Network Access Control (NAC) and Network Security Standards
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1 Network Control (NAC) and Network Security Standards Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #1
2 Agenda Goals of NAC Standards What problems do these standards solve? What is the relationship between TNC and IETF NEA standards? TNC Architecture and Standards TNC Adoption and Certification Advantages of Using Standards for NAC Case Studies Summary For More Information Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #2
3 Trusted Network Connect Open Architecture for Network Security Completely vendor-neutral Strong security through trusted computing Original focus on NAC, now expanded to Network Security Open Standards for Network Security Full set of specifications available to all Products shipping since 2006 TPM Integration is Supported Developed by Trusted Computing Group (TCG) Industry standards group More than 100 member organizations Includes large vendors, small vendors, customers, etc. Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #3
4 Problems Solved Network and Endpoint Visibility Who and what s on my network? Are devices on my network secure? Is user/device behavior appropriate? Network Enforcement Block unauthorized users, devices, or behavior Grant appropriate levels of access to authorized users/devices Device Remediation Quarantine and repair unhealthy or vulnerable devices Security System Integration Share real-time information about users, devices, threats, etc. Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #4
5 Basic NAC Architecture Requestor (AR) Policy Enforcement (PEP) Policy Decision (PDP) VPN Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #5
6 Integrating Other Security Devices Requestor (AR) Policy Enforcement (PEP) Policy Decision (PDP) Metadata (MAP) Sensors, Flow Controllers Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #6
7 Coordinated Security Asset Management System Endpoint Security (via NAC) SIM / SEM MAP IPAM IF-MAP Protocol Physical Security ICS/SCADA Security AAA DLP Server or IDS Switching Wireless Firewalls Cloud Security Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #7
8 Typical Deployments Health Check Behavior Check User-Specific Policies TPM-Based Integrity Check Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #8
9 Health Check Requestor Policy Enforcement Policy Decision Non-compliant System Windows XP SP3 xoshotfix 2499 xoshotfix 9288 AV - McAfee Virus Scan 8.0 Firewall Production Network Compliant System Windows XP SP3 OSHotFix 2499 OSHotFix 9288 AV - Symantec AV 10.1 Firewall NAC Policy Windows XP SP3 OSHotFix 2499 OSHotFix 9288 AV (one of) Symantec AV 10.1 McAfee Virus Scan 8.0 Firewall Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #9
10 Behavior Check Requestor Policy Enforcement Policy Decision Metadata Sensors and Flow Controllers Remediation Network!!!! NAC Policy No P2P file sharing No spamming No attacking others Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #10
11 User-Specific Policies Requestor Policy Enforcement Policy Decision Metadata Sensors and Flow Controllers Guest User Mary R&D Joe Finance Windows XP OS Hotfix 9345 OS Hotfix 8834 AV - Symantec AV 10.1 Firewall NAC Policy Users and Roles Per-Role Rules Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #11
12 TPM-Based Integrity Check Requestor TPM Trusted Platform Module HW module built into most of today s PCs Enables a HW Root of Trust Measures critical components during trusted boot PTS interface allows PDP to verify configuration and remediate as necessary Policy Enforcement Policy Decision Compliant System TPM verified BIOS OS Drivers Anti-Virus SW Production Network NAC Policy TPM enabled BIOS OS Drivers Anti-Virus SW Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #12
13 Enforcement Options Edge Enforcement Inline Enforcement Protocol-Based Enforcement Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #13
14 Edge Enforcement Pros Simple Secure Policy Enforcement Cons Big change Hard for legacy endpoints VPN Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #14
15 Inline Enforcement Pros Gradual or partial deployment Cons Security varies IPsec/TLS vs. IP/MAC authn Policy Enforcement VPN Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #15
16 Protocol-Based Enforcement Pros Easy deployment Cons Low security Nothing inline Problematic Policy Enforcement VPN Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #16
17 Clientless Endpoint Handling Requestor Policy Enforcement Policy Decision Metadata Sensors and Flow Controllers Remediation Network!!!! NAC Policy Place Printers on Printer Network Monitor Behavior Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #17
18 TNC Architecture Requestor Policy Enforcement Policy Decision Metadata Sensors and Flow Controllers t Integrity Measurement Collector Collector Collectors (IMC) IF-IMC TNC Client (TNCC) IF-M IF-TNCCS Integrity Measurement Verifiers Verifiers Verifiers (IMV) IF-IMV TNC Server (TNCS) IF-MAP IF-MAP Metadata IF-MAP Sensor IF-PTS Platform Trust Service (PTS) TSS TPM Network Requestor IF-T Policy Enforcement (PEP) IF-PEP Network Authority IF-MAP IF-MAP IF-MAP Flow Controller Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #18
19 Foiling Root Kits Solves the critical lying endpoint problem TPM Measures Software in Boot Sequence Hash software into PCR before running it PCR value cannot be reset except via hard reboot During TNC Handshake... PDP engages in crypto handshake with TPM TPM securely sends PCR value to PDP PDP compares to good configurations If not listed, endpoint is quarantined and remediated Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #19
20 Federated TNC Conveys TNC results between security domains Consortia, coalitions, partnerships, outsourcing, and alliances Large organizations Supports Web SSO with health info Roaming with health check Asserting Security Domain (ASD) How? SAML profiles for TNC Applications Network roaming Coalitions, consortia Large organizations Role=Executive Device=Healthy Requestor Relying Security Domain (RSD) Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #20
21 TNC and SCAP Together Requestor (AR) Policy Enforcement (PEP) Policy Decision (PDP) Metadata (MAP) Sensors, Flow Controllers SCAP Client Software SCAP Analysis Software SCAP External Scanner Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #21
22 Flexible Solutions Assessment Options Identity, health, behavior, and/or location Optional hardware-based assessment with TPM Pre-admission, post-admission, or both Enforcement Options 802.1X, firewalls, VPN gateways, DHCP, host software Clientless endpoints No NAC capabilities built in Printers, phones, robots, guest laptops Information sharing IF-MAP lets security devices share info on user identity, endpoint health, behavior, etc. Federated TNC supports federated environments Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #22
23 Microsoft NAP Interoperability IF-TNCCS-SOH NAP or TNC Client Switches, APs, Appliances, Servers, etc. NAP or TNC Server IF-TNCCS-SOH Standard Developed by Microsoft as Statement of Health (SoH) protocol Donated to TCG by Microsoft Adopted by TCG and published as a new TNC standard, IF-TNCCS-SOH Availability Built into Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, and Windows XP SP 3 Also built into products from other TNC vendors Implications NAP servers can health check TNC clients without extra software NAP clients can be health checked by TNC servers without extra software As long as all parties implement the open IF-TNCCS-SOH standard Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #23
24 IETF Network Endpoint Assessment IETF NEA WG Goal: Universal Agreement on NAC Client-Server Protocols Co-Chaired by Cisco employee and TNC-WG Chair Published several TNC protocols as IETF RFCs PA-TNC (RFC 5792) and PB-TNC (RFC 5793) Equivalent to TCG s IF-M 1.0 and IF-TNCCS 2.0 Co-Editors from Cisco, Intel, Juniper, Microsoft, Symantec Now working on getting IETF approval for IF-T Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #24
25 Comparison of IETF NEA and TNC IETF Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA) Standards are Equivalent to two Existing TNC Standards: IETF RFC 5792 = TNC IF-M 1.0 IETF RFC 5793 = TNC IF-TNCCS 2.0 TNC Standards Add: Support for TPM-based health checks Enforcement standards APIs for adding health checks Support for behavior monitoring Support for federation Security integration (IF-MAP) SCAP integration Overarching architecture Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #25
26 NEA Standards Requestor Policy Decision t Integrity Measurement Collector Collector Collectors (IMC) IF-M Integrity Measurement Verifiers Verifiers Verifiers (IMV) TNC Client (TNCC) IF-TNCCS TNC Server (TNCS) Network Requestor IF-T Network Authority Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #26
27 TNC Architecture Requestor Policy Enforcement Policy Decision Metadata Sensors and Flow Controllers t Integrity Measurement Collector Collector Collectors (IMC) IF-IMC TNC Client (TNCC) IF-M IF-TNCCS Integrity Measurement Verifiers Verifiers Verifiers (IMV) IF-IMV TNC Server (TNCS) IF-MAP IF-MAP Metadata IF-MAP Sensor IF-PTS Platform Trust Service (PTS) TSS TPM Network Requestor IF-T Policy Enforcement (PEP) IF-PEP Network Authority IF-MAP IF-MAP IF-MAP Flow Controller Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #27
28 What About Open Source? Lots of open source TNC support: University of Applied Arts and Sciences in Hannover, Germany (FHH) libtnc OpenSEA 802.1X supplicant FreeRADIUS omapd IF-MAP Server strongswan IPsec Open Source TNC SDK (IF-IMV and IF-IMC) TCG support for these efforts Liaison Memberships Open source licensing of TNC header files Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #28
29 TNC Certification Program Certifies Products that Properly Implement TNC Standards Certification Process Compliance testing using automated test suite from TCG Interoperability testing at Plugfest Add to list of certified products on TCG web site Customer Benefits Confidence that products interoperate Easy to cite in procurement documents Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #29
30 Case Study: St. Mary s County Public Schools Who Public school district in Maryland 16,000 students, 2,100 staff 26 schools, Grades K-12 New, intensive STEM academies STEM = Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math Grades 6-12 Problem Received grant for 60 wireless laptops for STEM academies Need strongest security Only STEM laptops can connect User-specific access controls Strong health checks on laptops All wireless traffic encrypted Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #30
31 St. Mary s County Public Schools - Solution Solution NAC appliance with... Permanently resident agent Continuous health checks Wireless access points 802.1X enforcement Integrated via TNC's IF-PEP Lessons Learned Design for the environment Tightly controlled endpoints Strong security requirements Need constant health checking Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #31
32 Summary Standards for NAC such as TNC and the IETF NEA standards solve today s security problems with growth for the future Flexible open architecture to accommodate rapid change Coordinated, automated security for lower costs and better security TCG TNC and IETF standards TCG TNC expands NAC to include TPM, IF-MAP, and other useful things Standards = open network security architecture Enables multi-vendor interoperability Can reuse existing products to reduce costs and improve ROI Avoids vendor lock-in Standards for NAC has strong security Optional support for TPM to defeat rootkits Thorough and open technical review Wide support for these standards Many vendors, open source Copyright 2011 Trusted Computing Group Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners. Slide #32
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