Vonage and VoIP Executive Summary and Report

Transcription

1 2008 Vonage and VoIP Executive Summary and Report This report examines how Vonage brought VoIP to market and the ways in which the opportunity was structured and exploited. Charles Cieutat, Takashi Mikoshiba, Rama Oruganti, Gabriel Tassain Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall /14/2008

2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A/ Summary Context for Voice over IP (VoIP): VoIP was a major innovation in the communications industries of the late 90 s where incumbents telcos and cablecos provided regulated communication services. VoIP allowed communicating by voice through the Internet instead of the old telephony lines. VOIP providers did not build or lease costly "last-mile" connections to the subscribers. VoIP was introduced in 1995 and saw the construction of a well-integrated and riskmitigated ecosystem around the technology. VoIP market: VoIP was a revolutionary technology that saw tremendous growth (170% CAGR between 1998 and 2003) and created a large amount of new entrants in the telephone market who saw an opportunity to capture a substantial market share of the high profit land-line phone business of incumbents. By 2005, 1,100 US companies were providing VoIP services. Vonage s mode of entry: Vonage leveraged the growing broadband infrastructure and the maturing voice over IP technologies to launch the service directly to the residential customer in 2002 when there was 10% broadband penetration. It positioned itself against incumbent offerings by focusing on price, features, and services differentiation. Vonage competitive positioning and market expectations for VoIP: Although the VoIP is suspected to grow significantly in the years to come, most growth should be absorbed by cablecos. The sustainability of Vonage s business model seems at risk. B/ Major Findings Market prospects were high enough for major VoIP players to build a well-functioning ecosystem where initiative and integration risks were mitigated, but where interdependence to Internet was high. The strategic principle of first mover advantage was more of a disadvantage. VoIP was a successful innovation. It allowed emulating the communications regulated market while at the same time providing service providers and carriers a cheaper and Internetintegrated way to provide voice services to residential and especially corporate consumers VoIP service providers used judo strategy exposing themselves to cheap telephony where incumbents, especially telcos had high profit margins on land-line telephony that they wanted to secure. As such, incumbents were slow to respond. VoIP pure-play business models such as Vonage s is not sustainable, easily imitable by competitors, and at the mercy of incumbents, especially cablecos. Vonage would be better off finding an exit strategy. Vonage s current main value is its highquality ~3M subscribers that could be of great interest for cablecos. 2 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

3 A/ CONTEXT FOR VOIP 1/ Relevant Markets and Industries Affected In the 90 s, the communications industry was segmented into three major types of service providers that relied on different technologies to provide their services: Telecommunications companies (AT&T, Verizon) that provided o Land-line telephone services using the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) o Internet services using the public Internet Internet Service Providers (AOL) that provided their residential customers access to the public Internet Cable companies (Comcast, Time Warner Cable) that used cable technology to provide mostly TV services The U.S. telephone industry is regulated. The Telephone companies (Baby Bells) are required to provide telephone service in their assigned territory by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Voice over IP was a major innovation in the communications industries of the late 90 s. In the 90 s, the communications industry experienced significant growth due to the increase of communications worldwide. The major driver of increased bandwidth consumption was of course the massive adoption of the Internet. Until the late 90 s, Internet access was mostly done through dial-up. Broadband connections (cable and DSL) gained traction on the market only in the beginning of the 2000 s. But what is VoIP? VoIP is a technology to make telephone calls using an internet connection instead of the regular phone lines. In 1995, Vocaltec released the first internet phone software. This software was designed to run on a home PC and much like the PC phones used today, it utilized sound cards, microphones and speakers. The software was called "Internet Phone" and used the H.323 protocol instead of the SIP protocol that is more prevalent today. A major drawback in 1995 was the lack of broadband availability, and as such, this software used modems which resulted in poor voice quality when compared to a normal telephone call. 3 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

4 In 1996, VoIP was a revolutionary technology that created a large amount of new entrants in the telephone market VoIP service providers who saw an opportunity to compete and capture a substantial market share of the land-line phone business of the large telecommunications companies. As such, in 1996, Internet phones catch the attention of US telecommunication companies, which ask the US Congress to ban the technology. Indeed, at first, VoIP was seen by telcos as a substitute of their lucrative land-line business. 2/ Organizational and Technological Issues For VoIP to succeed as an innovation, an ecosystem had to be built. As VoIP was an incremental innovation based on a radical innovation the Internet the VoIP ecosystem benefited from actors that already existed from the Internet arena. 4 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

5 Technology manufacturers VoIP technology initiators Vocaltec, Level 3, NexTone VoIP backbone manufacturers Cisco, Sonus Networks End-user equipment makers -Computers (Dell, HP) - Electronics (Logitech) -End-user equipment (modems, box) Pure-play VoIP service providers Vonage, Skype Incumbent service providers -Telcos (AT&T, Verizon) -Cable (Comcast, Time Warner) VoIP consumer -Residential -SMBs, Corporates End-user Service Providers Standardization bodies 3GPP, IETF, IEEE Government / Regulators FCC Standardization & Regulation In the early ages of VoIP, initiative risk was high. Several protocols ITU-T H.323, IETF Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), Internet Multimedia System (IMS) and digital signal processors also known as codecs were written and implemented by different standardization bodies. Two approaches were undertaken to build VoIP capabilities: Integrated VoIP network: the architecture of a VoIP network includes soft-switches, media gateways and servers, and application servers. Interestingly, Level 3, an Internet backbone telecom service provider, predicted the importance of VoIP in the future. Level 3 played a key role in developing standards, hardware, and software that allowed building VoIP networks. Peer-to-peer network: Skype introduced this technology that relies uniquely on software in customers endpoints. Therefore, P2P networks do not require central servers such as in integrated VoIP networks. This flat architecture allows keeping capital and operational expenditures at a minimum. The technology initiative risk was initially high, but was contained by: The standardization work pursued by the 3GPP forum to harmonize and retain IMS and SIP as the main VoIP protocols The development of VoIP networking equipment and standards by key players in the industry such as Level 3 (backbone VoIP network and integration with PSTN), Cisco (enterprise VoIP), Sonus Networks (reengineering of PSTN), and NexTone (H.323 to SIP) On top of technological issues, the initiative risk was increased by extensive regulations from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC required VoIP service providers to 5 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

6 comply with requirements comparable to those for traditional telecommunications service providers: local number portability; make service accessible to people with disabilities; pay regulatory fees, universal service contributions, and other mandated payments; and enable law enforcement authorities to conduct surveillance pursuant to the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). On the other hand, the underlying innovation for VoIP Internet had not yet taken off because of dial-up access technologies. The low dial-up bandwidth and the inadequate capability of the public Internet to transfer time sensitive packets for voice resulted in VoIP with high latency and jitter. In the VoIP ecosystem, the interdependence risk with broadband internet access was high. Another major challenge was the integration risk between VoIP and the existing technologies and networks. For example, a call between a VoIP phone and a land-line phone must be routed from the Internet to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). Integration risk was mitigated by the same actors as in the initiative risk, such as Cisco, Level 3, Sonus Networks, etc. By 1998, VoIP had reached some potential. A number of entrepreneurs started setting up gateways to allow first PC-to-Phone and later Phone-to-Phone connections. Some of these entrepreneurs started by providing customers a facility to make free phone calls using the regular phone. This free to the customer marketing model, was sponsored by various advertising companies or agencies. These services often required the services of a PC to originate the call, although the actual communication was from phone to phone. VoIP service relied on advertising sponsorship to subsidize costs, as opposed to charging customers for calls was the first year of massive adoption of broadband Internet, which eventually unleashed the potential for VoIP. Overall, on the period 1998 to 2003, VoIP traffic grew at a CAGR of 170% 1. B/ VOIP MARKET 1/ Residential Telecommunication Market At the time Vonage started its service in 2002, the main players in the home fixed phone market were local exchange carriers such as AT&T, Verizon, Qwest and BellSouth (later acquired by AT&T), and companies like MCI and Sprint also had a significant presence in the long distance market. As discussed later, the broadband was just starting to accelerate its penetration into the home market, and cable companies such as Comcast, Cablevision and Time 1 See Exhibit 1 6 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

7 Warner did not have much of a presence in the phone market at the time. In 2003, CIA reported that the number of landline telephones in the US was 268 million (including home and office use). We estimate that the total market size for the US residential landline telecom market was somewhere around $70 billion (268M x 50% office/home ratio (assumption) x $45/month fee (assumption) = $72 Billion), and VoIP pure plays like Vonage had a good chance to capture a good portion of the value through its innovative pricing strategy which provided unlimited local and long-distance calls for less than $40 per month. 2/ Vonage and other VoIP Service Providers Vonage and 8x8 Inc. (Packet 8) were the early entrants in the VoIP services, and many other players followed as the Vonage and 8x8 started to gain shares and as home broadband continued its adoption in 2003 and By 2005, the VoIP pure play was a red-hot market, and more than 1,100 US companies were providing VoIP services. The common thread was that they all offered low fixed voice prices to anywhere in the world. As the VoIP pure plays were expanding rapidly, another giant started to emerge the Skype technologies. Skype differed from the VoIP pure plays such as Vonage in that Skype was a free and proprietary PC software that allowed VoIP communication for PC-to-PC users for free of charge. Although both types of players used VoIP for its services, the revenue generating model was each quite different. 3/ Business and Revenue Models Vonage vs. Skype Vonage: Vonage and other VoIP pure-plays relied on its fixed monthly fee for its revenues. Therefore, their revenue grew as soon as they acquire a new customer, and seemed to add a lot of value and made a lot of sense for customers that used a lot of long distance calls from home. When customers contracted with Vonage, they received a device/router that linked a phone and the broadband connection. Skype: As Skype started its services as a free PC-to-PC VoIP provider, they did not require any sort of routers or equipment, and therefore incurred no fixed cost or variable cost (except for operation maintenance and upgrading cost) once the software was developed. In the initial stages, they did not really have any revenue sources but attracted users on an exponential basis especially for long distance and international communication. Soon after, Skype started a PCto-phone and Phone-to-PC services called Skype-Out and Skype-In, and charged fees on percall/minute-by-minute basis. The pricing scheme was attractive for users who did not want to pay monthly fixed fees, but the disadvantage of Skype was that you had to be online on your PC to make or receive a call. (They later did introduce physical phones and monthly fixed plans.) 7 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

8 One advantage of Skype is that it is portable like mobile phones and can make a call from anywhere as long as one has a broadband connection. 4/ Is Vonage Business Model and Growth Sustainable? As Vonage and other VoIP pure-plays started to erode market share and customers from incumbent telcos, telcos remained relatively silent in the initial stages and seemed to be observing the effect and the future impact. First, a lot of customers did not cancel traditional landline contracts even if they started to use VoIP services. Second, incumbents were still enjoying a high profit margin with their current customers, and reducing their monthly fixed fee for as a competitive action and retention measures would probably decrease their existing revenue and profit. For incumbent telcos, price cut was an easy measure that could be implemented, and even as early as 2003, some analysts and researchers were questioning the growth sustainability of Vonage and other VoIP pure-plays. With the rapid growth of Vonage s customer base, it seemed that VoIP were shaking the land-line market and capturing a large pie in the fixed phone value chain. Nevertheless, telcos and other cable companies had the ability to bundle products in ways that portion of fees for VoIP services seems very small. Vonage and other VoIP pure-plays basically provided a stand-alone product, and their ability to compete with incumbent and other cable companies remains to be seen. C/ VONAGE: TIMELINE AND MODE OF ENTRY Vonage transmits calls using VoIP technology, which converts voice signals into digital data packets for transmission over the Internet. Vonage provides its service by using its customers' existing broadband Internet connections, eliminating the need for Vonage to build or lease costly "last-mile" connections. 1/ Timing 8 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

9 The company launched services in March 2002 and, in that year, it completed five million calls. The company ended 2002 with 7,800 subscriber lines, and, by mid-2006, that subscriber base has increased to nearly 1.9 million. 95% of Vonage lines were in the United States. Vonage s market entry occurred when broadband internet connections started taking off in the US. Vonage saw the opportunity to leverage the broadband connections to transfer voice, not just data packets. This idea parallels how telephone evolved from telegraph. Cable companies and telcos invested in the infrastructure but companies such as Vonage started extracting value. At that time, roughly 10% of the adult Americans had access to high-speed internet connections 2. This allowed the company to grow with the growing base of potential customers. Given that telecom carriers traditionally required DSL subscribers to also purchase a local access line, many existing Vonage customers likely use a cable modem or an alternative broadband connection. The increasing growth of cable based broadband connections versus the DSL also allowed the growth of Vonage as an independent VOIP provider. Being the first significant competitor in the market to offer an independent VoIP offering across much of the country enabled Vonage to capitalize on the accelerating shift from traditional telephony services to VoIP services. This trend was helped by Vonage s emphasis on service and features that traditional telecoms and cable companies sorely lacked. 2/ Entry Vonage leveraged the growing broadband infrastructure and the maturing voice over IP technologies to launch the service directly to the residential customer. It positioned itself against traditional telecommunication offerings and initially focused on price differentiation and then moved towards differentiating based on price, features and service. The company targets both the price sensitive costumer looking for basic service and the more sophisticated customers who are looking for advanced features (some offered a-la-carte) that are unavailable with the regular phone providers. 2 See exhibits for a comparison of dial-up vs. broadband Internet access 9 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

10 Vonage priced at around $25, compared to incumbents that priced from $35 to $50. As such, Vonage priced competitively the company priced the unlimited call product vis-à-vis the incumbent telecom providers. 3/ How a Vonage Phone Works A more detailed view of the Vonage network and technologies can be found in Exhibit. 4/ Vonage Strategic Model Vonage offers fixed-price calling plans which are billed monthly. The plans include many of the calling features offered by the traditional telephone companies, including call- waiting, caller ID, and call forwarding. Vonage also offers services not usually provided by the traditional carriers, such as area code selection, Web-based voic , and a comprehensive account management Web site. In addition, Vonage offers some premium services on an a la carte basis, such as toll-free numbers, fax numbers, and virtual phone numbers. The key strategies for Vonage s success are: Marketing to build a strong brand and drive subscriber growth Vonage drives subscriber growth by building a strong brand and customer awareness through aggressive marketing through internet, television, print, radio, and promotional advertising. Improving Customer Service to Attack Churn Improving customer service to attack churn is a key priority for Vonage. The company continually strives to keep up the level of service with the growing customer base to reduce costly costumer churn. It is cheaper to retain an existing customer than to acquire a new one. 10 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

11 Aggressive pricing to keep off competition Vonage continuously and aggressively prices its unlimited residential package to meet the competition. For example, it lowered its price of $39.99/month, to $34.99/month in September 2003, $29.99/month in May2004, and then to $24.99/month in October In addition, the company continues to run first-month-free promotions on select service plans. Cost Effective Distribution Vonage s uses two main channels: the direct sales channel and the retail sales channel. The direct sales channel, which includes Vonage s Web site, toll-free numbers, and limited outbound telephone sales, contributes more than 80% of the company s total new subscriber additions. The direct sales channel also includes additions from Vonage s Refer-A-Friend program (about 10% of total new subscribers), where existing customers receive up to two months of service credit for referring a new customer. The retail channel is an important growth driver for the company despite its relatively smaller size. Vonage is sold in over 11,000 retail stores, including Wal-Mart, Best Buy, Circuit City, and Staples. Innovation and enhanced competitive features Vonage strives to offer a variety of unique features such as web-based voic and area code selection along with high quality, good service at a lower price point. D/ VONAGE COMPETITIVE POSITIONING AND MARKET EXPECTATIONS FOR VOIP 1/ Level of Resources Committed Resources committed to VoIP technology varies according to the specific service provider. Traditional phone service providers (e.g. ATT, Verizon), required a big level on investment in technology to replace its existent equipment. However, in many cases these companies can leverage the infrastructure already installed (physical lines). Cable companies (e.g. Comcast, Cablevision, Time Warner) can also leverage their already installed infrastructure with the benefit that VoIP services do not cannibalize their other services (e.g. TV). Finally, pure-play companies (e.g. Vonage) lack the infrastructure necessary to reach customers, but they can rely on the broadband services provided by any of the other players in the market. This clearly puts pure-play companies in a difficult position to compete, mainly against cable companies. Vonage initiated operations in 2001 when the company secured $12 million in its initial round of financing. Since then the company has been able to raise additional capital, and by 2005 total investment in the company were $658 million after raising $250 million in convertible debt funding with a group of investors that same year. 11 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

12 2/ Exit Strategies and Reversibility of Commitments VoIP technology demands a big level of investment. Cable companies are better positioned to reverse their commitments in VoIP since this technology does not affect their ability of offer other services (TV, broadband). For Telcos, this situation is different since VoIP tends to replace traditional landlines, and it s not surprising that by 2008 Telcos were not a big player in VoIP. However, it s important to mention that during the last years many consumers did not replace its landlines but rather complemented them with VoIP mainly for long distance call. Finally, pure-play companies are in the worse position to reverse their commitments. These companies were created with the objective of providing VoIP services, and lack the capabilities to provide other services if they have to revert their commitments. 3/ Market Expectations In 2004, Gartner Dataquest projected that 17 percent of all wired voice connections in North American households will be IP-based by In 2005, Forrester declared the VoIP market was not living up to expectations, mainly due to consumer s lack of interest in the technology. Since 2005, adoption of pure-play and over-the-top (OTT) telco-provided VoIP services remained at 3% of US consumers. These customers were mainly attracted by low prices for long-distance and especially international calling and additional service features. In 2006, Vonage forecasted 4.8M subscribers by 2008 and 8.9M by By 2008, Vonage had only 2.6M subscribers, almost the same number as in 2006 and around 50% off forecast. Currently 15% of residential lines are VoIP, however, there is not a direct substitution effect between VoIP and traditional landlines since many users decide to use both technologies simultaneously. Cable companies are considered to be the main driver for IP-based voice services growth and could accelerate technology adoption rates. For example, cable companies can easily offer bundled services to customers. Forrester Research forecasts that cable companies will claim 80% of the 28.4 Million residential VoIP users by The Yankee group and TeleGeography have similar predictions. 12 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

13 CONCLUSION VoIP, as a technology itself, was a successful innovation, with a 170% CAGR between 1998 and Market prospects were high enough for major VoIP players to build a well-functioning eco-system where initiative and integration risks were mitigated. On the other hand, because VoIP was an incremental innovation that built on Internet a radical innovation the interdependence risk was high. There was definitely a chasm to cross between 1995 and VoIP was a laggard technology that really saw its adoption increase significantly after 2000, when broadband Internet hit the masses. VoIP was dependant on broadband Internet to provide to the user an experience that would make VoIP a substitute of plain old telephony, but at a lower cost to the user. Between 1995 and 2000, VoIP had definitely a chasm to cross: numerous VoIP service providers entered the market, but few of them survived the Internet era when in 2000 the markets collapsed. With such interdependence risk with the Internet, the famous strategic principle of first mover advantage was more of a disadvantage. In 2000, with VoIP technology ready in terms of functionality and bandwidth, new entrants such as Vonage entered the market. They created value to residential customers by proposing an alternative to incumbents. Their value proposition was to: 1/ make VoIP user-friendly and 2/ provide a substitute to the old telephony especially for long distance calls at a cheaper price. In a way, VoIP service providers used judo strategy exposing themselves to cheap telephony where incumbents, especially telcos had high profit margins on land-line telephony that they wanted to secure. As such, incumbents were slow to respond. Vonage captured value from its value proposition based on price, as witnessed by its ability to capture about 2.5 million lines in the U.S. between 2001 and 2007 and a successful IPO in Nevertheless, we believe Vonage business model is not sustainable on the long term. Vonage s business model as a pure-play VoIP provider is clearly easily imitable by competitors. Moreover, Vonage is at the mercy of incumbents, especially cablecos that have used the VoIP technology to provide VoIP telephony services at very low marginal costs. As such, Vonage can definitely be attacked by incumbents on the basis of price. Moreover, as pure-play telephony players, Vonage is again attackable on bundling of voice, Internet, and TV by telcos and cablecos. Finally, Vonage is going through numerous ongoing litigations that could significantly threaten Vonage to pursue business. Based on the competitiveness of the market and Vonage s unsustainable business model on the long-term, we believe that Vonage would be better off finding an exit strategy. Vonage s current main value is its high-quality low-churn ~3M subscribers that were acquired with 13 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

14 significant investment in advertising and marketing. We believe cablecos would be a suitable acquirer of Vonage s subscribers, because of their ability to add subscribers to their internet network without significant investment in technology. Cablecos could also see great up-sell opportunities. Similar to the tussle between Netscape and Microsoft, Vonage was able to thrive based on judo strategy moves against the large incumbents. As we know from basic strategy principles, a mode of entry for small players is to invest in niche markets and not face directly their competitors. Such a strategy could be successful in the long-term, but incumbents, such as Microsoft, sometimes become experts at judo moves themselves. In retrospect, we believe that Vonage should have evaluated its business model and found better ways to provide more value to its customers. The key here is that Vonage is trying to capture value in an ecosystem where others can offer a good-enough VoIP solution and gain value through their non-voip offerings. In the best case, Vonage can sell itself or partner with other Internet/cable service providers. Even though we believe that VoIP pure-play service providers are in the extinction mode, VoIP was a successful innovation. It allowed emulating the regulated communications market especially bundling and convergence while at the same time providing service providers and carriers a cheaper and Internet-integrated way to provide voice services to residential and especially corporate consumers. 14 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

15 Traffic (Millions of minutes) ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INNOVATION STRATEGY EXHIBITS Exhibit 1: Telephone traffic to 2003 International Cross Border VoIP and PSTN Traffic CAGR 15% 180 PSTN Traffic VoIP Traffic % Source: The Essential Guide to Telecommunications, Fourth Edition 170% 15 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

16 Exhibit 2: Broadband vs. dial-up penetration in the U.S., Source: Pew Internet & American Life Project Exhibit 3: Monthly charge for telephone services, 2002 $60.00 Monthly Charge in 2002 $50.00 $40.00 $30.00 $20.00 $10.00 $- Vonage Verizon AT&T Qwest BellSouth Source: Company website and Bear Stearns report 16 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

17 Exhibit 4: Description of Vonage network and technology 17 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

18 Exhibit 5: Stock performance of Comcast (CMCSA), Vonage (VG), Nasdaq (IXIC), 8X8 Inc. (EGHT) Source: Google Finance Exhibit 6: Vonage number of subscribers 2003 to 2007 Source: Vonage website 18 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

19 Exhibit 7: VoIP telephony lines segmentation Residential broadband telephony lines (millions) VoIP: telco (managed) VoIP: pure play/telco (OTT) VoIP: cableco Residential broadband telephony lines (millions) Actual Forecast VoIP: telco (managed) VoIP: pure play/telco (OTT) VoIP: cableco Source: Forrester Research 19 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008

20 SOURCES Wikipedia, VoIP The Essential Guide to Telecommunications, Fourth Edition, Chapter 4: VoIP, the PSTN, and Signaling and Official websites of Vonage 2006 and 2007 Vonage Annual reports and 10-K Deutsche Bank Analyst Reports on Vonage Aug 2006 and May 2008 Bear Stearns Analyst Reports on Vonage Aug, 2006 and May 2008 Ativo Research on Vonage June 2008 Stanford Group Company Report on Vonage May Forrester Gartner Yankee Group Wall Street Journal New York Times 20 Vonage and VoIP Entrepreneurship and Innovation strategy, Fall 2008