How to launch and defend against a DDoS



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Transcription:

How to launch and defend against a DDoS John Graham-Cumming October 9, 2013 The simplest way to a safer, faster and smarter website

DDoSing web sites is... easy Motivated groups of non-technical individuals Followers of Anonymous etc. Simple tools like LOIC People with money to spend Botnets Online booter services Anyone with a grudge 2

What gets attacked TCP 92% against port 80 SYN flooding UDP 97% against DNS Reflection/amplification attacks Other significant attack ports TCP port 53 (DNS) UDP port 514 (syslog) 3

And when... 4

Three things make DDoS easy Fire and forget protocols Anything based on UDP ICMP No source IP authentication Any machine can send a packet from any machine Internet Amplifiers Authoritative DNS servers that don t rate limit Open DNS recursors Open SNMP devices 5

DDoS Situation is Worsening Size and Frequency Growing In 2012 the largest DDoS attack we saw was 65 Gbps In 2013 it was 309 Gbps (almost 5x size increase) DNS-based DDoS attacks grew in frequency by 200% in 2012 6

March 24, 2013 309 Gbps sustained for 28 minutes 30,956 open DNS resolvers Each outputting 10 Mbps 3 networks that allowed spoofing 7

March 25, 2013 287 Gbps sustained for 72 minutes 32,154 open DNS resolvers Each outputting 9 Mbps 3 networks that allowed spoofing 8

Amplification Attacks Controlling Machine 10Mbps 1x Compromised Trigger Machine Compromised Trigger Machine Compromised Trigger Machine 10x 1Gbps 10000x 1Gbps Victim 9

DNS and SNMP Amplification Small request to DNS or SNMP server with spoofed source IP address DNS or SNMP server responds with large packet to source : the victim DNS multiplier is 8x (Req: 64B; Resp: 512B) EDNS multiplier is 53x (Req: 64B; Resp: 3,364B) SNMP multiplier is 650x (Req: 100B; Resp: 65kB) 10

HOWTO: 1 Tbps DDoS Get a list of 10,000 open DNS recursors Each machine will produce 1 Tbps / 10,000 = 100 Mbps Use more machines if that s too high DNS amplification factor is 8x so need 1 Tbps / 8 = 125 Gbps trigger traffic So 100 compromised servers with 1Gbps connections will do If DNS recursors support EDNS then only need 1 Tbps / 50 = 20 Gbps trigger traffic 11

SNMP etc. We have seen a 25 Gbps DDoS attack using SNMP amplification Came from Comcast Broadband Modems NTP? 12

28 Million Open Resolvers 13

24.6% of networks allow spoofing 14

Spamhaus DDoS Was Easy 1 attacker s laptop controlling 10 compromised servers on 3 networks that allowed spoofing of 9Gbps DNS requests to 0.1% of open resolvers resulted in 300Gbps+ of DDoS attack traffic. 15

Solving This Problem Close Open DNS Recursors Please do this! Stop IP Spoofing Implement BCP38 and BCP84 16

IP Spoofing Used to ICMP attacks, TCP SYN floods and amplification attacks Vast majority of attacks on CloudFlare are spoofed attacks Victim IP DNS Server IP 64 byte request 512 byte reply Victim IP DNS Server IP Dealing with IP spoofing stops amplification, hurts botnets 17

Mars Attacks! 23% from Martian addresses 3.45% from China Telecom 2.14% from China Unicom 1.74% from Comcast 1.45% from Dreamhost 1.36% from WEBNX Larger point: spoofed packets come from everywhere 18

Ingress Filtering: BCP38 and BCP84 BCP38 is RFC2827 Been around since 2000 http://www.bcp38.info/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ingress_filtering BCP84 is RFC3704 Addresses problems with multi-homed networks 19

Why isn t BCP38 implemented widely? Simple: economic incentives are against it IP-spoofing based DDoS attacks are an externality : like a polluting factory IP-spoofing based DDoS attacks are not launched by the networks themselves: a factory that only pollutes on someone else s command Networks have a negative incentive to implement because of impact on their customers networks Externalities get fixed by regulation Better to fix this without government intervention Governments will intervene when they are threatened (and they are!) 20

We ve been here before SMTP Open Relays Let s not get to the point that BL are created Or that governments intervene 21

DDoS Defense 22

Start with a global network 23

Use Anycast 24

Anycast Attack Dilution 310 Gbps / 23 PoPs = 14 Gbps per PoP 25

Hide Your Origin If you use a DDoS service make sure your origin IP is hidden Change it when signing up Make sure no DNS records (e.g. MX) leak the IP and make sure that IP only accepts packets from the service 26

Separate Protocols By IP For example, have separate IPs for HTTP and DNS Filter by IP and protocol No UDP packets should be able to hit your HTTP server No HTTP packets should be able to hit your SMTP server 27

Protect your infrastructure Separate IPs for infrastructure Internal switches, routers Filters those IPs at the edge No external access to internal infrastructure Otherwise attackers will attack your infrastructure 28

Work closely with your upstream Get to know who to call when trouble strikes Enable them to perform filtering in their infrastructure Share you IP/Protocol architecture with them 29