Joint Concept (FRA) JC-3.10(A)_INFLUENCE(2012)

(FRA) Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experimentations Influence in support of Operations Joint Concept (FRA) JC-3.10(A)_INFLUENCE(2012) No. 073/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 31 March 2012 1

This French Joint Concept Influence in Support of Operations, or (FRA) JC-3.10(A)_INFLUENCE(2012), respects the graphic standards defined in the French Joint Publication PIA-7.2.4 (no. 161/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 18 June 2010). The aforementioned graphic standards are themselves in compliance with the prescriptions of the Allied Administrative Publication AAP-47(A), Allied Joint Development Doctrines. The front cover 1 of this document has been created by the Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experimentations (CICDE) 2. Please note: the only official reference of this document is the electronic French version aligned on the Intradef and Internet websites of the CICDE (http://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr) in the Corpus conceptuel et doctrinal interarmées (Joint Conceptual and Doctrinal Corpus). 1 Bust of Pericles bearing the inscription: "Pericles, son of Xanthippus, Athenian". Marble, Roman copy after a Greek original from ca. 430 BC, from the Museo Pio-Clementino, a part of the Vatican collections. 2 Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d expérimentations. 2

(FRA) JC-3.10(A) 3 _INFLUENCE (2012) INFLUENCE IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS No. 073/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 31 March 2012 3 The letter A indicates the first complete revision of the original document since its promulgation. 3

4 Translated by Miss Cécile BOUTELOUP Translation Service of the CICDE

Letter of Promulgation Paris, 31 March 2012 No. 073/DEF/CICDE/NP Lieutenant General Didier CASTRES Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) (SCEM-OPS) 1. The ability to influence the actors of a conflict or crisis directly contributes to the success of a military campaign. It is one of the courses of action for which a military leader must rely on within the framework of a comprehensive manoeuvre. As part of the overall military strategy, the military influence strategy covers Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment (APOE) directed towards populations or opponents in order to win the decision. 2. The ability of the military chief consists in acting simultaneously within the physical and perceptions fields so as to reach a complete synergy between the capabilities of conventional military activities and the more innovative ones intended to shape the operational environment to the benefit of the force. 3. In the case of a unique joint manoeuvre, an approach through influence requires to make understand, or at least accept, the objectives of the intervention to the populations. It also aims to interfere with the adverse decision-making process. It is part of the pursuit of "juste puissance" (concept similar to that of Smart Power), i.e. the subtle balance between the employment of military and civilian tools to resolve a conflict or crisis. It must be initiated, defined and conducted at the national level as well as at the level of the force on the theatre. 4. This concept draws conclusions on the recent conflicts and operations (Lebanon, Afghanistan, counter-piracy, etc.), multinational experimentations conducted with our allies, and contemporary academic researches. It is compatible with the principles developed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). 5. This French Joint Concept Influence in Support of Operations, (FRA) JC-3.10(A)_INFLUENCE (2012), aims to: a. be a document unifying current and past concepts and doctrines on the new joint area of Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment (APOE); b. define and clarify a terminology that has become more and more complex; c. precise the necessary aptitudes to act on perceptions and within the operational environment; 5

d. establish a link between the different functions contributing to the implementation of APOE. 6. This innovative concept intends to stimulate a deeper reflection upon the notion of influence. This concept will have to be developed as a doctrine so as to define how those APOE should be integrated to the overall manoeuvre at all levels (strategic, operational and tactical). 6

Summary of Amendments 1. This table constitutes the collection of all the amendments proposed by readers, regardless of their origin or rank, as submitted to the Assistant Director for Doctrinal Synergy (AD-DS) of the CICDE and detailed in Annex E (see p. 49). 2. Amendments validated by the CICDE are written in red in chronological order in the table below. 3. Amendments are shown in purple in the body of the new version. 4. The administrative number indicated at the bottom of the front cover and third page is corrected (in bold, red, Roman characters) with the mention: "amended on day/month/year". 5. The amended version of the document to be used as a joint reference replaces the previous version in all electronic databases. No. Amendments Source Effective Date 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 7

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References and Foreword References a. (FRA) JC-01_CCEAF(2010), Capstone Concept on the Employment of the Armed Forces no. 004/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 11 January 2010. b. (FRA) JC-3.4_CA(2011), Comprehensive Approach to External Crisis Management and Military Contribution no. 024/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 24 January 2011. c. CIA-3.10.3_CIMIC(2005), Coopération civilo-militaire no. 262/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP as of 03 March 2005 (under revision). d. (FRA) JD-01_CDEAF(2011), Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of the Armed Forces no. 127/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 12 July 2011. e. DIA-3.10_OI(2006), Opérations d'information no. 570/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 29 May 2006. f. DIA-3.10.1_OMI(2008), Opérations militaires d influence no. 069/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 05 March 2008. g. DIA-3.10.2_COMOPS(2007), Communication opérationnelle no. 297/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 26 July 2007. h. (FRA) JD-3.4.4_COIN(2010), Counter-insurgency no. 253/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 05 November 2010. i. MCM-0085-2010, NATO's Military Policy for Strategic Communications as of 11 August 2010. j. MC-422/3, NATO Military Policy on Information Operations as of 09 March 2007. k. MC-457/2, NATO Military Policy on Public Affairs 2011. l. AJP-01(C), Allied Joint Doctrine March 2007. m. AJP-3,10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations November 2009. n. AJP-3,10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, November 2007. o. This document supersedes the former PIA-03.152, Concept interarmées des opérations d information (Information Operations Concept), no. 294/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP as of 11 March 2005. 9

Strategic & Employment Frameworks National Security Strategy Threats Globalization & Risks Politics Human Environment of an Operation (HEO) Law Media Information Environment Comprehensiveness Multilateralism Confrontation Fields Physical (land, sea, air, space) Immaterial (electromagnetic space, cyberspace, field of perceptions) Operational Context Time Frame Technology Geostrategic Framework Operational Environment Geographic Framework Urbanization Priorities Figure 1 The different dimensions of the Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of the Armed Forces (ref. d). 10

Foreword "Western power, its obsession with security since 2001 and its practical manifestations, are often perceived as aggressive." The French White Paper on National Defence and Security (2008) 1. "War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will" 4. Major conflicts of the twentieth century have confirmed this old saying; the current operational context has even extended and reinforced it. The effect of weapons remains insufficient if the action is not supported by the increasing power of immaterial and morale forces to achieve decisive advantage. 2. The first stage of those forces consists in the comprehension of the nature of France's engagements 5 and of their context. Conditions for military activity 6 have evolved. They are characterized by duration, dispersion, diversity and intensification factors; however, major sociological phenomena external to the military have appeared and must be controlled (political impact of the activities conducted on the field, unavoidable pressure from the media and communication vectors, excessive use of the law, increasing number of actors intervening in the evolution of crises, etc.). In parallel, new fields of confrontation have appeared, such as space and the information environment, which ones must be controlled. 3. The second stage of those forces resides in the ability to build and shape the perception and representation of a situation. Both perception and representation are based on facts, documents and images that influence the decision-makers or the friendly, neutral, unfavourable or hostile public opinions, on the theatre of operations as well as outside. Through its ability to persuade by means of the threat or use of force, a military engagement intends to soften the will of its opponents and change the course of events. It aims to take the advantage over potential or actual non-compliant actors by shaping the operational environment, including within immaterial fields. A military engagement is deployed in its various forms in compliance with the concept of "juste puissance" or "smart power" 7. 4. Following the same path, the French White Paper on Defence and National Security (LBDSN- 2008) and the Capstone Concept on the Employment of the Armed Forces (CCEAF) point out that the psychological and cognitive areas have become real fields of confrontation for the battle of perceptions. Ideologies, emotions, disinformation and rumours have an impact on individuals and public opinions. The context of globalization and of a world without physical barriers to the circulation of information stresses this phenomenon. 5. During a conflict or crisis, the desire to influence on perceptions is not restricted to the immediate environment of the action. It covers the overall international community, mainly through the capabilities offered by new technologies. The perception of what happened becomes more important that what really occurred. Reaching the Desired End State (DES), and thus the desired political objectives, does not depend on the real results of the military activities only (success or failure) but also on their perceptions. 6. Information has become an issue at stake due to its diversity, ubiquity and immediacy. It has an influence on the decision-making process, on its implementation and interpretation by the different actors. Activities conducted within the psychological and cognitive fields are decisive to the overall success of a military campaign. 4 5 6 7 Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Ref. a, (FRA) JC-01_CCEAF(2010), p. 21. The definitions of the terms highlighted in bold letters are listed in Annex F. The French concept of "juste puissance" is similar to that of "smart power", a term that was created in the United States of America in 2003 following the invasion of Iraq. It can be defined as the ability to combine force (hard power) and persuasion (soft power) for the success of a given strategy. At the strategic level, it implies the use of diplomacy, persuasion, power projection and influence in a way to reach the best return on investments of the engaged means. It mainly is an engagement in support of the diplomatic activity in all its forms and of the military force. It implies the control of the conducted activities, their legitimacy and a capacity of adaptation. 11

7. Influencing the actors of the "battle field" enables to alter their representations, perceptions and behaviours. Informing public opinions must encourage them to support soldiers in operations and to counter the effects of the adverse propaganda. Fighting and weakening the opponents' ideas and influencing their decision-making process contribute to achieving political objectives and to the protection of our own decision-making process. 8. This document highlights the role of influence in operations abroad conducted by the French Armed Forces. It may be partly adapted to other engagements (homeland missions and all kinds of other missions). The first chapter of this document clarifies the role of the influence strategy within the national defence and security strategy as well as its objectives. The second chapter precisely defines the military influence strategy and its objectives. The third chapter develops the basic notions and principles to follow, and aptitudes to acquire. The fourth and last chapter exposes the Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment (APOE) function and the different capabilities contributing to this process. 12

Place of (FRA) JC-3.10(A)_INFLUENCE(2012) in the JCDA* NATO Strategic Concept 2010 French White Paper on Defence and National Security (LBDSN-2008) European Security Strategy 2003 Highest References Capstone Concepts MC-4000 CIA-01 Concept empl. des forces (FRA) JC-01 CCEAF Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces Joint Concepts CIA-3.10 INFLUENCE (FRA) JC-3.10 INFLUENCE 6917/08 INFO OPS 7317/08 PSYOPS CIA-3.10.3 CIMIC Joint Doctrines AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine DIA-01 Doctr. d empl. des forces (FRA) JD-01 CDEAF Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces AJP-3 Operations DIA-3a Cdt des eng. opérationnels DIA-3b Cdt des eng. opérationels DIA-3c Cdt des eng. opérationnels DIA-3d Cdt des eng. opérationnels DIA-3.0.2 Cdt du niveau opératif AJP-3.10 IINFO OPS DIA-3.10 Les OP d influence DIA-3.10.2 COMOPS AJP-3.10.1 PSYOPS DIA-3.10.1 OP MIL d influence CIA-3.10.3 CIMIC Joint Publications Legend * Joint Concepts & Doctrines Architecture NATO Document FRA Document EU Document Classified document (triangle on lower right-hand side) Promulgated document Promulgated document / New version under ratification Promulgated document / New Version in progress / Revision Document under ratification Document under development/study Document to be deleted after incorporation into a higher-level document or after being replaced by another document 13

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Table of Contents Page Chapter 1 Influence at the Core of the Strategy... 17 Section I From the Information Warfare to the Military Influence Strategy... 17 Section II The Influence Strategy as part of the National Defence and Security Strategy... 17 Section III The Battle of Perceptions... 17 Chapter 2 General Framework of the Military Influence Strategy... 19 Section I Definition... 19 Section II General Objectives... 19 Section III The Military Influence Strategy in Support of Operations... 21 Chapter 3 Basic Notions, Principles and Aptitudes Necessary to the Military Influence Strategy... 25 Section I Basic Notions... 25 Section II Principles of the Military Influence Strategy in Support of Operations... 25 Section III Aptitudes to Acquire or Develop... 27 Chapter 4 Capabilities and Processes Contributing to the Military Influence Strategy... 31 Section I The "Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment" Function... 31 Section II Context of the Operations and Target Audiences... 31 Section III Activities Covered by APOE... 33 Annex A General Scheme of the Military Influence Strategy... 37 Annex B NATO's and EU's Influence Strategy... 39 Annex C The Information Campaign within a Theatre of Operations... 43 Annex D Functions Dedicated or Contributing to APOE... 47 Annex E Incoporation of Amendments... 49 Annex F Lexicon... 51 Part I Initialisms and Acronyms... 51 Part II Terms and Definitions... 52 Summary (back cover)... 60 15

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Chapter 1 Influence at the Core of the Strategy Section I From the Information Warfare to the Military Influence Strategy 101. Information warfare an expression that has been used for several years places information 8 at the core of the confrontation of wills. It plays a major role within conflicts and is equally important as a simple contribution of the Armed Forces to a non-military crisis. In addition to the physical environment of the theatre of engagement, where forces are fighting different actors of a war or crisis, information may extend the conflict to the cyberspace. 102. Population has also become an ongoing issue for operations as being the target of a confrontation of legitimacies and wills between the actors. A population is rarely homogeneous and may be subject to identity issues and/or diverse mobilizing interests. Thus, it makes it harder to develop an efficient military influence strategy. By managing information, the military influence strategy aims to win the battle of perceptions by achieving effects on identified target audiences. The control of information is developed within the framework of the information warfare and contributes to the overall military strategy. Section II The Influence Strategy as part of the National Defence and Security Strategy 103. France's national defence and security strategy is based on a whole range of instruments of power, each supporting in a coordinated way the defence of vital interests, strategic interests or interests of power, and the maintenance of France's rank. This leads to an influence strategy that aims to preserve national interests on the medium and long term through foreign policy, military strategy, internal security policy, economy and culture 9. 104. The influence strategy can be defined as the art of organizing and using diplomacy, economy, information, as well as military and socio-cultural capabilities so as to support the interests of a state, group of states or international community through activities in the psychological and cognitive fields. 105. It aims to increase the effects of the desired policy on the target audiences, should they be governmental, international or private, entities or individuals. Section III The Battle of Perceptions 106. The Capstone Concept and Doctrine on the Employment of the Armed Forces (CCEAF and CDEAF) underline the issue over the control of the perception of a conflict or any military operation by the different actors. Those documents recall the offensive and defensive dimensions of the battle of perceptions 10. Within the military context, a battle of perception can be defined as a "struggle of the legitimacies felt by the actors of a conflict". It aims to persuade of the soundness of the engaged action and to give its meaning, encourage its adhesion, or at least acceptance, and to influence the decision-making process of the adversary. Battles of perceptions imply activities within the physical and immaterial fields, on the theatre and outside the theatre. They occur within several interdependent environments. 8 9 10 As it covers several meanings, the term information can hardly be restrained to one specific definition. For instance, it can be defined as: an element of knowledge based on a fact or data and to be communicated (ref. e, DIA-3.10_OI[2006] on Information Operations); meaning given from one or several data following an analysis work, sometimes automated or reduced to its simplest form, and intended to be communicated (DIA-2_RIM&CI[2010] on Military-Oriented Intelligence and Counter- Intelligence, no. 240/DEF/ CICDE/NP as of 02 October 2010). Creation in 2011 of the French Institute to promote and develop the French culture abroad. Ref. a and d, (FRA) JC-01_CCEAF(2010) and (FRA) JD-01_CDEAF(2011). 17

a. The information environment refers to "the virtual and physical space in which the information is received, exploited and disseminated" 11. It includes the cyberspace and social networks. It is linked to the strategic level due to the globalization of information and to its techniques. Acting in the information environment in real time enables to identify opportunities, trends and possibilities for the accomplishment of the mission. b. The Human Environment of an Operation (HEO) 12 refers to "all interactions between individual or collective actors who may have an impact on the employment of armed forces within a given zone". It implies the perfect knowledge of the populations and systems, and is based on the social, cultural, religious and ethnic analyses of the theatre. The HEO falls under the operational level 13. c. The operational environment is defined as a "composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander" 14. It falls under the operational level. 11 12 13 14 Ref. a, (FRA) JC-01_CCEAF(2010). The analysis of the HEO is often based on open sources and requires experts to fully understand the complexity of the theatre, identify the roots of the conflict, control its factors and have the advantage over the situation in order to reach the desired strategic and operational objectives. So as to define the lines of operations of the military influence strategy, such analysis requires: a constant assessment of the perceptions of the local civilian population; an anticipation of the strategy and activities, namely of influence, conducted by non-compliant actors; and the integration of requests within the intelligence plan. The operational level is the level of integration and of manoeuvre of the allotted military capabilities so as to produce the effects ordered from the strategic level within a given zone, campaign or environment (ref. d, [FRA] JD-01_CDEAF [2011]). Ref. AAP-6(2011). 18

Chapter 2 General Framework of the Military Influence Strategy Section I Definition 201. In addition to the operational, deployment and capability strategies, the overall military strategy includes an "influence" dimension. This dimension is constantly applied in support of each operation, in its preparation as well as during or towards a resolution of crisis. National Security Strategy French White Paper (LBDSN) Defence Policy Overall Military Strategy (FRA) JC-01_CCEAF Operational Strategy (FRA) JD-01_CDEAF Capability Strategy Deployment Strategy Military Influence Strategy (FRA) JC-3.10 Figure 2 The military influence strategy within the overall military strategy. 202. The military influence strategy 15 is adapted to the Armed Forces and their missions, and is limited to the field of responsibility of the French chief of defence staff, as defined in Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of the Armed Forces. It can be defined as follow: 203. The military influence strategy consists in the conception and conduct of activities carried out by the Armed Forces to continuously obtain effects in the psychological and cognitive fields, and lead an individual, group or organization favourable, hostile or neutral to act in the interests of the Nation, of a coalition or of the international community. 204. Within a multinational framework and in the absence of a public diplomacy concept in France, the military influence strategy is similar to both what NATO refers to as Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) 16 and to the information strategy of the European Union (cf. Annex B). Section II General Objectives 205. The military influence strategy is constantly applied. It reinforces the legitimacy, credibility and capabilities of the Armed Forces in the accomplishment of their missions. It ensures the coherence of objectives and is based on the different military instruments of power of the defence diplomacy (deployment, activities of cooperation for technical or operational military assistance 17, display of power, development of a doctrinal corpus expressing the determination to act, education and training of officers from foreign armed forces, export of weapons and skills, etc.). It is developed in coherence with the other diplomatic (negotiations, etc.), economic (embargo, arms sales, etc.) and legal (taking into account the national law) activities. 15 16 17 See figure 9 in Annex A. Ref. Study conducted by RAND Corporation for the CICDE, NATO s Strategic Communications concept and its relevance for France, October 2010. Ref. (FRA) EJC-3.21_OMA(2011), Operational Military Assistance to a Foreign Armed Force. 19

206. The military influence strategy contributes to the implementation of the different strategic functions: a. Knowledge and anticipation: warns on changes in the perception of France's activities and of the social trends and schools of thoughts within our areas of interest. This function is based on analyses provided by the Military-Oriented Intelligence (RIM) 18, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (embassies), French or foreign research centres, the academic world and polling institutes. b. Prevention: contributes to deter from the field of information to intimidation. This function aims to prevent any direct or indirect aggression against France and its interests by explaining or displaying the capabilities of the Armed Forces. More specifically, it aims to defuse tensions. c. Deterrence: participates to the credibility of nuclear deterrence. This function seeks to make the interest in the nuclear weapon accepted and acknowledged within France and among our allies, and to reinforce its credibility in the eyes of a potential opponent. d. Protection: persuades of the efficiency and aptitudes of the French Armed Forces in defending the Nation, its institutions, the national territory and its population, and promotes their actions. This function contributes to the resilience 19 of the Nation. e. Intervention: integrates the "influence" dimension to the joint manoeuvre at the strategic level. This function aims to comfort the legitimacy of the interventions on the theatres of operations or joint and combined (NATO, EU, ad hoc coalition) operations areas before, during and after the engagement of the armed forces. It also aims to isolate the adversary's action in its incoherence so as to discredit it. It contributes to the attrition of the command capabilities of the adversary(-ies). 207. To this end, and in order to be coherent, the military influence strategy: a. is based on the objectives set for the military international relations listed in the annual directive from the French chief of defence staff 20 ; b. participates to the domestic outreach 21 of the Armed Forces within the Nation; c. within the interministerial framework, seeks to make the national and strategic interests accepted within a military perspective while being coordinated with the activities of other ministries. 208. The military influence strategy defines the effects to obtain via Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment (APOE) 22, including the possible psychological operations of the strategic level. APOE are defined as the "range of intentional actions intended to obtain an effect on perceptions in order to alter the attitudes and/or behaviours of the target audience so as to reach the desired end state." 18 Renseignement d intérêt militaire / Military-Oriented Intelligence. 19 Resilience is defined as the determination and the capacity of a country, a society and a government to withstand the consequences of a major aggression or disaster, and then rapidly to restore their capacity to function normally or at least in a socially acceptable manner. This concerns not only government, but the whole of civil society and all actors in the economy (LBDSN-2008). 20 The French Joint Defence Staff (EMA) drafts the annual directive 15,000 that fixes the lines to follow in the field of military international relations. It integrates coordination on military matters in times of peace, namely with NATO, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) or another international organization. 21 Domestic outreach consists in reaching out to the desired audience through the process of relations so as to obtain its adherence and support. The Armed Forces are trained to reach out to people to share their values, explain their action and specificity, and strengthen the defence consciousness (EMA, 2011). 22 So as to better cover the areas subject to influence, the expression Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment (APOE) replaces that of Information Operations (Info Ops). It refers both to the staff function in charge of planning the desired effects, and to the activities. 20

Diplomacy Public Affairs Continuously Domestic Outreach Defence Diplomacy and International Relations Military Influence Strategy in support of Operations Overall Military Strategy Deployment Strategy Capability Strategy Military Influence Strategy Operational Strategy Military Influence Strategy in support of Operations Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment Effects on Target Audiences Figure 3 The military influence strategy in support of operations. Section III The Military Influence Strategy in Support of Operations 209. Rather applied within the national territory or during operations abroad, the military influence strategy in support of operations is part of the joint manoeuvre. It aims to reach the desired end state fixed to the Armed Forces by the political authority: a. by preparing, increasing, reinforcing and comforting the effects obtained with the threat or use of force; b. by using alternatives to the resort to force. 210. For instance, the following figure (figure 4) show the relations between the military influence strategy integrated to the state's influence strategy, itself integrated to the Comprehensive Approach (CA). The CA is organized around four main axes of influence: diplomacy, economy, overall military strategy and civilian activities. 21

Diplomacy Diplomatic «postures» (surprise, dissatisfaction, disapproval, summoning of ambassadors, withdrawal of ambassadors, economic sanctions, legal actions, etc.). economic sanctions, boycott Economy International Organizations (UN, EU, G8, G20), international organizations of the Francophonie Civilian Activities Governance, including social, cultural actions, etc. Overall Military Strategy France s Influence Strategy Military Influence Strategy Military Influence Strategy in support of Operational Engagements Defence Diplomacy Defence Agreements Common Trainings Arms Purchases and Sales Embargo Domestic Outreach of the Armed Forces Figure 4 Example of the implementation of the military influence strategy at different levels. 211. The military influence strategy in support of operations is conceived in view of the effects on the perceptions of the different parties (allies, neutral or non-compliant actors) of an international conflict or crisis. The desired effect should induce an evolution of their state of mind or at least a change in their conception of the situation that would be more in line with the national interests or multinational objectives. It intends to: a. prior to a conflict, prevent the resort to force, which military response would have a high human, material, financial and/or political cost; make international discussion organizations (in particular the UN) adhere to the national objectives; seek international support and possibly form an ad hoc coalition (based on existing agreements or not); prepare the French population to the likelihood of a crisis or conflict; b. in the event of a declared crisis, create a favourable context to the deployment of forces and to the conduct of operations, then to the disengagement, namely by making durable the positive effects obtained to the benefit of France's interests or of the objectives of a coalition; c. build and support the national or allied legitimacy and credibility of their resort to force, if needed, for the resolution of a national or international conflict or crisis; d. fight against the influence strategies of non-compliant actors through activities on the will, knowledge or capabilities; e. reinforce the conviction of the favourable target audiences by acting on their adherence and support; f. convince neutral or passive target audiences to adhere to the set objective and implemented means, or at least, to not oppose it; g. act on the knowledge and will of the unfavourable and hostile target audiences, and on their decision-making process or technical capabilities in order to weaken them, limit their hostile or aggressive posture, and to demoralize, discredit and/or neutralize them; h. contribute to the reinforcement of the determination of our forces and protect them from the influence activities and/or propaganda of non-compliant actors. To this end, the Armed Forces should understand the pursued objectives and be aware of the possible effects of disinformation. 22

212. The military influence strategy in support of operations consists: a. at the strategic level, in an influence campaign that can be implemented before, during and possibly after the resolution of a crisis. Indeed, its objectives may go beyond the missions to accomplish on the theatre of operations and require actions that do not depend on the forces only, as, for instance, within the framework of a comprehensive approach within a smart power strategy. b. at the level of the joint manoeuvre, in an information campaign within the theatre of operations to alter perceptions via APOE in coordination with the other military activities (cf. Annex C). 23

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Chapter 3 Basic Notions, Principles and Aptitudes Necessary to the Military Influence Strategy Section I Basic Notions 301. A good understanding of this document requires before all the knowledge of key definitions (cf. Annex F): a. Influence refers to the "ability to obtain effects through activities on perceptions, representations, attitudes and behaviours". b. Perception refers to the "process by which individuals detect and interpret information through the filter of their representations from their environment by means of their senses". It can facilitate the acceptance of the force, of its legitimacy and objectives, or the rejection of our adversaries. c. Representation refers to the "conscious or unconscious act of ordering sensory information, resulting in the development of a conviction, belief or system of thought. This process is mainly oriented by the education and cultural environment of an individual". d. Legitimacy refers to "what is right, fair and reasonable" 23. In the case of a military activity, it is granted both by a political mandate and by its perception by the different actors. e. Effect refers to "the cumulative consequence of one or more actions across the engagement space that leads to a change in the situation in one or more domains. Aggregation of desired effects leads to the achievement of objectives" (MCM-0052-2006, 06 June 06) 24. f. Attitude refers to the "predisposition of individuals to act in accordance with their ideas and/or convictions. Usually, in the absence of external constrains (physical, psychological, etc.), behaviours are conditioned by the attitude". g. Behaviour refers to the "conscious or unconscious way of acting and accomplishing or not certain actions". Section II Principles of the Military Influence Strategy in Support of Operations 302. The implementation of the activities on perceptions and within the operational environment must carefully follow several principles. Legitimacy 303. Most of conflicts consist in a struggle for legitimacy felt by the belligerents which objective is to gain the adherence of the local populations, their own national community, the international community and diasporas. 304. In France and in occidental states in general, this tendency is intensified by the porosity of the states' borders, the globalization of information, the excessive recourse to law of our societies, the sometimes conflicted contact between the established powers and emerging ones, and a natural tendency to compassion and sensitivity to emotions favoured by the modern communication vectors. 23 24 Translation of the definition from the French dictionary Le Petit Robert, 2006. Cf. Bi-SC NATO Information Operations Reference Book, 2010. 25

305. The success of a military engagement conducted by our forces mainly resides in their aptitude 25 to act on their operational environment and to shape it. Forces should make the target audiences understand and accept, or at least not oppose, their intervention. In parallel, the ideologies and postures of the adversary should be discredited as they may appear legitimate to those same target audiences. Credibility 306. The credibility of the Armed Forces is necessary so that they can shape their operational environment. To do so, they must be the best and the most acknowledged, through their image and exemplary action, to disseminate the message on the operational reality. 307. This credibility is based on values such as professionalism, strictness, commitment, ethic and efficiency. The credibility of the information and messages of the Force is important as well. It relies on the truthfulness of the disseminated information. However, this does not imply a complete transparency. Indeed, it would be incompatible with the preservation of the security of our activities, and thus of our soldiers. Secrecy 308. The implementation of a military influence strategy requires secrecy on the course of action used to obtain the desired effect so as to: a. preserve the freedom of action of the forces; b. seek adherence without appearing as being imposed to avoid rejection; c. contribute to the effect of surprise of the joint manoeuvre. 309. This aspect is particularly sensitive as secrecy and military deception operations are tricky to implement within a context where the Armed Forces must preserve their credibility namely face to the media without favouring short-term objectives to the detriment of long-term ones 26. Individual and Collective Involvement 310. Individual and collective involvement within the Armed Forces is necessary to the conduct of a military influence strategy. It requires initiative, determination and loyalty. Troops in daily contact with non-combatants largely contribute to the success of the military influence strategy if they know the effects to expect from the messages they must disseminate through their activities. Consequently, behaviours (Rules of Engagement and Rules of Behaviour) 27 should not be limited to what can or cannot be done. They must demonstrate an understanding of the human dimension of the situation. All individuals, at their level, must capture the spirit of the mission to understand the consequences of their own decisions on the field. Moreover, such understanding will strengthen the adherence of our soldiers to the objectives of the engagement. 311. All combatants are actors in terms of influence through the effects produced by their behaviour, image and action. Combatants must be trained and prepared to the reality of the human environment of the operations. Coherence and Continuity 312. The manoeuvre must remain unique, regardless of its level. The coherence and convergence of the conventional military activities and influence activities ensure this unity. However, as opposed to operations conducted by conventional capabilities, the effects expected from APOE are rarely immediate. As those effects are tested through time, incoherence might occur. Indeed, the effects depend on both the coherence of the APOE at a given time for instance during an operation and their continuity within the overall military campaign. The coherence of objectives within a coalition or between actors of a comprehensive approach is equally 25 26 27 Ref. a, (FRA) JC-01_CCEAF(2011). It must be kept in mind that archives will necessarily be open to the public in the future. Cf. DIA-5.2_EDF(2006), Emploi de la force en opération militaire se déroulant à l extérieur du territoire français, no. 805/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP as of 25 July 2006. 26

Anticipation important, namely to the support of the legitimacy of the operation, should it be on the theatre of operations or outside. 313. The planning of APOE requires the ability to anticipate the actions of all the actors following their own influence strategy. This anticipation relies on the familiarity with the actors and target audiences but also on initiative and imagination (favoured by education and training). Anticipation must lead the adverse military influence strategy to failure. Ad hoc Rules of Engagement 314. The military influence strategy in support of operations follows an approach of controlled effects. It applies to the technical, doctrinal, legal, moral and ethical dimensions. Thus, maliciousoriented propaganda techniques are excluded from the military influence strategy. Indeed, such strategy does not intend to deliberately undermine the individual or collective free will by the alteration and/or falsification of information. It should never use submission and indoctrination. Section III Aptitudes to Acquire or Develop Acquiring Knowledge 315. Within the framework of the military influence strategy, the "acquiring knowledge" 28 function mainly aims to identify non-compliant actors and the main key leaders on the theatre of operations as well as their vulnerabilities and forces, in order to analyse the human environment of an operation and to assess the effects of APOE. So as to give meaning and efficiency to a military influence strategy in support of operations, knowing so as to understand the human dimension of a theatre of operations in its military, social and sociological approach is important to act efficiently. This knowledge calls for diverse competences, including the control of the Military-Oriented Intelligence (RIM), but also the analysis of human, technical and/or documentary sources (OSINT) 29. 316. Depending on the areas concerned, the following elements are analysed: a. the armed forces and their environment through the RIM; b. information collected next to civilian structures (embassy; international, governmental or private organizations), advisers of the Force (POLAD, DEVAD, CULAD 30, etc.) and liaison teams; c. the Human Environment of the Operation (HEO) through Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) 31, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), and Special Forces; d. local media via the military public affairs chain and possibly via the embassy of the area directly or indirectly concerned by the operations, and national and international media via the DICoD 32. 28 29 30 31 32 Ref. d, (FRA) JD-01_CDEAF(2011). Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) refers to "information publicly available and that can be freely collected next to all types of dissemination of information materials, regardless of its transmitter" (cf. CEIA-3.7.1_ISO[2010], Recherche et emploi de l information ouverte as of 20 July 2010). Among those materials are: newspapers, public, specialized or professional press; books, handbooks, technical manuals, posters, advertising and campaign brochures, leaflets or other public physical information materials, as long as they are not subject to a deliberate restriction of their dissemination from the transmitter; TV shows, radios, films released to the public, photographs made available to the public; any information, structured or not, freely disseminated or made available via Internet. Political Adviser, Development Adviser and Cultural Adviser. Cf. Annex D. Délégation à l information et à la communication de la Défense / French Defence Information and Communication Agency. 27

Managing Information 317. One of the key functions highlighted in Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of the Armed Forces is information management, defined as a "way to act to achieve an objective through the exploitation, domination and protection of the information area" 33. During an operation, each actor seeks to shape the operational environment, namely through information. For the forces, the information management contributes to the decision-making process and implies an access to reliable information in due time. 318. Information management ensures information superiority, under normal circumstances as well as in time of crisis. It enables the sharing of relevant information so as to formulate and forward the necessary orders at the right time. It includes not only the acquisition of information, its analysis and protection, but also the capacity to undermine the information management of non-compliant actors. Command Acquire Knowledge Operate Information Management Deteriorate Adverse Information Influence / Cooperate / Communicate Acquire Knowledge Support Figure 5 The control of information among key operational functions (cf. CDEAF). 319. The control of information intends to counter the influence strategy or propaganda of noncompliant actors. Such control, which effects are based on messages (texts, images) and activities, may be exercised over the theatre of operations or our territory, that of our allies or of other states. This adverse military influence strategy intends to convince the legitimacy of its actors, recruit new opponents, weaken the morale of our forces, provoke tensions within our democracies, create arguments between the allies of a coalition, and undermine the political and military decision-making process of our forces. Shaping the Operational Environment 320. The action of shaping can be defined as "creating pre-conditions that will favour or optimize the range of physical or immaterial engagements" 34. A target audience is even more receptive if it is ready or prepared to receive the Force's message. The joint manoeuvre, conducted through physical or immaterial activities, must make target audiences more receptive during the "shaping" of the operational environment. 321. By preparing the confrontation fields material or immaterial, the shaping aims to limit the freedom of action of non-compliant actors. It must reduce their options and extend that of allied or national forces. It must highlight the strengths of these latter and seek information superiority while preventing it from non-compliant actors or at least, weakening it. By threatening a noncompliant actor in all its action area and by reducing its feeling of security namely by using APOE in a coordinated way and by damaging its command capabilities its comprehension of the operational situation and its freedom of action can be significantly reduced. 33 34 Ref. d, (FRA) JD-01_CDEAF(2011). Ref. CIA-3.2.2_OPURB(2010), Les opérations urbaines (Fighting in Urban Areas), no. 254 /DEF/CICDE/NP as of 30 September 2010. 28

Synchronizing APOE 322. So as to reach the desired end state at the lowest cost and within the given schedules, an authority coordinates and synchronizes the military operations of a unique manoeuvre. The range of objectives within the framework of a comprehensive approach as well as the difference of temporal scope between the conventional military activities and the APOE are likely to generate difficulties. However, some functions of the APOE (cf. Annex D) contribute in a major way to military operations, namely through their enabler role between the Force and civilian actors. 323. In order to ensure their coherence and relevancy within the joint manoeuvre, APOE must be synchronized: in time and space (for example, during the mandate relieves of different contingents within a theatre of operations), between the functions, between the different levels (strategic, operational and tactical), and with the other physical activities, namely of destruction. Damaging or fratricide interferences may occur if not synchronized vertically (hierarchical) and horizontally (between functions or actors). 324. A fratricide APOE is defined as a "non physical action of our forces provoking undesirable effects within the operational environment and resulting in a hindrance to the conduct of operations as well as in the limitation, delay or impossibility of reaching the desired end state". Taking into account the synchronization of APOE is imperative to limit such risk and maintain the coherence and efficiency of the overall manoeuvre. Developing a Database in Support of Operations 325. So as to favour the sharing of data on populations and target audiences, Knowledge Development (KD) tools (notion developed by NATO) can be deployed to support operations. Their use should be cautious regarding the respect of operations security. Information is available and shared depending on the level of responsibility, functions and need-to-know requirements. 326. Knowledge Development (KD) is defined as a "collaborative and iterative process ensuring the collect of data and information, their analyses and the sharing of their results" 35. It implies a change of state of mind in the acquisition, exploitation and dissemination of information regarding the spectrum of the environment of an operation (PMESII 36 systems within NATO). KD is different from the Military-Oriented Intelligence (RIM); it enables a more open approach through the transversal sharing of open information to all actors of an operation. It enables the Force Commander (FCdr) and his staff to better understand the effect of military, political, economical and cultural activities on the different systems and actors of an area of engagement. 327. KD seeks information to analyse the different systems and actors of an area of engagement in order to offer the best response. Related to the "acquiring knowledge" function, KD uses nonmilitary sources (international organizations, NGOs, companies, national or local governmental agencies, etc.). It takes part of the comprehensive approach to understand and analyse the interactions, capabilities and influences of enemies, allies, neutrals and actors of the civil society through the analysis of PMESII systems. It integrates the analysis of the human environment of an operation. The synergy of the RIM and of the information coming from other open sources must enable to offer a global view of the operational environment to the benefit of APOE by including the relations between actors and systems. Measuring the Effectiveness of APOE 328. Although integrated to the joint manoeuvre, the information campaign requires its own Measures of Effectiveness (MoE). As they are difficult to establish due to their nature, they must include both qualitative and quantitative indicators objective (fact) and subjective (interpretation of a fact). Data on the effects obtained in that area will be slower to acquire and hardly predictable compared to the MoE of conventional military activities. 35 36 Ref. RDIA-004, Knowledge Development (KD), no. 138DEF/CICDE/SEC-CENT/NP as of 18 June 2010. Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information. 29

329. This approach through effects makes the cooperation between APOE and the "targeting" function absolutely necessary during the initial phase of the systems analysis as well as during the pre-selection of targets, development of targeting dossiers, treatment of selected targets, MoE similar to the Battle Damage Assessment and Combat Assessment but possibly to a larger perspective. 330. The use of polls conducted next to target audiences may enable an assessment of the efficiency of the APOE on the long term, namely by measuring the evolution tendencies of those targets. 30

Chapter 4 Capabilities and Processes Contributing to the Military Influence Strategy 401. Within the framework of a joint manoeuvre, the military influence strategy in support of operations is implemented through different activities (described below) and operates on the selected target audiences. Section I The "Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment" Function 402. The "Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment" function (APOE function) is the Coordinating Authority 37 of the information campaign. It operates at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. It replaces, extents and specifies the former "information operations" function. 403. The APOE function "advises the command on the effects of activities on perceptions and within the operational environment on target audiences. It plans the desired effects within the framework of the military influence strategy to operations. It coordinates and assesses them" 38. It acts in synergy with the targeting function and the other physical activities conducted by the deployed forces. It is based on: a. capabilities dedicated to information (acquisition of knowledge, military public affairs, PSYOPS); b. technical capabilities that can collect information, conduct influence activities, enable to act against the adverse command and protect the force (electronic warfare, cyberdefence 39, vectors, air, maritime and land fires, etc.); c. non information-specialized capabilities that significantly contribute to the image of the Force and may alter its perception by the actors: liaison officers of the Force toward external organizations, CIMIC, Special Forces, operational or technical military assistance 40 ; d. processes (operations security, key leaders engagement, aptitudes and behaviours); e. and courses of action (military deception operations 41, etc.). Section II Context of the Operations and Target Audiences 404. The APOE function must take into account the different types of engagements and target audiences that can be identified. 37 38 39 40 41 "The assigned responsibility for coordinating specific capabilities, functions or actions involving two or more agencies (organisations or commands). Note: The individual with assigned Coordinating Authority has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he/she should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he/she is unable to obtain essential agreement he/she shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority (Bi-SC NATO Information Operations Reference Book, 2010, based on AAP-6[2009]). PIA-7.2.6-3_GIAT-O(2012), Glossaire interarmées de terminologie opérationnelle (Joint Glossary). Cf. Annexes D and F. Military assistance, should it be operational or technical, can contribute to the military influence strategy that is conducted next to the local armed forces. It enables to establish privileged personal relationships with the military superiors of the helped states, to benefit from information on the population's feeling and to transmit messages (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams [OMLT] in Afghanistan, Operational Assistance Detachment [OAD]. [FRA] EJC-3.21_OMA[2011], Operational Military Assistance to a Foreign Armed Forces, as of 04 January 2011). Cf. Annex D. 31

Depending on the Different Types of Engagement 405. Within a conflict of high intensity, the APOE function s priority is to influence the adverse decision-making process and its decision-makers at all levels. This Command and Control Warfare (C2W) with the adversary consists in the attrition of its will and in its cohesion despite the constraints of the laws into force, but also to forbid, suppress, undermine and orientate the available information to the adverse decision-maker. The objective is to affect its comprehension of the reality (communication infrastructures, information systems, etc.) and thus, its capacity to exert an efficient command over its capabilities. 406. In a state or area subject to insurgency, a counter-insurgency campaign 42 is conducted within the framework of an overall stabilization process 43 that aims to re-establish the conditions for a political and social life by rehabilitating the three pillars of governance, security, and economical and social development. However, as insurgency comes from a deliberate and methodical process of destabilization through violence and subversion 44, the priority of Counter- Insurgency (COIN) is to counter this violence through an effort in security and a particularly active military influence strategy to counter the rebels' propaganda. Its objective mainly consists in ensuring the coherence of the messages and activities with the legitimacy of the operation so as to take the advantage over the adversary in the "battle of perceptions", the issue of which is crucial in counter-insurgency. 407. However, the re-establishment of the other pillars of stability (governance, security, and economical and social development) remains necessary. Activities in those areas are crucial to diminish the rebels' legitimacy in their radical critic of the existing order and subtract them from popular supports. Depending on the Target Audiences: from the Simple Actor to the Non- Compliant Actor 408. Those diverse engagements involve actors with different ways of thinking or courses of action than those of the deployed forces. An actor can be defined as an "individual, group or organization acting within an international, national or local system and using its aptitudes and skills to influence other individuals, groups or organizations to serve its own interests and objectives". There are different types of actors: a. governmental actors; b. different non-governmental (rebels, guerrilla, etc.) and cross-border actors (NGOs, multinationals, terrorist groups, etc.); c. international actors acting out of the field of a state, such as international organizations (UN, NATO); d. local actors. 409. Among those actors, a target audience is defined as an "individual, group or organization selected for activities on perceptions and within the operational environment, conducted by the armed forces, in an attempt to change perceptions and/or behaviours". It is identified among the actors and selected by a systems analysis 45 of the operational environment, the human environment of the operation and the information environment. Target audiences are standing, ad hoc or collateral. They are classified as "favourable, neutral, potentially hostile or hostile" depending on their attitudes and/or behaviour regarding the military objectives of our forces. 42 43 44 45 Ref. h, (FRA) JD-3.4.4_COIN(2010). Ref. (FRA) JC-3.4.9_ STAB(2010), Contribution of the Armed Forces to Stabilization, no. 022/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 02 February 2010. "Action designed to weaken the military, economic or political strength of a nation by undermining the morale, loyalty or reliability of its citizens" (AAP-6). "Analytical process that can be used to holistically examine adversaries, potential adversaries, non-aligned, and friendly nations or entities. It considers the operational environment as a set of complex adaptive systems in order to identify behaviours and structures, and to assess strengths, vulnerabilities, and interrelationships. It is successfully utilised in the civilian and military communities and has proven to be particularly useful in analysing and understanding complex operational environments" (NATO KD Concept, 2008). 32

Target Audiences International Organizations Non-Compliant Actors Non- Governmental Belligerents Opponents Actors National Population Public Opinions Decisionmakers Local Governments of the Crisis Area Allied Forces French Forces Actors Figure 6 Actors of the military influence strategy. 410. Nowadays, adversaries have become more and more "irregulars" and can less and less be qualified as enemies. Their motives can sometimes vary widely within a same group. In order to better identify the target audience, the notion of "non-compliant actor" 46 is used to define an "actor that acts voluntarily or not, directly or indirectly, by developing and implementing a strategy going against the desired end state of France or of one of its coalition. This actor can be active or potential: if likely to declare itself as such later on, if its interests are likely to change or if neutral. The notion of non-compliant actor integrates the notion of irregular adversary." However, it should be reminded that the "enemy (or non-compliant actor) of today can be the client of tomorrow and the ally of the day after" 47. Consequently, the change of status of a noncompliant actor should be considered in the resolution of a crisis in view of a future negotiation or reconciliation. Section III Activities Covered by APOE 411. Depending on the selected military influence strategy, activities on perceptions and within the operational environment may cover several types of defensive and offensive activities. Overall Military Strategy Operational Strategy Military Influence Strategy in support of Operations Information Campaign at the Operational Level Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment Information Activities Military PA Activities Civil-Military Activities Indirect Activities Figure 7 Activities on perceptions and within the operational environment at the operational level. 46 47 Ref. e, DIA-3.10_OI(2006), amended definition. Ref. Liddell Hart B.H., Le But de la guerre, Forces Aériennes Françaises, October 1951, p. 18. 33

412. As opposed to the information and civil-military activities of the operational and tactical levels, military public affairs and indirect activities most often require a validation from the strategic level. Information Activities 413. Information activities refer to "actions designed to affect information and/or information systems. They can be performed by any actor and include protection measures" 48. They cover influence activities, counter-command activities and information security activities (cf. Annex D). They contribute to military deception operations. a. Influence activities, implemented by "Psychological Operations" 49, refer to the "range of intentional actions intended to obtain an effect on perceptions in order to alter attitudes and/or behaviours". They also anticipate and counter the military influence strategy and/or propaganda of non-compliant actors. b. Counter-command activities may be used to alter the information flows surrounding a decision-maker. Those actions directly contribute to the achievement of information superiority. They aim to reduce the capacity of non-compliant actors to acquire information and to develop, disseminate and make applied their decisions. The targets of those activities are links or nods of communication, captors, intermediaries, decision-makers or processes. c. Information security activities mainly include operations security, the aim of which is the "protection of the forces' freedom of action by preserving the reliability of their decisionmaking process. It defines and enforces at all levels the active and passive, material and immaterial means to prevent any non-compliant actor to access or use information crucial to the success of a mission" 50. Operations security prevents non-compliant actors from accessing to crucial elements of the friendly information and anticipates the activities to come (security of information and of the information systems). Military Public Affairs Activities 414. The Military Public Affairs (MPA) function implements public affairs activities, i.e. "the dissemination of messages to public opinions. Within the framework of a public affairs strategy, messages are based on sound information". Military Public Affairs contribute to the development process of APOE without questioning its particular role due to the sensitivity of that area and to the maintenance of its necessary credibility next to its audiences. For those reasons, they must maintain a particular position next to the command. 415. Through a MPA plan (or MPA strategy), MPA deal with the media at the level of the theatre in compliance with the rules linked to the deontological framework of democratic societies. The MPA function does not have control over the use of the information given to the media. This has an impact on the population and on non-compliant actors, and indirectly contributes to the effects on their perceptions, namely by restoring the truth. Its impact is usually observable through the communication intended to the public on the Internet, the network communication in liaison with the process of the key leaders engagement and troop information. 48 49 50 AJP-3.10(2009). Ref. i, DIA-3.10.1_OMI(2008). Ref. d, (FRA) JD-01_CDEAF(2011). 34

Military Influence Strategy in support of Operations Information Campaign at the Operational Level Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment Military Deception Operations Information Activities Actions Militarysur PAla communication Activities Civil-Military Activities Indirect Activities Contribution of the Cyberdefence Contribution of the Electronic Warfare Psychological Operations Attitude and Behaviour of the Armed Forces C2W Activities Operations Security Activities Influence Activities Communication by the Media Communication to the Public Network Communication Operations Security Troop Information Key Leaders Engagement (KLE) Civil-Military Activities Figure 8 Capabilities and processes of the military influence strategy at the operational level. 416. The "Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)" function plans and implements the civil-military activities aiming "to establish, maintain or exploit the relations between the armed forces and civil actors, should they be international organizations, private actors (NGOs, companies, etc.), local authorities and/or populations, so as to facilitate operations and strengthen and/or reach operational objectives" 51. They seek relations based on interests with those target actors and groups. 417. Civil-military activities play a crucial role in terms of the perception of the Force by its human environment, namely through its limited but visible actions of support to the local economical development, education and healthcare 52. 418. Those civil-military activities legitimize the action and presence of the foreign military force, and favour the exercise of authority of key actors within the process of politico-military stabilization of the target area. However, the desired loyalty of target audiences expected by the CIMIC usually remains hypothetical and depends on the satisfaction of their immediate needs. Indirect Activities 419. If needed, Special Forces can plan and conduct indirect activities, i.e. the "range of actions conceived, planned and conducted by the Special Forces within the information environment" 53. The objectives, methods and means are voluntarily discreet or concealed. Coordination is ensured with the Special Forces under the authority of the French Joint Operations Centre (CPCO 54 ) or of the FCdr, by delegation. 51 52 53 54 Provisional definition. Cf. DIA-3.29_AMP(2009), Aide médicale aux populations, no. 097/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 15 May 2009. Special Forces, 2011. Centre de planification et de conduite des opérations. 35

36 420. Those activities use operational techniques and courses of action that are unusual to conventional forces but do not exclude support from those latter. Indirect activities may be conducted independently from conventional operations (independent special operations) or in coordination with those ones (adapted special operations). Their objectives are major actors of a theatre of operation abroad (symbolic targets) which action or position may have consequences (positive or negative) on France's overall interests and particularly, on reaching the force's objectives.

Annex A General Scheme of the Military Influence Strategy Diplomacy Public Affairs Domestic Outreach Defence Diplomacy and International Relations Military Influence Strategy in support of Operations Overall Military Strategy Deployment Strategy Capability Strategy Military Influence Strategy Operational Strategy "Activities on perceptions and within the operational environment" function: - Advises the command on the APOE s effects; - Plans the effects to obtain from APOE within the context of a military influence strategy in support of an operation; - Coordinates and assesses those latter. Military Deception Operations Influence Campaign at the Strategic Level Information Campaign at the Operational Level Activities Actions sur on les Perceptions perceptions and en within environnement the Operational opérationnel Environment (APOE) Effects on Target Audiences Contribution of the Cyberdefence Contribution of the Electronic Warfare Information Activities Military PA Activities Civil-Military Activities Indirect Activities Psychological Operations Attitude and Behaviour of the forces C2W Activities Operations Security Activities Communication by the Media Communication to the Public Operations Security Influence Activities Network Communication Key Leaders Engagement (KLE) Troop Information Figure 9 General scheme of the military influence strategy. 37

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Annex B NATO's and EU's Influence Strategy NATO's Strategic Communications B01. Since the operations in Afghanistan, NATO has developed a concept of STRATegic COMmunications (STRATCOM) 55 to answer to the imperative need to adapt its influence strategy to the requirements of contemporary conflicts. The aim is to gain support from the actors of the theatre. More precisely, the concept seeks to ensure that they receive clear, sound and opportune information on the military activities, and that the interpretation of the Alliance's messages are not left at the discretion of the adversary of the NATO's forces or of other users of communication means. Its final goal is to reinforce the strategic impact of the influence activities of NATO's actors. Target audiences are designated at the level of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). B02. NATO's strategic communications is defined as "the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications actions and capabilities Public Diplomacy 56, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (lnfo Ops), and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate in support of Alliance policies, operations and actions, and in order to advance NATO s aims. Overall Strategy North Atlantic Council (NAC) Public Diplomacy Information Operations Public Affairs (PA) Military Public Affairs Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Military Strategy North Atlantic Council (NAC) Supreme Allied Command EURope (SACEUR) Military Public Affairs Information Operations Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Figure 10 Organization of NATO's strategic communications (STRATCOM). B03. The STRATCOM concept aims to facilitate collaboration between the different functions of information and communication. It is particularly based on the narrative within the perspective of a "battle of narratives" so as not to let non-compliant actors only occupy the information field with their representation of the conflict. Narratives expose the reason to be, intentions and objectives, and "why" of the conflict at all the forces levels 57. 55 56 57 NATO Strategic Communications Policy PO(2009)0141, 2009. "The totality of measures and means to inform, communicate and cooperate with a broad range of target audiences worldwide, with the aim to raise the level of awareness and understanding about NATO, promoting its policies and activities, thereby fostering support for the Alliance and developing trust and confidence in it (MC 0457/2, 2011). For instance, NATO's narrative is "a democratic, multinational alliance uniting across borders to guard, with courage and competence, against threats to our homes" (ACO 95-2, 2009). NATO seeks to confirm this narrative in the choices of its military engagements, influence strategy and operations. 39

B04. It might be represented as follow: Information Operations Military Public Affairs Public Diplomacy Public Affairs (PA) Narrative (words, images, facts, etc.) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Development Projects Humanitarian Assistance Figure 11 Narrative in NATO's STRATCOM. B05. The structure of NATO's STRATCOM mainly consists of three levels of responsibility 58 : a. the Secretary General leads strategic communications in respect of NATO's policy. Messages related to NATO's objectives and engagements are determined by the political leaders of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), Secretary General and Military Committee. The speaker at the head of the department, the Assistant Secretary General for Public Affairs, is responsible of the relations with the media. b. the Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy is in charge of public diplomacy activities, except the press and the media. c. the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) has defined the concept of strategic communications in support of operations by specifying the objectives and required competences. It is based on the "information operations", "psychological operations" and "military public affairs" functions. d. The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) is in charge of the development of concepts and of the application of doctrines, and of all education and training activities in the different military areas. The "strategic communications" branch created in 2010 coordinates the work of the staff with that conducted in other strategic headquarters (IS, IMS 59, SHAPE). It orientates the work of organizations subordinated to the SACT (JWC in Stavanger, JFTC in Bydgoscz, JALLC in Lisbon) 60 and to a lesser degree, the NATO School in Oberammergau, so as to harmonize the management of this area to the benefit of operational structures and nations. With those latter, it coordinates education activities and authenticates national structures in the name of NATO. 58 59 60 Although this chapter makes the distinction between activities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels so as to clarify structural issues, such distinction is neither useful nor appropriate when dealing with strategic communications. The socalled operational and tactical levels are always strategic in communication: any transmitted message has a strategic scope as it can influence the representations of audiences outside of the theatre of operations. International Staff (IS), International Military Staff (IMS). Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC). 40

EU's Information Strategy B06. At the politico-military level, there is no concept or doctrine referring to information activities (term adopted by the EU) implemented by the EU in support of operations. However, there is a document containing guidelines: Draft guidelines for ESDP Crisis Response Information Activities, as of November 2002. B07. Within the framework of the EU's information strategy, those guidelines describe the general principles on which information activities are based, how they are conceived, in which area they are implemented and who the main actors are. In the context of a given crisis, those "activities" mainly aim to influence the decision-makers so as to initiate and maintain their support to the EU's objectives. B08. Some principles frame those information "activities": they are opportune, proactive, coherent (thanks to an effort in coordination), targeted, objective and comprehensive in order to be credible. They are based on the production of an information strategy (describing objectives, themes, key messages and audiences) linked to the given crisis. This information strategy (expression adopted by the EU) is intended to all actors of the EU that could be involved in the management of a crisis for which Europe intervenes (Commission, command of an operation, head of a mission, special EU Representative, EU delegation in the area, etc.). Information activities are implemented in the following areas: a. political and diplomatic areas (international meetings with the decision-makers, diplomatic visits to deliver the EU's position on a crisis, declaration of the EU presidency to a press conference, opinion of the High Representative published in the papers or on the EU's website, etc.); b. economical and humanitarian affairs areas (through the commission, the EU carries its message activity in line with its information strategy); c. police, civil administration and civil security areas; d. and military area: in that case, information "activities" are implemented via "military information operations" (term adopted by the EU) and Public Relations/Public Information. B09. Target audiences are divided into three groups: audiences within the EU, audiences within the international community and local audiences in the crisis zone. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) approves and ensures the coordination of those "information activities". To do so, it gets support from a non-standing team made of personnel from the whole of the crisis management structures of the EU and of the commission: the Information Strategy Team (IST). B10. Under the conduct of the "public affairs" cell of the council in charge of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that shifts to the European External Action Service (EEAS) the IST drafts the information strategy, ideally before a deployment. This document will then be used as a base for the drafting of documents related to military information "activities" (information operations and Public Relations/Communication at the operational level). Those documents will be based on the EMUE's concepts 61. 61 EU Concept for Military Information Operations, EU Concept for Psychological Operations, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) at the level of the EU Operational HQ (OHQ) and Force HHQ (FHQ), Chapter 11 - Information Activities. 41

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Annex C The Information Campaign within a Theatre of Operations C01. All activities on perceptions and within the operational environment within a theatre of operations occur within a period of time, from the prior phase of an engagement to after the disengagement. C02. This situation leads to a distinction between an influence campaign at the strategic level that can be implemented before, during, and possibly after the resolution of a crisis, and an information campaign that is integrated to the campaign plan of the operational level. Indeed, the objectives of the influence campaign may go beyond the missions to accomplish within the theatre of operations alone. Definition C03. An information campaign 62 is defined as the "range of activities on perceptions and within the operational environment, conceived at the strategic level, and combined, planned and conducted at the operational level to reach one or several information objectives 63, for a given period of time and within a given geographical area, so as to contribute to the overall manoeuvre by conquering, extending or maintaining the control of the information environment". C04. It is necessarily in line with the influence campaign (strategic level) and can not be totally autonomous, namely in its non-military dimensions. It covers the range of phases, from prevention to a possible intervention, of stabilization and standardization. Objectives of the Information Campaign C05. The information campaign aims to contribute to the DES through clearly identified effects (change of attitudes, behaviour, decision, conviction, policy, etc.). It is conducted by the joint commander as the "influence contribution to the campaign and is closely linked to the campaign plan. It is applied within the area of operations without neglecting effects on neighbour states or on the regional area of the conflict. C06. In operations of crisis management, stabilization or counter-insurgency where stabilized, disturbed or rebelling areas can be close to each other the success of the deployed forces resides in a positive influence next to the populations to convince them of the legitimacy of their action, favour the rejection of the propaganda of non-compliant actors, disorganize the adverse decision-making process, and thus its capacity to implement its own information campaign. C07. An information campaign must: a. specify the political objectives and those of the campaign. Political objectives are set by the executive power, while strategic objectives are set by the Operation Commander (OpCdr) and translated by the FCdr into military or civil-military objectives for the campaign, and into missions or indicators. b. be planned in terms of physical and non-physical effects to obtain in conjunction with the other military and civil actors involved in the operation. 62 63 At the operational level and to answer the needs of the theatre with precision, the USA have defined the notion of Communication Strategy, which is the application of STRATCOM (Commander s handbook for strategic Communication and communication strategy, V3, 24 June 2010). Information objective: "provide statements of measurable response that reflect the aspired conditions in the information environment as a result of information actions. They enable analysis, planning, execution/management and assessment/evaluation of related actions and/or effects" (AJP-3.10, Joint doctrine for information operations, 2009). 43

c. contribute to shape the operational environment through activities on perceptions and within the operational environment including information, communication, civil-military and possibly indirect activities, conducted before the deployment of the force in order to create a favourable context. d. determine the themes, messages to deliver to each target audience and how activities on perceptions and within the operational environment can be coordinated depending on the other military activities, planned or conducted by friendly forces or noncompliant actors. e. identify and counter non-compliant actors' APOE and their desired effects by anticipating their disinformation and propaganda campaigns towards local human groups, local leaders, national and/or allied forces, national and/or allied public opinions. f. anticipate the decision of non-compliant actors' leaders or the crystallisation of public opinions. g. undermine or influence the decision-making process of non-compliant actors. h. determine reasonably measurable and significant measures of effectiveness to adapt, if needed, the information campaign and influence campaign. Narrative of the Military Campaign C08. In coherence with the influence campaign (strategic level), the information campaign (operational level) aims to win the battle of narratives. It aims to make irrelevant the adversary's representation of the conflict by supplanting or marginalizing it. It establishes the reasons of the conflict and the relevance of the objectives to reach. Those reasons and objectives must be in line with the reality of the situation by including the cultural, political and social dimensions of the target audiences. C09. An information campaign can be based on the narrative model elaborated by NATO in Afghanistan as the main course of action in the framework of its strategic communications. It also relies on the effects obtained through the coordination of the different military activities. Based on the overall vision of the mission and on the information objectives defined by the authorities of the strategic level, the narrative calls for both reason and emotion. The narrative should be in coherence with the operation (or vice-versa). C10. In addition to the appropriateness between texts, images and facts, this narrative should be based on the creation of an identity ("branding") 64 of the engaged forces that aims to give a positive perception of the forces (legitimacy, utility, efficiency, competence, credibility, etc.) and to counter any negative identity that could come from rumours, disinformation, an accusation of being an army of occupation, of being inefficient, etc. The Employment of Forces in an Influence Campaign and Information Campaign C11. Any force or power projection produces a psychological effect. The employment of forces is the first vector of an influence campaign by producing effects on perceptions through their actions, of any form, and namely through the resort to force. C12. Activities such as a power projection, show of force, limited strikes, deployment of a force within an operational area, combat power, the multinational dimension of a force, technological superiority, the level of training, etc. contribute to the weakening of the will of non-compliant actors and have psychological effects on the populations. However, their positive effects must be balanced with the possible negative effects, such as collateral damages. 64 This branding can be defined as: "the entire process involved in creating a unique name and image for a product (good or service) in the consumers mind, through advertising campaigns with a consistent theme. Branding aims to establish a significant and differentiated presence in the market that attracts and retains loyal customers" (Adapted from the Business Dictionary, 2010b), NATO s Strategic Communications concept and its relevance for France, RAND Corporation, 2010. 44

C13. The forces' behaviour and their aggressive or non-aggressive attitude may have one or several effects on non-compliant actors or on the other actors. They alter the emotions, motivations, reasoning, decision-making process or behaviour of the target audiences. The presence of forces has a great psychological impact on the populations in contact with them just from their visibility (uniforms, equipment, etc.). C14. Finally, the effect of a military operation is likely to have an impact not only on the theatre of operations but also out of the joint operations area due to the sophistication of modern media communications. Commanders at all levels are thus responsible of the real and potential psychological effects that may result from the activities in their respective operational areas. 45

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Annex D Functions Dedicated or Contributing to APOE D01. In this annex, elements introduced in Section III of Chapter 4 are further discussed. Contribution of the Cyberdefence D02. Within the framework of the French Ministry of Defence, cyberdefence represents all actions it conducts for a military or non-military intervention in the cyberspace in order to guarantee the efficiency of the Armed Forces action, the accomplishment of the entrusted missions and the correct functioning of the ministry. Indeed, the cyberspace constitutes a new field of confrontation in which diverse types of malevolent activities can be conducted by a large spectrum of potential actors and for various motives. Based on measures to protect information systems, cyberdefence covers the active and in-depth defence of the information systems, the capacity in the management of cybernetic crisis and a capability to counter attacks within the cyberspace. Cyberdefence enables to counter cyberattacks 65 or adverse disinformation activities to the benefit of the military influence strategy. Contribution of the Electronic Warfare D03. The electromagnetic environment covers the maritime, land, air, spatial and informational environments. Operating in one or several of those is often a prerequisite to success in the other environments. In this context, the electronic warfare 66 covers all systems implementing or using electromagnetic radiation, regardless of their frequency. It covers all offensive and defensive activities in the electromagnetic space. It also includes counter-command activities and communication and information systems. It covers the range of operational or technical information coming from a non-cooperative interception in the electromagnetic spectrum. D04. It enables to know the organization and capabilities of the adversary and to discover its activities or intentions. Defensive and offensive counter-measures (jamming/decoys) are a favoured tool to combine with the dissemination of information, namely within the framework of military deception operations. For instance, they can be combined with shows of force or the use of APOE. D05. In support of the military influence strategy, it enables to: a. acquire knowledge; b. undermine the enemies capabilities in the electromagnetic field (jamming of radios and command systems, etc.); c. deceive (deception, intrusion, etc.); d. assess the effects obtained through activities on perceptions and within the operational environment. Psychological Operations D06. The Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) function directly operates on the strategic and local target audiences. PSYOPS covers the range of activities aiming to obtain an effect on the behaviours of individuals, groups or organizations (target audiences) so as to contribute to the reach of political and military objectives. They are characterized by the will of an efficient action on others through means that do not necessarily include the use of force or the exercise of 65 66 A cyberattack is a "voluntary, offensive or malevolent action, conducted via the cyberspace and intended to damage data or computer systems (confidentiality, integrity, availability), which can harm the actions depending on those. A cyberattack is elaborated to reach an objective and can be of short or long-term, in witch case it can evolve and adapt to defensive measures" ([FRA] JC-6-3_CYBERDEF[2011], Cyberdefence). Ref. PIA-3.6.1(A)_ORGGE(2012), Organisation du domaine interarmées guerre électronique, about to be promulgated. 47

authority. 67 This function implements vectors (visual, audio and audiovisual) that are specific or non-specific to the armed forces. Civil-Military Cooperation D07. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) tends to improve the integration of the force in the human environment so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the mission, the re-establishment of a standard security situation and the management of a crisis by civil authorities (administration, humanitarian action, economic recovery, etc.). Key Leaders Engagement D08. The Key Leaders Engagement (KLE) plan is the planned and coordinated use of the senior leadership of the friendly force to influence key decision-makers / opinion shapers / influencers / leaders in the assigned area of operations in support of the commander s objectives. Military Deception Operations D09. Military deception operations aim to influence non-compliant actors in their decision-making by conducing them to react at the detriment of their own interests. They use stimulation and deception to reach the desired end state at a lower cost. In other words, this course of action intends to lead adverse decision-makers to act in a way that could benefit the objectives of the DES. a. Stimulation consists in imposing to the adversary an erroneous representation of the real situation, of the security and support of friendly forces, as well as of the nature and unfolding of the operations by implementing a range of measures. b. Deception is the range of measures intended to suppress or blur the clues on the existence, state, operational and logistic activities of the forces. It also preserves the secrecy of information and camouflage. Military Public Affairs D10. Military public affairs cover the range of actions conducted to communicate public information on a military operation or exercise. Special Operations D11. Special Operations (SO) are military operations conducted by the Special Operations Command to reach military or military-interested objectives of strategic nature. They are conducted by the members of the Special Forces in an autonomous way or within the context of a conventional operation. D12. However, the indirect activity 68 capability of the Special Forces remains at the level of the FCdr for its coordination and decision to be employed, namely due to the necessary secrecy on the specific objectives to reach and courses of action to apply. The origin of indirect activities is often unknown or concealed. Their objectives are major actors of a theatre of operation abroad (symbolic targets) which action or position may have consequences (positive or negative) on France s overall interests and particularly, on reaching the force s objectives. Operations Security D13. This subject will be further discussed in the joint doctrine on APOE in 2012. 67 68 Ref. i, DIA-3.10.1_OMI(2008). "Range of actions conceived, planned and conducted by the Special Forces within the information environment." 48

Annex E Incorporation of Amendments 1. Readers of this document are invited to report any errors, misprints or mistakes, as well as any remark or suggestion for improvement to the Assistant Director for Doctrinal Synergy (AD-DS) of the CICDE at the following address: Sous-directeur Synergie doctrinale CICDE École militaire 21, Place JOFFRE 75700 PARIS SP 07 or at the following number: (+33) 1 44 42 83 38; or directly on the CICDE s Intradef and/or Internet websites: http://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr No. Source Paragraph Indent Line Comment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 2. Amendments validated by the director of the CICDE will be highlighted in red in the Summary of Amendments featured on page 7 of the electronic version of this document. 49

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Annex F Lexicon Part I Initialisms and Acronyms Initialisms F01. Each letter of an initialism is pronounced separately as though separated by periods. Acronyms F02. Acronyms are made up of several syllables which can be pronounced as a single word. Graphic Charter of the Lexicon F03. In this lexicon, the characters which constitute an initialism, acronym or abbreviation are written in capitals so that the reader can memorize their meaning. F04. French initialisms, acronyms and abbreviations are written in bold, italic, Arial font, size 9, in red Roman characters. Anglo-saxon initialisms, acronyms and abbreviations are written in bold Arial font, size 9, in blue Roman characters. List of Initialisms and Acronyms Used within this Document A AAP AD-DS AJP APOE / APEO Bi-SC C2W CA CCEAF / CEF CDEAF / DEF CEMA CICDE CIMIC COIN CPCO CSDP CULAD DES DEVAD DICoD EEAS EJC / CEIA EMA ESDP EU EUMS In the NATO Allied Joint Doctrine System, signifies that a document has been completely reviewed for the first time Allied Administrative Publication Assistant Director for Doctrinal Synergy Allied Joint Publication Activity on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment / Action sur les perceptions et l environnement opérationnel Bi-Strategic Commands Command and Control Warfare Comprehensive Approach Concept d Emploi des Forces / Capstone Concept on the Employment of Armed Forces Doctrine d Emploi des Forces / Capstone Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces Chef d état-major des armées / French Chief of Defence Staff Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d expérimentation / Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experimentations Civilian-Military Cooperation Counter-Insurgency Centre de planification et de conduite des opérations / Joint Operation Centre (FRA) Common Security and Defence Policy CULtural ADvisor Desired End State Development Advisor Délégation à l information et à la communication de la Défense / French Defence Information and Communication Agency European External Action Service Exploratory Joint Concept / Concept exploratoire interarmées Etat-major des armées / French Defence Staff European Security and Defence Policy European Union European Union Military Staff 51

FCdr Force Commander FRA France/French (NATO Country Code) HEO / EHO Human Environment of an Operation / Environnement humain des opérations IMS International Military Staff Info Ops Information Operations IS International Staff IST Information Strategy Team JALLC Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre JC / CIA Joint Concept / Concept interarmées JCDA Joint Concept and Doctrine Architecture JD / DIA Joint Doctrine / Doctrines interarmées JFTC Joint Force Training Centre JP / PIA Joint Publication / Publication interarmées JWC Joint Warfare Centre KLE Key Leader Engagement LBDSN-2008 Livre blanc sur la défense et sécurité nationale / French White Paper on Defence and National Security MC Military Committee MoE Measures of Effectiveness NAC North Atlantic Council NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization NP NON PROTÉGÉ / UNCLASSIFIED OAD Operational Assistance Detachment OpCdr Operation Commander OPSEC Operations Security OMLT Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams OSINT Open Source Intelligence PA Public Affairs PGP Pôle graphique de Paris / Graphic Pole of Paris PMESII Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information POLAD Political Advisor PSC Political and Security Committee PSYOPS Psychological Operations RIM Renseignement d intérêt militaire / Military-Oriented Intelligence SACT Supreme Allied Commander Transformation SCEM-OPS Sous chef d état-major Opérations / Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe SO Special Operations STRATCOM Strategic Communications UN United Nations USA United States of America Part II Terms and Definitions Term Definition Source Year Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment (APOE) Action sur les Perceptions et l Environnement Opérationnel (APEO) Range of intentional actions intended to obtain an effect on perceptions in order to alter the attitudes and/or behaviours of the target audience so as to reach the desired end state. Actions on perceptions and within the operational environment include information activities, civilmilitary activities, public affairs related activities and indirect activities. (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2012 52

Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment function (formerly Information Operations function) Fonction Action sur les perceptions et l environnement opérationnel This function advises the command on the effects of "activities on perceptions and within the operational environment" on target audiences. It plans the desired effects within the framework of the military influence strategy to operations. It coordinates and assesses them. (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2012 Actor Individual, group or organization acting within an international, national or local system and using its aptitudes and skills to influence other individuals, groups or organizations to serve its own interests and objectives. (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2012 Attitude Predisposition of individuals to act in accordance with their ideas and/or convictions. Usually, in the absence of external constrains (physical, psychological, etc.), behaviours are conditioned by the attitude. (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2012 Battle of perceptions Bataille des perceptions Struggle of the legitimacies felt by the actors of a conflict. (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2012 Behaviour Conscious or unconscious way of acting and accomplishing or not certain actions. (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2012 Civil-military activity Action civilo-militaire Activity that aims to establish, maintain or exploit the relations between the armed forces and civil actors, should they be international organizations, private actors (NGOs, companies, etc.), local authorities and/or populations, so as to facilitate operations and strengthen and/or reach operational objectives. (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2012 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Coopération Civilo- Militaire (CIMIC) Comprehensive Approach (CA) Approche Globale (AG) Civil-military cooperation is an operational function intended to improve the integration of the force in the human environment so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the mission, the re-establishment of a standard security situation and the management of a crisis by civil authorities (administration, humanitarian action, economic recovery, etc.). A comprehensive approach aims at the prevention or lasting and rapid settlement of a crisis through the synergy of actions carried out by various agents in the fields of governance, security, and economic and social development. It implies collaboration between actors sharing the same vision and coordination with other actors present on the theatre of operations. It requires an appropriation of the required solution as soon as possible by the host nation or local representatives. It favours the necessary conditions to answer the legitimate needs of the population as quickly as possible. Lastly, it seeks the participation of regional actors to this effort. The assigned responsibility for coordinating specific capabilities, functions or actions involving two or more agencies (organisations or commands). DIA-3.10.3_CIMIC 2012 (FRA) JC-3.4_CA 2011 Coordinating Authority Autorité de coordination Note: The individual with assigned Coordinating Authority has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel an agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he/she should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he/she is unable to obtain essential agreement he/she shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority. [Based on: AAP-6(2009)] Bi-SC NATO Information Operations Reference Book 2010 53

Cyberattack Voluntary, offensive or malevolent action, conducted via the cyberspace and intended to damage data or computer systems (confidentiality, integrity, availability), which can harm the actions depending on those. A cyberattack is elaborated to reach an objective and can be of short or long-term, in witch case it can evolve and adapt to defensive measures. (FRA) JC- 6.3_CYBERDEF 2011 Cyberdefence Within the framework of the French Ministry of Defence, cyberdefence represents all actions it conducts for military or non-military intervention in the cyberspace in order to guarantee the efficiency of the armed forces action, the accomplishment of the entrusted missions and the correct functioning of the ministry. (FRA) JC- 6.3_CYBERDEF 2011 Cyberspace Global domain made from the mesh network of information technology infrastructures (including the Internet), telecommunications networks, information systems, processors and integrated control mechanisms. Cyberspace includes transported digital information as well as operators of online services. (FRA) JC- 6.3_CYBERDEF 2011 Defence diplomacy Diplomatie de défense Disinformation Désinformation Domestic outreach Rayonnement Effect Participation of the Armed Forces to the actions of the French diplomacy aiming to prevent any risk of crisis and to contribute to the achievement of France's objectives abroad. Except in the case of a declared crisis in a given state, it encompasses the support or resort to military means. Public diplomacy is coordinated by the French CHOD (CEMA) and remains the favoured tool of France's influence strategy. False information that is given deliberately to deceive the opponent, the public opinion and the media so as to create an altered reality convincing enough to deceive the "target audience" with a sound reasoning. Domestic outreach consists in reaching out to the desired audience through the process of relations so as to obtain its adherence and support. The Armed Forces are trained to reach out to people to share their values, explain their action and specificity, and strengthen the defence consciousness (French Joint Defence Staff/EMA, 2011). The cumulative consequence of one or more actions across the engagement space that leads to a change in the situation in one or more domains. Aggregation of desired effects leads to the achievement of objectives. (MCM0052-2006, 06 June 06) A change in the behavioural or physical state of a system (or system elements), that results from one or more actions, or other causes. (COPD, Draft September 09) (FRA) JD-01_CDEAF 2011 (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE CIA- 3,10(A)_INFLUENCE Bi-SC NATO Information Operations Reference Book 2002 2012 2010 Fratricide activities on perceptions and within the operational environment Action sur les perceptions et l environnement opérationnel fratricide Non physical action of our forces provoking undesirable effects within the operational environment and resulting in a hindrance to the conduct of operations as well as in the limitation, delay or impossibility of reaching the desired end state. (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2012 Human Environment of an Operation (HEO) Environnement Humain des Opérations (EHO) Range of interactions between actors and systems able to have an influence on the employment of the Armed Forces in a given area. This analysis enable the acquisition of knowledge and understanding of the human environment so as to contribute to the politico-military decision-making process, the preparation and conduct of operations, the choice of courses of action, and the adaptation of the behaviours and skills of the deployed armed forces. (FRA) JD-3.4.4_COIN (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2010 2012 54

Indirect activities Action indirecte Influence Influence activity Action d'influence Influence strategy Stratégie d influence Information Information activity Action sur l information Information campaign Manoeuvre informationnelle Information environment Environnement informationnel Information management Maîtrise de l'information Information Objective Objectif informationnel Information superiority Supériorité informationnelle Juste puissance Smart power Range of actions conceived, planned and conducted by the Special Forces within the information environment. Ability to obtain effects through activities on perceptions, representations, attitudes and behaviours. Range of intentional actions intended to obtain an effect on perceptions in order to alter attitudes and/or behaviours. The influence strategy can be defined as the art of organizing and using diplomacy, economy, information, as well as military and socio-cultural capabilities so as to support the interests of a state, group of states or international community through activities in the psychological and cognitive fields. The term "information" covers several meaning and thus can hardly be restrained to one specific definition. It can be defined as: an element of knowledge based on a fact or data and to be communicated [see ref. e, DIA- 3.10_OI(2006)]; meaning given from one or several data following an analysis work, sometimes automated or reduced to its simplest form, and intended to be communicated. Actions designed to affect information and/or information systems. They can be performed by any actor and include protection measures. Range of activities on perceptions and within the operational environment, conceived at the strategic level, and combined, planned and conducted at the operational level to reach one or several information objectives, for a given period of time and within a given geographical area, so as to contribute to the overall manoeuvre by conquering, extending or maintaining the control of the information environment. The virtual and physical space in which information is received, processed and conveyed. It consists of the information itself and information systems. (MC 422/3) Note: The information environment encompasses the cyberspace. The art of reaching an objective through the exploitation, domination and protection of the field of information. Provide statements of measurable response that reflect the aspired conditions in the information environment as a result of information actions. They enable analysis, planning, execution/management and assessment/ evaluation of related actions and/or effects. Superiority is when, in relation to the opponent, the forces gain a dominant operational advantage through more capable information gathering, processing and sharing. This domination must be sought throughout all phases of a military campaign or operation. Ability to combine force (hard power) and persuasion (soft power) for the success of a given strategy. At the strategic level, it implies the use of diplomacy, persuasion, power projection and influence in a way to reach the best return on investments of the engaged means. It mainly is an engagement in support of the diplomatic activity in all its forms and of the military force. It implies the control of the conducted activities, their legitimacy and a capacity of adaptation. Special Forces 2011 (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE DIA-3.10_OI (under revision as doctrine for APOE) DIA-2(A)_RIM&CI) 2011 2012 2012 2006 2010 AJP-3.10 2009 (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2012 2012 (FRA) JD-01_CDEAF 2011 AJP-3.10 2009 (FRA) JC-01_CEAF 2010 (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2012 55

Key Leader Engagement (KLE) Engagement des relais d influence The planned and coordinated use of the senior leadership of the friendly force to influence key decision-makers / opinion shapers / influencers / leaders in the assigned area of operations in support of the commander's objectives. AJP-3.10 2009 Knowledge Development (KD) Développement de la connaissance Knowledge Development (KD) is a continuous, adaptive and networked activity carried out at strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. It provides commanders and their staff with a comprehensive understanding of complex environments, including the relationships and interactions between systems and actors within the engagement space. NATO Bi-SC Knowledge Development Concept 2010 Military activity Action militaire Action conducted through military means. Note: A military activity may be a combat, security or assistance activity or an activity on perceptions and within the human and/or information environment. (FRA) JD-01_CDEAF 2011 Military deception operations Opérations militaire de déception Military deception operations aim to influence noncompliant actors in their decision-making by conducing them to react at the detriment of their own interests. They use stimulation and deception to reach the desired end state at a lower cost. (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2012 Military influence strategy Stratégie militaire d influence The military influence strategy consists in the conception and conduct of activities carried out by the Armed Forces to continuously obtain effects in the psychological and cognitive fields, and lead an individual, group or organization favourable, hostile or neutral to act in the interests of the Nation, of a coalition or of the international community. (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2012 Range of actions conducted to communicate public information on a military operation or exercise. Military public affairs Communication opérationnelle Non-compliant actor Source d opposition Operational environment Environnement opérationnel Operational Military Assistance (OMA) Assistance Militaire Opérationnelle (AMO) Note: Military Public Affairs (PA) are an integral part of the command and are a specific operational function. First, they contribute to an operation through their participation in the planning works and conduct of the operation, and by facilitating the comprehension of the military situation by the different audiences. Second, they act on the operation by defining the meaning of the intervention, supporting its legitimacy and promoting the image of the armed forces and their capacities in accomplishing the mission. Actor that acts voluntarily or not, directly or indirectly, by developing and implementing a strategy going against the desired end state of France or of one of its coalition. This actor can be active or potential: if likely to declare itself as such later on, if its interests are likely to change or if neutral. Note: The notion of non-compliant actor integrates the notion of irregular adversary. A composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Contribution of French Armed Forces to a foreign armed force in its various components of competences, knowledge, how-how and experience in the field of defence and in the ability to act in an operation. DIA-3.10.2_COMOPS 2007 DIA-3.10(A)(under revision) 2006 (FRA) JD-01_CDEAF 2011 (FRA) EJC-3.21_OMA 2011 56

Operations Security (OPSEC) Sûreté de l'information Perception Population Propaganda Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Opérations Militaires d Influence (OMI) Public affairs strategy Stratégie de communication Public affairs-related activity Action de communication Public diplomacy Diplomatie publique Operations security contributes to the protection of the forces' freedom of action by preserving the reliability of their decision-making process. It defines and enforces at all levels the active and passive, material and immaterial means to prevent any noncompliant actor to access or use information crucial to the success of a mission. Process by which individuals detect and interpret information through the filter of their representations from their environment by means of their senses. Heterogeneous collection of groups of individuals linked by ethnic, religious, tribal, political, social, historical or geographical criteria. Note: To be distinguished from the concept of "nation". Propaganda refers to all the misleading and manipulative actions conducted within the information environment in order to alter and constrain perceptions, attitudes and behaviours. It aims to deliberately undermine the individual or collective free will by the alteration and/or falsification of information. To this end, it provides an incorrect and partial understanding of a fact. Propaganda is characterized by the manipulation of feelings and emotions at the expense of the faculties of reasoning and judgement. It is based on methods of threats, violence, terror and lies. It may use submission, press-ganging and indoctrination. Its coercive nature and the malevolent measures it uses place propaganda out of the acceptable scope of influence. Range of activities aiming to obtain an effect on the behaviours of individuals, groups or organizations (target audiences) so as to contribute to the reach of political and military objectives. They are characterized by the will of an efficient action on others through means that do not necessarily include the use of force or the exercise of authority. Based on the objectives and themes established by the civil and military high authorities, the Public Affairs (PA) strategy consists in the development of PArelated activities and key messages in support of a military campaign. It is supported by a public affairs plan. Public affairs-related actions that encompass the dissemination of messages to public opinions. Within the framework of a public affairs strategy, messages are based on sound information. The totality of measures and means to inform, communicate and cooperate with a broad range of target audiences world-wide, with the aim to raise the level of awareness and understanding about NATO, promoting its policies and activities, thereby fostering support for the Alliance and developing trust and confidence in it. (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2012 2012 2012 2012 DIA-3.10.1_OMI 2008 (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2012 2012 NATOMC 0457/2 2011 Representation The conscious or unconscious act of ordering sensory information, resulting in the development of a conviction, belief or system of thought. This process is mainly oriented by the education and cultural environment of an individual. (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2012 Resilience Resilience is defined as the determination and the capacity of a country, a society and a government to withstand the consequences of a major aggression or disaster, and then rapidly to restore their capacity to function normally or at least in a socially acceptable manner. This concerns not only government, but the whole of civil society and all actors in the economy. LBDSN (White Paper) 2008 57

Shape (verb) Modeler Creating prior conditions favouring or optimizing the scope of physical or immaterial engagements. CIA-3.2.2_OPURB 2010 Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) Communication stratégique The coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications actions and capabilities Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (lnfo Ops), and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate in support of Alliance policies, operations and actions, and in order to advance NATO s aims. NATO PO(2009) 0141 2009 Strategic Psychological Operations (SPO) OMI Stratégiques (OMIS) Planned at the governmental or intergovernmental level, SPO aim to influence "target audiences" in support of political, diplomatic or economic activities. SPO come under the responsibility of the Nation and are integrated to the military influence strategy. DIA-3.10.1_OMI 2008 Subversion Action designed to weaken the military, economic or political strength of a nation by undermining the morale, loyalty or reliability of its citizens. NATO AAP-6 2011 Target audience Audience-cible Individual, group or organization selected for activities on perceptions and within the operational environment, conducted by the armed forces, in an attempt to change perceptions and/or behaviours. (FRA) JC- 3.10(A)_INFLUENCE 2012 58

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Summary (FRA) JC-3.10(A)_INFLUENCE(2012) 1. The participation of the Armed Forces to the resolution of crises and conflicts goes beyond the physical activities conducted to bring the adversary to its knees. In fact, the armed intervention occurs within a complex environment and must take into account the psychological and sociological impacts of a military campaign and its amplifier effects. 2. Consequently, the overall population, its perception on the events and, if possible, its adherence to the different activities in progress are more and more of an issue to the diverse protagonists. 3. From this general observation, the first chapter of this document explains that the battle of perceptions is at the core of the strategy and plays a major role in the theatre of operations as well as in the "wider world" (national public opinions, international organizations, etc.). 4. The second chapter gives a general outline of the military influence strategy and exposes its general objectives within the framework of the five strategic functions defined by the French White Paper on Defence and National Security (LBDSN-2008). Then it explores the objectives specific to the military influence strategy in support of operations. 5. The third chapter defines the keys to success at that level and insists on the aptitudes to acquire and develop to efficiently conduct the Activities on Perceptions and within the Operational Environment (APOE) of an operation. It underlines the necessary synergy that must exist between the military activities in the physical fields and those in the fields of perceptions. 6. Finally, the fourth chapter specifies the capabilities necessary to the APOE function, which one is at the base of the whole military influence strategy. This function is centred on the influence of identified "target audiences". It covers information activities, military public affairs, civil-military activities and the indirect activities of the Special Forces. This document has been developed by the (FRA) Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experimentation (CICDE), a joint agency working on behalf of the Defence Staff (EMA). For any information, please contact the CICDE at: CICDE, Sous-directeur Synergie doctrinale (SD-SD) École militaire 1, place JOFFRE 75700 PARIS SP 07 Phone: (+33) 1 44 42 83 38 60 Instead of a physical library, the CICDE has chosen to limit the paper publication of its documents in favour of a unique and up-to-date virtual library to make it available from any computer with Internet connection. Classified documents may be downloaded on protected networks only. The electronic version of this document is available on line on the Intradef and Internet websites of the CICDE at htpp://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr in the section entitled "Corpus conceptuel et doctrinal interarmées français" (Joint Concept and Doctrine Architecture).