Trends, Issues, and New Standards for ICS Security

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1 Trends, Issues, and New tandards for IC ecurity David Mattes 1 * 1 Asguard Networks, Inc., 3417 Fremont Ave N, uite 221, eattle, Washington, 98103, UA (*correspondence: mattes@asguardnetworks.com, Tel: ) KEYWORD Cybersecurity, IC ecurity, network security, segmentation, isolation, VLAN, overlay network ABTRACT This paper is divided into three broad sections. First we will present an overview of Industrial Control ystems (IC) security issues and trends and how these affect Water / Wastewater environments. This introductory session will provide examples of IC networks and illustrate design vulnerabilities. econd we will discuss standards from IA (IA TR ), Trusted Computing Group (Metadata for IC ecurity), and Internet Engineering Task Force (Host Identity Protocol) that focus on a specific issue related to IC security: how to efficiently and flexibly enable private, secure communications for IC devices over untrusted large-scale networks. We will discuss how these standards relate to one another and their importance in providing a basis for interoperable product solutions. In the third section we will present features of a network segmentation product based on these standards. This product has been deployed in a county water / wastewater utility. We will present the water / wastewater network segmentation design, and discuss the benefits from solutions based on these standards and technology. Introduction The world s critical infrastructure is exposed, vulnerable, and fragile 1. From the top floor to the shop floor there is a growing awareness that all is not quiet on the industrial cybersecurity front. On a daily basis we are reminded of the threat of targeted attacks at critical infrastructure. Additionally, researchers are finding thousands of IC systems directly connected to the Internet. Beyond targeted attacks, many experts believe the greatest threat vectors to IC systems are vanilla malware and internal (accidental and intentional) incidents 2. We desperately need standards-based tools to help us manage the connectivity and security risks that result from adding ever increasing levels of connectivity. tandards from IA, TCG, and IETF taken together provide a compelling architecture and specification for constraining connectivity to the absolute minimum through a process known as network segmentation. This architecture allows a 1 Langner, R.; Robust Control ystem Networks ; Momentum Press; Macaulay, T. and inger, B; Cybersecurity for Industrial Control ystems, CRC Press, 2011 Presented at the 2013 IA Water/Wastewater and Automatic Controls ymposium Crowne Plaza Orlando-Universal Hotel, Orlando, Florida, UA Aug 6-8,

2 Mattes 2 common core network infrastructure to be divided into tightly constrained zones, with policy enforced conduits of connectivity between the zones. When implementing a network segmentation architecture for industrial networking, the design must focus on robustness, reliability, and security. New commercial products are now available that implement advanced network segmentation capabilities,, with a novel delegated approach to managing and supporting IC network environments. This dual-view can bridge the cultural divide that often separates operational and IT organizations within an Enterprise. The evolving threat landscape for IC A variety of threat actors with a wide variety of motives makes the risk of loss of control and loss of view very real for water and wastewater organizations. Figure 1: 2010 Reported incident types (RII) Presented at the 2013 IA Water/Wastewater and Automatic Controls ymposium Crowne Plaza Orlando-Universal Hotel, Orlando, Florida, UA Aug 6-8,

3 Mattes 3 Figure 2: 2010 Reported incidents by industry (RII) Figure 3: Reported IC vulnerabilities 3,4 tandards-based architecture for network segmentation The IA TR architecture is titled Backhaul Architecture Model: ecured Connectivity over Untrusted or Trusted Networks 5, and describes an overlay network concept that leverages shared data: IC and U CERT Advisories 4 McBride,.; Documenting the Lost Decade, Presented at the 2013 IA Water/Wastewater and Automatic Controls ymposium Crowne Plaza Orlando-Universal Hotel, Orlando, Florida, UA Aug 6-8,

4 Mattes 4 network infrastructure to create isolated network environments for distributed components of a control system that need to communicate with one another. These overlay networks are logical constructs that can be used to enforce principles of least privilege communications across network trust boundaries. These overlay networks map directly to the IA 99 notion of zones. CMDB Web Application hared IP Network Infrastructure ecure Network Management ystem NA NA NA ecurity Boundary Private Overlay Network HMI & PLC HMI erver Valve Controller Figure 4: The IA private overlay network architecture In Figure 4, the orange line denotes a security boundary across which no communications are allowed. The green circles in Figure 4 represent Network ecurity Appliances (NAs) Backhaul Interfaces in the IA TR nomenclature that create the private overlay network. The database cylinder in Figure 4 represents a Configuration Management Database (CMDB) specifically for distributing policy and network configuration for private overlay network functionality. Along with the TCG IF-MAP base specification 6, the IF-MAP Metadata for IC ecurity specification 7 specifically addresses the CMDB component in the IA TR architecture. The TCG specifications define a publish-subscribe semantic to deliver network and policy configuration data to the network security appliances in network real-time. When the CMDB is coupled with a web-based user interface, a comprehensive ecure Network Management ystem provides complete lifecycle management of the NAs and the private overlay 5 IA Website: TCG Website: 7 TCG Website: Presented at the 2013 IA Water/Wastewater and Automatic Controls ymposium Crowne Plaza Orlando-Universal Hotel, Orlando, Florida, UA Aug 6-8,

5 Mattes 5 networks. The IA TR model specifies that the NAs shall implement a data caching model for the configuration and policy data so that they can continue to function and apply policies in the event that the CMDB becomes unavailable. The NA maintains a network link presence on two or more networks. One NA link is to the local control system equipment, either directly connected to a single piece of equipment or connected via intermediate network switches and/or other infrastructure. A second NA link is to the shared network infrastructure. The NA can maintain additional network links to the shared network infrastructure for e.g. different network media (802.3, , GM) or link bonding for failover connectivity to the shared network. CMDB HTTP / OAP Web Application hared IP Network Infrastructure HTTP / OAP HTTP / OAP HMI erver Figure 5: ecure communications with CMDB The NA connects to the CMDB to obtain its network security policy configuration. In order to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of this configuration data, communications with the CMDB shall be authenticated and encrypted. As shown in Figure 5, and described in the TCG IF-MAP Metadata for IC ecurity pecification, NA to CMDB communications are secured using an HTTP/OAP communications protocol. Furthermore, the CMDB shall mutually authenticate clients using PKI and only permit authorized clients to connect. The configuration and policy data that are stored in the CMDB shall follow the TCG IF-MAP Metadata for IC ecurity pecification. The manipulation of the configuration and policy data occurs through the Administrative Application. The connection between the Administrative Application and the CMDB shall be secured using HTTP communications, as shown in Figure 5. The Administrative Application shall enforce user authentication policies to restrict access to the Administrative Application. As shown in Figure 6, in response to communications from a local to remote control system component, the NA establishes an encrypted tunnel between the respective pair of NAs, based on the unique cryptographic identities within each NA. ince the NA encrypts communications, the communications of the controls systems components are hidden from the shared network and protected against network Presented at the 2013 IA Water/Wastewater and Automatic Controls ymposium Crowne Plaza Orlando-Universal Hotel, Orlando, Florida, UA Aug 6-8,

6 Mattes 6 attacks. The encapsulation and encryption of communications between control systems components within the overlay network is depicted in Figure 6, and further described in the HIP VPL document 8. Figure 6: Encapsulation of control systems communications over shared network The NA shall be transparent to the existing control systems components, yet the NA shall never allow control systems communications to route across the NA and enter the shared network and vice versa. The NA shall not communicate on the local control systems network, but shall present to the local systems a virtual wired connection to the remote control systems components, as allowed by policies stored in the CMDB. ince the control systems communications are isolated from the shared network, their IP address configuration is independent from the shared network IP address space. If the shared network changes and the NAs obtain different shared network IP addresses, the control system components can retain their own independent IP addresses. From the private overlay network perspective, the NA acts as a transparent bridge to remote overlay network devices or segments. The private overlay network appears as a single IP broadcast domain to the IC components. This property allows control systems components to use protocols (e.g. broadcast and multicast) that are difficult to manage on the shared network ecure communications example As an example, consider the HMI and erver in Figure 6. When the HMI wants to communicate with the erver, the HMI sends out an ARP Request for the erver. The ARP Request asks the question: What is the MAC for the device with IP Address ? ince the ARP Request is a broadcast packet, all local devices see this packet. When the NA connected to the HMI sees this ARP Request, the NA creates an Encrypted Tunnel to the remote NA, and encapsulates and encrypts the ARP Request and sends the Encapsulated Packet to the remote NA over the hared Network. The NA connected to the erver decrypts and extracts the ARP Request and sends it out on the local network segment connected to the erver. The packet appears on the local network segment as a broadcast packet and therefore the erver sees the ARP Request. The erver responds to the ARP Request with a unicast ARP Reply. This ARP Reply is delivered to the NA on the local network segment. 8 IETF Website: Presented at the 2013 IA Water/Wastewater and Automatic Controls ymposium Crowne Plaza Orlando-Universal Hotel, Orlando, Florida, UA Aug 6-8,

7 Mattes 7 The NA encrypts and encapsulates the ARP Reply and sends it to the remote NA over the hared Network. The NA connected to the HMI then decrypts and extracts the ARP Reply and sends it out on the local network segment as a unicast packet to the HMI. At this point IP traffic continues to flow between the HMI and erver in the same fashion. Any intermediate network switches between the NA and the local control system equipment perform the task of mapping flows to specific switch ports (this is the function of the switch). A foundational tool for network segmentation A commercial implementation of the IA TR and HIP VPL architecture models is now available. This product also implements the TCG IF-MAP Metadata for IC ecurity specification for the overlay network security policy configurations. Products based on these standards extend the accepted security of VPNs and Firewalls with a robust and flexible management layer, which makes the management and security of IC clear, simple, and easy to use. Using an advanced network segmentation tool, an Enterprise can provide secure private networks as an internal managed service. Administrators create individual private networks in response to requests from internal user groups (e.g. operations). A private overlay network is created simply by giving the network a unique name in the Enterprise environment. Users are then delegated to manage the configuration of the control systems components inside this network, and the security policy configuration governing connectivity between the control systems components. The ability to delegate administration of different elements of the secure industrial network is a key innovation of advanced network segmentation products. Delegation allows an Enterprise can provide secure private networks as an internal managed service. Administrators create individual private networks in response to requests from internal user groups (e.g. operations). A private overlay network is created simply by giving the network a unique name in the Enterprise environment, and assigning the private overlay network to the operations group. The operators of the control systems components are now able to control the configuration of their device connectivity, independent of the underlying network. Operators are delegated to manage the configuration of the control systems components inside this network, and the security policy configuration governing connectivity between the control systems components. While the operators have their own secure private network sandbox, the Administrators maintain governance and oversight of the entire solution. A Water / Wastewater implementation of network segmentation A county water utility in Florida has a shared county public safety network to provide robust, highlyavailable IP network communications for a variety of users. The public safety network is a combination of IP-provided MPL WAN that has redundant links tied to a microwave mesh backhaul. One user of this network is the water and wastewater operations CADA network. The CADA network is implemented as a VLAN within the public safety network, with seamless failover between the IP and microwave backhaul. Presented at the 2013 IA Water/Wastewater and Automatic Controls ymposium Crowne Plaza Orlando-Universal Hotel, Orlando, Florida, UA Aug 6-8,

8 Mattes 8 With the proliferation of users and services within the public safety network, and the addition of valueadd IT services appearing within the CADA network, the CADA manager became concerned with the effectiveness of VLAN segregation for the water/wastewater CADA systems. In order to achieve an additional level of isolation and security, the utility was seeking a network segmentation solution that leverages the existing public safety network. As shown in Figure 7, the utility deployed NAs at the CADA Operations center and at each of their remote sites and lift stations. They also deployed a NA to connect Corporate Visboards to the Master Historian. Another requirement was a method of constraining Contractor access to local and remote IC equipment. Three private overlay networks were implemented on top of the public safety network. The security policies and IC network configurations are managed by the ecure Network Management ystem. CADA Overlay Visboards Overlay V Contractor Overlay C Water Plant Control Water Plant Contractor C NW witch Water Plant Water Plant Control Master Historian C NE witch econdary Historian Engineering Workstation Engineering Workstation Public afety Network CADA V A ecure Network Management ystem Figure 7: Water / Wastewater plants leverage a shared Public afety Network for secure communications ummary tuxnet was a watershed event that focused the world s attention on Industrial Control ystems. ince IC were often deployed in air-gapped environments, their vulnerable by design attributes were largely ignored. tuxnet showed that an air-gap is not secure, and increased connectivity results in a larger attack surface for IC. With all the media attention, vulnerabilities are being disclosed at staggering rates, and IC vendors are slow to catch up. Presented at the 2013 IA Water/Wastewater and Automatic Controls ymposium Crowne Plaza Orlando-Universal Hotel, Orlando, Florida, UA Aug 6-8,

9 Mattes 9 Best practices suggest comprehensive risk management, tied to a defense in depth cybersecurity implementation, is the appropriate approach for securing IC. Network segmentation is a foundational building block of a defense in depth, layered security implementation. tandards from IA are focusing on network segmentation because it can be used to minimize the connectivity for IC to the absolute minimum, and protect that connectivity over shared network infrastructures. Additional standards from IETF and TCG describe how these segmented networks can be efficiently managed at scale. tandards-based commercial network segmentation products are now available that not only decouple and secure the IC communications from a shared network, but also decouple the management of the IC systems from the management of the shared network. This approach at delegated management makes it possible for an enterprise to deploy secure private networks as an internal service. A case study has been presented in which a water utility in Florida added an additional layer of security to their CADA network. The CADA network continues to leverage a robust public safety network, while remaining isolated and secured from that network. The resulting environment reduces the connectivity of the CADA components to an absolute minimum. List of Acronyms: ---- CMDB... Configuration Management Database HMI... Human Machine Interface IETF... Internet Engineering Task Force IC... Industrial Control ystem IA... International ociety of Automation NA... Network ecurity Appliance PKI... Public Key Infrastructure PLC... Programmable Logic Controller RTU... Remote Terminal Unit RII... Repository for Industrial ecurity Incidents CADA... upervisory Control and Data Acquisition TCG... Trusted Computing Group VPN... Virtual Private Network VLAN... Virtual Local Area Network ---- David Mattes is the founder and CTO of Asguard Networks. David founded Asguard Networks to create products that address the challenge of managing connectivity and information security for Industrial Control ystems (IC). Prior to Asguard Networks, David spent 13 years in Boeing s R&D organization. At Boeing, David focused on IC security issues, particularly on the challenge of segmenting connectivity for IC devices into private networks and securely connecting them to and through Boeing s Enterprise networks. David can be contacted at mattes@asguardnetworks.com. Presented at the 2013 IA Water/Wastewater and Automatic Controls ymposium Crowne Plaza Orlando-Universal Hotel, Orlando, Florida, UA Aug 6-8,

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