SOMALILAND: DEMOCRATISATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

SOMALILAND: DEMOCRATISATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 28 July 2003 ICG Africa Report N 66 Nairobi/Brussels

TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS... i I. INTRODUCTION... 1 II. BRIEF HISTORY OF SOMALILAND... 2 A. THE BRITISH SOMALILAND PROTECTORATE (1884 1960)...2 B. THE STATE OF SOMALILAND (1960)...4 C. INTERLUDE: DICTATORSHIP AND CIVIL WAR...5 D. THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND...6 III. GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATISATION... 8 A. FACTIONAL RULE (1991-1993)...8 B. CLAN REPRESENTATION AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION (1993-1997)...10 C. TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY...12 1. The May 2001 Constitutional Referendum...12 2. Constitutional Transition: The Death of Egal...13 IV. ELECTIONS: THE OLD WAYS DIE HARD... 14 V. LOCAL ELECTIONS: TOWARDS DECENTRALISATION... 15 A. POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS...16 B. THE ISSUES...16 C. THE POLL...17 D. THE RESULTS...18 VI. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: THE COIN TOSS... 19 A. THE CHOICE...19 1. UDUB...19 2. Kulmiye...20 3. UCID...21 B. THE CAMPAIGN...21 C. THE POLL...23 D. THE RESULTS...24 E. RECRIMINATIONS...25 F. THE SUPREME COURT...27 VII. SOOL AND EASTERN SANAAG REGIONS... 28 A. SOMALILAND AND THE HARTI...28 B. WHERE NEXT?...30 VIII. COMPLETING THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION... 31 A. STRENGTHENING THE MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM...32 B. THE CONSTITUTION...32 C. HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRESS FREEDOM...33 IX. CONCLUSION: THE SOMALI PEACE PROCESS AND THE PROBLEM OF RECOGNITION... 34

APPENDICES A. MAJOR CLANS AND SUB CLANS OF SOMALILAND...36 B. LOCAL AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS...37 C. MAP OF SOMALIA...38 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP...39 E. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS...40 F. ICG BOARD MEMBERS...46

ICG Africa Report N 66 28 July 2003 SOMALILAND: DEMOCRATISATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Recent developments have made the choice faced by the international community considerably clearer: develop pragmatic responses to Somaliland s demand for self-determination or continue to insist upon the increasingly abstract notion of the unity and territorial integrity of the Somali Republic a course of action almost certain to open a new chapter in the Somali civil war. Somaliland s presidential election of 14 April 2003 was a milestone in the self-declared, unrecognised republic s process of democratisation. Nearly half a million voters cast ballots in one of the closest polls ever conducted in the region: when the last votes had been counted and the results announced on 19 April, the incumbent president, Dahir Rayale Kahin, had won by only 80 votes. A former British protectorate in the Horn of Africa, Somaliland declared its independence from the rest of the Somali Republic in May 1991, following the collapse of the military regime in Mogadishu. Although unrecognised by any country, Somaliland has followed a very different trajectory from the rest of the failed state of Somalia, embarking on a process of internally driven political, economic and social reconstruction. Somaliland s democratic transition began in May 2001 with a plebiscite on a new constitution that introduced a multiparty electoral system, and continued in December 2002 with local elections that were widely described as open and transparent. The final stage of the process legislative elections is scheduled to take place by early 2005. The electoral process has met with widespread approval from domestic and international observers alike, but has not been without problems. The enlistment of government resources and personnel in support of the ruling party s campaign, the disqualification of numerous ballot boxes due to procedural errors, reports of government harassment and intimidation of opposition supporters in the aftermath of the election, and the opposition s initial refusal to accept defeat all marred an otherwise promising democratic exercise. The next phase of the democratic transition will be the most critical: until opposition parties are able to contest parliamentary seats, Somaliland will function as a de facto one party state. Somaliland s international partners can play a key role in assisting the National Electoral Commission to convene legislative elections with the least possible delay, while ensuring a level playing field. Constitutional and judicial reforms may also be required to ensure the integrity of the democratic process over the long-term. Somaliland s increasingly credible claims to statehood present the international community with a thorny diplomatic dilemma at a time when southern Somali leaders are meeting under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) with the aim of establishing a new Somali government. Recognition of Somaliland, although under consideration by a growing number of African and Western governments, is still vigorously resisted by many members of both the African Union (AU) and the Arab League on the grounds that the unity and territorial integrity of member states is sacrosanct. Furthermore, the creation of a new Somali

ICG Africa Report N 66, 28 July 2003 Page ii government emerging from the IGAD process that claims jurisdiction over Somaliland threatens to open a new phase in the Somali conflict. Diplomatic hopes for a negotiated settlement between Somaliland and a future Somali government, however, are unlikely to bear fruit. A hypothetical dialogue on Somali unity would have to overcome mutually exclusive preconditions for talks, divergent visions of what a reunited Somali state might look like and incompatible institutional arrangements. Failing a negotiated settlement, any attempt to coerce Somaliland back to the Somali fold would entail a bitter and probably futile conflict. The question now confronting the international community is no longer whether Somaliland should be recognised as an independent state, but whether there remain any viable alternatives. RECOMMENDATIONS To the Somaliland Government 1. Demonstrate a genuine commitment to pluralism by releasing remaining political detainees and reinstating any government employees dismissed from their jobs for political reasons. 2. Withdraw the proposed press law and invite the independent media to assist in drafting legislation more conducive to the development of independent yet responsible media. 3. Conclude the formal transition to a multiparty political system with the least possible delay, by setting the date of parliamentary elections within less than twelve months. 4. Introduce legislation providing for reasonable subsidies to all official political parties on an equitable basis. 5. Demonstrate a commitment to human rights by investigating past abuses, taking corrective action against those responsible and introducing new measures to strengthen the protection of human rights. 6. Initiate an independent review of the constitution, with particular attention to the three-party ceiling. 7. Undertake a comprehensive review of the electoral law, based on lessons learned. 8. Introduce legislation to strengthen the electoral process, including penalties for infractions of the electoral law. 9. Commission an independent judicial review, with a view to introducing reforms strengthening both the capacity of the judiciary and its independence from political influence. To Donor Governments 10. Provide party building training and financial assistance to all three official parties in order to prepare them for legislative elections. 11. Offer technical and financial assistance to the National Electoral Commission in order to remedy problems encountered during local and presidential elections, and to assist in the design and implementation of an appropriate voter registration system. 12. Assist the government with other reforms intended to advance the process of democratisation. 13. Increase support for social and economic development in order to enhance the peace dividend and preclude public disillusionment with the democratisation process. 14. Explore options for providing Somaliland with access to direct bilateral and multilateral financial assistance pending a resolution of the territory s legal status. To the United Nations, African Union and IGAD 15. Adopt a more open-minded approach to the question of Somaliland s ultimate status, in particular by: a) dispatching fact-finding missions to assess the current situation and to recommend policy options, with leadership taken by either the AU s Peace and Security Council or the presidential troika (currently South Africa, Mozambique and Zambia) in view of the serious divisions within IGAD; b) taking Somaliland s demands under formal consideration, including a legal review of the territory s case vis-à-vis the current AU charter; and

ICG Africa Report N 66, 28 July 2003 Page iii c) granting Somaliland observer status pending a final decision on its international status. Nairobi/Brussels, 28 July 2003

ICG Africa Report N 66 28 July 2003 SOMALILAND: DEMOCRATISATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION On 14 April 2003, the people of Somaliland enjoyed an experience all too rare in the Horn of Africa: an election without a predetermined outcome. The re-election of the incumbent President, Dahir Rayale Kahin, came as a surprise for a number of reasons: First, because of the razor thin margin of his victory just 80 votes out of nearly 500,000 ballots cast. Secondly, because he is not a member of Somaliland s majority clan. Thirdly, because the opposition was tipped to win. Somaliland s presidential election was remarkable for other reasons as well: it was the second election since December 2002, after a democratic hiatus of 32 years, and the third time in as many years that Somalilanders had been given the opportunity to express their preferences at the ballot box. These first bold steps towards democratisation set Somaliland apart from the rest of the Somali Republic, which has become virtually synonymous with the term failed state since the collapse of Major-General Mohamed Siyaad Barre s dictatorship in 1991. At a time when the Horn of Africa has been described as home to some of the world s worst regimes, 1 the achievements of this unrecognised republic stand out in even greater contrast. transition. The interlude between presidential and parliamentary elections (expected to take place before June 2005) will be a critical period in which the government faces a clear choice: to lay the ground for free and fair elections and a truly pluralistic political system or to exploit its incumbency to stifle real political competition. International engagement during this period could help to tip the balance one way or the other. Somaliland s democratisation renders the prospects for reunification with the rest of Somalia increasingly improbable, not only because the aspiring state s political institutions have little in common with the kinds of interim, factional arrangements likely to emerge in the south, but also because its leadership is becoming more accountable to its electorate the majority of whom no longer desire any form of association with Somalia. It is becoming apparent that if the international community continues to insist upon a unity and territorial integrity of the Somali Republic that may no longer be realistic and does not develop pragmatic responses to the demand for Somaliland s self-determination, the result could well be the reopening of the Somali civil war. 2 But elections alone do not make a democracy. Corrupt and authoritarian habits of governance, a legacy of Somalia s dictatorial and war-torn past, have encumbered Somaliland s democratic 1 Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan among world's worst regimes, report says, IRIN, 15 April 2003. The citation refers to a report to the UN Human Rights Commission by the U.S.- based advocacy group, Freedom House. 2 For thoughtful reflections on the nature of statehood and its relevance to Somaliland, see for example, Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton, 2000), pp. 267-268 and Maria Brons, Somalia: From Statelessness to Statelessness? (Utrecht, 2001), passim.

ICG Africa Report N 66, 28 July 2003 Page 2 II. BRIEF HISTORY OF SOMALILAND The modern day Republic of Somaliland, which declared its independence from Somalia on 18 May 1991, is the third incarnation of the territory established by the British in the Horn of Africa towards the end of the nineteenth century. It spans a land area of 137,600 square kilometres, or roughly 22 per cent of the territory of the Somali Republic (637,540 square kilometres), most of which receives less than 300 millimetres of rainfall annually. The population is currently estimated at between two and three million (the lower figure is probably more accurate) out of some seven million inhabitants of the whole Somali Republic. In June 1960, after more than seven decades as a British protectorate, the territory received its independence from Queen Elizabeth II. Once one of five Somali entities that aimed to unite under a single flag, 3 it was the only Somali territory actually to unite with Italian Somalia, which it did just five days after obtaining its own independence. Following the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, Somaliland announced the dissolution of the 1960 union with Somalia, but its declaration of independence has yet to be recognised by a single member of the United Nations. A. THE BRITISH SOMALILAND PROTECTORATE (1884 1960) Britain acquired its Somaliland Protectorate by accident rather than by design. In 1884, the Mahdist revolt in Sudan necessitated the hasty withdrawal of Egyptian garrisons from much of the Horn of Africa, threatening a sudden vacuum. Anxious to secure the supply of meat for its garrison across the Red Sea at Aden and to preempt the territorial ambitions of rival powers in the region (the French to the west, the Italians to the east, and King Menelik of Shoa to the South), the British government entered into treaties of protection with the leaders of local Somali clans: namely the Iise, Gadabursi, Habar Garhajis, Habar 3 The five points of the white star at the centre of the blue Somali flag stand for Italian Somalia, British Somaliland, Djibouti, the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia, and the Northeast Province of Kenya. Awal and Habar Tol ja alo. 4 The territory represented by these treaties was ill-defined, and the extent of British control was eventually delineated by a series of protocols with the other main colonial powers in the region: France in 1888, Italy in 1894, and Ethiopia in 1897. Within these borders resided some 650,000 ethnic Somalis belonging to three major clans: the Isaaq, the Darod and the Dir, representing roughly 66 per cent, 19 per cent and 15 per cent respectively of the total population. 5 The British took little interest in their new protectorate: instructions were issued to the effect that the occupation was to be as unobtrusive as possible. [ ] No grandiose schemes were to be entertained; expenditure was to be limited to a minimum, and was to be provided by the local port revenues. 6 By employing methods of indirect rule, the number of British colonial officials was kept to a minimum. British plans to administer this Cinderella of Empire on the cheap were shredded by the eruption in 1899 of the Dervish (Darawiish) revolt led by Sheikh Mohamed Abdullah Hassan. Known to his followers as the Sayyid and to his British adversaries as the Mad Mullah, the Sheikh challenged British rule in the protectorate for twenty-one years, tying down as many as four thousand imperial troops and three warships. He was ultimately defeated only by the dispatch of an experimental air force bomber squadron to Somaliland. Although he was often described as the first modern nationalist leader among the Somalis, the Sheikh s uprising served to divide the people of the Protectorate rather than to unite them. The majority Isaaq clan tended to side with the British, while the Dervishes drew their support mainly from among the Dhulbahante branch of the Darod (the Sheikh s maternal lineage), with whom the British had no treaty of protection, and to a lesser extent from the Warsengeli clan (also a branch of the Darod). It 4 The history of this period is covered in depth in: I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somaliland: From Nation to State (London, 1965), pp. 35-49. 5 Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism (Cambridge, 1963), p.118. See Appendix A below for a depiction of Somaliland s major clans and sub clans. 6 Ibid., p. 47.

ICG Africa Report N 66, 28 July 2003 Page 3 was a schism that would prefigure Somaliland politics for much of the next century. Between the end of the Dervish revolt and the advent of World War II, the British embarked on a modest expansion of their administration of the Protectorate, necessitating a shift of the administrative capital from the coast to the interior, first to the town of Sheikh and then to Hargeysa. Nevertheless, in comparison with Italian rule to the south, British administration of the Protectorate resembled a form of benign neglect. Unlike more favoured colonial possessions, such as Kenya and Nigeria, the British showed little interest in Somaliland s economic development beyond clearing rough roads between major towns. The British system of indirect rule left traditional systems of authority largely intact, employing clan chiefs ( aqiilo) as mediators between the government and the people. District courts, presided over by judges known as qadis, dispensed a familiar blend of customary and religious law. In August 1940, British Somaliland fell into Italian hands and was briefly incorporated into the Italian East African Empire. Just seven months later the Protectorate was back under British control, where it remained until the end of the war, when, like other Somali territories (with the exception of the French Somali Coast), it was consigned to British Military Administration. In 1946, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, proposed that the de facto union of Somali territories under British rule be extended. His plan met with strenuous objections from other wartime Allies, as well as Ethiopia, who suspected the British of trying to extend their colonial possession in the Horn, and had to be abandoned. In 1948, the British decided to return Somaliland to its pre-war status as a Protectorate in preparation for eventual independence. The failure of the Bevin Plan was by no means the last word on the unification of the Somali people. Since 1943, the Somali Youth League, a nationalist political association with branches in all of the Somali territories except Djibouti, had been working towards the unity of the Somali peoples throughout the Horn. 7 In the British Somaliland Protectorate, the Somaliland National League, the 7 Originally named the Somali Youth Club, it changed its name to Somali Youth League in 1947. result of a merger between two pre-war political associations, also began agitating for unification. Economic and social development of the Protectorate failed to keep pace with the rapidly changing political scene. Unlike Somalia, which the United Nations General Assembly determined should become independent in 1960 after a ten-year period of Italian Trusteeship, no date had been set for Somaliland s independence. Events during the mid-1950s served to focus British and Somali attention alike on the process of Somaliland s decolonisation. In late 1954, the British decided, without warning, to cede the Haud and Reserved Area to Ethiopian control. These traditional grazing lands of Somaliland s nomads had been arbitrarily awarded to Ethiopia by the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian protocol, but had remained under British administration in order to ensure Somali grazing rights. Public outrage in the Protectorate found expression in political agitation and increasingly urgent demands for greater autonomy from British rule. A new national convention of associations, unions and political parties, known as the National United Front (NUF) was established specifically to demand the retrieval of the Haud and obtain independence for Somaliland as a member of the British Commonwealth. 8 The surrender of the Haud and Reserved Area gave added impetus to Somaliland s unification agenda since the merger with the other Somali territories (including Ethiopia s Ogaden region) would restore the grazing lands to Somali control. In response to Somali pressure, the British government agreed in 1956 to an accelerated schedule for self-government, and Somaliland s timetable for independence became gradually synchronised with that of the Italian Trust Territory of Somalia, scheduled for 1960. In 1957 the first Somali Legislative Council was appointed by the British governor and in 1958, the process of replacing expatriate government officials with Somalis got underway. In early 1959, the Council was reconstituted to include twelve elected 8 The Front s pluralistic composition was short lived. Having failed to prevent the surrender of the Haud, the NUF went on to become a political party in its own right, drawing its support mainly from the Habar Je elo sub clan of the Isaaq.

ICG Africa Report N 66, 28 July 2003 Page 4 representatives, and the introduction of a new constitution in early 1960 permitted the formation of an executive branch. The 33 seats of the legislature were filled by elections and, with barely three months remaining until independence, a young politician named Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, leader of the pro-unity SNL, emerged as Leader of Government Business. In April 1960, a delegation of the Protectorate s new leaders travelled to Mogadishu, where they accepted without modification the constitutional arrangements that had already been prepared for the independence of the Italian Trust Territory. At a meeting in London less than a month later, the British formally agreed to grant independence to the Protectorate, on condition that the traditional clan leaders express their support for the decision. On 19 May 1960, the Somaliland Council of Elders gave its assent and the path was clear for Somaliland s independence. B. THE STATE OF SOMALILAND (1960) Somaliland s second incarnation, as an independent and sovereign state, was short lived. A Royal Proclamation of Queen Elizabeth II granted independence to the Protectorate at midnight on 25 June 1960, and the State of Somaliland came into being on 26 June. The territory was, however, woefully unprepared for the challenge of statehood: the entire country could boast of only a handful of university graduates and two secondary schools. Not a single sealed road linked the major towns, and there was no industry to speak of. Despite its plans for imminent unification with Somalia, Somaliland s independence was received internationally as a welcome step in the process of African decolonisation, and consequently recognised by a number of foreign governments. 9 Five days later, on 1 July 1960, the Italian Trust Territory of Somalia also received its independence. The legislatures of the two territories met in joint session in Mogadishu and announced their unification as the Somali Republic. The State 9 According to a former U.S. ambassador, David Shinn, 35 governments recognised Somaliland including the U.S. See David Shinn, The Horn Of Africa: Where Does Somaliland Fit?, paper presented at a discussion seminar on Somaliland in Umea, Sweden, 8 March 2003. of Somaliland was no more. But the process of unification was anything but smooth: Although officially unified as a single nation at independence, the former Italian colony and trust territory in the south and the former British protectorate in the north were, from an institutional standpoint, two separate countries. Italy and Britain had left them with separate administrative, legal and education systems where affairs were conducted according to different procedures and in different languages. Police, taxes, and the exchange rates of their separate currencies were also different. The orientations of their educated elites were divergent, and economic contacts between the two regions were virtually non-existent. 10 These problems were exacerbated by perceived southern domination of the new government. Mogadishu became the national capital, while Hargeysa declined to a mere provincial headquarters remote from the centre of things. 11 Representatives from the former British Somaliland, now known as the Northern Regions, received just 33 seats in the new 123-member national assembly. The posts of President and Prime Minister were both held by southerners, as were the principal ministerial portfolios such as Defence, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Interior. The command of the new national army was overwhelmingly drawn from former carabinieri officers from the south a source of acute frustration for British-trained military officers from the north. The precipitate nature of the union had also left a number of important legal questions pending. The two Acts of Union approved by the respective legislatures differed somewhat, and no single legal document actually bound the two territories. 12 The new national assembly recognised the error and passed a new Act of Union in January 1961, retroactive to the moment of independence, but 10 Harold D. Nelson (ed.), Somalia: A Country Study (United States Government: Department of the Army), p.35. 11 I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, op.cit., p. 172. 12 Anthony J. Carroll and B. Rajagopal, The Case for an Independent Somaliland, American University Journal of Law and Politics, vol. 8, no. 653 (1993), p. 661.

ICG Africa Report N 66, 28 July 2003 Page 5 some observers have argued that, since the two territories were not legally united, the new Act remained without force in the north. 13 Public support for the merger was put to the test in June 1961 in the form of a referendum on the new unitary constitution. Whatever enthusiasm for unity had initially existed in the north seemed already to be fading. The SNL leadership campaigned for a boycott of the referendum and only 100,000 Northerners actually turned out to vote from an estimated population of 650,000. More than half of the Northerners who did vote rejected the constitution, reflecting widespread discontent in the Northern Region over the economic decline there, and over the growing political influence Mogadishu. 14 In December the same year, Northern military officers in Hargeysa launched an unsuccessful coup on the platform of a separation between north and south. Such expressions of discontent, however, did not amount to a serious challenge to Somali unity. Northern politicians continued to represent northern interests in both the executive and legislative branches of government, and in 1967 British Somaliland s independence leader, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, became the first northern Prime Minister of Somalia. C. INTERLUDE: DICTATORSHIP AND CIVIL WAR Somali President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated by a disgruntled policeman on 15 October 1969, and less than a week later the military staged a coup d état under the leadership of General Mohamed Siyaad Barre. Many Somalis were hopeful that the military takeover would represent an improvement over the decrepit civilian administration, which had become spoiled by corruption and nepotism. The military also embraced a Greater Somalia policy of political and military irredentism, which had lapsed in the late 1960s, reviving some of the popular enthusiasm that had underpinned the original union between north and south. 13 Ibid., p. 661. 14 Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism (Cambridge, 1963), p.121. The honeymoon was short lived. The regime s disastrous defeat in the 1977-78 Ogaden War with Ethiopia, its dependence on select branches of the Darod clan for political support, and its increasingly brutal character all contributed to public disillusionment. An attempted coup by Majerteen officers from the northeast of the country triggered brutal government reprisals around the town of Gaalka yo and led to the formation of the first Somali opposition group, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). But disaffection with the military regime was felt most keenly in the former British Somaliland: public expenditure in the northwest compared unfavourably with other regions (less than 7 per cent of development assistance was allocated to the north), and the government s economic policies seemed to be aimed at curbing the influence of the wealthy Isaaq trading community. In the aftermath of the Ogaden War, approximately a quarter of a million refugees had been settled in the northwest by the Somali government, with the assistance of UNHCR. 15 Most were ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden branch of the Darod clan, although some were members of the Oromo and other Ethiopian ethnic groups. For several years, traditional competition between the Isaaq and the Ogaden for pasture and water in the southern Haud had been aggravated by the Somali government s provision of arms, ammunition and training to the Ogaden fighters of the Western Somali Liberation Front. Although intended for use against the Ethiopian government, this military assistance was often directed instead against Isaaq civilians in the Haud. 16 Government favouritism towards the Ogaden refugees, who enjoyed preferential access to social services (provided by UNHCR and its Somali government counterpart, the National Refugee Commission), business licenses and government posts, further fuelled Isaaq grievances. 15 The total number of refugees settled throughout Somalia as a consequence of the Ogaden War has never been accurately determined. The Somali government s estimate of 1.5 million was contested by the UNHCR, which had arrived at a figure closer to 600,000 through its own surveys. A planning figure of 900,000 was finally agreed upon. For a discussion of the Somali government s refugee policies in the northwest, see Maria Brons, op.cit., pp. 187-189. 16 Africa Watch, Somalia: A Government at War with its Own People, Washington/New York, 1990, p. 31.

ICG Africa Report N 66, 28 July 2003 Page 6 In 1981, a group of mainly Isaaq exiles meeting in London declared the formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM), an armed movement dedicated to the overthrow of the Barre regime. The SNM initially tried to cast itself as an alliance of opposition figures from different clans, but its core membership and constituency was principally Isaaq. The SNM established its first bases in Ethiopia in 1982, and by 1983 it had established itself as an effective guerrilla force in the northwest. In response, government pressure on the Isaaq population, whom it deemed sympathetic to the SNM, took the form of extreme and systematic repression. 17 Summary arrests, extrajudicial executions, rape, confiscation of private property and disappearances all became commonplace as the government sought to deprive the SNM of the support of the Isaaq public. The government also enlisted the support of the non-isaaq clans of the northwest, attempting with only partial success to exploit traditional kinship affiliations. In 1988, following a meeting in Djibouti between Siyaad Barre and his Ethiopian counterpart, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Ethiopian government instructed the SNM to cease operations in Somalia and withdraw its forces from the border areas. The SNM, fearing the collapse of its long insurgency, instead attacked the major northern towns of Hargeysa and Burco, triggering the onset of full-scale civil war in the northwest. The government response was fierce: artillery and aircraft bombed the major towns into rubble and forced the displacement of roughly half a million refugees across the border into Ethiopia. Isaaq dwellings were systematically destroyed, while their settlements and water points were extensively mined. The formation in 1989 (with SNM support) of the southern Somali factions, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the United Somali Congress (USC), provided the SNM with allies and helped to relieve some of the pressure on its fighters. In January 1991, as USC advances in and around Mogadishu forced Barre to abandon the capital, the SNM staged its final offensive in the northwest. The remaining government forces disintegrated and fled, and the vestiges of civil administration collapsed. D. THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND Within months of the SNM victory, Somaliland appeared in its third incarnation. On 18 May 1991, a self-proclaimed independent Republic of Somaliland was announced. Since then, it has followed a very different trajectory from southern Somalia. While the collapse of the Siyaad Barre regime plunged the south into civil war and the kind of institutional vacuum that has since come to epitomise the notion of state failure, Somaliland embarked on a period of increasing political stabilisation and economic growth. Since 1991, roughly half a million people have returned to their homes, and tens of thousands of dwellings and businesses have been rebuilt from rubble. The majority of militia have been demobilised or incorporated into national armed forces and tens of thousands of mines and unexploded munitions have been removed from the ground. Somaliland s social services are in less admirable shape, being heavily dependent on external support. With the help of Western donors, the United Nations and international NGOs, the government has been able to restore rudimentary education and health care services throughout much of Somaliland. All such funding, however, is channelled through international aid agencies since donors are unable to provide assistance directly to a government they do not recognise. Arab and Islamic donors have also played a part in Somaliland s reconstruction, though their funds are by-and-large directed towards the development of a parallel social service system, outside of the government. Most people, however, still depend on private service providers, such as medical clinics, pharmacies and private schools, which have mushroomed without standardisation or regulation. Overall, foreign aid has played a minor part in Somaliland s reconstruction. The figures of the Somalia Aid Co-ordinating Body (the Nairobibased body that co-ordinates assistance to Somalia in the absence of a recognised government) are imprecise, but suggest that less than 20 per cent of that donor aid is directed towards Somaliland, or roughly U.S.$30 million in 2002. 18 Moreover, this figure does not show the high proportion of donor 17 Africa Watch, Somalia, op. cit., p.7. 18 Based on Somalia Aid Coordination Body, Donor Report, Nairobi, 2002.

ICG Africa Report N 66, 28 July 2003 Page 7 funding that is spent on overhead, Nairobi offices or international personnel. Probably less than half the total volume of aid is actually spent on the ground. The real engine of Somaliland s recovery has been neither the government, nor international assistance, but rather the private sector. Livestock, much of it raised in southern Somalia and eastern Ethiopia, is the backbone of the Somaliland economy, accounting for roughly 90 per cent of export earnings or U.S.$175 million per year. Since 1998, however, a Saudi ban on Somali livestock has severely depressed the livestock trade. 19 The proceeds of the livestock trade are generally used to purchase foodstuffs and luxury items for import, an unknown proportion of which is destined for Ethiopia as both legitimate trade and contraband. terms, quite modest. Since 2001, Somaliland has introduced a new and potentially decisive dimension to its quest for statehood: democratisation. In May 2001, a new constitution establishing a multi-party electoral system was approved by plebiscite. Local (municipal) elections followed in December 2002 and a fiercely contested presidential election was held in April 2003. With only parliamentary elections remaining until Somaliland s transition to multiparty democracy is formally complete, international interest in this would-be state has grown perceptibly. The Somaliland economy is also fuelled by the estimated U.S.$200 million that arrives each year from Somalilanders abroad via hawaala money transfer agents. 20 These remittances are almost entirely destined for private households and have played a vital role in the physical reconstruction of family homes and businesses a critical function given the scale of devastation visited upon major towns like Hargeysa and Burco during the civil war. Since no international banks are present in Somaliland, the hawaala have come to offer a growing range of financial services, including interest-free accounts, cheque-cashing facilities and business loans. The government s own accomplishments (basic civil administration across roughly 80 per cent of the territory, reasonably disciplined army and police forces and a relatively stable currency), although impressive achievements on a budget of roughly U.S.$20 million per year are, in absolute 19 The ban was initially imposed on the grounds that Somali were potential carriers of Rift Valley Fever (RVF), a haemorrhagic disease, following an outbreak in Northeast Kenya/Southwest Somalia, and subsequently among animals in Saudi Arabia. Since a UN report declared Somaliland free of the disease, however, many Somalilanders suspect that the ban remains in force for political rather than veterinary reasons: Saudi Arabia is strongly opposed to Somaliland s claim to separate statehood. 20 Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development, A Self Portrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding from the Ruins (Hargeysa, 1999), p. 69.

ICG Africa Report N 66, 28 July 2003 Page 8 III. GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATISATION After more than a century of colonial administration, civilian misrule and military dictatorship, the people of Somaliland are yearning for freedom, justice and representative government. The problem is that Somaliland like the rest of Somalia has little experience of democratic rule. Political leaders have instead seemed intent on resuscitating centralised, patrimonial systems of political authority. The behaviour of the political elite often smacks of arrogance and paternalism; the rule of law is weak, corruption is endemic and nepotism still pervades political and administrative appointments. Civil society remains underdeveloped, and the Somaliland public remains by-and-large a passive taker of government policy not its maker. 21 Such constraints have conspired to make Somaliland s pursuit of democracy a long, uphill struggle a struggle all the more remarkable for its domestic, as opposed to donor driven, origins. Donors have been reluctant to provide even token support for Somaliland s democratic project on the grounds that it might be construed as support for the territory s independence. Ironically, Somaliland s international isolation past and present - has made a positive contribution to its political evolution. Benign neglect under British rule, and the decidedly less benign neglect of the Barre regime, left the territory s traditions of pastoral democracy 22 intact, conferring a vital degree of legitimacy and accountability upon the SNM and subsequent Somaliland administrations. The SNM s failure to obtain significant international sponsorship during the 1980s obliged the movement to develop a popular support base. Present day Somaliland s administrative arrangements are consciously modelled on the small, cost-efficient exemplar of the British colonial administration, reflecting the government s minute revenue stream and its extremely limited opportunities to incur debt. 21 Carolyn Logan, Overcoming the State-Society Disconnect in the Former Somalia, USAID/REDSO, Nairobi, September 2000. 22 The term is borrowed from I.M. Lewis s seminal work on pre-independence Somaliland, A Pastoral Democracy (London, 1961). It is unclear whether Somaliland s unique political system has evolved towards democracy because of the territory s poverty, historical neglect and international isolation, or in spite of them. Yet there is no denying that over the past decade, Somaliland has made significant progress towards a pluralistic political system, a free and critical press, rule of law, and an environment conducive to the respect and promotion of human rights. Historically, Somaliland s democratisation process has unfolded in three phases: the first, which began with the cessation of hostilities, witnessed the establishment of an administration led by a clanbased military faction (the SNM); the second phase involved the transfer of power from the factional government to a more inclusive civil administration; and the third began with a constitutional referendum, which paved the way for multiparty elections. A. FACTIONAL RULE (1991-1993) In late January 1991, the SNM was engaged in the final stages of its mopping up operations against government forces in the northwest while General Mohamed Farah Aidid s forces entered the Somali capital, Mogadishu, over one thousand kilometres away to the south.. By the end of the month, Isaaqpopulated areas, including the towns of Hargeysa, Berbera and Burco were in SNM hands. Several hundred Somali government soldiers captured by the SNM were subjected to summary trials: those found guilty of war crimes were executed on the spot. The majority, however, were released and given safe passage home. A garrison of several hundred southern soldiers and their families in Burco even chose to remain temporarily rather than face the anarchy and bloodshed that had consumed Mogadishu. The key dilemma remaining was how to deal with the non-isaaq clans who had aligned themselves, to lesser or greater degrees, with the Barre regime. To the west, SNM forces destroyed the largely Gadabursi village of Dila and entered the Gadabursi town of Boorama, but were withdrawn in less than 24 hours on the orders of the SNM command, which sought a speedy rapprochement with the Gadabursi leadership. In the east, the SNM leadership decided against entering Dhulbahante territory and opted for dialogue instead.

ICG Africa Report N 66, 28 July 2003 Page 9 Within weeks of its victory, in mid-february 1991, the SNM leadership met in Berbera for preliminary talks with representatives of the Isse, Gadabursi, Dhulbahante, and Warsengeli clans. All sides confirmed their common desire for peace and agreed to meet again during the month of April at a larger regional peace conference in order to conclude a formal peace. The conference was to be followed by a congress of the SNM s supreme decision-making body, the 99-member Central Committee. In the meantime, the SNM attempted to consolidate its grip on the Isaaq regions of the northwest. The scale of destruction in Hargeysa, and the danger posed by tens of thousands of mines and unexploded munitions within the city limits obliged the SNM to declare Berbera the temporary capital. An administration, central bank and other basic institutions existed only on paper. Command and control had largely broken down and many of the SNM s militia were out of control, looting and settling old scores. In April 1991, elders from the various northwestern clans convened as agreed at Burco. 23 The original purpose of the meeting had been to cement the peace in Northwest Somalia, but as the assembled leaders debated how best to proceed, angry crowds gathered around the conference hall, demanding independence from Mogadishu, the Somali capital. SNM fighters joined the crowds in their tanks and Land Cruisers mounted with heavy machine-guns, taking up threatening positions around the conference venue. Independence was hastily declared and a Provisional National Charter followed about a week later. Article I of the Charter stated: The State formerly known as Somaliland, which secured its Independence from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the 25th Day of June 1960, is hereby reconstituted as a full Independent and Sovereign State. 24 The Charter also stipulated that for a transitional period of two years the government of the new Republic of Somaliland would be the responsibility of the Somali National Movement, whose Chairman and Vice Chairman would become, respectively, the President and Vice President. Provision was made for members of other clans to join the new cabinet and Parliament (an enlarged version of the SNM central committee), but power remained firmly in the hands of the Isaaq. Upon conclusion of the transitional period, the Provisional National Charter would be replaced by a Constitution approved by the people of Somaliland in a National Referendum. The new President, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuur, was a shrewd but uncharismatic former diplomat, who had favoured federation over independence and assumed the Presidency of Somaliland through circumstance rather than conviction. He governed mainly from behind closed doors, and his impoverished administration exerted little real control, even of the capital city Hargeysa. Within a matter of months, the SNM began to suffer from the kind of factionalism more often associated with southern Somali political movements. As tensions within the SNM came to a head, even the illusion of control evaporated and in January 1992 the Movement went to war with itself. The fighting pitted the loosely named national army (in reality an alliance of clan-based militias aligned with the Tuur government) against opposition forces led by members of an SNM faction known as the Alan As (Red Flag). The belligerents were all members of the Isaaq; non- Isaaq clans chose to remain uninvolved. During the course of the conflict the towns of Burco and Berbera were heavily damaged and tens of thousands of recent returnees from Ethiopian refugee camps were again put to flight. In October 1992, after nine months of sporadic, highly mobile warfare, a delegation of clan elders managed to bring the two sides to peace talks at the town of Sheikh. The conference, known as Towfiiq, concluded with a ceasefire and an agreement to reconvene for a more inclusive, national conference at Boorama in January 1993. 23 For a concise, first hand account of the Burco conference, see John Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia? (London, 1994), pp. 139-142. 24 National Charter of the Somaliland Republic (unofficial translation), 1991.

ICG Africa Report N 66, 28 July 2003 Page 10 B. CLAN REPRESENTATION AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION (1993-1997) The 1993 Boorama Conference (properly known as Guul Allah, or God s Triumph ), which lasted nearly five months and involved hundreds of representatives from all of Somaliland s clans, is considered to have been a milestone in Somaliland s evolution as a de facto state. Before they dispersed, the conference delegates managed to conclude a peace and security accord, formulate a new national charter, and establish a new government under the leadership of Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, the former Prime Minister of Somalia. The choice of Egal to lead the new government was significant, yet controversial. As one of the authors of Somaliland s independence in 1960, and arguably the most accomplished Isaaq statesman, there was no doubt about his ability to lead. But he had come up firmly against the 1991 declaration of independence, opting instead to take part in talks hosted by the Djibouti government aimed at setting up a national government in Mogadishu. Presumably on account of his objections to Somaliland s ambitions for statehood, between 1991 and 1993 he had chosen self-imposed exile in the United Arab Emirates. Upon his nomination to the Somaliland presidency at the Boorama conference, few Somalilanders believed that he had entirely abandoned his preference for a united Somalia. The primary achievement of the Boorama Conference was the replacement of the factional rule of the SNM with a civilian administration. This new system of government, known as the beel system, was a hybrid of Western political institutions and the traditional Somali system of clan representation. Although only intended to function as a three-year stopgap measure, the beel system has underpinned Somaliland s peace and stability ever since. 25 At the heart of the beel system is a two-chamber Parliament, comprising 82 members each, with 25 For an in-depth examination of state structures in Somaliland and the beel system, see Cabdirahmaan Jimcaale, Consolidation and Decentralisation of Government Institutions, Hargeysa, WSP- International/Academy for Peace and Development, 2002, pp. 29-43. seats distributed by clan. While the lower house serves as a legislature, the upper house (known as the Guurti) is charged with maintaining peace and security in the territory. Over time the Guurti, which was composed of traditional leaders or their representatives, has also emerged as Somaliland s supreme moral authority. By designating the Parliament as the primary forum for clan representation, the beel system relieved some of the pressure on the executive branch and civil service to fulfil clan demands for representation one of the causes of war under the Tuur administration. Although the new President remained mindful of the need for a broadly based cabinet, he enjoyed a certain degree of flexibility in ministerial appointments and was eventually able to embark, albeit in a very tentative way, on a course of civil service reform. Likewise, the leadership role assumed by clan elders at the Boorama conference, as well as by the establishment of the Guurti, implied their direct responsibility for the success of the accord and thus helped the new government to secure their cooperation. For example, the authority of traditional leaders was to prove vital in the government s efforts to disarm and demobilise clan militia. Those who handed in their weapons were absorbed into a new National Army or promised demobilisation assistance. Those who declined the government s offer forfeited the protection of their clans if they disturbed the peace. As uniformed police replaced the militia on the streets of the major towns, public confidence and pride in the new government grew. The improved security situation encouraged a surge in physical reconstruction: newly built homes began to rise above the rubble and new companies opened for business. Even the United Nations, which disapproved of Somaliland s claims to statehood and had therefore remained absent from the Boorama Conference, was forced to acknowledge that the peaceful reconciliation process has moved forward impressively and noted the formation of a functioning administration under the leadership of Mr. Egal. 26 26 Letter to Mr Egal from Jonathan T. Howe, Special Representative of the Secretary General, 1 October 1993.

ICG Africa Report N 66, 28 July 2003 Page 11 The fruits of the peace process were not restricted to Isaaq areas of Somaliland. On the contrary, the Boorama Conference signalled the first modest step towards securing more equitable arrangements for the Dir and Darod groups in Somaliland and in broadening the new government s constituency beyond the Isaaq clan. The choice of Boorama, the principal town of the Gadabursi clan, as the conference venue was itself highly symbolic. Having long sided with the Barre government in its war against the SNM, the Gadabursi had made their peace with the Isaaq in 1991, then taken the lead in obtaining the October 1992 Sheikh ceasefire agreement, and finally hosted the peace conference intended to restore peace among their old adversaries. For their pains, the Gadabursi were rewarded with the post of Vice President. Furthermore, unlike the 1991 Burco conference, where the Isaaq-dominated SNM Central Committee had held the real power, the Boorama Conference established a genuinely multi-clan Parliament. Taking the colonial period as their historical point of reference, the non-isaaq clans demanded at Boorama and received a greater share of the seats than they had been assigned in the legislature under British rule. The beel system, however, was no panacea: it succeeded in resolving some, but not all, clan grievances, and in some respects it gave rise to new problems. For example, under British rule, the Harti clans (Dhulbahante and Warsengeli) had been considered second only to the Isaaq in terms of importance. With the appointment of a Gadabursi Vice President, many Harti felt that they had been unfairly relegated to third place a sleight for which the post of Speaker of the Lower House was considered to be inadequate compensation. Although the Harti representatives at the Boorama conference endorsed the new arrangements, the perception that they had been somehow marginalised at Boorama contributed to a broader Harti sense of alienation from Somaliland. At the same time, the advent of the beel system complicated the delicate issue of power sharing within the Isaaq. The distribution of Isaaq seats in the new Parliament was a legacy of the SNM central committee, which since 1989 had employed an arcane formula based on the progeny of their celebrated ancestor, Sheikh Isaaq. Under this arrangement, the large and influential Garhajis clan received a disproportionately small share of seats, but a Garhajis politician also held the post of SNM chairman. Although Egal, a member of the Habar Awal, assumed the Presidency in May 1993, the distribution of Isaaq seats in Parliament remained the same. The Garhajis political leadership felt cheated and refused to recognise the legitimacy of the new government. Tensions came to a head in November 1994 when the Egal government tried to wrest control of Hargeysa airport from a group of clan militia from the Iidagale, a sub-clan of the Garhajis. Heavy fighting broke out first in Hargeysa, then in Burco, where government authority was challenged by militia from another Garhajis sub clan, the Habar Yunis. With the political legitimacy conferred by the Boorama process, the revenues of Berbera port at his disposal and a unified army under his command, Egal was in a far better position to enforce the writ of his government than Tuur had been in 1992. Nevertheless, by early 1996 fighting had ground to a halt with neither side able to impose its will decisively on the other. No comprehensive peace agreement was ever signed and hostilities were instead brought to a close by a series of local agreements between clans. In December 1996 a National Conference was convened in Hargeysa to resolve Somaliland s divisions and to appoint a new government. Although generally considered to have been a follow-up to the 1993 Boorama Conference, the 1996-1997 Hargeysa Conference differed in important ways, shedding light on both the strengths and weaknesses of Somaliland s beel system. When the Hargeysa Conference opened, Egal had already been in office far longer than the two-year term he had originally been appointed to serve. In May 1995, his mandate set to expire, Egal had used the ongoing civil war in Somaliland to justify a sixmonth state of emergency; in September 1995, with the war still unfinished, Parliament granted him an eighteen-month extension of his term, ending in March 1997. In the lead up to the Hargeysa conference, Egal moved the goalposts once again. The conference would not be a clan conference (shir beleed) but rather a national conference (shir qarameed) because of the existence of a legitimate government. On these grounds, he lobbied for and obtained a concession that the members of Parliament should constitute half of the delegates to

ICG Africa Report N 66, 28 July 2003 Page 12 the conference, while clan representatives would make up the other half. These new ground rules, combined with Egal s innate political genius and his deft use of a large political slush fund, won him a landslide victory and secured him a further fiveyear term at Somaliland s helm. But the credibility of the shir (assembly of elders) as a national political forum had been fundamentally damaged. Egal s first term had been, in many respects, a failure. He had presided over a civil war; his government had made little or no progress towards a new constitution, a referendum or elections; and the self-declared republic was no closer to international recognition. Fortunately for Somaliland, Egal s second term would prove more fruitful. In the aftermath of the Hargeysa Conference, Somaliland experienced its most prolonged and dramatic period of reconstruction and growth. The sphere of activity of the administration was broadened to almost all parts of the territory; and the process of democratisation, which had essentially remained frozen since the 1991 Burco conference, finally went forward. C. TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY One of the pressing tasks of Egal s second term of office was the development of a new, permanent constitution for Somaliland. Since 1994, Egal and the Parliament had been at odds over the question of who should draft it, with each side producing its own version. Not surprisingly, the Parliament s draft favoured a strong legislative branch, Egal s greater powers for the executive. The Hargeysa Conference attempted to break the stalemate by combining the two into a single document that would provide an interim basis for government pending endorsement by general referendum. Egal was deeply dissatisfied with the compromise, and the constitution remained a bone of contention until 2000 when a 45-member committee, jointly nominated by the executive and the legislature, managed to come up with a mutually acceptable draft. The presidency retained most of the executive powers sought by Egal, while Parliament received additional powers of financial oversight and a role in the approval of administrative appointments. With the last remaining obstacles resolved, the referendum originally envisioned by the 1991 Burco conference for 1993 was finally held on 31 May 2001. 1. The May 2001 Constitutional Referendum To the general public, the substance of the constitution mattered little beyond Article 1, which reaffirmed Somaliland s existence as a sovereign and independent state. Egal himself encouraged this perception by linking the transition to a multiparty democracy with Somaliland s desire to gain international recognition, arguing that the international community would not recognise Somaliland s independent status unless it adopted such a system. 27 A report on the referendum by one team of international observers found the linkage to be unmistakeable: A yes vote to the constitution was widely perceived as an endorsement of Somaliland s independence and a rejection of rule from Mogadishu and Somalia. 28 In that context, the overwhelming endorsement of the new constitution (over 1.183 million yes votes out of nearly 1.19 million ballots cast, or 97 per cent) sent an unmistakeable message. Egal himself was unprepared for the landslide, which reportedly dispelled any lingering misgivings he might have felt about Somaliland s independence: Whatever he may have believed previously, one of his Ministers later confided, from 31 May [2001] onwards he was a Somalilander. 29 In some respects the referendum results were misleading. The much lower turnout for subsequent elections casts doubt upon the turnout for the referendum. And the 97 per cent yes is not an accurate representation of support for independence among Somalilanders. In the Harti-inhabited parts 27 Mark Bradbury and Adan Yusuf Abokor, Choosing Politics Over Violence: state formation in Somaliland, unpublished draft, forthcoming in The Review of African Political Economy, p. 9. 28 Initiative and Referendum Institute (IRI), Final Report of the Initiative and Referendum Institute s (IRI) Election Monitoring Team, Somaliland National Referendum May 31 2001, Washington, D.C., Citizen Lawmaker Press, 27 July 2001. 29 From an interview cited by Matt Bryden in The Banana Test: Is Somaliland Ready for International Recognition?, forthcoming in Les Annales de l Ethiopie, vol. 19, Addis Ababa: Centre Français des Études Ethiopiennes (July 2003).

ICG Africa Report N 66, 28 July 2003 Page 13 of eastern Somaliland, the turnout was especially low suggesting to one team of international observers (probably correctly) a local boycott of the referendum. But even so, the team noted that even if one assumes that the 34 per cent of the Somaliland eligible voters that did not vote in the referendum were opposed to the Constitution, independence, or the current administration, nonetheless, there was nearly 66 per cent of the eligible voters who clearly supported the constitution and independence a respectable result in any representative democracy. 30 Approval of the new constitution paved the way for multiparty elections, about which the Somaliland public remained deeply ambivalent. Although few contested the transitional nature of the beel system, many were apprehensive that the introduction of multiparty politics was being rushed and that Egal could not be trusted to establish a level playing field for electoral competition. In August 2001, simmering discontent boiled over into open revolt when Parliament tabled a vote of no-confidence in Egal. The motion was defeated by just one vote. The same month, a group of traditional elders challenged Egal, calling for a shir beleed (clan conference) to be held to decide on the future of the country. 31 The challenge of the elders and the government s heavy-handed response threatened to bring Somaliland to the brink of civil conflict, but mediation by civic and religious leaders managed to defuse the crisis. Time for completion of the political transition was now running short. Municipal elections were slated to take place in late December 2001, to be followed by presidential elections before the expiry of Egal s mandate in March 2002. But the legislative and administrative preconditions for elections did not yet exist. An Electoral Law was passed only in November 2001, and the National Electoral Commission (NEC) was formed a month later, just two days before the scheduled date of the elections. Confronted with a potential crisis if Egal s term of office came to an end without the election of a successor, Parliament granted the president one last extension of his mandate until March 2003. 2. Constitutional Transition: The Death of Egal Egal did not live out his term of office: he died on 3 May 2002 while undergoing surgery in South Africa. Many observers, Somali and foreign alike, doubted that Somaliland could survive his death, and watched the transition for signs of disintegration. The greatest fear was that violence would undo the progress that had been made since the start of the democratisation process. Instead, his sudden departure from the scene served as a tonic to the political process, generating an outpouring of nationalist sentiment. 32 When the news of Egal s death reached Hargeysa, the leaders of Somaliland s three councils (the two chambers of Parliament and the Council of Ministers) met to decide upon a course of action. Article 130 of the Constitution stipulated that in the event of the president s death prior to the adoption of a multiparty electoral system, the Parliament should elect a new president within 45 days. In the meantime, the speaker of the House of Elders should serve as interim chief executive. It was an arrangement some believed was intended to preclude the accession of the Vice President, Dahir Rayale Kahin, a Gadabursi, to the Presidency: Egal wanted to replace Dahir and to establish a new team for the next government, a politician close to Egal explained to ICG. He didn t want to leave the system as it was [ ] After the referendum he even called some Samaroon 33 elders and asked them who else they might suggest as a Vice President. 34 The leaders managing the transition were less concerned with palace intrigues than with avoiding a political vacuum. Whether by accident or by design, they set aside Article 139 of the constitution and opted instead to apply Article 89 (intended to come into effect only after the first elections), which states that the Vice President shall assume the office of the Presidency for the remainder of the term. By sunset on 3 May, Kahin had been sworn in as interim president until March 2003, and Somaliland had successfully navigated its first constitutional transition. 30 IRI, op cit., p. 58. 31 Bradbury and Abokor, op. cit., p. 10. 32 Ibid., p.10. 33 Samaroon is another name for Gadabursi. 34 ICG interview, Hargeysa, April 2003.

ICG Africa Report N 66, 28 July 2003 Page 14 IV. ELECTIONS: THE OLD WAYS DIE HARD Somaliland s democratisation process is incomplete, but it can already boast of some impressive achievements. Between December 2002 and April 2003, the people voted twice for their leaders: once in local elections and once in a presidential poll. All citizens over the age of 16, male and female, were eligible to cast their ballots, and nearly half a million of them did so each time. During the first round, they elected 332 district councillors representing six political associations; during the second, they voted in their first democratically elected head of government since 1969. On the other hand, the process has revealed serious flaws in the constitution and electoral law, as well as grave inadequacies on the part of the Electoral Commission. It has also served to highlight regional differences, reinforced the urban bias in Somaliland politics and maintained the near-total exclusion of women from elected political office. More importantly, however, elections have obliged Somaliland s political elites to confront their own profound ambivalence about the democratic process, and will yet demand tough choices of them that will test the depth of their commitment to genuine democratisation. The old ways die hard, one of Somaliland s leading political figures told ICG, but Somaliland has already crossed that bridge, and there is no turning back. 35 The electoral system is a work in progress, an incomplete tangle of constitutional articles, legislation, and administrative procedures. Luckily for Somaliland, the whole has proven more coherent than the sum of its parts, which are often unclear, contradictory or simply missing. The legal foundation of democracy is the 2001 constitution, which states that Somaliland s political system shall be based on peace, cooperation, democracy and plurality of political parties. The constitution guarantees the right of every citizen, male and female, to participate in political life, to be elected to political office and to vote. These are no trifling matters in a conservative 35 ICG interview, Addis Ababa, May 2003. society where women have traditionally been excluded from formal political participation. These foundational rights are subject to a variety of restrictions. Article 9 of the constitution, following the Nigerian precedent, limits the number of political parties to three; it also forbids any political party to be based on regionalism or clanism. In addition, The Electoral Law requires political organisations to obtain 20 per cent of the popular vote in each of Somaliland s six regions. The purpose of these criteria is to ensure that all parties attract a national constituency, rather than a clan or regional base. Together, these measures amount to a kind of political steeplechase that political associations must complete in order to be eligible to take part in elections. Prior to elections, critics argued that the hurdles had been deliberately arranged in such a way that only one party Egal s would ever qualify. But the electoral law has since proven to be a relatively flexible document, and the system ultimately did produce three official political parties. Whether or not they fulfil the desire of Somalilanders for political representation, however, remains to be seen. The body charged with navigating Somaliland s previously uncharted electoral waters is the National Electoral Commission (NEC), which was formed on 18 December 2001, just two days before the scheduled date of the first local elections. Given the impossibility of organising elections within 48 hours, the NEC s first act when it convened on 19 December was to declare a postponement. The Parliament, and particularly the House of Elders, took umbrage at the commission s decision, since it implied an extension of the President s mandate. Since only the Guurti has the power to grant such extensions, the NEC s decision was initially attacked as being ultra vires, but Parliament could hardly object to the commission s argument that it required several months to prepare a successful election and eventually agreed to extend the president s term of office by one year. The NEC s decision to postpone the elections pleased no one. The ruling Ururka Dimograadiga Ummadda Bahoobey (the Democratic United Peoples Movement, or UDUB) party, stood to benefit from early elections, while the opposition was still relatively weak and disorganised. Opposition parties stood to gain from a delay of