O L A. Minnesota State Colleges and Universities Information Technology Security Follow-Up OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR STATE OF MINNESOTA



Similar documents
O L A. Minnesota State Colleges and Universities Financial Reporting Information Technology Controls

O L A. Department of Employee Relations Department of Finance SEMA4 Information Technology Audit OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR STATE OF MINNESOTA

O L A. Workers Compensation Court of Appeals July 1, 1998, through June 30, 2003 OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR STATE OF MINNESOTA

O L A. Minnesota State Colleges and Universities Wireless Network Security Audit OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR STATE OF MINNESOTA

O L A. Teachers Retirement Association Information Technology Security Controls OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR STATE OF MINNESOTA

How To Audit The Minnesota Department Of Agriculture Network Security Controls Audit

Department of Education. Network Security Controls. Information Technology Audit

Winona State University Period from July 1, 1996, through December 31, 1999

Sentencing Guidelines Commission. Financial Audit For the Period July 1, 1995, through June 30, Public Release Date: May 6, 1999 No.

Vulnerability Management. Information Technology Audit. For the Period July 2010 to July 2011

Oversight of Information Technology Projects. Information Technology Audit

Department of Human Services. Oversight of MNsure Eligibility Determinations for Public Health Care Programs. Internal Controls and Compliance Audit

Financial Audit Division Office of the Legislative Auditor State of Minnesota

Federal Compliance Audit Year Ended June 30, 2008

Department of Employment and Economic Development. Internal Controls and Compliance Audit. July 2011 through May 2015

Healthcare Provider Payment Controls. Information Technology Audit. July 1, 2009, through April 30, 2010

Teachers Retirement Association. Financial Statement Audit. Year Ended June 30, 2009

Office of the Auditor General Performance Audit Report. Statewide Oracle Database Controls Department of Technology, Management, and Budget

O L A. E-Verify Vendor Data Security. Special Review OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR STATE OF MINNESOTA. April 21, 2010 Report 10-15

Major IT Projects: Continue Expanding Oversight and Strengthen Accountability

Accounts Receivable and Debt Collection Processes. Internal Controls and Compliance Audit

MICHIGAN AUDIT REPORT OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL. Doug A. Ringler, C.P.A., C.I.A. AUDITOR GENERAL ENTERPRISE DATA WAREHOUSE

MICHIGAN AUDIT REPORT OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL THOMAS H. MCTAVISH, C.P.A. AUDITOR GENERAL

Office of the Auditor General Performance Audit Report. Statewide UNIX Security Controls Department of Technology, Management, and Budget

Internal Controls and Compliance Audit. July 2011 through June 2013

MINNESOTA STATE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES BOARD OF TRUSTEES. Agenda Item Summary Sheet

STATE OF ARIZONA OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL. April 1, 2008

MICHIGAN AUDIT REPORT OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL THOMAS H. MCTAVISH, C.P.A. AUDITOR GENERAL

Judiciary Judicial Information Systems

MICHIGAN AUDIT REPORT OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL THOMAS H. MCTAVISH, C.P.A. AUDITOR GENERAL

Department of Public Utilities Customer Information System (BANNER)

University of Arizona

Minnesota State Colleges and Universities. Internal Control and Compliance Audit Fiscal Years 2005, 2006, and 2007

CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK EMPLOYEE ACCESS TO THE STUDENT INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AT SELECTED CAMPUSES. Report 2007-S-23

July 6, Mr. Michael L. Joseph Chairman of the Board Roswell Park Cancer Institute Elm & Carlton Streets Buffalo, NY 14263

FOLLOW-UP REPORT Change Management Practices

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

AUDIT REPORT PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH AUTOMATED MEDICAID PROCESSING SYSTEM (CHAMPS) CLAIMS EDITS

MICHIGAN AUDIT REPORT PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE QUALIFIED VOTER FILE AND DIGITAL DRIVER'S LICENSE SYSTEMS

Department of Transportation Office of Transportation Technology Services

Specific observations and recommendations that were discussed with campus management are presented in detail below.

Financial Management Information System Centralized Operations

Grant Management: Internal Control and Compliance Audit. Office of Internal Auditing March 10, 2015

MICHIGAN AUDIT REPORT OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL THOMAS H. MCTAVISH, C.P.A. AUDITOR GENERAL

University System of Maryland University of Maryland, College Park Division of Information Technology

MICHIGAN AUDIT REPORT OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL. Doug A. Ringler, CPA, CIA AUDITOR GENERAL DATA SECURITY USING MOBILE DEVICES PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF

State Web Server Security Audit

MICHIGAN AUDIT REPORT OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL THOMAS H. MCTAVISH, C.P.A. AUDITOR GENERAL

North Carolina's Information Technology Consolidation Audit

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

December 2013 Report No

Ms. Debbie Davenport Auditor General Office of the Auditor General 2910 North 44 th Street, Suite 410 Phoenix, Arizona Dear Ms.

Department of Transportation Financial Management Information System Centralized Operations

How To Audit The Mint'S Information Technology

Information Technology Operational Audit DEPARTMENT OF STATE. Florida Voter Registration System (FVRS) Report No July 2015

Legislative Audit Division State of Montana

HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT NETWORK (HRMN) SELF-SERVICE

INFORMATION SECURITY Humboldt State University

U.S. Department of Energy Office of Inspector General Office of Audits and Inspections

Comptroller of Maryland Information Technology Division Annapolis Data Center Operations

October 2008 Report No

Judiciary Judicial Information Systems

Utica College. Information Security Plan

Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services Information Technology and Communications Division

Legislative Audit Division State of Montana. Criminal Justice Information Network (CJIN)

OVERVIEW. In all, this report makes recommendations in 14 areas, such as. Page iii

Office of the Auditor General Performance Audit Report. Clarety Office of Retirement Services Department of Technology, Management, and Budget

Oregon Employment Department: Computer Programs for Unemployment Tax Returns and Claims Need Attention

Indiana University of Pennsylvania Information Assurance Guidelines. Approved by the Technology Utilities Council 27-SEP-2002

OFFICE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION COLLECTION AGENCY REGISTRATIONS MORTGAGE-RELATED AND CONSUMER COLLECTION AGENCY COMPLAINTS PRIOR AUDIT FOLLOW-UP

FINAL May Guideline on Security Systems for Safeguarding Customer Information

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Date: June 30, Sabina Sitaru, Chief Innovation Officer, Metro Hartford Innovation Services

REPORT NO OCTOBER 2013 SEMINOLE STATE COLLEGE OF FLORIDA. Operational Audit

GAO INFORMATION SECURITY. Weak Controls Place Interior s Financial and Other Data at Risk. Report to the Secretary of the Interior

Fiscal Year Analysis of the College Medical Billing Process

Software Licenses Managing the Asset and Related Risks

Office of the Inspector General United States Office of Personnel Management. Statement of Michael R. Esser Assistant Inspector General for Audits

REPORT NO DECEMBER 2012 UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA. Operational Audit

University System of Maryland University of Baltimore

Office of Information Technology E-Government Services

Audit Report. Management and Security of Office of Budget and Program Analysis Information Technology Resources. U.S. Department of Agriculture

1 Published on September 14, 2015, and January 6, 2016, respectively.

July 2012 Report No An Audit Report on The ReHabWorks System at the Department of Assistive and Rehabilitative Services

INFORMATION SECURITY California Maritime Academy

May 2007 Report No

Audit Report. Comptroller of the Treasury Central Payroll Bureau. May 2009

NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services Information Technology and Communications Division

Submitted by: Christopher Mead, Director, Department of Information Technology

IT General Controls Domain COBIT Domain Control Objective Control Activity Test Plan Test of Controls Results

GAO INFORMATION SECURITY. Fundamental Weaknesses Place EPA Data and Operations at Risk. Testimony

MINNESOTA STATE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES BOARD OF TRUSTEES. Agenda Item Summary Sheet

Policy on the Security of Informational Assets

STATE OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL STATEWIDE PAYROLL SYSTEM AUDIT REPORT

Office of Inspector General

MnSCU Network Security

PROJECT SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES

Comptroller of Maryland Compliance Division

U.S. Department of Energy Office of Inspector General Office of Audits & Inspections

Transcription:

O L A OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR STATE OF MINNESOTA Financial Audit Division Report Minnesota State Colleges and Universities SEPTEMBER 17, 2004 04-39

Financial Audit Division The Office of the Legislative Auditor (OLA) is a professional, nonpartisan office in the legislative branch of Minnesota state government. Its principal responsibility is to audit and evaluate the agencies and programs of state government (the State Auditor audits local governments). OLA s Financial Audit Division annually audits the state s financial statements and, on a rotating schedule, audits agencies in the executive and judicial branches of state government, three metropolitan agencies, and several semi-state organizations. The division also investigates allegations that state resources have been used inappropriately. The division has a staff of approximately forty auditors, most of whom are CPAs. The division conducts audits in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Comptroller General of the United States. Consistent with OLA s mission, the Financial Audit Division works to: Promote Accountability, Strengthen Legislative Oversight, and Support Good Financial Management. Through its Program Evaluation Division, OLA conducts several evaluations each year. OLA is under the direction of the Legislative Auditor, who is appointed for a six-year term by the Legislative Audit Commission (LAC). The LAC is a bipartisan commission of representatives and senators. It annually selects topics for the Program Evaluation Division, but is generally not involved in scheduling financial audits. All findings, conclusions, and recommendations in reports issued by the Office of the Legislative Auditor are solely the responsibility of the office and may not reflect the views of the LAC, its individual members, or other members of the Minnesota Legislature. This document can be made available in alternative formats, such as large print, Braille, or audio tape, by calling 651-296-1235 (voice), or the Minnesota Relay Service at 651-297-5353 or 1-800-627-3529. All OLA reports are available at our Web Site: http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us If you have comments about our work, or you want to suggest an audit, investigation, or evaluation, please contact us at 651-296-4708 or by e-mail at auditor@state.mn.us

O L A OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR State of Minnesota James Nobles, Legislative Auditor Representative Tim Wilkin, Chair Legislative Audit Commission Members of the Legislative Audit Commission Dr. James McCormick, Chancellor Minnesota State Colleges and Universities Members of the Minnesota State Colleges and Universities Board of Trustees We have conducted a follow-up audit of security concerns raised in prior Minnesota State Colleges and Universities (MnSCU) information technology audits. Our audit scope was limited to an assessment of the prior security findings. The Report Summary highlights our overall conclusions. We decided to assess the status of prior security concerns because computer security plays a crucial role in protecting MnSCU s business systems and data. In addition, MnSCU s systems are in a constant state of change due to upgrading and refinement. We conducted our audit in accordance with Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. Those standards require that we obtain an understanding of management controls relevant to the audit objectives. We obtained our evaluation criteria from several sources, including the Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT) and publications provided by hardware and software manufacturers whose products are used by MnSCU. To meet the audit objectives, we interviewed the MnSCU information technology professionals who are responsible for security controls. In addition, we analyzed security data from the operating system and database management system underlying MnSCU s business systems. Information technology audits frequently include a review of sensitive security data that is legally classified as nonpublic under the Minnesota Data Practices Act. In some cases, to protect state resources and comply with the Minnesota Data Practices Act, we must withhold securityrelated details from our publicly released report. When these situations occur, we communicate all pertinent details to agency leaders in a separate, confidential document. For this audit, we issued a separate, confidential document to the management of the Minnesota State Universities and Colleges. /s/ James R. Nobles James R. Nobles Legislative Auditor /s/ Claudia J. Gudvangen Claudia J. Gudvangen, CPA Deputy Legislative Auditor End of Fieldwork: July 30, 2004 Report Signed On: September 14, 2004 Room 140, 658 Cedar Street, St. Paul, Minnesota 55155-1603 Tel: 651/296-4708 Fax: 651/296-4712 E-mail: auditor@state.mn.us TDD Relay: 651/297-5353 Website: www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us

Table of Contents Page Report Summary 1 Chapter 1. Introduction 3 Chapter 2. Security Follow-up 5 Agency Response 9 Audit Participation The following members of the Office of the Legislative Auditor prepared this report: Claudia Gudvangen, CPA Brad White, CPA, CISA Eric Wion, CPA, CISA Neal Dawson, CPA, CISA Deputy Legislative Auditor Audit Manager Auditor-in-Charge Information Technology Auditor Exit Conference We discussed the results of the audit with the following representatives of the Minnesota State Colleges and Universities at an exit conference on September 7, 2004: Laura King Ken Niemi Joanne Chabot John Asmussen Beth Buse Vice Chancellor and Chief Financial Officer Vice Chancellor and Chief Information Officer Deputy Chief Information Officer Executive Director Internal Auditing Deputy Director Internal Auditing

Report Summary Key Conclusion: MnSCU has taken steps to resolve many of the security weaknesses reported in prior audits; however, it has not developed a comprehensive security program to effectively manage security throughout the organization. Furthermore, we question whether MnSCU can develop a successful security program given the limited resources currently devoted to security. Finding: MnSCU has not resolved some outstanding security weaknesses, nor has it developed a comprehensive security program. (Finding 1, page 7) Audit Scope: Audit Period: As of July 2004 Selected Audit Areas: Prior audit findings on computer security Background: We have performed several information technology audits at MnSCU since 1996. These audits typically focused on selected general controls that help secure its Integrated Statewide Records System (ISRS). These audits found similar and often serious security concerns. The purpose of this information technology audit was to assess and report the status of security weaknesses described in prior audit reports. We limited our scope to those weaknesses that impacted ISRS. 1

This page intentionally left blank. 2

Chapter 1. Introduction The purpose of this information technology audit was to assess and report the status of selected security-related weaknesses described in prior audit reports. We have performed several information technology audits at MnSCU since 1996. These audits typically focused on general controls. General controls are not unique to specific computerized business systems; rather, they apply to all business systems that operate in a particular computing environment. Examples of general controls include computer security policies, procedures, and standards. Prior to 2004, our audits focused on general controls that help secure MnSCU s primary business system, the Integrated Statewide Records System (ISRS). Our audits found similar and often serious security weaknesses. For the first time in 2004, we performed audits of three other computer applications. They included MnSCU s Data Warehouse, the Degree Audit Reporting System (DARS), and the Course Applicability System (CAS). These audits also encountered similar security concerns. MnSCU is an extremely complex organization from both a business and technological perspective. One thing that leads to its complexity is the size and diversity of the organization. It consists of the Office of the Chancellor, 5 community colleges, 8 technical colleges, 12 combined community and technical colleges, and 7 state universities. These colleges and universities are located on 53 campuses throughout the state, annually serving over 165,000 students in credit courses and 240,000 students in noncredit courses. MnSCU employs approximately 16,000 people (full year equivalent) and has an operating budget that exceeds $1.6 billion. Technologically, MnSCU is also extremely large and diverse. Staff indicated that the organization likely has over 50,000 computers. While individual colleges are responsible for managing many of those computers, the Office of the Chancellor manages the critical systemwide business systems. For example, it developed ISRS to help institutions manage many of its business activities. ISRS consists of over 20 modules, including accounting, human resources, purchasing, student registration, accounts receivable, and financial aid. The Office of the Chancellor manages an ISRS database for each institution. Collectively, these databases store about 700 million rows of data. The Office of the Chancellor also manages several other mission critical business systems, including a data warehouse, an instructional management system, and others. To support its systems, the Office of the Chancellor manages a large computer network consisting of over 100 servers, 50 firewalls, 70 routers, and many other devices. Security over many of these computer systems is vital in ensuring: Systems are available for use by staff and students. Information maintained in these systems is both complete and accurate. Confidential data is protected from unauthorized disclosure. 3

This page intentionally left blank. 4

Chapter 2. Security Follow-up Chapter Conclusions MnSCU has taken steps to resolve many of the security weaknesses we reported during prior audits. Although progress has been made, continued work is necessary to fully resolve several of the weaknesses. Of most significance is that MnSCU has not developed a comprehensive security program to effectively manage security risks throughout the organization. Furthermore, we question whether MnSCU can develop a successful security program given the resources currently devoted to security. Audit Objective We designed our work to evaluate and report the status of selected security- related audit findings cited in prior reports issued by the Office of the Legislative Auditor. Background Every organization needs strong security controls to protect its critical computer systems and business data; however, even with Figure 2-1 The Ongoing Security Management Lifecycle Monitor Compliance With Policies Source: Auditor prepared. Assess Business Risks Deploy Tools Define Policies & Procedures strong controls, it is impossible to be completely secure. This fact makes designing and implementing a security infrastructure an ongoing exercise in risk management. As illustrated in Figure 2-1, organizations typically begin this process by performing a detailed risk analysis to identify potential vulnerabilities. The results of this analysis help organizations design policies and procedures to reduce their exposures to a level that executive management is willing to accept. Security professionals then deploy tools, such as access control software, to enforce the policies and procedures that were sanctioned by management. Information provided by these tools helps organizations 5

monitor compliance with their policies and procedures and fine-tune subsequent risk assessments in the ongoing security management lifecycle. These are fundamental activities that allow an organization to effectively manage its information security risks, rather than react to individual problems in an ad hoc manner after a violation has been detected or an audit finding has been reported. Status of Prior Audit Findings Table 2-1 Assessment of Prior Security-Related Findings Finding Statement MnSCU has not implemented a fully effective security infrastructure. MnSCU has not implemented formal standards and procedures for granting access to its information technology professionals and software. Many information technology professionals have unnecessary system privileges, and an excessive number are authorized to enter security transactions. Audit Report Number Status Assessment Comment 00-53 Partially Although MnSCU has made Resolved improvements to address security issues, it has struggled to develop a comprehensive security program. We do not believe it can develop a comprehensive program given the limited resources currently devoted to security matters. 03-33 Resolved MnSCU placed people into groups or roles based upon job duties. Based on these roles, it defined the levels of access appropriate for each group and implemented the desired access. MnSCU also implemented a process to identify any users that had access that deviated from the defined role. 03-33 Substantially Resolved MnSCU has made significant improvements in this area; however, some people continue to have unnecessary system privileges and too many are authorized to enter security transactions. Some computer programs, including SCUPPS programs, are not properly or consistently secured. Several users can view, alter, or delete critical data from uncontrolled environments. MnSCU did not enforce strong password management controls. 03-33 Partially Resolved 03-33 Substantially Resolved 03-33 Partially Resolved MnSCU made some security improvements but did not develop and implement standards for securing critical programs. MnSCU revoked this access for many of the people that did not need it; however, we still found some examples that had not been resolved. MnSCU resolved several of the password-related weaknesses; however, others persist. 6

Finding Statement MnSCU does not have effective monitoring of security-related events. Some interface files were not appropriately secured during transmission. Audit Report Number Status Assessment Comment 03-33 Partially MnSCU implemented procedures to Resolved monitor and review certain operating system security events. We believe MnSCU should also consider monitoring other risky events and assess its database monitoring needs. 03-33 Resolved MnSCU implemented technologies to properly encrypt the interface files. Current Finding and Recommendations 1. MnSCU has not fully resolved some outstanding security weaknesses, nor has it developed a comprehensive security program. Although, as shown in Table 2-1, MnSCU made progress in resolving many of the prior securityrelated audit findings, several remain partially unresolved. Of most significance, MnSCU has not developed a comprehensive security program to effectively manage security risks throughout the organization. To be successful, an organization must have a security program made up of many components, including a periodic risk assessment and the development of policies and detailed procedures that describe how to mitigate specific risks. In addition, a security program must include monitoring procedures to validate the effectiveness of its security controls. Without these and other components, an organization cannot effectively manage the security risks. We think it will be unlikely, if not impossible, for MnSCU to develop a comprehensive security program given the current level of staff resources devoted to security. Although MnSCU has created a Security Office, it consists of only two staff. In addition, its director has other responsibilities besides security, and the second staff member manages user accounts. As a result, security efforts have been primarily reactive rather than proactive. The Security Office has relied heavily upon other information technology professionals within the organization to make security decisions and help implement security measures. Although these professionals and others play a vital role in security, such heavy reliance on them typically does not work well over time because they are too busy performing their day-to-day responsibilities. Furthermore, technology and related risks are constantly changing; therefore, it is critical that MnSCU have professionals whose job responsibilities are devoted to managing security. MnSCU is not unlike many large organizations. Our audits of other large state agencies often find similar weaknesses, including the lack of an overall strategy to effectively manage security risks. Without adequate staffing and a comprehensive security strategy, MnSCU will be unable to successfully manage security throughout its organization. As a result, there may be a negative impact on computer systems availability, data integrity, or data confidentiality. 7

Recommendations MnSCU should continue its efforts to resolve prior computer security findings. MnSCU should develop a comprehensive security program to effectively manage security risks throughout the organization. Furthermore, it should assess its current and future security needs to ensure resources are adequate to provide for an effective security program. 8

OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR 500 WELLS FARGO PLACE ph 651.296.8012 30 EAST SEVENTH STREET fx 651.297.5550 ST. PAUL, MN 55101-4946 www.mnscu.edu September 14, 2004 Mr. James Nobles, Legislative Auditor Office of the Legislative Auditor Room 140 Centennial Building 658 Cedar Street, St Paul, MN 55155 Dear Mr. Nobles, We appreciate the objective review the Office of the Legislative Auditor has made of our efforts to improve our overall security environment at the Minnesota State Colleges & Universities, and particularly your recognition of the significant progress we have made in resolving your previous findings despite limited resources available. We are satisfied that we have made much progress, and that more work will always need to be done. The relatively broad scope of some previous findings makes it extremely difficult to state that they have been fully resolved, but we will continue our efforts to make that happen. We believe that the significant progress to date in improving our technical security environment has positioned us to now focus on the broader, organization-wide effort to establish a comprehensive security program, a program which will move beyond the mere technical aspects of security implementation. Over the next year, we intend to plan and begin implementation of a comprehensive security program, as recommended by your current Follow-up Audit. Of course, the current fiscal environment makes it extremely difficult to identify and earmark financial and human resources needed for such a comprehensive program. We will, therefore, carefully assess our current investments in security and develop a creative and innovative plan to enable us to upgrade our current investments in this area. Thank you again for recognizing our progress in improving the security environment within the Minnesota State Colleges & Universities, and for your ongoing support in this long-term effort. /s/ Kenneth F. Niemi Kenneth F. Niemi Vice Chancellor for Information Technology /s/ Laura M. King Laura M. King Vice Chancellor Chief Financial Officer c: James H. McCormick, Chancellor The Minnesota State Colleges and Universities System is an Equal Opportunity employer and educator.