Notice of Filing of Order

Transcription

1 State of Minnesota Clay County District Court Seventh Judicial District I Court Filt,;;tJumber: 14-CR Case Type: Crim/Traf Mandatory I Notice of Filing of Order STEVEN EVERETT BEITELSPACHER 715 N 11TH ST STE 404 MOORHEAD MN State of Minnesota vs ANGELIAC DIANE PAIGE GREENW ALDT You are notified that an order was filed on this date. Dated: March 25, 2014 cc: HEIDI MARGARET FISHER DAVIES Janice Cossette Court Administrator Clay County District Court PO Box 280, 807 North 11th St. Moorhead MN MNCIS-CRM-128 STATE Notice of Filing of Order Rev.: 12/2002

2 STATE OF MINNESOTA COUNTY OF CLAY IN DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CRIMINAL DIVISION State of Mitmesota, Plaintiff, vs. Court File No. 14-CR ORDER AND MEMORANDUM Angeliac Diane Paige Greenwaldt, Defendant. The above-entitled matter came before the undersigned Judge of District Court on March 6, 2014 as a Contested Omnibus Hearing pursuant to Defendanf s Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Complaint. Chief Assistant Clay County Attorney Heidi M.F. Davies, Esq. appeared on behalf of the State of Minnesota. Defendant Angeliac Greenwaldt appeared personally, along with her Attorney, Steven E. Beitelspacher, Esq. Both parties were allowed to submit written legal briefs in support of their respective positions. Having considered the exhibits, and oral and written arguments of the parties, the Court now makes the following: ORDER 1. Count 1 of the criminal complaint - Traffic DWI - Refuse to Submit to Chemical Test in violation of Mitm. Stat. 169A.20 subd. 2, is DISMISSED. 2. Count 2 of the complaint Traffic - DWI Operate Motor Vehicle Under the Influence of Alcohol in violation of Minn. Stat. 169A.20 subd. 1(1) shall proceed to trial and shall be added to the Court's Trial Calendar. 3. The attached Memorandum is herein incorporated by reference. r.'"jil- Dated this J> day of March, FILED MAR Clay Co CourtAdmin

3 State v. AngeUac Greenwaldt Case File No.: 14-CR Factual Background MEMORANDUM On or about February 2,2014 at approximately 9:30 p.m., Moorhead Police Officer Vern Heltemes responded to a call of a possibly impaired driver. He located the vehicle as it was pulling into the Taco John's parking lot. Officer Heltemes approached the driver who was identified as Angeliac Diane Paige Greenwaldt, the Defendant. Officer Heltemes observed that the Defendant had difficulty opening her car door, focusing on Officer Heltemes, had slurred speech, and a strong odor of alcohol about her. The Defendant nearly fell when she tried to exit the vehicle. Officer Heltemes arrested the Defendant and transported her to the Clay County Jail. At the Jail, the Defendant was read the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory and asked to take a breath test. The Defendant refused testing, stating the refusal was because of her "mental disabilities. " Through her Attorney, the Defendant moves this Court to dismiss the charge of test refusal, arguing it violates her constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment and Article I 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. Legal Analysis The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, 10. Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Minn. 2012). The State bears the burden to establish that a warrantless search or seizure was reasonable. State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the taking of blood, breath, or urine from the body is a search and seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, requiring a search warrant to perform those tests in the absence of one of the exceptions. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, , 109 S.Ct. 1402, (1989); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The two exceptions to the warrant requirement implicated in drinking and driving case are the consent exception and the exigent circumstances exception. Until the 2013 Supreme Court case of Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct (2013), Minnesota courts have upheld warrantless chemical tests of persons suspected of driving while intoxicated under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202, 214 (Minn. 2009); State v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538 (Minn. 2008) 2

4 State v. Angeliac Greenwaldt Case File No.: 14-CR (overruled by Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct (2013». The courts held that the evanescent nature of alcohol in the blood stream presented the single factor exigency of imminent destruction of evidence. Id. Post-McNeely, police officers can no longer rely on a per se exigency exception, but must apply a totality of the circumstances analysis on a case-by-case basis. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at Here, the State did not argue that there were exigent circumstances to uphold a warrantless search of the Defendant's blood, breath, or urine. This was a routine DWI stop and the only exigency was the natural dissipation of alcohol from the Defendant's blood stream. According to the United States and Minnesota Supreme Courts, this alone, cannot support a warrantless search in this case. See Id.; State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 567 (Minn. 2013). The second exception that applies to a warrantless search in drunk-driving cases is consent. Under this exception, if a suspect consents to submit to a chemical test, a warrant is not required. The State must prove that the consent was given voluntarily and without coercion. State v. Barajas, 817 N.W.2d 204, 218 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012). In the present case, the Defendant did not consent to a search of her blood, breath, or urine - she refused. Therefore, the consent exception does not apply. As noted above, the exigent circumstances exception does not apply to this case either. Therefore, any search done of the Defendant without a warrant would have been considered unreasonable. Here, Defendant exercised her right to be free of an unreasonable search and was charged criminally for doing so. See Minn. Stat. 169A.20 subd. 2 (making it a crime (gross misdemeanor) to refuse to submit to a chemical test of the blood, breath, or urine). Defendant challenges the constitutionality of this statute. The Minnesota Court of Appeals recently addressed the issue of the constitutionality of the test refusal statute in State v. Bernard,.- N.W.2d --, 2014 WL (Minn. Ct. App. March 17, 2014), In an unprecedented decision, the court held that when the circumstances of the case are such that the requesting officer could have secured a search warrant, any nonconsensual search of the defendant's blood, breath or urine would be reasonable; therefore the state may constitutionally criminalize "a suspected drunk driver's refusal to submit to a chemical test." Id. at *6. The court reasoned that the officer "indisputably had probable cause to believe" the defendant had been driving while impaired and therefore would have "also indisputably had the option to obtain a test of [defendant's] blood by search warrant." Id. at *4. The Court relies on State v. Wiseman, 816 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), cert, denied 133 S.Ct (2013), to support its reasoning that a "hypothetical warrant-sponsored test is [ ] a 3

5 State v. AngeUac Greenwaldt Case File No.: 14 CR 'constitutionally reasonable search. mid. However, the court in Wiseman did not rely on a "hypothetical warrant" to uphold the statutory test refusal scheme because they found a search of the defendant's blood would have been reasonable under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Wiseman, 816 N.W.2d at 695. Notably, the Bernard court cited no other authority to support its holding that a search is reasonable in the instance where a police officer could have obtained a search warrant but chose not to. A brief review of the Fourth Amendment and its progeny of cases interpreting it with respect to search warrants, reveals that for a governmental search to be considered reasonable and therefore not in violation of the Constitution, either the officer has obtained a warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate, or he can demonstrate one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,619, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009); Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Thompson v. LouiSiana, 469 U.S. 17,19-20,105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013). The United States Supreme Court addressed an argument similar to the one put forth by the Bernard Court in Katz v. U.S., 189 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct In Katz, government agents put electronic surveillance on a pay telephone it knew the defendant would be using. Id. at 354, 88 S.Ct The agents did not seek a warrant prior to conducting the electronic surveillance, even though they had been doing an investigation and had probable cause to seek a warrant. Id. The Court conceded that given the information the agents had in this case, a magistrate "could constitutionally have authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the Government asserts in fact took place." Id. However, the Court declined to sanction the search in this case, stating: The Government urges that,... because they did no more here than they might properly have done with prior judicial sanction, we should retroactively validate their conduct. That we cannot do.... In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end. Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause, for the Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer * * * be interposed between the citizen and the police * * *.' 'Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the (Fourth) Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,' and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge 4

6 State v. Angeliac Greenwaldt Case File No.: 14-CR or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -subject only to a few specifically established and well~delineated exceptions. Id at , 88 S. Ct. at 514 (internal citations omitted). Further, the Court stated, Omission of such authorization [securing a warrant based upon probable cause from a magistrate] 'bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after~the~event justification for the * * * search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment.' Beck v. State o/ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85S.Ct. 223,228, 13 L.Ed.2d 142. And bypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a search leaves individuals secure from Fourth Amendment violations 'only in the discretion of the police.' Id., at 97, 85 S.Ct. at 229. Katz, at ,88 S.Ct. at 515. In Camara v. Municipal Court 0/ City and County of San Francisco, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a person can be charged with a crime for refusing to allow the government to search his premises in absence of a warrant or exception to the warrant requirement. 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.ed.2d 930 (1967). The Court noted that in that case, there was no emergency demanding immediate access, the inspector attempted three times to get consent and was denied, and the inspector could have gotten a warrant but did not attempt to get one. Id. at 540, 87 S.Ct. at The Court held that the "appellant had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection." Id. This Court and other District Courts across the state seem to be presented with quite a conundrum following the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in Bernard. The Court of Appeals has applied the Fourth Amendment in a way no Court has ever approved. overwhelming authority from the U.S. Supreme Court and Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a search executed without a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement is per se unreasonable and in violation of the Constitution. See Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1414; Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485; Katz, 389 U.S. 347,357,88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576; Thompson, 469 U.S. 17, 19~20, 105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246; McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696; State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W,2d 218, 221~22 (Minn. 1992); Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 568. As noted above, none of those exceptions include what the Bernard Court is offering The that because an officer had cause to get a warrant but didn't, the 5

7 State v. Angeliac Greenwaldt Case File No.: 14-CR-I4-344 search is reasonable. In such a scenario, a citizen's Fourth Amendment right to be secure in hislher person is left at the discretion of the police, in direct contradiction to the mandate of the Fourth Amendment. See U.S Const. amend. IV ("[N]o warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."); u.s. v. Jeffers, 342 U.SA8, 51, 72 S.Ct. 93, 95, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951). District Courts are bound to follow the higher courts of the state on issues of state statutory and constitutional law. See generally Dayton Co. v. Carpet Linoleum & Resilient Floor Decorators' Union Local 596 AFL, 229 Minn. 87,39 N.W.2d 183 (1949), appeal dismissed 339 U.S. 906 (1950). The interpretation placed upon the state Constitution by the state Supreme Court is final, but, where state statutes are substantially the same as federal statutes, decisions of the United States Supreme Court will be followed. Id. at 100. Consequently, decisions of the United States Supreme Court are binding upon state courts on federal constitutional questions; they are controlling where questions arise primarily under the Constitution of the United States. [d. citing, State v. Weyerhauser, 72 Minn. 519, 75 N.W. 718; City of Waseca v. Braun, 206 Minn. 154, 288 N.W. 229; Dahl v. Collette, 202 Minn. 544, 279 N.W. 561; Glover v. Minneapolis BUilding Trades Council, 215 Minn. 533, 10 N.W.2d 481, 147 A.L.R. 1071; Coons v. Journeymen Barbers, etc., Union, 222 Minn. 100, 23 N.W.2d 345; State v. Continental Oil Co., 218 Minn. 123,15 N.W.2d 542. The question to be answered in this case, is can the state impose criminal sanctions on a person who exercises hislher Fourth Amendment constitutional right to be free of an unreasonable search? Given that the scope of the issue clearly revolves around matters concerning the United States Constitution, this Court is bound to follow the precedents set by the United States Supreme Court. Consequently, this Court, following the holding of Camara, finds the State cannot criminalize such an unreasonable search. The Minnesota Supreme Court has conceded that the "governrnent may not grant a privilege on condition that the recipient forfeits a constitutional right." Netland, 762 N.W.2d at 211, citing Frostv. R.R. Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 592, 46 S.Ct. 605,10 L.Ed (1926). The Supreme Court in Frost v. Railroad Commission of California. articulated this concept best: [A]s a general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state 6

8 State v. Angeliac Greenwaldt Case File No.: 14 CR may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence. 271 U.S. at , 46 S.Ct As applied to Minnesota's test refusal statute, this is exactly what the legislature has done. When an individual exercises hislher right to refuse to be unreasonably searched, helshe is charged with a crime. Minn. Stat. 169A.20 subd. 2. The United States Supreme Court has held that a Defendant cannot be constitutionally convicted for refusing an unreasonable search. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 540, 87 S.Ct. at In this case, at the time the officer requested a breath sample from the Defendant, he did not have a warrant or an exception that would have allowed a warrantless search. Therefore the search would have been unreasonable. It follows that the Defendant cannot be convicted of the crime of test refusal (Minn. Stat. 169A.20 subd. 2) on the facts of this case, despite the fact that the officer likely had enough cause to obtain a judicially-sanctioned search warrant. Therefore, Count 1 of the complaint - Traffic - DWI - Refuse to Submit to Chemical Test in violation of Minn. Stat. 169A.20 subd. 2 is DISMISSED. The parties shall proceed on Count 2 of the complaint - Operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of Minn. Stat. 169A.20 subd. 1(1). The Court declines to find the test refusal statute unconstitutional at this time as requested by the Defendant. The "power to declare a statute unconstitutional should be exercised with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary." Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d at 364. The Court must "uphold a statute unless the challenging party demonstrates that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt." Irongate Enterprises, Inc. v. Cnty. of St. Louis, 736 N.W.2d 326, 332 (Minn. 2007). Thus Defendant bears a "very heavy burden." State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 566 (Minn. 1997). She cannot sustain that burden, if only because reasonable District Judges across this state disagree on this question. The constitutionality of the implied consent law and test refusal statute is, at most, merely uncertain-not beyond reasonable FILED MAR Clay Co court Admin