RECOVERING THE COST OF VISITING AN INJURED PLAINTIFF

Transcription

1 254 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1993) RECOVERING THE COST OF VISITING AN INJURED PLAINTIFF A person who is hospitalized for injuries caused by an accident will probably be visited by members of his family during the period he is in hospital. Can the transport expenses incurred by the injured party s family members be recovered from the tortfeasor responsible for the accident? At first blush, the answer would appear to be No. The expenses are incurred by the injured party s family, and not the injured party himself. It is not the injured party s loss. Nor are the expenses incurred on the injured party s behalf. However, the question was answered in the affirmative by K S Rajah JC recently in his judgment in Leong Kwong Leong Kong Sun v Teng Ching Sin & Singapore Bus Service (1978) Limited 1 (Suit No of 1988) (hereafter referred to as Leong Kwong Sun ) delivered on 8 February There, the plaintiff was allowed to recover as special damages the transport expenses incurred by his family in visiting him in hospital. In so deciding, the Judicial Commissioner is not unsupported by authority. In Malaysia, for instance, the reported cases appear to be unanimous in deciding that such claims are recoverable. But the decision in Leong Kwong Sun does mark a departure from at least 3 Singapore High Court decisions where similar claims were disallowed. 2 What then is the position in Singapore today as regards the recoverability of transport expenses incurred by the injured party s family members? FIRST PRINCIPLES Before dealing with the cases, it would be useful to consider whether, on first principles, claims for transport expenses incurred by the injured party s family members should be recoverable. It is quite clear that the members of the injured party s family have no cause of action against the tortfeasor so as to enable them to recover the transport expenses which they have incurred. The tortfeasor owes no duty to the Digested at [1993] MMD paragraph 420. The 3 decisions, in chronological order, are: 1. Lai Chi Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin [1981] 2 MLJ 167; 2. Toy Ah Lan (m.w.) v Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd [1985] 2 MLJ cxciii; and 3. Chia Ngon Lin & Anor v Ler Boon Seng [1990] BLD paragraph The second of these 3 decisions was referred to by K S Rajah JC in the relevant part of his judgment, but his Honour felt unable to follow it because no reasons were given for disallowing the claim.

2 5 S.Ac.L.J. Recovering the Cost of Visiting an Injured Plaintiff 255 injured party s family members. The decision of Lai Chi Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin 3 illustrates this point. The first plaintiff came from Hong Kong and was studying in Singapore on a scholarship when he was knocked down by the defendant s car. The third plaintiff was the first plaintiff s mother. On being told of the accident, she flew from Hong Kong to Singapore to be with her son. She claimed special damages suffered by her for air fares, accommodation and food, taxi fares and loss of earnings. The defendant submitted that the mother s claim was not recoverable in law. The argument was that the defendant owed a duty only to other persons who are using the road on which he is driving and those whose property may be on or adjoining the road and no other persons. This contention was accepted by F A Chua J, who said: The law as regards the claim of a third party for loss of expense incurred as a result of injury to another person is this. At one time, there was considerable support for the view that a person could sue if he had necessarily incurred expense as a result of the defendant s negligence. So, a parent could sue for expense he had incurred through injuries caused to his child by the defendant s negligence. Following the decision in Receiver for the Metropolitan Police District v Croydon Corporation 4 the earlier view must be considered erroneous and those cases in support of it wrongly decided. Therefore, in the normal run of cases, a third party will have no direct remedy against the wrong-doer. 5 This is reinforced by the decision of the majority of the Court of Appeal in Ang Eng Lee & Anor v Lim Lye Soon. 6 The first plaintiff, an eight year old infant, was knocked down and injured by a lorry driven by the defendant. Suing by his father and next friend, he brought this action against the defendant claiming damages for negligence. Joined as the second plaintiff was his father, who claimed damages for loss and expenses incurred on account of the injuries sustained by the first plaintiff. L P Thean J, who delivered the judgment of the majority of the Court of Appeal, said: The second plaintiff claimed against the defendant the sum of $1,453 as special damages incurred on account of the injuries sustained by the 1st plaintiff. These are loss and expenses of the first plaintiff and not the second plaintiff. The second plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant.... [T]he loss and expenses set out in the statement of claim, if proved, are those of the first plaintiff and he is entitled to recover them in this [1981] 2 MLJ 167. [1957] 2 QB 154. Id, page 171. [1987] 2 MLJ 545.

3 256 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1993) action; they arose out of his need for the services which in this case were paid for by the second plaintiff. But the second plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant and ought not to have been joined in the first place. 7 If the family members of the injured party are unable to sue the tortfeasor directly for the expenses which they have incurred, it would seem anomalous that they should be able to recover the same sums by the back door through the injured party. The anomaly is compounded by the fact that the transport expenses are incurred not by the injured party but by his family members. There is no pecuniary loss incurred by the injured party. Of course, if the injured party is the sole breadwinner, the transport expenses incurred during the visits by his wife and children are arguably the injured party s loss, since he is the provider of the funds. But apart from this exceptional situation, it is difficult to fathom how the transport expenses incurred by the injured party s family members can be construed as an item of special damage suffered by the injured party. Nevertheless, there is a considerable amount of authority for saying that a plaintiff may recover as special damages the transport expenses incurred by his family in visiting him in hospital. The author proposes to deal with the position in England, Australia and Malaysia before discussing the local cases. THE ENGLISH POSITION The English practitioner s textbook Kemp & Kemp 8 states: The reasonable cost of visits to a plaintiff in hospital will usually be recovered. 9 It cites as authority Kirkham v Boughey 10 and Olsen v Demolition Co Ltd. 11 Kirkham v Boughey deserves some detailed discussion as K S Rajah JC quoted extensively from it in Leong Kwong Sun. This will be done in the course of the discussion on Leong Kwong Sun. For the present purposes, it suffices to note that Diplock J said in Kirkham v Boughey: Visits by a spouse may well be a factor in the recovery of a patient, and a visit to a wife in hospital may thus be a proper step in mitigating the damage sustained by loss of consortium by reducing the period during which the consortium is lost. But if the sole justification for the visit is the comfort or pleasure which it gives to the wife, then I think it is not recoverable. 12 Id, pages 547 to 548. Kemp & Kemp, The Quantum of Damages (Revised Edition). Id, Volume 1 at paragraph 5-008/6. [1958] 2 QB 338. Olsen v Demolition and Construction Co Ltd (unreported), 21 October 1957, noted in Kemp & Kemp, The Quantum of Damages (Second Edition) Volume 1 at page 361. [1958] 2 QB 338 at page 343.

4 5 S.Ac.L.J. Recovering the Cost of Visiting an Injured Plaintiff 257 Diplock J s comments must be read in their context. The statements were made in response to the submission that husbands are frequently awarded, as part of their damages for injuries to their wives, the cost of visiting the wife in hospital. The damages in respect of transport expenses are awarded to the husband, not the injured wife, in respect of his claim for the wrong done to his quasi-proprietary interest in the consortium of his wife. Nevertheless, in Olsen v Demolition Co Ltd, Ashworth J, after quoting Diplock J s statement that Visits by a spouse may well be a factor in the recovery of a patient, said: I have no doubt that Mrs Olsen s visits to the plaintiff were an important element in his recovery, which would have been very much slower in their absence. I regard the cost as an expense reasonably incurred by him in the process of recovery and as such the items can properly be claimed from the defendants. Although the point was not argued, it may be that these expenses could properly be regarded as necessaries for which the plaintiff was prima facie responsible. 13 Another case which should be considered is that of Donnelly v Joyce. 14 The plaintiff was an infant suing by his father and next friend. The special damages claimed comprised 3 items: travelling expenses of his parents to and from hospital; cost of special socks and boots made necessary by his injuries; and 2 years loss of wages incurred by his mother while caring for him. The trial judge awarded damages in respect of all 3 items. The defendant appealed against the award in respect of the third item. The English Court of Appeal held that the third item was the plaintiff s loss, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover that loss. In delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Megaw LJ said: The defendant has not... challenged the validity of, or the entitlement of the plaintiff to recover in this action, the first two items of the particulars of special damage... The defendant, indeed, agreed the amount on both those heads, assuming... that the defendant was liable at all. Yet these amounts both represent payments made by the father or mother, or both, out of their own pockets, for the benefit of the infant, rendered necessary by the defendant s fault. In what relevant respect do these items of special damage differ, so far as concerns the right of the plaintiff See Kemp & Kemp, The Quantum of Damages (Second Edition) Volume 1 at page 364. Alternatively, see Kemp & Kemp, The Quantum of Damages (Revised Edition) Volume 1 at paragraph 5-008/6 footnote 35. [1974] 1 QB 454.

5 258 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1993) to recover them in this action in which he alone is the plaintiff, from the item of money lost by the mother in order to give nursing attention to her infant son necessitated by the defendant s wrongdoing? If the defendant is right in contending that this latter item is not recoverable in this action because the mother has not been joined as a plaintiff, how are the first two items recoverable? The suggested principle applies equally to all the items. The mother s loss of wages can properly be treated, for the purpose of the principle now in issue, as though it were of an identical nature with the payments covered by the other two items. We do not agree with the proposition... that the plaintiff s claim... is properly to be regarded as being... in relation to someone else s loss, merely because someone else has provided to, or for the benefit of, the plaintiff the injured person the money, or the services to be valued as money, to provide for needs of the plaintiff directly caused by the defendant s wrongdoing. The loss is the plaintiff s loss. The question from what source the plaintiff s needs have been met, the question who has paid the money or given the services, the question whether or not the plaintiff is or is not under a legal or moral liability to repay, are, so far as the defendant and his liability are concerned, all irrelevant. The plaintiff s loss... is not the expenditure of money to buy the special boots or to pay for the nursing attention. His loss is the existence for the need for those special boots or for those nursing services, the value of which for purposes of damages for the purpose of the ascertainment of the amount of his loss is the proper and reasonable cost of supplying those needs. 15 (emphasis added) Thus Donnelly v Joyce articulates the basis for the plaintiff s recovery of transport expenses incurred by his family in visiting him in hospital. The plaintiff s loss is the need for the visits by his family. The expenses were incurred for the benefit of the injured party and were rendered necessary by the defendant s fault. The amount of the plaintiff s loss is to be quantified by the proper and reasonable cost of supplying his need for his family to visit him in hospital, i.e. the value of the transport expenses incurred by the plaintiff s family in visiting him. THE AUSTRALIAN POSITION The leading Australian case is Wilson v McLeay, 16 a decision of Taylor J sitting as a single Judge in the High Court of Australia. The plaintiff, a Queensland resident, was seriously injured in a motor-car accident while holidaying in Sydney. Her parents travelled by air from Queensland to Id, pages 461 to 462. (1961) 106 CLR 523.

6 5 S.Ac.L.J. Recovering the Cost of Visiting an Injured Plaintiff 259 Sydney to visit her in hospital. She claimed special damages of 267 5s. for expenses incurred by her parents for aeroplane fares and accommodation in Sydney. Taylor J said: [A] plaintiff s entitlement to damages accrues when he is injured by the negligence of the defendant. And if an assessment of damages were then to be made it would... be proper, in a case such as the present, to make some allowance to permit the plaintiff to provide for the reasonable attendance of her parents. She was in hospital many hundreds of miles from home, her injuries were serious and such as to call for such comfort and consolation as her parents reasonable attention could provide. Of course, if at the trial it appeared that no expenditure for that purpose had, in fact, been incurred no allowance should be made. But that is not the position in the present case and the assessment of general damages should include some allowance on this account.... [A]ccording to the medical evidence, it was of some importance in the alleviation of her condition that she should have the comfort and assistance of her parents.... I do not think the claim under this head should be quantified merely by taking the precise amount of the expenditure incurred; I think it will be sufficient to add to the amounts already specified the sum of (emphasis added) In reaching his decision, Taylor J found support in the unreported case of Morgan v Hosking. 18 He said: That was a case where a young girl, fifteen years of age, was so badly injured that she was left an inert paralysed wreck and it was likely that the constant and expert nursing which she needed would require her confinement to hospital for the rest of her life. In dealing with the question of damages this Court considered that she should be in a position to pay the expenses of the constant visits of her parents which, as the evidence shows, mean so much to her. Her parents visits were no doubt considered to constitute part of the care and attention rendered necessary by the consequences of the defendant s negligence. 19 (emphasis added) The legal position in Australia after Wilson v McLeay is neatly summarized in the headnote to the case, which states: The expenses of the visits of parents to a daughter seriously ill in hospital are not allowable as special damages in an action by the daughter for damages for personal injuries received by her in a motorcar accident, but in an appropriate case the necessity for some such Id, pages 527 to 528. Morgan v Hosking (unreported), 15 December 1960 (High Court of Australia, per Kitto, Menzies and Windeyer JJ). (1961) 106 CLR 523 at pages 527 to 528.

7 260 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1993) expenditure may be taken into consideration in assessing general damages and a sum, not quantified merely by taking the precise amount of such expenses, may be added to the general damages in respect thereof. (emphasis added) As in England, the test for recoverability of the expenses is the necessity for the expenditure. However, in Australia, such expenses are not recovered as an item of special damages by the injured party. Instead, a sum is added to the general damages to provide for reasonable attendance by the family of the injured party, where it is of some importance in the alleviation of his condition that he should have the comfort and assistance of his family. The basis for recovery is that the visits constitute part of the care and attention rendered necessary by the consequences of the defendant s negligence. The following Australian State Supreme Court decisions bear this out. In particular, they highlight the need for evidence that the visits played a part in the injured party s recovery. In Curator of Estates of Deceased Persons & Rozario v Fernandez 20 a decision of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, the first plaintiff was the administrator of the estate of the deceased while the second plaintiff was the deceased s widow. The deceased s injuries in the accident resulted in quadriplegia and other medical complications which could have been fatal. The medical evidence was that it was necessary or at least highly desirable in the deceased s interest that his wife and children should be with him. The surgeon stated that [T]he only way a quadriplegic survives is by the most tremendous effort to make use of what is left to him.... [T]he most important single factor in survival is the morale of the patient.... [T]he presence of close relatives... would be of considerable value in maintaining this morale give him something to live for in fact. Ward J held, on the authority of inter alia Wilson v McLeay and Donnelly v Joyce, that the first plaintiff was entitled to recover as part of the general damages the reasonable expenses of the wife and children in visiting the deceased (while he was alive) and attending at his bedside. In Richardson v Schultz, 21 a decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia, the plaintiff suffered severe brain damage in a road accident and was removed to the hospital unconscious, and remained unconscious in a serious condition for some weeks. During that time, her parents made regular visits to the hospital to see her, but she was unable to recognise them. After recovering consciousness, she was transferred to rehabilitation wards and her parents continued to visit her there. Williams J decided that the cost of visits by relatives to a patient in a hospital should be allowed as damages only when the visits were of some importance in the alleviation of the patient s condi (1977) 16 ALR 445. (1980) 25 SASR 1.

8 5 S.Ac.L.J. Recovering the Cost of Visiting an Injured Plaintiff 261 tion, and as it was not proved that the parents visits during the period she was unconscious could or did help her to pull through and eventually regain consciousness, no allowance was made, in assessing the general damages, for the parents visits during this period. However, although there was no direct evidence that the visits of the plaintiff s parents to see her at the rehabilitation wards helped to alleviate her condition, having regard to the fact that she was only 16 years of age, the Judge decided that the probabilities were that they did help to alleviate her condition, in the sense of providing her with comfort and encouragement. So he allowed the reasonable costs of the visits of her parents to the rehabilitation wards. In Hunter & Others v Scott & Another, 22 a decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Gibbs J, having considered Wilson v McLeay, stated that the authorities support the view that when a wife is injured and her husband s visits to her constitute part of the care and attention rendered necessary by her injuries, or, to put it in another way, contribute to her recovery, the expenses of the visits may be taken into account in assessing the wife s damages. 23 The Judge added that the wife could not recover, unless it can be shown that the visits of the husband, or children, as the case may be, were necessary to assist the wife s recovery, (emphasis added) In the case before him, as there was no evidence that [the husband s] subsequent continued presence in Brisbane played any part in [the wife s] recovery and there was a similar lack of evidence in relation to the visits of the children, no allowance was made, in assessing the wife s damages, in respect of those visits. 24 THE MALAYSIAN POSITION Unlike the Australian courts, in the reported or digested decisions, the Malaysian courts have invariably allowed the injured party to recover as part of his special damages the expenses incurred by his family in visiting him in hospital. However, the basis for recovery is far from clear. Often, no reasons are given for allowing the claim. The cases will be discussed in chronological sequence. In Tay Siew Goh v Tay Tian Soo, 25 Gill J allowed $175 for the transport expenses of the plaintiff s parents and other relatives to visit her in the hospitals. The Judge did not restrict the class of relatives in respect of whom the plaintiff was entitled to recover transport expenses for their visits. Nor did he say why such special damages were recoverable [1963] Qd R 77. Id, page 87. Id, page 88. [1965] 1 MLJ 21.

9 262 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1993) In Wong Kong v Yee Hup Transport Co & Ors, 26 MacIntyre J allowed the plaintiff to recover the sum claimed for travelling expenses incurred by the plaintiff s wife to visit him daily in hospital. The Judge reasoned that the presence of the wife in hospital was not required for the purpose of performing her wifely or her domestic duties but to assist the hospital staff in nursing her husband since he was bedridden and forced to lie on his back and required extra assistance. In fact, the plaintiff had deposed that he was asked by a nurse in the hospital to employ an assistant to look after him and the surgeon who attended on him confirmed that bedridden patients were allowed to be attended by their relatives. Besides, the psychological effect of the wife s presence [helped] to achieve a speedy recovery and thus [reduce] the quantum of damages. The Judge felt that as the plaintiff was bedridden, this necessitated the presence of his wife in hospital. 27 The case is therefore consistent with the English and Australian authorities, although it is not clear from the judgment what evidence, if any, was led as to how the psychological effect of the wife s presence assisted in the plaintiff s recovery. In Lim Kiat Boon & Ors v Lim Sen Kong & Anor, 28 transport expenses for the plaintiff s wife and children to visit him in hospital was allowed as an item of agreed special damages. In Mohamed Ibrahim & Anor v Christopher Piff & Anor, 29 a decision of the Malaysian Federal Court, the second respondent, a school girl, was injured in a road accident caused by the appellants negligence. Her injuries required treatment in London. The trial judge awarded as special damages: (1) the cost of the air passage for her entire family from Kuala Lumpur to London; and (2) the cost of the return passage for the whole family from London to Kuala Lumpur. These expenses were treated as home leave passage and were paid for by the employers of the second respondent s father. As such, the appellants contended, these items should be disallowed altogether. In the alternative, the award should be reduced as only one parent need accompany the ailing child. The Federal Court dismissed the appeal. The Court felt that the family had sacrificed the pleasures of a real home leave, as the parents at least must have spent a considerable period of their stay hovering around their ailing daughter. Further, the second respondent s family had effected some economies by obviating the need for additional household help, which would have been necessary if only the mother had accompanied the second respondent to England. Wan Suleiman FJ, who delivered the judgment of the Court, concluded: In short, what the 1st respondent [i.e. the second respondent s father] and his family did was equivalent to his taking the money his employers [1966] 2 MLJ 234. Id, page 239. [1980] 2 MLJ 39. [1981] 1 MLJ 221.

10 5 S.Ac.L.J. Recovering the Cost of Visiting an Injured Plaintiff 263 had set aside for the home leave passage and spending that sum to accompany the daughter home in order to get her more specialised medical treatment, the journey having become necessary because of the act of negligence on the part of appellants. The respondents were entitled to reimbursement as if the money had come from their own pockets, and there was no need for respondents to undertake to refund such sum to the provider... in order to be entitled to recover. Wan Suleiman FJ cautioned that the case should not be seized upon as authority for the proposition that a whole family should be entitled to claim air fare to accompany an injured member to another country for medical treatment. He then cited in support of this statement the following passage from Kemp & Kemp: No useful purpose would be served by citing an extended list of cases in which particular types of expenses have been held to be recoverable. In every case the court must decide whether it would be reasonable to incur the particular expense; that is a question of fact and degree to be determined on the facts of the particular case. 30 (emphasis added) A few things may be said about the Mohamed Ibrahim case. It is not clear from the judgment whether the Court considered it necessary for the second respondent s recovery that her entire family should accompany her to England. The argument turned on whether, with the second respondent in a coma, it was reasonable that both parents should be entitled to accompany her. The approach adopted by the Federal Court in deciding whether to allow recovery of the transport expenses incurred by the injured party s family appears simply to be: whether it would be reasonable to incur the particular expense. A similar approach was adopted in Chan Kim Hee v Karam Singh & Anor. 31 There, Yusof Abdul Rashid J allowed the plaintiff to recover the transport expenses incurred by the members of his family during their visits to see him in hospital because it was reasonable for them to visit him while he was hospitalised and it was reasonable for them to have made the number of trips which they in fact did. As with the Mohamed Ibrahim case, the Judge was concerned mainly with whether the expenditure was reasonably incurred, and not whether it was necessary for the plaintiff s recovery. In Chan Lye Huat v Tan Ong Kong, 32 the court awarded as agreed special damages a sum of $400 for transport and food for the appellant s family to visit him in hospital. In Soo Wai Seng v Tan Kim Lock, 33 Eusoff Chin J stated that had the plaintiff Id, page 222. [1981] 2 MLJ 273. [1985] 2 MLJ 112. [1986] 2 MLJ 61.

11 264 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1993) succeeded in his claim, he would have awarded as special damages for the plaintiff the expenses incurred by the plaintiff s father in visiting the plaintiff 3 times per week during the period the plaintiff was in hospital. Other cases where similar claims for transport expenses were allowed as special damages include: Koh Hak Eng v Nadarajan & Anar 34 (transport expenses for plaintiff s parents); Zulkafle bin Zainal v Kan Choong Beng 35 (transport expenses incurred by the plaintiff s wife and members of his family); Shlvanathan v Chang Chong Foo & Anor 36 (transport expenses for plaintiff s family); and Kasirin bin Kasmani v The Official Administrator and/or the personal representative of the estate of Low Kiew Meng, deceased 37 (transport and living expenses of plaintiff s wife, who resided at the place where plaintiff was hospitalized). The Malaysian position appears to be far more relaxed than the position in England or Australia. The Malaysian courts seem to have accepted that transport expenses incurred by the plaintiff s family in visiting him in hospital are recoverable as a matter of course, subject only to their being reasonably incurred. Unlike in England or Australia, the Malaysian courts do not appear to require the visits to be a factor in the recovery of the plaintiff. THE SINGAPORE CASES PRIOR TO LEONG KWONG SUN The earliest Singapore case on this point appears to be the High Court decision in Lai Chi Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin, 38 which was referred to earlier. The first plaintiff came from Hong Kong and was studying in Singapore on a scholarship when he was knocked down by the defendant s car. The third plaintiff was the first plaintiff s mother. On being told of the accident, she flew from Hong Kong to Singapore to be with her son. She claimed for special damages suffered by her for air fares, accommodation and food, taxi fares and loss of earnings. The defendant submitted that the mother s claim was not recoverable in law. His argument was that the defendant owed a duty only to other persons who are using the road on which he is driving and those whose property may be on or adjoining the road and no others. This contention, that the third plaintiff had no right of action, was accepted by F A Chua J, who said: The law as regards the claim of a third party for loss of expense incurred as a result of injury to another person is this.... in the normal [1991] MMD paragraph 58. [1991] MMD paragraph 758. [1991] MMD paragraph 874. [1991] MMD paragraph [1981] 2 MLJ 167.

12 5 S.Ac.L.J. Recovering the Cost of Visiting an Injured Plaintiff 265 run of cases, a third party will have no direct remedy against the wrongdoer. 39 The plaintiffs counsel submitted in the alternative that the first plaintiff could recover the travelling and other expenses and the loss of earnings of his mother, relying on the English Court of Appeal decision in Donnelly v Joyce. 40 He submitted that the mother s loss was in fact the first plaintiff s loss because of the existence of the need for companionship of his mother. Chua J nevertheless disallowed the first plaintiff s claim, reasoning as follows: I am of the view that Donnelly s case does not help Lai. There is no medical evidence that there was a need for the companionship of the mother for the rehabilitation of Lai. The medical evidence I have is that the companionship of the mother went a great way towards his rehabilitation. Even then there is no evidence in what way the companionship of the mother had helped towards the rehabilitation of Lai.... I don t think one can really say that the companionship helped towards the rehabilitation of Lai. 41 The decision in Lai Chi Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin is significant for two reasons. First, it prohibits in the normal run of cases a member of an injured party s family from recovering in his own name damages in respect of the transport expenses which he incurred in visiting the injured party in hospital. Second, while the decision does not expressly prohibit an injured plaintiff from recovering as special damages the transport expenses incurred by his family in visiting him, it does make his task extremely onerous. The decision requires the plaintiff to establish that the presence of the family members at the hospital was necessary for the plaintiff s rehabilitation. It further requires the plaintiff to establish the manner in which the presence of the family members at the hospital in fact contributed towards the rehabilitation. Thus, although the medical evidence before the Judge was to the effect that the companionship of the plaintiff s mother went a great way towards his rehabilitation, Chua J nevertheless held that: There is no medical evidence that there was a need for the companionship of the mother for the rehabilitation of Lai.... there is no evidence in what way the companionship of the mother had helped towards the rehabilitation of Lai. (emphasis added) However, in Harry Seah Hong Meng v Tan Siow Cher 42 also a Singapore High Court decision, Sinnathuray J awarded the plaintiff as special damages the sum of $1, for transport for visits by his family while he was a Id, page 171. [1974] 1 QB 454. [1981] 2 MLJ 167 at page 172. [1984] 2 MLJ xxix.

13 266 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1993) patient at the hospital. 43 The Judge did not give reasons for the award. The court file does not contain a bundle of authorities, and it is possible that Lai Chi Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin was not cited to the Judge. In Tay Ah Lan (m.w.) v Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd, 44 the Assistant Registrar of the Supreme Court awarded as part of the special damages the sum of $ for transport expenses for the plaintiff s husband to visit her whilst she was in hospital. He made the award notwithstanding that Lai Chi Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin was cited to him for the proposition that Third party s expenses cannot claim. 45 On appeal, Wee Chong Jin CJ disallowed this claim. The reasons for his Honour s decision are not apparent from the digest of the case in the Malayan Law Journal or the court file, but it is likely that Lai Chi Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin was cited to him in the course of arguments. In Chia Ngon Lin & Anor v Ler Boon Seng, 46 the Deputy Registrar of the Supreme Court awarded as special damages the sum of $1,500 for transport expenses for the plaintiff s family. The authorities cited to him included Lai Chi Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin, Donnelly v Joyce, and Harry Seah Hong Meng v Tan Siow Cher. On appeal, the same authorities were cited and Chan Sek Keong J disallowed the award for transport expenses of the plaintiff s family members. In his unreported judgment dated 12 April 1990, Chan J stated: The complaint against [the $1,500 award for transport expenses for the plaintiff s family] is that there is no medical evidence that the visits of the family members have benefited the plaintiff in the sense that they assisted in the rehabilitation of the plaintiff: see Chua J in LAI CHI KAY v LEE KUO SHIN [1981] 2 MLJ 167. I agree. Moreover, as these are special damages, they have to be proved. There is no evidence as to how that sum was incurred and by which family members. This passage suggests that Chan J accepted that in principle a plaintiff in a personal injury case can recover as special damages the transport expenses incurred by his family. That certainly appears to be the interpretation which the Judge placed on Lai Chi Kay s case. However, as in Lai Chi Kay s case, the obstacle is that of proof. There must be medical evidence that the visits The digest found at [1984] 2 MLJ xxix is incorrect in so far as it states that the plaintiff was allowed the sum of $11, as special damages for Transport - visits by family. The author has ascertained from a perusal of the court file that a total of $11, was awarded as special damages, of which the award for transport expenses for the plaintiff s family formed only a component. Although the sum of $1, was claimed under the plaintiff s Statement of Claim, it appears that a revised figure of $1, was submitted to the Judge at the trial. [1985] 2 MLJ cxciii. Lai Chi Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin was cited in the Assistant Registrar s Notes of Evidence in the court file. [1990] BLD paragraph 1019.

14 5 S.Ac.L.J. Recovering the Cost of Visiting an Injured Plaintiff 267 of the family members have benefited the plaintiff in the sense that the presence of the family members assisted in the rehabilitation of the plaintiff. The Judge also imposed an additional requirement the plaintiff must lead evidence as to how the sum claimed was incurred and by which family members. Therefore, on hindsight, it would appear that the decision in Leong Kwong Sun, that in principle a plaintiff can recover as special damages the transport expenses incurred by his family in visiting him in hospital, is not as remarkable as it originally seemed. Although similar claims were refused in at least 3 Singapore High Court decisions, it can be argued that the claims were refused, not because such claims are not recoverable in principle, but simply because those claims were not proved. The fact that such a claim was allowed in at least one Singapore High Court decision underscores this point, although no reasons were given for that award. Reference may also be made to the decision of the majority of the Court of Appeal in Ang Eng Lee & Anor v Lim Lye Soon, 47 which was discussed earlier. The largest component of the special damages of $1,453 claimed by the second plaintiff was $ for transport to and from Alexandra Hospital on visits [during the period the first plaintiff was hospitalized] at $16/- [per trip] for 50 trips. 48 L P Thean J, who delivered the majority decision, stated that the special damages claimed by the second plaintiff were loss and expenses of the first plaintiff and not the second plaintiff. The Judge further observed that the loss and expenses set out in the statement of claim, if proved, are those of the first plaintiff and he is entitled to recover them in this action; they arose out of his need for the services which in this case were paid for by the second plaintiff. 49 THE DECISION IN LEONG KWONG SUN We now turn to the judgment of K S Rajah JC in Leong Kwong Sun. The facts are immaterial for the purposes of this discussion, save to note that the Judicial Commissioner awarded, inter alia, the sum of $2, for transport expenses incurred by the plaintiff s family members when visiting him while he was warded in hospital, and a further sum of $ for transport expenses to be incurred by his family members for visits to the hospital in the future. The defendants argued that in principle, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover special damages in respect of the transport expenses incurred by his family when visiting him in hospital. For this proposition, the defendants [1987] 2 MLJ 545. See page 52 of the Record of Appeal in Ang Eng Lee & Anor v Lim Lye Soon, Civil Appeal 42 of [1987] 2 MLJ 545 at pages 547 to 548.

15 268 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1993) counsel relied on Tay Ah Lan (m.w.) v Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd 50 and Leong Lai Mun v Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd. 51 The parties agreed however that if the plaintiff was entitled to recover the transport expenses incurred by his family, then the amount to be awarded should be $2, Tay Ah Lan (m.w.) v Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd has already been discussed. There, the Assistant Registrar of the Supreme Court awarded as part of the special damages the sum of $ for transport expenses for the plaintiff s husband to visit her whilst she was in hospital. On appeal, Wee Chong Jin CJ disallowed this claim. In Leong Lai Mun v Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd, the Deputy Registrar of the Subordinate Courts while awarding the plaintiff as special damages $1, for transport expenses, disallowed the plaintiff s claim for transport expenses incurred by her mother to visit her whilst in hospital. K S Rajah JC began countering the defendants contention by referring to 3 cases where the contrary conclusion was reached, namely: Shlvanathan v Chang Chong Foo & Anor, 52 Chua Poh Suan v Samad bin Saban, 53 and Harry Seah Hong Meng v Tan Siow Cher. 54 In Shlvanathan v Chang Chong Foo & Anor, the Malaysian High Court awarded as special damages M$800 for transport expenses for plaintiff s family while he was in hospital and M$10 for transport for family visiting plaintiff at specialist hospital. In Chua Poh Suan v Samad bin Saban, a Singapore District Court decision, the parties agreed on special damages of $1,000 for travelling expenses incurred by plaintiff and parents. In the Singapore High Court decision of Harry Seah Hong Meng v Tan Siow Cher, Sinnathuray J awarded the plaintiff as a component of the special damages the sum of $1, for transport visits by family. 55 K S Rajah JC then referred to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Wilson v McLeay, 56 where Taylor J felt able to award substantial damages [1985] 2 MLJ cxciii. [1991] MMD paragraph 284. [1991] MMD paragraph 874. [1991] MMD paragraph [1984] 2 MLJ xxix. The digest found at [1984] 2 MLJ xxix is incorrect in so far as it states that the plaintiff was allowed the sum of $11, as special damages for Transport - visits by family. The author has ascertained from a perusal of the court file that a total of $11, was awarded as special damages, of which the award for transport expenses for the plaintiff s family formed only a component. Although the sum of $1, was claimed under the plaintiff s Statement of Claim, it appears that a revised figure of $1, was submitted to the Judge at the trial. (1961) 106 CLR 523.

16 5 S.Ac.L.J. Recovering the Cost of Visiting an Injured Plaintiff 269 to the plaintiff daughter in respect of the expenses of her parents visits to her in hospital... as it was of some importance in the alleviation of her condition that she should have the comfort and assistance of her parents. 57 The final authority on which K S Rajah JC relied was the decision of Diplock J in Kirkham v Boughey. 58 Of this decision, his Honour said: In Kirkham v Boughey [1958] 2 QB 338, Diplock J considered the objection taken to visits to the wife as an item of special damages on the ground that visits to the wife are not recoverable as being damnum absque injuria, i.e. loss, hurt or harm without injury in the legal sense, there being no breach of duty redressible by an action and a loss which does not give rise to an action for damages as being too remote. His Lordship was of the view that the husband of an injured wife is in a different position from any other relative. He said (p. 342):... He is in the position of one whose property is on, or in proximity to, the highway, and it is for the damage to his proprietary right, the comfort and services of his wife, that he has a remedy.... the husband is entitled to recover... It would, I suppose, be possible to relate this to consortium as money expended in mitigating his damage under that head. Alternatively,... in the husband s legal duty to provide proper maintenance and comfort for his wife.... I prefer this explanation, which would extend, not merely to a husband, but to the parent of an injured infant, although here again there may be vestiges of a proprietary right in the parent. And at p. 343: Mr Harington has, however, pressed upon me two matters. First he says it is well known that husbands are frequently awarded, as part of their damages for injuries to their wives, the cost of visiting the wife in hospital, and such damages have been claimed, and, indeed, agreed, in this case. As I have said, I do not know how the agreed figure of special damage was made up. It was done at my urging to save costs and it would be quite wrong to regard this agreement as conceding that the cost of a husband s visit to hospital was recoverable in law. But I see no difficulty in reconciling the recovery of this item with the principle which I have already discussed. Visits by a spouse may well be a factor in the recovery of a patient, and a visit to a wife in hospital may thus be a proper It is respectfully submitted that K S Rajah JC was incorrect when he identified this case as Morgan v Hosking, which is an earlier unreported decision on which Taylor J relied in Wilson v McLeay. [1958] 2 QB 338.

17 270 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1993) step in mitigating the damage sustained by loss of consortium by reducing the period during which the consortium is lost. But if the sole justification for the visit is the comfort or pleasure which it gives to the wife, then I think it is not recoverable. K S Rajah JC then observed, in relation to his award of $ for transport expenses to be incurred by family members to visits to hospital in the future : The plaintiff will have to undergo future surgery.... If the expenses incurred by the wife and the children for visits in the future can be recovered, there can be no good reason for refusing the claim for transport charges. The dispute is over the principle and the multiplier of 5 years for future visits. In making this statement, the Judicial Commissioner appears to have taken the view that the defendants had conceded that the expenses incurred by the plaintiff s wife and children for visits in the future can be recovered, and that the only dispute was over the multiplier to be applied for such future visits. However, the defendants, who have appealed to the Court of Appeal, contend in their Petition of Appeal that the learned Judge erred in fact that the [defendants] have agreed to expenses incurred by the wife and children for visits in the future when this was not so and what was agreed was for visits for the [plaintiff] himself. K S Rajah JC concluded this part of the judgment as follows: Upon the solemnization of marriage, the husband and wife are mutually bound to co-operate with each other in safeguarding the interests of the union and caring for the children. (See s. 45 Women s Charter Cap 353). Applying the principle as stated by Diplock J to the facts of this case, I find the visits were a factor in the recovery of the plaintiff and is clearly recoverable. Recovery is also consistent with the statutory duty placed on spouses by the Women s Charter. The then learned Chief Justice gave no reasons for disallowing the claim and I am unable to follow the decisions on which the defendant relied. It appears therefore that K S Rajah JC reached his conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to recover as special damages the transport expenses incurred by his family members in visiting him based on the following reasons: 1. There are precedents where such claims were allowed; 2. The principle as stated by Diplock J in Kirkham v Boughey was applicable to the facts of this case, so as to allow recovery of the expenses incurred in the visits; 3. The visits by the plaintiff s family members were a factor in the recovery of the plaintiff;

18 5 S.Ac.L.J. Recovering the Cost of Visiting an Injured Plaintiff Recovery was consistent with the statutory duty placed on spouses by s 45(1) Women s Charter (Cap 353) to co-operate with each other in safeguarding the interests of the union and caring for the children; and No reasons were given for disallowing such claims in the cases relied on by the defendants. COMMENTARY ON LEONG KWONG SUN Precedents The first and fifth grounds relied upon by K S Rajah JC in Leong Kwong Sun are inter-related, and best dealt with together. It is significant to note that while the defendants in this case questioned the plaintiff s entitlement to recover the transport expenses incurred by his family, there was little argument before the Judicial Commissioner on the authorities, in particular the Singapore cases, where this point has been considered. Indeed, his Honour observed: Michael F. Rutter in his work Handbook on Damages for Personal Injuries and Death in Singapore and Malaysia (1988) has cited (at p. 174) a long list of cases where transportation was considered as a recoverable item for pre-trial and post-trial pecuniary loss. Cases where the court held it was not recoverable are also given. In this case, the principle was questioned but cases for and against the award were not examined. The importance of Leong Kwong Sun as a statement of the law in Singapore would certainly have been enhanced had all the relevant authorities been cited. As the Judicial Commissioner rightly pointed out, no reasons were given for disallowing the claim in both of the Singapore decisions relied on by the defendants. The mere fact that a claim is disallowed does not necessarily mean that it is not recoverable in principle. The claim may have been refused because the plaintiff has failed to prove the particular head of special damage in the manner required by the court. As the earlier discussion on the Singapore cases shows, this may well have been the reason why the plaintiff s claim for transport expenses incurred by his family failed in both Lai Chi Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin and Chia Ngon Lin & Anor v Ler Boon Seng. The very fact that such a claim was allowed by the High Court in Harry Seah Hong Meng v Tan Siow Cher suggests that such special damages are recoverable in principle. The cases of Tay Ah Lan (m.w.) v Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd and Leong Lai Mun v Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd do not necessarily stand for the proposition advanced by the defendants.

19 272 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1993) The Judicial Commissioner s reliance on Shlvanathan v Chang Chong Foo & Anor, Chua Poh Suan v Samad bin Saban, Harry Seah Hong Meng v Tan Siow Cher and Wilson v McLeay is unexceptional. However, it should be noted that in the first three cases, no reasons were given for awarding special damages in respect of the transport expenses incurred by the plaintiff s family, and that the second case is very weak authority for the Judicial Commissioner s proposition, since the parties had agreed that the travelling expenses incurred by plaintiff and parents were recoverable. The Principle in Kirkham v Boughey In contrast, K S Rajah JC s reliance on Kirkham v Boughey 59 is difficult to understand. The Judicial Commissioner does not clearly identify what he considers to be the principle in Kirkham v Boughey. When the passages cited by the Judicial Commissioner are seen in their proper context, it is difficult to see how any principle to be derived from Kirkham v Boughey would actually apply to Leong Kwong Sun. In fact, the case does not actually deal with an objection taken to visits to the wife as an item of special damages at all. In Kirkham v Boughey, the plaintiffs, husband and wife, sustained injuries as a result of a motor accident caused by the defendant s negligence. The wife sustained severe injuries and had to be detained in hospital. The husband s injuries were trivial and he could have returned to work in Africa, but chose instead to take up employment in England at a much lower wage because of his anxiety for his wife and the problem of caring for their children. The husband claimed damages, inter alia, for loss of earnings but not for loss of consortium. The defendant argued that the damages claimed under the head of loss of earnings were not recoverable, even if the plaintiff s course of action was reasonable. He argued that the driver of a vehicle on a public highway owes a duty to take reasonable care only to those whose persons or property are in geographical proximity to the driver. Diplock J agreed. He felt that however commendable may be the sacrifice made by the relative of an injured person in giving up lucrative employment to nurse the injured person to health, that person has no remedy in law against the driver of the vehicle which caused the injuries, because the driver owes no duty to the relative. 60 Diplock J went on to comment that the husband of an injured wife was, however, in a different position from any other relative: [T]he common law recognizes his right, in the nature of a proprietary right, to consortium, and to this extent the circle of those to whom the [1958] 2 QB 338. Id, pages 341 to 342.

20 5 S.Ac.L.J. Recovering the Cost of Visiting an Injured Plaintiff 273 driver of a vehicle on the highway owes a duty is widened to include the husband of a married woman who is present on the highway. The husband... is in the position of one whose property is on, or in proximity to, the highway, and it is for the damage to his proprietary right, the comfort and services of his wife, that he has a remedy.... [T]he husband is entitled to recover the cost of medical treatment, convalescence, etc. It would, I suppose, be possible to relate this to consortium as money expended in mitigating his damage under that head. Alternatively... the claim may lie in the husband s legal duty to provide proper maintenance and comfort for his wife.... I prefer this explanation, which would extend, not merely to a husband, but to the parent of an injured infant, although here again there may be vestiges of a proprietary right in the parent. 61 However, as the disputed item of special damage did not fall under either of these heads, it was not recoverable. The husband s counsel then sought to draw an analogy between the disputed head of damage and transport expenses. He said that husbands were frequently awarded, as part of their damages for injuries to their wives, the cost of visiting the wife in hospital. To this, Diplock J said: I see no difficulty in reconciling the recovery of this item with the principle which I have already discussed. Visits by a spouse may well be a factor in the recovery of a patient, and a visit to a wife in hospital may thus be a proper step in mitigating the damage sustained by loss of consortium by reducing the period during which the consortium is lost. But if the sole justification for the visit is the comfort or pleasure which it gives to the wife, then I think it is not recoverable. 62 The gist of Diplock J s dictum is that the tortfeasor owed a duty of care not only to the victim but also to her husband. The victim s husband could have sued the tortfeasor in his own name for the injury done to his right to the consortium of his wife. In addition, the husband could recover medical and other related expenses incurred on account of his injured wife, the basis being either that: 1. the money was expended to mitigate the husband s damage arising from the loss of consortium; or that 2. the husband was under a legal duty to provide proper maintenance and comfort for his wife. The husband could recover as part of his damages for injury to his wife the cost of visiting her in hospital, because such visits were a factor in the wife s recovery, and went towards mitigating the damage sustained by loss of Id, page 342. Id, page 343.

21 274 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1993) consortium by reducing the period during which the consortium was lost. The damages in respect of transport expenses are awarded to the husband, not the injured wife, in respect of his claim for the wrong done to his quasiproprietary interest in the consortium of his wife. It can be seen therefore that Kirkham v Boughey does not actually deal with the recoverability by an injured plaintiff of the transport expenses incurred by his family in visiting him. What then is to be made of the Judicial Commissioner s reference to the principle in Kirkham v Boughey? It is suggested that K S Rajah JC took the same approach as did Ashworth J in Olsen v Demolition Co Ltd, 63 i.e. he considered that the visits by the plaintiff s family in fact assisted in the plaintiff s recovery, so that the transport expenses could properly be regarded as necessaries towards the plaintiff s recovery and were thus recoverable. If, however, the Judicial Commissioner was in fact alluding to an injury to the plaintiff s or his wife s right to consortium, several objections may be raised. First, since it was the husband himself who was injured, and not the wife, it cannot be said that there was a wrong done to his quasi-proprietary interest in the consortium of his wife. Second, at common law, a married woman whose husband has been injured by a negligent act or omission has no right of action against the negligent person in respect of loss or impairment of consortium consequential on the injury, 64 so there was no question of the wife in Leong Kwong Sun being able to maintain an action against the defendants for the recovery of the transport expenses incurred by her at all. The general rule that a third party has no right of action against the tortfeasor would apply. In any case, it was the injured party, and not his wife, who was the claimant in Leong Kwong Sun. Third, any allusion to consortium would not explain the Judicial Commissioner s award of damages in respect of the visits by the plaintiff s children. Section 45(1) of the Women s Charter Similar difficulties are encountered when one considers the Judicial Commissioner s reliance on s 45(1) Women s Charter (Cap 353). There may well be a statutory duty placed upon spouses to co-operate with each other in safeguarding the interests of the union and caring for the children. But it is difficult to understand how this supports an injured plaintiff s claim to be entitled to recover the transport expenses incurred by his wife and children in visiting him in hospital. Further, the reference to s 45(1) Women s Charter (Cap 353) does not explain the Judicial Commissioner s award of damages in respect of the visits by the plaintiff s children Olsen v Demolition and Construction Co Ltd (unreported), 21 October 1957, noted in Kemp & Kemp, The Quantum of Damages (Second Edition) Volume 1 at page 361. Best v Samuel Fox & Co [1952] AC 716.

22 5 S.Ac.L.J. Recovering the Cost of Visiting an Injured Plaintiff 275 Conclusion The authorities that were discussed earlier support K S Rajah JC s decision that an injured plaintiff can in principle recover the expenses incurred by his family in visiting him in hospital. Although some of the reasons given by the Judicial Commissioner for his award may not be very convincing, if the above analysis of the cases is adopted by the Singapore courts, there can be no doubt as to the correctness of the proposition in Leong Kwong Sun that a plaintiff can recover as special damages the transport expenses incurred by his family in visiting him in hospital. THE POSITION IN SINGAPORE TODAY Although the position in Singapore as regards the recoverability by an injured plaintiff of the transport expenses incurred by his family in visiting him in hospital is not entirely clear, there being the apparently conflicting High Court decisions of Lai Chi Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin, Tay Ah Lan (m.w.) v Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd, and Chia Ngon Lin & Anor v Ler Boon Seng on the one hand and Harry Seah Hong Meng v Tan Siow Cher and Leong Kwong Sun on the other, it is submitted that these cases can be reconciled and that the better view is that the plaintiff can, in principle, recover the transport expenses incurred by his family in visiting him in hospital. This view is arguably also supported by the decision of the majority of the Court of Appeal in Ang Eng Lee & Anor v Lim Lye Soon. What then are the conditions which the plaintiff must satisfy in order to recover the transport expenses incurred? The practice in Singapore has always been to treat such claims as a head of special damages. This brings with it the attendant difficulties of proof, as illustrated in the earlier cases of Lai Chi Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin and Chia Ngon Lin & Anor v Ler Boon Seng. The decision in Lai Chi Kay & Ors v Lee Kuo Shin requires the plaintiff to establish that the presence of his family at the hospital was necessary for his recovery. It also requires the plaintiff to establish the manner in which the visits in fact contributed towards the plaintiff s recovery. Medical evidence that the visits went a great way towards [the plaintiff s] rehabilitation without elaboration on how the visits helped towards the plaintiff s recovery was considered to be unsatisfactory. The case of Chia Ngon Lin & Anor v Ler Boon Seng imposes the additional requirement that there be evidence as to how the transport expenses were incurred and by which family members. In contrast, the decision in Leong Kwong Sun is less stringent as regards the requirement of proof. There, it was sufficient for the plaintiff to show that the visits were a factor in the recovery of the plaintiff, although, as the quotation from Kirkham v Boughey shows, if the sole justification for the visit is the comfort or pleasure which it gives... then... it is not recoverable.

23 276 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1993) K S Rajah JC did not refer to any medical evidence of the need for the visits by the plaintiff s wife and children. Nor did the Judicial Commissioner specify how the visits helped towards the plaintiff s recovery. The requirement imposed by Chia Ngon Lin & Anor v Ler Boon Seng, however, would not appear to be applicable to Leong Kwong Sun, since the parties had agreed that if the plaintiff was entitled to recover the transport expenses, the quantum recoverable would be $2, The difference in judicial opinion as to the evidential requirements which the plaintiff must satisfy for recovery awaits the consideration of the Court of Appeal, to whom the defendants in Leong Kwong Sun have appealed. 65 One final matter should be noted. While the focus in this article has been on the recoverability of transport expenses incurred by the plaintiff s family, the principle behind the recovery of such expenses is of much wider application. Taken to its logical conclusion, the principle would allow a plaintiff to recover any expenses incurred by a third party which would assist the plaintiff s recovery. Only time will tell whether such a broad proposition will find acceptance in the Singapore courts, or whether subsequent cases will confine recovery to transport expenses incurred by the plaintiff s immediate family members. PHANG HSIAO CHUNG* 65. * Civil Appeal No. 142 of LL.B. (N.U.S.).