Attorney Deceit Statutes: Promoting Professionalism Through Criminal Prosecutions and Treble Damages

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1 Attorney Deceit Statutes: Promoting Professionalism Through Criminal Prosecutions and Treble Damages Alex B. Long * Unbeknownst to many lawyers, at least twelve jurisdictions including New York and California have statutes on the books that single out lawyers who engage in deceit or collusion. In nearly all of these jurisdictions, a lawyer found to have engaged in deceit or collusion faces criminal penalties and/or civil liability in the form of treble damages. Until recently, these attorney deceit statutes have languished in obscurity and, through a series of restrictive readings of the statutory language, have been rendered somewhat irrelevant. However, in 2009, the New York Court of Appeals breathed new life into New York s attorney deceit statute through its decision in Amalfitano v. Rosenberg. This Article discusses the extent to which, in this age of widespread distrust of the legal profession, this type of external regulation of the legal profession is a desirable approach. The Article concludes that although the utility of existing attorney deceit statues is undermined by the broadness of the language, the symbolism of the statutes is important. By relying on the development of tort law to address the same subject matter, courts can achieve the same educational and symbolic goals while dealing with attorney deceit on a more practical basis. * Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. My thanks to the participants at the Oklahoma City University School of Law faculty colloquium, including Paula Dalley, the Honorable Neil Gorsuch, Carla Spivack, and Deborah Tussey, for their comments and participation. Thanks also to Tom Davies and Maurice Stucke for comments and assistance. Paul Wehmeier provided valuable research assistance for which I am grateful. 413

2 414 University of California, Davis [Vol. 44:413 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. DECEIT IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW A. Deceit in Motion Practice B. Deceit in the Discovery Process and in the Presentation of Evidence C. Deceit in Negotiations D. Limitations to the Current Regulatory Approaches to Attorney Deceit II. TORT LAW REMEDIES IN THE EVENT OF ATTORNEY DECEIT A. Special Tort Rules that Apply to the Legal Profession B. Tort Claims Involving Deceit in Motion Practice Defamation Misrepresentation Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process Malicious Defense C. Tort Claims Involving Deceit in the Discovery Process and in the Presentation of Evidence No Civil Remedy for Perjury Spoliation of Evidence D. Tort Claims Involving Deceit in Negotiations III. ATTORNEY DECEIT STATUTES A. A Summary of the Various Attorney Deceit Statutes B. The Interpretation of the Statutes The Majority Approach The New York Approach IV. THE MEANING OF AMALFITANO AND THE POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ATTORNEY DECEIT STATUTES A. Amalfitano as Revolutionary Change The Persuasive Effect of Amalfitano Tort Claims Involving Deceit in Motion Practice Tort Claims Involving Deceit in the Discovery Process and in the Presentation of Evidence Tort Claims Involving Deceit in Negotiations B. Amalfitano as Anomaly: Why Courts Are Unlikely to Follow Amalfitano (At Least Not to Its Logical Extreme) Conflicts with the Legal Profession s View of Itself Creating Tension in Existing Tort Law Problems of Overdeterrence and Overcriminalization C. Amalfitano as a Harbinger of Legislative Scrutiny of and Judicial Intolerance of Attorney Deceit D. Amalfitano as Model for Reform

3 2010] Attorney Deceit Statutes The Advantages of Tort Law Recognizing Limited Liability for Fraud upon a Court CONCLUSION INTRODUCTION It is provided also, that if any serjeant, pleader, or other, do any manner of deceit or collusion in the king s court, or consent unto it, in deceit of the court, or to beguile the court, or the party, and thereof be attainted, he shall be imprisoned for a year and a day, and from thenceforth shall not be heard to plead in that court for any man; and if he be no pleader, he shall be imprisoned in like manner by the space of a year and a Day at least; and if the trespass require greater punishment, it shall be at the king s pleasure. Chapter 29, First Statute of Westminster (1275) deceit: 1. The action or practice of deceiving; concealment of the truth in order to mislead; deception, fraud, cheating, false dealing. The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed.) There can be little doubt that the legal profession has a problem in terms of the public s perception of lawyers honesty and the profession s ability and willingness to police its members. Although there may be dispute within the legal profession as to just how widespread attorney deceit is within the practice of law, surveys consistently reveal that the public has a low opinion of lawyers honesty. 1 When discussing the lawyer disciplinary process, commentators also frequently make note of the public s skepticism regarding whether the legal profession is willing to draft and enforce professional ethics rules in the public s interest, rather than the 1 See Michael C. Dorf, Can the Legal Profession Improve Its Image?: Americans Believe Lawyers to Be Necessary but Dishonest, Survey Finds, FINDLAW S WRIT (Apr. 17, 2002), (reporting findings of Columbia Law School survey showing that nearly forty percent of respondents believed that lawyers were either especially dishonest or somewhat dishonest); Lydia Saad, Nurses Shine, Bankers Slump in Ethics Ratings, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE (Nov. 24, 2008), (reporting survey results placing legal profession among lowest of professions in terms of honesty and ethics); see also Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi: The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll, 79-Sep A.B.A. J. 60, Sept. 1993, at 60, 62 (reporting that only twenty-two percent of respondents to poll believed that phrase honest and ethical describes lawyers).

4 416 University of California, Davis [Vol. 44:413 interest of the profession itself. 2 For some time now, those who closely watch the legal profession have warned that if the legal profession does not do a better job of addressing the public s concerns over dishonest and unethical behavior among lawyers, legislators and external agencies may step in and take away some or all of the legal profession s traditional authority to regulate itself. 3 In response, state bars have increasingly focused on internal reforms. These reforms include measures such as expanded Continuing Legal Education (CLE) requirements, a greater focus on professionalism, and the promulgation of lawyer civility codes. 4 However, it is questionable what sort of success these measures have had in addressing the public perception concerning lawyers honesty and the legal profession s ability to govern itself. A handful of states have recently considered initiatives that would have stripped the judiciary of its traditional power to regulate the practice of law. 5 Citing the need for a maximum level of competence, extreme honesty, unyielding integrity and respect for the law from those who[] are licensed to practice law as well as the failure of the Arizona Supreme Court to provide that level of professionalism, an Arizona organization in 2007 sponsored an initiative to grant the 2 See Kristin L. Fortin, Reviving the Lawyer s Role as Servant Leader: The Professional Paradigm and a Lawyer s Ethical Obligation to Inform Clients About Alternative Dispute Resolution, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589, 594 (2009) ( Society now questions whether it can trust modern lawyers to elevate client representation and public service over self-interest. ); Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving Independence in Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 257 (2001) ( [T]he legal profession at times has given the public reason to doubt its integrity of purpose when adopting certain ethics rules in the past.... ); Around the Nation, PROF. LAW., Winter 1999 at 24, 24 (noting growing public mistrust of the profession s ability to police itself ). 3 Kim, supra note 2, at 257; ABA Comm n on Professionalism,... In the Spirit of Public Service: A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 248 (1986). But see Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, (2009) (suggesting that courts, commentators, and legal ethics regulators downplay extent of external regulation of legal profession and continue to conceptualize law as a self-regulated profession ). 4 See Around the Nation, supra note 2, at 24 (noting rise in CLE programs focusing on professionalism and promulgation of civility codes); see also Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, (1997) ( In recent years, the legal profession has become increasingly concerned with professionalism, as well as with the public s perception of attorneys credibility, morality, and utility. ). 5 See Vesna Jaksic, Some States Seek Change in How Lawyers Are Regulated, 30 NAT L L.J. 6, 6 (2008).

5 2010] Attorney Deceit Statutes 417 authority to license lawyers to the state s legislature. 6 In 2008, a South Carolina legislator introduced a constitutional amendment that would similarly have stripped that state s supreme court of its oversight of the legal profession. 7 In 2009, an Oklahoma state representative similarly introduced a measure that would have amended the state constitution to require legislative approval of any rule adopted for inclusion in the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct. 8 Although none of these measures was enacted, they produced considerable discussion in their respective states. 9 At the federal level, the Enron scandal led some in Congress and federal agencies to question the ability of state bars to regulate the legal profession. In commenting on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for example, Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) Chairman Harvey Pitt noted the public skepticism concerning the willingness of the legal profession to police itself. 10 He also pointed out the generally low level of effective responses the SEC received upon referring possible disciplinary proceedings to state authorities and warned that if state bars were unwilling to assume the task of disciplining securities lawyers, the SEC would do so. 11 Others have suggested using existing legal devices to address the problem of unethical and dishonest lawyering. Some commentators have focused on amending the ethical rules dealing with deceit and 6 COMM. FOR THE PRES. OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOV T, Application for Initiative or Referendum Petition Serial Number, ballotmeasuretext/i pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2010); see id. 7 See Jaksic, supra note 5, at 6. 8 H.R.J. Res. 1028, 52d Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2009). 9 See, e.g., Ruth W. Cupp, Commentary, Bills Penned by Physician-Legislator Would Treat Lawyer Regulation the Same as Barbers, S.C. LAW. WKLY., Feb. 11, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR (discussing impetus for proposed legislation in South Carolina); Gregory Froom, S.C. Bar President Updates Delegates on Midterm Progress, S.C. LAW. WKLY., Feb. 4, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR (describing discussion of South Carolina measure). 10 See Rachel McTague, Pitt Says SEC Will Take on Assignment of Disciplining Lawyers if State Bars Do Not, 18 LAWS. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA), no. 20, at 591, 591 (Sept. 25, 2002) (quoting Pitt as saying two relevant questions are Where were the lawyers? and What were the lawyers doing to prevent violations of the law? ); James Podgers, Seeking the Best Route, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2002, at 68, 68 (quoting Pitt as noting skepticism about the degree to which the legal profession can police itself... ). 11 Podgers, supra note 10, at 68 (quoting Pitt). Senator John Edwards made a similar observation during consideration of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. With Enron and WorldCom, and all the other corporate misconduct we have seen, it is again clear that corporate lawyers should not be left to regulate themselves CONG. REC. S6552 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. John Edwards).

6 418 University of California, Davis [Vol. 44:413 the making of false statements to third parties during the course of representation so that they are less tolerant of deceptive statements and practices. 12 Others have focused on the use of discovery and other judicial sanctions against lawyers as a means of addressing dishonest conduct. 13 Generally absent from this discussion is any suggestion that the criminal law should be expanded specifically to target attorney deceit. The high-profile prosecution of lawyer Lynne Stewart for material support of terrorist activity for actions taken while she was representing a client cast a spotlight on potential accomplice liability for lawyers. 14 In addition, there are a few criminal statutes such as those prohibiting barratry or the hiring of runners to solicit employment that specifically single out lawyers and other professionals for punishment. 15 But the perception at least is that the criminal law that applies to lawyers is generally that which applies to nonlawyers See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer Ethics for Effective Representation in a Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem Solving: Mediation, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J 935, 951 (2001) ( [S]ome of the rules permit conduct that may be viewed as deceitful.... ); Don Peters, When Lawyers Move Their Lips: Attorney Truthfulness in Mediation and a Modest Proposal, 1 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 139 (2007) (proposing revision to ABA Model Rules of Prof l Conduct R. 4.1). 13 See, e.g., Richard Johnson, Integrating Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 819, 917 (2004) (arguing that Rule 11 should be amended to become vehicle to enforce litigation ethics rules contained in Model Rules of Professional Conduct); Judith A. McMorrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991 BYU L. REV. 959, 975 (1991) (suggesting that Rule 11 may be a better balance among lawyer, client, and society ); Thomas C. Tew, Electronic Discovery Misconduct in Litigation: Letting the Punishment Fit the Crime, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 289, (2007) (arguing that there are many opportunities for improvement in the Rules [of Civil Procedure] to address discovery abuses). 14 See Peter Margulies, Lawyers Independence and Collective Illegality in Government and Corporate Misconduct, Terrorism, and Organized Crime, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 939, 975 (2006) (discussing Stewart s case). 15 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 6152 (West 2003) (prohibiting lawyers from using runner[s] to solicit employment); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN (a)(3) (West 2009) (prohibiting barratry). 16 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 8 cmt. c (2000) ( For the most part, the substantive law of crimes applicable to lawyers is that applicable to others. ); Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 559 (2009) (noting that lawyers are subject to criminal law and that nothing about the roles prescribed in [ethics] codes excuses lawyers from abiding by laws of general applicability ). But see Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, (1998) (suggesting that existing scholarship underestimates extent to which criminal law regulates lawyers conduct).

7 2010] Attorney Deceit Statutes 419 This is essentially true. But, unbeknownst to most lawyers, there are numerous jurisdictions that already have criminal statutes in place that specifically target attorney deceit. At least twelve jurisdictions including California and New York have statutes on the books that single out lawyers who engage in deceit or collusion. 17 In nearly all of these jurisdictions, a lawyer found to have engaged in such action faces criminal penalties, civil liability in the form of treble damages, or both. The fact that most people have paid little attention to these attorney deceit statutes is understandable. Until recently, the statutes have languished in obscurity and, through a series of restrictive readings of the statutory language, courts have rendered them somewhat irrelevant. However, in 2009, the New York Court of Appeals breathed new life into New York s attorney deceit statute through its decision in Amalfitano v. Rosenberg. 18 In Amalfitano, the court explained that, contrary to at least several decades of prior case law, New York s statutory language should be read broadly to prohibit a potentially wide range of deceitful conduct on the part of attorneys. 19 As a result, New York s attorney deceit statute is once again relevant. This Article considers what influence Amalfitano may have in other jurisdictions, many of which borrowed their own attorney deceit statutes from New York. 20 But, as importantly, the Article discusses the extent to which, in this age of widespread distrust of the legal profession, this type of external regulation of the legal profession is a desirable approach. Part I discusses the various forms attorney deceit may take, as well as the existing rules of professional conduct and civil procedure that apply. Part II discusses the various tort theories that might also apply to attorney deceit and the special rules courts have developed that tend to limit liability in these cases. Part III examines the provisions and majority interpretations of the existing attorney deceit statutes before turning to an examination of the New York Court of Appeals decision in Amalfitano. Finally, Part IV explores the potential and likely implications of Amalfitano. Although Amalfitano is unlikely to have immediate and dramatic effects beyond New York, the Article concludes that Amalfitano may prove to be significant in terms of reflecting an increasing intolerance of overly zealous attorney behavior and the legal profession s perceived unwillingness to confront the problem. Moreover, the Article argues that although Amalfitano s expansive interpretation of New York s attorney deceit 17 See infra note 191 and accompanying text. 18 Amalfitano v. Rosenberg, 903 N.E.2d 265, (N.Y. 2009). 19 Id. at See infra note 188 and accompanying text.

8 420 University of California, Davis [Vol. 44:413 statute might be problematic due to its over-breadth, there is an increased role for courts to play in addressing the problem of attorney deceit through the development of tort law. I. DECEIT IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW Attorney deceit may take many forms, from lying to clients to concealing facts from the court. 21 ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(c) contains a general prohibition on dishonest conduct, declaring that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 22 Rule 8.4(c) is sweeping in its scope insofar as it applies not only to dishonest conduct occurring in the course of representing a client but to dishonest conduct in a lawyer s private life. 23 One of the difficulties in regulating dishonest conduct by attorneys is that it is often difficult to draw the line between engaging in prohibited dishonesty and fulfilling one s ethical obligations to a client. 24 As a result, there are numerous ethical rules that speak more directly to specific forms of attorney deceit occurring during the course of representing a client in pursuit of the client s objectives. The following Part briefly discusses some of the more common examples of deceitful conduct in the practice of law. A. Deceit in Motion Practice Deceit is not a word typically used in connection with the initiation of a legal action or the filing of a motion. However, knowingly making false allegations in a complaint or motion certainly meets the definition of deceptive conduct in that it represents an attempt to mislead a court. 25 Thus, at least in the general sense of the term, it is a form of fraud upon the court. 26 There are potentially several disciplinary rules that apply to such action. 21 See Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 663 (1990) (employing definition of deception that includes message meant to mislead others, including through silence). 22 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2008). 23 Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyers Professional Responsibilities and Liabilities in Negotiations, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 249, 270 (2009). 24 See id. at (noting paradoxical nature of negotiation ). 25 See John A. Humbach, Shifting Paradigms of Lawyer Honesty, 76 TENN. L. REV. 993, 993 (2009) (stating that truly honest lawyers would never assert or controvert issues unless there was basis in actual fact for assertion). 26 See E. Fin. Corp. v. JSC Alchevsk Iron & Steel Works, 258 F.R.D. 76, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (concluding that attorney who made misrepresentations in filing

9 2010] Attorney Deceit Statutes 421 Aside from Model Rule 8.4(c) s general prohibition on dishonest conduct, Model Rule 3.1 and its equivalent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 11, prohibit bringing a proceeding or asserting an issue therein without a nonfrivolous basis for doing so. 27 A comment to Model Rule 3.1 explains that an action is frivolous where the lawyer is unable to make a good faith argument in support of a client s position. 28 Thus, a lawyer who knowingly includes a false allegation in a complaint or who knowingly makes a false assertion of fact while filing a motion during a proceeding is subject to discipline as well as Rule 11 sanctions. 29 Such conduct might also violate a lawyer s duty of candor toward the tribunal. 30 Model Rule 3.3(a)(1) addresses other instances of what can broadly be called fraud upon the court. 31 Specifically, the rule prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to the tribunal. 32 A comment explains that: [A]n assertion purporting to be on the lawyer s own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer motion for default judgment had committed fraud upon court). 27 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Civil Rule 11 and Lawyer Discipline: An Empirical Analysis Suggesting Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 798 (2004) (stating that [t]he language of Model Rule 3.1 is strikingly similar to Rule 11 s language ). 28 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt See generally Fla. Bar v. Thomas, 582 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 1991) (reprimanding lawyer for filing frivolous lawsuit to punish another lawyer who had represented clients who had opposed lawyer in other matters); In re Boone, 7 P.3d 270, 280 (Kan. 2000) (explaining that same objective standard of good faith applies to both Rule 11 and Model Rule 3.1). 30 See MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002) (describing lawyer s duty of candor to tribunals). 31 Wright & Miller have noted the difficulty courts have had in articulating a single definition of this term. According to Wright & Miller: A number of courts have accepted the suggestion of a distinguished commentator that fraud upon the court is fraud that does or attempts to, subvert the integrity of the court itself, or that is perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudgingcases that are presented for adjudication. 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2870 (2d ed. 2010) (citations omitted). 32 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1).

10 422 University of California, Davis [Vol. 44:413 knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. 33 Similarly, Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly submitting false evidence, including submitting deceptive or fraudulent supporting documents in connection with the filing of motions. 34 Significantly, neither of these rules requires that the intended audience of the false statement actually relies on the statement to his or her detriment. The offenses are complete upon the making of the false statement. Also noteworthy is the fact that materiality is not a requirement under Model Rule 3.3(a); for disciplinary purposes, any false statement of fact to a tribunal regardless of whether it is material is actionable. In contrast, a lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, makes a false statement of fact to a third party (such as opposing counsel), is only subject to discipline under Rule 4.1(a) when the misrepresentation is material. 35 However, once again, reliance on the part of the third person is not a requirement. Thus, lawyers who have filed frivolous claims 36 or made misrepresentations in support of motions 37 have faced discipline under Rule 4.1(a) despite the fact that the other side may not have been deceived by the lawyer s actions. B. Deceit in the Discovery Process and in the Presentation of Evidence As Professor Bradley Wendel has noted, the discovery system is designed to facilitate truth-finding. 38 Yet, deception in the discovery 33 Id. cmt MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3); see, e.g., Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass n, 968 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding violation where lawyer submitted deceptive documents in support of motion); In re Neitlich, 597 N.E.2d 425 (Mass. 1992) (suspending lawyer who committed fraud upon court and opposing party by actively misrepresenting terms of client s pending real estate transaction ); In re Eadie, 36 P.3d 468, 477 (Or. 2001) (imposing discipline against lawyer who lied to judge about other side in motion to quash proceeding); see also In re Carmick, 48 P.3d 311, 315 (Wash. 2002) (involving disciplinary proceeding against lawyer who made misrepresentations during ex parte proceeding before judge). 35 Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2002) ( In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly... make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person.... ) (emphasis added). 36 See In re Selmer, 568 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn. 1997). 37 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass n, 968 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Columbus Bar Ass n v. Battisti, 739 N.E.2d 344, 345 (Ohio 2000) (involving discipline under analogue to Rule 4.1(a)). 38 W. Bradley Wendel, Rediscovering of Discovery Ethics, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 895, 895

11 2010] Attorney Deceit Statutes 423 process is a common complaint among practitioners. 39 Perhaps one reason for this is the tension inherent in the discovery process. On the one hand, except where information is protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, the discovery rules trump a lawyer s duty to keep client information confidential. 40 On the other hand, the ethical duty to keep client information confidential occupies a central role in the legal profession. 41 Thus, the natural tendency for many lawyers is to resist the disclosure of client information. In addition, many lawyers are competitive by nature, and the idea of voluntarily disclosing information that might damage a client s case is antithetical to the nature and training of many lawyers. 42 Thus, providing the opposing side with potentially damaging information amounts to the opposite of zealous representation in the eyes of some lawyers and smacks of doing the opposing lawyer s job. 43 Deceptive behavior during the discovery process is most frequently addressed through court-imposed sanctions. 44 Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure list a variety of possible sanctions for discovery abuses, including prohibiting the offending party from introducing evidence, striking pleadings, and dismissing the action. 45 Courts also possess the ability to sanction individual attorneys. 46 In addition, courts possess broad inherent powers to devise their own sanctions to address discovery abuses. 47 Attorneys may also face professional discipline for dishonesty occurring during the discovery process. The disciplinary rules (1996). 39 See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 736 (1998) (concluding that there is consensus that adversary excess including dishonest and hyper-aggressive behavior in discovery is frequent); Ralph C. Losey, Lawyers Behaving Badly: Understanding Unprofessional Conduct in E-Discovery, 60 MERCER L. REV. 983, 1006 (2009) (stating there is high incidence of lawyer misconduct in e-discovery ). 40 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 41 See MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2002). 42 See generally Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers and Bad Decisionmaking: Lessons from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1549, 1552 n.30 (2009) ( As a group, lawyers tend to be more aggressive, competitive and achievement-oriented than the average individual. ). 43 Helen W. Gunnarsson, Law Pulse, 90 ILL. B.J. 62, 62 (2002). 44 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Conflicts of Commitment: Legal Ethics in the Impeachment Context, 52 STAN. L. REV. 269, 304 (2000) ( [B]ar discipline rarely has been imposed for discovery abuse.... ). 45 FED. R. CIV. P FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3). 47 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991); Tew, supra note 13, at 323.

12 424 University of California, Davis [Vol. 44:413 discussed above concerning material misrepresentations to a tribunal, misrepresentations to third parties, and knowingly presenting false evidence 48 all apply with equal force to the discovery process. Thus, lawyers have faced professional discipline under each of these rules for providing deceptive responses to interrogatories and other discovery requests. 49 Lawyers may also face professional discipline and judicial sanctions for engaging in the spoliation or the destruction, alteration, falsification, or concealment of evidence. 50 In addition to some of the more general rules regarding dishonest conduct, several disciplinary rules speak directly to this type of behavior on a lawyer s part. For example, Model Rule 3.4(a) prohibits a lawyer from unlawfully obstructing another party s access to evidence or unlawfully altering, destroying, or concealing a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. 51 Lawyers are also subject to discipline for assisting or counseling clients to engage in such conduct. 52 Spoliation may involve both fraud upon the court and the other party. The wrongdoer may be attempting to deceive the other side into believing that the relevant evidence does not exist or exists only in the form offered. However, because courts base decisions on 48 See supra notes and accompanying text. 49 See In re Shannon, 876 P.2d 548, 552 (Ariz. 1994), modified, 890 P.2d 602 (Ariz. 1994) (disciplining lawyer who changed client s answers to interrogatories before filing them in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(3)); In re Griffith, 800 N.E.2d 259, 264 (Mass. 2003) (involving discipline under state analogue to Rule 4.1(a) for providing deceptive responses to interrogatories); Miss. Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899, 909 (Miss. 1994) (suspending lawyer who provided deceptive answers to interrogatories in effort conceal evidence in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(3)); In re Estrada, 143 P.3d 731, 740 (N.M. 2006) (concluding that lawyer violated state disciplinary rule prohibiting lawyer from engaging, or counseling client to engage, or assisting client, in conduct that... misleads the court by, inter alia, falsely denying plaintiff s request for admission of fact). 50 See generally Loomis v. Ameritech Corp., 764 N.E.2d 658, 662 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (defining spoliation of evidence). 51 MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2002); see also In re Selmer, 568 N.W.2d 702, (Minn. 1997) (suspending lawyer for, inter alia, knowingly offering false evidence during discovery). 52 See MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (prohibiting lawyer from counseling or assisting another person in such conduct); id. R.3.4(b) (prohibiting lawyer from counseling or assisting witness to testify falsely or offering inducement to witness that is prohibited by law); see also id. R.1.2(d) (prohibiting lawyer from counseling client to engage, or assisting client, in conduct that lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent); In re Griffith, 800 N.E.2d at 264 (suspending lawyer who, along with his client, provided deceptive responses to interrogatories).