Detention and Reintegration Working Group and Sahel Region Capacity-Building Working Group

Transcription

1 Detention and Reintegration Working Group and Sahel Region Capacity-Building Working Group Workshop on Prison and Security Issues and Implementation of the GCTF Rome Memorandum on the Rehabilitation of Violent Extremist Offenders Good Practices November 2014 Abuja, Nigeria Overview Summary On November 2014, Nigeria hosted a Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) workshop, in cooperation with the United States, on prison and security issues and implementation of the GCTF Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders (Rome Memorandum). The workshop, which was organized under the auspices of the GCTF s Criminal Justice and Rule of Law and Detention and Reintegration Working Groups, brought together prison, law enforcement, and counterterrorism (CT) officials, as well as investigators, academics, consultants, and other practitioners from GCTF members, Sahel region countries, the United Nations (UN), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Discussion focused on how effective implementation of Good Practices 1-6 in the Rome Memorandum can support internal and external prison security, which serve as the foundation for effective rehabilitation and reintegration programs. Participants reviewed several case studies to identify practical, human rights-compliant methods for implementing thorough prison security procedures that will enable successful intake, assessment, and classification programs; sound segregation, integration, and communication control measures; and valuable prison intelligence programs. Key cross-cutting themes that emerged from the workshop included the following: The importance of establishing a comprehensive prison security program that can enable effective rehabilitation and reintegration programs. Participants stressed that corrections officials and prison staff should employ basic, sound, correctional practices that establish a safe and secure prison environment, which protects against internal and external threats, and provide good care and custody to inmates. This will facilitate the development and implementation of effective rehabilitation and reintegration programs. Comprehensive intake, assessment, and classification procedures for inmates support a secure prison environment and enable operation of effective rehabilitation and reintegration programs. Panelists stressed that assessment of inmates should begin the moment they enter the penal system and should be a continuous process throughout the lifecycle of the inmate s detention. Intake, assessment, and classification procedures should be methodical, scientific, and standardized, and the results should be shared with prison guards, and corrections, law enforcement, and intelligence officials, and

2 - 2 - rehabilitation staff. The process should also inform key decisions about prison security programs, individual rehabilitation programs, and the development and implementation of prison intelligence programs. Panelists emphasized the importance of special procedures for terrorist inmates in particular, as they represent a unique group within the broader general inmate population who require individual evaluation, special care, and special custody arrangements. Prison security programs should consist of redundant, mutually supportive procedures that enable a controlled environment. In order to operate safe and effective rehabilitation and reintegration programs, corrections officials and prison staff should implement redundant security procedures. These could include physical security safeguards, procedural security mechanisms, and dynamic security processes, such as inmate engagement and intelligence programs. Security policies and procedures should also include contingency plans and corrections officials and prison staff should undergo continuous training with regular audits on response and implementation. Application of segregation, integration, and communication control mechanisms should consider a prison s capacity and the specific needs of its inmate population. It is important for corrections officials to individually assess their prison; its facilities; the capacity, resource, and training of its staff; and various factors including local culture and legislation when making determinations about the most efficient control mechanisms. The needs of various inmate populations may differ according to local circumstances and prison demographics. Participants emphasized that a one-size-fits-all approach for control mechanisms cannot support effective prison security or meaningful rehabilitation and reintegration programs. Drawing from different case studies, participants discussed how different segregation and integration models have each been used as effective control mechanisms for terrorist inmates in various situations. The value and challenge of operating effective prison intelligence programs. Effective prison intelligence programs support good prison security, help inform rehabilitative services, and support intake, assessment, and classification procedures. However, due to the unique and controlled environment in which they operate, prison intelligence programs also face unique challenges, including separation of intelligence sources from one another to ensure the veracity of information and operating in segregated versus integrated inmate environments. To ensure legitimacy and overall effectiveness, prison intelligence programs should be implemented with accompanying legal and policy frameworks and operated in compliance with human rights and in a manner that supports engagement with inmates and prison rapport. Summary The following is a thematic summary of the workshop. It is not intended to be a transcript of the proceedings. Opening Remarks Acting Controller General (CG) of the Nigerian Prison Service (NPS), Aminu Sule, and U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, James Entwistle, welcomed participants to the workshop. Acting CG Sule

3 - 3 - noted that prisons play an important and unique role in rehabilitating and reintegrating offenders. He underscored Nigeria s commitment to the GCTF and to the continued implementation of the Rome Memorandum, noting that this workshop was part of several Nigerian initiatives designed to disrupt acts of violent extremism and rehabilitate offenders. He also noted that Nigeria and its prison service face mounting challenges posed by growing and increasingly complex prison populations, limitations in operational capacity, and the persistence of threats from violent extremists, including Boko Haram. Acting CG Sule highlighted the need for continued international cooperation and capacity building as effective methods for countering these dangerous trends. Ambassador Entwistle noted that successful and effective implementation of the Rome Memorandum is a major undertaking requiring strong cooperation across governments; an extensive outreach strategy to the most vulnerable segments of the population; and collaboration with civil society organizations and community and traditional leaders. In order for these efforts to succeed, they must be predicated on the basic principles of sound correctional practice upon which effective rehabilitation and reintegration programs can be built. Session 1: Security Enabling Rehabilitation Panelists from the NPS and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) discussed how good prison security facilitates and enables the therapeutic environment necessary for an effective rehabilitation program. They reinforced that without good prison security management, follow-on rehabilitation and reintegration programs cannot succeed. They emphasized that in order to ensure security programs are capable of supporting rehabilitation, corrections officials should define the security mission for their guards and staff and articulate how it supports broader rehabilitation goals. This not only supports the development of a welltrained, invested staff that provides good care and custody, and who respect the detainee and their rights, but it also enables staff to engage more effectively with prisoners, build rapport, and address problems in a timely manner all of which help reinforce and support rehabilitation programs and provide for a more secure environment. Participants also discussed the need to strike the proper balance between security and rehabilitation programs, which requires slow and measured progress sustained by feedback and data collection. In their overview of the Nigerian deradicalization and rehabilitation program, which is currently under development and expansion, the NPS described the intake, assessment, classification, and segregation programs that will inform prison security programs, underscoring that they are critical to ensuring that prison staff can provide a safe, secure, and rehabilitative environment. These types of assessment programs offer the best opportunity to mitigate the tension between security and rehabilitation programs. The panelists were also careful to point out that developing these types of structures constitutes a long and laborious process that requires sustained government support and political will. Session 2: Developing an Effective Security Program Representatives from the European Union Technical Assistance to Nigeria s Evolving Security Challenges (EUTANS) mission and the U.S. Department of Justice s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) offered insights on how to develop and implement an effective prison security program. EUTANS discussed three types of security that

4 - 4 - should be employed in prisons: (1) physical; (2) procedural; and (3) dynamic. These elements support prison staff s ability to deter, detect, and disrupt inmate misconduct and disturbances within a prison so that a controlled environment can be established and effective rehabilitation programs can be implemented. To ensure that a controlled environment can be maintained in the face of unexpected events, such as fires, riots, or external attacks on the prison, EUTANS recommended that corrections officials establish incident management plans that clearly specify roles and responsibilities for prison staff. These plans should include various contingency strategies and staff should undergo continuous training to ensure they can react quickly, efficiently, and in a coordinated manner. EUTANS also encouraged prisons to have a security committee responsible for auditing and testing the security of the institution and the responses of its staff. ICITAP echoed earlier comments that safe, effective, and smoothly-operated rehabilitation programs have their roots in the basic principles of sound correctional practice and good security programs, noting that the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners provides an effective baseline guide for inmate management procedures. With regard to terrorist inmates, ICITAP noted that additional procedures are often required. To safeguard the security and good order of the prison and to support broader national CT goals, such as terrorist network mapping and intelligence collection, security programs for terrorist inmates should include segregation procedures, direct supervision by highly-trained and professional staff, and careful deconfliction between security and rehabilitation programs. Several participants asked about good practices for responding to large-scale prison escapes. Panelists reiterated their points regarding the importance of a well-trained staff and an effective prison intelligence program, but also stressed the need for good communication and strong coordination between the various security services, noting that a proactive approach rather than a reactive one offered the best opportunity for ensuring prison safety and security. Session 3: Effective Intake, Assessment, and Classification Programs Panelists from the International Centre on Counter-Terrorism The Hague (ICCT) and the Sacramento County, California jail system discussed the importance of an effective intake, assessment, and classification program that can help corrections officials tailor their security and rehabilitation programs. Both noted that prison staff cannot effectively rehabilitate an inmate or help them in a significant way if they do not have a firm understanding of the person s background, vulnerabilities, needs, and individual motivation, a point that was reiterated by several other panelists and participants throughout the course of the workshop. ICCT reemphasized earlier comments that terrorist inmates and violent extremist offenders are unique from inmates in the general prison population and must be approached differently. Understanding those differences and responding accordingly hinges on the intake, assessment, and classification process, and should begin when a prison first has contact with an inmate. Absent this evaluative process, it is difficult for corrections officials to provide the rehabilitative services inmates require or the safe and secure environment that enables such programs. The panelist from the Sacramento County (California, USA) Jail system emphasized that intake, assessment, and classification procedures should operate as an interdependent process in which one phase informs the other. This process should also be organized and overseen by an expert so that it can be operated in a methodical, scientific, and standardized way. To that end, both panelists challenged the idea that intake, assessment, and classification is an initial or static

5 - 5 - process that occurs only upon an inmate s entry to the prison. To the contrary, they underscored that the most effective programs are continuous throughout detention of the inmate and serve as the basis for the inmate s rehabilitation program, providing the necessary data to design a tailored plan. Participants pointed out that comprehensive risk assessments must not only precede the design of any tailored security programs for a prison, they should be conducted at various stages within the prison, from the level of the individual inmate up through the general prison population. Session 4: Segregation, Integration, and Communication Control Measures Officials from Morocco s Prison Administration and the Sacramento County Jail system shared their different experiences with segregation, integration, and communication control measures. They highlighted the need for individual assessment that is dependent on local circumstances. Morocco recalled its experience with the 2003 Casablanca bombings, following which terrorist inmates were segregated into a single facility. Increasing challenges associated with offender management, increased radicalization stemming from the symbol of a single terrorist detention facility, and security concerns about a threat of a single prison escape led Morocco to reevaluate its control measures and instead elect for an integrated system in which terrorist inmates are dispersed throughout the general prison population. Through this system, Morocco has been able to move terrorist inmates closer to their families, which has supported community engagement and rehabilitation efforts, as well as more effectively control extremists communications with outside parties and remove them from areas where they previously held influence. The official from the Sacramento County jail system offered an alternative method, noting that California primarily opts to segregate extremist or high-threat inmates, using minimum, medium, and maximum sub-divisions as part of its classification schema. In order to support effective operation of this system, however, the official stressed that there should be a designated classification unit with primary control over the prison s housing unit. This allows them to manage a fluid process, conduct continual reevaluations, and make adjustments to ensure the continued safe operation of the prison. The official also pointed out the challenges associated with such a system, as improper or hasty segregation poses serious risks that can denigrate the security of the prison, complicate efforts to prevent or intercept communications between inmates, and inhibit the effectiveness of other rehabilitative programs. Both panelists stressed the need for corrections officials to evaluate the capacity, resources, and training of their prison staff, as well as factors such as the local culture and the culture of the prison, physical facilities, national laws, and established policies and procedures when evaluating an inmate and before making decisions about whether to segregate or integrate them vis-à-vis the general prison population. Regional representatives asked for insights on how to best institute control measures in light of limited capacity and resources. Several low-cost good practices were discussed, including an emphasis on training to ensure staff has strong bedrock correctional skills, a basic understanding of intake, assessment, and classification, and the ability to recognize the warning signs of potential radicalization. Leveraging available community-based organizations and increasing communication and cooperation between security officials were also highlighted as good practices. Session 5: The Foundations for an Effective Rehabilitation Program and Training for Prison Staff

6 - 6 - Panelists from the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore (ICPVTR) and ICITAP noted the importance of training prison staff on the foundational elements of an effective rehabilitation program. The need to define the focus of the program, and the importance of a broad set of measurement tools as part of an ongoing intake, assessment, and classification program that informs prison staff training and a rehabilitation program, were recurring themes of the session. ICPVTR noted that corrections officials should be clear about the goals of their rehabilitation program and specify whether the desired outcome for the inmate is deradicalization or disengagement. Each supports broader reintegration goals, but the specific steps for either can vary according to host of individually assessed factors. Both the holistic approach to rehabilitation and specific strategies used to engage a particular inmate also depend on evaluation of the inmate and the desired end goals of the program. Programs involving religious counseling, psychiatric evaluation, vocational training, recreational or sports activities, and creative arts, combined with appropriate community engagement, were all cited as possible methods for supporting successful deradicalization or disengagement program. In order to ensure maximum effectiveness, ICPVTR reiterated earlier comments about the need to deconflict security programs with rehabilitation programs. For terrorist inmates, ICITAP called for a proactive model of inmate management which can account for the challenges posed by this unique population. The proactive model segregates terrorist inmates from the general prison population and ensures they are monitored by highly trained prison staff, who are in turn closely supervised. The panelist advocated for a direct supervision model of inmates in order to ensure the security and safe operation of the prison, but also to ensure that staff are able to monitor and report on institutional matters. Following these reports, information collected by prison staff should be shared with corrections and law enforcement officials, intelligence analysts, and rehabilitation staff, and should inform continuous intake, assessment, and classification procedures being operated by prison staff. Additionally, as part of this proactive model, any accompanying rehabilitation program should be designed and implemented in close consultation with experts due to the fact that terrorist inmates will often actively resist government efforts to rehabilitate them. Session 6: Effective Prison Intelligence Programs An official from the New South Wales (NSW) Corrective Service in Australia and an expert from the New York-based Soufan Group, a strategic security intelligence firm, discussed implementation of intelligence programs inside prisons. The NSW Corrective Service shared its experience with developing risk assessment tools that have been implemented in NSW prisons. These include routinized vetting procedures and collection of inmate data that is shared with corrections and law enforcement officials and intelligence agencies. The NSW Corrective Service also provided an account of their experience with developing the legislative and policy frameworks to authorize and enable the implementation of its risk assessment and collection programs in prisons, noting that this is a commonly overlooked but nonetheless important element of instituting an effective prison intelligence program. The NSW Corrective Service discussed the Australian Radicalisation Extremism Awareness Program (REAP), which is designed to educate corrections officials and prison staff on the indicators associated with radicalization so they can better use information to support their risk assessment and reporting operations. The Soufan Group representative offered perspectives on inmate-level intelligence collection programs, outlining a series of low-cost, non-resource intensive steps that can be taken to support

7 - 7 - broader intelligence goals and rehabilitation programs. Echoing other panelists comments on the importance of intake, assessment, and classification, the Soufan Group representative stressed that as soon as a person is detained, initial assessment needs to begin. To enable this effectively, law enforcement or security forces should request that an intelligence officer or corrections official accompany them on operations to detain suspects so that effective, human rights-compliant interrogation can begin as soon as an individual is in custody. Thereafter, demonstrating professionalism, asking slow and measured questions, exhibiting kindness, and treating the inmate with humanity are critical to establishing rapport. It was also noted that such actions not only yield higher quality intelligence more quickly, but also support long-term rehabilitation efforts. The importance of being truthful with inmates was also highlighted, as lying undermines trust and can compromise the effectiveness of the intelligence program. Finally, the Soufan Group representative pointed out that the process of radicalization takes years, and that corrections officials and prison staff should be prepared for an equally long process for successful rehabilitation to occur. Understanding an inmate s motivations is therefore crucial to supporting that process and to building a counter narrative that can be employed both in and outside of a prison setting. Several participants asked guidelines for how or when intelligence information should be shared with security officials outside of the prison setting. A discussion about the need to share information across government and at various levels ensued, with several participants highlighting that sharing intelligence information gathered inside a prison is an effective way for prison officials to build rapport with other elements of the government. Participants agreed that intelligence information must make its way into the hands of those who need it, but that national legislation governing the use of intelligence and how it can be shared must be observed and considered on a case-by-case basis. Wrap-Up, Way Ahead and Closing Remarks Several themes arose from the discussion, including the importance of establishing a strong security environment that can enable rehabilitation efforts; the need for continual intake, assessment, and classification procedures; and the value of an effective prison intelligence program, particularly its ability to inform provide useful, actionable information to corrections and law enforcement officials and rehabilitation staff. The need for governments to conduct their own evaluations regarding segregation and integration and to consider which method will be most effective given available resources, staff abilities, and local context was also highlighted. Participants agreed that efforts to build capacity at the local level, beginning with prison level staff and corrections officials, through increased training and communication between security partners were key, non-resource intensive steps that could be taken now to begin addressing immediate threats and gaps particularly those identified by Senegal and Chad. Nigeria noted that it would continue to develop its intake, assessment, and classification procedures in conjunction with its broader work to expand the NPS deradicalization and rehabilitation program, bearing in mind the comments experts had offered during the workshop. There was general consensus that although there are enduring challenges associated with developing and implementing prison security and rehabilitation programs, workshops such as this are imperative to finding creative ways to work together to address challenges and move forward.