mosques and Koranic schools 6. These actions, which sought the integration of the country, thus, tried to impose Arabization and Islamization over the entire Sudan. The first participation of the separatist group Anya-Nya happened as a rebellion in the South in 1963 and led to constant ill-coordinated attacks from this group. The popular insurgency of the year 1964, popularly known as the October Revolution, also demonstrated how unhappy the southern Sudanese people were. Students clashed with the police in Khartoum and a student died. Several other clashes erupted in other cities and General Abboud was forced to resign. In the same year southerners protesters began looting Arabs as a reaction to the death of the Interior Minister Clement Mboro; such looting became known as Black Sunday. After this series of riots the northern Sudanese could no longer ignore the terrible situation of the populations in the south of the country (COLLINS, 2008, p.84). Nevertheless, many governments kept Abboud s unsuccessful policies of Islamization and Arabization until the signature of the Addis Ababa Agreement, in 1972. This agreement granted autonomy to the South of Sudan recognizing a Regional Self-Government to the region, with a legislative body (Regional People s Assembly) and an executive in charge of public affairs and administration (High Executive Council). The agreement also accepted English as the main language of the Southern Region and decided that the number of soldiers and officers in the Sudanese army would be proportional to the population of each region (THE AGREEMENT ADDIS ABABA, 1972, p.2). 2.2. Attempts at peace and the struggle for autonomy The Agreement s initial success did not last long, especially because of the discovery of oil reserves in the South. The Khartoum government proposed to build a pipeline to explore southern oil which would go through East Africa and Southern Sudan to Mombasa (COLLINS, 2008, p.123). Waves of protest took the streets of southern Sudan and were widely reported by American media. However, since the 1970 s investments were concentrated in specific regions of Sudan, leaving 5 In the South, Sudanization was thus tantamount to Northernization (AFRICA WA- TCH, 1990, p.13). 6 Poggo (2002) defends that this initiative happened because of the government s suspicion about the activities of the Catholic Church in particular, which it believed was sowing the seeds of discord among the people of the South (POGGO, 2002, p.73). 499

500 the periphery even more isolated. Besides, there was an increase in Numayri s 7 personal power causing the emergence of a non-democratic and authoritarian government (COLLINS, 2008, p.131). The South depended hugely on the government economically, but since the government was focused on improving the golden triangle 8, the South failed to develop its economy (COLLINS, 2008). In 1983, Numayri resumed the autonomous Southern Sudanese government and limited the South s political power by dividing the region into three autonomous zones of government Bahr al-ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile with three different capitals Wau, Juba and Malakal (COLLINS, 2008, p. 137). Collins (2008, p.138) emphasizes the difficulties of this process, stating: The central issue of modern Sudan has been the Sudanese quest for identity whereby African indigenous cultures can peacefully co-exist with an imported Arab culture in a Sudan dominated by neither. For a few short years the Addis Ababa Agreement had resolved this dilemma. Ja afar Numayri, in his quest for autocracy and Arab domination, destroyed that vision, leaving a disembodied legacy of cultural warfare and devastating violence that has cursed Sudan to this day. The sum of all these events revitalized old hostilities and culminated in military mutinies over Sudan. The Second Civil War had, then, begun. Alongside, the Sudan People s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), led by Col. John Garang, emerged in 1983 with a manifesto that diverged from those of other existing groups because of their preoccupation not only with the southern problems, but with the whole situation of Sudan (AHMAD, 2010, p.6). Besides, the SPLM/A was founded as a political movement with a military wing, the Sudanese People Liberation Army (SPLA). As indicated by Suliman (1997, p. 13), in addition to the political crisis an economic collapse which destroyed the rest of the government s support, the policies required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reduce the Sudanese financial deficit thus aggravating the crisis, and the drop in the country s exports resulted in a famine process in 1984-1985. Therefore, a third joint parliamentary took power in 1985. However, as it was incapable of bringing stability to the country, in 1989, General Omar al-bashir took over the government in a coup led by the National Salvation Revolution (BÖLL STIFTUNG, 2010, p.118). That year, in Bergen, Norway, the Bergen Forum took place and a series of meetings were held so that major political actors would attempt to deal with the crisis. For the same purposes, there was also the Ambo meeting between the SPLA/M and representatives of northern political parties and civilian organizations (AHMAD, 2010, p.13). Also according to Ahmad (2010, p.13), after the 1990s, the effects of prolonged war led the government of Khartoum and the SPLM/A to rounds of negotiations that began with the Abuja meetings, in the early 1990 s, and culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. International pressure, especially with the announcement of the massacre in Darfur 9, was crucial to accelerate the process of negotiations. 2.3. The 2005 peace agreement and the referendum that created South Sudan The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), also known as the Naivasha Agreement, was signed on January 9, 2005 in a grand celebration in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital. The agreement was signed by John Garang, chairman of the SPLM/A and the Sudan s First Vice- President Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha and arose due to a situation of international pressure created by the genocide in Darfur and the country s twenty-two years of civil war. The IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) Declaration of 1994 and the Machakos Protocol in 2002 were the backbone of the CPA. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) aimed at identifying the root causes of the political conflict, eliminating historical injustices and avoiding the losses of the wars and destruction (AHMAD, 2010, p.7). The CPA was a complex document. It dealt with security, distribution of power and wealth issues and ended almost 40 years of civil war between northern and southern Sudan. Thereby, security was regarded by the CPA as the most important issue to be dealt with, and it should be established through the maintenance of armed forces separating North and South of Sudan and the withdrawal of northern troops from southern lands. The SPLA, on the other hand, would withdraw from the North within eight months. The matter of wealth division, especially oil, was resolved through an agreement of sharing the revenues between the Khartoum government and the government of South Sudan. The solution found 7 President of Sudan at the time. 8 Golden Triangle: Kenana Sugar Scheme on the White Valley, the Rahad Scheme on the Blue Nile and mechanized farming in Kassala and Kordofan (COLLINS, 2008, p.131). 9 Darfur, a region which has also been claiming autonomy in Sudan, has suffered genocide following clashes between rebels claiming for autonomy and an Arab militia supported by the Khartoum government (SUDAN, 2011). 501

502 for the power dilemma was to create an autonomous Government of South Sudan (GoSS) for a period of six years, and after the expiration of such period there would be a referendum, scheduled for the year 2011, which would be supervised by international monitors (COLLINS, 2008, p.269). Critics were skeptical of this agreement because they argued that there was nothing new in these concessions, given that the South had won the right to self-determination in 1994, 1997 and 1998. On each occasion, the Khartoum government had conceded such right only due to military pressure and did not fulfill its promises afterward (COLLINS, 2008, p.263). Despite the critics fear of another failed agreement, the terms were fulfilled and in 2010 the national elections and the referendum of 2011 marked the end of the six-year interim period agreed in the CPA. The referendum was an opportunity to the inhabitants of southern Sudan to separate themselves from the north of the country and to constitute a sovereign and independent state. Voting was guaranteed to all those who could prove were southern Sudanese or had family in the South including, therefore, many southern Sudanese who lived in the north (DOWNIE, 2010). The referendum for southern Sudan came as a relief to many years of political, cultural and religious oppression a struggle that has cost more than 2 million lives (DOWNIE, 2010). The referendum took place between 9 and 15 of January, 2011 and the results published on February 7, 2011 showed a 98.83% approval for the secession of South Sudan. The date chosen for the establishment of South Sudan as an independent state was July 9, 2011 (ATTA-ASAMOAH, 2011). The newest country in the world was well received by global leaders and is already recognized by the United Nations as the 193rd member of the organization (SOUTH SUDAN..., 2011). 3. South Sudan s national identity According to Nascimento (2003, p. 33), in the recent history of Africa, nationalism is associated to liberation struggles against colonial rule and plays an important role as an ideological inspirational tool in order to promote socioeconomic development in newly independent countries. Although South Sudan was no longer under colonial rule when it acquired its independence, it may, for our purposes, be said that it was under a similar situation. Thus, as we attempt to clarify the processes through which South Sudan separated itself from Sudan and the challenges it still has to face in order to become a stable developing country, we seek to explain to what measure the phenomenon of nationalism has influenced the mobilization that led to the country s secession. As we do so, the role that the construction of a distinct national identity has had in this process becomes clearer and new questions emerge: what is South Sudan s nationalism constituted of? And when has South Sudan s national identity if there is one come to existence? 3.1. Why is South Sudan not Sudan? From before the independence of South Sudan, the northern and the southern regions of Sudan have been very different from one another. When Tucker (1934) wrote about the linguistic situation in the southern Sudan in the early 20th century, he already stated that there were very clear differences between the Northerners, whose religion and culture is Islamic and who speak Arabic, and the Southerners, who back then, before the spread of Christianity in the region, were pagan and for the most part strongly opposed to outside culture (TUCKER, 1934, p. 28). What, thus, makes South Sudan different from Sudan and can be understood as part of the reasons of conflict between Northerners and Southerners in former Sudan are distinctive cultural aspects which constitute the very identity of these peoples. As Francis Deng (2006, p. 155) stated, the constant situation of war in Sudan since its independence on January 1, 1956 revealed a crisis of national identity. As previously seen, after independence the North prevailed over the South and started a process of Arabization and Islamization of Sudan (DENG, 2006, p. 156). However, notwithstanding such policies, the South developed a distinct identity. As they had historically been victims of enslavement, they developed a strong anti-slavery sentiment which added to anti- Arabization and anti-islamization sentiments. The influences of a separatist colonial policy, Christianity, and elements of Western Culture created a Southern identity which differed greatly from that of the Arab-Islamic North. Besides, according to Adar (2001, p. 88-89), the contrasts brought about by the British administration and the subsequent economic, political and infrastructural underdevelopment of the South enhanced southern aspirations and consciousness. Thus, Sudan had within itself two contrasting visions for the nation an Arab-Islamic vision and a secular black African vision (DENG, 2006, p. 156), or, in other words, two nationalisms: an Arabic-speaking Sudanese nationalism a religiousoriented nationalism and an African Sudanese nationalism a secular one (ADAR, 2001, p. 103-104). 503

504 In a previous work, Deng (1998) observed that these different perspectives would become a problem in the negotiations for a peace settlement. While the South would advocate for the right of self-determination and separation of religion and the state, the Islamic-oriented government in Khartoum would claim that secularism was against their religious and moral obligation to promote Islam in Africa. Self determination, on the other side, would be seen as a ploy for partitioning the country and therefore unacceptable (DENG, 1998, p. 73). Much of it can be understood taking into account that, differently from the tolerant and accommodating Islam which the Sufis 10 had brought to Sudan in the past, more recent Islamic movements were seen as rivalists (DENG, 2006, p. 156), considering the southerners culture and religion an enemy to be defeated. Furthermore, according to Adar (2001, p. 81), Arabization and Islamization were used by the ruling elites as a tool to maintain their political power, so any other ethno-religious groups in the country were seen as rivals of an Arab-Islamic Sudan. The Southern Problem, a reference to the non-muslim population in the South, thus, unified the North under the banner of the Arab-Islamic vision, seeking to extend Islam and the Arab culture to the whole Sudan (DENG, 2006, p. 156). Deng (2006, p. 157) states that conflicts in Sudan have at their roots seeming incompatibilities of racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious identities. However, classifying the conflicts in Sudan as a African-Arab dualism is for the author an oversimplification, because, albeit there are those of mixed Arab-African descent, the overwhelming majority in the North, especially in the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, and Darfur, though Muslims, are black and indistinguishable from the people in the South (DENG, 2006, p. 157). Deng, therefore, explains the conflicts as a consequence of the shaping and sharing of power, wealth, services, development opportunities, and the overall enjoyment of the rights of citizenship (2006, p. 157). However, as Nascimento (2003, p. 36-38) points out, some political scientists identified as instrumentalists 11 have considered that nationalist movements have an even greater strength when ethnic or religious differences coincide with social and economic inequalities. Therefore, even though the demands for independence may have a more social and economic root, that does not mean national identity has not had an important role in the matter, for such inequalities between Northerners and Southerners in Sudan may have worked to reinforce their differences. Based on that, we may infer that as the South considered itself as the most neglected and marginalized region in the country, the differences between both regions of Sudan and the South s dissatisfaction with the northern administration inflated the distinctiveness of the southern identity, and conflicts started to emerge. The first one erupted in 1955, only eight months prior to Sudan s independence on January 1, 1956, and had a separatist purpose. The conflicts that started in 1983, after the government resumed the peace agreement of 1972 which granted South Sudan autonomy, were led by the Sudan s People Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) and sought to restructure the country into one without discrimination due to race, ethnicity, religion, culture, or gender (DENG, 2006, p. 157-158). These demands thereby began to gain support in parts of the North, especially in the non-arab regions. The Nuba in the South Kordofan and the Ingassana or Funj of Southern Blue Nile were the first to join the SPLM/A in the struggle for equality (DENG, 2006, p. 158). As one may imply from this, the self identification of a Sudanese as Arab or African or even both plays an important role defining the sides of conflict. Concerning identities, one region that deserves closer attention in these conflicts is Abyei. With a population similar to that of the South the Ngok Dinka the region was devastated by the Khartoum government-backed Marahleen group and became depopulated as its people fled north and south to escape the atrocities (DENG, 2006, p. 158). After the secession of South Sudan in 2011, the prospects of these refugees returning home raised a series of concerns relating to new conflicts, as the region, which contains considerable amounts of oil, will have to decide in a referendum whether to join South Sudan or remain as part of the North. The Ngok Dinka identify themselves with the South, but the Misseriya, a nomad people identified with the Arab North, want to participate in the voting because they fear losing their right to grazing in the area (NICHOLS; JACOB-ERNST, 2011, p. 15). 3.2. A heterogeneous country with a common interest South Sudan is not a monolithic nation and the differences among its own ethnic groups must be addressed. The country s population is composed by several ethnic groups the Dinka and the Nuer are the predominant ones and their coexistence has yet to 10 Islam s mystic branch 11 These political scientists are qualified as positivists and as adepts of the methodology of rational choice (NASCIMENTO, 2003, p. 36). 505

506 be reconciled, as they continue to compete for land (NICHOLS; JA- COB-ERNST, 2011, p. 17). Religious affiliation is distributed among animists, Catholics and Protestants predominantly (ADAR, 2001, p. 89). For Adam Branch and Zachariah Mampilly (2005, p. 4), there is, thus, no unified South Sudanese identity. The only common identity would be based on common repression by, and resistance to, the Khartoum regime. According to these authors (2005, p. 4), during the 1990s, the conflict between the Dinka-dominated SPLA and various Nuer-dominated SPLA factions were even more violent than those against the Khartoum government. Furthermore, smaller Equatorian ethnic groups the Bari, Zande, Acholi, Madi, Moru, Kuku, and others view the SPLA as a vehicle of Dinka domination and complain bitterly about their treatment at the hands of the SPLA (BRANCH; MAMPILLY, 2005, p. 4). After the secession, once the common enemy which tied up the different ethnic groups of South Sudan has disappeared, concerns are raised that the differences among such groups may be brought up to the fore (NICHOLS; JACOB-ERNST, 2011, p. 17). Thus, South Sudan will have to manage such problems by attempting to construct a national identity which is capable of encompassing all the country s different tribal identities, as we discuss next. 3.3. The construction of a national identity Addressing national identity, specifically the construction of one, requires a better understanding of the phenomenon of nationalism. As there is no consensus or paradigmatic definition of what exactly is nationalism (NASCIMENTO, 2003, p. 33), our goal here is to clarify this concept, without attempting to provide a definitive meaning to the term, in order to shed a light on the role it has had in the process of independence of South Sudan and the role it may still play. As Gellner (1983, p. 1) defines it, nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent. Although this definition is susceptible to criticism, it is useful to understand the process which led to the secession of South Sudan, for since the beginning of the conflicts with the government of Khartoum the south region of Sudan has claimed for the right of self-determination, seeking autonomy to decide on the matters that concerned their interests (DENG, 1998, p. 73). Thus, according to such perspective, the idea which moves nationalism would be the creation of a State that exercises authority upon a nation, which is understood as a human group that shares a common culture (NASCIMENTO, 2003, p. 34, our translation). South Sudan s demands for autonomy, which, as previously addressed, have been based on the defense of a shared scope of cultural aspects that made the Southerners of Sudan different from the people of the North, thus, show the importance that the construction of the South s national identity had in legitimating and strengthening South Sudan s cause. Nevertheless, as previously presented, South Sudan s society is not homogeneous. There are several different ethnic groups inside South Sudan which do not necessarily have a harmonious relation with each other (NICHOLS; JACOB-ERNST, 2011, p. 17). Thus, Gellner s statement (1983, p. 55) that it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round poses the question on whether South Sudan s national identity construction has been an ideological tool in order to strengthen the country s independence movement or if it is truly a common sentiment shared by all South Sudanese. Whatever the answer to that question may be, we do not back Gellner s (1983) impression on nationalism as something manufactured and falsified. We otherwise agree with Benedict Anderson s perspective (1991, p. 26) to whom nationalism is seen as imagined and created, and nation is perceived as an imagined community in opposition to a fake conscience. Furthermore, the impressiveness of the referendum results, in which 98.8% of South Sudan s population voted in favor of the country s secession, indicates a common perception of belonging to the same nationality. These author s contributions to the understanding of nationalist phenomena, thus, allow us to state that, although South Sudan has several ethnic groups inside its territory which have to some degree their own identities, the existing similarities among the South Sudanese were used to forge a common identity. This identity, then, allowed these groups to come to an agreement on the creation of an independent state for all of them to live in. Therefore, nation-building policies which ought to be implemented in South Sudan have to consider the country s ethnic and cultural plurality and, upon that, educate the population to accept each other s differences. If that can be accomplished, it is possible to say South Sudan will have come a step closer to a civic nationalism, which, according to Nascimento (2003, p. 42) is based on the political conception of citizenship regardless of race, religion, language, ethnicity and place of origin to all people inside a country. 4. Current issues So far it was presented the history of Southern Sudan which led to the secession of South Sudan in July 9, 2011 and some aspects of the national identity of this country. Even though there was a very cohe- 507

508 sive southern identity throughout the long struggles for autonomy against the Khartoum government, South Sudan has itself a variety of ethnic identities within its territory that may now come to be a focus of new violence and conflicts. The nation-building process South Sudan will have to endure from now on, then, will have to promote a nationalist sentiment in its population which is capable of creating a sense of unity among the people while acknowledging the country s plurality. Along with that, the newest and poorest country in the world (NICHOLS; JACOB-ERNST, 2011, p. 17) will have to deal with challenging obstacles to its consolidation, as shall be discussed in this section: the situation of refugees, the consolidation of a civil government, the definition of its borders, and its economic dependency on oil. However, before starting the discussion on the issues concerning South Sudan, one needs to provide a more tangible definition to nation-building and state what aspects of such process are more important. According to Dobbins et al. (2005, p. 2), nation-building is a process which encompasses the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to promote a transition to democracy. These authors also state that nation-building is not intended to suggest the suppression or homogenization of distinct cultures within a given society (DOBBINS et al., 2005, p. 2), what is specifically important in the case of South Sudan if one wants to avoid further conflicts. Furthermore, the authors highlight the importance of state-building, the strengthening of institutions of governance, as a major component in nation-building (DOBBINS et al., 2005, p. 2). We acknowledge such importance by addressing the need of South Sudan consolidating a civil government if the country desires to reach peace, for [p]eace is the most essential product of nationbuilding as economic growth and democratization depend on it (DOBBINS et al., 2005, p. xxv). Some aspects of nation-building are therefore essential to the purposes of this study. Francis Fukuyama (2004, apud DOB- BINS et al., 2005, p. xxxvi), addressing United Nations missions of nation-building, has divided such missions in three phases: the stabilization of a war-torn society; the creation of local institutions for governance; and the strengthening of those institutions in order to guarantee economic and social development. So, sustained peace, the correct dealing of refugees return, the consolidation of a civil government, economic growth, and external assistance (DOBBINS et al., 2005) are essential to the nation-building process in South Sudan. At last, it is worthy to say that [n]ation-building can be viewed in terms of its inputs which, broadly speaking, are manpower, money, and time, and its desired outputs which are peace, economic growth and democratization. Needless to say, outputs depend on much more than the inputs. Success in nation-building depends on the wisdom with which such resources are employed and on the susceptibility of the society in question to the changes being fostered. Nevertheless, success is also in some measure dependent on the quantity of international military and police manpower and external economic assistance, and of the time over which these are applied (DOBBINS et al., 2005, p. xxi). 4.1. Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) The returning refugees in South Sudan represent a serious challenge for the government. There are two major issues that should be faced: the land redistribution to returnees and the equitable distribution of development and reconstruction resources (BRANCH; MAMPILLY, 2005, p. 1). During the civil war, by the 1990s, many people fled the region of Equatoria to Uganda, Zaire and Kenya. The SPLA (Sudan People s Liberation Army) did little to provide support to the Equatorian people; they instead moved large Dinka populations into the region of Equatoria, so that they would have better access to relief aid and avoid the war in the North. Nowadays, as these Equatorian refugees return to their homes after the independence of South Sudan, they find many Dinka IDPs living where they used to live. The tension between these two peoples exists, in part, because the Equatorians accuse the SPLA of being an instrument of repression by the Dinka people (BRANCH; MAMPILLY, 2005, p. 5). The basic services provision to the southern population has been done by the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), renamed the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC), which was created to provide services to populations under SPLA control. Since 1999, SRRC has been playing an important role in preparing Southern Sudan to receive the refugees expected to return. Lately, it has been focusing its efforts on humanitarian relief, giving to the Civil Authority of New Sudan (CANS) the responsibility of providing help in areas of education, health, agriculture, communications and economic development (BRANCH; MAMPILLY, 2005, p. 7). As the refugees return, the SRRC is the key body coordinating the activities of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and NGOs. It assists the repatriation and provides incentives to returnees, such as humanitarian relief (food, shelter, medicines), until they are resettled. Therefore, the ability of SRRC 509

510 to provide this assistance will be important to assure that the return of refugees will occur without disturbing the political order in the south (BRANCH; MAMPILLY, 2005, p. 8). The conflict between the Dinka and the Equatorians has produced many deaths and exiled populations, and the SPLM/A (Sudan People s Liberation Movement/Army) has depended upon foreign states and the UNHCR to take care of these people. The mass repatriation of Equatorians represents a political challenge for the SPLM/A, since the returnees and those Equatorians who remained demand rectification of injustices, requiring the government to return Dinka-occupied land to Equatorians and to give them equal access to foreign-provided development and reconstruction resources (BRANCH; MAMPILLY, 2005, p. 10). SPLM (Sudan People s Liberation Movement) officials and NGOs recognize the severity of this issue. There are now two possible scenarios: on the one hand, if the local government succeeds in redistributing land to the returning refugees in a fair manner, it can consolidate its authority. On the other hand, if it fails, this could ruin the SPLA political project in Equatoria and reproduce conditions for South-South conflicts (BRANCH; MAMPILLY, 2005, p. 11). During the long-lasting conflict between northern and southern Sudan, an estimated 550,000 to 600,000 Sudanese fled the country to seek safety in neighboring countries, 418,270 of whom became registered refugees (UNHCR South Sudan, 2011a). Since December 2005, more than 330,000 have returned to their villages of origin, 156,000 of whom came spontaneously (UNHCR South Sudan, 2011b), and between October 2010 and February 2011, more than 190,000 came back from northern Sudan. Nevertheless, there are over 90,000 Sudanese refugees remaining in countries of asylum, mainly Uganda and Kenya (UNHCR South Sudan, 2011a). UNHCR encourages the voluntary return of refugees to their country of origin by providing conditions for reintegration. Over 700,000 people are beneficiaries of UNHCR protection and community based reintegration projects, including returnees, hosting communities and IDPs. The fact that the programs benefit these three categories prevents conflicts based on competition for the limited aid (UNHCR South Sudan, 2011c). Furthermore, South Sudan hosts refugees from neighboring countries. There are more than 25,000 refugees in South Sudan coming from many countries such as Congo, Central African Republic and Ethiopia, and about 19,000 of them live in one of the four refugee settlements in South Sudan. Assistance and basic services are provided by UNHCR (UNHCR South Sudan, 2011d). The situation of IDPs in South Sudan is not less important. The civil war produced about four million IDPs and, by the end of 2008, only about 2.24 million had returned to their homes (UNMIS/RRR, 2009 apud IDMC, 2009). The main causes of internal displacement of people are attacks by the Ugandan Lord s Resistance Army (LRA), inter-communal and inter-tribal conflicts, the war between the government in Khartoum and the SPLA, and the conflict in the Darfur region (IDMC, 2010). The majority of the IDPs are still trying to find a permanent solution for their cases. One of the difficulties is that about 10 per cent of all IDP returns so far are estimated to be failed returns, i.e. return movements which lead to secondary displacement because returnees do not manage to successfully establish themselves in the places of return (IOM, 2008 apud IDMC, 2009). There are three main durable solutions for the IDPs issue: return to their place of origin, local integration and resettlement (IDMC, 2009). The return to the place of origin is a complicated solution due to the lack of infrastructure in the communities. Local integration is defined as the settlement of the IDP in the place of refuge. Sometimes the return to their home is neither practicable nor desirable, because after years of displacement, the IDP might be already integrated in the place of displacement. The third durable solution is resettlement, which consists in resettling the IDP elsewhere. For some IDPs, neither the return to their homes nor local integration is possible for many reasons, such as lack of access to land or livelihood opportunities (IDMC, 2009). Considering that the refugees situation is, in several manners, similar to the IDP s, it is possible to implement these durable solutions in the case of the refugees. The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) has not been offering a genuine choice to the returnees among the durable solutions (IDMA, 2009). Instead, the GoSS has so far stated that the IDPs should come back to their places of origin. It is true that the international actors, including UNHCR, International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UN- MIS) have done much to facilitate the return of IDPs and refugees to their places of origin, but they also have not been very efficient in guaranteeing the provision of a free and informed choice between the three possible solutions. Therefore, both the government and its international partners should consider the change of their policies as a matter of urgency in order to provide support also for local integration and resettlement (IDMC, 2009). 511

512 4.2. The consolidation of a civil government The independence of South Sudan brings new challenges to the SPLM, the current ruling party in the country. Although the SPLM has been the most active participant in the Government of South Sudan during the interim period, Ted Dagne (2011, p. 13) affirms that as the Republic of South Sudan emerges as an independent country, political rivalries may resurface and new groups may challenge the SPLM s leadership. Indeed, despite the SPLM s inclusive and egalitarian discourse of a New Sudan, the Equatorian peoples see the Sudan People s Liberation Army (SPLA) the military wing of the SPLM - as an instrument of domination of the Dinka. These peoples never had much impact within the SPLA and in fact were oppressed by this group, especially after the Regional Self-Government Act for the Southern Provinces of 1972, which granted Southern Sudan greater regional autonomy (BRANCH, MAMPILLY, 2005, p.5). In addition to that, the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) actually contributed to this political marginalization of the Equatorian peoples. It only addressed two political groups: the SPLM and the National Congress Party (NCP), contributing thus to the consolidation of the domination of these two parties in the Sudanese political scenario and to the exclusion of other groups from the government (SCHUMANN, 2010, p.113). The decentralization of the government, according to Branch and Mampilly (2005, p.6), would contribute to the establishment of a civil authority lead by the SPLM. It would also minimize the influence of the military authorities of the SPLA in the decisionmaking process of the civil authority, favoring the political participation and autonomy of marginalized groups and reducing the Dinka dominant influence on the South Sudanese government (BRANCH, MAMPILLY, 2005, p.6). Although the SPLA has emphasized the increase in local representative governments, in reality there is still a great need to demilitarize the civil authority (BRANCH, MAMPILLY, 2005, p.6-7). Another challenge the SPLM has to face in order to construct a democratic government is to promote coordination between the local authorities and the Non-Governmental Organizations for the provision of basic services such as education, health, and humanitarian aid (BRANCH, MAMPILLY, 2005, p.12-13). This coordination capacity is especially relevant given that the South Sudanese dependency on foreign aid and funds will possibly increase after the independence (BRANCH, MAMPILLY, 2005, p.13). Indeed, the support of the Non-Governmental Organizations is of substantial importance if the government of South Sudan wishes to consolidate itself as a civil authority through the provision of basic services. 4.3. The border issue: Abyei, Blue Nile State and South Kordofan The political control over the areas of Abyei, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile State has been a controversial issue in the Sudanese peace process since the CPA was signed in 2005. According to a United Nations Development Program for Sudan (UNDP Sudan) document (2011), these areas are object of dispute between the North and the South due to their natural resources, especially oil reserves. The Northern-Southern borders established in the CPA were based on the 1956 independence boundaries; however, this criterion did not apply to the areas in question. Indeed, two special protocols which later became a part of the CPA were created in 2004 to address the situation in Abyei, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile State (UNDP Sudan, 2011). The independence of South Sudan reinforces the need to reach an agreement on the border demarcation of these areas and on what country each region will join. The Abyei area is the most problematic. Under the Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict, the region was to receive a special administrative status and to be governed by a local Executive Council for an interim period. At the end of this period, Abyei was supposed to have a referendum, at the same time as the South Sudanese plebiscite, to decide which nation to join (UNMIS, 2009, p. 1). Nevertheless, the referendum has not yet taken place, and Abyei s status remains a source of disagreements between Sudan and South Sudan. According to an International Crisis Group (ICG) policy briefing (2008, p.9), one of the main sources of tension is the conflict between the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya. On the one hand, the Dinka have an ethnic and cultural identification to the South, which led them to support the SPLM/A (PETER, 2010, p. 66). The Misseriya, on the other hand, are traditionally allied with the National Congress Party (ICG, 2008, p. 10). The Misseriya are a nomadic pastoralist people, and fear that if Abyei joins the South, they will lose their access to pasture in the region. In that sense, they believe they should be allowed to vote in the Abyei referendum; however, the Government of South Sudan firmly opposes this demand (JACOB-ERNST; NICHOLS, 2011, p.15). Another factor that enhances the dispute for Abyei is the fact that the region is rich in oil fields. Oil constitutes the main source of revenue for both the South Sudanese and the Sudanese governments, but most of the oil reserves are located in the South (ICG, 2008, p.9). 513

514 Given the independence of South Sudan, the NCP wants to guarantee access to the Abyei oil fields (ICG, 2008, p.9), and thus defends the division of the region in two areas, one which would stay with the North, and one which would join the South (DAGNE, 2011, p.6). Dagne (2011, p. 6) highlights that the Government of South Sudan opposes this proposal, and believes that Abyei should join the South, although allowing some NCP participation in the government of the region and stating its willingness to share oil revenues. The intransigence on both sides makes it more difficult for an agreement to be reached, especially after the 2011 South Sudan Referendum, given that the ruling party in Khartoum has accepted the February 2011 referendum results but has hardened its position on Abyei (DAGNE, 2011, p.6). The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States was adopted in 2004 (UNDP Sudan, 2011). In these areas, the main source of conflict is the ethnic and cultural oppression. As said by Peter (2010, p.66) the Nuba and Ingessena, many of them Muslims, never really questioned that they were part of the North. However, the imposition of an Arabization process upon non-arab peoples, including forced islamization, ban of local languages and native systems of administration, landgrabbing and displacement led them to join the SPLM/A in an attempt to create a New Sudan. The main goal was to change the political structure of Sudan as a whole, allowing these marginalized peoples to break free from oppression and participate on the political process (PETER, 2010, p.66-67). Nevertheless, the idea of a New Sudan is now a distant possibility, as stated by Peter (2010, p. 67). The South Sudanese independence calls for a final arrangement on these areas. Nowadays, under the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, the two areas have a relevant degree of autonomy (UNDP Sudan, 2011). Peter (2010, p. 68-69) stresses that, although these states did not receive the right of self-determination through a referendum, they were supposed to have popular consultations a vague and controversial instrument which would orient the parliament s decisions about the legal status of such regions. A bill on popular consultations was approved by the Sudanese parliament in 2009, but the poll has not happened yet (PETER, 2010, p.70). 4.4. Economic dependency on oil and on Sudan s refineries 4.4.1. Sudan s refineries dependency and the oil revenues sharing The oil production is one of the most important sectors of the South Sudanese economy. According to a European Union Institute for Security Studies Report (2009, p. 45), oil represented 90% of the total exports in Sudan over the past six years. Therefore, the independence of South Sudan raises the matter of the division of the wealth derived from oil between Sudan and South Sudan. This matter is especially relevant considering that although most oil reserves are located in South Sudan, accounting for 80% of the total crude outputs in Sudan as a whole before the South s independency, most of the structure for refining and transporting this oil is in Sudanese territory (EUISS, 2009, p.46). Cleophas Lado (2002, p.160; 164) highlights that the Government of Sudan always tried to assure its complete control over oil reserves, in spite of their consequences to the Sudanese population. In fact, after the SPLM/A conducted an attack on a Chevron oilfield in 1984, the Sudanese government established alliances with several groups who opposed the SPLM/A. Although they have proven to be relatively efficient, these alliances had great impact on the population, once the government used them to foster conflicts not only between its allies and the SPLM/A, but also among its own allies (LADO, 2002, p.164). Meant to avoid that any group became a threat, this policy generated more internal conflicts and even an exacerbation of ethnic disputes between the Dinka and the Nuer (LADO, 2002, p.166). Furthermore, the practice of clearing the population out of oil-rich areas through violence including human rights violations under the blind eye of oil companies created an enormous contingent of displaced people (LADO, 2002, p.167-168). In that sense, the loss of the Southern oil reserves represented a hard blow on Sudan. Under the 2005 CPA, the revenues arising from oil exports were to be equally split temporarily between the two parts. Nevertheless, the South Sudanese independence creates the need for a new agreement on this matter (HARNEIT-SIEVERS, 2010, p. 100). There are, however, considerable obstacles to be overcome. The most relevant one is the distrust between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan, given the lack of transparency that dominated the CPA period (EUISS, 2009, p.49). As Harneit-Sievers (2010, p.99) points out, [i]n practice, the capacity to monitor production figures lies solely with Khartoum, leading to suspicions that the South does not receive its fair share. Another important issue is the Southern elite s belief that sharing the oil revenues might threaten the future of South Sudan as an independent state, once the oil exports are the main source of government income (EUISS, 2009, p.49). The need for a new agreement is undeniable, given both countries heavy dependency on oil revenues and South Sudan s dependency on Sudanese pipelines and ports for exportation, at least in the short-term. In addition to that, the arrangement is important 515

516 to avoid new armed confrontation over the oil reserves (HARNEIT- SIEVERS, 2010, p. 99); but it should also not repeat the lack of transparency and accountability that exists in current arrangements (EUISS, 2009, p.50). 4.4.2. Economic dependency on oil The reduction of the South Sudanese dependency on oil is one of the goals of South Sudan s government, as stated in the 2009 Government of South Sudan Growth Strategy (GOSS). One of the main reasons for this effort is that oil is a finite resource, which makes dependency on it rather problematic. Indeed, optimistic predictions suggest that South Sudan can only rely on strong oil revenues for the next 20 years (ISS, 2009, p.47). In addition to that, there is the volatility of the oil revenues, which suffer significant variation on monthly basis and are expected to decline rapidly over the next decade (GOSS, 2009, p.10). The primary focus of this diversification effort is on agriculture. As the sector employs approximately 80% of the population (HARVEIT- SIEVERS, 2010, p. 100), it is considered by the South Sudanese government as the best starting point for a sustainable economic growth (GOSS, 2009, p.10). It is also believed to be the most effective way of reducing poverty, once growth in agricultural production should also incentive production in related sectors (GOSS, 2009, p.11). South Sudan s diversity of climate, large amounts of fertile land and several different ways of living favor the activities encompassed by the term agriculture which includes keeping of livestock, hunting, cultivation of the land and fishing (GOSS, 2009, p.11). Most families, however, only produce enough for their own consumption, what is called subsistence agriculture (GOSS, 2009, p.11). According to the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) (2009, p. 11-12), the lack of access to markets where these families can commercialize their surplus is the major obstacle to the expansion of agricultural production. This difficulty is generated by factors such as insecurity, the high cost of transportation due to the lack of infrastructure viable roads, for example and the unpredictable taxation. The GoSS (2009, p. 11-12; 15) is committed to addressing these three factors through coordinated action of several Ministries and governmental agencies, creating thus an enabling environment that favors the expansion of individual agricultural production. 4.5. Structural deficiencies The lack of infrastructure is very problematic to the GoSS. Transportation is a major problem due to the lack of roads (there are about 7000km of roads, but only 60km are paved). Moreover, much of the road network is in unsafe conditions, as well as much of the rail system (CIA, 2011). There is only one major airport, which is located in Juba, and it has a very limited capacity (DAGNE, 2011, p. 14). Furthermore, only two of the 24 airports have paved runways (CIA, 2011). The telephone system is limited to major towns and dependent on cell phone services from Uganda and Khartoum (DAGNE, 2011, p. 14). Electricity is produced mostly by costly diesel generators (CIA, 2011), and many South Sudanese do not have access to electric power: approximately 96% of the population uses firewood or charcoal as the primary fuel for cooking, while 50% of the population uses firewood or grass as a primary source for light (DAGNE, 2011, p. 14). Running water is also scarce, so that around 38% of the population has to walk for more than 30 minutes to collect drinking water (DAGNE, 2011, p. 14). Therefore, the poor infrastructure of South Sudan is receiving attention from international actors. Since 2004, the World Food Program (WFP) has worked to repair thousands of kilometers of roads (WFP, 2011), while the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has implemented the Sudan Infrastructure Services Project (SISP), which works in collaboration with the GoSS to provide critical public infrastructure in the sectors of energy (power generation and distribution), transport (construction and rehabilitation of primary and secondary roads, bridges, airstrips, railways and water transportation networks) and water and sanitation (water treatment and distribution services) (USAID, 2011a). Furthermore, the SISP aims to increase the capacity of government agencies and private enterprises in the road sector to plan and implement effective transportation infrastructure development activities (USAID, 2011b). 5. International action As stated before, international military and police manpower and external economic assistance are key factors in a well succeeded nation-building process (DOBBINS, 2005, p. xxi). Considering the major problems South Sudan has to overcome and its yet unstable government and huge structural deficiencies, international action is not simply helpful to the construction of a stable developing South Sudan, it is essential. In this section, thus, we seek to understand what role international actors have had and may still have in the world s newest country. 517

518 5.1. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) The first International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) in Southern Sudan were established after the end of the first civil war, in 1972. They had a prominent welfare role and donors of international aid started to provide funds to them and to UN agencies rather than providing directly to the Government of Sudan (GoS) (MORKEL, 2009, p. 69). In 1989 the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was created in response to the humanitarian crisis in the country. After conversations between the GoS, the SPLM/A and the UN, this UNICEF-led consortium was founded to coordinate the humanitarian work in Sudan (MORKEL, 2009, p. 2), leading the work of many IN- GOs (RIEHL, 2001, p.4). Later in 2005, it was superseded by the Integrated Sudanese Country Program (UNITED NATIONS, 2008 apud MORKEL, 2009, p. 2). Initially, the humanitarian programs of the INGOs in Sudan were traditional humanitarian operations, focusing on the delivery of emergency aid and adhered to the International Committee of the Red Cross (IRCR) humanitarian principles. However, in 1994 the OLS adopted the relief-to-development program, which would prevent dependency on external relief (MORKEL, 2009, p. 67). This program is based on the idea that integrating development and rehabilitation activities into the relief will ameliorate the roots of violence and contribute to the peace-building process (MORKEL, 2009, p. iii). Many INGOs operate inside southern Sudan, such as Oxfam, CARE, the Red Cross, World Vision, Save the Children Foundation and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF). MSF programs do not use to focus on development, but it unintentionally contributes to the development of the health sector (MORKEL, 2009, p. 68). In March 2000, the SPLM/A demanded that all OLS partner INGOs that were operating in SPLM/A controlled areas signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), stipulating conditions for the INGOs to operate. The INGOs complained and many of them refused to sign it, so they left the country. Nonetheless, after renegotiating the MoU the NGOs returned to Southern Sudan (MORKEL, 2009, p. 86-87). In fact, the INGOs have a vital role in providing aid in Southern Sudan. The vast majority of the health, education, infrastructure, and, in places, nutritional needs of the South Sudanese have for many years been fulfilled by foreign NGOs or foreign funding (BRANCH; MAMPILLY, 2005, p. 12). However, this does not prevent them from receiving several critiques. The critiques that have been made on foreign-funded and NGO-implemented aid can be divided into two categories. The first category focuses on the problems that an unmediated relation between NGOs and local populations can cause. It makes the local administration incapable of doing alone the basic tasks done by NGOs and the NGOs may distribute aid according to their own institutional imperatives (BRANCH; MAMPILLY, 2005, p. 13). The second category focuses on situations where armed groups are the intermediaries between foreign resources and the local population, so that they can mediate that relationship to their own advantage. This category fits the present situation better than the first category, which fit better South Sudan s situation in the 1990s. The SPLA has improved its control over foreign NGOs through the MoU so that, in opposition to the situation in the 1990s, now the NGOs are subordinated to local politics (BRANCH; MAMPILLY, 2005, p. 13-14). SPLM/A faces a dilemma: on the one hand, if it does not want to lose support due to popular dissatisfaction with poverty and lack of services, it should recognize that a degree of foreign aid will be necessary. On the other hand, a long-term dependence upon foreign aid will undermine the social and political coherence of the South (BRANCH; MAMPILLY, 2005, p. 14). Nevertheless, sharing some power with NGOs could result in an enhancement of political legitimacy, rather than in a loss of political authority (RIEHL, 2001, p. 16). Thus, the SPLM/A has created NGO programs that can be transferred to the local administration and it has also ensured that the distribution of aid go through its own structures (BRANCH; MAMPILLY, 2005, p. 14). By doing so, it can ensure that it will neither fail at providing basic services to the population nor weaken the political coherence of the South. 5.2. Neighboring countries During the Second Civil War, SPLM had strong relations with many African countries and received military, political and financial help from some of them. In East Africa, SPLM has strong relations with Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. SPLM/A has received political and military assistance from Ethiopia and, in the 1990s, significant military assistance from Eritrea. Egypt has also had strong ties with SPLM/A during the last two decades, although the government of Hosni Mubarak did not support the South s right of self-determination until the Egyptian authorities realized that independence was inevitable (DAGNE, 2011, p. 7). Certainly, the support from these countries was of great importance to the success of SPLM/A. 519

520 Concerned about the north-south conflict in Sudan, the Inter- Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), a regional organization for cooperation and development, put the issue in its agenda. The role of the countries in the region regarding the conflict is based on two premises: that the conflict affects not only Sudan, but also the surrounding region and that the conflict only can be ended if its root causes are addressed (DAGNE, 2011, p. 15). In fact, a regional approach to security can work and create the conditions to facilitate the resolution of internal conflicts (SCHUMANN, 2010, p. 113). However, while IGAD is pursuing proactive diplomacy, the tension and policy divergence among its state members can limit its ability to influence the governments of the region, so that it may need additional support (EUISS, 2010, p. 55). Since the implementation of the CPA, the influence of Sudan s neighbors on its internal affairs has diminished. The NCP has been resistant to submitting to pressures from Ethiopia, Kenya or Uganda, and their policy influences have been marginalized. Therefore, there are strong pro-splm sentiments within policy circles in these countries (EUISS, 2010, p. 53). On 27 June 2011, a peacekeeping force was established in Abyei by the Resolution 1990 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UN- ISFA), composed of soldiers of the Ethiopian Army, should ensure that Abyei Area will be demilitarized from any forces other than UNISFA and the Abyei Police Service, help to keep the order in the area, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, among other attributions (UNSC, 2011). The creation of a new state poses several challenges to the African multilateral organizations, such as the African Union (AU) and the IGAD. It is urgent that they are addressed (EUISS, 2010, p. 54), because the independence of South Sudan can strengthen the credibility of claims for secession in the region. In addition to that, Sudan may be more supportive of recognizing a new Islamic state in the region, which could become a member of the Arab League (MARCHAL, 2010, p. 93). practice had significant impact on the effectiveness of International Organizations actions (SCHUMANN, 2010, p.105-106). In this sense, it is extremely important that the international community addresses the issue of supporting the newborn South Sudanese State with more responsibility and commitment, in order to enable effective coordinated actions by the International Organizations (SCHUMANN, 2010, p.102). The African Union (AU) plays a central role in the post-referendum situation of South Sudan. As stated in the International Crisis Group (ICG) Report (2010, p.19), the recognition of the South Sudan as an independent state by the AU worked as a demonstration of the African opinion and helped define other countries responses to the independence. From now on, the African Union must play an important role in securing the legitimacy of South Sudan and guaranteeing that the independence does not affect the regional stability in the Horn of Africa, especially if it is capable of promoting coordinated actions with the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) (ICG, 2010, p.21). The United Nations established in July 8, 2011 the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan UNMISS. The main goals of the UNMISS shall be to help establish the necessary conditions for social and economic development in South Sudan; to strengthen the democratic governing capacities of the South Sudanese Government; and to consolidate security in the area (UN News Centre, 2011). Several other UN Agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UN Children s Fund (UNICEF), are already involved in the long-term sustainable development efforts in South Sudan (UN News Centre, 2011). Other International Organizations might also take part in the support efforts in South Sudan. The European Union, for example, has declared its will to contribute financially and politically to AU s initiatives in the country (ISS, 2009, p.56). On the other hand, the Red Cross head of operations for the Horn of Africa, Daniel Duvillard, highlights that the GoSS still needs to create a framework within which the international organizations can operate (ICRC, 2011). 521 5.3. International organizations International Organizations efforts in Sudan during the CPA period were marked by what Peter Schumann called organizational hypocrisy (2010, p.102), meaning that international actors respond[ed] to conflicting interests and pressures through contradictory actions and statements (SCHUMANN, 2010, p.102), oriented by objectives external to the Sudanese peace process. Such 6. Conclusion Ahead South Sudan s path stand many challenges, and its chances of consolidating itself as a stable developing country lie in the country s abilities to act alongside with internal and external actors. In the course of this article, we examined the nature of South Sudan s particularities and what made it so different from Sudan. We later

522 discussed what were the most urgent obstacles to be addressed concerning the country s political, social and economic structure. As seen, South Sudan s struggle for autonomy goes back decades ago and have at its roots the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium administration of Sudan, which, by governing the north and the south as distinct entities, paved the way to the maintenance and enhancement of each region s characters. The north was the land of the Arabic-speaking Muslims who administrated the country and tried to unify Sudan under Islam and Arabic culture; it was also the region with greater infrastructure and economic development. The animist black African south was left underdeveloped, and when Sudan s independence came, a civil war stroke the country as the southerners demanded autonomy. These historical factors led to the failure of Khartoum s Arabization and Islamization policies to create a unified Arab-Islamic Sudanese identity (ADAR, 2001). Such policies only served to enhance the south s consciousness as a distinct entity, and secession appeared as the only solution to Sudan s long-lasting conflicts. However, the question on whether a South Sudanese identity existed remained. By analyzing some aspects of South Sudan s independence process, we have been able to identify aspects which brought the South Sudanese together, and some that could tear them apart. The construction of a national identity which unites them while acknowledging their differences is thus necessary to maintaining peace in the new-born country. Other challenges follow. South Sudan has to deal with refugees returning to their lands and finding them occupied by new inhabitants. The consolidation of a civil government is essential to ensure peace. Remaining disputes over contested territories have to be addressed. At last, the country has yet to find ways of overcoming structural deficiencies and oil dependency. 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