Principality of Liechtenstein

COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE EVALUATION OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM (MONEYVAL) MONEYVAL(2014) 2 Report on Fourth Assessment Visit Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Principality of Liechtenstein 2 April 2014

The Principality of Liechtenstein is a member of MONEYVAL. This is the fourth report in MONEYVAL s fourth round assessment visits, following up on the recommendations made in the third round. This evaluation was conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A representative of MONEYVAL participated as an evaluator in the assessment and also examined compliance with the European Union anti-money laundering Directives where these differ from the FATF Recommendations, therefore falling within the remit of MONEYVAL examinations. The report on the 4 th Assessment Visit was adopted by MONEYVAL at its 44 th Plenary (Strasbourg, 31 st March - 4 April 2014). [2014] Committee of experts on anti-money laundering measures and the financing of terrorism (MONEYVAL). All rights reserved. Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. For any use for commercial purposes, no part of this publication may be translated, reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic (CD-Rom, Internet, etc.) or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system without prior permission in writing from the MONEYVAL Secretariat, Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law (DG I), Council of Europe (F - 67075 Strasbourg or moneyval@coe.int).

2 Contents Page Acronyms... 6 Preface... 8 Executive Summary... 9 1. KEY FINDINGS... 9 1.1. Legal Systems and Related Institutional Measures... 10 1.2. Preventive Measures Financial Institutions... 11 1.3. Preventive Measures Designated Nonfinancial Businesses and Professions... 14 1.4. Legal Persons and Arrangements and Nonprofit Organisations... 15 1.5. National and International Cooperation... 16 2. GENERAL... 18 2.1. General Information on Liechtenstein... 18 2.2. Structural elements for an effective AML/CFT system... 19 2.3. General Situation of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism... 20 2.4. Money Laundering... 21 2.5. Terrorism financing... 24 2.6. Overview of the Financial Sector... 25 2.7. Overview of the DNFBP Sector... 35 2.8. Overview of Commercial Laws and Mechanisms Governing Legal Persons and Arrangements... 41 2.9. Overview of Strategy to Prevent Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing... 43 3. Legal System and Related Institutional Measures... 48 3.1. Criminalisation of Money Laundering (R1 rated PC in third round MER)... 48 3.1.1. Description and Analysis... 49 3.1.2. Recommendations and Comments... 58 3.1.3. Compliance with Recommendation 1... 59 3.2. Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing (SR.II rated PC in Third Round MER)... 59 3.2.1. Description and Analysis... 59 3.3. Criminalisation of Financing of Terrorism (c. II.1)... 60 3.3.1. Recommendations and Comments... 67 3.3.2. Compliance with Special Recommendation II... 67 3.4. Confiscation, Freezing, and Seizing of Proceeds of Crime (R.3 rated LC in the third round MER)... 68 3.4.1. Description and Analysis... 68 3.4.2. Recommendations and Comments... 77 3.4.3. Compliance with Recommendation 3.... 78 3.5. Freezing of Funds Used for Terrorist Financing (SR.III rated PC in the third round MER)... 78 3.5.1. Description and Analysis... 78 3.5.2. Recommendations and Comments... 86 3.5.3. Compliance with Special Recommendation III... 86 3.6. The Financial Intelligence Unit and its Functions (R.26 rated LC in the 2007 MER)... 86 3.6.1. Description and Analysis... 87 3.6.2. Recommendations and Comments... 106 3.6.3. Compliance with Recommendation 26... 107

3 3.7. Cross-Border Declaration or Disclosure (SR.IX rated NC in the 2007 MER)... 108 3.7.1. Description and Analysis... 108 3.7.2. Recommendations and Comments... 114 3.7.3. Compliance with Special Recommendation IX... 115 4. Preventative Measures Financial Institutions... 115 4.1. Customer Due Diligence and Record Keeping... 115 4.2. Risk of Money Laundering or Financing of Terrorism... 119 4.3. Customer Due Diligence, Including Enhanced or Reduced Measures (R.5 8)... 122 4.3.1. Description and Analysis... 122 4.3.2. Asset Management Firms and Their Application of Simplified Due Diligence... 138 4.4. Politically Exposed Persons (R.6 rated PC in the 2007 MER)... 144 4.4.1. Description and Analysis... 144 4.5. Cross-Border Correspondent Banking (R7 rated PC in the 2007 MER)... 147 4.5.1. Description and Analysis... 147 4.6. New Technologies and Non-Face-to-Face Transactions (R8 rated PC in the 2007 MER)... 149 4.6.1. Description and Analysis... 149 4.6.2. Recommendations and Comments... 151 4.6.3. Compliance with Recommendations 5 8... 153 4.7. Third Parties and Introduced Business (R.9 rated PC in the 2007 MER)... 155 4.7.1. Description and Analysis... 155 4.7.2. Recommendations and Comments... 158 4.7.3. Compliance with Recommendation 9... 158 4.8. Financial Institution Secrecy or Confidentiality (R.4)... 158 4.8.1. Description and Analysis... 158 4.8.2. Recommendations and Comments... 164 4.8.3. Compliance with Recommendation 4... 165 4.9. Record Keeping and Wire Transfer Rules (R.10 and SR.VII)... 165 Record Keeping (R 10 rated C in the 2007 MER)... 165 4.9.1. Description and Analysis... 165 4.10. Wire Transfers (SR VII rated NC in the 2007 MER)... 167 4.10.1. Description and Analysis... 167 4.10.2. Recommendations and Comments... 172 4.10.3. Compliance with Recommendation 10 and Special Recommendation VII... 172 4.11. Monitoring of Transactions and Relationships (R.11 and 21) (R.11 rated PC in the third round MER)... 173 4.11.1. Description and Analysis... 173 4.12. Special Attention to Transactions from Some Countries (R 21 rated PC in the 2007 MER)... 175 4.12.1. Description and Analysis... 175 4.12.2. Recommendations and Comments... 177 4.12.3. Compliance with Recommendations 11 and 21... 177 4.13. Suspicious Transaction Reports and Other Reporting (R.13-14 and SR.IV)... 178 Suspicious Transaction Reports (R.13 & SR.IV rated PC in the 2007 MER)... 178 4.13.1. Description and Analysis... 178 4.14. Tipping-off/protection from civil and criminal liability (R.14 rated PC in the 2007 MER)... 184

4 4.14.1. Description and Analysis... 184 4.14.2. Recommendations and Comments... 186 4.14.3. Compliance with Recommendations 13, 14, and Special Recommendation IV... 187 4.15. Foreign Branches (R. 22 rated PC in the 2007 MER)... 187 4.15.1. Description and Analysis... 187 4.15.2. Recommendations and Comments... 189 4.15.3. Compliance with Recommendation 22... 189 4.16. The Supervisory and Oversight System Competent Authorities and SROs. Role, Functions, Duties, and Powers (Including Sanctions) (R. 23, 29, & 17)... 189 4.16.1. Description and Analysis... 189 4.16.2. Recommendations and Comments (R.23 and 29)... 215 4.16.3. Compliance with Recommendations 17, 23, and 29... 216 5. Preventive Measures Designated Nonfinancial Businesses and Professions... 217 5.1. Relevant Characteristics of the Liechtenstein Financial System... 217 5.2. Customer Due Diligence and Record Keeping (R.12 rated PC in the last MER). 219 5.2.1. Description and Analysis... 219 5.2.2. Recommendations and Comments... 232 5.2.3. Compliance with Recommendation 12... 234 5.3. Suspicious Transaction Reporting (R.16 rated PC in the last MER)... 235 5.3.1. Description and Analysis... 235 5.3.2. Recommendations and Comments... 242 5.3.3. Compliance with Recommendation 16... 243 6. Legal Persons and Arrangements and Nonprofit Organisations... 244 6.1. Legal Persons Access to Beneficial Ownership and Control Information (R.33, rated PC in the 2007 MER)... 244 6.1.1. Description and Analysis... 244 6.1.2. Recommendations and Comments... 265 6.1.3. Compliance with Recommendations 33... 266 6.2. Legal Arrangements Access to Beneficial Ownership and Control Information (R.34-rated PC in the 2007 MER)... 266 6.2.1. Description and Analysis... 266 6.2.2. Recommendations... 275 6.2.3. Compliance with Recommendation 34... 275 6.3. Nonprofit Organisations (SR.VIII rated PC in the 2007 MER)... 276 6.3.1. Description and Analysis... 276 6.3.2. Recommendations and Comments... 284 6.3.3. Compliance with Special Recommendation VIII... 284 7. National and International Cooperation... 285 7.1. National Cooperation and Coordination (R.31 and R.32 rated C in the 2007 MER)... 285 7.1.1. Description and Analysis... 285 7.1.2. Recommendations and Comments... 288 7.1.3. Recommendations:... 288 7.1.4. Compliance with Recommendation 31 and 32 (criterion 32.1 only)... 288 7.2. The Conventions and UN Special Resolutions (R.35 and SR.I rated PC in the third round MER)... 288 7.2.1. Description and Analysis... 288 7.2.2. Recommendations and Comments... 294

5 7.2.3. Compliance with Recommendation 35 and Special Recommendation I... 294 7.3. Mutual Legal Assistance (R.36, SR.V rated PC in the third round MER)... 295 7.3.1. Description and Analysis... 295 7.3.2. Recommendations and Comments... 307 7.3.3. Compliance with Recommendations 36 and Special Recommendation V. 307 7.4. Extradition (R.37, 39, SR. V Rated PC in the Third Round MER)... 308 7.4.1. Description and Analysis... 308 7.4.2. Recommendations and Comments... 314 7.4.3. Compliance with Recommendations 39 and Special Recommendation V. 314 8. Other Forms of International Cooperation (R.40 and SR.V)... 314 8.1. National and International Cooperation... 314 8.1.1. Recommendations and Comments... 332 8.1.2. Compliance with Recommendation 40 and Special Recommendation V... 333 9. OTHER ISSUES... 334 9.1. Resources and Statistics... 334 9.1.1. Recommendations... 336 9.2. Other Relevant AML/CFT Measures or Issues... 337 9.3. General Framework for AML/CFT System (see also section 1.1)... 337 Statistical Tables 1. Statistics on domestic criminality (general)... 21 2. Statistics of law enforcement results for 2008 2012.... 23 3. Judicial Follow-up.... 54 4. On the number of search and seizures (not limited to ML/FT)... 73 5. Statistics (R.32) for Suspicious Activity Reports.... 99 6. Number of MLA requests addressed to Liechtenstein... 303 7. Extradition requests and duration of execution.... 312 8. Counterpart requests related to economic and financial crime (2009... 332 Annexes 1. Ratings of Compliance with FATF Recommendations... 338 2. Details of All Bodies Met During the On-Site Visit... 368 3. List of All Laws, Regulations, and Other Material Received... 371 4. Copies of Key Laws, Regulations, and Other Measures... 372

6 ACRONYMS AIFM AMA AMC AML/CFT ARIS BA BL BCP BO CC CDD CO CPC CSP DDA DDO DNFBP ECHR ECMA EEA EFTA EGMLTF EIA ESA EU FATF FI FIU FMA FMAA FSAP FSRB FT GA GDP GNI GRECO IAIS ICA IMA ISA ISA IUA KYC LEG MAA MEF Alternative Investment Funds Mechanisms Asset Management Act Asset Management Companies Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Asset Recovery Intelligence System Banking Act Banking Law Basel Core Principles Banking Ordinance Criminal Code Customer Due Diligence Casino Ordinance Criminal Procedure Code Company Service Provider Due Diligence Act Due Diligence Ordinance Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions European Convention on Human Rights European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters European Economic Area European Free Trade Association Expert Group on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing E-Money Institutions Act EFTA Surveillance Authority European Union Financial Action Task Force Financial institution Financial Intelligence Unit Financial Market Authority Financial Market Authority Act Financial Sector Assessment Program FATF-style Regional Body Financing of terrorism Gambling Act Gross Domestic Product Gross National Income Group of States against Corruption International Association of Insurance Supervisors International Center of Asset Recovery Insurance Mediation Act Insurance Supervision Act International Sanctions Act Investment Undertaking Act Know your customer/client Legal Department of the IMF Market Abuse in Trading of Financing Instruments Ministry of Economy and Finance

7 MER MFA MFD MOU ML MLA NPO OGO OJ OPP PC PGR PEP PSP PTA ROSC SAR SBGC SNB SRO STR TCSP UN UNSCR WPRG WTO Mutual Evaluation Report Ministry of Foreign Affairs Monetary and Financial Systems Department of the IMF Memorandum of Understanding Money laundering Mutual legal assistance Nonprofit organisation Online Gambling Ordinance Office of Justice Office of the Public Prosecutor Penal Code Persons and Companies Act Politically-exposed person Payment Service Providers Professional Trustees Act Report on Observance of Standards and Codes Suspicious Activity Report Swiss Border Guard Corps Swiss National Bank Self-regulatory organisation Suspicious Transaction Report Trust and Company Services Provider United Nations Organisation United Nations Security Council Resolution Auditors and Auditing Companies Act World Trade Organisation

8 PREFACE This partial re-assessment of the anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) regime of Liechtenstein is based on the Forty Recommendations 2003 and the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing 2001 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and was prepared using the AML/CFT assessment Methodology 2004 and following the MONEYVAL rules of procedures of the fourth evaluation round for the identification of the FATF recommendations that were subject to reassessment. In line with these procedures, the evaluation team has therefore focused on how effectively the FATF s main and other significant recommendations have been implemented, namely Recommendations 1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 13, 17, 23, 26, 29, 30, 31, 35, 36 and 40, and Special Recommendations (SR.) I, SR.II, SR.III, SR.IV and SR.V, which were subject to reassessment regardless of how they were rated in the third round. The assessment team also assessed compliance with and effectiveness of implementation of all the other FATF recommendations that had been rated noncompliant or partially compliant in the third round. The assessment team considered all the materials supplied by the authorities, the information obtained onsite during their mission from June 12 24, 2013, and other verifiable information subsequently provided by the authorities. During the mission, the assessment team met with officials and representatives of all relevant government agencies and the private sector. Overall, the assessment team had over fifty meetings, more than half of which were with representatives of the private sector subject to the AML/CFT requirements, to gauge how effectively these requirements are being implemented by the private sector as well as by the authorities. A list of the bodies met is set out in Annex 1 to the detailed assessment report. The assessment was conducted by a team of assessors composed of staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and experts acting under the supervision of the IMF. The evaluation team consisted of: Mr. Giuseppe Lombardo, Senior Counsel (Legal Department, team leader); Ms. Gabriele Dunker (IMF consultant), Messrs. Richard Pratt and Boudewijn Verhelst (IMF consultants), Mr. Thomas Iverson (United States Treasury), and Mr. Michael Stellini (MONEYVAL Secretariat). The assessors reviewed the institutional framework; the relevant AML/CFT laws, regulations, guidelines, and other requirements; and the regulatory and other systems in place to deter and punish money laundering (ML) and the financing of terrorism (FT) through financial institutions and Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBP). The assessors also examined the capacity, implementation, and effectiveness of all these systems. This report provides a summary of the AML/CFT measures in place in Liechtenstein at the time of the mission or shortly thereafter. It describes and analyses those measures, sets out Liechtenstein s levels of compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations (see Table 1) and provides recommendations on how certain aspects of the system could be strengthened (see Table 2). This report was also presented to MONEYVAL and endorsed by this organisation on its plenary meeting of April 1, 2014. The assessors would like to express their gratitude to the Liechtenstein authorities for their cooperation and great hospitality throughout the assessment mission.

9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. KEY FINDINGS 1. Liechtenstein has made significant steps and achieved considerable progress since the last mutual evaluation, particularly in bringing its legal framework more closely in line with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, consolidating an overall robust institutional framework for combating money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) and moving towards greater transparency. Domestic cooperation is robust, and key stakeholders enjoy the trust of the financial and nonfinancial sectors. 2. However, effective implementation is uneven and not always optimal. Liechtenstein s proactive use of the in rem regime of confiscation of criminal proceeds has proven to be quite effective, however, the near absence of convictions for ML and the exiguous number of ML standalone prosecutions, already noted by the last mutual evaluation, call into question the effectiveness of the criminal approach to ML. The feedback received from several countries on mutual legal assistance (MLA) and the statistics provided by the authorities show that substantive progress has been achieved in an area that is particularly relevant, given that practically all the predicate offenses to ML occur outside the country. While the majority of countries indicated, to varying degrees, that information exchange with the Liechtenstein s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is good, a few were more critical. The number of onsite inspections carried out by the Financial Market Authority (FMA) has increased significantly since the last mutual evaluation, but the over-reliance on external firms to conduct on-site inspections, the lack of a fully fledged risk-based approach to supervision and the limited use of sanctions somewhat reduce the overall effectiveness of the supervisory regime. Finally, the effective implementation of the preventive measures and of the reporting of suspicious transactions is uneven across and within the various sectors subject to the anti money laundering (AML)/counter financing of terrorism (CFT) requirements, and affected by the over-reliance on trust and company service providers (TCSPs) for the performance of certain elements of the customer due diligence (CDD) process. 3. Few, albeit significant, legal shortcomings remain. The most important one concerns financial secrecy provisions, which are fragmented, not always fully coordinated, and could have an impact on the FIU s core functions and negatively affect the overall effectiveness of the AML/CFT regime. A review of all secrecy provisions should be undertaken to remove any inconsistencies and to ensure that these provisions do not limit or pose a challenge to an effective implementation of the AML/CFT framework. There should be a clear provision stating that authorities powers with regard to AML/CFT supersede any secrecy provisions enshrined in other laws. 4. There are some intrinsic vulnerabilities, of which authorities are aware, that continue to expose the country to risk of ML (and could, potentially, create a risk of FT). The business model of Liechtenstein s financial center focuses on private banking, wealth management, and mostly nonresident business, which are regarded as high risk by the FATF. It includes the provision of corporate structures such as foundations and other companies and trusts that are designed for wealth management, the structuring of assets, and asset protection. Banks continue to be exposed to ML risks as they offer a variety of products that can be abused for ML purposes. The TCSP sector in Liechtenstein is particularly vulnerable to the risk of ML (and, potentially, to FT) because of the

10 services offered and the types of customers served, who often are intermediated, nonresident, and components of existing legal structures. While industry representatives were generally aware of AML/CFT measures and obligations, their level of implementation is not always commensurate with the risk level of the sector. The role of TCSP in creating often very complex legal persons that can make it challenging to trace back beneficial ownership amplifies the risk that this particular sector is facing. The insurance sector has developed over the years, and a number of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) have been submitted that showed an increasing use of insurance products. The real estate sector does not appear to pose particular risks, considering the limited possibilities of investment and the inaccessibility for foreigners. There are no bureaux de change, no notaries, and (as yet) no casinos in Liechtenstein. 5. The vulnerabilities of the TCSP sector impact the entire framework in Liechtenstein due to their central role as repository of beneficial ownership information (for the purpose of Recommendation 33), and the over-reliance placed upon them by financial institutions and other Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) in carrying out the CDD process. These risks are further amplified by a general and residual tendency for industry and other participants to prioritise confidentiality. To mitigate these risks, the authorities should consider requiring enhanced due diligence (EDD). Such EDD should go well beyond the minimum current requirement of a signed certificate stating the identity of the beneficial owner and should include a high degree of knowledge of the expected profile of business coming from the beneficial owner. 1.1. Legal Systems and Related Institutional Measures 6. Liechtenstein has brought the ML offense fully in line with the relevant convention and FATF standards, but there are questions on its effective implementation. The substantial number of investigations only very exceptionally results in a domestic ML prosecution, and there was only one conviction since 2007. The repressive approach is still under pressure as a result of its reliance on external factors and the perceived high level of burden of proof concerning the predicate criminality. Liechtenstein maintains a policy of transferring prosecutions to foreign judicial authorities whenever this measure is deemed more effective. The recommendation of the previous assessment to develop autonomous money laundering cases to attenuate the (over)reliance on external factors has not yet been followed up. 7. The authorities took great care to ensure the technical implementation of the CFT standards. All FT Convention Treaties have entered into force in Liechtenstein and the sole financing of all offenses covered by the relevant treaties is now punished as terrorist financing. Another important gap has been addressed by penalising the financing of a terrorist individual or group as such. The imprisonment term is rather low, particularly in comparison with the sanctions wielded by most European jurisdictions, weakening their deterrent and dissuasive effect. All in all, however, the legal and institutional framework is adequate enough to capture any FT indication. 8. A strong point in the Liechtenstein AML/CFT system is its focus on asset recovery. Beside the criminal confiscation the Liechtenstein regime also features a civil forfeiture procedure that is systematically used to significant effect for foreign predicate proceeds, taking priority over criminal convictions. The civil in rem confiscation procedure is indeed a powerful and effective tool, particularly in a criminal policy system that is quite reliant on foreign investigations and prosecutions.

11 The results of the Liechtenstein confiscation regime, translated in the number of conservatory measures, the systematic use of the in rem confiscation possibilities and the overall amount of forfeited criminal assets, must be underscored, notwithstanding some elements can hamper the performance of the system. In particular, the seizure/confiscation measures dispatch still can suffer from dilatory procedures before the Constitutional Court, which merits a serious reflection by the legislator to strike an appropriate balance between the protection of fundamental rights and a reasonable application of the procedures. 9. The adoption of the Enforcement of International Sanctions Act (ISA) significantly improved the legal framework governing the terrorist asset freezing regime in Liechtenstein, but some issues remain. Except for public guidance on delisting, there are now clear-cut procedures in place for challenging or reviewing the administrative measures and governmental decisions on freezing listed terrorists assets, both in a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267 and 1373 context. The ISA restriction to only enforce the sanctions adopted by the most significant trading partners cannot be reconciled with the general purport of UNSCR 1373 by unduly narrowing the implementation of the resolution from the very start. Also, neither the ISA nor any other legal text determines how to proceed in the event of the establishment of a domestic list. 10. The FIU s power to obtain additional information from any reporting entity was strengthened right after the onsite visit. However, the FIU s power to gather information established by Article (Art.) 4.3. of the FIU Act is subject to secrecy provisions and could affect the FIU s ability to properly undertake its core functions. Additionally, certain provisions in sector-specific laws restrict the possibility for the FIU to get the full range of information it needs from the FMA. Liechtenstein should ensure that none of the FIU s powers to request and obtain information from domestic authorities and reporting entities are subject to any unduly restrictive conditions and should amend Art. 4.3. of the FIU Act in that regard. Clear provisions should be introduced to compel domestic authorities to provide information requested by the FIU, and reporting entities should be subject to specific sanctions for failure to provide information to the FIU when so requested. 11. The quality of notifications disseminated by the FIU to the Office of the Public Prosecutor (OPP) has improved over time as a result of an enhancement to the analytical process. The FIU should keep this aspect of its functions under constant vigilance to ensure that the improved quality of notifications is maintained. The FIU issued comprehensive guidelines on the manner of reporting, including standard reporting forms and the procedure to be followed in the submission of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) by reporting entities and has continued providing training to reporting entities. 1.2. Preventive Measures Financial Institutions 12. Liechtenstein s legal framework for preventive measures has been significantly improved, but its effectiveness is hampered by certain characteristics inherent in the business model and by issues related to the implementation of the AML/CFT requirements across the financial industry. While there is a general understanding of AML/CFT obligations, their implementation and effectiveness are negatively affected by certain factors. Effectiveness is particularly undermined by the prevalence of and over-reliance on professionals (mostly trustees)

12 introducing contracting parties, both foreign and domestic, who often establish and represent legal structures on behalf of the customer, which is a predominant characteristic of the Liechtenstein s financial business model. Such arrangements might distort the various elements of AML/CFT obligations, particularly the identification and verification of the beneficial owner. Financial institutions (FIs) do not necessarily consider the high risk activities and customers specifically categorised by the FATF and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Accordingly, the effectiveness of the AML/CFT framework is undermined by a failure to treat identified higher risk customers and activities as such. Assessors noted uneven implementation of due diligence obligations across FIs, often without regard for the high risk nature activities and customers. Certain FIs described thoughtful and thorough policies and procedures developed based on risk, whereas other institutions described weak risk assessments and policies and procedures that appeared to be taken directly from the minimum requirements set forth in law, without giving thought to prevailing risks specific to the institution or instituting additional procedures to effectively manage risks. Of particular note are deficiencies related to the general lack of development of exhaustive customer profiles based on reliable and up-to-date information and documentation, necessary to fully understand customers and their beneficial owners, including in the cases of higher risk legal entity customers with complex structures. The documentation used to verify the parties to a relationship varies across the industry. FIs and DNFBPs alike should improve the effectiveness of the CDD measures undertaken, including by implementing procedures to develop a more thorough understanding of the customer and related parties based on reliable and up-to-date information and documentation, with an increased focus on the beneficial owner(s). 13. The preventive measures framework is broadly in line with the international standard, but a number of technical deficiencies remain. Most notably, verification measures for customers and beneficial owners do not have to be based on reliable sources in all instances; certain blanket exemptions under the Due Diligence Act (DDA) for simplified CDD are not permissible under the international standard; and there is no requirement in the DDA that CDD measures have to be applied to all existing customers at appropriate times and on the basis of materiality. For purposes of crossborder correspondent relationships, there is an unjustified presumption that all European Union (EU) and European Economic Area (EEA) countries adequately apply the FATF Recommendations. Enhanced CDD measures are required only for persons in, but not from high risk jurisdictions. The DDA grants the authorities only few countermeasures to apply to high risk jurisdictions. Record keeping requirements are adequate, albeit some minor deficiencies have been identified in relation to business correspondence and transaction records. 14. The reporting requirement has been brought fully in line with the standard, particularly in relation to terrorist financing and attempted (occasional) transactions, but its effective implementation is uneven and hampered by certain factors. The automatic five-day freezing mechanism was retained. However, the FIU was empowered to release certain transactions before the expiry of the freezing period. The requirement to submit SARs to the prosecutor s office by the FIU exposes the reporting entity that has filed the SAR. Although all reporting entities were aware of their reporting obligation, the level of understanding of the implementation of the reporting obligation was not found to be satisfactory in all cases. A large majority of SARs were triggered by negative information on the customer in the media or commercial intelligence database. The main contributor of SARs is the banking sector, which is the main component of the financial sector in