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1 Security Security and and Insecurity Insecurity of of HTTP HTTP Headers Headers Dirk Dirk Wetter Licence:
2 imaohw Independent Security Consultant Offense / Defense / Security Project Management Historical strong Unix/networking background OWASP Involvement OWASP AppSec Research 2013 German OWASP Day 2012, 2014 German Chapter Lead Helping hand here/there Other My TLS hobby: testssl.sh chair
3 Security and Insecurity of HTTP Headers Disclaimer Completeness Perspective Matt McGee, CC-BY=ND 2.0,
4 1. What, (in)security? Instruction: Browser Do this 30x, 401 Cache Expire Do not frame this, set Cookie, keep-alive, etc Displaying: specify Content-Type/Encoding, Compression More properties to identify session / keep backend server
5 1. What, (in)security? Redundant information Type of server, application Version numbers, more or less Framework Architecture hints Via <proxy> IP of load balanced server
6 2. Where does it come from? Where do header lines originate from? Simple setup (Web+Appl server} + Application
7 2. Where does it come from? Where do header lines originate from? - Not so simple setup RP or WAF Entry web server App server + Application
8 2. Where does it come from? <OT> Often forgotten Server time! - HTTP header: Date - TLS timestamp - SChannel: all - OpenSSL < 1.0.1f conclusions from date timestamps </OT>
9
10 2. Where does it come from? Further Interesting stuff Big IP F5 Set Cookie: BIGip<str>= ; Netweaver-Cluster
11 2. Where does it come from? Conclusion #I Fingerprinting of Architecture / Infrastructure Patchlevel of Components Maybe more (see l8er) Evil dude: Gimme more!
12 2. Where does it come from? Conclusion #II - Client side perspective: What's really necessary? What else can be done to improve security?
13 1% wget -qso /dev/null eiklaut.net HTTP/ OK Date: Thu, 21 May :44:42 GMT Content-Type: text/html Content-Length: 630 Last-Modified: Fri, 29 Nov :39:54 GMT Server: Apache (RHEL), mod_ssl openssl Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=44h5vc482fgiapfmit5t0n9f03; path=/; X-Powered-By: PHP/ X-UA-Compatible: IE=EmulateIE7 Accept-Ranges: bytes Connection: keep-alive 0%
14 2. Where does it come from? Conclusion #II : If / where possible: Proper secure defaults! Remove chatty lines add security headers
15 3. Theory Cookie attributes / flags HttpOnly access of JavaScript methods cookie classical XSS some browser protection nowadays Secure no transport via plaintext HTTP cookie clobbering, mixed content SOP, works?!» Some bypasses
16 3. Theory Transport encryption: HSTS (RFC 6797) HTTP Strict Transport : Within max age never ever use plain http, maybe includesubdomains max age: [seconds] Recommended > ½ year: Browser support ok *) Chrome >=4 Firefox >= 4 Safari >=7, Opera >=12.1 IE 11 on W10 only! *) see
17 3. Theory Transport encryption: HSTS One problem though TOFU! preload: DryPot / GDFL 2.0/ CC BY-SA 3.0
18 3. Theory Transport encryption: HSTS Pitfalls Change of mind (http!) within time specified Certificate expired (example Firefox) Careful with includesubdomains for TLD!
19
20 3. Theory Transport encryption: HSTS Solution to Pitfalls set max age to 0 (see RFC 6797, 6.1.1) worked w/ FF Chrome? order new certificate ;-)
21 3. Theory IETF Draft RFC 7469 HTTP Public Key Pins / Public Key Pins Report Only Certificate pinning a.k.a. Within max age remember keys and do not except anything else includesubdomains pin sha256=<base64str> report uri=<json POST URI>!
22 3. Theory Goodbye (un)lawful / whatsoever interception ;-) RFC: UAs MUST close the connection to a host upon Pin Failure Ok, some constraints... (quality of encryption) Local CAs TOFU Picture courtesy of
23 3. Theory HPKP: which keys? - Best: pins of >= two keys actual Pin of backup key in pocket / safe Careful with issuer pinning - how? script from Hanno Böck - Locking out? - max age=0???
24 3. Theory
25 3. Theory HPKP, browser support: Chrome >=35 Firefox >= 35 Safari, Opera? IE 1x probably not at all (yet)
26 3. Theory Was: per site Now per page
27 3. Theory X Content Type Options: nosniff Originally designed for IE < 8 MIME sniffing! Ignored Content-Type completely Similar unix file (or MIME libs file uploads) User controlled content chameleon files, picture XSS HTML/JS in PS, PNG etc. Attention: Compatibility view of IE Warning for Aliens, liftarn,openclipart.org/detail/2881/warning-for-aliens T-800: by Noble0, CC BY SA 3.0 / r.wikipedia.org/wiki/fichier:old_artificial_profile_avatar.jpg
28 3. Theory Safer dl'ing: Content Disposition: attachment X Download Options : noopen CC-BY_SA 2.0 Magnus Manske
29 3. Theory X Content Type Options: nosniff Border cases for Firefox General: trust MIME type What if empty? PDF/PS, XML, HTML Determine image type T-800: by Noble0, CC BY SA 3.0 /
30 3. Theory X FRAME OPTIONS DENY SAMEORIGIN ALLOW FROM uri Clickjacking 'n friends Against framing your page Attention: Business reasons for framing Application (e.g. Typo3 backend) Chrome/Webkit? don't give a damn: ALLOW FROM
31 3. Theory XSS X XSS Protection 0 off, sense? ( 1 on, browser engine can sanitize 1; mode=block better: no rendering Good thing (again): report=<json POST URI> Support: no Firefox Chrome/Webkit IE
32 3. Theory
33 3. Theory XSS, again X Content Security Policy (FF < 23) X WebKit CSP (Chrome < 25) Content Security Policy (+ related) (Content Security Policy Report Only) not trivial! Cooperation of development, JS frameworks, templates, trackers, objects embedded,... ~two parts 1. Policy directive (*-src) 2. source value(s) Concat as much pairs as you want Separation by semicolon
34 3. Theory XSS, again Content Security Policy Policy which content are you allowed to render?» script src» img src» style src» frame src (father option to X-FRAME-OPTIONS)» font src» media src (video, audio)» default src»...
35 3. Theory XSS, again Content Security Policy eet Source this are you allowed to do with directive h S at_ e 'none' h _C y c i ol 'self' P _ y ritxss u 'unsafe inline' Attention: standard defense c _Se t n 'unsafe eval' bad nte o C Uri hp/ p. ex» trick only or» * Attention!asp..o w w ww Violations (json POST URI): / / : ps t t h Content Security Policy <key value> report uri <URI> See Support Chrome/ Firefox: good! IE 10/11 fragmentary Shameless plug: OWASP TT 2013
36 3. Theory
37 3. Theory CSP v2 (still W3C draft) 1. Whitelist scripts: Hash support Inline Code: <script> notevilstuff </script> Header: Content Security Policy: script src 'sha256 <base64 encoded hash( notevilstuff ))>'; 2. Whitelist script: Nonce Inline Code: <script nonce='n0n53'> notevilstuff </script> Header: Content Security Policy: script src 'nonce n0n53';
38 3. Theory CSP v2 (still W3C draft) 3. /4. Same whitelists with style src 5. frame ancestors
39 4. Where to set / unset? Depends... Your access Your hat on your head In principle 4 possibilities application application server configuration {server,web}.xml, web.config, php.ini etc. web server (configuration) reverse proxy / load balancer / WAF
40 4. Where to set / unset? What's the best place? KISS What ever is the easiest for you As long as the application still works Best At the root of the cause
41 4. Where to set / unset? Disclaimer: Obscurity & Security Do PROPER defense! Maybe protection against shodan search Otherwise: criminals throw target
42 4. Where to set / unset? Pitfalls Application needs still to work! Cookie: Secure, HTTPOnly, restricting domain scope Caching
43 5. Practice Two examples Web servers (reverse proxy, resp.) Apache + nginx no IIS today Tasks 1. Minimize default verbosity 2. Provide / remove additional headers
44 5. Practice Apache Default configuration Server: Apache/2.2.3 (Linux/SUSE) Server: Apache/2.4.8 (Win32) OpenSSL/1.0.1b PHP/5.5.3 Server: Apache/ (Ubuntu)PHP/ ubuntu7.5 with Suhosin Patch mod_python/3.3.1 Python/2.7.2 I. Secure defaults ServerTokens Prod (Header) Results in not enough? while you're at it: ServerSignature Off (Error) Server: Apache a2enmod security2; echo \ "ServerTokens Full\nSecServerSignature Microsoft IIS/8.0" \ >> /etc/<somepath>/mod*security*.conf omit Server: not possible (recompile)
45 5. Practice Apache II. Remove /add header lines a2enmod headers Header always set X FRAME OPTIONS sameorigin Header always set X Content Type Options nosniff Header always set X XSS Protection "1; mode=block" Header always set Strict Transport Security "max age= " env=https Header edit Set Cookie "^(.*)" $1;Secure env=https Header edit Set Cookie "^(.*)" $1; HttpOnly Header unset "X Pingback" Header always unset "X Powered By" Header unset sap cache control
46 5. Practice nginx Default configuration Server: nginx/1.x.y I. Secure defaults remove banner (both error and header): server_tokens off; Enable module: ngx_headers_more more_set_headers Server: OWASP ru135 ; more_clear_headers Server: * ; II. Remove/add header lines more_set_headers more_clear_headers
47 5. Practice Remarks 1. As usual for nginx/apache: set/clear headers: per location possible! small fixes possible w/o access to app 2. PHP r00t of all evil e.g. php.ini: expose_php=off Same: real app server hardening
48 5. Practice Test it! - Tool from the outside - curl / wget / devel tools browser - Thorough functional tests! - BROWSERS!!
49
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