(FRA) Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experimentations Influence in support of Operations Joint Concept (FRA) JC-3.10(A)_INFLUENCE(2012) No. 073/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 31 March 2012 1
This French Joint Concept Influence in Support of Operations, or (FRA) JC-3.10(A)_INFLUENCE(2012), respects the graphic standards defined in the French Joint Publication PIA-7.2.4 (no. 161/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 18 June 2010). The aforementioned graphic standards are themselves in compliance with the prescriptions of the Allied Administrative Publication AAP-47(A), Allied Joint Development Doctrines. The front cover 1 of this document has been created by the Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experimentations (CICDE) 2. Please note: the only official reference of this document is the electronic French version aligned on the Intradef and Internet websites of the CICDE (http://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr) in the Corpus conceptuel et doctrinal interarmées (Joint Conceptual and Doctrinal Corpus). 1 Bust of Pericles bearing the inscription: "Pericles, son of Xanthippus, Athenian". Marble, Roman copy after a Greek original from ca. 430 BC, from the Museo Pio-Clementino, a part of the Vatican collections. 2 Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d expérimentations. 2
(FRA) JC-3.10(A) 3 _INFLUENCE (2012) INFLUENCE IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS No. 073/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 31 March 2012 3 The letter A indicates the first complete revision of the original document since its promulgation. 3
4 Translated by Miss Cécile BOUTELOUP Translation Service of the CICDE
Letter of Promulgation Paris, 31 March 2012 No. 073/DEF/CICDE/NP Lieutenant General Didier CASTRES Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) (SCEM-OPS) 1. The ability to influence the actors of a conflict or crisis directly contributes to the success of a military campaign. It is one of the courses of action for which a military leader must rely on within the framework of a comprehensive manoeuvre. As part of the overall military strategy, the military influence strategy covers Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment (APOE) directed towards populations or opponents in order to win the decision. 2. The ability of the military chief consists in acting simultaneously within the physical and perceptions fields so as to reach a complete synergy between the capabilities of conventional military activities and the more innovative ones intended to shape the operational environment to the benefit of the force. 3. In the case of a unique joint manoeuvre, an approach through influence requires to make understand, or at least accept, the objectives of the intervention to the populations. It also aims to interfere with the adverse decision-making process. It is part of the pursuit of "juste puissance" (concept similar to that of Smart Power), i.e. the subtle balance between the employment of military and civilian tools to resolve a conflict or crisis. It must be initiated, defined and conducted at the national level as well as at the level of the force on the theatre. 4. This concept draws conclusions on the recent conflicts and operations (Lebanon, Afghanistan, counter-piracy, etc.), multinational experimentations conducted with our allies, and contemporary academic researches. It is compatible with the principles developed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). 5. This French Joint Concept Influence in Support of Operations, (FRA) JC-3.10(A)_INFLUENCE (2012), aims to: a. be a document unifying current and past concepts and doctrines on the new joint area of Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment (APOE); b. define and clarify a terminology that has become more and more complex; c. precise the necessary aptitudes to act on perceptions and within the operational environment; 5
d. establish a link between the different functions contributing to the implementation of APOE. 6. This innovative concept intends to stimulate a deeper reflection upon the notion of influence. This concept will have to be developed as a doctrine so as to define how those APOE should be integrated to the overall manoeuvre at all levels (strategic, operational and tactical). 6
Summary of Amendments 1. This table constitutes the collection of all the amendments proposed by readers, regardless of their origin or rank, as submitted to the Assistant Director for Doctrinal Synergy (AD-DS) of the CICDE and detailed in Annex E (see p. 49). 2. Amendments validated by the CICDE are written in red in chronological order in the table below. 3. Amendments are shown in purple in the body of the new version. 4. The administrative number indicated at the bottom of the front cover and third page is corrected (in bold, red, Roman characters) with the mention: "amended on day/month/year". 5. The amended version of the document to be used as a joint reference replaces the previous version in all electronic databases. No. Amendments Source Effective Date 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 7
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References and Foreword References a. (FRA) JC-01_CCEAF(2010), Capstone Concept on the Employment of the Armed Forces no. 004/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 11 January 2010. b. (FRA) JC-3.4_CA(2011), Comprehensive Approach to External Crisis Management and Military Contribution no. 024/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 24 January 2011. c. CIA-3.10.3_CIMIC(2005), Coopération civilo-militaire no. 262/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP as of 03 March 2005 (under revision). d. (FRA) JD-01_CDEAF(2011), Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of the Armed Forces no. 127/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 12 July 2011. e. DIA-3.10_OI(2006), Opérations d'information no. 570/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 29 May 2006. f. DIA-3.10.1_OMI(2008), Opérations militaires d influence no. 069/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 05 March 2008. g. DIA-3.10.2_COMOPS(2007), Communication opérationnelle no. 297/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 26 July 2007. h. (FRA) JD-3.4.4_COIN(2010), Counter-insurgency no. 253/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 05 November 2010. i. MCM-0085-2010, NATO's Military Policy for Strategic Communications as of 11 August 2010. j. MC-422/3, NATO Military Policy on Information Operations as of 09 March 2007. k. MC-457/2, NATO Military Policy on Public Affairs 2011. l. AJP-01(C), Allied Joint Doctrine March 2007. m. AJP-3,10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations November 2009. n. AJP-3,10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, November 2007. o. This document supersedes the former PIA-03.152, Concept interarmées des opérations d information (Information Operations Concept), no. 294/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP as of 11 March 2005. 9
Strategic & Employment Frameworks National Security Strategy Threats Globalization & Risks Politics Human Environment of an Operation (HEO) Law Media Information Environment Comprehensiveness Multilateralism Confrontation Fields Physical (land, sea, air, space) Immaterial (electromagnetic space, cyberspace, field of perceptions) Operational Context Time Frame Technology Geostrategic Framework Operational Environment Geographic Framework Urbanization Priorities Figure 1 The different dimensions of the Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of the Armed Forces (ref. d). 10
Foreword "Western power, its obsession with security since 2001 and its practical manifestations, are often perceived as aggressive." The French White Paper on National Defence and Security (2008) 1. "War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will" 4. Major conflicts of the twentieth century have confirmed this old saying; the current operational context has even extended and reinforced it. The effect of weapons remains insufficient if the action is not supported by the increasing power of immaterial and morale forces to achieve decisive advantage. 2. The first stage of those forces consists in the comprehension of the nature of France's engagements 5 and of their context. Conditions for military activity 6 have evolved. They are characterized by duration, dispersion, diversity and intensification factors; however, major sociological phenomena external to the military have appeared and must be controlled (political impact of the activities conducted on the field, unavoidable pressure from the media and communication vectors, excessive use of the law, increasing number of actors intervening in the evolution of crises, etc.). In parallel, new fields of confrontation have appeared, such as space and the information environment, which ones must be controlled. 3. The second stage of those forces resides in the ability to build and shape the perception and representation of a situation. Both perception and representation are based on facts, documents and images that influence the decision-makers or the friendly, neutral, unfavourable or hostile public opinions, on the theatre of operations as well as outside. Through its ability to persuade by means of the threat or use of force, a military engagement intends to soften the will of its opponents and change the course of events. It aims to take the advantage over potential or actual non-compliant actors by shaping the operational environment, including within immaterial fields. A military engagement is deployed in its various forms in compliance with the concept of "juste puissance" or "smart power" 7. 4. Following the same path, the French White Paper on Defence and National Security (LBDSN- 2008) and the Capstone Concept on the Employment of the Armed Forces (CCEAF) point out that the psychological and cognitive areas have become real fields of confrontation for the battle of perceptions. Ideologies, emotions, disinformation and rumours have an impact on individuals and public opinions. The context of globalization and of a world without physical barriers to the circulation of information stresses this phenomenon. 5. During a conflict or crisis, the desire to influence on perceptions is not restricted to the immediate environment of the action. It covers the overall international community, mainly through the capabilities offered by new technologies. The perception of what happened becomes more important that what really occurred. Reaching the Desired End State (DES), and thus the desired political objectives, does not depend on the real results of the military activities only (success or failure) but also on their perceptions. 6. Information has become an issue at stake due to its diversity, ubiquity and immediacy. It has an influence on the decision-making process, on its implementation and interpretation by the different actors. Activities conducted within the psychological and cognitive fields are decisive to the overall success of a military campaign. 4 5 6 7 Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Ref. a, (FRA) JC-01_CCEAF(2010), p. 21. The definitions of the terms highlighted in bold letters are listed in Annex F. The French concept of "juste puissance" is similar to that of "smart power", a term that was created in the United States of America in 2003 following the invasion of Iraq. It can be defined as the ability to combine force (hard power) and persuasion (soft power) for the success of a given strategy. At the strategic level, it implies the use of diplomacy, persuasion, power projection and influence in a way to reach the best return on investments of the engaged means. It mainly is an engagement in support of the diplomatic activity in all its forms and of the military force. It implies the control of the conducted activities, their legitimacy and a capacity of adaptation. 11
7. Influencing the actors of the "battle field" enables to alter their representations, perceptions and behaviours. Informing public opinions must encourage them to support soldiers in operations and to counter the effects of the adverse propaganda. Fighting and weakening the opponents' ideas and influencing their decision-making process contribute to achieving political objectives and to the protection of our own decision-making process. 8. This document highlights the role of influence in operations abroad conducted by the French Armed Forces. It may be partly adapted to other engagements (homeland missions and all kinds of other missions). The first chapter of this document clarifies the role of the influence strategy within the national defence and security strategy as well as its objectives. The second chapter precisely defines the military influence strategy and its objectives. The third chapter develops the basic notions and principles to follow, and aptitudes to acquire. The fourth and last chapter exposes the Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment (APOE) function and the different capabilities contributing to this process. 12
Place of (FRA) JC-3.10(A)_INFLUENCE(2012) in the JCDA* NATO Strategic Concept 2010 French White Paper on Defence and National Security (LBDSN-2008) European Security Strategy 2003 Highest References Capstone Concepts MC-4000 CIA-01 Concept empl. des forces (FRA) JC-01 CCEAF Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces Joint Concepts CIA-3.10 INFLUENCE (FRA) JC-3.10 INFLUENCE 6917/08 INFO OPS 7317/08 PSYOPS CIA-3.10.3 CIMIC Joint Doctrines AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine DIA-01 Doctr. d empl. des forces (FRA) JD-01 CDEAF Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces AJP-3 Operations DIA-3a Cdt des eng. opérationnels DIA-3b Cdt des eng. opérationels DIA-3c Cdt des eng. opérationnels DIA-3d Cdt des eng. opérationnels DIA-3.0.2 Cdt du niveau opératif AJP-3.10 IINFO OPS DIA-3.10 Les OP d influence DIA-3.10.2 COMOPS AJP-3.10.1 PSYOPS DIA-3.10.1 OP MIL d influence CIA-3.10.3 CIMIC Joint Publications Legend * Joint Concepts & Doctrines Architecture NATO Document FRA Document EU Document Classified document (triangle on lower right-hand side) Promulgated document Promulgated document / New version under ratification Promulgated document / New Version in progress / Revision Document under ratification Document under development/study Document to be deleted after incorporation into a higher-level document or after being replaced by another document 13
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Table of Contents Page Chapter 1 Influence at the Core of the Strategy... 17 Section I From the Information Warfare to the Military Influence Strategy... 17 Section II The Influence Strategy as part of the National Defence and Security Strategy... 17 Section III The Battle of Perceptions... 17 Chapter 2 General Framework of the Military Influence Strategy... 19 Section I Definition... 19 Section II General Objectives... 19 Section III The Military Influence Strategy in Support of Operations... 21 Chapter 3 Basic Notions, Principles and Aptitudes Necessary to the Military Influence Strategy... 25 Section I Basic Notions... 25 Section II Principles of the Military Influence Strategy in Support of Operations... 25 Section III Aptitudes to Acquire or Develop... 27 Chapter 4 Capabilities and Processes Contributing to the Military Influence Strategy... 31 Section I The "Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment" Function... 31 Section II Context of the Operations and Target Audiences... 31 Section III Activities Covered by APOE... 33 Annex A General Scheme of the Military Influence Strategy... 37 Annex B NATO's and EU's Influence Strategy... 39 Annex C The Information Campaign within a Theatre of Operations... 43 Annex D Functions Dedicated or Contributing to APOE... 47 Annex E Incoporation of Amendments... 49 Annex F Lexicon... 51 Part I Initialisms and Acronyms... 51 Part II Terms and Definitions... 52 Summary (back cover)... 60 15
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Chapter 1 Influence at the Core of the Strategy Section I From the Information Warfare to the Military Influence Strategy 101. Information warfare an expression that has been used for several years places information 8 at the core of the confrontation of wills. It plays a major role within conflicts and is equally important as a simple contribution of the Armed Forces to a non-military crisis. In addition to the physical environment of the theatre of engagement, where forces are fighting different actors of a war or crisis, information may extend the conflict to the cyberspace. 102. Population has also become an ongoing issue for operations as being the target of a confrontation of legitimacies and wills between the actors. A population is rarely homogeneous and may be subject to identity issues and/or diverse mobilizing interests. Thus, it makes it harder to develop an efficient military influence strategy. By managing information, the military influence strategy aims to win the battle of perceptions by achieving effects on identified target audiences. The control of information is developed within the framework of the information warfare and contributes to the overall military strategy. Section II The Influence Strategy as part of the National Defence and Security Strategy 103. France's national defence and security strategy is based on a whole range of instruments of power, each supporting in a coordinated way the defence of vital interests, strategic interests or interests of power, and the maintenance of France's rank. This leads to an influence strategy that aims to preserve national interests on the medium and long term through foreign policy, military strategy, internal security policy, economy and culture 9. 104. The influence strategy can be defined as the art of organizing and using diplomacy, economy, information, as well as military and socio-cultural capabilities so as to support the interests of a state, group of states or international community through activities in the psychological and cognitive fields. 105. It aims to increase the effects of the desired policy on the target audiences, should they be governmental, international or private, entities or individuals. Section III The Battle of Perceptions 106. The Capstone Concept and Doctrine on the Employment of the Armed Forces (CCEAF and CDEAF) underline the issue over the control of the perception of a conflict or any military operation by the different actors. Those documents recall the offensive and defensive dimensions of the battle of perceptions 10. Within the military context, a battle of perception can be defined as a "struggle of the legitimacies felt by the actors of a conflict". It aims to persuade of the soundness of the engaged action and to give its meaning, encourage its adhesion, or at least acceptance, and to influence the decision-making process of the adversary. Battles of perceptions imply activities within the physical and immaterial fields, on the theatre and outside the theatre. They occur within several interdependent environments. 8 9 10 As it covers several meanings, the term information can hardly be restrained to one specific definition. For instance, it can be defined as: an element of knowledge based on a fact or data and to be communicated (ref. e, DIA-3.10_OI[2006] on Information Operations); meaning given from one or several data following an analysis work, sometimes automated or reduced to its simplest form, and intended to be communicated (DIA-2_RIM&CI[2010] on Military-Oriented Intelligence and Counter- Intelligence, no. 240/DEF/ CICDE/NP as of 02 October 2010). Creation in 2011 of the French Institute to promote and develop the French culture abroad. Ref. a and d, (FRA) JC-01_CCEAF(2010) and (FRA) JD-01_CDEAF(2011). 17
a. The information environment refers to "the virtual and physical space in which the information is received, exploited and disseminated" 11. It includes the cyberspace and social networks. It is linked to the strategic level due to the globalization of information and to its techniques. Acting in the information environment in real time enables to identify opportunities, trends and possibilities for the accomplishment of the mission. b. The Human Environment of an Operation (HEO) 12 refers to "all interactions between individual or collective actors who may have an impact on the employment of armed forces within a given zone". It implies the perfect knowledge of the populations and systems, and is based on the social, cultural, religious and ethnic analyses of the theatre. The HEO falls under the operational level 13. c. The operational environment is defined as a "composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander" 14. It falls under the operational level. 11 12 13 14 Ref. a, (FRA) JC-01_CCEAF(2010). The analysis of the HEO is often based on open sources and requires experts to fully understand the complexity of the theatre, identify the roots of the conflict, control its factors and have the advantage over the situation in order to reach the desired strategic and operational objectives. So as to define the lines of operations of the military influence strategy, such analysis requires: a constant assessment of the perceptions of the local civilian population; an anticipation of the strategy and activities, namely of influence, conducted by non-compliant actors; and the integration of requests within the intelligence plan. The operational level is the level of integration and of manoeuvre of the allotted military capabilities so as to produce the effects ordered from the strategic level within a given zone, campaign or environment (ref. d, [FRA] JD-01_CDEAF [2011]). Ref. AAP-6(2011). 18
Chapter 2 General Framework of the Military Influence Strategy Section I Definition 201. In addition to the operational, deployment and capability strategies, the overall military strategy includes an "influence" dimension. This dimension is constantly applied in support of each operation, in its preparation as well as during or towards a resolution of crisis. National Security Strategy French White Paper (LBDSN) Defence Policy Overall Military Strategy (FRA) JC-01_CCEAF Operational Strategy (FRA) JD-01_CDEAF Capability Strategy Deployment Strategy Military Influence Strategy (FRA) JC-3.10 Figure 2 The military influence strategy within the overall military strategy. 202. The military influence strategy 15 is adapted to the Armed Forces and their missions, and is limited to the field of responsibility of the French chief of defence staff, as defined in Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of the Armed Forces. It can be defined as follow: 203. The military influence strategy consists in the conception and conduct of activities carried out by the Armed Forces to continuously obtain effects in the psychological and cognitive fields, and lead an individual, group or organization favourable, hostile or neutral to act in the interests of the Nation, of a coalition or of the international community. 204. Within a multinational framework and in the absence of a public diplomacy concept in France, the military influence strategy is similar to both what NATO refers to as Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) 16 and to the information strategy of the European Union (cf. Annex B). Section II General Objectives 205. The military influence strategy is constantly applied. It reinforces the legitimacy, credibility and capabilities of the Armed Forces in the accomplishment of their missions. It ensures the coherence of objectives and is based on the different military instruments of power of the defence diplomacy (deployment, activities of cooperation for technical or operational military assistance 17, display of power, development of a doctrinal corpus expressing the determination to act, education and training of officers from foreign armed forces, export of weapons and skills, etc.). It is developed in coherence with the other diplomatic (negotiations, etc.), economic (embargo, arms sales, etc.) and legal (taking into account the national law) activities. 15 16 17 See figure 9 in Annex A. Ref. Study conducted by RAND Corporation for the CICDE, NATO s Strategic Communications concept and its relevance for France, October 2010. Ref. (FRA) EJC-3.21_OMA(2011), Operational Military Assistance to a Foreign Armed Force. 19
206. The military influence strategy contributes to the implementation of the different strategic functions: a. Knowledge and anticipation: warns on changes in the perception of France's activities and of the social trends and schools of thoughts within our areas of interest. This function is based on analyses provided by the Military-Oriented Intelligence (RIM) 18, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (embassies), French or foreign research centres, the academic world and polling institutes. b. Prevention: contributes to deter from the field of information to intimidation. This function aims to prevent any direct or indirect aggression against France and its interests by explaining or displaying the capabilities of the Armed Forces. More specifically, it aims to defuse tensions. c. Deterrence: participates to the credibility of nuclear deterrence. This function seeks to make the interest in the nuclear weapon accepted and acknowledged within France and among our allies, and to reinforce its credibility in the eyes of a potential opponent. d. Protection: persuades of the efficiency and aptitudes of the French Armed Forces in defending the Nation, its institutions, the national territory and its population, and promotes their actions. This function contributes to the resilience 19 of the Nation. e. Intervention: integrates the "influence" dimension to the joint manoeuvre at the strategic level. This function aims to comfort the legitimacy of the interventions on the theatres of operations or joint and combined (NATO, EU, ad hoc coalition) operations areas before, during and after the engagement of the armed forces. It also aims to isolate the adversary's action in its incoherence so as to discredit it. It contributes to the attrition of the command capabilities of the adversary(-ies). 207. To this end, and in order to be coherent, the military influence strategy: a. is based on the objectives set for the military international relations listed in the annual directive from the French chief of defence staff 20 ; b. participates to the domestic outreach 21 of the Armed Forces within the Nation; c. within the interministerial framework, seeks to make the national and strategic interests accepted within a military perspective while being coordinated with the activities of other ministries. 208. The military influence strategy defines the effects to obtain via Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment (APOE) 22, including the possible psychological operations of the strategic level. APOE are defined as the "range of intentional actions intended to obtain an effect on perceptions in order to alter the attitudes and/or behaviours of the target audience so as to reach the desired end state." 18 Renseignement d intérêt militaire / Military-Oriented Intelligence. 19 Resilience is defined as the determination and the capacity of a country, a society and a government to withstand the consequences of a major aggression or disaster, and then rapidly to restore their capacity to function normally or at least in a socially acceptable manner. This concerns not only government, but the whole of civil society and all actors in the economy (LBDSN-2008). 20 The French Joint Defence Staff (EMA) drafts the annual directive 15,000 that fixes the lines to follow in the field of military international relations. It integrates coordination on military matters in times of peace, namely with NATO, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) or another international organization. 21 Domestic outreach consists in reaching out to the desired audience through the process of relations so as to obtain its adherence and support. The Armed Forces are trained to reach out to people to share their values, explain their action and specificity, and strengthen the defence consciousness (EMA, 2011). 22 So as to better cover the areas subject to influence, the expression Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment (APOE) replaces that of Information Operations (Info Ops). It refers both to the staff function in charge of planning the desired effects, and to the activities. 20
Diplomacy Public Affairs Continuously Domestic Outreach Defence Diplomacy and International Relations Military Influence Strategy in support of Operations Overall Military Strategy Deployment Strategy Capability Strategy Military Influence Strategy Operational Strategy Military Influence Strategy in support of Operations Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment Effects on Target Audiences Figure 3 The military influence strategy in support of operations. Section III The Military Influence Strategy in Support of Operations 209. Rather applied within the national territory or during operations abroad, the military influence strategy in support of operations is part of the joint manoeuvre. It aims to reach the desired end state fixed to the Armed Forces by the political authority: a. by preparing, increasing, reinforcing and comforting the effects obtained with the threat or use of force; b. by using alternatives to the resort to force. 210. For instance, the following figure (figure 4) show the relations between the military influence strategy integrated to the state's influence strategy, itself integrated to the Comprehensive Approach (CA). The CA is organized around four main axes of influence: diplomacy, economy, overall military strategy and civilian activities. 21
Diplomacy Diplomatic «postures» (surprise, dissatisfaction, disapproval, summoning of ambassadors, withdrawal of ambassadors, economic sanctions, legal actions, etc.). economic sanctions, boycott Economy International Organizations (UN, EU, G8, G20), international organizations of the Francophonie Civilian Activities Governance, including social, cultural actions, etc. Overall Military Strategy France s Influence Strategy Military Influence Strategy Military Influence Strategy in support of Operational Engagements Defence Diplomacy Defence Agreements Common Trainings Arms Purchases and Sales Embargo Domestic Outreach of the Armed Forces Figure 4 Example of the implementation of the military influence strategy at different levels. 211. The military influence strategy in support of operations is conceived in view of the effects on the perceptions of the different parties (allies, neutral or non-compliant actors) of an international conflict or crisis. The desired effect should induce an evolution of their state of mind or at least a change in their conception of the situation that would be more in line with the national interests or multinational objectives. It intends to: a. prior to a conflict, prevent the resort to force, which military response would have a high human, material, financial and/or political cost; make international discussion organizations (in particular the UN) adhere to the national objectives; seek international support and possibly form an ad hoc coalition (based on existing agreements or not); prepare the French population to the likelihood of a crisis or conflict; b. in the event of a declared crisis, create a favourable context to the deployment of forces and to the conduct of operations, then to the disengagement, namely by making durable the positive effects obtained to the benefit of France's interests or of the objectives of a coalition; c. build and support the national or allied legitimacy and credibility of their resort to force, if needed, for the resolution of a national or international conflict or crisis; d. fight against the influence strategies of non-compliant actors through activities on the will, knowledge or capabilities; e. reinforce the conviction of the favourable target audiences by acting on their adherence and support; f. convince neutral or passive target audiences to adhere to the set objective and implemented means, or at least, to not oppose it; g. act on the knowledge and will of the unfavourable and hostile target audiences, and on their decision-making process or technical capabilities in order to weaken them, limit their hostile or aggressive posture, and to demoralize, discredit and/or neutralize them; h. contribute to the reinforcement of the determination of our forces and protect them from the influence activities and/or propaganda of non-compliant actors. To this end, the Armed Forces should understand the pursued objectives and be aware of the possible effects of disinformation. 22
212. The military influence strategy in support of operations consists: a. at the strategic level, in an influence campaign that can be implemented before, during and possibly after the resolution of a crisis. Indeed, its objectives may go beyond the missions to accomplish on the theatre of operations and require actions that do not depend on the forces only, as, for instance, within the framework of a comprehensive approach within a smart power strategy. b. at the level of the joint manoeuvre, in an information campaign within the theatre of operations to alter perceptions via APOE in coordination with the other military activities (cf. Annex C). 23
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Chapter 3 Basic Notions, Principles and Aptitudes Necessary to the Military Influence Strategy Section I Basic Notions 301. A good understanding of this document requires before all the knowledge of key definitions (cf. Annex F): a. Influence refers to the "ability to obtain effects through activities on perceptions, representations, attitudes and behaviours". b. Perception refers to the "process by which individuals detect and interpret information through the filter of their representations from their environment by means of their senses". It can facilitate the acceptance of the force, of its legitimacy and objectives, or the rejection of our adversaries. c. Representation refers to the "conscious or unconscious act of ordering sensory information, resulting in the development of a conviction, belief or system of thought. This process is mainly oriented by the education and cultural environment of an individual". d. Legitimacy refers to "what is right, fair and reasonable" 23. In the case of a military activity, it is granted both by a political mandate and by its perception by the different actors. e. Effect refers to "the cumulative consequence of one or more actions across the engagement space that leads to a change in the situation in one or more domains. Aggregation of desired effects leads to the achievement of objectives" (MCM-0052-2006, 06 June 06) 24. f. Attitude refers to the "predisposition of individuals to act in accordance with their ideas and/or convictions. Usually, in the absence of external constrains (physical, psychological, etc.), behaviours are conditioned by the attitude". g. Behaviour refers to the "conscious or unconscious way of acting and accomplishing or not certain actions". Section II Principles of the Military Influence Strategy in Support of Operations 302. The implementation of the activities on perceptions and within the operational environment must carefully follow several principles. Legitimacy 303. Most of conflicts consist in a struggle for legitimacy felt by the belligerents which objective is to gain the adherence of the local populations, their own national community, the international community and diasporas. 304. In France and in occidental states in general, this tendency is intensified by the porosity of the states' borders, the globalization of information, the excessive recourse to law of our societies, the sometimes conflicted contact between the established powers and emerging ones, and a natural tendency to compassion and sensitivity to emotions favoured by the modern communication vectors. 23 24 Translation of the definition from the French dictionary Le Petit Robert, 2006. Cf. Bi-SC NATO Information Operations Reference Book, 2010. 25
305. The success of a military engagement conducted by our forces mainly resides in their aptitude 25 to act on their operational environment and to shape it. Forces should make the target audiences understand and accept, or at least not oppose, their intervention. In parallel, the ideologies and postures of the adversary should be discredited as they may appear legitimate to those same target audiences. Credibility 306. The credibility of the Armed Forces is necessary so that they can shape their operational environment. To do so, they must be the best and the most acknowledged, through their image and exemplary action, to disseminate the message on the operational reality. 307. This credibility is based on values such as professionalism, strictness, commitment, ethic and efficiency. The credibility of the information and messages of the Force is important as well. It relies on the truthfulness of the disseminated information. However, this does not imply a complete transparency. Indeed, it would be incompatible with the preservation of the security of our activities, and thus of our soldiers. Secrecy 308. The implementation of a military influence strategy requires secrecy on the course of action used to obtain the desired effect so as to: a. preserve the freedom of action of the forces; b. seek adherence without appearing as being imposed to avoid rejection; c. contribute to the effect of surprise of the joint manoeuvre. 309. This aspect is particularly sensitive as secrecy and military deception operations are tricky to implement within a context where the Armed Forces must preserve their credibility namely face to the media without favouring short-term objectives to the detriment of long-term ones 26. Individual and Collective Involvement 310. Individual and collective involvement within the Armed Forces is necessary to the conduct of a military influence strategy. It requires initiative, determination and loyalty. Troops in daily contact with non-combatants largely contribute to the success of the military influence strategy if they know the effects to expect from the messages they must disseminate through their activities. Consequently, behaviours (Rules of Engagement and Rules of Behaviour) 27 should not be limited to what can or cannot be done. They must demonstrate an understanding of the human dimension of the situation. All individuals, at their level, must capture the spirit of the mission to understand the consequences of their own decisions on the field. Moreover, such understanding will strengthen the adherence of our soldiers to the objectives of the engagement. 311. All combatants are actors in terms of influence through the effects produced by their behaviour, image and action. Combatants must be trained and prepared to the reality of the human environment of the operations. Coherence and Continuity 312. The manoeuvre must remain unique, regardless of its level. The coherence and convergence of the conventional military activities and influence activities ensure this unity. However, as opposed to operations conducted by conventional capabilities, the effects expected from APOE are rarely immediate. As those effects are tested through time, incoherence might occur. Indeed, the effects depend on both the coherence of the APOE at a given time for instance during an operation and their continuity within the overall military campaign. The coherence of objectives within a coalition or between actors of a comprehensive approach is equally 25 26 27 Ref. a, (FRA) JC-01_CCEAF(2011). It must be kept in mind that archives will necessarily be open to the public in the future. Cf. DIA-5.2_EDF(2006), Emploi de la force en opération militaire se déroulant à l extérieur du territoire français, no. 805/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP as of 25 July 2006. 26
Anticipation important, namely to the support of the legitimacy of the operation, should it be on the theatre of operations or outside. 313. The planning of APOE requires the ability to anticipate the actions of all the actors following their own influence strategy. This anticipation relies on the familiarity with the actors and target audiences but also on initiative and imagination (favoured by education and training). Anticipation must lead the adverse military influence strategy to failure. Ad hoc Rules of Engagement 314. The military influence strategy in support of operations follows an approach of controlled effects. It applies to the technical, doctrinal, legal, moral and ethical dimensions. Thus, maliciousoriented propaganda techniques are excluded from the military influence strategy. Indeed, such strategy does not intend to deliberately undermine the individual or collective free will by the alteration and/or falsification of information. It should never use submission and indoctrination. Section III Aptitudes to Acquire or Develop Acquiring Knowledge 315. Within the framework of the military influence strategy, the "acquiring knowledge" 28 function mainly aims to identify non-compliant actors and the main key leaders on the theatre of operations as well as their vulnerabilities and forces, in order to analyse the human environment of an operation and to assess the effects of APOE. So as to give meaning and efficiency to a military influence strategy in support of operations, knowing so as to understand the human dimension of a theatre of operations in its military, social and sociological approach is important to act efficiently. This knowledge calls for diverse competences, including the control of the Military-Oriented Intelligence (RIM), but also the analysis of human, technical and/or documentary sources (OSINT) 29. 316. Depending on the areas concerned, the following elements are analysed: a. the armed forces and their environment through the RIM; b. information collected next to civilian structures (embassy; international, governmental or private organizations), advisers of the Force (POLAD, DEVAD, CULAD 30, etc.) and liaison teams; c. the Human Environment of the Operation (HEO) through Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) 31, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), and Special Forces; d. local media via the military public affairs chain and possibly via the embassy of the area directly or indirectly concerned by the operations, and national and international media via the DICoD 32. 28 29 30 31 32 Ref. d, (FRA) JD-01_CDEAF(2011). Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) refers to "information publicly available and that can be freely collected next to all types of dissemination of information materials, regardless of its transmitter" (cf. CEIA-3.7.1_ISO[2010], Recherche et emploi de l information ouverte as of 20 July 2010). Among those materials are: newspapers, public, specialized or professional press; books, handbooks, technical manuals, posters, advertising and campaign brochures, leaflets or other public physical information materials, as long as they are not subject to a deliberate restriction of their dissemination from the transmitter; TV shows, radios, films released to the public, photographs made available to the public; any information, structured or not, freely disseminated or made available via Internet. Political Adviser, Development Adviser and Cultural Adviser. Cf. Annex D. Délégation à l information et à la communication de la Défense / French Defence Information and Communication Agency. 27
Managing Information 317. One of the key functions highlighted in Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of the Armed Forces is information management, defined as a "way to act to achieve an objective through the exploitation, domination and protection of the information area" 33. During an operation, each actor seeks to shape the operational environment, namely through information. For the forces, the information management contributes to the decision-making process and implies an access to reliable information in due time. 318. Information management ensures information superiority, under normal circumstances as well as in time of crisis. It enables the sharing of relevant information so as to formulate and forward the necessary orders at the right time. It includes not only the acquisition of information, its analysis and protection, but also the capacity to undermine the information management of non-compliant actors. Command Acquire Knowledge Operate Information Management Deteriorate Adverse Information Influence / Cooperate / Communicate Acquire Knowledge Support Figure 5 The control of information among key operational functions (cf. CDEAF). 319. The control of information intends to counter the influence strategy or propaganda of noncompliant actors. Such control, which effects are based on messages (texts, images) and activities, may be exercised over the theatre of operations or our territory, that of our allies or of other states. This adverse military influence strategy intends to convince the legitimacy of its actors, recruit new opponents, weaken the morale of our forces, provoke tensions within our democracies, create arguments between the allies of a coalition, and undermine the political and military decision-making process of our forces. Shaping the Operational Environment 320. The action of shaping can be defined as "creating pre-conditions that will favour or optimize the range of physical or immaterial engagements" 34. A target audience is even more receptive if it is ready or prepared to receive the Force's message. The joint manoeuvre, conducted through physical or immaterial activities, must make target audiences more receptive during the "shaping" of the operational environment. 321. By preparing the confrontation fields material or immaterial, the shaping aims to limit the freedom of action of non-compliant actors. It must reduce their options and extend that of allied or national forces. It must highlight the strengths of these latter and seek information superiority while preventing it from non-compliant actors or at least, weakening it. By threatening a noncompliant actor in all its action area and by reducing its feeling of security namely by using APOE in a coordinated way and by damaging its command capabilities its comprehension of the operational situation and its freedom of action can be significantly reduced. 33 34 Ref. d, (FRA) JD-01_CDEAF(2011). Ref. CIA-3.2.2_OPURB(2010), Les opérations urbaines (Fighting in Urban Areas), no. 254 /DEF/CICDE/NP as of 30 September 2010. 28
Synchronizing APOE 322. So as to reach the desired end state at the lowest cost and within the given schedules, an authority coordinates and synchronizes the military operations of a unique manoeuvre. The range of objectives within the framework of a comprehensive approach as well as the difference of temporal scope between the conventional military activities and the APOE are likely to generate difficulties. However, some functions of the APOE (cf. Annex D) contribute in a major way to military operations, namely through their enabler role between the Force and civilian actors. 323. In order to ensure their coherence and relevancy within the joint manoeuvre, APOE must be synchronized: in time and space (for example, during the mandate relieves of different contingents within a theatre of operations), between the functions, between the different levels (strategic, operational and tactical), and with the other physical activities, namely of destruction. Damaging or fratricide interferences may occur if not synchronized vertically (hierarchical) and horizontally (between functions or actors). 324. A fratricide APOE is defined as a "non physical action of our forces provoking undesirable effects within the operational environment and resulting in a hindrance to the conduct of operations as well as in the limitation, delay or impossibility of reaching the desired end state". Taking into account the synchronization of APOE is imperative to limit such risk and maintain the coherence and efficiency of the overall manoeuvre. Developing a Database in Support of Operations 325. So as to favour the sharing of data on populations and target audiences, Knowledge Development (KD) tools (notion developed by NATO) can be deployed to support operations. Their use should be cautious regarding the respect of operations security. Information is available and shared depending on the level of responsibility, functions and need-to-know requirements. 326. Knowledge Development (KD) is defined as a "collaborative and iterative process ensuring the collect of data and information, their analyses and the sharing of their results" 35. It implies a change of state of mind in the acquisition, exploitation and dissemination of information regarding the spectrum of the environment of an operation (PMESII 36 systems within NATO). KD is different from the Military-Oriented Intelligence (RIM); it enables a more open approach through the transversal sharing of open information to all actors of an operation. It enables the Force Commander (FCdr) and his staff to better understand the effect of military, political, economical and cultural activities on the different systems and actors of an area of engagement. 327. KD seeks information to analyse the different systems and actors of an area of engagement in order to offer the best response. Related to the "acquiring knowledge" function, KD uses nonmilitary sources (international organizations, NGOs, companies, national or local governmental agencies, etc.). It takes part of the comprehensive approach to understand and analyse the interactions, capabilities and influences of enemies, allies, neutrals and actors of the civil society through the analysis of PMESII systems. It integrates the analysis of the human environment of an operation. The synergy of the RIM and of the information coming from other open sources must enable to offer a global view of the operational environment to the benefit of APOE by including the relations between actors and systems. Measuring the Effectiveness of APOE 328. Although integrated to the joint manoeuvre, the information campaign requires its own Measures of Effectiveness (MoE). As they are difficult to establish due to their nature, they must include both qualitative and quantitative indicators objective (fact) and subjective (interpretation of a fact). Data on the effects obtained in that area will be slower to acquire and hardly predictable compared to the MoE of conventional military activities. 35 36 Ref. RDIA-004, Knowledge Development (KD), no. 138DEF/CICDE/SEC-CENT/NP as of 18 June 2010. Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information. 29