USAK YEARBOOK Vol.4, Year 2011 pp. 159-185 UNDERSTANDING THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: CHANGES WITHIN CONTINUITY, IS TURKEY DEPARTING FROM THE WEST? Mesut ÖZCAN - Ali Resul USUL Abstract Turkish foreign policy during the AK Party reign has attracted the attention of a number of observers and analysts and generated debates both in Turkey and abroad. A number of foreign policy analysts and commentators have regarded this new policy as a radical shift from conventional Turkish foreign policy. We argue in this study that although there are some significant changes and innovations in the nature and style of Turkey s foreign policy during the last seven years; the international orientation of Turkey continues to preserve its basic nature. Thus, we define the recent changes as changes within continuity. We also argue that Turkey s foreign policy changes may also be classified as leader driven. Keywords: Islam, The AK Party, Turkey, Turkish Foreign Policy. INTRODUCTION The general elections in November 2002 resulted in a drastic change in the Turkish political landscape. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) was assigned the task of forming the government. The AK Party still continues to rule Turkey and has won all local and general elections since 2002. The domestic and international policies of the AK Party government have been matters of great debate both domestically and internationally. One of the most contentious issues regarding the AK party government has been its new foreign policies that have been closely watched by foreign policy analysts. While the AK Party government has substantially improved Turkey-EU relations on the one hand; the party s foreign policy executive, has realized a series of new initiatives toward the Middle East, Caucasia, Africa, and Russia. Furthermore, conventional US-Turkey relations were also challenged when Turkey refused to comply with
160 UNDERSTANDING THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN American policies with regard to the events of 1 March 2003. These and other issues in Turkish foreign policy during the AK Party reign have attracted the attention of several observers and analysts and generated stormy debates both in Turkey and abroad. Some foreign policy analysts and commentators have regarded this new policy as a radical shift from conventional Turkish foreign policy when the ideological identity of the AK party is taken into consideration. The AK party is sometimes accused of being an Islamic or Islamist party and of harboring a hidden Islamic agenda. Accordingly, new orientations in Turkish foreign policy should be understood within the context of the AK Party s Islamic agenda. The underlying reasoning behind this thinking is that the Islamic identity of the AK Party determines to a great extent the rationale of the new Turkish foreign policy and these new policies in fact signify a radical departure from the conventional Western orientation of the Turkish state. This article aims to understand and explain the fundamental nature of recent Turkish foreign policy, and how and why Turkish foreign policy has been changing through a review of the relevant literature of foreign policy changes. Second, this article also discusses whether Turkey s recent activities in the Middle East or with relation to other non-western states means a departure from the previously accepted Western- oriented policy of Turkey. The authors of the study argue that the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy are leader-driven. In other words, Turkey s new foreign policy choices and preferences reflect to a great extent, the visions of the new Turkish political elite in Turkey, which consists of the leaders of the AK Party. We also argue that though there are some significant changes and innovations in the nature and style of Turkey s foreign policy during the last six years; the basic international orientation of Turkey continues to preserve its basic nature, namely on the whole Westernoriented foreign policy. Therefore, we define the recent changes in terms of the preferences, nature or style of Turkish foreign policy as changes within continuity. FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE AND AK PARTY The literature of foreign policy analysis underlines the fact that change in foreign policy could have different connotations. According to Charles Hermann for example, there exists four different meanings of foreign policy change: adjustment change, program change, problem/goal change and international orientation change. 1 As it is understood, 1 Charles Hermann, Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34 (1990), pp 3-21.
U SAK YEARBOOK 2011 161 adjustment change is more related to the level of efforts, and it is more quantitative in nature than qualitative. The purpose of the foreign policy does not change. The AK party governments efforts to deepen relations with the EU could be regarded in this category, because the AK Party has not significantly changed previous Turkish policies toward the EU; however, it is clear that the new government has increased its level of efforts to deepen Turkey s relations with the EU and improved Turkey s EU candidacy. 2 Turkey-EU accession negotiations have started 2005; however, this could not be regarded as a major foreign policy change but instead regarded as adjustment change when the new governments increased level of efforts is taken into consideration. Turkey was declared a candidate at the 1999 Helsinki Summit and Turkish governments have in general committed to Turkey s EU candidacy. As discussed below, what could be regarded as a real policy change in a qualitative but not quantitative sense in Hermann s classification is Turkey s foreign policies toward the Middle East in general and more specifically toward its neighbors. Do all the matters discussed below mean radical changes in the orientation of Turkish foreign policy? It is a reality that there exists a program change, that is methodological and qualitative; however, the extent of this change is controversial. According to the basic Turkish foreign policy executive, Turkey s basic orientation, which has been in general toward the West and Europe, has not been challenged by the AK Party governments. For example, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, stressed that the axis of our foreign policy is toward NATO, the EU and the transatlantic process. 3 It could even be argued, according to the Foreign Policy Executive of the AK Party Government, that the multidimensional character of Turkish policy would consolidate Turkey s national desire for EU membership. 4 This is simply because if Turkey could consolidate its power, prestige and influence in the Middle East or Africa, Turkey would become geopolitically more important; hence, it would be more difficult for the EU to refuse Turkish membership. In other words, according to this logic, there is a sort of parallelism between the likelihood of Turkish EU membership and increasing Turkish influence in other parts of the world. Professor Davutoğlu, the former advisor to the Prime Minister and new Minister of Foreign affairs, uses an interesting analogy of bow and arrow 2 3 4 Mesut Özcan, Harmonizing Foreign Policy Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p. 157. Davutoğlu Rules out Shift from Transatlantic Axis, Todays Zaman, 23 March 2009. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı, Radikal, 26 February 2004.
162 UNDERSTANDING THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN in his influential book, Strategic Depth : the extent to which Turkey draws a bow in Asia will determine the extent that Turkey can shoot an arrow. 5 When analyzing the new discourse of foreign policy of the AK Party governments, it is said that the AK Party s foreign policy understanding has a multidimensional character that is arguably different from the previous one-dimensional, Western-dominated foreign policy. Multidimensionality in foreign policy means that while Turkey would improve and deepen its relations with the European countries and the EU, Turkey would also engage in active foreign policies in the Middle East, Caucasia and Central Asia, the Balkan region and even Sub-Saharan Africa. However, these engagements do not mean a shift from the conventional Western-oriented foreign policy of Turkey and the new policy differs from a utopian, third-worldist, non-realist foreign policy understanding. From this perspective, it is clear that there is no radical international orientation change in Turkish foreign policy. However, a number of commentators believe or suspect that Turkish foreign policy during the AK Party reign has experienced a radical transformation. Particularly, Turkey s increasing relations with the Middle East during the current government are described as having the effect of moving the foreign policy of Turkey in another direction where growing relations with the Muslim countries will check Turkey s commitment to the West. 6 In this regard, one of the common criticisms in this regard is that the AK Party s Middle East policy was highly critical of the USA. 7 The attitudes of Turkish foreign policy did not share the US goal of isolating Iran, Syria and Hamas but instead preferred engagement with all; consequently, problems between the two countries peaked in relation to Iraq before the invasion of that country. The main point of friction between Turkey and the US in the last couple of years was Turkey s prevention of use of its territory for the invasion of Iraq. The decision of the Turkish Parliament greatly frustrated American policy makers. In analyzing the conditions of the time, some scholars point to the mistakes of the US in not recognizing the improvement of the general position of Turkey in the 5 6 7 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, (İstanbul: Küre, 2001), p. 562. For some examples see, Semih Idiz, Batı dan uzaklaştığımız inancı artıyor, Milliyet, 23 February 2009; M. Ali Birand, AKP, Avrupa ya sırt mı dönüyor?, Posta, 04 March 2009; Cengiz Çandar, Dış Politikada Rota mı Şaştı, Referans 23 January 2008; Şahin Alpay, AKP, AB yi Gözden Çıkarıyor mu?, Zaman, 26 January 2008. Soner Çağaptay, Secularism and Foreign Policy in Turkey, Policy Focus No: 67, Washington Institute of for Near East Policy, p. 3.
U SAK YEARBOOK 2011 163 world, the high level of demands on the Turkish side and the problem of international legitimacy. 8 However, the attitudes of the Turkish public towards problems in regions such as Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon and Iran are ignored in these analyses. In particular, the developments in Iraq and the emergence of a Kurdish regional government in the north of the country caused concern for the Turkish public given the damaging results of the terrorist activities of PKK for more than two decades. Many Turks believed that the US attitude in the Middle East does not consider the interests of Turkey, and according to opinion polls, only 9 percent of the Turkish public supported the US policy in the region while 86 percent supported the removal of the US forces from Iraq according to 2007 figures. 9 The Turkish Government s policy of optimal independence in regional and global issues appealed to the demands of the public, but it is interpreted as a deviation from classical relations with the USA. 10 Contrary to the negative portrayal of Turkish attitudes in foreign policy, it is argued that the reason for these criticisms stems from the fact that Turkey s semi-independent policies frustrate some people because they highlight the catastrophic failure of American policies in Iraq, Iran, Palestine and Afghanistan. 11 Beginning in 2008, the criticisms towards Turkey in its relations with southern neighbors were tuned down and even Turkey s increasing and independent relations with the Middle East were praised by some scholars and even by US policy makers. After criticizing the policies of the Bush government in regards to the global war on terror and the negative implications of this policy in the Middle East, Graham Fuller, a former CIA official, described Turkey s attitude towards its neighbors in a positive way and argued that Turkey s better relations with Russia, Iran, Syria and Hamas are beneficial for the Washington administration; despite the fact that the US government is not fully aware of this benefit. 12 Beside the observers, the official attitude of the US administration is also more cooperative and positive towards Turkey in terms of its relations with neighbors that have problematic relations with the US. For example, 8 Cameron Brown, Turkey in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, Turkish Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, (March 2007), p. 105. 9 B. J. Grim, and R. Wike, Turkey and Its (many) Discontents, Pew Research Center Publications, (2007) available online at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/623/turkey, (accessed on 31.12.2008). 10 Joshua W.Walker Reexamining the US-Turkish Alliance, The Washington Quarterly, Vol 31, No.1, (2007-2008) p. 94. 11 İbrahim Kalın, Turkey and the Middle East: Ideology or Geo-politics?, Private View, (Autumn 2008), p.29. 12 Graham Fuller, Türkiye ABD Planına Dâhil Olmamalı, BBC Turkish, 25 November 2008, p.1, available online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2008/11/08 1124_fuller.shtml, (accessed on 03.01.2009).
164 UNDERSTANDING THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN the US State Department has been less critical of Turkey s relations with Syria and has even made positive comments on Turkey s role in reviving Israeli-Syrian talks. 13 In relation to the above, after the considerable groundwork set down by Davutoğlu, it was declared that Israel and Syria had launched proximity talks to be mediated by Turkey. 14 Despite the earlier criticisms of the active involvement of Turkey in regional politics in opposition to the calls for isolation of some countries, Washington was urged to include Turkey in its long term plans for the Middle East, since the USA greatly needs Turkey s support. 15 The latest visit of President Obama to Turkey within the first 100 days of his presidency shows that the new US administration evaluates the Turkish role in the region as positive. In what represents a clear difference from the time of the Cold War, during which time Turkey was adapting itself to US approaches, this time the burden is predominantly on the US side. 16 Turkey s policy of zero problems with neighbors is accepted as a success in transforming relations with countries in her neighborhood but there were questions about the sustainability of this policy given the instabilities of the surrounding environment. Observers argued that this policy is sustainable and Turkey should develop its relations with its neighbors and refrain from being a part of wider US policies in the region which will be detrimental to the national interest of Turkey given the US s failure in foreign policy. 17 In a similar vein to the arguments of Fuller, other American observers also positively commented on Turkish foreign policy despite the differences between Turkey and the US in certain policy areas. Turkey s independent approach in foreign policy is praised by Stephen Kinzer, former NY Times Bureau Chief in Turkey and it is argued by Kinzer that Turkey s activism in the Caucasus, in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and in South East Asia has led the US to regenerate its relations with Turkey in a new framework. 18 The recent problems with regard to Turkey s EU candidacy is also sometimes used as a means of criticism of the AK party governments and it is often argued that the AK Party is not very enthusiastic on the subject of Turkey s EU membership because of its Islamic nature. It would be true to argue that the process of Turkey s EU membership is not at the place that it should normally be. However, this recent predicament in relations is less related to AK Party policies. There exist three basic 13 Carol Migdalowitz, Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and US Views, CRS Report for Congress, (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2008) p. 4. 14 Görüşmeler Başladı, Türkiye Ev Sahipliği Yapıyor, Zaman, 22 May 2008. 15 Walker, Reexamining the, p. 106. 16 Ibid., p. 107. 17 Fuller, Türkiye ABD, p. 1. 18 Türk Dış Politikasına Büyük Övgü, Bugün, 1 February 2008.
U SAK YEARBOOK 2011 165 reasons for this tension in relations: the general enlargement fatigue of the EU; the Cyprus problem; and increasing anti-turkish rhetoric from the influential political leaders of France and Germany. Therefore, it could be argued that a worsening in relations is less related to Turkey s multidimensional choices of foreign policy. On the contrary, Turkey s increasing profile in regional politics and its approaches in foreign policy have attracted the attention not only in the US but also in Europe. In its official report on the progress of Turkey towards membership to the Union, the EU Commission referred to the positive role of Turkey in regional stabilization, especially in the Caucasus and the Middle East. 19 Similarly, after Turkey s initiatives for decreasing tensions in the Caucasus after the conflict in Georgia, the Socialist Group within the European Parliament declared that Turkey played a crucial role in decreasing tensions and Turkey has made a constructive contribution to Europe s security. 20 Despite the problems in the EU accession process, Turkey s foreign policy has attracted the attention of European observers. Turkey is described as a self-confident country in its dealings with the European Union. 21 According to the same commentary, a constructive and successful foreign policy is an asset at the hand of Turkey in its relations with the EU and Turkey s initiatives in several problem areas like Lebanon, Georgia, Iran and Syria are strategic advantages in the hand of its government. Turkey s attitude toward the latest Israeli offensive against Gaza also attracted a great deal of attention, with the engagement of Turkey in the region being described as playing a significant role behind the scenes. THE SOURCES OF CHANGES IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY States do not often change their foreign policies, excluding some minor adjustments. Therefore, serious foreign policy changes are generally a matter of curiosity in the literature of foreign policy analysis. For example, political adaptation is the keyword for foreign policy changes in a state. In other words, the emergence of new foreign policies could be observed after profound international changes are the case with the new international orientations of former Eastern European countries in the post-cold War period. However, the literature on this issue underlines the fact that 19 Turkey 2008 Progress Report of the European Commission, EU Commission, (2008), p. 85. 20 AP Sosyalist Gruptan Türkiye nin Dış Politikasına Övgü, Milliyet, 5 November 2008. 21 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung da Türk Dış Politikasına Övgü, AB Haber http://abhaber.com/haber.php?id=15445, accessed on 20 December 2008.
166 UNDERSTANDING THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN domestic politics could just as likely be the source of policy changes. Domestic politics may affect foreign policy through very different dynamics. K. J. Holsti, having examined foreign policy changes in eight sates, indicated that seven out of eight cases could be better explained by leader-oriented variables. 22 In other words, decision-making variables of personality and perception, in addition to leader-related factors according to Holsti, come to the forefront in the understanding and explanation of foreign policy changes. Thus, although it is not an easy task to decide entirely whether the sources of current foreign policy changes are more agency or structure in nature, it seems that Turkey s mentioned foreign policy changes may also be classified as leader driven. The AK Party: New Turkish Political Elite The AK Party is a new phenomenon in Turkish politics. Its ideological nature is similar neither to former central-right Turkish political parties, like the Justice Party (AP) or Democrat Party (DP), nor to formerly Islamically-oriented political parties, like the National Salvation Party (Milli Selâmet Partisi-MSP). 23 Although the ideological backgrounds of some of the leading figures of AK party, like Abdullah Gül, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Bülent Arınç, do originate from the former Islamically-oriented MSP, their foreign policy choices and preferences are not very similar to the MSP and its succeeding parties. One of the most interesting foreign policies of this new governing elite is their emphasis on Turkey s EU membership. This new political cadre seems to be pro-european, in contrast to the MSP which was strongly Eurosceptic. 24 This new political cadre purports that Turkey s EU membership is the backbone of the Turkish foreign Ministry; they also defend efforts to improve Turkey s relations with non-european states, in particular with neighboring states. 22 K. J. Holsti, Why Nations Realign, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982). 23 There is now a substantial literature on the nature of AK Party. See, for example, Ümit Cizre, Secular and Islamic Identities in Turkey, (London: Routledge, 2007), Hakan Yavuz (ed.) The Emergence of a new Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti, (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah, 2006), Ergun Özbudun and William Hale, Islamism, Democracy, and Liberalism in Turkey: The Rise of the AKP, (London: Routledge, 2009). 24 Ali R. Usul, The Justice and Development Party and the European Union: From Euroscepticism to Euro-enthusiasm and Euro-fatigue? in ed. Ümit Cizre, Secular and Islamic Idendities in Turkey, (London: Routledge, 2007).
U SAK YEARBOOK 2011 167 What is interesting to note here is that the new political cadre sees neighboring countries, like Iraq and Syria, as belonging to the same cultural or civilizational region which helps Turkey develop more liberal/cooperative foreign policies with these countries that rely on a win-win logic in foreign policy that has also often been advanced in the case of Turkey by AK Party leaders, Erdoğan and Gül. The Debate on Neo-Ottomanism Many commentators believe that the change in Turkish foreign policy is related with the embracement of the term neo-ottomanism. 25 The arguments surrounding neo-ottomanism or new-ottomanism are not new. When Turkey became a much more influential actor in the Middle Eastern scene after the end of Cold War, Turkey s active involvement in Middle Eastern affairs became labeled by some commentators and scholars as neo-ottomanism. However, the term of neo-ottomanism is quite ambiguous and its usage generates many problems. It is still not clear what we understand exactly by neo-ottomanism. Is it an alternative foreign policy model for Turkey? Does it hide secret imperialist ambitions on the part of Turkey? Or is it just a romantic and hollow rhetoric echoed by certain Turks? Neo-Ottomanism cannot be regarded as an alternative foreign policy for Turkey, as it is sometimes argued. However, it may be used in the sense of a metaphor that indicates Turkey s interest in regions that were parts of the former Ottoman Empire. The basic underlying implication in this metaphor is that elements of Ottoman civilization had exerted a considerable influence on the regions of the former Ottoman Empire, including the Middle East and Balkans where the Ottoman heritage is generally regarded in a positive sense. Accordingly, there exists a sort of Ottoman identity shared by former parts of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East and some parts of the Balkans, like Bosnia or Macedonia. Of course, this feeling of being a part of the Ottoman Empire does not offer an alternative to national identities in the Middle East and Balkan region; but it could create an atmosphere of belonging to the same civilization. Since the main successor of the Ottomans is Turkey; there exists fertile historical ground in these former Ottoman States for Turkey to exert an influence. In other words, these areas remain naturally under Turkey s influence; but this is not to be seen as Turkish imperialism because Turkey s interests in these areas are more related to an exertion of Turkey s soft power rather than imperialist aspirations. It is clear that the AK Party Foreign Policy Executive attaches substantial importance to 25 Hakan Yavuz, Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo- Ottomanism, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studie, Vol. 2, (2008) pp. 9-41.
168 UNDERSTANDING THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN Turkey s Ottoman past, but the term of neo-ottomanism, since it carries a negative and imperialistic connotation, does not explain the AK Party s interest in former Ottoman territories. The Ahmet Davutoğlu Factor One of the most interesting innovations in the style of foreign policy making during the AK Party government is the role of Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu, who had acted as advisor to Turkey s Prime Minister and now acts as the Foreign Minister. Professor Davutoğlu and his influential book, the Strategic Depth (Stratejik Derinlik), published in 2001, has been the focus of attraction of domestic and foreign observers of Turkish foreign policy who try to understand the new dynamics of Turkey s foreign policy. This change in Turkish foreign policy is mostly attributed to the role of Professor Davutoğlu. Murinson names Ahmet Davutoğlu as the architect of the new foreign policy concept of Strategic Depth. In relation to his explanation of the change in Turkish Foreign Policy with its embrace of the concept of neo- Ottomanism and his allocation of the role of architect of the new foreign policy to Davutoğlu, Murinson describes Davutoğlu as a truly original neo-ottoman thinker. 26 Ahmet Davutoğlu s place in recent Turkish foreign policy decision making is unique and original. Davutoğlu is sometimes compared to Henry Kissinger in this regard. 27 It seems that Professor Davutoğlu as an advisor was very influential in foreign policy decision-making as well as possessing influence over operational functions. In other words, he had not acted merely as would be expected of a typical advisor but he had also performed executive-like functions in the fields of foreign policy. Davutoğlu has been an important factor in the shaping and pursuing of new foreign policy and thus, and from this point of view, his role in Turkish foreign policy history as a whole is exceptional. It is important to note here that Davutoğlu, before he became Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 2009, was not a decision-maker but instead an advisor to decision-makers, like the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. What has been very critical is that Turkish decision-makers in the AK Party administration, like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Ali 26 Alexander Murinson, The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 6, (November 2006), pp. 948. 27 Erdal Şafak, Türkiye nin Kissinger ı, Sabah, 3 May 2009, Parris: Davutoğlu, Türkiye nin Henry Kissinger ı, Star, 29 October 2008.
U SAK YEARBOOK 2011 169 Babacan, have appraised Davutoğlu s ideas and found them beneficial and appropriate for Turkey. The AK Party and Islamic Foreign Policy? Some of the most common explanations concerning the origins of recent innovations in Turkish foreign policy are based around the argument that the AK Party is in essence an Islamic or Islamist or post-islamist organization. Although there are some differences between these terms; all these are associated somehow with the fact that the core identity of the AK Party is identified with Islam itself. Therefore, from a foreign policy perspective, some foreign policy commentators who believe that the core identity of the AK Party is closely associated with Islamic beliefs, argue that Islamic concerns constitute the basic nature of the AK Party s understanding of foreign policy. For example, Robins, who defined the AK Party as post-islamist 28, based his analysis upon a dichotomy of a post- Islamist government and a Kemalist state. He also defines the new AK Party elite as counter-elite. Robins argued that in contrast to the problems that emerged during the short experience of the foreign policy in 1996, when the Welfare Party was the main partner in the coalition government of the time; the AK Party s post-islamist style has affected Turkish foreign policy in a positive way and foreign policy has hence became more effective as a result of it being the result of the fusion of the traditions of Kemalism and post-islamism 29 The cohabitation between the Kemalist state and post-islamist government eliminate much of the feared conflict and incoherence in foreign policy. The same writer argues in another article that reaching a firm conclusion about moderation or de- Islamization in the foreign policy of the AK Party is difficult because of the role of the Turkish armed forces in containing the party in government. 30 Similarly, although some critics suggest that the current government has followed an Islamic foreign policy, it is also acknowledged that AK Party has abandoned neither Turkey s NATO membership nor its ambition to join the European Union. 31 The commitment of the AK Party to the European Union is a part of the political ideology of the party. 32 28 Philip Robins, Turkish Foreign Policy since 2002: between a Post-Islamist Government and a Kemalist State, International Affairs, Vol.83, No. 1, (2007), p.291. 29 Ibid., p. 289. 30 Philip Robins, Between the EU and the Middle East: Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Government, 2002-2007, ISPI Working Paper, No 11, pp. 3. Available online at http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/wp_11_2007.pdf, accessed on 21.12.2008. 31 Migdalowitz, Turkey: Selected Foreign, p. 3. 32 Nathalie Tocci, Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?, South European Society and Politics Vol 10, No. 1, (2005), pp. 80.
170 UNDERSTANDING THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN Some other scholars define the AK Party as a coalition in itself, bringing together moderate Islamists, moderate nationalists, secular but socially conservative centre-right voters and a sizeable number of liberal intellectuals. 33 Muslim nationalism is another term that has been employed to try to define AK Party s foreign policy. 34 It is argued that the AK Party government is projecting Turkey as a mediator and a big sister to countries in the Arab and the Muslim world, coveting the position of leader of the Islamic nation as in the past. 35 Certain analysts establish connections between secularism and the pro-western foreign policy of Turkey and conclude that there has been an erosion in secularism as a result of increased relations with Muslim and Middle Eastern countries. Accordingly, political sentiments are changing in line with the AK Party s arguments and society believes that their interests lie with other Muslim majority countries. It is argued that not only has the foreign policy of Turkey changed toward Muslim countries and issues, but the public has also become much more sympathetic to these kinds of political messages. The term Strategic Depth is described as counterrevolutionary in Turkish Foreign policy. 36 It would be argued that the images of the Middle East region and the Middle Eastern people in the minds of the new AK Party foreign policy executive may be regarded as somewhat different from those of previous political leaders, and this fact could be an important factor in the new Turkish activism in the Middle East and North Africa. When looking at the Foreign Policy Analysis, this is a very natural conclusion to be drawn. In reference to their divergences from the formerly held policy, Abdullah Gül argued that Turkey is pursuing a value based foreign policy and aims to develop its soft power. 37 Gül stated that, in spite of the existence of active and dormant problems in the vicinity of Turkey, Turkey does not look at its environment and to the international system from a security perspective. 38 The current Foreign Minister and former Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister, Prof. Ahmet Davutoğlu, argued that Turkey is a central country because of its geographical and 33 Ergun Özbudun, From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, South European Society and Politics Vol 11, No:3-4, (2006) pp. 555. 34 Cağaptay, Secularism and Foreign, p.viii. 35 Sami Moubayed, Erdoğan s Multi-Pronged Foreign Policy, Gulf News, 7 January 2009. 36 Çağaptay, Secularism and Foreign, p. 2. 37 Abdullah Gül, New Horizons in Turkish Foreign Policy Boğaziçi Yöneticiler Vakfı, Dedeman Hotel, İstanbul, 22 May 2004. 38 Ibid.
U SAK YEARBOOK 2011 171 historical characteristics and a country with an optimal place in Europe and Asia can not define itself in a defensive manner. 39 One of the most important characteristics of this new foreign policy vision is the selfconfidence of Turkey in comparison with the 1990s. TURKEY S NEW FOREIGN POLICY: WHAT IS NEW? When the AK Party came to power in 2002, the new foreign policy executive started to declare that the AK Party would pursue a different foreign policy. According to this new political elite, Turkey was formerly portrayed as an isolated country in its region which had problematic relations with its neighbors in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus. Turkey was also described as a country that lacked selfconfidence in foreign policy. The leaders of AK Party argued that former perceptions regarding Turkish foreign policy led to an understanding that Turkey was surrounded by enemies and there was no friend of a Turk other than Turk. This encirclement psychology, according to the new AK Party foreign policy executive, resulted in a policy dominated by security threats and security-based solutions for foreign policy problems. Criticizing these features of the conventional foreign policy of Turkey, the AK party leaders have often declared that Turkey s foreign policies would depend on certain key principles, which can be listed as multidimensionality, zero-conflict with neighbors, a balance between security and democracy, the acceptance of Turkey as a central state in the diplomacy of the region, the resort to more active and pro-active diplomacy as well as rhythmic diplomacy, exerting soft power rather than hard one. 40 Accordingly, these new principles would help Turkey to rid itself of problems that had formerly been dominant in Turkish foreign policy and make Turkey more prosperous and powerful at home and abroad. 41 New Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East Turkey s relations with the Middle Eastern countries (in particular the Arab countries) have always been subject to the complications of recent history. On the one hand, the negative memories of World War I, especially with relation to the Arab revolt, dominated general feelings towards the region; on the other, the new republic had focused on the 39 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey s Foreign Policy Vision, Insight Turkey Vol.10, No.1, (2008), p. 78. 40 Davutoğlu, Türkiye Merkez Ülke... 41 Ziya Öniş, The New Wave of Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey: Drifting Away from Europeanization?, DIIS (Danish Institute for International Studies) Report 2009, No. 5, (January 2009).
172 UNDERSTANDING THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN institutionalization of the state and pursued a radical policy of Westernization/Modernization holding the view that the Islamic Middle East was an area that the modern/ radically secular new Republic should not pay attention to. For the Turkish elite, the Middle East represented backwardness in cultural/civilizational terms and it was an area of political risks that Turkey should refrain from intervening in. 42 However, this fact does not mean that Turkey had not developed certain policies for the Middle East. Turkey s relations with the Middle East in this era were characterized by factors of ideological differences, such as the Soviet threat, pro-americanism, and the acceptance that Arab countries were inferior to Turkey. 43 In this period, decisions in Turkish foreign policy were consciously western-oriented. For example, the governing Democrat Party viewed Turkey as the most important factor in the preservation of peace in the Middle East and a bridge between East and West. In relation to that, Turkey had to make every effort to attract the Muslim countries of the Middle East to join the Baghdad Pact against the Soviet threat. 44 Turkey perceived the changes in the world system in the Cold War, tried to benefit from the conditions therein and desired to play a leadership role for the countries of the region as the representative of the western world. But Turkey failed to realize another important development in this period, that of anti-colonial movements and the independence of many of the former European colonies, and was not able to develop relations with the newly- independent states. It was criticized by Arab states as being the spokesman of imperialism. 45 At the beginning of the post-cold War period, Turkey s active non-involvement policy during the Iran-Iraq war had turned into an active involvement policy with its interventions in northern Iraq, problems with Syria and strategic cooperation with Israel. 46 Regarding Turkey s foreign policies in the region during the AK Party governments, it is clear that there is a new activism in Turkish Foreign Policy toward the region. According to some authors, like Stephen 42 İsmail Cem, Türkiye Avrupa Avrasya, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), p. 16. 43 Hüseyin Bağcı, Demokrat Partinin Ortadoğu Politikası in ed. F.Sönmezoğlu, Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1998), pp. 101-102. 44 Mahmut B. Aykan, The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol 25, No. 1, (1993) p. 92. 45 Melek Fırat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, 1945-1960 Ortadoğu yla İlişkiler, in ed. Baskın Oran, Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Vol. 1, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), p.615. 46 Ramazan Gözen, İmparatorluktan Küresel Aktörlüğe Türkiye nin Dış Politikası, (Ankara: Palme, 2009).
U SAK YEARBOOK 2011 173 Larrabee, this represents an important departure from the conventional foreign policy of Turkey. 47 It is pointed out that there has been a diversification in the tools and strategies of Turkey employed in recent years towards the region and argues that although several Turkish governments have played with the idea that Turkey may play a peace builder role in the Middle East, only the current AK Party government has made this an important element of its policy towards the region. 48 It is declared that Turkey has attempted to build its position in the Middle East on four principles 49 : First, security for everyone, not for any particular group or country. Second, priority must be given to dialogue as a means of solving crises. Accordingly, the Turkish Prime Minister s and President s frequent visits to the region are a reflection of their legitimacy in the eyes of different actors in the region. The third principle is economic interdependence. The fourth principle is cultural coexistence and plurality, especially given ethnic and sectarian differences. Turkey-Syria Relations During the post Cold War period, Turkey s relations with Arab Middle eastern countries were mainly dominated by security and water issues. 50 In the 1990 s, Turkey s most problematic relations in the region were with Syria. Syria was supporting the separatist Kurdish movement, the PKK, and had increased its support in the second half of the 1990s. As the primary supporter of PKK, Syria had been the focal point in Turkey s foreign policy after the post-cold War. 51 Turkey hardened its policy toward Syria in these years for several reasons. These can be summarized as Syria s increasing support of the PKK; Syria s attempts at the internationalization of the water problem; and an agreement with Greece to permit Greek war planes to use Syrian airspace in case of problems with Turkey. 52 In fact, just after the expulsion of Öcalan and the closure of PKK camps there, the two countries had signed an agreement concerning security 47 Stephen Larrabee, Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East, Foreign Affairs, Vol 86, No. 4, (2007), p. 107. 48 Meliha B. Altunışık, The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey s Soft Power in the Middle East, Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No.2, (2008) p. 50. 49 Davutoğlu, Turkey s Foreign Policy, pp. 84-85. 50 Ali Çarkoğlu, and Mine Eder, Domestic Concerns and the Water Conflict over the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol 37, No. 1, (January 2001), pp.41-71. 51 Mahmut B. Aykan, The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1998: A Turkish View, Middle East Policy, Vol 6, No. 4, (1999), p. 175. 52 Meliha Altunışık, Güvenlik Kıskacında Türkiye-Ortadoğu İlişkileri, in ed. Gencer Özcan, En Uzun Onyıl, and Şule Kut, (İstanbul: Boyut, 1998), p. 338.
174 UNDERSTANDING THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN issues. The period after 1999 represented a new era in relations between Turkey and Syria, which was the period before AK Party came to power. However, the relations between the two countries have developed in several ways to an unprecedented level of cooperation during the AK Party reign when compared with those throughout the whole of the previous period since Syria s independence. In accordance with these new pillars of Turkey s foreign policy toward the region mentioned above, the results of the improved relations between Turkey and Syria had became obvious during and after the Iraqi Crisis in 2003. Not only did the contacts between the officials of the two countries increase, but the contacts between the people of these two neighbors developed and trade levels increased. Turkey and Syria signed a Free Trade Area agreement in 2004 and Turkey s exports to this country increased from 184 million US dollars in 1999 to 797 million US dollars in 2007. 53 Another sign of developing relations between Turkey and Syria came on 16 September 2009, with the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council Agreement. With this agreement, two countries had a joint meeting of cabinets with the participation of several ministers from both sides on 13 October 2009 and signed several agreements in the areas of education, commerce, transportation and irrigation. On the same day, two countries reciprocally abolished visa requirements for their citizens. 54 Joint meetings between Turkish and Syrian officials are described by the Arabic newspapers as ideal partnership abolishing artificial borders. 55 Northern Iraq One of the most interesting developments in Turkey s policy toward Northern Iraq is that Turkey, during the AK Party period, has in general shifted its policy orientation from a Turcoman-dominated policy toward the new discourse that Turkey has a distant relationship with all ethnic groups in Northern Iraq, such as Arabs, Kurds or Turcoman. The governing elite of the AK Party has often repeated that all ethnic groups in Northern Iraq are relatives of the Turkish people, whether they are Kurds, Arabs or Turcomans. Turkish policy makers have tried to establish contacts even with the smallest groups in Iraq. 56 This new rhetoric is a genuine innovation in Turkish foreign policy because Turkey s general 53 DEİK, http://www.deik.org.tr/lists/ticariiliskiler/attachments/64/ikili-iliskiler-oca k%202008_tr.pdf, (31 March 2009). 54 Şam ile sınırlar fora, hedef AB modeli Radikal, 14 October 2009. 55, İctimaat el Maclis i Suri- Turki: Şiraketun Nemuzeciyye tuzilu hududen mustanaaten, Dar Al Hayat, 14 October 2009. 56 Davutoğlu, Turkey s Foreign Policy, p. 86.
U SAK YEARBOOK 2011 175 policy had been dominated by the considerations of Turcomans in a region where Turcomans had been considered the linchpin of Turkey s policy in the region. In particular, after the weak performance of the Turcoman Front in the elections in January 2005, Prime Minister Erdoğan voiced his dissatisfaction with the performance of Turcoman political organizations. 57 Turkey s relations with the Iraqi Kurds show signs of improvement as a result of the reaching of a consensus between Turkey, the US and the Iraqi Kurds against the activities of PKK in northern Iraq. It seems that in response to the guarantees of protection of territorial integrity, Turkey follows a more cooperative approach with the Kurds. After a big military operation in Northern Iraq in February 2008, Turkey tried to increase its contacts with the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq. Iraqi President Talabani, a Kurdish politician, visited Turkey and Turkish President Abdullah Gül paid a visit to Iraq in early 2009, and described the government in Northern Iraq as a Kurdish Regional Administration, which caused an uproar domestically. 58 Beginning with 2008, Turkey increased its contacts with Kurdish officials in Iraq s Kurdish region; this development also represents a change in the traditional attitude of Turkey, which had seen Northern Iraq only from a security perspective and had left it in the zone of military influence. Lastly, after overcoming a dispute with the Baghdad administration over the distribution of Iraq's oil wealth, Iraqi Kurds began crude oil exports via Turkey on 1 June 2009, which should be evaluated as a significant event in this regard. Iran Although there have been some tensions in the relations between Turkey and Iran, which were visible during the 28 th February process when Iran was considered over-sensitive by generals who saw themselves as the protectors of secularism in Turkey since Iran had previously tried to export an Islamic regime to Turkey, Turkey-Iran relations are in general not in conflict and depend on mutual understanding and interests. It seems that the AK Party foreign policy executive has continued this policy, and that Turkey-Iran relations during the AK Party period have continued to display normal characteristics. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the issues related with Iran s nuclear program have been two important factors in the relations between Turkey and Iran over the last couple of years. Although Turkey is not happy with Iran s desire to develop a nuclear program and a possible nuclear arsenal, it has followed a cautious policy and refrained from direct confrontation with Iran. Turkey has also played the role of conciliator in the diplomatic efforts 57 Sedat Ergin, Iraklı Türkmenler Buharlaştılar mı?, Hürriyet, 18 February 2005. 58 Gül 'Kürdistan' İfadesine Açıklık Getirdi, Zaman, 25 March 2009.
176 UNDERSTANDING THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN between Iran and the European countries to reach a peaceful solution to the problems related to Iran s nuclear program. Moreover, in view of the common interests of both states vis a vis the possible emergence of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, Iran has tried not to alienate Turkey on the nuclear issue. Iran has cooperated with Turkey in the struggle against the PKK for the above two reasons. In order to secure continuation of support of Iran against the PKK and as a result of increasing economic relations after the construction of a natural gas pipeline between Iran and Turkey, Turkey opposed a military operation against Iran and favored diplomatic efforts with regard to solution of the nuclear issue. Turkey always stressed that the region should be clear of nuclear weapons and Prime Minister Erdogan stated that blaming only one country (namely Iran) for its nuclear program is not a sincere act. 59 Beginning from the early 2000s, Turkey s relations with Iran were not in conflict and over the last couple of years; relations between these two countries have strengthened. Iranian President Ahmadinejad visited Turkey in August 2008 and Turkish President Gül visited Tehran in March 2009. During these visits, beside the bilateral relations, the developments in the region were high on the agenda. However, because of the potential of these two neighbors to become leading states in the region, both parties tried to act in a cautious way. Israel and the Palestinian Issue Turkey was the first Muslim country that recognized Israel as a sovereign state in 1949 after Israel had declared its sovereignty in 1948. The fundamental factor in the relations between Turkey and Israel had been the prevalent conditions during the Cold War period that had rendered both Turkey and Israel as the principal allies of the US. US support for Israel and Turkey s membership in the western organization as protection from the perceived threat of the USSR made Turkey and Israel regional partners as a result of global alliance formations. 60 In spite of this fact, Turkey had not supported Israel at every conjuncture of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Turkish attitudes started to change after 1964. The Turkish attitude shown during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars marked a change in Turkish foreign policy in the direction of active support for the Arab cause in the Arab-Israeli 59 Başbakan Erdoğan Kolombiya Üniversitesinde Konuştu, http://www.akparti.org.tr/haber.asp?haber_id=25852&kategori=1, (3 April 2009). 60 Davutoğlu, Stratejiik Derinlik, p. 418.
U SAK YEARBOOK 2011 177 conflict. 61 Turkey also acted along with the Arab states and as well as the wider international community in the UN in demanding the end of Israeli occupation in Palestine. In addition to these demands, Turkish representation in Israel had been demoted from the level of charge d affaires to the level of second secretary in December 1980 after Israel declared its intention to shift its capital to Jerusalem. 62 However, Turkey-Israel relations had improved by the second half of the 1990s to such a degree that the situation could be described as excellent, most notably in the field of security. The Turkish military played a pioneering role in the development of relations with Israel. The military training agreement signed between Turkey and Israel in February 1996 remained confidential for some months. The civilian authorities received only limited information about the exact elements of this agreement. The Turkish side revealed the existence of the agreement in April 1996 and it soon became evident that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence had been left in the dark about some elements of the agreement. 63 It is argued by Robins that the reason for the leaking of the agreement to the public was to make a strong political statement. The statement had two components, one for the domestic audience and the other for the southern neighbour. Domestically, the Turkish military was making it clear to all political parties, especially to the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), that they were sufficiently powerful to control the strategic direction of Turkish foreign policy, regardless of who formed the government or occupied the premiership. To Syria the leak contained a warning to desist from its unacceptable international behaviour of supporting terrorism on pain of facing an alliance of superior military might operating on two fronts. 64 This development represented an example of the increasing role of the military in Turkish foreign policy and the legitimisation of this role through increasing use of the security threats as a means to an end. When Turkey s relations with the Arab countries in the Middle East developed in a positive manner, its relations with Israel would start to lose their momentum. These changes could be regarded as the normalization of Turkey s foreign relations rather than a substantial divergence as regards the principles or objectives of foreign policy on the part of either Turkey or Israel. The trend that began in 1999 with the decline in security threats against Turkey after the capture of PKK leader Öcalan and the acceptance of Turkey s EU candidature, continued during the AK Party government. Even some prominent Turkish leaders, like former Prime Minister Bülent 61 Aykan, The Palestinian Question, p. 97. 62 Ibid. 63 Robins, Suits and Uniforms, p. 260. 64 Ibid.
178 UNDERSTANDING THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN Ecevit, began to express strong criticism of Israel on account of her Palestinian policy. However, in a divergence from the stance taken by former Turkish governments, the AK Party government seemed ready to take risks and preferred engagement with controversial regional actors like Hamas, as well as with the PLO in Palestine. Turkey s attitude toward the latest Israeli offensive against Gaza in January 2009 and Erdoğan s storming out of a debate in Davos with Peres with regard to the related subject matter on 29 January 2009, also attracted a great deal of attention. One has therefore witnessed increased engagement of Turkey in the region, with most of its efforts being made in the role of a backstage player; this is a development that has caused certain other regional actors to worry. Israeli newspapers criticized Turkey s attitude during the abovementioned crisis and Turkey is described as pursuing a one-sided, anti Israeli rhetoric and for not acting as a neutral country. 65 Lately, these kinds of criticisms emerged again during a small-size joint maneuver between Turkish and Syrian armed forces and Israeli Defense Minister described this development as a cause of concern. 66 In response to these criticisms, the Turkish Chief of Staff replied that this maneuver is between two neighbors and the criticisms of Israel do not interest us. 67 This stance strengthens the argument that Turkey tires to develop its relations with neighbors independent of other actors. The autumn of 2009 witnessed another series of crises between Turkey and Israel. This time a joint NATO maneuver with the participation of Israel in Turkey was cancelled by the Turkish side because of the attitude of Israel during the Gaza operation and the blocking of a transfer of materials for rebuilding homes in Gaza. Prime Minister Erdoğan explained the stance of the government to the Arab media with the sentiments of the public opinion. 68 The Turkish refusal of Israeli participation in the Anatolian Eagle military exercise has led some commentators to ask whether Turkish-Israeli relations have come to an end? 69 Some commentators attributed the change of tone towards Israel in Turkey and elsewhere to the Obama effect with the argument that the election of Obama created an image that the unwavering American support to Israel 65 Turkey Chooses Sides, Jerusalem Post, 5 January 2009. 66 Türkiye-Suriye Tatbikatı İsrail ı Endişelendirdi, Zaman, 28 April 2009. 67 Suriye ile Tatbikat İsrail i İlgilendirmez, Star, 30 April 2009. 68 Erdoğan: İstib ad İsrail anil Munavarat Yettefeku Maa Rağbeti Errai Ami-t Turki, El Watan, 16 October 2009. 69 Gareth Jenkins, End of the Affair?, Al Ahram Weekly, No. 968, 15-21 October 2009
U SAK YEARBOOK 2011 179 came to an end. 70 In addition to the frictions that emerged after this military exercise cancellation, a show aired on Turkish televisions that created serious criticisms from the Israeli side. Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman summoned the Turkish Charge de Affair to the Ministry to protest the broadcasting of this television series, which Israel argues presents IDF soldiers as murderers. 71 It would not, however, be true to argue that Turkey has pursued an anti- Israeli policy during the period of the AK Party government. On the contrary, Turkey has acted as a mediator between Israel and Syria. 72 Nevertheless, it would be correct to assert that the governing elite of the AK Party harbors special feelings and strong sympathies for the Palestinian people, which may be most clearly observed in the Turkish Prime Minister s strong reactions against the Israeli policy towards Palestine at the Davos Summit. Despite the strong sympathy for the Palestinian people expressed by the AK Party governing elite, it would not be correct to argue that the AK Party foreign policy executive s approach toward Israel is totally emotional. It appears that while the AK Party governing elite tries to sustain balanced relations with Israel on the one hand; on the other hand, Turkey has started to increase its voice on the Palestine issue, which could have been influenced partly by the inherent sympathies of the AK Party elite. Turkey s increasing involvement in the Palestine problem is also a strong indication of Turkey s increasing activism in the permanent issues of Middle Eastern politics, which had until very recently, had been regarded as dangerous and slippery by former Turkish governing elites. 73 Thus it is clear that the new governing elite is more involved in the Palestinian issue and has moved Turkey-Israel relations onto more balanced and realist foundations. Cyprus Issue Along with the European candidature, the new government was presented with the opportunity to restructure Turkish foreign policy in Cyprus. Formerly, Turkey s Cyprus policy was defined within the framework of national security and was immune from challenges of alternative conceptualizations. The new Cyprus policy formulated by the 70 Yoel Marcus, Is the Obama Effect Turning the World against Israel? Haaretz, 16 October 2009. 71 http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/about+the+ministry/mfa+spokesman/2009/press+ releases/fm_liberman_turkish_television_broadcast_14-oct-2009, 21 November 2009. 72 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_174----17-eylul-2008_-israilsuriye-arasindaki-aracili-baris-gorusmeleri-hk_.tr.mfa, 21 May 2009. 73 For some examples see, Mustafa Balbay, Ortadoğu Bataklığı ve Türkiye nin Yeri, Cumhuriyet, 6 June 2008; Haluk Şahin, Ortadoğu Bataklıklarında, Radikal, 24 January 2009.
180 UNDERSTANDING THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN AK Party government is described as a strategy to prove the willingness of the Turkish party to a solution, to formulate a new stance based on the Annan Plan and to end the status quo through a solution acceptable to both sides. Different from the stance taken by the former elites of Turkish foreign policy, the AK Party government perceived the Cyprus issue as an obstacle to closer relations with the EU, its ultimate foreign policy goal. 74 The prospect of EU membership was the main external factor in the change of attitude of the Turkish government in Cyprus. Without the pressure emanating from the EU accession process, no government would have pursued such a new approach. With the initiatives to restructure foreign policy in Cyprus, the government also challenged the values dominating the understanding of national security and the prevailing discourse. The change in Turkish policy toward Cyprus of Turkey can be considered as a fundamental shift from the former pattern of resistance to negotiations and this shift was praised by many observers abroad. Although the Turkish stance presented a novel approach, outcomes did not prove so fruitful at the end of the day. Despite the positive attitude and vote of the Turkish side (of the island), a settlement could not be achieved in 2004 as a result of rejection by the Greek side. The leaders of the governing party in Turkey may be disillusioned by the failure of a settlement despite their bold moves in support of the UN plan and the way that other actors within the state have expressed opposition to some aspects of the settlement plan. 75 Africa Similar to its increasing activism in the Middle East, Turkey also started to engage in the issues of Africa. Along with its candidature for the temporary seat of the UN Security Council for 2009-2010, Turkey increased its donations to African countries and Sudan was first among the recipient countries 76 As a result of its activities on the continent, Turkey now enjoys observer status in the African Union and has established TİKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency) offices in several African capitals to coordinate its support to African countries. In what mirrors the case of its engagement policies towards Syria, Turkey s relations with Sudan, because of the allegations of gross human rights abuses in Darfur by the Sudan government, has also attracted domestic and 74 Robins, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 297. 75 Migdalowitz, Turkey: Selected Foreign, p. 12. 76 TİKA Kalkınma Yardımları Raporu 2007, p. 28, Available online at http://www.tika.gov.tr/yukle/dosyalar/2007/kalkinmayardrap2007/tikakalkinmay ardimlariraporu2007.pdf, 3 April 2009.
U SAK YEARBOOK 2011 181 international criticisms. 77 However, Turkey has continued its contacts with the Sudan administration. Turkey s new interest in Sub-Saharan Africa is a genuine innovation novelty in Turkey s general foreign policy. Although Turkey aimed to develop its relations with the African continent and prepared a plan for increasing economic, political, military and cultural relations with the sub- Saharan countries in 1998, the breakthrough came with the declaration of 2005 as the Year of Africa in foreign policy. 78 There seems to be two general motivations for Turkey s new interest in the region. One is the general aim of the foreign policy executive to enlarge the foreign policy vision of Turkey and pursue foreign policies on a larger scale. The other seems related to Turkey s troubled relations with the EU, in particular France. Turkey s new foreign policy executive has begun to regard Turkey-EU relations more from a geo-strategic angle and consider Sub- Saharan Africa as a geopolitical arena where French influence is historically huge. Turkey s new activism in this area could be regarded as a form of competition with France, which at present opposes Turkey s EU membership and tries to decrease the momentum of Turkey-EU relationship. Turkey-Russia Relations The picture of Turkey s relations with Russia in the 2000s is completely different from that of the 1990s. Fed by historically negative perceptions and projected rivalries in the newly-emerging independent Central Asia, the relations between these two countries were uncooperative, mostly problematic, at the beginning of post Cold War period. Russia was not happy with the expectations of the increasing influence of Turkey in former Soviet territories and slogans like the Turkish world from the Adriatic to the Great Wall and the support of Turkish nationals to Chechen fighters. Turkish concerns concentrated on the support of Russia to the PKK in response. Despite increasing relations in the sphere of economics and institutions such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) the period of the early 1990s represented rivalry between Turkey and Russia. Beginning from the late 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey s relations with Russia have started to improve in several respects and contacts between the political leaders have intensified over the past few years. Turkish PM Erdoğan visited Moscow in December 2004 and Russian President Putin 77 Hasan Cemal, Sayın Erdoğan, Gazze ye One Minute Var da, Darfur a Yok mu?, Milliyet, 6 March 2009, and Semih İdiz, Erdoğan ın Darfur Çelişkisi, Milliyet, 5 February 2009. 78 Türkiye-Afrika İlişkileri, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afrika-iliskileri.tr.mfa, 21 May 2009.
182 UNDERSTANDING THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN visited Ankara in January 2005. In 2005, Erdoğan and Putin met four times and Putin was the first Russian head of state to visit Turkey in 32 years. 79 Different aspects of the change of the relations between these two countries are summarized as follows: Turkey s abandonment of quasiexpansionist policies in favor of closer relations with Russia, increasing military cooperation, desire to contain and suppress ethnic separatism and Islamic fundamentalism, desire to stabilize the Caucasus and finally the adoption of a joint stance against US led military campaign in Iraq. 80 In relation to the above, the main reason behind the intensification of Turkish- Russian relations has been Turkey s drastic improvement in terms of its potential and actual power vis-a vis Russia. 81 In similar vein to these arguments, the improvement of ties between Turkey and Russia is described as dual normalization (economic and political), and can be attributed to three overlapping developments: the diminishing of mutual threat perceptions, Russia s emergence as a profitable market for Turkish entrepreneurs as well as the Turkish elite s drive to make Turkey an energy hub, and, Vladimir Putin s goal to make foreign economic relations one of the areas of priority in Russian foreign policy. 82 Improvement of bilateral relations became much more visible after Turkey s refusal to transfer US troops via Turkish territory to Iraq before the invasion in 2003. Ankara s decision enhanced Turkish credentials as an independent actor in foreign policy by the Russians. In fact, the makers of foreign policy argue that this democratic and independent attitude of Turkey in the last couple of years has contributed to the image of Turkey in the eyes of other countries like Russia. 83 Turkey and Russia jointly opposed US proposals to extend the NATO- led Operation Active Endeavor into the Black Sea and American pressures to mitigate the provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which limits the time of non-coastal countries in the Black Sea to three weeks, and stipulates a limited number of vessels. 84 Ankara and Moscow had shared concerns about the attitude of the Bush administration toward Syria, Iran and Iraq. Along with the policy of the 79 Suat Kınıklıoğlu, and Valery Morkva, An Anatomy of Turkish-Russian Relations, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies Vol. 7, No. 4, (2007), p. 535. 80 Şener Aktürk, Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002), Turkish Studies Vol. 7, No. 3, (2006), p. 345. 81 Ibid, p. 358. 82 Lerna Yanık, Allies or Partners? An Appraisal of Turkey s Ties to Russia, 1991-1997, East European Quarterly Vol. 41, No. 3, (2007), pp. 349-350. 83 Abdullah Gül, New Horizons in Turkish Foreign Policy, Boğaziçi Yöneticiler Vakfı, Dedeman Hotel, İstanbul, 22 May 2004. 84 NATO Ships in Black Sea Raise Alarms in Russia, The New York Times, 28 August 2008.
U SAK YEARBOOK 2011 183 new government in Turkey to overcome problems with neighbors, convergence of outlooks between the two countries about regional issues contributed to an improvement in relations. In addition to these developments, the frustration of both Turkey and Russia in their relations with the EU and US over the last couple of the years provided defensive motivations to these two countries to deepen their relations. 85 For the Turkish side, the problems in the EU membership process are stressed by other scholars as a reason for the warming of relations with Russia and it is argued that a more realistic assessment of an EU membership bid played a role in Turkey s desire to form closer relations with Russia. 86 Despite these increasing relations, Russia is unwilling to support Turkey on the Cyprus issue and vetoed a draft resolution UN Security Council on Cyprus after the referendum on the island in 2004. Turkey s improved relations with Russia over the last couple of years can be explained by diminishing threat perceptions, increasing economic interdependence and, on the Turkish side, the desire to follow a more independent foreign policy. Turkey s rapprochement with Russia also indicates Turkey s desire to pursue a multi-faced foreign policy where Russia, as a big power, has a special role as would be expected from a Turkey seeking a more independent foreign policy. Turkey-Armenia Relations As a result of the principle of zero problems with neighbors and the overcoming of pressures emanating from arguments concerning the alleged genocide, Turkey has tried to develop its relations with Armenia over the last couple of years. Aware of the setbacks and negative implications of the frozen conflicts in the southern Caucasus, Turkish policy makers are attempting to open the lock to maintain stability in the region and guarantee energy security. In order to respond to accusations of genocide, in 2005, Turkey proposed a joint committee of history by Turkish and Armenian historians to investigate the arguments. The Georgian-Russian War in August 2008 showed the fragility of the stability of the region and signified the need for common efforts to reach a solution of the problem. Turkey proposed a Caucasus Security and Cooperation Platform and invited Armenia to join this platform. A football match between Turkey and Armenia in Yerevan on 6 September 2008 represented a new opportunity for the increasing of contacts between the two countries. Upon the invitation of Armenian President Sarkisyan, Turkish President Gül visited Yerevan and there were some arguments that football diplomacy 85 Kınıklıoğlu and Morkva, An Anatomy of, p. 548. 86 James W. Warhola, and William A. Mitchell The Warming of Turkish-Russian Relations: Motives and Implications, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 14, No. 1, (2006), pp. 132.
184 UNDERSTANDING THE NEW TURKISH FOREIGN may help to contribute to the normalization of relations. 87 In April 2009, just before the visit of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that, Turkey and Armenia were working together with the Swiss mediation to normalize their relations and they agreed on a road map for furthering their relations. 88 This declaration was praised by American and European politicians but strongly criticized by Azeri politicians and some segments of Turkish society. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry spokesmen said that, Azerbaijan believes that normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations should only be in parallel to withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied Azeri territories. 89 In protest to the change of the attitude for Turkey in breaking its relations with Azerbaijan in regards to the Armenian occupation of Azeri territories and the possible opening of borders between Turkey and Armenia, Azeri President Aliyev did not attend the Alliance of Civilizations meeting in Istanbul in April 2009, and instead visited Moscow to improve political and economic relations. To reassure the Azeri side about the intentions of Turkey and to overcome domestic criticisms, the Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister visited Baku separately in May 2009, and promised that the border between Turkey and Armenia would not be opened until the end of the occupation of Azeri territories. 90 The initiatives in the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia continued in the Autumn of 2009, and two countries signed protocols in Zurich and agreed on a time table for the normalization of relations. 91 Despite the domestic criticisms and last minute crisis before the signature of the protocols, governments in both countries seemed ready to go forward. However, it can be argued that rapprochement with Armenia created a setback in Turkey s relations with Azerbaijan. Ankara s ultimate ambition in the Caucasus is described by foreign analysts as the resolution of border disputes between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey and the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. It is argued that, if the geopolitical equation in the region changes with Turkish facilitation than Ankara will emerge as a clearer strategic winner. 92 87 Bülent Aras, and Fatih Özbay Turkish-Armenian Relations: Will Football Diplomacy Work? SETA Policy Brief, (2008) No. 24. 88 Türkiye-Ermenistan İlişkileri, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-56_-22-nisan-2009_- turkiye-ermenistan-iliskileri-hk_.tr.mfa, 28 May 2009. 89 Azerbaycan dan Türkiye ye Rest, Milliyet, 23 April 2009. 90 Başbakan Erdoğan ın Bakü ziyareti Azerbaycan Basınında, Milliyet, 14 May 2009. 91 Tarihi İmzalar, Radikal, 11 October 2009. 92 Igor Torbakov and Hanna Ojanen Looking For a New Strategic Identity: Is Turkey Emerging as an Independent Regional Power? The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Briefing Paper 30, (2009).
U SAK YEARBOOK 2011 185 CONCLUSION: NEW TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: CHANGES WITHIN CONTINUITY It is clear that there is a new understanding in the Turkish foreign policy during the AK Party era. However, we are inclined to argue that in spite of this new understanding, these transformations are not changes in the international orientation of Turkey per se, as argued above. While some changes in Turkish Foreign policy could be classified as adjustment change, as is the case with the AK Party s increased efforts with regard to EU issues, some other changes could be regarded as qualitative changes as seen in the relations between Turkey and the US and Turkey s increasing activism in the Middle East and Africa. Some commentators argue that the AK Party s multi-dimensional foreign policy and the strategic depth doctrine of the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, should be regarded as a change in the international orientation of Turkey s foreign policy away from the West, the US and the EU in principle, to the East, the Middle East, Africa and Russia in practice. They also argue that the term neo-ottomanism may be attached to the ideological posture of the AK Party in foreign policy. However, we argue that first of all, this understanding of multidimensionality in the relations does not mean a radical departure from the West, and second, neo-ottomanism does not constitute in itself an alternative foreign policy for the AK Party. Arguably, it would be quite true to argue that neo-ottomanism is not a departure from Europe, simply because the Ottoman State was in practice a European, rather than an Asian state. We believe that the leitmotive behind the new understanding in Turkish foreign policy is the new political elite in Turkish politics. Therefore, we argue these new policies are leader-driven. Ahmet Davutoğlu s role in this regard is unique and original. No advisor had been so influential in the determination of choices and preferences of Turkish foreign policy in the history of Turkish foreign policy.