NAVFAC EXWC Platform Information Technology (PIT) Cyber Security Initiatives
|
|
|
- Jordan Neal
- 10 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 NAVFAC EXWC Platform Information Technology (PIT) Cyber Security Initiatives Center of excellence for secure integration, deployment and sustainment of Industrial Control Systems and Operational Technology infrastructure
2 CONTROL SYSTEMS - THE CYBER- SECURITY LANDSCAPE Historically, PITs were designed to value reliability and safety as opposed to cyber security. Current systems now include network connectivity, and many legacy PITs have been networked using add-on interfaces. It is necessary to evaluate all proposed changes to PIT hardware and software to ensure that existing reliability and safety margins, as well as cyber security requirements, such as access control, need to know, and least privilege, are met. Many older PITs in use do not have any cyber security associated with them Adding them to a network opens them up to security threats that were not applicable while they were stand-alone systems monitored and controlled by local personnel. Many PITs operate on a 24 hour by 7 day basis and cannot be patched during operation Changes to hardware and software must be made in a controlled manner using a test bed to ensure that the PIT will perform properly when upgraded and will have improved cyber security.
3 PIT CYBER TEST BED EMPLOYMENT PIT Cyber Test Bed (PCTB) will be used to: Fulfill multiple missions in support of development, integration, testing, and simulation of Operational and Information Technology related to Control Systems, Data Collection Systems, and Management Information Systems Evaluate all proposed changes to ensure that existing reliability and safety margins are met, and cyber security requirements (i.e., access control, need to know and least privilege) are met Evaluate how people will respond to cyber incidents Test the impact of classified and unclassified security events Test the classified and unclassified impacts of Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts (IAVA), Information Assurance Vulnerability Bulletins (IAVB), Alerts issued by PIT-CERT, and equivalent monitoring sources
4 PIT CYBER TEST BED DESCRIPTION Collection of systems/devices typical of those used in DOD ashore PIT facilities Buildings, Power Plants, Substations, Attempt to break the systems as installed today Evaluate potential mitigation from commercial vendors, universities, labs Attempt to break the systems after mitigation Provide guidance/lessons-learned to DOD and industry
5 RELATIONSHIP OF PCTB TO CS-CSI PCTB will connect to CS-CSI components to Evaluate ongoing threats to DoD CS networks and configurations Evaluate the impacts of IAVA and IAVB on current (legacy) and future PIT configuration PCTB will support all Automated Meter Infrastructure (AMI) within the CS Cyber Security Infrastructure (CS-CSI) Incorporates many features of CS-CSI but in a test environment PCTB Extensions will allow it to identify risks of attacks and demonstrate improvements to mitigate vulnerabilities
6 DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS BUILT TO SUPPORT ASHORE SYSTEMS Phase 1: Support for AMI within the Smart Grid Cyber Security Infrastructure AMI Test and Evaluation Equipment Access to PSNet and NMCI Phase 2: Support for the CAF Test BCS and UCS operating under the CAF Test non-ca BCS and UCS Phase 3: Extension of the PCTB Demonstrate forensics and logging for serial and IP Demonstrate how to encapsulate legacy CS commands Identify system impacts from patching
7 PCTB NECESSARY RESOURCES A controlled environment for testing, improving and maintaining the cyber status of typical systems found in naval facilities Representative CS and CS-PE systems, test hardware and software, and appropriate network connectivity Staff with appropriate expertise and training Develop CS cyber-security policies and procedures Identify, research, fix or mitigate security weaknesses in CS systems Establish methods to patch/upgrade servers and network devices needing constant availability
8 MISSION Be the corporate Baseline for PIT and AMI configuration. Maintain Experimental / Evaluation environment for Enterprise MIS. Simulate Systems load through software emulation. Evaluate New/Modified OT component interaction with the Baseline. Replicate specific FEC environments for training purposes. Replicate specific environmental configurations for intrusion exercises (Red Team / Blue Team). Evaluate integration of experimental technologies (Micro Grid, Solar, etc). Evaluate integrations/interfaces with MIS.
9 PCTB EARLY OPERATIONAL INITIATIVES Emulate AMI and CS-PE operational architectures Evaluate security posture of new and existing UCS and BCS Identify and mitigate vulnerabilities break, fix, try to break some more Test OS and application updates, patches Test newly developed systems before being deployed Test legacy systems identified as being vulnerable. Periodically re-test existing systems to see if security posture has changed. Develop an enterprise patch management process and standard operating procedures Establish CS configuration and change management Ensure compliance with DoD cyber assurance requirements Make use of industry CS cyber security best practices Define systemic and personnel responses to cyber events Conduct red team blue team penetration testing.
10 RECOMMENDED APPROACH Phase 1a NITC Define Implementation Plan based on existing study and requirements. Build Out Baseline Enclave Environment per Enclave CDA guidelines. Establish Configuration / Change Management processes and procedures for updates to the Baseline. Phase 1b HQ Establish overall requirement for access controls and space allocation based on to-be capabilities Evaluate physical environment at PRTH to determine whether any structural modifications are required to establish appropriate testbed environment (including control/operations area, training capabilities, and OT component rack and storage spaces). Evaluate common components that should be included in testbed capability suite.
11 RECOMMENDED APPROACH (CONT.) Phase 2 NITC Build Out simulation environment HQ transfer common components to PRTH as appropriate Identify / Acquire hardware/software suite for load simulation Identify / Acquire hardware/software suite for network environment simulation Establish SOP for documenting testing configuration, goals, and results. IOC Phase 3 Establish Library of configurations for each FEC/Locality operating environment. Establish SOP for altering the testing configuration based on Library contents. Establish SOP for enabling/disabling interconnections/interfaces with MIS during test cases.
12 RECOMMENDED APPROACH (CONT.) Phase 4 Establish SOPs for intrusion testing to include documentation of any purposeful changes to overarching testbed security settings to enable specific components to be tested for vulnerabilities. Establish SOPs for interconnection with experimental engineering environments (micro grid, Labs, etc) FOC
13 PCTB TEST ENVIRONMENT Physical and virtual test environments accurately model existing and proposed Navy CS systems Working copies of deployed PIT Platform Enclaves (PIT-PE) Representative samples of CS as deployed in Navy environments Unique AMI vendor implementations Contemporary and legacy building control systems Data Communication (PSNet, NMCI, regional PIT networks) Utility-scale control systems (SCADA, MicroGrid) Simulated real-world interfaces and operational environments Meters, sensors and controllers Ship, aircraft connect and disconnect (Cold Iron) Power grid management and event communication Weather data
14 PCTB KEY SERVICES PIT vulnerability assessment Network and port mapping Wireless traffic monitoring and tampering Intrusion detection and node behavior analysis User activity monitoring Server and Application security testing Denial of Service Command and Response Injection Response to unexpected inputs (input fuzzing) Loss of control outcomes Data Acquisition and Logging Evaluate logging solutions where current data captured is inadequate Reliability, Availability, Security metrics Hardware and software configuration monitoring
15 SAMPLE ELEMENTS TO BE TESTED Network Operation Center (NOC) Human-Machine Interface (HMI) Overview of system availability, reliability, security Supervisory Station Local control station in building or facility Servers, Software, Communications to data collection devices Remote Terminal Units (RTU) Connected to physical equipment Convert electrical signals from sensors to digital data Field Devices Measure analog or digital values Output to local controllers or metering devices
16 PCTB LOCATION Port Hueneme Bldg 2 (EXWC-NITC) Secure, access-controlled space Existing power with backup generator Access to PSNet and NMCI Rm 140
17 PCTB SCHEDULE Support for AMI within the Smart Grid Cyber Security Infrastructure AMI Test and Evaluation Equipment Access to PSNet and NMCI Support for the Common Architecture Framework (CAF) Test BCS and UCS operating under the CAF Test non-ca BCS and UCS Establish interfaces to MicroGrid Test Facility Extension of the PCTB Demonstrate forensics and logging for serial and IP Demonstrate how to encapsulate legacy PIT (ICS) commands Identify system impacts from patching
18 THE PCTB WILL IMPROVE THE OPERATIONAL SECURITY OF CS Evaluate how cyber systems respond to intentional or unintentional cyber incidents Evaluate how people will respond to cyber incidents and in what time frame Evaluate all proposed changes to CS to ensure that existing reliability and safety margins and cyber security requirements are met Verify that cyber security technologies, testing, and / or operator responses will not impact the reliability and availability of the control systems during normal or upset operation Monitor all network traffic, operator commands, and equipment automatic operations, as well as the ability to simulate operations and operator displays in the face of selected cyber threats
19 MICROGRID TEST FACILITY
20 MICROGRID TEST FACILITY
21 MICROGRID TEST FACILITY Re-configurable test-bed to validate equipment readiness prior to deployment, and test microgrid systems and components featuring developing technologies Integrate and test renewable energy, energy storage, traditional power generation and control systems in combinations to obtain stable and secure microgrid systems Produce Test Reports and guidance documents to assist in successful deployment of distributed energy resources and microgrid systems Construction start FY15 4 th Qtr, complete FY16 2 nd Qtr At MUSE yard, Port Hueneme Interact with PCTB Provide testing and demonstration of control and monitoring functions.
NSA/DHS Centers of Academic Excellence for Information Assurance/Cyber Defense
NSA/DHS Centers of Academic Excellence for Information Assurance/Cyber Defense Cyber Investigations Data Management Systems Security Data Security Analysis Digital Forensics Health Care Security Industrial
SCADA System Security. ECE 478 Network Security Oregon State University March 7, 2005
SCADA System Security ECE 478 Network Security Oregon State University March 7, 2005 David Goeke Hai Nguyen Abstract Modern public infrastructure systems
Patch and Vulnerability Management Program
Patch and Vulnerability Management Program What is it? A security practice designed to proactively prevent the exploitation of IT vulnerabilities within an organization To reduce the time and money spent
i Network, Inc Technology Solutions, Products & Services Providing the right information, to the right customer, at the right time.
Technology Solutions, Products & Services Providing the right information, to the right customer, at the right time. 2 Barry Brueseke (619) 401 7334 www.inetwork west.com 4/3/2014 IEEE Cyber Security Workshop
The President s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. Office of Energy Assurance U.S. Department of Energy 202/ 287-1808
cover_comp_01 9/9/02 5:01 PM Page 1 For further information, please contact: The President s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board Office of Energy Assurance U.S. Department of Energy 202/ 287-1808
Roger W. Kuhn, Jr. Advisory Director Education Fellow Cyber Security Forum Initiative
Roger W. Kuhn, Jr. Advisory Director Education Fellow Cyber Security Forum Initiative November 2014 Disclaimer Current SCADA Vulnerability Factors Industrial Control Systems 101 Proposed Countermeasures
SCADA System Overview
Introduction SCADA systems are critical to the control and monitoring of complex cyber-physical systems. Now with advanced computer and communications technologies, SCADA systems are connected to networks
GE Measurement & Control. Cyber Security for Industrial Controls
GE Measurement & Control Cyber Security for Industrial Controls Contents Overview...3 Cyber Asset Protection (CAP) Software Update Subscription....4 SecurityST Solution Options...5 Centralized Account
INTEGRATING SUBSTATION IT AND OT DEVICE ACCESS AND MANAGEMENT
Utilities WHITE PAPER May 2013 INTEGRATING SUBSTATION IT AND OT DEVICE ACCESS AND MANAGEMENT Table of Contents Introduction...3 Problem Statement...4 Solution Requirements...5 Components of an Integrated
Intrusion Detection and Cyber Security Monitoring of SCADA and DCS Networks
Intrusion Detection and Cyber Security Monitoring of SCADA and DCS Networks Dale Peterson Director, Network Security Practice Digital Bond, Inc. 1580 Sawgrass Corporate Parkway, Suite 130 Sunrise, FL 33323
What Risk Managers need to know about ICS Cyber Security
What Risk Managers need to know about ICS Cyber Security EIM Risk Managers Conference February 18, 2014 Joe Weiss PE, CISM, CRISC, ISA Fellow (408) 253-7934 [email protected] ICSs What are they
Independent Security Operations Oversight and Assessment. Captain Timothy Holland PM NGEN
Independent Security Operations Oversight and Assessment Captain Timothy Holland PM NGEN 23 June 2010 Independent Security Operations Oversight and Assessment Will Jordan NGEN Cyber Security 23 June 2010
Cyber Security and Privacy - Program 183
Program Program Overview Cyber/physical security and data privacy have become critical priorities for electric utilities. The evolving electric sector is increasingly dependent on information technology
Utility Telecom Forum. Robert Sill, CEO & President Aegis Technologies February 4, 2008
Utility Telecom Forum Robert Sill, CEO & President Aegis Technologies February 4, 2008 1 Agenda Asked to describe his job, Mike Selves, director of Emergency Management and Homeland Security in Johnson
GE Measurement & Control. Cyber Security for NEI 08-09
GE Measurement & Control Cyber Security for NEI 08-09 Contents Cyber Security for NEI 08-09...3 Cyber Security Solution Support for NEI 08-09...3 1.0 Access Contols...4 2.0 Audit And Accountability...4
Security Issues with Integrated Smart Buildings
Security Issues with Integrated Smart Buildings Jim Sinopoli, Managing Principal Smart Buildings, LLC The building automation industry is now at a point where we have legitimate and reasonable concern
Attachment A. Identification of Risks/Cybersecurity Governance
Attachment A Identification of Risks/Cybersecurity Governance 1. For each of the following practices employed by the Firm for management of information security assets, please provide the month and year
Cyber Security for NERC CIP Version 5 Compliance
GE Measurement & Control Cyber Security for NERC CIP Version 5 Compliance imagination at work Contents Cyber Security for NERC CIP Compliance... 5 Sabotage Reporting... 6 Security Management Controls...
7 Homeland. ty Grant Program HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM. Fiscal Year 2008
U.S. D EPARTMENT OF H OMELAND S ECURITY 7 Homeland Fiscal Year 2008 HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM ty Grant Program SUPPLEMENTAL RESOURCE: CYBER SECURITY GUIDANCE uidelines and Application Kit (October
GE Oil & Gas. Cyber Security for NERC CIP Versions 5 & 6 Compliance
GE Oil & Gas Cyber Security for NERC CIP Versions 5 & 6 Compliance Cyber Security for NERC CIP Versions 5 & 6 Compliance 2 Contents Cyber Security for NERC CIP Compliance... 5 Sabotage Reporting... 6 Security
Cyber Security. BDS PhantomWorks. Boeing Energy. Copyright 2011 Boeing. All rights reserved.
Cyber Security Automation of energy systems provides attack surfaces that previously did not exist Cyber attacks have matured from teenage hackers to organized crime to nation states Centralized control
TRIPWIRE NERC SOLUTION SUITE
CONFIDENCE: SECURED SOLUTION BRIEF TRIPWIRE NERC SOLUTION SUITE TAILORED SUITE OF PRODUCTS AND SERVICES TO AUTOMATE NERC CIP COMPLIANCE u u We ve been able to stay focused on our mission of delivering
How To Manage Security On A Networked Computer System
Unified Security Reduce the Cost of Compliance Introduction In an effort to achieve a consistent and reliable security program, many organizations have adopted the standard as a key compliance strategy
Host Hardening. Presented by. Douglas Couch & Nathan Heck Security Analysts for ITaP 1
Host Hardening Presented by Douglas Couch & Nathan Heck Security Analysts for ITaP 1 Background National Institute of Standards and Technology Draft Guide to General Server Security SP800-123 Server A
GE Measurement & Control. Cyber Security for NERC CIP Compliance
GE Measurement & Control Cyber Security for NERC CIP Compliance GE Proprietary Information: This document contains proprietary information of the General Electric Company and may not be used for purposes
WHITE PAPER ON SECURITY TESTING IN TELECOM NETWORK
WHITE PAPER ON SECURITY TESTING IN TELECOM NETWORK DATE OF RELEASE: 27 th July 2012 Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 2 2. Need for securing Telecom Networks... 3 3. Security Assessment Techniques...
SCADA Security Training
SCADA Security Training 1-Day Course Outline Wellington, NZ 6 th November 2015 > Version 3.1 web: www.axenic.co.nz phone: +64 21 689998 page 1 of 6 Introduction Corporate Background Axenic Ltd Since 2009,
Security Solutions to Meet NERC-CIP Requirements. Kevin Staggs, Honeywell Process Solutions
Kevin Staggs, Honeywell Process Solutions Table of Contents Introduction...3 Nerc Standards and Implications...3 How to Meet the New Requirements...4 Protecting Your System...4 Cyber Security...5 A Sample
IT Security and OT Security. Understanding the Challenges
IT Security and OT Security Understanding the Challenges Security Maturity Evolution in Industrial Control 1950s 5/4/2012 # 2 Technology Sophistication Security Maturity Evolution in Industrial Control
Design Document. Team Members: Tony Gedwillo James Parrott David Ryan. Faculty Advisor: Dr. Manimaran Govindarasu
12/6/2010 SDMAY11-11 CYBER SECURITY OF SCADA SYSTEMS TEST BED Design Document Team Members: Tony Gedwillo James Parrott David Ryan Faculty Advisor: Dr. Manimaran Govindarasu Design Document Tony Gedwillo
Facilitated Self-Evaluation v1.0
Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ES-C2M2) Patricia Hoffman Facilitated Self-Evaluation v1.0 Assistant Secretary Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability U.S.
IEEE-Northwest Energy Systems Symposium (NWESS)
IEEE-Northwest Energy Systems Symposium (NWESS) Paul Skare Energy & Environment Directorate Cybersecurity Program Manager Philip Craig Jr National Security Directorate Sr. Cyber Research Engineer The Pacific
Steve Lusk Alex Amirnovin Tim Collins
Steve Lusk Alex Amirnovin Tim Collins ViaSat Inc. Cyber-intrusion Auto-response and Policy Management System (CAPMS) Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems Peer Review August 5-6, 2014 Summary: Cyber-intrusion
CYBER SECURITY: SYSTEM SERVICES FOR THE SAFEGUARD OF DIGITAL SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEMS. Massimo Petrini (*), Emiliano Casale TERNA S.p.A.
21, rue d Artois, F-75008 PARIS D2-102 CIGRE 2012 http : //www.cigre.org CYBER SECURITY: SYSTEM SERVICES FOR THE SAFEGUARD OF DIGITAL SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEMS Massimo Petrini (*), Emiliano Casale
Defense-in-Depth Strategies for Secure, Open Remote Access to Control System Networks
Defense-in-Depth Strategies for Secure, Open Remote Access to Control System Networks A look at multi-vendor access strategies Joel Langill TÜV FSEng ID-1772/09, CEH, CPT, CCNA Security Consultant / Staff
CORE Security and the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)
CORE Security and the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) Addressing the PCI DSS with Predictive Security Intelligence Solutions from CORE Security CORE Security +1 617.399-6980 [email protected]
8/27/2015. Brad Schuette IT Manager City of Punta Gorda [email protected] (941) 575-3354. Don t Wait Another Day
Brad Schuette IT Manager City of Punta Gorda [email protected] (941) 575-3354 2015 FRWA Annual Conference Don t Wait Another Day 1 SCADA Subsystems Management Physical Connectivity Configuration Mgmt.
SANS Top 20 Critical Controls for Effective Cyber Defense
WHITEPAPER SANS Top 20 Critical Controls for Cyber Defense SANS Top 20 Critical Controls for Effective Cyber Defense JANUARY 2014 SANS Top 20 Critical Controls for Effective Cyber Defense Summary In a
External Supplier Control Requirements
External Supplier Control s Cyber Security For Suppliers Categorised as Low Cyber Risk 1. Asset Protection and System Configuration Barclays Data and the assets or systems storing or processing it must
Industrial Control System Cyber Situational Awareness. Robert M. Lee* June 10 th, 2015
Industrial Control System Cyber Situational Awareness Robert M. Lee* June 10 th, 2015 Executive Summary Cyber situational awareness is the concept of understanding and visualizing the networked environment
Discussion Draft of the Preliminary Cybersecurity Framework Illustrative Examples
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 Discussion Draft of the Preliminary Cybersecurity Framework Illustrative Examples The
Seven Strategies to Defend ICSs
INTRODUCTION Cyber intrusions into US Critical Infrastructure systems are happening with increased frequency. For many industrial control systems (ICSs), it s not a matter of if an intrusion will take
Understanding SCADA System Security Vulnerabilities
Understanding SCADA System Security Vulnerabilities Talking Points Executive Summary Common Misconceptions about SCADA System Security Common Vulnerabilities Affecting SCADA Networks Tactics to Strengthen
CHAPTER 67 INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNICIAN (IT) NAVPERS 18068-67H CH-63
CHAPTER 67 INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNICIAN (IT) NAVPERS 18068-67H CH-63 Updated: July 2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNICIAN SUBMARINES (ITS) SCOPE OF RATING GENERAL INFORMATION INFORMATION
Utility-Scale Applications of Microgrids: Moving Beyond Pilots Cyber Security
Boeing Defense, Space & Security Ventures Utility-Scale Applications of Microgrids: Moving Beyond Pilots Cyber Security Tristan Glenwright - Boeing BOEING is a trademark of Boeing Management Company. The
Goals. Understanding security testing
Getting The Most Value From Your Next Network Penetration Test Jerald Dawkins, Ph.D. True Digital Security p. o. b o x 3 5 6 2 3 t u l s a, O K 7 4 1 5 3 p. 8 6 6. 4 3 0. 2 5 9 5 f. 8 7 7. 7 2 0. 4 0 3
CONTROL SYSTEM VENDOR CYBER SECURITY TRENDS INTERIM REPORT
Energy Research and Development Division FINAL PROJECT REPORT CONTROL SYSTEM VENDOR CYBER SECURITY TRENDS INTERIM REPORT Prepared for: Prepared by: California Energy Commission KEMA, Inc. MAY 2014 CEC
Cyber security tackling the risks with new solutions and co-operation Miikka Pönniö 22.9.2015
Siemens Osakeyhtiö Cyber security tackling the risks with new solutions and co-operation Miikka Pönniö 22.9.2015 Restricted Siemens Osakeyhtiö 2015. All Rights Reserved. siemens.fi/answers Cyber security
Critical Infrastructure & Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) CYBER PROTECTION
Critical Infrastructure & Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) CYBER PROTECTION ALBERTO AL HERNANDEZ, ARMY RESERVE OFFICER, SOFTWARE ENGINEER PH.D. CANDIDATE, SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PRESENTATION
Solutions and IT services for Oil-Gas & Energy markets
Solutions and IT services for The context Companies operating in the Oil-Gas & Energy sectors are facing radical changes that have a significant impact on their business processes. In this context, compliance
Principles of Information Security, Fourth Edition. Chapter 12 Information Security Maintenance
Principles of Information Security, Fourth Edition Chapter 12 Information Security Maintenance Learning Objectives Upon completion of this material, you should be able to: Discuss the need for ongoing
New Era in Cyber Security. Technology Development
New Era in Cyber New Era in Cyber Security Security Technology Technology Development Development Combining the Power of the Oil and Gas Industry, DHS, and the Vendor Community to Combat Cyber Security
Lifecycle Solutions & Services. Managed Industrial Cyber Security Services
Lifecycle Solutions & Services Managed Industrial Cyber Security Services Around the world, industrial firms and critical infrastructure operators partner with Honeywell to address the unique requirements
IT Networking and Security
elearning Course Outlines IT Networking and Security powered by Calibrate elearning Course Outline CompTIA A+ 801: Fundamentals of Computer Hardware/Software www.medallionlearning.com Fundamentals of Computer
2. From a control perspective, the PRIMARY objective of classifying information assets is to:
MIS5206 Week 13 Your Name Date 1. When conducting a penetration test of an organization's internal network, which of the following approaches would BEST enable the conductor of the test to remain undetected
5 FAM 860 HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE
5 FAM 860 HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE (Office of Origin: IRM/BMP/GRP/SM) 5 FAM 861 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 5 FAM 861.1 Overall Department Policy a. Configuration management (CM) is the detailed
N-Dimension Solutions Cyber Security for Utilities
AGENDA ITEM NO.: 3.A. MEETING DATE; 08/18/2014 N-Dimension Solutions Cyber Security for Utilities Cyber Security Protection for Critical Infrastructure Assets The cyber threat is escalating - Confidential
Directives and Instructions Regarding Wireless LAN in Department of Defense (DoD) and other Federal Facilities
Directives and Instructions Regarding Wireless LAN in Department of Defense (DoD) and other Federal Facilities Wireless Infrastructure, Article 12-29-2011 The federal government, and the Department of
Cyber Security :: Insights & Recommendations for Secure Operations. N-Dimension Solutions, Inc.
Cyber Security :: Insights & Recommendations for Secure Operations N-Dimension Solutions, Inc. Cyber Security Protection for Critical Infrastructure Assets Agenda: Cyber Landscape Cyber Threats to Your
Industrial Control Systems Security Guide
Industrial Control Systems Security Guide Keith Stouffer, Engineering Lab National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST SP 800-82, Rev 2 and ICS Cybersecurity Testbed Keith Stouffer Project Leader,
The Protection Mission a constant endeavor
a constant endeavor The IT Protection Mission a constant endeavor As businesses become more and more dependent on IT, IT must face a higher bar for preparedness Cyber preparedness is the process of ensuring
The Case for Support: The Center for Cyber Security Studies at the U. S. Naval Academy
The Case for Support: The Center for Cyber Security Studies at the U. S. Naval Academy Computer and network security threats of the future are of concern today, and new strategies are required to ensure
Honeywell Industrial Cyber Security Overview and Managed Industrial Cyber Security Services Honeywell Process Solutions (HPS) June 4, 2014
Industrial Cyber Security Overview and Managed Industrial Cyber Security Services Process Solutions (HPS) June 4, Industrial Cyber Security Industrial Cyber Security is the leading provider of cyber security
future data and infrastructure
White Paper Smart Grid Security: Preparing for the Standards-Based Future without Neglecting the Needs of Today Are you prepared for future data and infrastructure security challenges? Steve Chasko Principal
On the use of Honeypots for Detecting Cyber Attacks on Industrial Control Networks
CIBSI 2013 Panama City, Panama, October 30 th, 2013 On the use of Honeypots for Detecting Cyber Attacks on Industrial Control Networks Paulo Simões, Tiago Cruz, Jorge Gomes, Edmundo Monteiro [email protected]
Directives and Instructions Regarding Security and Installation of Wireless LAN in DoD Federal Facilities
Directives and Instructions Regarding Security and Installation of Wireless LAN in DoD Federal Facilities Wireless Infrastructure, Article 3-15-2012 The federal government recognizes that standards based
Course: Information Security Management in e-governance. Day 1. Session 5: Securing Data and Operating systems
Course: Information Security Management in e-governance Day 1 Session 5: Securing Data and Operating systems Agenda Introduction to information, data and database systems Information security risks surrounding
OCIE CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE
Topic: Cybersecurity Examinations Key Takeaways: OCIE will be conducting examinations of more than 50 registered brokerdealers and registered investment advisers, focusing on areas related to cybersecurity.
TASK -040. TDSP Web Portal Project Cyber Security Standards Best Practices
Page 1 of 10 TSK- 040 Determine what PCI, NERC CIP cyber security standards are, which are applicable, and what requirements are around them. Find out what TRE thinks about the NERC CIP cyber security
A Systems Approach to HVAC Contractor Security
LLNL-JRNL-653695 A Systems Approach to HVAC Contractor Security K. M. Masica April 24, 2014 A Systems Approach to HVAC Contractor Security Disclaimer This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored
Top Five Data Security Trends Impacting Franchise Operators. Payment System Risk September 29, 2009
Top Five Data Security Trends Impacting Franchise Operators Payment System Risk September 29, 2009 Top Five Data Security Trends Agenda Data Security Environment Compromise Overview and Attack Methods
Nessus and Antivirus. January 31, 2014 (Revision 4)
Nessus and Antivirus January 31, 2014 (Revision 4) Table of Contents Introduction... 3 Standards and Conventions... 3 Overview... 3 A Note on SCAP Audits... 4 Microsoft Windows Defender... 4 Kaspersky
Code of Practice for Cyber Security in the Built Environment
Brochure More information from http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/3085299/ Code of Practice for Cyber Security in the Built Environment Description: This code of practice explains why and how cyber
Redhawk Network Security, LLC 62958 Layton Ave., Suite One, Bend, OR 97701 [email protected] 866-605- 6328 www.redhawksecurity.
Planning Guide for Penetration Testing John Pelley, CISSP, ISSAP, MBCI Long seen as a Payment Card Industry (PCI) best practice, penetration testing has become a requirement for PCI 3.1 effective July
THE FUTURE OF SMART GRID COMMUNICATIONS
THE FUTURE OF SMART GRID COMMUNICATIONS KENNETH C. BUDKA CTO STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES MAY 2014 THE GRID OF THE FUTURE WIDE-SCALE DEPLOYMENT OF RENEWABLES INCREASED ENERGY EFFICIENCY PEAK POWER REDUCTION, DEMAND
Critical Controls for Cyber Security. www.infogistic.com
Critical Controls for Cyber Security www.infogistic.com Understanding Risk Asset Threat Vulnerability Managing Risks Systematic Approach for Managing Risks Identify, characterize threats Assess the vulnerability
Ovation Security Center Data Sheet
Features Scans for vulnerabilities Discovers assets Deploys security patches transparently Allows only white-listed applications to run in workstations Provides virus protection for Ovation Windows workstations
CyberNEXS Global Services
CyberNEXS Global Services CYBERSECURITY A cyber training, exercising, competition and certification product for maximizing the cyber skills of your workforce The Cyber Network EXercise System CyberNEXS
North Dakota 2013 IT Security Audit Vulnerability Assessment & Penetration Test Project Briefing
North Dakota 2013 IT Security Audit Vulnerability Assessment & Penetration Test Project Briefing Introduction ManTech Project Manager Mark Shaw, Senior Executive Director Cyber Security Solutions Division
How To Ensure The C.E.A.S.A
APPENDI 3 TO SCHEDULE 3.3 TO THE COMPREHENSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE AGREEMENT APPENDI 3 TO SCHEDULE 3.3 TO THE COMPREHENSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE AGREEMENT TUGeneral TUSecurity TURequirements TUDesign TUIntegration
AUDIT REPORT. Cybersecurity Controls Over a Major National Nuclear Security Administration Information System
U.S. Department of Energy Office of Inspector General Office of Audits and Inspections AUDIT REPORT Cybersecurity Controls Over a Major National Nuclear Security Administration Information System DOE/IG-0938
SCADA and Security Are they Mutually Exclusive? Terry M. Draper, PE, PMP
SCADA and Security Are they Mutually Exclusive? Terry M. Draper, PE, PMP Today s Topics SCADA Overview SCADA System vs. IT Systems Risk Factors Threats Potential Vulnerabilities Specific Considerations
Wasting Money on the Tools? Automating the Most Critical Security Controls. Mason Brown Director, The SANS Institute
Wasting Money on the Tools? Automating the Most Critical Security Controls Bonus: Gaining Support From Top Managers for Security Investments Mason Brown Director, The SANS Institute The Most Trusted Name
Protecting Critical Infrastructure
Protecting Critical Infrastructure SCADA Network Security Monitoring March 20, 2015 Table of Contents Introduction... 4 SCADA Systems... 4 In This Paper... 4 SCADA Security... 4 Assessing the Security
FIREWALLS & NETWORK SECURITY with Intrusion Detection and VPNs, 2 nd ed. Chapter 4 Finding Network Vulnerabilities
FIREWALLS & NETWORK SECURITY with Intrusion Detection and VPNs, 2 nd ed. Chapter 4 Finding Network Vulnerabilities Learning Objectives Name the common categories of vulnerabilities Discuss common system
Post-Access Cyber Defense
Post-Access Cyber Defense Dr. Vipin Swarup Chief Scientist, Cyber Security The MITRE Corporation November 2015 Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. 15-3647. 2 Cyber Security Technical Center
Deterrent and detection of smart grid meter tampering and theft of electricity, water, or gas
Deterrent and detection of smart grid meter tampering and theft of electricity, water, or gas Jeff McCullough Introduction This white paper was inspired by real concerns regarding smart grid electric meters
SEMANTIC SECURITY ANALYSIS OF SCADA NETWORKS TO DETECT MALICIOUS CONTROL COMMANDS IN POWER GRID
SEMANTIC SECURITY ANALYSIS OF SCADA NETWORKS TO DETECT MALICIOUS CONTROL COMMANDS IN POWER GRID ZBIGNIEW KALBARCZYK EMAIL: [email protected] UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN JANUARY 2014
How to Integrate NERC s Requirements in an Ongoing Automation and Integration Project Framework
How to Integrate NERC s Requirements in an Ongoing Automation and Integration Project Framework Jacques Benoit, Cooper Power Systems Inc., Energy Automations Solutions - Cybectec Robert O Reilly, Cooper
Guideline on Auditing and Log Management
CMSGu2012-05 Mauritian Computer Emergency Response Team CERT-MU SECURITY GUIDELINE 2011-02 Enhancing Cyber Security in Mauritius Guideline on Auditing and Log Management National Computer Board Mauritius
SCADA Security Measures
Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Network and Security Research Center Department of Computer Science and Engineering Pennsylvania State University, University Park PA SCADA Security Measures
