HAIDA GWAII WORKSHOP May 12, 2015 LESSONS FROM SIMUSHIR CASE

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1 PUGET SOUND HARBOR SAFETY COMMITTEE HAIDA GWAII WORKSHOP May 12, 2015 LESSONS FROM SIMUSHIR CASE Captain John Veentjer, USCG Re(red Execu(ve Director, Puget Sound Marine Exchange

2 Services we provide: The backbone of our existence!! Monitoring and tracking of deep draft vessels!! Information on shipping activities in the Puget Sound and Grays Harbor! Daily shipping activity reports! Automatic Identification System!! Manage the West Seattle Buoys!! Answering Services!! Statistical Reports!! And much more!

3 Monitor Vessel Movements! 24 hour/7 day watch! Monitor status of vessels from projected arrival to arrival to departure! Collect information from various sources, e.g., operators schedules, agents, pilots, CG VTS, etc.! Inform member/customers with need to know! Extensive database of vessel activity

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5 AIS SNAP SHOT OF PUGET SOUND TRAFFIC Saturday, May 9, :50AM

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9 AIS SNAP SHOT OF NORTH PACIFIC TRAFFIC Saturday, May 9, :50AM

10 Emergency Response Towing Vessel (ERTV)! History! Current law! Capabilities! Roles and Responsibilities! Operations

11 Emergency Response Towing Vessel (ERTV) History! Tug first put in Neah Bay 1999! Call out to assist some 50+ vessels in 15 years (avg 3+/year)!!! Some Navy, CG funding State funding first part year then full year After July 1, 2010, industry funded

12 Washington State Legislature enacted SB 5344 in 2009 By July 1, 2010, the owner or operator of a covered vessel transiting to or from a Washington port through the Strait of Juan de Fuca, except for transits extending no further west than Race Rocks Light, shall establish and fund an emergency response system that provides for an emergency response towing vessel [ERTV] to be stationed at Neah Bay.

13 ERTV Capabilities! Part of the emergency response system required by RCW ! Stationed at Neah Bay! Satisfy the following minimum planning standards: "! Underway within twenty minutes of a decision to deploy; "! Able to deploy at any hour of any day! and be safely manned to remain underway for at least forty-eight hours; "! In severe weather conditions, be capable of making up to, stopping, holding, and towing a drifting or disabled vessel of one hundred eighty thousand metric dead weight tons; "! In severe weather conditions, be capable of holding position within one hundred feet of another vessel; "! Be equipped with and maneuverable enough to effectively employ a ship anchor chain recovery hook and line throwing gun; "! Be capable of a bollard pull of at least seventy short tons; and "! Be equipped with appropriate equipment for:!!!! Damage control patching; Vessel dewatering; Air safety monitoring; and Digital photography.

14 Roles and Responsibilities! ERTV Compliance Group!Overall program!10 person Board (8 voting, 2 non-voting)! Washington State Maritime Cooperative!ERTV contract!loan to ERTV! Marine Exchange! Administration (invoice/collection/ payments/records)

15 Operations! Available to any vessel for intended use! Contracted separate from WSMC Contract!Owner/operator/representative of vessel!coast Guard!State (Department of Ecology)! Call to MX to notify when off-hire to WSMC! Backfilled as necessary

16 FOR MORE INFORMATION

17 FOR MORE INFORMATION

18 Comprehensive Marine Safety System InternaHonal, Federal & Other Standards Vessel Traffic System - Deep, Wide Waterways, CooperaHve VTS Management between US/Canada Monitoring, InspecHons, Enforcement Port State Control Eliminate Substandard Vessels Tug Escort, Tug Assist, Pilots Double Hulls for Tankers & Cargo Vessel Fuel Tanks Enhanced NavigaHon & Crew Competency Harbor Safety Plan Standards of Care And much more.

19 Puget Sound Harbor Safety Committee PARTNERSHIP FOR SUCCESS The informal organizational structure and mutual cooperation of its members have allowed HSC to become the ideal model for balancing the needs of various interests in the marine environment whether they are economic, environmental recreational, regulatory or national defense.

20 What are Standards of Care (SOC)?!!! procedures and practices, beyond regulatory requirements, that experienced and prudent maritime professionals follow to ensure safe, secure, efficient and environmentally responsible maritime operations.!!! are good marine practices that are developed and published to provide a guide for maritime professionals to consider and incorporate into their decision making process.!!! are not regulations and thus not enforceable. In some cases, they are not the correct action to take. Alternative procedures may be more appropriate.!! Mariners should be mindful that if they are involved in a maritime incident when not following relevant Standards of Care they could be subject to legal action based on a rebuttable presumption of negligence.!! These SOCs are clearly not all inclusive. They complement the laws and regulations and should they seem to conflict with law or regulation, the law or regulation is always superior.

21 Pacific States/Bri5sh Columbia Oil Spill Task Force West Coast Offshore Traffic Risk Management Project Findings and Recommenda5ons regarding the Distance Offshore Risk Factor 1. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup finds that the risk of a grounding/collision generally increases the closer a vessel transits to shore. Using a rela5ve ranking/risk- indexing model that incorporated nine risk factors (volume of oil/vessel design factor, driu factor, higher collision factor, distance offshore factor, weather/seasonal factor, tug availability factor, coastal route/density factor, historical casualty factor, and environmental sensi5vity factor), the Workgroup mapped areas of higher risk along the West Coast of Canada and the United States. The resulhng higher risk area line was generally no more than 25 miles from land along the enhre West Coast, except off Southeast Alaska, off Northwest BC, and off Point Arguello in California, where it extended to 50 nm offshore in those cases. The workgroup finds that vessels transi5ng within these higher risk areas have a greater poten5al for a grounding due to one or more of the risk criteria than if they transited offshore of these areas. 2. The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup recommends that, where no other management measure such as Areas to Be Avoided (ATBAs), Traffic Separa5on Schemes (TSSs), or recommended tracks already exist, vessels 300 gross tons or larger transihng coastwise anywhere between Cook Inlet and San Diego should voluntarily stay a minimum distance of 25 nauhcal miles (nm) offshore. 3. For the sake of consistency with exis5ng agreements, the Workgroup further recommends that, where no other management measures such as ATBAs, TSSs, Tanker Exclusion Zones, or recommended tracks already exist, tank ships laden with crude oil or persistent petroleum products and transihng coastwise anywhere between Cook Inlet and San Diego should voluntarily stay a minimum distance of 50 nm offshore. 4. Vessels transi5ng short distances between adjacent ports should seek rouhng guidance as needed from the local Captain of the Port or VTS authority for that area. 5. In addi5on, the Workgroup recognizes that laden tank barges operated by members of the American Waterways Operators have agreed to a voluntary policy of transihng at least 25 miles offshore of the US West Coast. The Council of Marine Carriers in BriHsh Columbia has commided to a similar voluntary policy for its laden tank barges transi5ng in the open ocean off the West Coast of Canada, but also maintains the longstanding prac5ce of tugs seeking refuge in the many inlets available along the BC coastline which may be the safer ac5on under certain circumstances The Workgroup further recommends that these voluntary minimum distances offshore be communicated to mariners by placing the text of these recommenda5ons in the Coast Pilot and Sailing DirecHons for the West Coast, and also by placing notes on the appropriate nauhcal charts, 8. Regarding the areas where the Higher Risk zones go beyond 25 nm, the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Workgroup finds that various factors mi5gate the risk in these areas. For instance, the coastal transporta5on trade along Bri5sh Columbia and SE Alaska is primarily by tug and tows. A number of powerful poten5al "rescue tugs" are frequently transi5ng through these areas as a result of this unique trading paeern. These transi5ng tugs supplement the rescue tugs located in homeports as used in this study.

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25 Situations Incidents Accidents Oil Spill Maritime Simulation Incident Data Expert Judgment Oil Outflow Model =G0PB*W!! ^8G0! ]1+84/!! E0d:,40;0G/1! K8:<90!b:99! E0d:,40;0G/! )#+*% -"7"&6-67;%% g96+;#(7+% f*>9*gg1!s'hh%x! i #[! R = { < s, l, x > } i i c

26 PUGET SOUND HARBOR SAFETY COMMITTEE QUESTIONS Captain John Veentjer, USCG Re(red Execu(ve Director, Puget Sound Marine Exchange