August 24, 2011 Practice Group: Mortgage Banking & Consumer Financial Products Before the Parade Passes By Recent Developments under the Fair Credit Reporting Act The Fair Credit Reporting Act (the FCRA or the Act ) has long been one of the trickiest consumer credit laws to understand, with many institutions failing to comply without even knowing they were subject to its requirements. While the financial services industry s recent attention has necessarily been devoted to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 s (the Dodd-Frank Act ) continuing parade of high profile reforms including changes to federal preemption standards and the establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the CFPB ), to name just a few the past month has also seen a series of lower profile, but no less significant, developments with respect to the FCRA. This alert summarizes these FCRA-related developments, which include the transfer of primary regulatory authority over the Act to the CFPB; the repeal of the outdated informal Staff Commentary to the FCRA, and the issuance of a new Staff Report that consolidates, clarifies, and updates the Federal Trade Commission s (the FTC ) interpretations of the Act; the promulgation of final regulations by the FTC and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (the Board ) amending risk-based pricing notices and adverse action model forms to reflect new credit score disclosure requirements under Section 1100F of the Dodd-Frank Act; and the release of a CFPB report on the extent to which the credit scores available to consumers may differ from those actually used by lenders. I. FTC Staff Report Until recently, the FCRA has been enforced primarily by the FTC (and also by the federal bank regulatory agencies with respect to institutions subject to their jurisdiction). Over the years, the FTC has issued a variety of formal and informal guidance under the FCRA. In 1990, the FTC consolidated this guidance in a comprehensive Commentary to the FCRA (the Commentary ). While the Commentary was non-binding and did not carry the force of law, it provided useful insight into how the FTC interpreted the statute and how it intended to exercise its enforcement authority. However, the Commentary has become outdated in several respects both because it does not reflect several more recent statutory and interpretive guidance and also because it has not been updated to address a number of modern practices with respect to the dissemination and use of consumer reports. Accordingly, the FTC has repealed the Commentary and replaced it with an updated Staff Report that provides a section-by-section summary of how the FTC has interpreted the FCRA. i Much of the Staff Report, which the FTC likely intended to gently guide the new CFPB as it assumes primary regulatory and interpretive responsibility for FCRA, is a restatement of longstanding interpretations of the statute. However, the Staff Report does provide some extremely useful guidance regarding some aspects of FCRA that had been to put it charitably difficult to discern among the thicket of formal and informal interpretations of the Act.
It is particularly noteworthy that the interpretations in the Staff Report differ from the old Commentary in several respects. These departures include: Commercial Transactions. The Report adopts interpretations regarding the application of the FCRA to an application for business credit that had been previously expressed only in informal staff opinions that postdated (and contradicted) the Commentary. Specifically, the Report confirms that a permissible purpose exists under the Act to obtain a consumer report about an individual who will be personally liable on a business-purpose debt (e.g., as a guarantor or cosigner). This has implications for reporting services that provide creditworthiness information about business principals in connection with credit transactions and other permissible purposes, because to avoid being considered a consumer reporting agency under the Act, those services typically require users to certify that the user will not use reports for any FCRA permissible purpose. Thus, a person that desires to evaluate an individual s creditworthiness in connection with a business transaction on which that individual will be personally liable may only be able to obtain the report from a regulated consumer reporting agency rather than from one of these nonregulated services. Additionally, the user of the report must comply with applicable FCRA requirements related to the use of consumer reports including, for example, the adverse action notice requirements notwithstanding that the report may be used for business purposes. Joint User Exception. The FTC had previously articulated a joint user exception under which a lender or other user of a consumer report could share an applicant s consumer report with other parties jointly involved in making a decision on the application without risking being considered a consumer reporting agency. For example, the FTC suggested that a lender could forward a consumer report on a credit applicant to a prospective insurer or guarantor of the loan whose review of the file was necessary to the credit decision. The joint user exception was potentially problematic, however, because the reasoning underlying the relevant FTC staff opinion letters was arguably applied more broadly than just to circumstances where multiple parties needed to review a report in order to reach a truly mutual decision on an application. As a result, the exception was invoked in a variety of other circumstances where it was difficult to characterize the parties as true joint users of the types described in the FTC guidance. For example, the joint user exception has been used as the basis for the disclosure of consumer reports from a mortgage lender to service providers that were not co-equal participants in the credit decision. The Staff Report helpfully resolves these ambiguities by abandoning use of the term joint user. Instead, the Report sets forth a broader exemption under which the regulators will look to whether the party to whom the report is being provided merely effectuates a particular transaction initiated by the consumer, then that party is not providing consumer reports to third parties and is not a consumer reporting agency. (Conversely, if the lender or other user of the consumer report shares the report for the purpose of providing consumer reports to third parties, the lender may become a consumer reporting agency.) The FTC notes that the exemption also extends to communications with a service provider, as long as the user transmits information to the service provider: (i) solely for the purpose of using the information to service that consumer s account, and (ii) under circumstances that allow the service provider to use the information only in the manner that the creditor would be permitted to use it. Thus, the FTC appears to say that a creditor may safely communicate consumer credit information to underwriters, loan servicers, collection agencies, and other service providers without becoming a consumer reporting agency. 2
Identified Information. The Commentary suggested that certain anonymous information may not be considered a consumer report, to the extent that the information does not identify particular consumers. For example, the Commentary indicated information coded by Social Security number, driver s license, or bank account number was not a consumer report as long as no individual consumer s identity was expressly disclosed. The FTC has eliminated these statements in light of advances in technology that can permit individual identities to be reverse engineered from otherwise anonymous or aggregated data. Instead, the Staff Report clarifies that while truly anonymous information is not a consumer report, a communication that does not identify a consumer by name may still constitute a consumer report if the information could otherwise reasonably be linked to the consumer. Address in Adverse Action Notices. Because the modern consumer reporting industry is conducted on a nationwide basis, making it unlikely that a consumer would ever need to visit the physical premises of a consumer reporting agency, the Staff Report permits a consumer reporting agency to list a post office box as its address for adverse action notices, which was previously prohibited under the Commentary. The Staff Report also contains several other noteworthy interpretations, which while consistent with the Commentary and previous guidance, bear mentioning because the Report directly addresses current credit practices. These interpretations include clarifications with respect to: Account Review. Section 604(a)(3)(A) of the FCRA provides a permissible purpose for obtaining a consumer report in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the review or collection of an account of the consumer. The FTC had previously issued an informal opinion letter that could have been read to suggest that a creditor could never rely on this permissible purpose to obtain a consumer report in connection with a closed-end credit transaction. The Report clarifies that a creditor may rely on this permissible purpose both with respect to open-end credit and closed-end credit, as long as the creditor uses the report solely to decide whether to modify the terms of an existing account relationship. Thus, a creditor or servicer may obtain a consumer report in connection with a modification decision without the consumer s express written consent, provided that the creditor or servicer only uses the report for that purpose and not to market other products or services to the consumer. Debt Collection. The Staff Report clarifies that a collection agency, detective agency, private investigator, or attorney has a permissible purpose under the FCRA to obtain a consumer report on a consumer for use in obtaining payment of that consumer s account on behalf of a creditor. A creditor may also obtain a consumer report on an existing account to formulate its collection strategy. Automobile Dealers. FCRA provides that a permissible purpose exists when the user has a legitimate business need for the information in connection with a business transaction that is initiated by the consumer. The Staff Report clarifies that an automobile dealer has a permissible purpose to obtain a consumer report under this authority only when the consumer clearly understands that he or she is initiating the purchase of a vehicle. For example, a permissible purpose exists when a consumer offers to pay for a car with a personal check or inquires about 3
financing. However, the dealer may not order a report on a consumer who is merely window shopping or test driving a car, because there is no transaction initiated by the consumer until the consumer has demonstrated an intent to initiate the purchase or lease of a vehicle. Prescreening. The Report incorporates the holdings of several significant cases regarding the extent to which a firm offer of credit made pursuant to a prescreened solicitation must state particular credit terms. Specifically, following a portion of the holdings in Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc. ii and Murray v. New Cingular Wireless, iii the Report indicates that while a firm offer may not be a sham offer used as a ruse to engage in target marketing, a solicitation may qualify as a firm offer even if it does not set forth all of the terms of the offer or includes a term that is variable, such as the interest rate on a credit card account. Written Instructions. Under Section 604(a)(2) of the FCRA, a permissible purpose exists to obtain a consumer report in accordance with the written instructions of the consumer to whom the report relates. The Staff Report indicates that written instructions must provide a clear and specific written authorization to procure a consumer report. Thus, the FTC s new interpretation is that more general statements, such as I understand that where appropriate, credit bureau reports may be obtained are not sufficiently specific. Whatever the form the written instructions may take, they must include an express grant of permission to obtain the consumer report. Adverse Actions. Consistent with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ( ECOA ) adverse action regulations discussed below, the Staff Report clarifies that because the FCRA adopts the definition of adverse action from ECOA, only an applicant must receive an adverse action notice in the context of a credit transaction. In other words, when a consumer report is used in a credit transaction and the user takes an adverse action that is based in whole or in part on information in that report, only the applicant (and co-applicant) must be provided an adverse action notice. Other parties, such as guarantors or cosigners, do not need to be given an adverse action notice, even to the extent that they may be adversely affected by the credit decision. While the Staff Report s clarifications and new interpretations are both welcome and necessary, it is unfortunate that the FTC failed to address one ambiguity that is especially significant in light of the Dodd-Frank Act s expanded adverse action notice requirements namely, the scope of a person s liability in connection with an adverse action violation. Section 1681m of FCRA contains certain restrictions applicable to users of consumer reports, including the adverse action notice requirement and the risk-based pricing notice requirement. When Section 1681m was amended in 2004 to include the requirement to provide risk-based pricing notices, the amendments included a new subsection providing that no private right of action is available for any violation of Section 1681m. iv At least one court has held that the blanket private right of action exemption for all of Section 1681m is a scrivener s error and that there remains a private right of action for any violation of Section 1681m other than the requirement to provide the risk-based pricing notice. v The weight of the authority holds, however, that a private right of action is no longer available for any violation of Section 1681m. vi The FTC may have felt that the availability of a private right of action is beyond the scope of the Staff Report, because the issue does not bear on how the FTC has chosen to administratively enforce the Act. This is not an unreasonable position to take, but the FTC s views on this important issue would have been welcome. 4
II. Adverse Action and Prescreened Solicitation Final Rules On July 6, 2011, the Board and the FTC promulgated final rules regarding the credit score disclosure requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 1100F of the Act amended FCRA to provide that certain information regarding the consumer s credit score be included in adverse action notices and risk-based pricing notices. These amendments became effective on July 21, 2011, without any need for implementing regulations. However, the regulations provide useful guidance in a number of areas, because these seemingly simple amendments raise surprisingly thorny implementation issues. A. Adverse Action Notices The FCRA requires a person to provide an adverse action notice when the person takes an adverse action based in whole or in part on information in a consumer report. With respect to consumer credit, an adverse action generally means a denial or revocation of credit, a change in the terms of an existing credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested. However, the term can also include any action taken in connection with a transaction initiated by a consumer or in connection with a review of a consumer s account that is adverse to the consumer s interests. Section 1100F of the Act provides that if a numerical credit score is used in connection with an adverse action, the adverse action must include that credit score and also state the following information (which the person providing the notice would receive from the consumer reporting agency that provided the score): The range of possible credit scores under the model used; All of the key factors that adversely affected the credit score of the consumer in the model used (up to four, unless one of the factors is the number of credit inquiries, in which case five factors must be disclosed); The date on which the credit score was created; and The name of the person or entity that provided the credit score or credit file upon which the credit score was created. The Board s final rule amends the model adverse action notices in Regulation B (which implements the ECOA) to include a space to provide this additional information. These revisions are relatively straightforward, but the Board also took the opportunity to provide guidance regarding the content and delivery of adverse action notices containing this additional information. Although the Board does not have authority to implement or interpret the FCRA adverse action requirements, the final rule generously provides a (non-binding) roadmap to compliance by answering several important questions. When is credit score information required? The regulations clarify that the Section 1100F credit score information is only required when the creditor actually uses a credit score in connection with an adverse action. The additional information is required if the credit score played any role in the decision, even if the score was not a significant factor. On the other hand, if the adverse action is not based on the credit score to any extent or if the 5
consumer report did not contain a credit score, the adverse action notice does not need to include the additional credit score information. When a creditor obtains multiple scores but only uses one in making the decision, the creditor must disclose the credit score that it used. Creditors should maintain policies and procedures to determine which of the multiple credit scores was used. If under those policies, the creditor determines that multiple scores played a role in the adverse action, the creditor only needs to disclose one of the scores. Who must receive the credit score information? FCRA requires a creditor to provide an adverse action notice to any consumer against whom adverse action is taken based in whole or in part on a consumer report. Thus, multiple applicants may be entitled to receive adverse action notices. In fact, the regulations note that when there are two applicants, a creditor must provide a separate adverse action notice to each applicant when the application is denied, even in part, based on information in a single applicant s consumer report. This stands in contrast to ECOA, which only requires an adverse action notice to be given to any one primary applicant. The Board also confirmed that in the context of a credit transaction, both ECOA and FCRA adverse action notices only need to be provided to applicants. A creditor does not need to give notices to guarantors, cosigners, or other parties, even to the extent that they may be adversely affected by the credit decision. The Board notes that when there are multiple applicants and the Section 1100F requirements are triggered because the adverse decision is based on an applicant s credit score, a creditor must take care not to disclose one applicant s credit score to other applicants. The Board rejected requests to add language to the forms indicating that for co-applicants, the adverse action decision may be based on either or both of the applicants credit information. Instead, the Board recommends providing separate adverse action notices to each applicant each notice would indicate that the adverse action is based on a credit score, but would only disclose the recipient s score. The Board recognizes the potential for confusion if an applicant with an excellent credit score receives such a notice, but believes that in such circumstances, the applicant will either understand that the decision was based on the co-applicant s credit or will at least contact the creditor to inquire. Can the credit score information appear on a separate document? Some commenters suggested that creditors be allowed to provide a uniform adverse action notice to each applicant, while providing a supplemental document containing the Section 1100F credit score information only to the applicant whose credit score was used in the adverse action decision. The FTC rejected this approach, asserting that providing a form with credit score information separately from an adverse action notice does not appear to be consistent with the legislation. However, the FTC does not cite any legislative history or other authority in support of this conclusion, which is unfortunate since providing a separate credit score notice seems consistent with the plain language of the Act and would solve many of the administrative challenges presented by the disclosure requirement. 6
How should the creditor present information from and about the consumer reporting agency that provided the score? The final rule clarifies that the person taking the adverse action is responsible for providing the adverse notice, which must include the key factors adversely affecting the credit score. The notice must include at least four key factors (or five if the number of inquiries is one of the factors). The Board indicated that the creditor is responsible for ensuring that its contractual arrangement with the consumer reporting agency enables it to receive the credit score information necessary to complete the form. In other words, a creditor remains responsible for compliance, even if the consumer reporting agency fails to provide it with the necessary information. Thus, it is incumbent upon creditors to ensure that they receive the information in a timely and usable format. Because the credit score information is essentially passed through from the consumer reporting agency, several commenters requested that the Board include language on the model forms directing the consumer to the consumer reporting agency for more information about the credit score. In response to these requests, the Board included optional language in the model forms that directs the consumer to the entity that provided the score for any questions about the score, along with the entity s contact information. In some circumstances, a creditor may base its adverse action decision from multiple consumer reporting agencies, all of which would be identified in the general FCRA adverse action notice. However, as discussed above, even when the creditor uses multiple credit scores, it must choose only one score to disclose in the Section 1100F portion of the notice. When a creditor does this, the Board expects the creditor to replace the general reference in the Section 1100F notice from this consumer reporting agency (which would refer to a single consumer reporting agency previously identified in the notice) to a more specific reference to the name of the consumer reporting agency. Must a creditor provide the Section 1100F information when it has already provided credit score information in a risk-based pricing notice or an exception notice? The risk-based pricing notice and the residential mortgage exception notice required under the riskbased pricing rule also contain credit score information. Unfortunately, the Board does not have any authority to craft an exception to the Section 1100F requirements for a creditor that has already provided credit score information. That said, the Board did not appear particularly inclined to do so even if it had the authority, because of the possibility that a creditor might use different credit scores at different points in the application process. According to the Board, legitimate and separate consumer protection interests are served by disclosing credit score information both at the time of application and at the time of adverse action, even if that information may be duplicative to some extent. Thus, a creditor must still comply with the Section 1100F adverse action notice requirement even if it has already provided credit score information to the consumer, whether on a risk-based pricing notice, an exception notice, or on another document. Similarly, because the risk-based pricing and adverse action notices must be provided at different times, a creditor may not attempt to satisfy both risk-based pricing and adverse action credit score disclosure requirements in a single document. 7
B. Risk-Based Pricing Notices The FCRA requires a creditor to provide a risk-based pricing notice to a consumer when the creditor uses a consumer report to grant or extend credit to the consumer on material terms that are materially less favorable than the most favorable terms available to a substantial proportion of consumers from or through that creditor. The Board and the FTC had previously issued implementing regulations providing that residential mortgage creditors may comply with this requirement by providing each applicant with a modified Notice to the Home Loan Applicant that includes information about the applicant s credit score and associated information (an Exception Notice ). The Board and the FTC have updated the risk-based pricing model forms to include the credit score information now required under Section 1100F of the Dodd-Frank Act. Because this information is the same as the credit score information required to be disclosed on the adverse action notice (although the credit scores actually disclosed on the respective notices may differ in certain circumstances), many of the issues addressed in the risk-based pricing final rule mirror those in the adverse action final rule, particularly with respect to the content and delivery of the credit score information (e.g., identification of which credit score to disclose, the number of key factors to include in the disclosure, the creditor s responsibility to obtain the relevant information from the consumer reporting agency, whether notices must be given to guarantors or cosigners, etc.), which we will not repeat here. The final rule does, however, contain some guidance unique to risk-based pricing notices. Perhaps most significantly for the residential mortgage industry, the agencies expressly declined to alter the exception from the risk-based pricing notice requirement for a residential mortgage creditor that provides Exception Notices. In light of the transfer of rulemaking authority to the CFPB, the agencies decided not to make any changes to the rules beyond those directly mandated by Section 1100F. The agencies also provided specific guidance regarding when an automobile dealer uses a consumer report such that it must provide a risk-based pricing notice to consumers. The final rule indicates that when an automobile dealer is the original creditor in a three-party financing transaction, but the financing source (i.e., the investor that will acquire the resulting credit contract) is the party that underwrites the transaction, orders a credit report, and sets the terms of credit, the automobile dealer has still used a consumer report and must provide a risk-based pricing notice to the consumer when the material terms of the transaction are materially less favorable than the most favorable terms available to a substantial proportion of consumers from or through the automobile dealer. III. CFPB Report to Congress on Credit Scores Section 1078 of the Dodd-Frank Act required the CFBP to conduct a study by July 21, 2011, on the nature, range, and size of variations between the credit scores sold to creditors and those sold to consumers by nationwide consumer reporting agencies and whether such variations disadvantage consumers. The CFPB released this report on July 19. While it does not break any new legal ground, it provides an overview on the various types of credit scores that currently are available to creditors 8
and consumers. The report noted that when a consumer purchases a score from a consumer reporting agency, it is unlikely that the score will be the same that a lender used when evaluating the consumer s application for an extension of credit. This can occur if the consumer purchases an educational score that lenders do not actually use, the lender uses a different scoring model than the one purchased by the consumer, the lender uses a different consumer reporting agency, or the underlying data in the consumer report changes significantly between the time that the consumer sees the score and the lender obtains the consumer report. As a result, the CFPB is concerned that consumers may not be able to accurately assess how lenders view their credit profiles. This concern is addressed to some extent by the requirements that lenders disclose the credit scores on which they rely in risk-based pricing notices, exception notices, and adverse action notices. However, the report suggests that the CFPB may not think that these disclosures are sufficient. In any event, the CFPB is obtaining a large database of anonymized consumer report information which it will analyze to determine the extent to which consumers may be harmed by discrepancies between the credit scores available to them and the scores that lenders actually use. The results of this study may provide a basis for future regulatory actions. * * * * * * FCRA is a difficult statute replete with traps for the unwary. The Staff Report and the final Section 1100F regulations clarify ambiguities both old and new, while the CFPB report to Congress suggests that more regulatory activity may be on the horizon. These important developments should not be overlooked as the Dodd-Frank Act regulatory parade passes by. If you have any questions about the Staff Report, Section 1100F of the Dodd-Frank Act, or other aspects of the FCRA, please contact Melanie Brody, Jon Jaffe, David Tallman, or any other member of K&L Gates Mortgage Banking and Consumer Financial Products Group. Authors: Melanie Brody Partner melanie.brody@klgates.com +1.202.778.9203 Jonathan D. Jaffe Partner jonathan.jaffe@klgates.com +1.415.249.1023 David A. Tallman Associate david.tallman@klgates.com +1.202.778.9046 i The report, entitled Forty Years of Experience with the Fair Credit Reporting Act: An FTC Staff Report and Summary of Interpretations, is available at www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcrajump.shtm. ii 389 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2004). 9
iii 523 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2008). iv 15 U.S.C. 1681m(h)(8). v See Barnette v. Brook Road, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 2d 741 (E.D. Va. 2006). vi See, e.g., Perry v. First National Bank, 459 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2006). 10
K&L Gates Mortgage Banking & Consumer Financial Products practice provides a comprehensive range of transactional, regulatory compliance, enforcement and litigation services to the lending and settlement service industry. Our focus includes first- and subordinate-lien, open- and closed-end residential mortgage loans, as well as multi-family and commercial mortgage loans. We also advise clients on direct and indirect automobile, and manufactured housing finance relationships. In addition, we handle unsecured consumer and commercial lending. In all areas, our practice includes traditional and e-commerce applications of current law governing the fields of mortgage banking and consumer finance. For more information, please contact one of the professionals listed below. LAWYERS Boston R. Bruce Allensworth bruce.allensworth@klgates.com +1.617.261.3119 Irene C. Freidel irene.freidel@klgates.com +1.617.951.9154 Stanley V. Ragalevsky stan.ragalevsky@klgates.com +1.617.951.9203 Brian M. Forbes brian.forbes@klgates.com +1.617.261.3152 Andrew Glass andrew.glass@klgates.com +1.617.261.3107 Phoebe Winder phoebe.winder@klgates.com +1.617.261.3196 Charlotte John H. Culver III john.culver@klgates.com +1.704.331.7453 Amy Pritchard Williams amy.williams@klgates.com +1.704.331.7429 Chicago Michael J. Hayes Sr. michael.hayes@klgates.com +1.312.807.4201 Dallas David Coale david.coale@klgates.com +1.214.939.5595 Miami Paul F. Hancock paul.hancock@klgates.com +1.305.539.3378 New York Philip M. Cedar phil.cedar@klgates.com +1.212.536.4820 Elwood F. Collins elwood.collins@klgates.com +1.212.536.4005 Steve H. Epstein steve.epstein@klgates.com +1.212.536.4830 Drew A. Malakoff drew.malakoff@klgates.com +1.216.536.4034 San Francisco Jonathan Jaffe jonathan.jaffe@klgates.com +1.415.249.1023 Elena Grigera Babinecz elena.babinecz@klgates.com +1.415.882.8079 Seattle Holly K. Towle holly.towle@klgates.com +1.206.370.8334 Washington, D.C. Costas A. Avrakotos costas.avrakotos@klgates.com +1.202.778.9075 David L. Beam david.beam@klgates.com +1.202.778.9026 Melanie Hibbs Brody melanie.brody@klgates.com +1.202.778.9203 Krista Cooley krista.cooley@klgates.com +1.202.778.9257 Daniel F. C. Crowley dan.crowley@klgates.com +1.202.778.9447 Eric J. Edwardson eric.edwardson@klgates.com +1.202.778.9387 Steven M. Kaplan steven.kaplan@klgates.com +1.202.778.9204 Phillip John Kardis II phillip.kardis@klgates.com +1.202.778.9401 Rebecca H. Laird rebecca.laird@klgates.com +1.202.778.9038 Laurence E. Platt larry.platt@klgates.com +1.202.778.9034 11
Phillip L. Schulman phil.schulman@klgates.com +1.202.778.9027 Nanci L. Weissgold nanci.weissgold@klgates.com +1.202.778.9314 Kris D. Kully kris.kully@klgates.com +1.202.778.9301 Morey E. Barnes morey.barnes@klgates.com +1.202.778.9215 Kathryn M. Baugher kathryn.baugher@klgates.com +1.202.778.9435 Emily J. Booth emily.booth@klgates.com +1.202.778.9112 Holly Spencer Bunting holly.bunting@klgates.com +1.202.778.9853 Jessica M. Flathmann Sandler jessica.sandler@klgates.com +1.202.778.9488 Rebecca Lobenherz becky.lobenherz@klgates.com +1.202.778.9177 Melissa S. Malpass melissa.malpass@klgates.com +1.202.778.9081 David G. McDonough, Jr. david.mcdonough@klgates.com +1.202.778.9207 Stephanie C. Robinson stephanie.robinson@klgates.com +1.202.778.9856 Tori K. Shinohara tori.shinohara@klgates.com +1.202.778.9423 Kerri M. Smith kerri.smith@klgates.com +1.202.778.9445 David Tallman david.tallman@klgates.com +1.202.778.9046 Kathryn Sellig Williams kathryn.williams@klgates.com +1.202.778.9122 PROFESSIONALS Government Affairs Advisor / Director of Licensing Washington, D.C. Stacey L. Riggin stacey.riggin@klgates.com +1.202.778.9202 Regulatory Compliance Analysts Washington, D.C. Dameian L. Buncum dameian.buncum@klgates.com +1.202.778.9093 Teresa Diaz teresa.diaz@klgates.com +1.202.778.9852 Robin L. Gieseke robin.gieseke@klgates.com +1.202.778.9481 Brenda R. Kittrell brenda.kittrell@klgates.com +1.202.778.9049 Dana L. Lopez dana.lopez@klgates.com +1.202.778.9383 Patricia E. Mesa patty.mesa@klgates.com +1.202.778.9199 Daniel B. Pearson daniel.pearson@klgates.com +1.202.778.9881 Jeffrey Prost jeffrey.prost@klgates.com +1.202.778.9364 12