MISSIV. Datum. Postadress Besöksad ress Telefon Telefax E-post, Internet

Transcription

1 MISSIV Datum Beteckning Sida 1 (2) Ert tjänsteställe, handläggare Ert datum Er beteckning Vårt tjänsteställe, handläggare Vårt föregående datum Vår föregående beteckning Ulf Hassgård, , ulf.hassgard@mil.se Beslut - C INSATS inriktningsdokument för interoperabla ledningssystem (l huvuddokument, 24 bilagor (varav 1 hemlig), 2 underbilagor) Bakgrund I enlighet med INSDIR har C INSATS inriktningsdokument för interoperab1a ledningssystem (Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Documentfor lnteroperabilty Enabling Systems) reviderats. Syftet med dokumentet är att beskriva och säkerställa Försvarsmaktens fortsatta implementeringen inom området interoperabla lednings- och kommunikationssystem ur främst ett operativt perspektiv. Dokumentet beskriver därmed det operativa nyttjandet av taktiska datalänkar, säker identifiering, skyddat tal, skyddad text och andra interoperabilitetsskapande system i tidsperioden Dokumentet är synkroniserat med Försvarsmaktens Utvecklingsplan och Materielplan. Beslut Beslut om fastställande av C INSATS inriktningsdokument för interoperabla ledningssystem har fattats av genit Anders Silwer. Tidigare beslut i detta ärende (HKV :62897) upphävs som en följd av detta. I den slutliga beredningen har öv Mats Helgesson och övlt Ulf Hassgård deltagit, MOfJgande Anders Silwer Försvarsmaktens insatschef (UH) Postadress Besöksad ress Telefon Telefax E-post, Internet Högkvarteret Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se Stockholm

2 FÖRSVARSMAKTEN MISSIV HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 2 (2) BOl I a~or Enclosure 1 - Main document Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Document for Interoperability Enabling Systems Enclosure 2 Joint Tactical Data Links Concept of Operations Enclosure 3 Joint Identification Friend or Foe Concept of Operations Enclosure 4 Joint Secure Voice Concept of Operations Enclosure 5 Joint Secure Text Concept of Operations Enclosure 6 Joint Infrastructure Concept of Operations Annex A Contral and Reporting Centre Annex B ASC 890 Annex C JAS 39 Annex D C-l30 Annex E Airbase Annex F Helicopter 14 Annex G Helicopter 15 Annex H Helicopter 16 Annex I Sea Surveillance Battalion Annex J Corvettes Annex K Mine Counter Measures Vessels Annex L Submarines Annex M Support Vessels Annex N Amphibious Annex O Ground Based Air Defence Annex P Tactical Air Controi Party Annex Q (HKV Special Operations Forces H/S 12 J00:82432) Annex R Joint Data Link Operations Centre Appendix A List of Contributors and Abbreviations Appendix B Platform Implementation Matrices Sändlista Som orientering FMV (SML, AK LED, AK MARK, AK SjÖ, AK Flyg & Rymd) Som orientering inom Försvarsmakten LG, 119, K 3, P 4, P 7, A 9, Lv 6, Ing 2, LedR, TrängR, 1. ubflj, 3. sjöstriflj, 4. sjöstriflj, Amf 1, MarinB, F 7, F 17, F 21, Hkpflj, FMLOG, FMTM, MHS K, MHS H, MSS, SSS, LSS, FMTS Inom Högkvarteret STF C INSATS, SC INSS, INSS JO, INSS 13, INSS J5, INSS J6, INSS 17, INSS SFL, ATS, MTS, FTS Som orientering inom Högkvarteret LEDS, LEDS CIO, PROD LEDUND, MUST

3 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 1 (35) Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Document for INTEROPERABILITY ENABLING SYSTEMS Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

4 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 2 (35) List of contents Abbreviations and acronyms... 4 Foreword... 5 Executive Summary... 6 List of References Introduction Background Scope Assumptions Aim Policy Methodology of documentation Introduction Documentation structure Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Document for Interoperability Enabling Systems Concept of Operations (CONOPS) documents Platform annexes Swedish Armed Forces Operations Introduction Coalition Operations Command structure Swedish national operations EU US/NATO PfP UN Swedish Armed Forces Operations roles General Joint Operations Ground Operations Ground operations overview Small scale rotational deployment to existing mission/operation Small scale new mission/operation Large scale stand-alone mission/action Large scale new mission/operations Large scale rotation to existing mission/operation Maritime Operations Maritime operations overview Small scale maritime missions/operations Air Operations Air operations overview Small scale Air operations/missions - in on-going operations Small scale Air operations Stand Alone Ground/surface to air interface operations Interoperability Enablers Introduction... 25

5 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 3 (35) 6.2. TDLs Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Secure voice communications Secure text/data communication Software Defined Radios Common Infrastructure Organisational structure Structure and Hierarchy Joint C3 Board Joint TDL and Joint IFF Directorates Försvarets Materielverk (FMV), Swedish Defence Material Administration Training Organisation FMTM Swedish Armed Forces Network and Telecommunications Unit Joint Data Links Operations Cell (JDLOC) Army, Navy, and Air Force (Service level) Unit TDL Officers (UTOs)... 35

6 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 4 (35) Issue Status Number Date Comments Review Issue Review Issue Review comments added, text corrected Final Issue Abbreviations and acronyms A complete list of abbreviations and acronyms used in this document and associated CONOPS and platform annexes can be found at Appendix A to this document.

7 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 5 (35) Foreword Threats against international peace and security have changed during the last decade. Conflicts and crises in faraway parts of the world may quickly have an effect on Swedish national interests and security. Therefore, reactions to these challenges and threats may need to be met nationally, regionally or globally. The Swedish Parliament has promulgated a solidarity declaration where Sweden commits itself to support any neighbour or partner nation in case of national emergencies. In accordance with the Lisbon Treaty of the European Union we expect other nations to support Sweden in similar situations. This creates requirements for the Swedish Armed Forces to be interoperable in all types of operations, national or international. Operations will be expeditionary by nature, most likely executed in a multinational and multi-functional environment, directed at achieving security and stability more than a pure military victory. Information exchange between units will be critical, whether informing the war of ideas in cyberspace, or facilitating effective command decisions. 1 Precision firepower, accurate intelligence and dissemination of information in order to deliver military power from joint and combined forces will be the cornerstones of the Swedish Armed Forces. Collateral damage is to be avoided in these new operations and tasks. The Swedish Armed Forces are, as a result of the above, going through one of the most extensive transformations within its modern history. The Armed Forces will be able to meet the new demands on a modern, interoperable, mobile and flexible operational defence force which can both defend Swedish national autonomy as well as taking part in international operations. This document covers the period of time from 2015 to 2022 describing the interoperability enabling command and control systems and their use within the Swedish Armed Forces. The main document and its associated suite of CONOPSs (TDLs, IFF, Secure Voice and Secure Text, and Infrastructure as well as platform annexes) provide the policy, vision and roles in missions for Swedish Armed Forces platforms. Anders Silwer Lieutenant General Chief Joint Operations Swedish Armed Forces HQ 9 October Ref [1] European Defence Agency (EDA), Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs, 3 October 2006; Brussels

8 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 6 (35) Executive Summary This document contains and provides the Swedish Armed Forces Cheif Joint Operations requirements and guidelines for the implementation and employment of interoperability enabling command and control systems within the Armed Forces. The main purpose of this document is to provide a broad description of the operational usage and continuous introduction of interoperability enabling command and control systems. It has to be emphasised that this document is not to be used as a basis for materiel procurement. The Swedish Armed Forces have specific procurement documents and processes for this purpose. The timeframe. The previous Issue (#2) of this document had a timeline spanning from 2011 to This issue is covering the Swedish Armed Forces operational requirements and ambitions in the time period from 2015 to Changes to previous versions. This is the third issue of the Interoperability enabling systems policy documentation set. It has been updated to reflect and be aligned with the Swedish Armed Forces Development Plan 2 as well as the Procurement Plan 3 with respect to introduction of interoperability enabling capabilities. One of the major changes in this issue of the documentation is the amplified focus on the use of the described interoperable systems for national operations. An additional Concept of Operations (CONOPS) document is now included in the Interoperability Enabling Systems documentation with a description of the common infrastructure for the Swedish Armed Forces employment of the interoperability enabling systems as well an overview of training requirements. The document structure. The structure for this issue has remained similar to previous versions of the Interoperability enabling systems policy documentation; with an overarching policy document to provide a framework to the supporting CONOPS and platform annexes. The Interoperability enabling system policy documentation set also contains a comprehensive list of abbreviations used in all of the documents as well as the platform Implementation Matrices. The five CONOPS provides a description the operating environment and gives a brief technical description for each system. In addition to a description of the joint employment, the use of the enabling systems in each service is also explained. The CONOPS describe Tactical Data Link (TDL) systems, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems, Secure Voice and Secure Text systems, and the new Infrastructure CONOPS as an addition to the previous issue. The existing platform annexes have been reviewed and updated. A number of new annexes have been added; annexes for helicopter platforms Hkp 14, 15 and 16, Sea Surveillance Battalion, and Forward Air Controller (FAC)/Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP). The two appendices containing the list of abbreviations and the platform Implementation Matrices have likewise been updated to be in line with the latest Swedish Armed Forces directives and doctrine. 2 Ref 2 [2] FMUP 3 Ref [3] MP

9 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 7 (35) List of References The information in this publication has been extracted from multiple sources. References to these documents and sources of information are listed below. Number Document 1 EDA Initial long-term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs, 3 October, 2006; Brussels 2 Swedish Armed Forces Development Plan 2013 (FMUP 2013); Swedish Armed Forces HQ; Swedish Armed Forces Materiel Plan 4 Ett användbart Försvar; Government s Proposition to the Parliament Allied Air Publication (AAP)-6, Förordning med instruktion för Försvarsmakten SFS 2007: Swedish Armed Forces Joint policy documentation for Interoperability enabling Systems HKV 09100:62897 Issue 2, 2009; Stockholm 8 The EU s Lisbon Treaty, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 222; the Solidarity Clause 9 Doktrin för Gemensamma Operationer (Doctrine for Joint Operations), Swedish Armed Forces HQ; 09833:64796, US Joint Tactical Data Enterprise (JTDE); 31 October Systemplan Ledning; Swedish Armed Forces HQ; :67037 Comments Previous edition

10 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 8 (35) 1. Introduction 1.1. Background Due to the rapidly changing geo-political landscape the Swedish Government decided in the year of 2004 that Sweden s capability to contribute in all kinds of peace-promoting operations, from preventive measures to peace-enforcement, should increase both qualitatively and quantitatively. 4 This is even more emphasised in the Swedish Governments directives to the Swedish Armed Forces for the time period of this document, As stated in European Union (EU) Headline Goal 2010: Interoperability but also deployability and sustainability will be at the core of Member States efforts and will be the driving factors of this goal The Union will thus need forces, which are more flexible, mobile and interoperable, making better use of available resources by pooling and sharing assets, where appropriate, and increasing the responsiveness of multinational forces. It is also stated, in the European Defence Agency (EDA) Initial Long-Term Vision, that EU has recognised the need to be a global security actor. For such purpose it envisages a capability to project forces over strategic distances and to austere areas of operation. Sweden s contribution to EU s capability to make rapid reaction resources available for crisis management operations is primarily focused on the EU Battle Group (BG) concept and the proposed Nordic Battle Group Other conflict-prevention and crisis management operations around the globe, especially in Africa, the Middle East and Asia will also be undertaken for the Swedish Armed Forces. The Government stresses the central importance of effective multilateral cooperation for Swedish security policy and the unlikely situation that nations are to fight against terrorism and violations without support from national and international partners. To carry out these kinds of operations, the Armed Forces are continuing to develop a modern, flexible, modular and highly accessible operational defence capability. The emphasis is on rapid operational deployment that will increase the Armed Forces capability with regards to both national and international operations. To support these operations Swedish Armed Forces are also currently going through a transformation in its personnel structure to a professional and fully contracted military organisation 5 & 6. 4 Ref [4] Ett användbart Försvar PROP , Stockholm 5 The Swedish Armed Forces have 55,000 positions of which 15,400 are permanently staffed. The remainder is staffed by reserves (this includes all categories, soldiers, Non Commissioned Officers NCOs (specialist officers) and commissioned officers). 6 Ref [2] FM UP 2012

11 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 9 (35) The transition to this capability has required the adoption by the Armed Forces of international valid technical interoperability enablers to platforms and systems. These enablers; Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), secure voice and secure text/data systems operate in a system of systems approach and are not primarily focused on platform requirements. The Armed forces shall employ interoperable solutions at all levels of their operations and capabilities. The basis of this will be the use of interoperable/international standards in implementation of systems (e.g. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) and US Military Standards (MIL-STDs)). It is important that all Swedish Armed Forces equipment is technically proven and available rather than having the latest or up to date technical standards 7. The joint and combined networks described in this series of documentation shall allow all participants that may be potentially involved in an operation to be able to exchange information with each other, both nationally and internationally. For the purpose of this document, the definition of the overall objective of interoperability 8 is: The ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve allied tactical, operational strategic objectives Scope The scope of this policy document for interoperability enabling systems is to cover all operations that are described in chapter 5, in the time frame This document will set out the structure and requirements concerning interoperability enablers as listed for national and international operations and training exercises from 2015 until This document provides a brief description of the identified interoperability enabling systems that are required to be employed to ensure that the required missions can be executed Assumptions The following assumptions below have been made for the production of the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Documentation for interoperability enabling systems : 7 Ref [2] FM UP 8 Ref [5] AAP-6, 2012

12 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 10 (35) 1.4. Aim The strive to achieve a Network Enabled Capability policy and strategy that is compatible and interoperable with US, the European Union and the NATO developments and standards are still valid. Swedish interoperability enabling systems implementation will be based on NATO standards or Military Standards (MIL-STDs) where appropriate. There will be a continued migration towards the use of the J-series family of message standards (Variable Message Format (VMF), Link 16, Link 22 Joint Range Extension Application Protocol (JREAP) systems and Satellite Communication (SATCOM)) connectivity within NATO. International interoperability information, cryptographic material and interoperable systems and technology, new as well as existing, are releasable to the Armed Forces in the timeframe of these documents. The aim of this policy document is to provide a joint service framework to ensure a coherent description of the employment of TDLs, secure voice, secure text and IFF, as well as the supporting Infrastructure, for the Swedish Armed Forces platforms to achieve interoperability. This will include national as well as international operations. This document describes the operations for all planned Swedish Armed Forces platforms for the time period of This policy document is a living document and will be periodically reviewed, maintained and updated to reflect Armed Forces policy and incorporate the appropriate Architectural Framework (AF) that is subsequently recorded. Work and investigations is being carried out to analyse the requirements and provide direction/policy for the Armed Forces for and after the time period Policy The Swedish Armed Forces shall continue to develop a modern, interoperable, flexible and highly accessible operational defence capacity. The emphasis is on highly available modern forces that focus on expeditionary capability for operations both in national and international missions. The Armed Forces shall, in accordance with the existing comprehensive approach concept, have the capacity to support and communicate with civil authorities such as police, coast guard, fire brigades, search and rescue, etc. in, for example, the fight against terrorism or sabotage operations on vital civil infrastructure or other prioritised facilities. The Armed Forces shall also support civil authorities in disaster relief and humanitarian aid, search and rescue service missions, etc., in peacetime 9. 9 Ref [6] Förordning med instruktion för Försvarsmakten SFS 2007:1266

13 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 11 (35) The aims for a greater international capability shall be an integrated and high-priority goal of the transformed Armed Forces. Development and review of interoperability and the level of ambition regarding international operations shall continue to be improved. A network enabled approach will be a fundamental priority in the development of capabilities for military co-operations as well for civil-military cooperation. Within the work to improve the Armed Forces overall capacity for international operations, Sweden s contribution within the rapid reaction capability for both the UN and EU is important. It is of vital importance to co-ordinate Swedish development in close co-operation with EU, NATO as well as with nations such as the US, United Kingdom (UK) and the Nordic countries. The Armed Forces will be able to participate in operations both autonomously and/or in cooperation with other nations. Command and Control (C2) systems development within the Armed Forces will therefore be harmonised with the equivalent development programmes within the EU and NATO. The Partnership for Peace Planning & Review Process (PARP) will continue to be the basis for capability development in C2 systems, as well as for other areas. By 2015, the Air Force Control & Reporting Centres (CRCs) will be fully transformed to interoperable C2 systems. 10 The Naval forces will by 2014 have partly reached interoperability with C2 systems. By 2014 the ground forces will partly be available for international operations 11. It is policy that Swedish military operations will have a special focus on the Nordic nations, EU and NATO. Since the Armed Forces shall be able to carry out international operations in a European context or under NATO command, the development of C2 units shall closely follow the development of NATO s Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) and European Union s NEC (EU NEC). It is policy that the Armed Forces will continue to employ the existing interoperability enabling systems 12. The Swedish Armed Forces will continue to monitor and adopt appropriate new technology/systems that will help enable its tactics/operations. This will allow the Armed Forces to maintain its interoperability capability with potential national and international partners. Following the Solidarity Clause of the Lisbon Treaty, the Swedish Government s Solidarity Declaration 13 states that Sweden will also be prepared for help from other nations and therefore the Armed Forces must have the capability to command or be commanded by units coming to Sweden with interoperable C2 systems. This includes Host Nation Support. A new concept for Host Nation Support will be established by Ref [2] FM UP 11 Ref [2] FM UP 12 Ref [7] Swedish Armed Forces Joint policy documentation for Interoperability enabling Systems HKV Issue 3, 2009; Stockholm. 13 Ref [8] The EU s Lisbon Treaty, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 222; the Solidarity Clause

14 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 12 (35) 3. Methodology of documentation 3.1. Introduction The Swedish Armed Forces joint policy document for interoperability enabling systems describes the roles of the enablers in international/national training exercises and in international/national operations. It describes how interoperability enabled equipped platforms are expected to operate in different scenarios, missions and tasks. The method used for the production of the policy document for interoperability enabling systems carried out by evaluating the scenarios and forces/platforms that have been comprehensively described in FMUP. This evaluation is made against the current and planned level of interoperability provided by the interoperability enabling systems. The next step looks at the potential capability gaps that may occur due to unforeseen or previously unidentified Information Exchange Requirements (IERs). From the evaluation of the performance of the existing interoperability enablers and potential capability gaps new systems and tactics are then recommended to fulfil the requirements. A description of how these enablers shall be operated is then provided, along with the role of the platforms that will take part in these missions/operations, in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) documentation and subsequently in the platform annexes. Each category of interoperability enablers, with existing and emerging technology, will have a separate CONOPS with its mission requirements linked to this policy document for interoperability enabling Systems. The application and use of the UK Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework (MoDAF), and comparable architecture frameworks such as NATO C3Architecture Framework (NAF), has proven to give a comprehensive understanding of the requirements and architecture used to fulfil these requirements. This methodology will be maintained and used in the form of the Coalition interoperability Process (CiOP) suite of tools for the Swedish Armed Forces. CiOP have been used to illustrate the capability gaps and essential IERs that are required for each mission/operation. This documentation methodology sets out the framework of its supporting documentation and describes the hierarchy of the operations in both national and international context. The document also describes the hierarchy and structure of the Swedish Armed Forces interoperability enabling systems documentation that exists and are required for the implementation of missions described in chapter 5 of this document. Details of contributors to this suite of documentation can be found in Appendix A to this document.

15 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 13 (35) 3.2. Documentation structure To ensure that all the interoperability enablers, IERs and associated CONOPS are linked together, a top level document has been established and maintained (this document). This top level document is called the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Document for Interoperability Enabling Systems The document structure for Interoperability enabling systems is designed to ensure that a system of systems approach is implemented and maintained. This approach prevents a platform centric methodology and requirements from being implemented. This document does not replace the existing joint policy document for Interoperability Enabling Systems , since both documents are valid within their respective time periods. Figure 1 illustrates the hierarchy and structure of the suite of documents used for interoperability enabling systems. Appendix A List of contributors & abbreviations Swedish Armed Forces Interoperability Enabling Systems Policy Document Appendix B Platform implementation matrices TDL CONOPS IFF CONOPS Secure voice CONOPS Secure text CONOPS Common infrastructure CONOPS Air Platforms Maritime Platforms Ground Platforms Support Platforms Annex A CRC Annex B ASC Annex I Sea surveillance Bn Annex J Corvettes Annex O GBAD Annex P TACP Annex R JDLOC Annex C JAS 39 Annex D C-130 Annex K MCM Annex L Submarines Annex Q SOF Annex E Airbase Annex F Helicopter 14 Annex M Support Vessels Annex N Amphibious Annex G Helicopter15 Annex H Helicopter16 Figure 1. Swedish Armed Forces Interoperability Document structure & hierarchy 14 Ref [7] Swedish Armed Forces joint policy documentation for interoperability enabling Systems

16 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 14 (35) 3.3. Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Document for Interoperability Enabling Systems This policy document is the top-level document in the document hierarchy. Its main purpose is to reference and interpret the demands in the Swedish Armed Forces Development Plan The policy document translates the requirements for communication enablers that will be required for the Swedish Armed Forces to carry out and set the policy for the operation and deployment for the prescribed missions. The policy document for interoperability enabling systems provides the source of all requirements for implementing the enablers stated in this suite of documentation. This will ensure that a platform centric approach is not applied to the implementation of interoperability enabling systems and allows for traceability of platform requirements/iers that are being implemented Concept of Operations (CONOPS) documents The suite of CONOPS documentation is the next level within the hierarchy of the documentation suite. CONOPS documents are produced and maintained for each interoperability enabler (TDLs, IFF, Secure Voice and Secure Text) and the joint infrastructure for the time period Additional CONOPS documents, if required, can be included in the structure as new capabilities are investigated, planned and introduced to the Swedish Armed Forces. The role of the CONOPS documents, within this suite of documentation, is to interpret the information and requirements detailed in the policy document to an enabler system level perspective. This interpretation will provide a translation from operational requirements to platform IERs for all enablers. The CONOPS then describe which platform will require a specific enabler to satisfy the specific IER. Platform implementation requirements and IERs must be directly linked and traced to the mission/operational requirements set out in the policy document for interoperability enabling systems. From the information contained within the TDL, IFF, Secure Voice, Secure Voice and common infrastructure CONOPS documentation (enclosure 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6 to this document), and the platform annexes, platform implementation summary matrices have been compiled. The summary matrices 16 provide an overview and description of the current, interim, planned and conceptual implementation of interoperability enabling systems on Swedish platforms. 15 Ref [2] FM UP 16 The platform summary matrices can be found at Appendix B to this document.

17 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 15 (35) 3.5. Platform annexes The platform annexes will provide current, interim, planned and conceptual implementation of the specific interoperability enablers for each identified platform. The platform annexes will provide detailed descriptions of missions and tasks and the role of the interoperability enabling systems that is being used in that task. Each of the platform annexes will contain a high level interoperability matrix which will provide details of IERs with other Armed Forces platforms. This will allow cross reference with other platform annexes and a high level Interoperability assurance of platform IERs. 4. Swedish Armed Forces Operations 4.1. Introduction Swedish Armed Forces operations will be conducted under four main headings: Swedish national (training and national defence including Civil- Military Interaction (CIMIC)) EU US/NATO/Partnership for Peace (PfP) UN These operations will be described in more detail in paragraphs of this document. The above operations main headings can be sub-divided into the following: Preserve the integrity of the Swedish National territory Defence of Swedish National territory (Väpnat Angrepp) and assets, i.e. homeland defence. International operations (both Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement). Operations for regional stability Coalition Operations Command structure The Armed Forces are currently contributing with units and personnel in UN, EU and NATO led operations in a number of various countries and environments. C2 for current operations are based on NATO nomenclature. Full command and operational command will not be transferred to another nation. Operational Control (OPCON) or any level below is delegated to the force commander/leading nation in a Transfer Of Authority (TOA) statement.

18 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 16 (35) The TOA also includes tactical data link management of the current operation. Some national and platform specific support will be the responsibility of the Swedish Joint Data Links Operations Cell (JDLOC). The OPCON is defined below as: The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. Supreme Commander (Full commannd) Joint Forces Command (OPCOM) Transfer of Authority (TOA) Force Commander (OPCON) Component Commander (TACOM) Component Commander (TACOM) Component Commander (TACOM) Chief Task Group (TACCON) 4.3. Swedish national operations Figure 2, Example of C2 Structure The Armed Forces continuously develop defence systems to improve the ability for its platforms to have a rapid reaction capability for both national and international operations. This development leads to the adoption and continued use of interoperability enabling and national legacy systems, working in parallel in national and international missions.

19 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 17 (35) Nationally and internationally, the Armed Forces will use a modular and flexible communications infrastructure that will align with a Service Orientated Architecture (SOA) methodology. This will result in the ability to provide a common integrated service network for surveillance, C2, intelligence, and logistic information. It is essential that the Armed Forces carry out exercises with participants from Sweden s potential coalition nations. This will be executed by hosting international exercises with potential coalition partners within Sweden s national territory. The above participation in and hosting of, exercises is essential to improve, maintain and demonstrate interoperability capabilities with Sweden s main potential coalition partners EU Development of a common European security and defence policy is changing the prerequisites of Sweden s own defence policy. To meet the different threats and challenges of today, the EU has moved towards a more active role in international operations and developed an early and rapid reaction capability. As a result, it is in the interest of both Sweden and other EU member states to increase the EU s crisis management capabilities. The focus should continue to be on Sweden making a tangible contribution to the EU s capability and making rapid reaction resources available for international crisis management operations. Sweden s planned battle group for 2015 shall be based on experiences obtained from the Nordic Battle Groups (NBG) in 2008 and The development of platforms and systems shall be closely aligned with EU and Sweden s main potential coalition partners, such as the Nordic countries. In this timeframe it is expected and assumed that potential coalition partners will be the US 17, United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland. (The Nordic Battle Group 2011 also included Croatia, Estonia, Ireland and Norway) US/NATO PfP NATO represents the most important forum for security policy co-operation between the US and the allied European states. The Government of Sweden directs that there is a requirement for a strong bond and close dialogue between Europe and the US because of the key significance of US involvement in Europe 18. The Swedish Government states that Sweden should continue to develop co-operation with the US and NATO within the framework of the PfP initiative. Sweden should take existing opportunities to participate in international crisis management exercises with the US and NATO outside the PfP initiative but within the framework of Swedish security policy. Therefore, this provides the requirement for the employment of interoperability enablers stated and is described in this document. 17 Even if the US will not take part in EU operations it is most likely to believe that the Swedish Armed Forces are going to use equipment, software that will require the support from US. 18 Ref [4] Ett användbart Försvar

20 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 18 (35) In this timeframe it is expected that Sweden s main potential coalition partners will be the US, UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Finland (as a partner nation) UN Looking to the future, it is more apparent than ever that security is more than just the absence of military conflict 19. Threats to peace and security can best be averted collectively and in co-operation with other countries. A greater international capability is an integrated and high-prioritised component of the transformed Armed Forces. Development of interoperability, and the level of ambition regarding international operations, shall continue to be raised. Sweden has a long tradition and accumulated experience from United Nations peacekeeping operations as well as commitments to provide troops and observers for UN service. In this timeframe it is expected that Sweden s potential coalition partners will be the US, UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Finland. Figure 3 illustrates Sweden s Armed Forces ambitions for international operations. Figure 3, Swedish Armed Forces International Operations 19 Ref [4] Ett användbart Försvar

21 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 19 (35) 5. Swedish Armed Forces Operations roles 5.1. General The Swedish Armed Forces main task is territorial integrity and national defence operations. Along with this, the Swedish Armed Forces has capacity to deploy 1,700 personnel to theatres worldwide from 2014, with the goal to increase this to 2,000 personnel by Swedish Armed Forces shall be able to deploy forces continually in four simultaneous operations, where one operation contains battalion size units. This capacity will include the capability to be a framework nation for EU Battle Groups, as well as commanding brigade level units. The Armed Forces will have the overall ability to carry out joint operations. However, for operations abroad the main focus is ground operations. Readiness for deployable operations shall be 90 days or shorter Joint Operations A Joint Operation is a co-ordinated military action conducted in several different arenas to achieve a joint overall aim. The aim is achieved through the use of a wellbalanced joint force capable of maximising the effects of synergy. The essence of the concept is that the effect of a co-ordinated effort is greater than the sum of the effects of the military force s individual elements. This means that the Armed Forces must be able to combine individual combat capabilities with a combined level capability in order to achieve the joint aim. Success is dependent on each individual element understanding its role in the whole within the operation. This will require, amongst other things, a robust tactical capability and a strong culture and traditions within the military units. It is only when all this has been achieved that a joint force will be able to generate its full effect. Joint operations will be required across the whole spectrum of conflict, in which a military component will be one of many Ground Operations Ground operations overview The land environment is from a military perspective extremely complex 21. Ground operations are essentially aimed at gaining control of infrastructure, e.g. cities, and combat in the urban environment will nearly always be conducted under harsh and chaotic conditions. It will involve fighting in restricted space, with opposing forces as well as a civilian population that is more or less peacefully inclined or hostile towards our forces, all in close proximity to each other. The chaos will be combined with extensive material destruction and the complexity of deciding legitimate and non-legitimate targets. Everyone will be affected by operations in the ground arena, 20 Joint operations are not only conducted at the operational level but can also be directed and carried out at lower levels. This is classified as joint combat. Larger joint operations will, however, always be directed by an operational command organisation. 21 Ref [9] Doktrin för Gemensamma Operationer, HKV 09833:64796, 2005; Stockholm

22 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 20 (35) where the complex environment will place great demands on both personnel and equipment. The ground arena covers all ground surfaces, but also the combat space in direct proximity to the ground. There are no clearly defined boundaries between the various arenas; instead this will be regulated by availability of resources and operational aims. Ground operations will involve all units, whatever their affiliation, whose operations can be connected in any way to ground objectives, within the bounds of an individual or joint operation. The aim of ground operations may be to establish or maintain control on the ground of all or part of an area of operations, or to counteract the control exercised by opposition forces of a particular area. Ground operational control will have been established when commanders have sufficient, sustainable freedom of action to be able to achieve their operational aims unaffected by any significant limitations or interference from opposition forces. Maintaining ground operational control will be dependent on a military presence on the ground in the operational area for the necessary period of time. The time factor and the ability to remain on the ground are also dependent on maintaining control of both airspace and maritime areas to ensure that extended ground operational control is not affected. The ability of ground combat forces to seize, defend and control terrain is a pre-requisite for the deployment, basing and conduct of operations. This is not only achieved by using ground units, but also operational maritime and air assets. The complexity is similar when operations are conducted within the borders of Sweden. Adding to this complexity these operations can be supported by forces from coalition or partner nations. Host Nation Support concepts are yet to be established in order to prepare for possible operational alternatives, including C2 and cryptographic preparations. International ground operations will be carried out in the following modus 22 : Small scale rotational deployments to existing mission/operation. Small scale new mission/operation. Large scale stand-alone mission/operation. Large scale new mission/operation. Large scale rotational deployments to existing operation/missions Small scale rotational deployment to existing mission/operation This is a small scale rotational deployed ground mission/operation (for example Kosovo Force (KFOR)) that comprises of between personnel. The Order of Battle (Orbat) can include Senior and Staff Officers in the Operational Headquarters (OHQ), Force HQ (FHQ), National Intelligence Centre (NIC) and National Support Element (NSE). Depending on the character of the mission and other units in the 22 Ref [2] FM UP

23 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 21 (35) area, the following may also be supplied: Liaison and Monitoring Team (LMT), Operations Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT), Regional Liaison and Monitoring Team (RLMT) and Countermine Explosive Ordnance Device (EOD) /Improvised Explosive Devices Disposal (IEDD) operations units Small scale new mission/operation A small scale new mission/operation with ground force (for example in Chad) requires between personnel. This will require Senior and Staff in OHQ, FHQ and NSE. This mission will also require a maintenance company (staff, maintenance, medical platoons and intelligence) along with a rifle company. Depending on the type of operation, and other units in the area, the follow-on units need to include medical staff and Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) / Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopter capability Large scale stand-alone mission/action A large scale ground stand-alone mission (for example, a NBG mission) the operation requires about 1,200-2,000 personnel. This type of operation will require SOs in OHQ, NIC and NSE. There will also be a FHQ comprising of a headquarters company, a Core battalion with Infantry companies and a mortar company. The operation will also require: Combat Support (CS) comprising of an engineering unit, anti-aircraft company, a Chemical Biological Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN) Group, Intelligence Surveillance, Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) unit, Geographic information unit, PSYOPS units and CIMIC units. The Combat Service Support will include a battalion command, a Logistics company, a Medical company, a Military Police, a communications company, Expeditionary Air Wing (consisting of: C2 facility, a fighter unit, a tactical air unit, an airport unit, a transport helicopter unit, a MEDEVAC helicopter unit) Large scale new mission/operations A large scale new ground action (ref KS 01) comprises about personnel. This includes Senior and Staff Officers in OHQs, NIC and the NSE. These types of missions typically require a core battalion comprising of a battalion including command, rifle and mortar companies. Along with the core battalion engineering, ISTAR, geographic information, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and CIMIC units can be included. Depending on the character of the mission and availability of other units in the area, the following may also be required: a Quick Reaction Force (QRF), Medical staff and the capability to carry out CASEVAC / MEDEVAC with a transport helicopter unit.

24 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 22 (35) Large scale rotation to existing mission/operation A large scale ground rotation action (for example International Security Assistance force (ISAF)) requires about personnel. Swedish Armed Forces Senior and Staff Officers are required in OHQ, NIC and the NSE. This action will require a core battalion including battalion command, rifle companies, Combat Support (CS) (engineering unit, ISTAR and CIMIC units). Combat Service Support (CSS) (medical units and a military police unit). These types of operations normally require special units and interoperable CIS equipment for directing fire support. Depending on the input character and other units in the area, the following will also be required: QRF, medical staff and a capability to carry out CASEVAC / MEDEVAC with a transport helicopter unit Maritime Operations Maritime operations overview The maritime environment is characterised by its facility for transport, manoeuvre and covert operations, in particular beneath the surface, enabling a military presence to pose a constant threat from several different directions 23. The maritime arena facilitates mobility and is often essential for the transportation of troops and for logistic re-supply. International law allows ships to travel freely in international waters and on the high seas right up to the limit of another country s territorial waters, without the permission of the governments of other states. This affords naval forces the unique ability to be able to be present without having to be directly committed to an armed conflict. The maritime operational arena encompasses all sea surfaces and the area below and the airspace directly above the surface. It also covers coastal areas and, in particular, inshore archipelagos and river deltas. There are no clearly defined boundaries between the different arenas, but this will be decided according to resources and operational aims. Maritime operations involve all units, regardless of affiliation, that conduct operations in direct support of the achievement of maritime operational objectives as part of a separate or joint operation. The aim of maritime operations is to contest or establish operational sea control of all or part of an area of operations. Sea control creates conditions to enable the achievement of joint operational aims, e.g. protection of own lines of communication. Sea control is achieved when own forces can conduct operations with a high degree of security or when an opponent has no freedom of action to conduct operations without interference by our forces. 23 Ref [9] Doktrin för Gemensamma Operationer, HKV 09833:64796, 2005; Stockholm

25 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 23 (35) The achievement of operational sea control presupposes a naval presence in the operational area for the necessary period of time. When sea control is to be contested a military presence will be required in certain areas at times of our own choosing. In order to establish and contest sea control it will be essential to establish or contest operational air superiority at certain times or in a particular area. Sea control in an area will only be possible if sea control is also established in base areas. Complete operational sea control, or command of the sea, can only be realised under extremely favourable conditions, and it is therefore often sufficient to aim to attain the degree of control necessary for the achievement of designated objectives. International maritime operations will be carried out and are, defined as Small scale missions/operations 24 : Small scale maritime missions/operations Small maritime operations with a naval unit (for example ATALANTA operations) requires about personnel. It is possible to use submarine and mine counter measure vessels for these missions. The deployment of maritime units will be of a somewhat smaller scale compared to ground operations. The amphibious forces are essentially operating in the land environment but are also able to conduct maritime activities at the same time. In this case the amphibious forces ground operations and the use of vehicles can be exchanged for use of combat boats and the logistics scenario builds on a manoeuvrable sea based capability. To carry out these maritime operations SOs are required to be posted in FHQ and NIC. Corvettes, Ocean Patrol Vessels (OPVs), a Support Vessels could be possible units that could host a FHQ Air Operations Air operations overview The air and space environment is characterised by the ability of air forces to detect targets on the ground at long range, either visually or through the use of sensors. It is also possible to detect targets in the air at long range. Additionally air operations generally allow aircraft to move relatively rapidly to designated points. The operational air arena encompasses the airspace above land and sea and also includes outer space. Above all else, the air operations afford rapid and flexible mobility and excellent territorial overview. Air operations involve all units, regardless of affiliation, that conduct operations in direct support of air operational objectives as part of a separate or joint operation. The aim of operations in the air arena is to achieve or contest air superiority in a particular area or for a designated period of time. Air superiority creates conditions 24 Ref [2] FM UP

26 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 24 (35) to enable the achievement of operational ground or sea control or alternatively joint operational objectives. Air superiority is dependent on operational ground control of airbase areas. Over sea areas air superiority is achieved when resources required by opposing forces for air superiority, e.g. fighter aircraft and naval forces, have essentially been neutralised. Air superiority is achieved when a commander has freedom of action to conduct operations to achieve his aims without significant interference from opposing forces. Air superiority is contested when an opponent is unable to achieve his aims without being limited by the action of our forces. To achieve air superiority it will be necessary to keep designated areas of airspace under observation and, when required, to engage targets in those areas using selected weapon systems. Air operations will be carried out in the following manner 25 : Small scale Air operations/missions - in on-going operations. Small scale Air Operations/Missions Stand Alone Small scale Air operations/missions - in on-going operations Small scale air operations are those carried out with combat aircraft within the framework of an existing operations. These small scale air operations comprise of around 100 personnel, and require a fully functioning air base with a support structure including all main air base functions with the exception of specific aircraft maintenance Small scale Air operations Stand Alone Small scale Air operations Stand Alone are carried out with fighter aircraft within a new mission but are in the context of a larger operation (ref Expeditionary Air Wing (EAW)). These operations require about 240 personnel and have the capacity, with some host nation support and ground protection units, to run an autonomous operation with fighter aircraft (as part of a larger operation) Ground/surface to air interface operations There are various points at which the air and ground/surface warfare environments and operations interface in information exchange terms. Examples of this interaction are between a. An airborne surveillance capability and a ground/surface unit which directly uses, or disseminates, received information. 25 Ref [2] FM UP

27 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 25 (35) b. An air asset and a ground/surface-based controlling agency. c. An air asset and Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) units. d. A ground unit and air-lift assets. The principle mission types that are covered in the ground/surface to air interface are known as Close Air Support (CAS) and is supported by the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) which includes a Forward Air Control (FAC) role. Other missions such as fire control, Naval Gunfire Support (NGS), amphibious operations, etc., from both ground and maritime assets/platforms are included in the ground/surface to air interface description. Operations within this environment are not solely limited to land and air platforms. The missions and tasks that are carried out at this ground/surface to air interface require specific consideration when dealing with communication systems. Due to this unique interface it is concluded that the term Ground/surface to air interface is in itself an environment. The term "Ground/surface to air interface" for the purposes of these documents is defined as the information exchange between a controlling entity (on the ground or surface) and an air asset that is required to carry out specific mission types. The ground/surface to air interface addressed is further refined to be the interaction between the controller of the terminal phase of an air strike operation and the strike asset(s). 6. Interoperability Enablers 6.1. Introduction The timely exchange and dissemination of digital battle space information is fundamental to effective military operations. C2 information is globally regarded as a key enabler of the ability to control, monitor and evaluate operational activity in different battle and peacekeeping environments. The key aim of the timely exchange of information is to present commanders with a rationalised common operational picture. The creation of this common operational picture will require co-ordination of sensors, Electronic Warfare (EW) and platform positional data. The key to successful exchange of Battle space information is to have secure Electronic Counter Measures (ECM), as well as resistant and latent Interoperability enabling systems. Currently, in international operations, TDLs, IFF, secure voice and secure text are employed as the main enablers to allow a near seamless information exchange. The main thrust for the continuation and introduction of new Interoperability enabling systems described below is to ensure that digital information exchange can

28 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 26 (35) be carried out between Swedish Armed Forces platforms and national as well as potential international partners. Two interoperability enabling systems that will be employed in the Armed Forces C2 systems before 2015 are the Joint C3 Information Exchange Data Model (JC3IEDM) (STANAG 5525) and the Tactical Communications Post 2000 Interoperability Point (TACOMS IOP) (STANAGs 4637 to 4647). These standards will provide baseline interoperability for information exchange and understanding over communication protocols for joint multi-national operations for the majority of the Armed Forces C2 systems. There will be some systems using proprietary or legacy standards even in the future, but the objective is to implement international standards in as many systems as possible. These interoperability enablers will not be described in the following CONOPS since they will be ubiquitous. Alongside the introduction and employment of interoperability enabling systems are the existing national legacy communication systems. These will be maintained to complement information exchange between platforms, as long as necessary, where enablers with interoperable capability are not implemented. As with many other nations, the Swedish Armed Forces are deploying a range of sophisticated communication (data and voice) solutions that generally are not fully supportive of information exchange within and across its three different services and potential coalition partners. Therefore, in order to satisfy the demand to improve communication, (not only with international coalition partners but also across the national Swedish assets both military and civilian), gateways may provide a cost effective and fast solution to overcome existing and developing communication capability gaps. Gateways are of particular interest to ground and maritime forces as a method of connecting land based networks and improving communication and interoperability. Figure 4 provides a general illustration of the Swedish Armed Forces employment of the interoperability enabling systems.

29 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 27 (35) Figure 4 - Swedish Armed Forces employment of the interoperability enabling systems Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

30 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 28 (35) 6.2. TDLs The implementation and continued employment of interoperable TDLs for Armed Forces requires following a sustainable and coordinated roadmap. The "J" series of message standards are designated as the US Department of Defense's primary tactical data link format according to the Joint Tactical Data Link Migration Plan and many others of future potential coalition partners. It is therefore essential that any future implementation to Swedish Armed Forces platforms of interoperable TDLs employ message formats that are members of the J-series family. In the timeframe of this document it is policy that future development and implementation of TDL systems will use the J-series family of messages. The TDL most widely employed by the Armed Forces for joint force operations is Link 16. Link 16 is internationally accepted as the primary joint tactical data link and provides extensive message functionality on the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) band. Link 16 has a Line Of Sight (LOS) restriction due to its use of UHF frequencies. Due to these restrictions the Swedish Armed Forces will continue to employ international legacy TDLs as an interim Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) capability where required, e.g. Link 11. Sweden will also, in a timely manner and dependent of major potential coalition partners, adopt and employ de facto internationally developed BLOS TDLs during the time period of this document. The Navy will continue to use national legacy BLOS TDLs for the time period of these documents. This is to ensure that tactical information will be distributed along all naval units and to achieve situational awareness in national operations. For the CAS and FAC missions that are carried out by Swedish military platforms in the ground/surface to air interface that is defined in paragraph 5.6 this document, VMF will be the primary enabler. VMF is formally a type of message format and by definition not a TDL. However, the use and the architecture of the VMF messages, header and the bearer protocols used in its implementation have led VMF to become known as a TDL. For the purpose of this document VMF will be referred to as a TDL system. A description of how TDL systems operate and are employed can be found in the Joint TDL CONOPS (Enclosure 2) Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) To participate in international crises management operations, the Swedish Armed Forces uses a NATO compatible IFF system with the minimum Mk XII capability on all participating platforms. This is to ensure that coalition partners can identify Swedish platforms and vice versa. The aim of the cooperative interoperable IFF system is to contribute to the creation of a Recognised Air Picture Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

31 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 29 (35) (RAP)/Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP) and to reduce fratricide, i.e. the loss of assets due to friendly fire (also known as blue-on-blue ). For airborne platforms the IFF system also needs to meet requirements from civil aviation authorities on Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) Modes and Mode S. During the timeframe of this document, , the IFF system will be upgraded to Mk XIIA (i.e. including Mode 5) on the condition that the system is releasable to Sweden. To operate the military IFF systems procedures need to be in place to handle coexistence with the civilian SSR system, which has precedence. A description of how IFF systems operate and are employed can be found in the IFF CONOPS (Enclosure 3) Secure voice communications To provide security in the tactical voice information distribution with High Frequency (HF)/Very High Frequency (VHF)/ UHF/ Satellite Communication (SATCOM) and landline communication bearers between operators in a combined and/or joint operation, a voice link protected from unwanted participation is a key component. A secure voice communication capability provides the Swedish Armed Forces with the means to more effectively contribute to joint and combined military operations in scenarios as stated above. A full list of the secure voice systems employed and a description of how they are operated and employed can be found in the Secure voice CONOPS (Enclosure 4) Secure text/data communication Secure text systems are required to provide security in the tactical text information distribution in between operators in a combined and/or joint operation. Secure text communication systems are used for distributing and receiving orders, special messages and providing reports as well as obtaining non real time situational awareness information within an operation. Cryptographic equipment, materiel and message standards for interoperability enabling systems and their configuration and use/operation, may vary between the three different services and their environments. A description of how secure text/data systems are operated and employed can be found in the secure text CONOPS (Enclosure 5) Software Defined Radios To an ever increasing extent, current and future joint and combined operations are demanding rapid exchange of information between coalition forces in a dynamic and highly mobile combat environment. Interoperability between communications systems is a major factor for the success of the operations. This also includes interoperability between:

32 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 30 (35) Military services Civilian ministries or administrations Other civilian organisations including non-governmental organisations with the aim of conducting peace-keeping or security operations The interoperability requirements listed above & require a flexible and adaptive approach to communications and radio technology. There is an international trend to developing Software Defined Radios (SDRs). Software Defined Radios are being developed so that a single radio may have the capability of accepting multiple waveforms that may span many different Radio Frequency bands (UHF/VHF/HF etc.) GTRS is a Swedish programme that is intended to overcome the requirements that may be set out by future capabilities for seamless radio communication as discussed above. This seamless communication is intended to be used for both Swedish and future potential coalition partner s platforms. The main goal of the GTRS is to achieve common interoperability capability and security to systems employed by the Armed Forces and civilian authorities (fire brigade, police, coast guard, medical services, etc.) by designing and implementing software defined waveforms. These new SDR capabilities may have an impact on TDLs, IFF, secure voice and secure text systems and therefore will be recorded subsequently in the respective CONOPS document. Of special interest for Sweden in this area is the future US development of the MIDS Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) version and when and how this will be employed by different international partners. Sweden is currently developing the GTRS project in accordance with the directives of US Joint Tactical Data Enterprise (JTDE) Services Migration Plan and is supported by Germany, France, Spain and Italy Common Infrastructure The operation of the interoperability enabling systems discussed in chapters 6.2 to 6.6 above, require specific infrastructure elements. However, the interoperability enabling systems also share elements that are known as a common infrastructure. Examples of these common infrastructure elements are: Future Mission Networks Gateways Common cryptographic infrastructure Training Interoperability assurance A description of the above elements can be found in common infrastructure CONOPS (Enclosure 6).

33 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 31 (35) 7. Organisational structure 7.1. Structure and Hierarchy To ensure the efficient deployment and joint approach for the employment of interoperability enabling systems, an organisational structure is required and has been established in the Armed Forces and supporting organisations to provide policy, direction and focus. The organisational structure is designed to ensure a top down approach, to provide platform commanders a joint approach to the employment of these enabling systems. This organisational structure ensures that platform centric solutions are avoided and the prescribed policy of a system of systems approach is applied and maintained to all interoperability enabling systems for Swedish Armed Forces. This chapter describes the hierarchy, role, functions and responsibilities of the interoperability organisations within the structure. The organisations described in this chapter are: The Swedish Armed Forces Joint C3 (JC3) Board The Joint TDL Directorate The Joint IFF Directorate Training Organisations FMTM Maintenance FMV, Swedish Defence Material Administration The Joint Data Links Operations Cell (JDLOC) Figure 5 illustrates the Swedish Armed Forces Interoperability organisation structure & hierarchy.

34 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 32 (35) Figure 5. Swedish Armed Forces Interoperability organisation structure & hierarchy 8.2. Joint C3 Board The JC3 Board is chaired by the Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (DCOM OPS) with representatives from Supreme Commander s Staff (Plan & Policy), Joint Operations Requirement Division (J0), CIS Division (J6), LCC, MCC, ACC, Military Intelligence and Security Directorate (MUST), Training and Procurement Directorate (Intel & CIS), Swedish Defence Materiel Administration Strategic Planning and Development (FMV Strategisk Materiel Ledning (SML)). The JC3 Board reports to the Chief of Joint Operations (COM JFC) and Director of Supreme Commander s Staff (Policy & Plans), with a regularly interval of six month or when so required. The JC3 Board heads the Armed Forces interoperability organisation structure. The board is the policy-making body providing the Deputy Chief of Joint Operations, who is responsible for policy and direction of the CIS function including interoperability enablers and their employment, with decision alternatives. The Chief of Joint Operations holds the responsibility for the endorsement, and approval by signature of the entire interoperability enabling systems suite of documentation (Joint Policy document, Joint TDL, IFF, secure voice and secure text CONOPS, infrastructure CONOPS, and platform annexes).

35 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 33 (35) The JC3 Board is responsible for the provision, review and maintenance of policy to all three of the Armed Forces services in how the interoperability enabling systems are developed, procured, operated and maintained. The JC3 Board is responsible for the co-ordination and maintenance of policy for all training (technical, tactical and operational) for the interoperability enabling systems. The JC3 Board has the authority to propose changes in this organisation structure, such as adding a new Directorate, for approval by the Director of Operations and Director of Supreme Commander s Staff (Development) Joint TDL and Joint IFF Directorates The Joint TDL Directorate is directly responsible to the JC3 Board for all Tactical Data Link, secure voice and secure text interoperability issues. The Joint IFF Directorate is directly responsible to the JC3 Board for all IFF interoperability issues. It is the responsibility of these directorates to interpret the interoperability requirements set out within the high level document and produce and maintain the set of Joint TDL, IFF, Secure Voice and Secure Text CONOPS, Infrastructure CONOPS, and platform annexes. The Joint directorates are responsible for being the focal point for all TDL, IFF, secure voice, secure text system and common infrastructure interoperability issues for all services. These directorates will provide the direction for the implementation of these technical enablers for all operations stated in this document. The Joint TDL and IFF Directorates are chaired by the head of Training and Procurement Directorate (Intel & CIS) with representatives from CIS Division (J6), LCC, MCC, ACC, Military Intelligence and Security Directorate (MUST), Swedish Armed Forces Network and Telecommunications Unit (FMTM), JDLOC and the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) TDL Office and IFF Office. The TDL and IFF Directorates reports to the JC3 Board in close proximity to each conducted official meeting Försvarets Materielverk (FMV), Swedish Defence Material Administration The FMV is responsible for the development, procurement, implementation and sustainment of interoperability enablers to the Armed Forces platforms and systems. The FMV will be responsible for ensuring that the translation of interoperability requirements for the development, procurement and sustainment of interoperable enablers are in accordance with the policy and directives set out by the Joint TDL and IFF Directorates. It is the responsibility of the FMV to ensure that any deviation that is made from the policy directives and requirements made by the Joint TDL and IFF Directorates are reported back with an impact analysis.

36 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 34 (35) It is the responsibility of the FMV to provide Configuration Management (CM) for TDLs, IFF, secure voice and secure text, and Infrastructure for all Armed Forces platforms. The CM process will be managed centrally within the FMV to ensure a system of system approach is maintained as described by this document Training Organisation It is the responsibility of the training organisation to ensure that all training requirements are planned, developed and implemented for all interoperability enablers. The training organisation will be responsible for ensuring that all training needs are met for all the interoperability enablers and platforms alike. This will include both technical and tactical training for the interoperability enabling systems. To support the requirements for training for all interoperable enablers a training group has been set up under the leadership of the JC3 Board. It is the responsibility of the training group to address both tactical and technical training needs for all interoperable enablers. The training group will be led by the Armed Forces Headquarters and will have representatives from all training facilities, Joint HQ Procurement and Training Departments and FMV TDL Office and IFF Office FMTM Swedish Armed Forces Network and Telecommunications Unit The FMTM will be responsible for maintenance of general equipment and the manning of the JDLOC. The FMTM will be responsible for the necessary stationary equipment, such as land radios and infrastructure Joint Data Links Operations Cell (JDLOC) The JDLOC has the sole responsibility for the centralised infrastructure elements of planning, design, management, implementation and analysis of all operations that utilise interoperable TDLs, IFF and secure voice systems, and/or infrastructure described in this document. The Joint Data Links Operations Cell is responsible for the day-to-day management infrastructure and focal point for Link 16, Link 11, Link 22, VMF and IFF employed for Armed Forces platforms and visiting forces in the Swedish Area of Interest. The JDLOC will report to the Joint Forces Command regarding operations and the Joint TDL and Joint IFF Directorates regarding performance of interoperable enablers. JDLOC will also co-operate with FMV and FMTM regarding technical matters Army, Navy, and Air Force (Service level) All Swedish Army, Navy, and Air Force units participating in international and national training exercises and operations, as described in this document, will have delegated responsibility for the day to day management of the interoperable enablers from the JDLOC. This will ensure that the joint service approach for the interoperability enabling systems is maintained for all services.

37 Enclosure 1 Main Body Page 35 (35) 8.9. Unit TDL Officers (UTOs) All air stations, ships, battalions and other units that are involved in operations and missions described in this document will have liaison requirements with the JDLOC. This will be done via an appropriate UTO. The UTO will be the key focal point for the air stations, ships, battalions and other units for the planning and information exchange for all the operations and missions described in this document.

38 Enclosure 2 Page 1 (34) Swedish Armed Forces JOINT TACTICAL DATA LINKs Concept of Operations (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

39 Enclosure 2 Page 2 (34) List of contents 1. Introduction Background Aim Document structure Scope Assumptions Operations involving the use of TDLs Principle of TDLs use in operations TDLs in support of joint operations Situational awareness Position and Identification C2 Platforms Non C2 Platforms Air Operations Missions & tasks (capabilities) Maritime Operations Mission & Tasks (capabilities) Land Operations Mission & Tasks (Capabilities) Unit Contribution to operations C2 units Air units Control & Reporting Centre (CRC) ASC S-102B JAS 39 C/D Gripen Airbase Helicopters Naval Units Sea Surveillance Battalion Corvettes Mine Counter Measures Vessels (MCMVs) Submarines Support vessels Amphibious Forces Ground units Ground Based Air Defence operations Centre (GBADOC) Tactical Air Party (TACP) Special Operation Forces (SOFs) Joint TDL support Joint Data Links Operation Cell TDL system descriptions General... 22

40 Enclosure 2 Page 3 (34) 3.2. Link Link 16 Terminals Link 16 Stand Alone System Link 16 voice Link 16 Frequency Clearance BLOS TDLs Link Link Joint Range Extension Application Protocol VMF Introduction Use of VMF in CAS in the ground/surface to air operations Future potential uses of VMF TDL implementation policy General J-Series family of message standards Link Primacy Link 16 Standard Primacy BLOS TDLs Standards primacy VMF Standards primacy TDL Configuration Management Interoperability testing standard primacy Organisational Structure Tactical Data Link Education and Training Introduction System Training TDL Specific infrastructure Communications planning Joint Data Links Operations Cell (JDLOC) Army Navy and Airforce (Service level) responsibilities Unit TDL Officers (UTOs) responsibilities Platform TDL implementation look-up table... 34

41 Enclosure 2 Page 4 (34) Issue Status Number Date Comments Issue draft Review Issue Final issue References Reference A B Description Swedish Armed Forces Joint Interoperability Enabling Systems Policy document Secure voice CONOPS List of Acronyms A list of acronyms for this document and the other associated CONOPS and platform annexes can be found at appendix A to Ref [A].

42 Enclosure 2 Page 5 (34) Abstract. This document describes the employment of interoperable Tactical Data Links (TDLs) in missions and operations carried out by the Swedish Armed Forces. These missions and operations cover both national (including liaison with civil authorities) and international scenarios. This CONOPS document is a part of a suite of documents describing interoperability enabling systems, which the Swedish Armed Forces currently employs. This TDL CONOPS document has been produced in collaboration with a number of military and government departments and organisations, on behalf of the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Headquarters, (HKV). A detailed list of contributors to this CONOPS can be found in appendix A to reference A. References The information in this publication has been extracted from multiple sources. References to these documents and sources of information can be found in the Swedish Armed Forces interoperability enabling systems policy document

43 Enclosure 2 Page 6 (34) 1. Introduction 1.1. Background The timely exchange and dissemination of digital battlespace information is fundamental to effective military operations and central to an effective Network Enabled Capability (NEC) philosophy. Command & Control (C2) information is regarded globally as a key enabler of the ability to control, monitor and evaluate operational activity in different battle and peacekeeping environments. The key aim of this timely exchange of information is to present commanders with a rationalised and accurate Situational Awareness Picture (SAP). To create the Situational Awareness (SA), the complete and correct co-ordination and distribution of sensor, Electronic Warfare (EW) and platform positional data will be required. The key to successful exchange of battlespace information is to have secure, Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) resistant and a latent data exchange. Currently, in international operations, Tactical Data Links (TDLs) are employed as the main interoperability enabling system to allow a near seamless information exchange from sensor to war fighter. TDLs are military communication links, developed for the transmission of digital tactical information using standardised message formats, protocols and bearer characteristics. The Swedish Armed Forces is continuing to implement interoperable communication systems for both national and international operations. The overarching purpose is to create more flexible Forces with increased operational effectiveness with units available for all tasks of the Swedish Armed Forces nationally, in the global arena, in Europe, and in Sweden s immediate region 1. This development has required the Swedish Armed Forces to embrace international communication systems such as TDLs, to ensure that tactical information can be communicated between coalition partners. Furthermore, it is stated in the Swedish Armed Forces Development Plan 2 that these new systems will now be employed on a number of platforms for national defence purposes during the time period To complement the existing interoperable TDL (Link 16) employed by Swedish Armed Forces platforms in national and international operations, other TDLs, such as Link 22 and Variable Message Format (VMF) are now introduced or are being considered for implementation. Other interoperability enabling systems are being employed alongside the Swedish Armed Forces prescribed TDLs. These enablers are IFF, secure voice and secure text/data. These are each described in a separate CONOPS. 1 The Defence Commission report, Defence in Use, Swedish Government, DS 2008:48; Stockholm 2 FMUP 2013

44 Enclosure 2 Page 7 (34) Swedish national TDLs will continue to be employed alongside the interoperable TDL systems, where so required. The operation and employment of Swedish national TDLs are not described within this suite of documentation Aim The aim of this CONOPS is to provide a joint framework to ensure a coherent description of the employment of TDLs for all Swedish Armed Forces platforms to be interoperable in international/national operations. This CONOPS describe these operations in the time period of This CONOPS is a living document and will be periodically reviewed and updated to reflect Swedish Armed Forces TDL policy and operation Document structure This Joint TDL CONOPS document is structured to ensure that the information is displayed in a joint concept and can be interpreted by commanders and platform authorities alike. It is designed to be incorporated into the system of systems architecture of the suite of interoperability enabling systems documentation. Figure 1 illustrates where the Joint TDL CONOPS document is situated within the interoperability enabling systems documentation structure.

45 Enclosure 2 Page 8 (34) Figure 1. CONOPS document structure The main body of this CONOPS describes the joint perspective employment of TDLs within the Swedish Armed Forces for the missions and operations described within the interoperability enabling system s documentation. Information specific to individual platforms will be addressed in detail in the platform annexes attached to the CONOPS. Platform annexes (Annexes A - R)

46 Enclosure 2 Page 9 (34) will contain information of all interoperability enabling systems (TDLs, IFF, secure voice and secure text) and their related implementation Scope This CONOPS describes the operation and employment of TDL systems in a general perspective within the timeframe for the operations described in the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Document for Interoperability Enabling Systems 1.5. Assumptions The following assumptions have been made in order to achieve interoperability for the Swedish Armed Forces with TDLs: The strive to align the interoperable TDLs with a Network Enabled Capability strategy that is compatible and interoperable with United States of America (US) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is still valid. International interoperability information, technology, cryptographic material and interoperable systems are releasable to the Armed Forces in the timeframe of these documents. 2. Operations involving the use of TDLs 2.1. Principle of TDLs use in operations The effective implementation of TDL networks provides significant operational benefits in information exchange between Swedish Armed Forces and coalition platforms and assets. The exchange of real-time and near-real time tactical information between C2, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and weapon systems facilitates and allows co-ordinated action between these forces. Accurate and timely positional and tactical information significantly improves the level of support that may be achieved and reduces the risk of fratricide between coalition forces TDLs in support of joint operations Situational awareness Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) and active status reporting are the raw materials and the basis for the compilation of an SA. However, for SA to be effective, ISR data must be collected, fused, intelligently filtered, disseminated and targeted to ensure that the end-user is not overwhelmed with information. In a TDL network with C2 nodes it is possible to create and maintain a virtual representation of the physical battle space and its current situation, which can be delivered to participating units.

47 Enclosure 2 Page 10 (34) Position and Identification The consequences of failing to identify an object correctly in the battle space can result in fratricide. The Armed Forces will use TDLs to identify themselves and report their status explicitly, a protocol that is essential to: Facilitate Combat Identity (CID) and thus mitigate and reduce the potential risk of fratricide. Reduce the load on surveillance systems and communications bearers. Facilitate effective and efficient battle and mission management and reporting. Minimise the data management overhead associated with the maintenance of SA for co-operating platforms C2 Platforms C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and in the accomplishment of the mission. TDLs provide commanders with a virtual representation of the C2 situation within the battle space and contribute to a C2 capability. In the timeframe of this CONOPS the virtual representation produced by Swedish C2 nodes and platforms will consist of a Recognized Air Picture (RAP), Recognised Maritime Picture, (RMP) and a Recognised Ground Picture (RGP). C2 nodes/platforms will also use TDLs to exchange commands, orders and requests such as Weapons Control Orders (WCOs), Engagement Orders, Role and Duty assignment instructions. The C2 nodes and platforms in the TDL network will be the focal points of exchanging Mission Management information to ensure effective and efficient Battle Management Non C2 Platforms Non C2 nodes are platforms with a TDL implementation that receive the virtual representation of the physical battlespace from a C2-node. Non C2 nodes also receive orders, C2 information and other mission specific information via TDLs for more effective combat awareness. A non C2 node reports combat status, sensor information, weapons information and position information along with confirmation of received orders. Thereby, the non-c2 nodes are contributing as important sources of information to the C2 nodes Air Operations Air units will have extensive TDL support for operations in the timeframe of these CONOPS including contributing to the RAP, RMP and RGP with their own sensor information as well as reporting status information and their own position. This will be in addition to other sensor and weapon information. The operation

48 Enclosure 2 Page 11 (34) types listed below in chapter should be regarded as air operations in a broader sense Missions & tasks (capabilities) Swedish air assets will use TDLs to conduct or support the following mission areas: Air Operations Establish and/or contribute to RAP Contribute to RMP Counter Air Operations o Offensive Counter Air (OCA) o Defensive Counter Air (DCA) Strategic Air Operations such as: o Attack on an adversary s vital assets, like C2 structures Anti-Surface Force Air Operations o Air Interdiction (AI) o Close Air Support (CAS) o Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), using Air Maritime Coordination (AMC) procedures Support Air Operations o Air Reconnaissance o Air Surveillance o Sea Surveillance o Land Surveillance o N Anti-submarine Warfare ((ASW) Helicopter 14 only). Detailed information on TDL operations for the Swedish Air Force systems is described in annexes A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H of this CONOPS Maritime Operations Maritime assets and especially naval units have the flexibility to change role at short notice. All major units in the maritime environment will be required, as a minimum, to have their position and identity established in the RMP. This will be carried out by using a phased approach to integration of Link 16 for Line Of Sight (LOS) communications and the potential use of Link 22 for Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) Communication and Link 11 as an interim solution into Maritime C2 systems until the introduction and employment of Link 22 is put in place.

49 Enclosure 2 Page 12 (34) Mission & Tasks (capabilities) Swedish maritime assets will use TDLs to conduct or support the following possible mission areas; Establish and/or contribute to RMP Contribute to RAP ISR Escort Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) ASuW Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) Mine Warfare (MW)/ Mine Counter Measure (MCM) operations Including Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Amphibious operations Electronic Warfare (EW) NGS (Naval Gunfire Support) Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) Route Surveillance Support operations Detailed information on TDL operations for the Navy platforms is described in annexes I, J, K, L, M and N of this CONOPS Land Operations Interoperable TDLs that will support land operations in the timeframe of this CONOPS , will be Link 16 and VMF. The implementations of these systems within different platforms will range from fully integrated to non-integrated, Stand Alone systems Mission & Tasks (Capabilities) Swedish land assets will use TDLs to conduct or support the following possible mission areas: Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) operations. Contribute to RAP. Land Manoeuvre Operations requiring receipt of SA and, specifically, the receipt and dissemination of air attack warnings. Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) operations. CAS /Forward Air Controller (FAC) operations. Fire Support (FS) operations (direct and indirect fires). Counter battery. Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC)/Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC). Special Operations Forces (SOF)

50 Enclosure 2 Page 13 (34) Detailed information on TDL operations for Land systems is described in Annexes O, P and Q of this CONOPS Unit Contribution to operations This chapter describes the Swedish Armed Forces unit/platform TDL contribution to the operations. Figure 2 illustrates the employment of Link 16 by Swedish Armed Forces platforms C2 units Figure 2. Link 16 operations overview Swedish Armed Forces will have C2 functionality for national and international operations within the time period of this CONOPS. The platforms that will carry out the C2 function in Sweden are listed here below in the following sub chapters Air units Swedish air units/platforms will use a combination of Link 16 and VMF to carry out the missions and tasks in the timeframe The Swedish Armed Forces will employ the air units/platforms described in paragraph for the stated international operations.

51 Enclosure 2 Page 14 (34) Control & Reporting Centre (CRC) One interoperable CRC achieved Link 16 Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in Initially the CRC provides a C2 capability for Link 16 training for Swedish Armed Forces platforms. Full Operational Capability (FOC) with integrated Link 16 in the CRC will be achieved by The initial aim for the CRC is to provide national training on: Control of JAS 39 C/D Gripen C2 coordination with Air Surveillance and Control (ASC) 890 Basic control and coordination of GBAD Support to maritime operations In the timeframe of these CONOPS the CRC will have FOC for integrated air defence. Link 16 capability will enable the CRC to effectively communicate with national and international systems during training and operations within and in close vicinity of Swedish territory. The number of operational Multi-functional Information Distribution System (MIDS) remote radio sites will increase during the timeframe of these CONOPS. In the same timeframe the CRC will be able to be used in combined exercises within Sweden using interoperable methods and procedures to gain international experience for Swedish military units. In the short term cooperation with US, United Kingdom (UK), Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Finland and Denmark is anticipated. The CRC will provide a counterpart to the ASC 890 during missions in a multiple C2 environment. The CRC will contribute to the RAP and the RMP. This will be achieved by detecting and tracking air and surface targets using data received from sensors, ASC 890, JAS 39 C/D and Sea Surveillance Battalion. Air and Maritime tracks will be distributed over a Link 16 network and on landlines using Joint Range Extension Application Protocol (JREAP) (Military Standard (MIL-STD) 3011). Operators will co-ordinate and communicate with GBAD units and other command and control centres operating within the Area of Responsibility (AOR) using secure voice and data networks. The CRC will host the Link 16 Network Management System (NMS). The NMS is supervised by staff of the Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) (as described in Annex R to this CONOPS). In conjunction to the operation of the NMS the CRC carries out Multiple MIDS terminal control at remote sites throughout Sweden. This will allow for: The provision of continuous/reliable Radio Frequency (RF) coverage/access to other MIDS platforms (primary goal is to interface to airborne MIDS platforms).

52 Enclosure 2 Page 15 (34) Ground-based C2s to monitor and control airborne platforms without an airborne relay. Non-C2 MIDS platforms to receive surveillance data without an airborne C2 unit Provision of increased survivability (a single terminal failure does not have major impact). For the detailed system description and function of the CRC see annex A to these CONOPS ASC 890 The main task for the ASC 890 is surveillance, which includes detecting, tracking and identifying air and surface tracks and by that contributing to the RAP and the RMP, that will be distributed over the Link 16 TDL network. Furthermore, the ASC 890 will have the capability to provide real time picture to commanders and cooperating units and finally to conduct weapon control and support other air operations with management. The ASC 890 may also provide a function as a TDL Link 16 relay platform to increase the range of LOS of the network. This will be a vital function for both training and operations within Sweden. For the detailed system description and function of ASC 890 see annex B to these CONOPS S-102B Figure 2 in chapter provides an illustration of platforms that currently have and may have Link 16 implemented in the future. The S-102B platform is planned to be equipped with Link 16 in However, details of the Link 16 implementation are not finalized and may also be of a classified nature. Due to this status, this issue of Swedish Armed Forces interoperability enabling systems policy documentation suite will not have a platform annex for the S- 102B discussing its planned implementation of the interoperability enabling systems. Details of future Link 16 to the S-102B implementation may be described in subsequent issues of this documentation set JAS 39 C/D Gripen JAS 39 C/D Gripen is a non C2 multi role fighter that will be central to all current and future air operations within the Swedish Armed Forces. The JAS 39 C/D will use interoperable communication systems, within the time frame of this document for the following missions and tasks:

53 Enclosure 2 Page 16 (34) Air-to-air-missions, with exchange of sensor data, command and control messages and airspace control measures. Blue Force Tracking (BFT) used for de-confliction, co-ordination of Composite Air Operations (COMAOs) and fratricide prevention. Ground/surface to Air missions such as CAS and AI For the detailed system description and function of JAS 39 C/D Gripen see annex C to these CONOPS Airbase Within the timeframe of , Air base will not be provided with its own Link 16 system capability. However the Air base will be able to accommodate and host a Link 16 Stand Alone System (Link 16 SAS) on a temporary basis Helicopters TDLs for use on Swedish Armed Forces Helicopters (HkP) 14, 15 and 16 are still under investigation. However TDLs will provide a role in the support of Hkp 14, 15 and 16. Hkp 14 will use interoperable TDLs/communication systems, within the time frame of this document for the following missions and tasks: Transport of troops and materiel (Tactical Troop Transport (TTT)) Medical transportation (Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) and Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)) Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Search and Rescue (SAR) ASuW Hkp 15 s use of interoperable TDLs is to be determined in the future. Hkp 16 use of interoperable TDLs is to be determined in the future. However Hkp 16 will use interoperable communication systems, within the time frame of this document, for the following missions and tasks: Utility cargo/combat sustainment transports Personnel and Cargo movement SAR CASEVAC MEDEVAC Special Operations Hkp 16 will also be employed to support disaster relief operations such as flood and storm recovery operations, and fire suppression.

54 Enclosure 2 Page 17 (34) Information on Hkp 14, 15 and 16 can be found in annexes F, G and H to this CONOPS Naval Units Swedish naval units will use a combination of Link 16, VMF and BLOS TDLs (Link 22) to carry out the missions and tasks in the timeframe Implementation of TDLs for Swedish maritime vessels is described in paragraphs to Sea Surveillance Battalion The TDL implementation requirement for the Sea Surveillance Battalion will depend on the potential implementation of Link 22 for the Navy and connection with the CRC exchanging information produced in a Link 16 environment possibly using JREAP. The need of a multilink facility will occur when Link 22 is implemented, which also will produce requirements for gateway solutions for transmission of information between different TDL systems. For a description and function of the Sea surveillance battalion see annex I to these CONOPS Corvettes The Visby class Corvette is a multi-role naval ship, particularly well suited for the following operations: ASW ASuW AAW MCM. The Gävle/Sundsvall class Corvette is a multi-role ship that is well suited to carry out the following missions and tasks: ASW ASuW AAW. In the timeframe Link 16 will not be integrated in the corvettes C2 system. Link 16 is required to provide SA and for contributing with sensor information to the RAP and RMP. However, the Corvettes will be equipped with a Link 16 Stand Alone System (SAS 3 ). This will allow the Corvette to be able to operate on a Link 16 network, receiving information that is transmitted from others in the network. 3 As described in chapter of this document.

55 Enclosure 2 Page 18 (34) To overcome LOS limitations an interoperable BLOS TDL such as Link 22 is required and will likely to be integrated to the corvettes C2 system. If restricted by time constraints or by other reasons a Link 11 Stand Alone System (L11 SAS) may be used as an interim BLOS capability. Link 22 is expected to be implemented during 2017 timeframe. Swedish Legacy BLOS links (8000 message series) will be used in parallel with interoperable TDLs to ensure that tactical information is distributed to all Swedish Naval units and to achieve SA in national operations. VMF (which consists of a message, header and bearer and described in chapter of this document) may be the primary message format and catalogue that will be employed by the Corvettes for digital NGS operations described in these CONOPS. For details, description and TDL implementation of the Corvettes see annex J to these CONOPS Mine Counter Measures Vessels (MCMVs) The Koster class is designed for MCM operations and ASW in extreme littoral and littoral waters. These operations may be in environments such as base areas, archipelagos and coasts in an internationally composed force. The MCM s main tasks will be: MCM EOD Route Surveillance ISR ASW AAW (Self defence operations) Legacy national TDLs will be used to ensure that tactical information is distributed along all Swedish Naval units and to achieve SA in national operations. Interoperable BLOS and LOS TDLs are under consideration for the MCMVs. For a system description and function of MCMV see annex K to these CONOPS Submarines The submarines can use the TDLs for verification and correlation of the surface picture, e.g. to correlate sensor information. The possibility to send/receive target information is also of major interest in submarine operations. The submarines are capable to carry out the following operations:

56 Enclosure 2 Page 19 (34) ISR Special Operations (SpecOps) ASuW ASW Oceanographic and hydrographical survey operations For submarines a TDL system with a BLOS capability would be preferable due to operative and tactical procedures. Currently (2012) only a few nations are considering Link 22 on submarines. Hence, further analysis regarding the operational benefits versus costs is required. For a system description and function of the submarines see annex L to these CONOPS Support vessels In international missions support/auxiliary ships provide the support role for the Corvettes and the MCMVs with maintenance and logistics. The ships will, for example, be able to conduct Replenishment At Sea (RAS). This ability gives the different forces, Corvettes and MCMVs, a high mobility and flexibility with increased endurance. The Support vessels main operations are: Support operations AAW (self-defence) ISR Flagship, Commander Task Force (CTF) (in a Ocean Patrol Vessel (OPV) role) During the period covered in this document the support ships will be fitted for Link 16 SAS and/or Link 11 SAS depending on the operational requirements. Legacy national TDLs will be used to ensure that tactical information is distributed along all Swedish Naval units and to achieve SA in national operations. Link 22 is under consideration and may be introduced on the Support vessels during the time frame of this documentation. Other interoperable BLOS & LOS TDLs such as VMF are still under consideration for the Support vessels. For the detailed system description and function of Support vessels, see annex M to these CONOPS.

57 Enclosure 2 Page 20 (34) Amphibious Forces The Amphibious Battalion will be organised in order to be able to participate in international operations, where the highest military effort level will be Peace Enforcement (PE) Operations. Primary task areas for the Amphibious Battalion are considered to be coastal areas, larger lakes, deltas and rivers. The Amphibious Battalion capacity to gain control of coastal and harbour areas on the surface, under the surface and in the air over prolonged periods will be an important part in the mission. The Amphibious Battalion main tasks/operations are: To obtain and sustain control in littoral areas ASuW Escort (ASW/ ASuW/ AAW) Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) Legacy national TDLs (8000-link) will be used to ensure that tactical information is distributed along all Swedish Naval units and to achieve SA in national operations. VMF will be the primary message format and catalogue that will be employed by the amphibious units for digital FAC/Fire Control interface to digital CAS operations described in these CONOPS. For a system description and function of Amphibious Forces see annex Nto these CONOPS Ground units Swedish ground units will use a combination of Link 16 and VMF to carry out the missions and tasks in the timeframe The Swedish Armed Forces will employ the following land units with interoperability enabling systems for the stated national and international operations: Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) Tactical Control Air Party (TACP) Special Operational Forces (SOFs) Ground Based Air Defence operations Centre (GBADOC) The GBADOC will be responsible for command and control of all Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) surveillance and fire units. All GBAD force operations and engagement operations are controlled from the GBADOC. The GBADOC is responsible for mission planning, defence design, war gaming, analysis, local air

58 Enclosure 2 Page 21 (34) picture production, contributing to the RAP, weapon system allocation, Air Tasking Order (ATO) and Airspace Control Order (ACO) receiving and dissemination etc. The GBADOC will be the main GBAD interoperability node and will communicate with all Higher Echelon Units, for example Force Headquarters (FHQ), Air Operations Centre (AOC), CRC and ASC 890. In the timeframe Link 16 is being integrated to the GBADOC C2 system. Missions for the GBAD unit are: Separation Of Parties by Force (SOPF) Conflict Prevention (CP) Evacuation Operation in a non-permissive environment (EO) Assistance to Humanitarian Operations (HA) This will be achieved by the following operations: Surface to Air Warfare (SAW). Contribute to the RAP. Contribute to the RMP. Air and maritime surveillance. Correlation and identification of Local Air Picture (LAP) and RAP targets and tracks. Protection of specific objects and other participating units. When required, to provide FHQ, Brigade HQs, and Battalion HQs with a RAP. For a system description and function of GBAD see annex O to these CONOPS Tactical Air Party (TACP) The primary role for the Swedish Armed Forces TACP is to integrate Air Operations into the planning and execution of the Land Operations. This is done by supporting the Ground Commander (GC) with CAS. The primary mission for the TACP in national and international scenarios is to integrate the use of all available CAS assets into the combat situation by being the FAC. Secondary the TACP is supporting the GC in the use of indirect fire (artillery and mortars) according to the plan for the combat situation by being the Forward Observer (FO). TACP is supporting the GC in collecting vital intelligence for the targeting process by using all available ground and aircraft based sensors. The TACP normally becomes the natural communication node between the ground and air units to increase SA on both air and ground units. TDLs, with

59 Enclosure 2 Page 22 (34) VMF being the prime digital enabler for CAS, will be used to support the TACP s missions and tasks. Access to Link16 network or its information will increase the airspace SA for TACP. Swedish Armed Forces TACP will be able to communicate via Link 16 if connected to a gateway or Combat Identification Server (CIDS). For a system description and function of TACP see annex P to these CONOPS Special Operation Forces (SOFs) Information about SOFs is classified and is not be available in this CONOPS. See annex Q for more information Joint TDL support Joint Data Links Operation Cell JDLOC has overall responsibility for the network management of interoperable TDLs for the Swedish Armed Forces. Further details of the JDLOC role and responsibilities can be found at chapter 7.2 of this document and in annex R. 3. TDL system descriptions 3.1. General This chapter is aimed at providing a high level description of interoperable TDL enabling systems and their key features that are currently or planned to be implemented on Swedish Armed Forces platforms. The descriptions of TDLs in this chapter are only intended to provide a background to the Armed Forces employed interoperable TDLs/systems Link 16 Link 16 uses the J-series message catalogue and a Data Element Dictionary (DED) adopted as a common standard. Link 16 messages support a majority of digital warfare functions. Link 16 is a high capacity, digital data distribution system providing integrated communications, Relative Navigation (RELNAV) and identification capabilities. It facilitates secure, flexible and Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) resistant information transfer, in the near real time domain. The Link 16 communication architecture is nodeless, flexible and allows a considerable number of virtual communications circuits to be established and operated simultaneously. These circuits may be functionally grouped and configured independently for varying levels of ECM resistance, security, etc. Link 16 supports the use of ECM Resistant Voice (ERV), Alpha Numeric Free Text (ANFT) and unformatted binary data such as slow-scan video imagery.

60 Enclosure 2 Page 23 (34) Due to restriction of Ultra High Frequency (UHF) LOS characteristics of Link 16, there is limit to range where platforms can exchange data. To overcome this restriction, a number of relay techniques may be employed Link 16 Terminals There are numerous variants of the Link 16 terminal used to exchange J-series messages. The Multifunction Information Distribution System (MIDS) is one variant used for tactical data exchange for Link 16. MIDS is a third generation Link 16 terminal. Link 16 systems exchange tactical information via the MIDS terminal using the J-series message catalogue, governed by either MIL-STD 6016 or STANAG 5516 (see Link standards primacy statements at chapter 5.3 of this document). The Swedish Armed Forces are currently only planning to employ MIDS Low Volume terminal (LVT) on their platforms. The MIDS terminal programme is currently going through an update (including a crypto upgrade). This is known as the Block Upgrade 2/Block Cycle 10. This change is being managed through the MIDS International Review Board (MIRB) and will impact the configuration of MIDS terminals procured and employed in Sweden Link 16 Stand Alone System The Link 16 SAS is an interim capability that utilises a MIDS terminal and a stand-alone host computer to provide basic data link functions. Link 16 SAS has the possibility to be fitted to various air, sea and land platforms. The Link 16 SAS requires no integration into host computer systems and therefore will not provide the network any of the fitted platform s sensor information. Link 16 SAS can receive most Link 16 messages providing the platform with increased situational awareness. Link 16 SAS can mainly transmit the platforms PPLI, free text messages and Link 16 voice. Other functionality can be enabled depending upon the platform s Link 16 communications requirements and the capability provided by the SAS stand-alone host computer Link 16 voice Link 16 voice is a complement to secure voice described in the joint secure voice CONOPS 4. Link 16 voice can be used for network administration. It can also be used for secure voice communication with extended range if a relay platform is available. 4 Reference B

61 Enclosure 2 Page 24 (34) Link 16 voice can used in two modes/capabilities; 2.4 Kilobits per second (Kbps) and 16 Kbps. 2.4 Kbps is generally not used as the quality of the voice received is of rather poor quality. However, the 16 Kbps voice quality is good, and the use of 16 Kbps utilises a high amount of the Link 16 Time Slot Duty Factor (TSDF) and therefore is only used in restricted circumstances. Many Link 16 platforms/terminals may not have the capability to operate Link 16 voice. Therefore, the use of this feature in Link 16 will be limited and not considered as an alternative to secure Voice Radio systems Link 16 Frequency Clearance Link 16 operates in the international protected radio navigation aid band Mega Hertz (MHz). Radio Navigation Aids (Navaids) equipment, such as Distance Measuring Equipment (DME), Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) and Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) systems have recognised status to operate in this frequency band. Link 16 has a potential to cause harmful interference in proximity to Radio Navaids equipment. Therefore, during peacetime, Link 16 has to be used within certain operating restrictions set out and recorded in a Frequency Clearance Agreement (FCA) document. The restrictions/operating criteria in the FCA provide protection for the potential Link 16 interference to these navigation aids. The criteria contained in the FCA are agreed with national Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs). The Swedish Armed Forces has the responsibility to ensure all Link 16 users comply with the regulations set out in the FCA. Link 16 FCA issues need to be considered both for the national Area Of Interest (AOI) and cross border emission and internationally, when Swedish Link 16 assets are being deployed Out Of Area (OOA). Tactical issues and tactical guidelines regarding the compliance to the FCA for Swedish Armed Forces units who employ Link 16 will be the responsibility of the Swedish JDLOC. This also includes Link 16 guest forces procedures and liaison for Swedish Armed Forces Link 16 operations in other nation s airspace. For guest forces operations using Link 16 in Swedish airspace guest forces procedures documentation have been set out and these are explained in Annex R to these CONOPS. Technical issues and design guidelines regarding the compliance to the FCA will be the responsibility of Swedish FMV TDL Office BLOS TDLs Due to the constraints of LOS functionality of Link 16, a BLOS capability must be considered for maritime operations. Link 16 at sea level has only a LOS to other sea platforms of approximately 25 Nautical Miles (NM).

62 Enclosure 2 Page 25 (34) It is assumed for combined operations with international forces that relay platforms will provide connectivity to other platforms within the international network. For national operations purposes it is important that the Swedish Armed Forces Link 16 C2 nodes can be used with the most optimal transmission range as possible. For naval purposes, this means it must be possible to have either relay capability available from aircraft or radio sites placed at tactical positions along the coastline Link 11 Link 11 is designed for operation on High Frequency (HF) ground using wave propagation and thus has a BLOS capability (to a theoretical range of approximately 300 NM). Link 11 can also operate in the UHF band but is then limited to LOS ranges (approximately 25 NM surface-to-surface or 150 NM surface-to-air). Link 11 is based on 1960s technology and is a relatively slow link (low capacity data throughput), which normally operates on a polling system with a Net Control Station (NCS) polling each participant in turn for their data. Link 11 is secure but not ECM resistant. As an interim BLOS capability, the Swedish Navy s corvettes could be equipped with an interim Link 11 SAS, or as a loan from a Link 11 nation. This is strictly a temporary solution that might be employed to overcome LOS limitations within an Area Of Operation (AOO) Link 22 Link 22 has its origins within and has been developed mainly with the maritime environment in mind. Its operation is mainly considered as BLOS tactical communication. However, Link 22 is also operated on UHF radio frequencies and therefore is then restricted to LOS communication (similar to Link 16 and Link 11 UHF ranges). Link 22 uses a message format which is a member of and common to the J- Series family. Link 22 has a commonality/ interoperability capability with Link 16 using modified J-Series messages. However, messages have been developed that are unique to the Link 22 requirement. The Link 22 message set is known as the F-Series messages. Main features of Link 22 are as follows: No requirement for a NCS, thus creating a nodeless system, similar to the architecture of Link 16. However, Link 22 uses a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) architecture which operates in a different manner to that used by Link 16. Message throughput is increased. The Link 22 architecture and messaging system allows for a higher level of message exchange within the network.

63 Enclosure 2 Page 26 (34) Introduction of an Electronic Protection Measures (EPM) capability. Link 22 is able to operate in a frequency hopping mode. Based on NATO STANAG 4444 (HF EPM Equipment) and STANAG 4372 (SATURN). Increased Error Detection And Correction (EDAC). Modern EDAC techniques and other functionality have led to an improvement in this area. Improved Message Catalogue. The Link 11 catalogue has been greatly improved upon, allowing for message exchange in more functional areas. Enhanced Relay Capability. Various enhanced relay methods have been incorporated into the Link 22 architecture Joint Range Extension Application Protocol Joint Range Extension Application Protocol (JREAP) itself is not classified as a TDL. JREAP is a method of extending the range of LOS TDLS such as Link 16. JREAP is a means of wrapping J-series messages which will allow them to be distributed via other transmission means other than Link 16 terminals/networks. If used on platforms, the J-series messages can be transmitted using JREAP on systems such as Joint Range Extension (JRE) possibly on the following media: Swedish Armed Forces HF 2000 and other HF systems Satellite communication Local Area Network (LAN)/Wide Area Network (WAN) using Internet Protocol (IP) JREAP is the application protocol that provides the format and JRE is an example of a system that consists of both hardware & software to send & receive data from units beyond line of sight, or with connectivity issues. To provide interoperability assurance for Swedish Armed Forces implementation of and systems that send and receive JREAP shall comply with Mil Std 3011A VMF Introduction VMF was initially developed for the ground environment, specifically for Fire Support and Situational Awareness. However, VMF s inherent flexibility means that the functionality is now being used in other environments as well. Strictly speaking VMF is only a message set and a not TDL. When added to a bearer and header it is generally known as a TDL. Therefore in the context of a TDL, VMF consists of a message set, a header and a bearer and these are specified in three separate US MIL-STDs.

64 Enclosure 2 Page 27 (34) VMF messages are designated as K-series and are part of the J-family series message catalogue. The US normally utilises Combat Net Radios (CNR) such as Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINGARS) or Enhance Position Reporting System (EPLRS) for use with VMF. Other bearers such as fixed frequency UHF and IP networks may also be used. For interoperability purposes the bearer has to be the same for all users who wish to exchange information. For example, UHF bearer will not be able to communicate VMF messages with a Satellite Communication (SATCOM) bearer. The main principle behind the concept of VMF messages is that they are of a single use Use of VMF in CAS in the ground/surface to air operations The emphasis of the VMF message catalogue was to be, and is, on satisfying the needs of the ground user by addressing functionality and functional areas that were either not supported or were poorly addressed by other TDLs. The ground/surface to air interface missions and tasks fall into this category. VMF messages support a wide range of warfare functional areas including CAS. However, there is at least one significant exception to this philosophical approach of messages of a single use (as discussed above) and this in the case of Fire Support. This includes CAS, missions that are addressed using bespoke VMF messages specifically written to replicate, and enhance, the corresponding voice data communication. It is expected that VMF will be the prime TDL enabler for the digital information exchange for ground/surface to air interface for Swedish Armed Forces platforms and units carrying out CAS, NGS and FAC operations Future potential uses of VMF In the time frame of , the Swedish Armed Forces have the ambition to explore alternative uses (outside the ground- surface to air interface) of VMF as a digital enabler. The potential areas where VMF may be considered as interoperability enabling system is for the follow operations: MEDEVAC CASEVAC Supply operations Logistic operations

65 Enclosure 2 Page 28 (34) 4. TDL implementation policy 4.1. General To ensure that information exchange on interoperable TDLs are implemented correctly and to their full required capability, policy on how they should be implemented is required. This chapter of the TDL CONOPS sets out the policy for interoperable TDL standard primacy and interoperability testing J-Series family of message standards As discussed in the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy document for interoperability enabling systems, future development and implementation of TDL Systems for Swedish Armed Forces platforms/systems will use the J series family of message standards. TDLs that are included within the J-series family of messages are: Link 16 Link 22 VMF International Broadcast System (IBS) All interoperable TDLs to be implemented on Swedish Armed Forces platforms and systems shall be a member of the J-series family of messages Link Primacy Swedish Armed Forces currently use a variety of national TDLs that are not interoperable with international systems and media. Link 16 will be used or implemented as the primary information exchange medium wherever Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) are suitable and possible in the time period This decision does not exclude other TDLs such as those that are required to achieve a BLOS capability as well as national TDLs. A strict configuration control and requirements tracing process for TDLs is required to ensure that platforms implement the messages in a manner that optimises interoperability, both for joint and combined operations. The configuration control and requirements tracing process is to be based on common, internationally accepted methods and tools that will be used by all Swedish Armed Forces platforms implementing interoperability enabling systems. For coordination issues FMV will administrate these processes centrally for all Swedish Armed Forces platforms.

66 Enclosure 2 Page 29 (34) It is Swedish defence policy to follow potential coalition partners development and implementation of STANAG, MIL-STD and future emerging international standards Link 16 Standard Primacy It is anticipated that STANAG 5516 Ed 6 will be the initial de facto format for Link 16 in the timescale of this CONOPS. It is the aim of the international community to align the STANAG 5516, Ed 6 to the MIL-STD 6016D, thus minimising differences between the two standards, and facilitating international interoperability BLOS TDLs Standards primacy For Swedish platforms requiring an interim interoperable BLOS capability implementation it is anticipated that STANAG 5511 Ed 7 will be the de facto standard for Link 11 in the timescale of this CONOPS. Regarding Link 22, the Swedish Armed Forces is planning for acquiring Link 22 for some of the Navy s platforms in the timeframe of this document. As of now STANAG 5522 Ed 3 is under ratification. For the other TDLs the relevant STANAGs and MIL-STDs will be used VMF Standards primacy Swedish Armed Forces platforms implementation of the ground/surface to air interface VMF it is anticipated that the US standards MIL-STD D Change 1 Change 1 (bearer), MIL-STD D Change 1 (header) and MIL-STD-6017B (message) or corresponding STANAG will be the de facto standards implemented by potential coalition partners. However, in the latter part of the timescale of this CONOPS, the MIL STDs may be required to migrate to E, E and 6017C. VMF for the ground/surface to air interface will require coordinated and welldefined implementation to the MIL-STDs discussed above. The implementation documentation will need to be adhered to by implementing platforms within the Swedish Armed Forces. To promote and maintain interoperability for CAS, FAC and NGS operations, a document set which translates the requirements for VMF implementation is recommended to be considered. It is recommended that the documentation set for these operations should include, as minimum: Single Link Requirement Specification (SLIRS). Header Implementation Requirement Specification (HIRS). Bearer Definition Document (BDD).

67 Enclosure 2 Page 30 (34) TDL Configuration Management Interoperable TDLs, due to their complex nature and reliance on numerous international standards, require that specific platform implementation(s) and subsequent maintenance are managed in a structured and coordinated manner. Therefore, the approach to Configuration Management (CM) of interoperable TDLs (Link 16, Link 11, Link 22 and VMF) is being managed centrally by the TDL Configuration Control and Review Board (CCRB). The CCRB is a part of a larger coordination activity within the Swedish Armed Forces and FMV. The CCRB is responsible for reporting to the Configuration Control Board (CCB) which SamoR FVTS has the responsibility for in the FMV. The CCRB carries no formal responsibility for requirements definition and implementation of TDL systems. This responsibility remains with the normal procedures for procurement and implementation for Swedish Armed Forces. The TDL CCRB will provide a basis for TDL CM decisions made in accordance with Swedish Armed Forces and FMV established decisions. All CM decisions are taken by the appropriate authorities within FMV and/or the Swedish Armed Forces in accordance with the normal processes and procedures. TDL CCRB s main purpose is: Provision of a common CM process for: o Upgrades of common TDL platform equipment. o Changes in relevant TDL standards that affect Swedish platforms. o Ensuring the interoperability of new TDL capability requirements. o Reporting and investigation of TDL issues/problems stemming from verification and/or operation. Collection and maintenance of information regarding Swedish Armed Forces platform wide implementation of TDLs in a common repository. Managing the investigation of current common TDL function issues in line with Swedish Armed Forces and FMV established processes. Dissemination of information regarding TDL planning, production and results. The CCRB comprises of the following stakeholders and representation: FMV TDL Office (CCRB Chair) TDL Platform representatives FMV Test & Evaluation (FMV T&E) Standards management representative (SIG/GYS) TDL user community representative (JDLOC) Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) (when required).

68 Enclosure 2 Page 31 (34) 4.4. Interoperability testing standard primacy To be able to participate in distributed Interoperability testing, such as the NATO Tactical Data Link Interoperability Test Syndicate (TDLITS), Swedish Armed Forces implements STANAG 5602, Standard Interface for Multiple Platform Link Evaluation (SIMPLE) in all interoperable TDL platforms and test sites. 5. Organisational Structure To meet the requirements of TDLs transitioning to a Network Enabled Capability (NEC) concept in a unified and joint manner, the Swedish Armed Forces has formed a joint operational organisational structure. This organisation is required to ensure that only one approach to and command of TDLs within Swedish Armed Forces is taken. This will allow a joint service approach and allow all three services an equal stake within TDL allocation, operations and planning. A description of the joint operational organisational structure can be found in the main document to this CONOPS, Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Document for Interoperability Enabling Systems Tactical Data Link Education and Training 6.1. Introduction Effective training in taking part of a TDL network is an important step to ensure successful use of TDL systems in future operations. There are three basic levels of training and education: General education, both operational and technical should be performed at one location to guarantee a joint perspective and reduce costs. Platform specific training and education will be performed at each Service s centre to increase the understanding for the platform needs. Exercises with platforms using TDLs will be planned with both a combined and a joint perspective System Training When introducing a new technical system, education and training is essential to ensure that all systems can be operated and maintained/supported correctly and effectively. Therefore it is important at an early stage to identify all users for these new systems, tactical as well as technical personnel. To provide an effective education, it is important that the training facilities are correctly equipped to deal with the needs for all services (Air Force, Navy

69 Enclosure 2 Page 32 (34) (including amphibious forces) and Army) and to include all system components of TDLs. This will allow for the appropriate training in the right environment. TDL training issues are being addressed by the Swedish Armed Forces interoperability enabling systems training group. This group provides guidance for training and education and requirements for the training courses at educational facilities. 7. TDL Specific infrastructure 7.1. Communications planning An overall communications planning and coordination activity is required. Communications planning messages for the operation of the TDLs described in this CONOPS are detailed in the secure text CONOPS Joint Data Links Operations Cell (JDLOC) Interoperable TDLs require a discrete infrastructure to support their successful operation. The Swedish Armed Forces JDLOC has the responsibility to provide the infrastructure support for interoperable TDLs for Swedish Armed Forces platforms. The JDLOC is an essential and central component of the TDL interoperability infrastructure. Interoperable TDLs that are/will be managed and supported by the JDLOC are: Link 16 Link 11 Link 22 VMF The JDLOC has the responsibility to provide for all Swedish Armed Forces multi TDLs planning, management and design issues. Therefore, JDLOC employs a multi TDL management philosophy for all management phases for interoperable TDLs employed by Swedish Armed Forces platforms listed above. JDLOC has the responsibility to manage frequency clearance issues for Link 16 specifically for the Swedish Armed Forces according to Sweden s Link 16 FCA. The JDLOC s responsibility for the management and enforcement of the Swedish FCA covers Swedish Armed Forces visiting platforms and guest forces to Sweden s Flight Information Region (FIR). The JDLOC will provide the management and operation of the NMS and dynamic Operational Network (OPNET) function located at the Swedish Armed Forces CRC as described in chapter of this document. The NMS will

70 Enclosure 2 Page 33 (34) provide the JDLOC with the capability to manage Link 16 networks dynamically in real time. This will ensure that the optimal network operation is maintained as well as monitoring frequency clearance issues. In the timeframe of these CONOPS, it is expected that the JDLOC will transition from single TDL management (Link 16) to multi TDL management philosophy. The JDLOC will be responsible for the management of all new interoperable TDLs that are being implemented and adopted by Swedish Armed Forces. These TDLs/enablers may include VMF and a BLOS TDL capability. A more detailed description of the roles and responsibilities for the JDLOC can be found at Annex R to this CONOPS Army Navy and Airforce (Service level) responsibilities The Joint TDL Directorate structure allows each service (Airforce, Navy and Army) in Swedish Armed Forces to have the correct direction for both platform implementation and operation of TDLs. Each service has responsibility to report to the Joint TDL Directorate capability gaps for specific needs regarding TDL employment. Each service has also the responsibility to report to Joint TDL Directorate problems encountered with the operation of interoperable TDLs within their platforms. All services will report training and education needs to the training facilities and also be prepared to carry out the operator hands on training All services will be prepared to designate a Unit TDL Officer for liaison with the JDLOC Unit TDL Officers (UTOs) responsibilities UTOs provide the necessary information for platforms to carry out their TDL operations. These officers provide the day to day communication link between JDLOC and the platforms. All service specific TDL issues should be directed through their respective TDL officer. Examples of these issues are: Platform Network requirements Problem reporting Development issues Participation in the TDL Operators Group (TOG)

71 Enclosure 2 Page 34 (34) 8. Platform TDL implementation look-up table Table 1 below provides a quick overview of interoperable TDLs have been implemented on Swedish platforms: Link 16 Link 11 Link 22 VMF CRC X ASC 890 X JAS 39 C/D X X Hkp 14 (X) (X) (X) Hkp 15 Hkp 16 X Corvettes (X) (X) (X) (X) Submarine (X) (X) MCM (X) (X) (X) Support Vessels (X) (X) (X) Amphibious (X) (X) (X) X SjöC/Sea (X) Surveillance Bn GBAD X TACP X (X) - Under consideration.

72 Enclosure 3 Page 1 (27) Swedish Armed Forces Joint Identification Friend or Foe Concept of Operations (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

73 Enclosure 3 Page 2 (27) List of contents 1. Introduction Background Aim Document structure Scope Assumptions Operations involving the use of IFF Background IFF contribution to joint operations Situational Awareness (SA) Position and identification Joint Operational Picture (JOP) Operations employing IFF systems General IFF operating guidelines IFF/SSR policy on deployed operations IFF/SSR management procedures IFF employments IFF contribution to air operations Maritime operations Land operations IFF technical system description Components IFF interrogator Sub-System - Operating States IFF transponder sub-system - operating states Use of IFF IFF transponder IFF interrogator Technical description Identification attempt Limitations IFF organisational structure General IFF education and training System training Operational training SIF/SSR modes Mode 4 and mode 5 operations IFF infrastructure General Joint Data Links Operations Cell (JDLOC) Management of IFF/SSR emissions in Sweden IFF capable Platforms... 27

74 Enclosure 3 Page 3 (27) Issue Status Number Date Comments Issue Template Issue Draft Draft 2.0 Issue Draft Updated draft 3.0 Review Issue Review Issue Post-draft Final Issue List of Acronyms A list of acronyms for this document and associated CONOPS can be found at Appendix A.

75 Enclosure 3 Page 4 (27) Abstract. Situational Awareness (SA), Target Identification (TI) and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) are elements of Combat Identification (ID). TI may be carried out by many different technical systems. This document only describes the employment of NATO IFF Mk XII and MkXIIA (which is Mk XII and Mode 5) in missions and operations carried out by the Swedish Armed Forces. These missions and operations cover both national and international scenarios. This CONOPS document is a part of suite of documents describing all international interoperability enablers that the Armed Forces currently procure. The IFF CONOPS document has been produced in collaboration with a number of departments and organisations, on behalf of the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Headquarters, HKV. A detailed list of contributors can be found in the main document, Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy document for interoperability Enabling Systems

76 Enclosure 3 Page 5 (27) References The information in this publication has been extracted from multiple sources. References to these documents and sources of information are listed in table 1 below: Ref# Document Comments NATO Standardisation Documents 1 Allied Communication Publication (ACP) 165 Operational Brevity Codes 2 Allied Joint Publication (AJP) Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control March STANAG 4193 Technical Characteristics of IFF Mk XA and Mk XII Interrogators and Transponders 4 Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 4193 Part I, Edition 2, Amendment (Amd) 1: General Description of the System 12 December STANAG 4193 Part II, Edition 1: Performance in the Presence of Electronic Countermeasures 12 November STANAG 4193 Part III, Edition 1, Amd 1: IFF Installed System Characteristics 28 October STANAG 4193 Part IV, Edition 2, Amd 1: Technical Characteristics of Mode S in Military Interrogators and Transponders 03 October STANAG 4193 Part V, Edition 2: Technical Description of the Mk XIIA System 01 October International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 10 Volume IV: Surveillance and Collision Avoidance Systems. Edition 4, July 2007 (Includes Amd 82) 10 ICAO Annex 10 Volume III: Communication Systems. Edition 2, July 2007 (To Amd 82, November 2002) 11 ICAO Document 9684-AN/951: Manual of the Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) Systems. Edition 3, EUROCONTROL Principles of Mode S Operation and Interrogator Codes 18/03/2003 (General Public) 13 ACP 160(D) IFF/SIF Operational Procedures Aug ACP 160 NATO Supplement-1 (E) Policy and Procedures for the Management of IFF/SIF

77 Enclosure 3 Page 6 (27) 1. Introduction 1.1. Background To reduce the risk of fratricide to the greatest extent possible is of great importance in all military operations. To do this, a system or a collection of systems to help provide information for the identification of own military platforms and distinguish them from any potential threat/s is required. Using Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems is one method of how the risk of fratricide may be reduced. The timely exchange and dissemination of digital battlespace information is fundamental to effective military operations. Command & Control & Communication (C3) information is regarded globally as a key enabler of the ability to control, monitor and evaluate operational activity in different national defence and peacekeeping environments. The Swedish Armed Forces are continuing to move through a transition to encompass both national and international operations. This change has required Swedish Armed Forces to embrace identification systems such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) IFF to (amongst other operational benefits) reduce fratricide. To complement NATO IFF for Armed Forces platforms in international operations, other technical enablers are required to be employed by the Swedish Armed Forces. These enablers are Tactical Data Links (TDLs), secure voice, and secure text which each are described in their own separate CONOPS. When a commander is required to select a target, positive identification is extremely important. The IFF system provides one source of information that will assist a commander in determining the identity of an object. However, The IFF system provides one source of information that will assist a commander in determining the identity of an object. However, IFF on its own does not enable a target to be positively identified as a friend or foe. The lack of IFF responses only allows an inference to be made with regards to an object s identity. To facilitate unrestricted access for military aircraft in civil controlled airspace (e.g. rapid deployment to operational areas), it is necessary for military aircraft to be able to integrate fully into the civil Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) environment Aim The aim of this CONOPS is to provide a joint framework to ensure a coherent description of the employment of NATO/IFF for all Swedish Armed Forces platforms to be interoperable in international/national operations. This CONOPS describe these operations in the time period of

78 Enclosure 3 Page 7 (27) This CONOPS is a living document and will be periodically reviewed and updated to reflect the Swedish Armed Forces IFF policy, missions and tasks Document structure This CONOPS document is part of the interoperability enabling systems document structure. This structure has been put in place to ensure that the policy, concepts and supporting information is displayed in a joint concept manner and can be interpreted by commanders and platform authorities alike. It is designed to be incorporated into the system of systems architecture of the suite of interoperability enabling systems documentation. Figure 1 illustrates this CONOPS document structure. Figure 1. Swedish Armed Forces interoperability enabling systems document structure

79 Enclosure 3 Page 8 (27) The main body of this CONOPS document describes the joint perspective of the deployment of IFF. Information specific to individual platforms is contained in the annexes attached to the CONOPS Scope This CONOPS describes the operation and employment of IFF systems in a general perspective within the timeframe for the operations described in the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Document for Interoperability Enabling Systems Assumptions The following assumptions below have been made in order to achieve interoperability for the Swedish Armed Forces with IFF; Mode 5 will be released to Swedish Armed Forces during the time period of this document. International interoperability information, technology, cryptographic material and interoperable systems are releasable to the Armed Forces in the timeframe of these documents. 2. Operations involving the use of IFF 2.1. Background IFF systems can provide the following capabilities for Swedish Armed Forces operations: Identification of co-operating units. Support and contribution to Situational Awareness (SA) of friendly air and maritime platforms and potentially SA for other identities (e.g. neutral platforms). IFF is used by the Swedish Armed Forces to identify, track and control aircraft together with SSR (used by both civil and Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Military ATC (MATC) agencies). IFF systems will support operations for Swedish Armed Forces that are conducted under the four following main headings: Swedish national operations. European Union (EU) United States of America (US)/NATO/Partnership for Peace (PfP).

80 Enclosure 3 Page 9 (27) United Nations (UN). Platforms with surveillance/command & Control (C2) capability and/or capability to engage air targets shall be equipped with an IFF interrogator. Platforms that need to be identified shall be equipped with an IFF transponder (See paragraph 3.1 for the system description). The operational use of and information provided by IFF systems as described in operational use of IFF (chapter 3), has limitations. It is important to note that the IFF systems have interfaces with other interoperability enabling systems and national sensors in order to help provide accurate and robust position and identification information. IFF interfaces with the following interoperability enabling systems: Link 16 Secure Voice Secure Text National systems/sensors Figure 2 provides an illustration of Swedish Armed Force platforms that employ IFF systems. Figure 2. Swedish Armed forces platforms employing IFF systems.

81 Enclosure 3 Page 10 (27) 2.2. IFF contribution to joint operations Situational Awareness (SA) Understanding all aspects of the operational environment in the context of space, time, tasking and resources is fundamental to efficient decision-making. Decision making in the operational environment is aided by the employment of SA. The IFF system described in this CONOPS contributes with platform identification information to a SA Picture (SAP) Position and identification The consequences of failing to detect, track and identify an object correctly may be severe and could lead to a possibility of fratricide. An enemy strike or rogues commercial aircraft not identified promptly and accurately will have the potential to result in the destruction or damage of own forces or a neutral object. IFF provides consistent and accurate positional and identification information that will assist in the decision if a platform is friend or foe. The positional and identification information provided by IFF systems decreases the possibility of incorrect identification and greatly reduces the consequent occurrence of a severe incident or fratricide Joint Operational Picture (JOP) The fusion of all available information: tracks, intelligence, weather, topography and threat warnings, provides a JOP. The responsibility for producing and maintaining the JOP product will be designated during the Planning Phase of an Operation. In Sweden, this responsibility will fall to the Swedish Armed Forces Strategic Operations Staff. Swedish Armed Forces platform IFF systems will contribute identification and positional information to the JOP Operations employing IFF systems General IFF operating guidelines IFF/SSR policy on deployed operations The main users of IFF/SSR on deployed operations are those operating in the air and air defence environments. Maritime forces may also be operating within the Joint Battlespace of the Joint Operations Area (JOA) or operating autonomously and generating their own Local Air Picture (LAP)/ Local Maritime Picture (LMP)).

82 Enclosure 3 Page 11 (27) The lead coalition nation is responsible for setting guidelines for the IFF employment policy in the JOA and for the integration of coalition planning staffs to co-ordinate on IFF and airspace issues. Swedish Armed Forces platforms are required to have an IFF Mode 4 capability. Mode 4 implementations is a JOA minimum entry requirement for all combat aircraft and all maritime units in any operation led by the US up to Mode 5 will replace Mode 4 as the JOA minimum entry requirement from , or possibly earlier. For operations together with other coalition nations or organisations, Mode 4 may be the only secure IFF mode available and employed until It is important to note that Mode 4 code allocation will not be available after 2020 and therefore will not be supported after this date. All secure IFF identification operations will require Mode 5 implementation for platforms from 2020 onwards IFF/SSR management procedures Swedish forces in the JOA should follow IFF procedures stated in following documents, orders and instructions: Rules Of Engagement (ROEs): ROEs define the Identity (ID) criteria including the use of IFF during transition from peace to war. Special Instructions (SPINS): SPINS are used to disseminate and amplify plans in support of Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) execution. ATO: The ATO provides individual mission tasking including associated Mode 3 codes. It is expected that the ATO will also include the 24-bit Aircraft Mode S Address (AA). Air Defence (AD) Plan: The AD plan contains details of RAP ID authorities, Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) and maritime Anti Air Warfare (AAW). Airspace Control Plan (ACP): ACP includes details regarding IFF in accordance with ID criteria, IFF capability of air assets and AD systems, emergency procedures e.g. IFF problems etc. Airspace Control Order (ACO): The ACO 3 provides details of IFF Switch On/Switch Off lines are published in the ACO. 1 According to the latest Mark XIIA implementation plan 2 Ref [1] ACP Ref [2] AJP Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control March 2006

83 Enclosure 3 Page 12 (27) Operation General matter (OPGEN)/Operational Tasks (OPTASKS) AAW, Anti Surface Warfare (AsuW) & RMP: These documents/messages describe how IFF is to be used for Air and Maritime units when operating in support of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) IFF employments When deployed on operations, IFF is employed for the following tasks: Positive Identification of co-operating friendly platforms. For the requirement on IFF functionality for Swedish military platforms see Table 1. To avoid fratricide ( Blue on Blue ), there is a requirement for all participants checking in for control to be subjected to a full IFF Modes 1-5 check. For the provision of SA, IFF is important in building the RAP/RMP. Contributing platforms to the SA are listed in Table 1 of this document. More information on IFF implementation can be found in the platform annexes of the Swedish Armed Forces interoperability enabling systems policy documentation. IFF will contribute to Battlespace Management in the Forward area 4 for the tactical control and coordination of aircraft, maritime surface, ground and GBAD units. In the Rear area 5 IFF will be used for tactical control and coordination of air and maritime surface units. The IFF system performance may degrade with an increasing number of IFF users. It is therefore necessary to introduce restraints for the use of IFF Interrogators. Interrogations in Mode 4, Mode 5 and Mode S shall be target specific only. Employment of Modes 1, 2, 3/A and C in target specific mode should also be considered. Re-interrogations for the purpose of confirmation of a targets identity in any Mode must be minimized. Forces in transit should be kept outside the JOA. Mode 3/A reply codes will be used for correlation with ATOs and civil flight plans. 4 Ref [2] AJP Ref [2] AJP-3.3.

84 Enclosure 3 Page 13 (27) Mode S will be used to provide identification of aircrafts equipped with Mode S transponders by correlation of Flight ID with civil Flight Plans. During an operation there may be tactical reasons for minimising the use of IFF. An example of a limitation is the use of IFF restrictions imposed by Emission Control (EMCON). In peacetime training and operations, requirements from Civil Aviation s Authorities (CAAs) may impose restrictions on the military use of IFF/SSR Modes. The peacetime restrictions on the IFF system are agreed with the national CAA and then recorded in the IFF Frequency Clearance Agreement (FCA) Mode S is currently not in use for ATC in the Swedish Flight Information Region (FIR). However Mode S is a requirement for all military airborne platforms in European airspace in peacetime IFF contribution to air operations The missions/air operations listed below are not platform specific. These missions and operations should be considered as areas regarding air operations in a broader sense. Swedish air assets will use the IFF system to conduct or support the following mission areas: Air Operations Counter-Air Operations o Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) o Defensive Counter-Air (DCA) Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) Strategic Air Operations such as: o Attack on an adversary s vital assets, like C2 structures Anti-Surface Force Air Operations o Air Interdiction (AI) o Close Air Support (CAS) o ASuW using Air Maritime Coordination (AMC) procedures Support Air Operations o Air Reconnaissance o Air Surveillance o Sea Surveillance o Land Surveillance More detailed information on IFF operations for Air systems is described in Annexes A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H of this CONOPS.

85 Enclosure 3 Page 14 (27) Maritime operations Maritime assets and especially naval units have the flexibility to change role at a short notice. Swedish maritime assets will use IFF to conduct or support the following mission areas: Establish and/or contribute to RMP Contribute to RAP ISR Escort Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) ASuW Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) Mine Warfare (MW)/ Mine Counter Measure (MCM) operations Including Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Amphibious operations Electronic Warfare (EW) NGS (Naval Gunfire Support) Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) Route Surveillance Support operations Detailed information on IFF operations for the maritime assets is described the in annexes, I, J, K, L, M and N for Navy platforms of this CONOPS Land operations The below listed mission areas should be considered as Land operations in a broader sense. Swedish Armed Forces Land assets will use IFF to conduct or support the following mission areas: Close Air Support (CAS) & Forward Air Controller (FAC) operations Helicopter support operations Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) operations Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) operations GBAD operations. Land manoeuvre operations requiring receipt of Air SA and, specifically, the receipt and dissemination of air attack warnings. Detailed information on IFF operations for Land systems is described in annexes O & P of this CONOPS.

86 Enclosure 3 Page 15 (27) 3. IFF technical system description 3.1. Components The IFF System comprises the following Sub-Systems: IFF Interrogator Sub-System. IFF Transponder Sub-System. Cryptographic infrastructure. A particular platform may be equipped with one or both of the Sub-Systems. Both the IFF Interrogator and the IFF Transponder Sub-Systems will require an Electronic Transfer Device (ETD) with Mode 4 and/or Mode 5 Key Variables (KVs) for transfer to the IFF fitted platform. Both the IFF Interrogator Sub-System and the IFF Transponder Sub-System will also require dedicated erase lines, to allow the erasure of all Codes and KVs. A platform may have one or more KV erase buttons, located at permanently manned positions IFF interrogator Sub-System - Operating States The IFF Interrogator Sub-System will have the following basic states of operation: Off In the Off state, no platform power will be supplied. Standby In the Standby state, operation shall be in accordance with STANAG Normal In the Normal state, operation shall be in accordance with STANAG When in both the Normal and Standby state, in which the transmitter is powered, the IFF equipment shall be considered to be in an ON condition IFF transponder sub-system - operating states The IFF Transponder Sub-System will have the following basic states of operation: Off In the Off state, no platform power will be supplied to the IFF Transponder sub-system. Standby In the Standby state, operation shall be in accordance with STANAG Normal In the Normal state, operation shall be in accordance with STANAG Ref [4] STANAG 4193 Part 1 Annex A Section [Ref 4] STANAG 4193 Part 1 Annex A Section [Ref 4] STANAG 4193 Part 1 Annex A Section

87 Enclosure 3 Page 16 (27) Emergency In the Emergency state, operation shall be as defined for normal operation, except that: o The emergency response shall be transmitted in all applicable modes. o Replies in all available operating modes, (excluding Mode 4), shall be enabled irrespective of the state of any Mode selection (operator) controls. In the Normal, Standby or Emergency, in which the transmitter is powered, the equipment shall be considered to be in the ON condition Use of IFF IFF transponder Operation of the IFF Transponder involves the following aspects: The IFF operator will have control over each individual mode. This will allow the activation or deactivation of replies to interrogations in each mode. The IFF operator will be provided with displays, showing the settings of specific IFF Transponder controls. The displays will also show alarm indications for the crypto, Built In Test (BIT), jamming etc. The IFF operator will have controls for selection of the Mode 4 KV, (i.e. selection of the A or B key). The IFF operator will have the ability to activate the Selective Identification Feature for (SIF) codes. The IFF operator will have an erase facility, which will actively erase the Mode 4 and Mode 5 KV. There will be maintainer interfaces for the changing of the operational system software (updates), the Mode 2 airframe or platform number and the Mode S Default Address. Automatic Code Change (ACC) will not be implemented IFF interrogator Operation of the IFF Interrogator shall involve the following aspects: The IFF operator will have control over each individual mode. This will allow the activation or deactivation of interrogations in each mode. The IFF operator will have the ability to specify a specific target for interrogation. The IFF operator will be provided with displays, showing the settings of specific IFF Interrogator controls. The displays will also show alarm indications for the crypto, BIT etc. 9 [Ref 4] STANAG 4193 Part 1 Annex A Section

88 Enclosure 3 Page 17 (27) The IFF operator will have controls for selection of the Mode 4 KV, (i.e. selection of the A and/or B key). The IFF operator will have the ability to select passive decode code entry. The IFF operator will have an erase facility, which will actively erase the Mode 4 and Mode 5 KV. There will be maintainer interfaces for the changing of the operational software (updates), databases, monopulse calibration and the II/SI code for Mode S. ACC will not be implemented. Some or all of the operator controls and displays may be provided by the host platform s C2 System (via keyboards, tracker balls and displays) Technical description An IFF system operates by using a series of questions and answers. Each type of question and answer is known as a Mode. Questions (interrogations) are emitted by an IFF Interrogator and the interrogations are detected by IFF Transponders that respond with answers (replies). The concept of interrogations and replies is shown in Figure 3.

89 Enclosure 3 Page 18 (27) Interrogation (1030 MHz) Aircraft fitted with an IFF Transponder Reply (1090 MHz) Surveillance Radar fitted with an IFF Interrogator IFF Antenna Radar Antenna IFF Transmitter / Receiver Sync Trigger Radar Transmitter / Receiver Trigger and Radio Transmission Control Coder Radar Video Control Decoder IFF Interrogator IFF Video Display Radar Figure 3. Operating principles of an IFF system The IFF Interrogator requires an IFF antenna. The IFF Antenna is separate from the IFF equipment, but fixed to the Radar Antenna (either on top or mounted backwards), using the same Rotating joint or Cable Winder. The IFF Interrogator requires synchronisation from the Radar, for knowledge of the Radar Antenna pointing angle. The IFF Transponder requires Antenna(s). The IFF Antenna(s) are normally fixed dipoles or monopoles in the ground plane. For an aircraft, normally one IFF Antenna is mounted on the top of the fuselage and one is mounted underneath the fuselage. For a ship, two IFF Antennas are normally mounted as high up as possible (on the mast). Two IFF Antennas are normally used to overcome any effect of shadowing. However, occasionally only one IFF antenna is used if shadowing is found to be small and to reduce installation costs.

90 Enclosure 3 Page 19 (27) Interrogations are transmitted from an IFF Interrogator at the Radio Frequency (RF) 1030 MHz. An IFF Transponder that receives the interrogation will respond with a reply at a RF of 1090 MHz. It is only possible for an IFF Transponder to process (i.e. receive, process and reply) one interrogation at a time. Any further interrogations received by an IFF Transponder are ignored (i.e. no queuing of interrogations takes place), until a reply has been made to the initial interrogation IFF modes NATO IFF Mk XIIA IFF comprises of the following modes. 10 Mode 1: This is a 2 or 4 digit field 11 used to define the operational role of the platform 12. For example, aircraft operating in the reconnaissance role could be assigned Mode While this is a useful feature that enables C2 platforms to maintain a broad SA of the disposition of aircraft by role, Mode 1 is not routinely used to uniquely identify a specific aircraft. The settings of this mode can be changed by the crew in flight on the IFF control box in the cockpit. Mode 2: This code comprises a unique 4 digit octal identifier usually tied to a specific airframe number, i.e., JAS39 C/D Gripen tail number AA NNN could be uniquely assigned Aircrews can select whether or not the transponder will reply to mode interrogation. The code setting is usually applied on the ground by the engineers and is not normally accessible by the aircrew in flight. Mode 3/A: This is a 4 digit octal field that ATC or Military radar units assign to aircraft under their control. Generally the first two digits denote the controlling agency and the last two digits are assigned to individual aircraft under the agency s control. The aircrew can select by switch setting whether or not the transponder will reply to Mode 3 interrogation and they can select the codes as assigned by external agencies. Mode C: Interrogating a Mode C equipped aircraft will enable the aircraft s pressure altitude to be displayed at the interrogating unit. Mode 4: This is NATO s secure IFF mode of operation and it has now become a de facto entry condition of participation in coalition operations. Mode 4 is used selectively to confirm allegiance only, i.e., it provides for positive secure friend ID. 10 Ref [4] STANAG 4193 Part I, Edition 2, Amd 1: 11 Two digits the first is in the octal range, ie, 0-7, and the second digit is in the range 0-3. However, some transponders do have the capability of a 4 digit code. This would allow for any increase in Mode 1 codes, should this ever happen in the future. It is not thought that 4 digit NATO Mode 1 codes exist at present. 12 An example of the use of Mode 1 could be: Interceptors 1-13, Tankers 1-23, AWACS 1-31, Air-to-Ground missions 1-03, Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) 1-21, etc. 13 Octal

91 Enclosure 3 Page 20 (27) Mode 5: The current (2012) IFF Mk XII system is effectively an Mk XA (Mode 1, 2, 3 and C) system with the addition of Mode 4. At present (2012) NATO nations are considering transition plans to the Mk XIIA system which will comprise of the Mk XII with the addition of Mode 5. Once a critical mass of coalition (i.e. US) tactical aircraft has been fitted with Mode 5, this will become the new entry level 14 for IFF. The ability to interrogate Mode 5 will therefore become a prerequisite for all Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C)/Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft if they are to continue to contribute to coalition operations. Mode 5 provides, at its most basic level (i.e. Level 1 of 4), enhanced security and the ability to identify individual aircraft. Mode 4, in contrast, only provides a response showing the track to be friendly. Perhaps one of the most useful features of Mode 5 is the ability, at Level 2, for platforms to transmit data that encodes current position. This information would be invaluable in providing an enhanced capability for correct correlation of secondary radar, primary radar and data link tracks, in the formation of a robust, unambiguous friendly air picture 15. Mode S: Mode S is a civil aviation IFF format that will eventually replace the civilian Mode A 16 (which is common to the Military Mode 3). The wide implementation of Mode S Transponders and the gradual decline in the use of the civilian Mode A codes should be considered as an incentive to implement Mode S capable-interrogators on AEW&C/AWACS platforms. However, the ground C2 systems (such as the CRC) with interfaces to civil ATC systems will have the potential of receiving and processing Mode S target reports. All aircraft, both civil and military platforms, using European Controlled Airspace are required to carry a Mode S capable transponder. The availability of more than 16 million unique ICAO 24-bit aircraft addresses, in conjunction with the automatic reporting of aircraft identification (flight identity), will permit the unambiguous identification of aircraft independently of any SSR Mode 3/A code assignment Level 2 is recommended as the default by NATO. The US plan to adopt Level Ref [3] STANAG 4193 Technical Characteristics of IFF Mk XA and Mk XII Interrogators and Transponders Ref [4] Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 4193 Part I, Edition 2, (Amd) 1, [Ref 5] STANAG 4193 Part II, Edition 1:, [Ref 6] STANAG 4193 Part III, Edition 1, Amd 1: [Ref 7] STANAG 4193 Part IV, Edition 2, Amd 1: Ref [8] STANAG 4193 Part V, Edition 2: 16 Modes A and C should eventually be replaced by Mode S but this will be in the long term. Internationally, there is growing momentum with respect to Mode S implementation, and many nations have Mode S mandates. However, it is recommended to delay any acquisition of transponders without a Mode C capability until Mode S is universally accepted. All the current Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS ) (DO 181, ARINC 718, European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) 73 etc) for civil transponders mandate Modes A, C and S. 17 Ref [9] ICAO Annex 10 Volume IV Ref [10] ICAO Annex 10 Volume III:, Ref [11] ICAO Document 9684-AN/951: Ref [12] EUROCONTROL Principles of Mode S Operation and Interrogator Codes 18/03/2003 (General Public):

92 Enclosure 3 Page 21 (27) A part of the Mode S environment is the operation of the Anti-collision Avoidance System (ACAS) II. Mode S Supermode allows a Mode 4 interrogation to be combined with a Mode 1, 2, 3/A or C interrogation, in order to capitalise on precious antenna dwell time, thus securing an identification attempt in the shortest possible time Emergency response NATO IFF Mk XII and Mk XIIA Transponders shall be capable to respond with military emergency replies in Modes 1, 2 and 3 or respond with civil emergency replies in Mode A. Normally the Emergency Response is enabled by an operator. The Emergency Response in Mode 1, Mode 2 and Mode 3, which is only for military use, consist of four reply groups. The first group consists of the normal reply code followed by three pulse groups each consisting of a pair of framing pulses. The Emergency Response in Mode A is for civil aviation use. The civil Emergency Responses consist of the reply code There are two more reply codes reserved for civil Emergency Responses, code 7600 that indicates radio communication failure and code 7500 indicating unlawful interference e.g. hijacking. NATO IFF Mk XII and Mk XIIA Interrogators are capable to decode both military and civil Emergency Responses. There are no Emergency Responses associated with Mode C and Mode Identification attempt An identification attempt consists of a series of interrogations in all or some of the modes available to the IFF Interrogator. At the end of the identification attempt, sufficient replies will have been obtained from the target of interest to establish, with high probability that the target is friendly or unknown. The lack of replies, taken in conjunction with direction of approach, speed, altitude and intent (if evident) may be taken as an indication of hostility. However, it should be noted that friendly and neutrals may also fail to respond, or may only respond to certain modes. For example, a friendly platform may have turned off their IFF Transponder to keep stealthy or their IFF Transponder may be inoperative. Civil airliners are occasionally found in the vicinity of a combat zone and will not respond to interrogations in Modes 1, 2, 4 and 5.

93 Enclosure 3 Page 22 (27) Identification information (response or no response from an interrogation) is only part of the identification process. Other information from sensors and IO enablers (as discussed in chapter 4 of this document) is required to be taken into consideration when determining an objects identity of friend, foe or neutral. 4. Limitations The IFF Systems has number of limitations. These are as follows: The confidence in the identity of a target obtained using identification codes in Mode 1 and 3/A, is much lower than for Mode 4 and Mode 5, owing to the lack of encryption and the relatively long Code Validity Interval (CVI). A target cannot be identified as hostile solely on a response/no response from an IFF interrogation. A target cannot be identified as a friend, if its IFF Transponder is switched off or is faulty. A target cannot be identified as a friend, if its IFF has an incorrect Mode 1 Code, an incorrect Mode 3/A Code or an incorrect Mode 4 and/or Mode 5 KV. A target cannot be identified as a neutral, a civilian or a non-combatant solely on a response/n response from an IFF interrogation. Mutual interference of the interrogation (at 1030 MHz) and the reply (at 1090 MHz) can reduce system capacity, defined as the maximum number of users who can simultaneously use the system in a theatre of operations. This will affect the ability to gain information from an interrogated object. A target may be misidentified as a friend, as a result of spoofing 18. However, spoofing is difficult with Mode 4, for which each reply is different. The IFF System can be jammed. The IFF System can be exploited IFF Mk XIIA transmissions are easily detected by Electronic Support Measurement (ESM) equipment and transponders may require to be switched to Standby, when the platform is operated over enemy territory. An enemy may also attempt to track a platform by interrogating it in an unencrypted mode. It is thus important to be able to switch off unencrypted Modes (i.e. 1, 2, 3/A, C and S) when operationally indicated. 18 Spoofing is used by an enemy platform attempting to mimic replies to interrogations.

94 Enclosure 3 Page 23 (27) 5. IFF organisational structure 5.1. General To ensure the employment and operation of IFF in a unified and joint manner, the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters has formed a joint operational organisational structure. This approach is required to ensure that within Sweden there is only one joint service command of IFF systems. This allows a joint service approach and for all three services an equal stake within IFF frequency and code allocation, operations and planning. A full description of the joint operational organisational structure can be found in the main document to this CONOPS, Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Document for Interoperability Enabling Systems IFF education and training Effective training is important to ensure success in operations. There are three basic parts of training and education general functionality of IFF, platform specific features and exercises with platforms using IFF: General education, both operational and technical is directed from one location to guarantee a joint perspective, reduce costs and to increase understanding of the separate and joint needs of different platforms. Platform specific training and education is performed at each warfare centres to increase the understanding for the platform needs. Exercises with platforms using IFF is planned with both a combined and a joint perspective System training When introducing a new technical system, education and training is one of the most important issues. Training is essential to ensure that all systems can be operated and maintained/supported correctly and effectively. IFF training issues are addressed by the Armed Forces interoperability enabling systems training group. This provides a joint view of the needs of education and to create training courses at educational facilities. IFF training issues are being addressed by the Swedish Armed Forces interoperability enabling systems training group. This group provides guidance for training and education and requirements for the training courses at educational facilities.

95 Enclosure 3 Page 24 (27) 6.2. Operational training Training for International Operations IFF/SSR will be employed as follows: Mode 1, Mode 2, Mode 3/A, Mode C, Mode 4 will be employed following Policy and Procedures in ACP 160(D) 19 and the Supplement 1(E) to ACP Assuming the document is releasable to Sweden Training for National Operations will mainly follow Policy and Procedures for International Operations, according to chapter National Policy and Procedures for IFF/SSR, may apply. Peacetime IFF/SSR training in Swedish airspace will be conducted by the Swedish Armed Forces in order to carry out tasks which will include: 1. Production of RAP and RMP. 2. Policing Swedish territorial waters and Swedish airspace 3. Crisis management and support to civil authorities 4. Military Air Traffic Management and control in Swedish airspace and deployed operations. 5. Overseas contingency operations. Implies use of Mode 4 and Mode 5 in Swedish airspace. Realistic training in Swedish airspace will require freedom of operation e.g. unrestricted employment of all IFF Modes. Provision should be made to allow small-scale short notice training. Details on cryptographic equipment and materiel management can be found in the Common infrastructure CONOPS (Enclosure 6) SIF/SSR modes As Modes 1, 2, 3/A, C and Mode S are non-secure, there is a need to practice tactics, training and procedures using these modes on a regular basis. There is also a specific infrastructure requirement for the management of these modes. 19 Ref [13] ACP 160(D) IFF/SIF Operational Procedures Aug Ref [14]ACP 160 NATO Supplement-1 (E) Policy and Procedures for the Management of IFF/SIF

96 Enclosure 3 Page 25 (27) Infrastructure for Modes 1, 2, 3/A, C and Mode S includes code allocation, management of changes which include guidelines for interrogating/responding Modes 1, 2, 3/A, C, and S Mode 4 and mode 5 operations Infrastructure for mode 4 and mode 5 includes issues concerning: Cryptographic materiel and crypto-handling is managed in accordance with bilateral agreements on usage of non-swedish crypto equipment (See common infrastructure CONOPS for further details). Considerations on usage Procedural management Policy for operating Mode 4 and Mode 5 in Swedish airspace 7. IFF infrastructure 7.1. General A specific infrastructure is required to support IFF use and employment for military platforms. This chapter discusses these specific requirements. IFF operations may also make use infrastructure elements that are common to the other IO enablers (TDLs, Secure Voice and Secure Text). These infrastructure elements are detailed in the common infrastructure CONOPS. The Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) is responsible for the day to day planning and management of the specific IFF infrastructure discussed in this chapter Joint Data Links Operations Cell (JDLOC) FMTM is responsible for the command, maintenance and manning of the JDLOC. JDLOC has the responsibility for being the Point of Contact (PoC) for the management of applications for, and approval of, IFF transmission within existing FCA JDLOC is also the PoC for the management of applications for IFF transmission deviating from existing FCA. The Joint Data Links Operations Cell will have the overall responsibility for operations and management of the IFF system in the Swedish Armed Forces in all aspects, e.g. Pre-Mission Test routines.

97 Enclosure 3 Page 26 (27) Distribution of Mode 2 codes for Swedish platforms and rotation of Mode 2 codes between Swedish platforms. Distribution of Mode S addresses assigned by ICAO for Swedish platforms and rotation of Mode S codes between Swedish platforms. Management of Interrogator Identifier- and Surveillance Identifier codes for Mode S Interrogators. Distribution of Mode 5 Platform Identification Number (PIN) Codes for Swedish platforms Management of IFF/SSR emissions in Sweden The National Post and Telecom Agency (PTS) are responsible for the overall management of the frequency spectrum in Sweden. FCA issues (i.e. the detailed functional management and coordination of IFF/SSR frequencies within Swedish FIR), are managed in accordance with a documented agreement between the Swedish Armed Forces and the Transportstyrelsen concerning the Conditions for military use of the frequency bands 1030/1090 MHz for IFF on military mobile platforms. FCAs for visiting forces and their FCA approvals are managed by the JDLOC.

98 Enclosure 3 Page 27 (27) 8. IFF capable Platforms Platforms employing IFF systems in the timeframe are listed in table 1 below: Platform/system Interrogator/Transponder employed JAS 39 C/D Gripen Interrogator / Transponder C-130 Transponder S-102 B Transponder 21 ASC 890 Interrogator / Transponder CRC Interrogator Co-location with sensor Helicopter 14 Transponder Helicopter 15 Transponder Helicopter 16 Transponder Corvette Interrogator / Transponder Mine Counter Measures Vessel Transponder (MCMV) Support Vessel Transponder Amphibious (limited numbers) Transponder UndE 23 (GBAD) Interrogator Fire Unit 70 (limited numbers) Interrogator LvKv 90 (AAV 90) (GBAD) Interrogator Table 1. Swedish Armed Forces IFF Platform functionality 21 The S-102B platform is planned to be equipped with IFF in 2015 (as illustrated in figure 2 in chapter 2.1). However, details of the IFF implementation are not finalized and also may be of a classified nature. Due to this status, this issue of Swedish Armed Forces interoperability enabling systems policy documentation suite will not have a platform annex for the S-102B discussing its planned implementation of the interoperability enabling systems. Details of future IFF implementation for the S-102B may be described in subsequent issues of this documentation set.

99 Enclosure 4 Page 1 (16) Swedish Armed Forces Joint Secure voice Concept of Operations (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

100 Enclosure 4 Page 2 (16) List of contents 1. Introduction Background Aim Document structure Scope Assumptions Operations involving the employment of secure voice The principle of secure voice in operations Operations Air operations Air to surface/ground interface operations Maritime/amphibious operations Ground operations Principles of secure voice system use Introduction Secure Voice over HF Secure Voice over VHF/UHF HaveQuick (HQ) II Second generation Anti-jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN) Secure voice over VHF Secure Voice over landline and satellite Gemensam Taktisk Radio System (GTRS)(Common Tactical Radio System) Secure voice organisational structure General Joint Data Links Operations Cell (JDLOC) Secure voice education and training Background System Training Secure voice infrastructure Secure voice platform implementation overview... 16

101 Enclosure 4 Page 3 (16) Issue Status Number Date Comments 0 Draft template Updated draft Review draft Final Issue List of Acronyms A list of acronyms for this document and associated CONOPS documents can be found at Appendix A.

102 Enclosure 4 Page 4 (16) Abstract This document describes the roles and functions for the employment of interoperable systems for secure voice communication in missions and operations carried out by the Swedish Armed Forces. These missions and operations cover both national (including liaison with civilian authorities) and international scenarios. This Concept of Operations (CONOPS) document is a part of series of documents describing all international interoperability enabling systems, which the Swedish Armed Forces currently implements. This CONOPS document has been produced in collaboration with a number of departments and organisations, on behalf of the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Headquarters, HKV. A detailed list of contributors can be found in the main document, Swedish Armed Forces joint policy document for interoperability enabling systems References The information in this publication has been extracted from multiple sources. References to these documents and sources of information can be found in the Swedish Armed Forces joint policy document for interoperability enabling Systems

103 Enclosure 4 Page 5 (16) 1. Introduction 1.1. Background The Swedish Armed Forces are continuing to move through a transition to the implementation of communication systems for both national and international operations. Improved interoperability is central in this context of the transition and is essential to be able to provide full time secure communications within the Swedish Armed Forces, coalition partners and with public/civilian authorities. The secure voice communications are required to be robust, reliable, redundant resistant in order to provide connectivity for different operational scenarios. The key aim of the timely exchange of information is to present commanders with a rationalised common operational picture. To create this common operational picture will require the complete co-ordination of sensor, Electronic Warfare (EW) and platform positional data. The key to successful exchange of voice messages in all Swedish Armed Forces military and Swedish civil operations is to employ secure and robust international interoperable secure voice communication systems. To complement secure voice for Swedish Armed Forces platforms in national and international operations, other interoperability enabling systems are required to be employed. These enablers are Tactical Data Links (TDLs), Idenfication Friend or Foe (IFF) and secure text. Each of these systems are described in their own separate CONOPS as part of the Swedish Armed Forces interoperability enabling systems policy documentation. Swedish national secure voice systems will continue to be employed alongside the interoperability enabling systems, where required Aim The aim of this CONOPS is to provide a joint framework within the time period of , to ensure a coherent description of the employment of interoperable secure voice communications for the Swedish Armed Forces platforms that will be used in international/national operations and an interface with civilian authorities. This CONOPS is a living document and will be periodically reviewed and updated to reflect Swedish Armed Forces secure voice policy and operation Document structure This CONOPS document is structured to ensure that the information is provided in a joint concept manner and can be interpreted by commanders and platform

104 Enclosure 4 Page 6 (16) authorities alike. Figure 1 illustrates Swedish Armed Forces interoperability enabling systems policy and CONOPS documentation structure. Figure 1. Swedish Armed Forces interoperability policy/conops document Structure The main body of this CONOPS document will describe the Swedish Armed Forces joint service perspective for secure voice Systems. Platform specific implementation for all interoperability enabling systems (TDLs, IFF, Secure voice and secure text) is addressed in detail in platform annexes attached to the CONOPS level.

105 Enclosure 4 Page 7 (16) 1.4. Scope This CONOPS describes the operation and employment of secure voice systems in a general perspective within the timeframe for the operations described in the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Document for interoperability Enabling Systems The scope of this CONOPS will discuss secure voice operations for Low Frequency (LF), High Frequency (HF), Very High Frequency (VHF), Ultra High Frequency (UHF) and Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Assumptions In order to achieve interoperability in secure voice communications, it is assumed that the necessary US and NATO (new and existing) technology and cryptographic materiel will be released to Sweden. 2. Operations involving the employment of secure voice 2.1. The principle of secure voice in operations Swedish Armed Forces employ voice communication links that can be protected from unwanted participation/disruption is a key component to any military operation. To provide the necessary means to effectively conduct national operations, as well as be part of a coalition, Swedish Armed Forces will implement a variety of secure voice systems to suit the different operations described within this CONOPS. Secure voice is often employed alongside TDLs, IFF, Secure text systems as a compliment to provide overall interoperable communication architecture. This architecture covers all four of arenas that Swedish Armed Forces platforms are deployed in: Air operations Surface/ground to air operations Maritime/amphibious operations Land operations 2.2. Operations Air operations The below listed mission/air operations are not platform specific and should be regarded as missions considered in areas within air operations in a broader sense.

106 Enclosure 4 Page 8 (16) Swedish air assets will use secure voice communications to conduct or support the following possible air missions/operations areas: Counter air operations o Offensive Counter Air (OCA) o Defensive Counter Air (DCA) Strategic air operations such as: o Attack on an adversary s vital assets, like Command and Control (C2) structures Anti-surface force air operations: o Air Interdiction (AI) o Close Air Support (CAS) o Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), using Anti Maritime Coordination (AMC) procedures Support air operations: o Air reconnaissance o Air surveillance o Sea surveillance o Land surveillance Detailed information on secure text operations for Swedish Air Force systems is described in the annexes A, B, C, D, E, F,G & H of the interoperability enabling systems policy documentation Air to surface/ground interface operations Operations that have been defined to operate in the Surface/Ground to Air interface are as follows that require secure voice communications are: Anti-Surface Force Air Operations, comprising of: o Air Interdiction (AI) o CAS o ASuW This will also include targeting and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) to support CAS/Forward Air Controller (FAC) operations. Air-Maritime Coordination: ASuW Sea surveillance

107 Enclosure 4 Page 9 (16) Detailed information on the secure voice operations for the surface/ground to air interface systems are described in the platform annexes C (JAS 39 C/D Gripen) and P (Tactical Air Party (TACP)) of the Interoperability enabling systems Policy documentation Maritime/amphibious operations Maritime assets and especially naval units/platforms have the flexibility to change role at a short notice. The key maritime warfare operations and tasks that need to be supported with secure voice communications are: Establishment and contribution to Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP) Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) ASuW Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) Mine Warfare (Mine Counter Measures (MCM) operations) Amphibious operations Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) Maritime Embargo Operations (MEO) EW Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) 1 Detailed information on secure text operations for Swedish Armed Forces maritime systems is described in the annexes I, J, K, L, M and N to the interoperability enabling systems Policy documentation Ground operations The below listed ground missions/capabilities are not platform specific. These missions listed below should be regarded as missions considered in areas within ground operations in a broader sense. Swedish Land assets will use secure voice to conduct or support the following mission areas: Land C2 operations. Land elements of the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) operations; Land Manoeuvre Operations requiring receipt of Air SA and, specifically, the receipt and dissemination of air attack warnings CAS operations Special Operations Forces (SOF) operations 1 NGS is also considered to be part of the Air to Ground / Surface interface (paragraph 2.12.)

108 Enclosure 4 Page 10 (16) Detailed information on secure text operations for Armed Forces Land systems is described in annexes O and P of the interoperability enabling systems policy documentation. 3. Principles of secure voice system use 3.1. Introduction The requirement on the secure voice system changes depending on the situation in which it will be utilised. To be able to provide Swedish Armed Forces with a system that fits the given situation, a range of different secure voice systems are required. An overview of the different secure voice systems capabilities employed by Swedish Armed Forces, in some cases system specific, is described below. It is important to note that the secure voice may have the ability to have transmission security, e.g. be frequency agile (capability to hop through a number of frequencies in their spectrum to reduce the chance of jamming the transmission) and cryptographic devices to protect the information (message) being transmitted on the radio Secure Voice over HF Secure voice over HF is used as one of the secure voice communication system employed for Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) and over the horizon requirements. Primary platform users of secure voice over HF will be Swedish Armed Forces naval units, transport aircraft, helicopters and Special Forces (SF) and will be used for general communication purposes. Figure 2 illustrates the platforms that employ HF secure voice. Figure 2 Platforms deploying HF Secure voice systems

109 Enclosure 4 Page 11 (16) 3.3. Secure Voice over VHF/UHF Secure voice over VHF/UHF capable radios 2 will be used as the primary secure communication system for Line Of Sight (LOS) communication. It is expected that virtually every platform assigned to international operations will implement secure voice over VHF/UHF to some extent. Figure 2 illustrates the platforms that employ VHF/UHF secure voice. Figure 3 Platforms deploying VHF/UHF Secure voice systems HaveQuick (HQ) II HQ I was the original HQ waveform used for secure voice communication. HQ II is an improved version of the original HQ I waveform that among other functionality, added improved jam resistance, i.e. Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM) capability. HQ I & II are not inherently secure, and therefore require an external or embedded cryptographic equipment and keys for secure communications. HQ I is a considered to have a very slow frequency hopping waveform and offers minimal ECCM protection. HQ II has increased net capacity and larger hop sets, 2 Secure radio capability provided by external cryptographic equipment and key variables.

110 Enclosure 4 Page 12 (16) and therefore has increased Electronic Protection Measures (EPM), but has the same slow frequency hopping waveform as HQ I. Have Quick II capable radios with crypto devices in accordance with major potential coalition partners will be the primary enabler for secure voice UHF communications. This will be for the majority of Swedish Armed Forces platforms that participate in joint operations during time period of this CONOPS Second generation Anti-jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN) SATURN is an improved and updated version of HQ II that offers, among other enhancements, improved ECCM performance relative to HQ II. SATURN, which is a NATO waveform standard, has its origins in the US HQ IIa waveform standard. The SATURN waveform will provide improved data communications capability compared to HQ II. Because of the improved ECCM performance relative to HQ I and HQ II, SATURN will be employed by the Armed Forces in phase with coalition partners. As with HQII capable radios, SATURN is not inherently secure, and therefore requires an external or embedded crypto for secure communications. SATURN is a "fast" frequency hopping waveform and provides increased ECCM protection. Details of the frequency hop rates are NATO classified. The Swedish Armed Forces are investigating the implementation, adoption and employment of SATURN during the time period of this CONOPS Secure voice over VHF SY-117F and SY-152 VHF radios are currently being employed. These radios are procured for the Swedish Armed Forces participation in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and include US Type 1 cryptographic and Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) radio capability. These radios will be used for interoperability with the US and employment for a CAS capability. These radios include the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) and HQII waveforms Secure Voice over landline and satellite Secure voice over Landline will be used as the primary system for secure voice communication whenever possible within Sweden. Any facility with a fixed telecommunication infrastructure and a need for secure voice communication will be equipped with secure voice over landline systems. Satellite communications are primarily used for international operations, and are under consideration for national operations.

111 Enclosure 4 Page 13 (16) Figure 4 & 5 illustrates the Swedish Armed Forces platforms deploying Landline and SATCOM Secure voice systems. Figure 4 Platforms deploying landline Secure voice systems Figure 5 Platforms deploying satellite Secure voice systems

112 Enclosure 4 Page 14 (16) 3.6. Gemensam Taktisk Radio System (GTRS)(Common Tactical Radio System) The GTRS project is a programme that is intended to initiate different projects to overcome the increased requirements for future seamless communication capabilities. This seamless communication technology, also called software defined radio technology, is intended to be to both on Swedish as coalition partners platforms. To ensure interoperability for secure voice operations, the following wave forms are under discussion to be developed for software defined radios: Coalition Wideband Networking Waveform (COAL WNW) 3 HQ II SATURN 4. Secure voice organisational structure 4.1. General To meet the requirements of secure voice in a unified and joint manner, the Swedish Armed Forces has formed a joint operational organisational structure. This organisational structure and hierarchy is required to ensure that only one approach and command of secure voice for platforms within Sweden is taken. This will allow a joint service approach and allow all three services an equal stake within secure voice frequency allocation, operations and planning. A full description of the joint operational organisational structure can be found in the main document to this CONOPS, Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Document for Interoperability Enabling Systems Joint Data Links Operations Cell (JDLOC) The JDLOC will have a supporting role for interoperable secure voice systems operations in the Swedish Armed Forces. The JDLOC will provide support for the design, management, planning and co-ordination for all secure voice communications on all Armed Forces platforms. The JDLOC platform annex R provides details of the aspects of the secure voice management role and function of the JDLOC. 3 COALWNW is an ongoing project. Phase 1 was finished in 2011 and the outcome was an Operational Requirement Document. Next phase including procurement of an interoperable waveform are under negotiations.

113 Enclosure 4 Page 15 (16) 5. Secure voice education and training 5.1. Background Effective training in taking part of a secure voice network is an important step to ensure successful use of secure voice systems in future operations. There are three basic parts of training and education: General functionality of secure voice This is both operational and technical and will be directed from one location to guarantee a joint perspective and reduce costs. Platform specific features of secure voice - will be performed at each warfare centres to increase the understanding for the platform needs. Exercises with platforms using a secure voice system - will be performed at each warfare centres to increase the understanding for the platform needs System Training When introducing a new technical system, education and training is one of the most important issues. Training is essential to ensure that all systems can be operated and maintained/supported correctly and effectively. Therefore it is important at an early stage to identify all users for these new systems, tactical as well as technical personnel. Secure voice training issues are being addressed by the Swedish Armed Forces interoperability enabling systems training group. This group provides guidance for training and education and requirements for the training courses at educational facilities. 6. Secure voice infrastructure An infrastructure to support interoperability in accordance with US/EU/NATO standards and changes hereto has to be continuously maintained. A Communications Plan (COMPLAN) that dictates (or responds to allies requirements) to the use of equipment in particular military operations are required. Network management for secure voice communication systems is a part of the overall management of the communications organisation for an operation and does not require additional bespoke and dedicated facilities. The management of cryptographic material required for secure voice equipment is part of an overall national interoperable cryptographic material management

114 Enclosure 4 Page 16 (16) system that complies with the necessary security requirements. Specific accounting and security actions are established for cryptographic material along with the associated procedures. The management of secure voice cryptographic materiel is described in the interoperability enabling systems common infrastructure CONOPS. 7. Secure voice platform implementation overview The overview of the secure voice system requirements for Swedish Armed Forces platforms are found below in table 1. Platform Sec Voice HF Sec Voice VHF/UHF Sec Voice Land line Sec Voice Satellite Control & X X Reporting Centre (CRC) JAS 39 C/D Gripen X X Air Surveillance & X X Control (ASC) 890 C 130 X X X S 102B X X Airbase X X X Hkp 14 X X Hkp 15 X Hkp 16 X Corvettes X X X Submarine X X MCM Vessels X X X Sup/Aux Ship X X X Amphibious Forces X X X (X) Sea Surveillance X X X Battalion (BN) Force Headquarters X X X X (FHQ) Brigade HQ X X X (X) Battalion HQ X X X (X) Ground Based Air X X Defence (GBAD) Tactical Air Party X X X X (TACP) Special Operations Forces (SOF) X X X X

115 Enclosure 5 Page 1 (24) Swedish Armed Forces JOINT SECURE TEXT Concept of Operations (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

116 Enclosure 5 Page 2 (24) List of Contents 1. Introduction Background Aim Document Structure Scope Assumptions Swedish Armed Forces employment of Secure Text systems Principle of Secure Text in operations Operations using Secure Text messages Introduction Air operations ACO ATO ATM ACM Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) SPINS Weapon Control Orders IFREP OPTASK Link MISREP Maritime Operations OpOrder Opgen SITREP ROEs Land operations Surface to Air Missile (SAM) Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD) Tactical Order INTSUM MISREP Secure Text System Description Background Secure Text message formats Air Defence Allied Technical Publication (ADatP) Over The Horizon (Targeting) GOLD (OTH (T) GOLD) Transmission of the text messages Background Maritime environment Introduction Maritime Secure Text systems ACP ISIS Communication System... 18

117 Enclosure 5 Page 3 (24) HF- (HFEM) Maritime Secure text communication bearers Satellite Communication (SATCOM) High Frequency Low Frequency (LF) Land Line Air environment The secure text system for the air environment consists of two different levels: SWECCIS down to the operational HQs For the lower tactical levels the Battle Management System (SLB) is used. Some legacy systems will continue to be used as well Ground environment Ground environment secure text systems The secure text system for the Army consists of two different levels: SWECCIS down to the Brigade HQs, and well as Manoeuvre, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support Battalions HQs. For the lower tactical levels the Battle Management System (SLB) is used. Some legacy systems will continue to be used as well Ground environment secure text transmission Secure Text Standard Primacy HFEM - STANAG ACP OTH (G) Interfaces with Swedish Armed Forces legacy systems Organisational Structure Secure Text Education and Training Introduction System Training Secure Text Infrastructure Secure voice platform overview... 24

118 Enclosure 5 Page 4 (24) Issue Status Number Date Comments Issue 0 Draft template Issue Draft - updated Review Issue Final Issue List of Acronyms A list of acronyms for this document and associated CONOPS can be found at Appendix A to this document.

119 Enclosure 5 Page 5 (24) Abstract This document describes the employment of Interoperable secure text systems in missions and operations carried out by the Swedish Armed Forces. These missions and operations cover both national (including liaison with civil authorities) and international scenarios. This Concept of Operations (CONOPS) document is a part of a suite of documents describing all international interoperability enabling systems, which the Swedish Armed Forces currently implements. This CONOPS document has been produced in collaboration with a number of departments and organisations, on behalf of the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Headquarters, HKV. A detailed list of contributors can be found in the main document, Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy document for Interoperability Enabling Systems References The information in this publication has been extracted from multiple sources. References to these documents and sources of information can be found in the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy document for Interoperability Enabling Systems

120 Enclosure 5 Page 6 (24) 1. Introduction 1.1. Background The Swedish Armed Forces is currently moving through a transition in the implementation of communication systems for both national and international operations. Improved interoperability is central in this context and is essential to be able to provide full time secure communications within the Swedish Armed Forces, with public authorities and coalition partners. The communications need to be robust, reliable, redundant and resistant in order to provide connectivity for different operational scenarios Secure text systems are used to provide a method of exchanging operational/tactical text (and data) information between operators in a combined and/or joint operation in a secure manner. Secure text systems allow the distribution of orders and the provision of reports within an operation under Command of a Component Commander. The type of security (cryptographic and message standards) employed for secure text may be different between the three services (Army, Navy and Air force) within the Swedish Armed Forces. To complement secure text systems for Swedish Armed Forces platforms in national and international operations, other enablers are required to be employed by the armed forces. These enablers are TDLs, IFF and secure voice, each described in a separate CONOPS in this suite of documentation. There are requirements for national communications systems which are not described within this document Aim The aim of this CONOPS is to provide a joint framework to ensure a coherent description of the employment of secure text systems for all Swedish Armed Forces platforms to be interoperable in international/national operations and an interface with civilian authorities. This CONOPS describes these operations in the time period of This CONOPS is a living document and will be periodically reviewed and updated to reflect Swedish Armed Forces secure text policy and operation Document Structure This CONOPS document is structured to ensure that the information is displayed in a joint concept manner and can be interpreted by commanders and platform authorities alike. It is designed to be incorporated into the system of systems architecture of the suite of interoperability enabling systems documentation.

121 Enclosure 5 Page 7 (24) Figure 1 illustrates the interoperability enabling systems document structure. Figure 1. Interoperability enabling systems document structure The main body of this CONOPS document will describe the Joint and/or Combined perspective of secure text communication.

122 Enclosure 5 Page 8 (24) Information specific to individual platforms will not currently be addressed. This will be addressed in more detail within the platform annexes attached to the CONOPS Scope This CONOPS describes the operation and employment of secure text systems in a general perspective within the operations described in the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Document for interoperability Enabling Systems Assumptions In order to achieve interoperability in secure text communications, it is assumed that the necessary US/NATO new/existing technology and cryptographic materiel will be released to Sweden. 2. Swedish Armed Forces employment of Secure Text systems 2.1. Principle of Secure Text in operations The ability to send and receive secure text messages is essential in all kinds of operations and tasks for the Swedish Armed Forces. Secure text systems enable the armed forces to transmission and receipt military request, reports, orders, plans and policies. Orders, plans and policies regarding operational and tactical matters are presented in an overall Communications Plan (COMPLAN) and are distributed as secure text messages. Common Operational Picture (COP) information including: Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP), Recognised Land Picture (RLP) and Recognised Air Picture (RAP) information can also be transmitted in a secure text message format. The communications policy and architecture information for an operation will be contained in operation orders and standing instructions. These will be described in the COMPLAN. This will include information such as the circuit purpose, participants, frequencies to be used, types of transmission, call signs to be used etc. COMPLAN information can be furthermore supplemented by text messages that are used to publish additional information and manage the communications architecture. For example, air defence communications information might be repeated and amplified as part of an Operational Task (OPTASK) Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) order issued by the AAW Commander.

123 Enclosure 5 Page 9 (24) Secure text communications can also be used as a complement to a Link 16/11 TDL Stand Alone Systems (SAS), providing the ability to exchange information between coalition partners Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) systems. Secure text system can be used for disseminating information and detailed directions to units whose primary language is not English. In particular, complex issues that require time and repetition to pass via a voice circuit may be more quickly and efficiently passed as text messages. Satellite communication is considered as an enabler that provides adequate bandwidth for the transmission of large encrypted files from the internet and a may be used as a complement to existing secure text systems bearers. Figure 2 illustrates the Swedish Armed Forces platforms that employ secure text systems. Figure 2 - Swedish Armed Forces platforms employing secure text systems

124 Enclosure 5 Page 10 (24) 3. Operations using Secure Text messages 3.1. Introduction This chapter provides an overview and brief description of expected missions and tasks that will involve the use of secure text messaging. It is to be noted that not all of these missions will be carried out in the timescale of this CONOPS with full support of integrated secure text systems, i.e Air operations Swedish air assets will use secure text communications to conduct or support the following possible air mission areas: Counter Air Operations Offensive Counter Air (OCA) Defensive Counter Air (DCA) Strategic Air Operations like: Attack on an adversary s vital assets, like Command and Control (C2) structures Anti-Surface Force Air Operations Air Interdiction (AI) Close Air Support (CAS) Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), using Air Maritime Coordination (AMC) procedures Support Air Operations Air Reconnaissance Air Surveillance Sea Surveillance Land Surveillance The secure text messages that are received pre-mission for the above operations and the following messages are: Airspace Control Orders (ACO) and updates Air Tasking Order (ATO) and updates Air Tasking Message (ATM) Airspace Control Measures(ACM) Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) Special Instruction (SPINS) Weapons Control Order (WCO) In Flight Report (IFREP) Recognised Air Picture (RAP) OPTASK Link

125 Enclosure 5 Page 11 (24) Details of these secure text messages are found in chapters Secure text communication will also be used for the distribution post-mission reports, such as: Mission Report (MISREP) (as described in chapter ). Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Information on secure text operations for the Swedish Air Force systems is described in the platform annexes A, B, C, D, E, F, G & H of these CONOPS ACO The ACO is the primary means of the airspace control authority in various theatres (such as NATO Central Region) to disseminate approved airspace control measures. It is published either as part of the ATO (see ) or as a separate document ATO A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected sorties/capabilities/forces to targets and specific missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions ATM The ATM is a message used to task joint force components; to inform the requesting command and the tasking authority of the action being taken; and/or to provide additional information about the mission. The message is used only for pre-planned missions and is transmitted on a daily basis, normally 12 hours prior to the start of the air tasking day or in accordance with established operation plans for the operational area ACM Air management requires control measures that facilitate flight and task mission areas. These control measures consist of a restricted operating zone, and the coordinating altitude Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) Once an OPORD is given, the situation may change before the mission is actually begun or during the operation the situation may change so that the Operations Order must be modified. In these cases the commander will issue a Fragmentary Order, or FRAGO. The FRAGO will state exactly how the situation and/or mission have been changed and what must be done to make up for the change.

126 Enclosure 5 Page 12 (24) SPINS SPINS are used as the primary means to supplement and promulgate information in the Airspace Control Order (ACO), the Air Defence Plan, OPTASK LINK. SPINS are managed and distributed by Swedish Armed Forces Air Operations Centre Weapon Control Orders Rules of Engagement are critical to prevent air defences engaging friendly or neutral aircraft. Their use is assisted but not governed by IFF electronic devices. While these rules originate at the highest authority, different rules can apply to different types of air defence covering the same area at the same time. AAD usually operates under the tightest rules. These rules are known as WCO, and come in three types: Weapons free: a weapon control order imposing a status whereby weapons systems may be fired at any target not positively recognized as friendly. Weapons hold: a weapon control order imposing a status whereby weapons systems may only be fired in self-defence or in response to a formal order. Weapons tight: a weapon control order imposing a status whereby weapons systems may be fired only at targets recognized as hostile IFREP Aircrews and Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) operators use the IFREP to report mission results or any other tactical information sighted of such importance and urgency that the delay (if reported by normal debriefing) would negate the usefulness of the information OPTASK Link The OPTASK Link provides all the parameters for multi TDL link utilization including net assignments, track limitations, and cryptographic information to be used for network initialisation and operation. Air Defence Allied Technical Publication (AdatP) -33 The OPTASK Link is populated by the Swedish Armed Force s JDLOC and managed by FTS for air, maritime and ground operations MISREP MISREPs are secure free text messages for mission reports for air platforms and operations.

127 Enclosure 5 Page 13 (24) 3.3. Maritime Operations Maritime assets and especially naval units/platforms have the flexibility to change role at a short notice. The key maritime warfare tasks that need to be supported with secure text communications are: Establishment and contribution to RMP Sea Traffic Control (STC) Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) Mine Warfare (Mine Counter Measures (MCM) operations) Amphibious operations Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) Maritime Embargo Operations (MEO) Electronic Warfare (EW) Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) Secure text will provide the commander the following necessary means to control subordinated elements: To convey operational instructions or intentions. To pass operational/tactical information to tactical commanders at sea. To report operational/tactical information between commanders and from subordinate higher formations. To notify organisations of impending and actual operations of units engaged in maritime warfare. Examples of what secure text exchange will comprise of: Operational Order (OpOrd).(Described in 3.3.1) Operational General Matters (Opgen).(Described in 3.3.2) OPTASK (Operational Tasking message for ASW, AAW, ASuW, Communications, Links etc. (as described in chapter of this document) Warning order FRAGO (as described in chapter of this document) Directions & Guidance Reports Situation Report (SITREP (as described in chapter 3.3.3) Logistics Report (LOGREP) Requests (Rules Of Engagement (ROE) and ROE Implementation) ACO and their subsequent updates (as described in chapter of this document)

128 Enclosure 5 Page 14 (24) ATO and their subsequent updates (as described in chapter of this document) Secure text messages for maritime platforms and operations are distributed through MaRA Naval Communications Centre (NAVCOMMSCEN). The organisation and structure for maritime secure text messages are illustrated in figure 3. MCC MCC MMHS International Platforms MaRa SjöC LF Submarines ISIS ISIS ISIS International Platforms Platform Ship to ship Maritime Platform Ship to Bn Amphibious Platform Key to abbreviations MCC Maritime Component Command MaRa (NAVCOMMSCEN) facilitates ship/shore and shore/ship and Broadcast on HF for all maritime operations. MMHS Military Message Handling System (eg. NATO standard for ACP 127 incl infrastructure) ISIS Swedish Maritime Message Handling System (Maritime Order Format (MOF ) and ACP 127, eg equal to MMHS) LF Low Frequency (Shore/Ship Broadcast on LF) Figure 3 Maritime Secure text distribution organisation OpOrder An OpOrd, is an executable that directs a unit to conduct a military operation. It will describe the situation facing the unit, the mission of the unit, and what activities the unit will conduct to achieve the mission goals. An OpOrd is designed to organise both generalities and specifics of a mission into five standard topics (paragraphs): Situation, Mission, Execution, Service Support, and Command and Signal.

129 Enclosure 5 Page 15 (24) For maritime platforms and assets the OpOrd is distributed by MaRa (NAVCOMMSCEN) Opgen Opgen messages convey general matters of policy, general instructions, and general information about aspects common to all forms of warfare. They also contain detailed instructions about the warfare responsibilities of the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC). For maritime platforms and assets the OpOrd is distributed by MaRa (NAVCOMMSCEN) SITREP A SITREP is a report giving the situation in the area of a reporting unit (platform) or formation. A SITREP provides a regular status report to commanders of a platform during its operation ROEs ROEs are: directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered Land operations The mission areas listed in this chapter should be looked upon as land operations in a broader sense. Swedish Land assets will use secure text communications to conduct or support the following possible missions/task areas: Close Air Support (CAS) & Forward Air Controller (FAC) operations Helicopter support operations NGS Operations UAV operations Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) operations Land Manoeuvre Operations requiring receipt of Air Situational Awareness (SA) and, specifically, the receipt and dissemination of air attack warnings Land elements of the future Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability Special Operations Forces (SOF) operations 1 ROE definition from NATO glossary of terms and definitions in English and French AAP- 6 dated 2010

130 Enclosure 5 Page 16 (24) Land units (platforms) will primarily use secure text communications for receiving pre-mission planning information. The received information will include orders such as: ACO and updates (as described in chapter 3.2.1) ATO and updates (as described in chapter 3.2.2) ATM (as described in chapter 3.2.3) Surface to Air Missile (SAM) Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD) Tactical Order (SSTO) (as described in chapter below) SPINS (as described previously in chapter of this document) OPTASK LINK (as described in chapter of this document) WCO (as described in chapter of this document) Secure text will also be used for mission reports, such as: OpOrd (as described in chapter 3.31 of this document) SITREP (as described in chapter of this document) Intelligence Summary (INTSUM)(as described in chapter 3.4.2below) MISREP (as described in chapter of this document) Secure text messages for Land platforms and operations are distributed through the normal chain of command down to appropriate units Surface to Air Missile (SAM) Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD) Tactical Order The SSTO is issued by the tactical controller of the operation area (CAOC, SAMOC). It regulates the area of operation, the WCS (Weapons Control Status) and the use of Tactical Battle Management Functions (TBMF) for the GBAD INTSUM The INTSUM contains a brief summary of the most current enemy situation covering a period of time designated by the commander. This period of time will vary with the desires of the commander and the requirements of the situation. It provides a summary of the enemy situation, enemy operations and capabilities, and the characteristics of the weather and terrain. It aids in assessing the current situation and updates other intelligence reports. The INTSUM reflects the intelligence officer's interpretation and conclusions regarding enemy capabilities and probable course(s) of action. The INTSUM is prepared at brigade and higher echelons and disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units.

131 Enclosure 5 Page 17 (24) MISREP A MISREP is a concise report of flight operations which have potential intelligence significance determined by the Essential Elements of Information (EEIs). 4. Secure Text System Description 4.1. Background Secure text communication can be achieved in different ways, both regarding the format of the message and its method of transmission. Choosing the correct format and transmission type will depend on the situation the message will be used for Secure Text message formats Air Defence Allied Technical Publication (ADatP)-3 ADatP-3 is a text format used within NATO for secure text message communication. It is specified in Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 5500 NATO Text Formatting System (FORMETS), edition 4, AdatP-3. The standard describes rules on how messages are structured and lists the catalogue of messages. There are several hundreds of messages listed within the ADatP-3. The AdatP-3 will be the format for secure text messages implemented for platforms in the Swedish Armed Forces. ADatP-3 can be sent in numerous ways. For example, messages may be exchanged as Allied Communication Publication (ACP) 127 messages and also as attachment to High Frequency (HFEM, STANAG 5066) messages. There may be other formats implemented to increase interoperability. For example the employment of Over The Horizon (OTH) Gold (as discussed in chapter4.2.2.). Swedish Armed Forces implementation of formats must be according to development within future potential coalition nations. As a complement to ADatP-3, Swedish Armed Forces are analysing the US equivalent to NATO ADatP-3, US Message Text Formats (USMTF). The analysis is being carried out to understand what USMTF messages are required to be implemented to gain interoperability with US forces Over The Horizon (Targeting) GOLD (OTH (T) GOLD) OTH (T) Gold is a US Navy text formatted American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) message that supports exchange of data between Over-The-Horizon-Targeting (OTH-T) systems and OTH-T support systems. OTH (T) Gold is the primary message format within a NATO naval force for the exchange of non-real time data between the Officer in Tactical Command and its subordinates. The message format is used for the compilation of the RMP,

132 Enclosure 5 Page 18 (24) typically to and from Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS). OTH (T) Gold is also the main format for: Distribution of non-real time TRACK DATA and to manage CONTACT DATA. Distribution of geographic areas and various grids (e.g. 4WHISKEY) Distribution of map data used within a NATO naval force (e.g. PIMTRACKS). Distribution of ship formation data for standard stationing doctrines (e.g. SCREEN KILO (sector)). OTH Gold Message Text Formats (MTFs) follow standard communications procedures for message headings, precedence and classification. OTH Gold messages are usually broadcasted over HF networks using the standard ACP-127 header. It can also be streamed or broadcasted Internet Protocol (IP) to IP or transmitted through Transmission of the text messages 5.1. Background Through the implementation of secure text, Swedish Armed Forces will have the opportunity to transmit and receive messages according to format described in ADatP Maritime environment Introduction Swedish Naval Forces have today the ability to send and receive secure formatted text messages through national Radio TeleType (RATTY) system. The system can use ITA-2 format and has the ability to communicate with the RTTYprogram that is used in exercises (Baltic Operations (BALTOPS)) Maritime Secure Text systems ACP-127 ACP-127 is used for transmission of different text formats and it is implemented in ISIS (Swedish MMHS) communication system, which will be implemented on all Swedish Armed Forces naval platforms ISIS Communication System The ISIS system makes up the communication part for the Command Control and Communication (C3) system for the modern Swedish naval ships. The integration of ISIS with the C2 system will be done through the Alfa interface. The Alfa interface is a Swedish standardised communication channel to and from the C2 systems.

133 Enclosure 5 Page 19 (24) The ISIS system can handle high real time requirements and manage many different types of tactical data such as targets and operation orders. ISIS is scalable and can be distributed, and can easily, by plug-in modules, be adapted to perform added functions. By using ISIS (via the Alfa interface) it is possible for a C2 system to communicate with all Swedish Naval units independently of the used external data format. The ISIS-software will convert between the external format messages and Alfa messages. The ISIS system can be integrated with a C2 system and/or a Staff Support system to handle the external communications needs by managing data format and knowledge about available communication chains. A communications chain can be comprised of several devices necessary to enable communications, for instance a crypto, a modem and a radio. All connected peripherals can be used in various configurations. ISIS has the possibility to handle ADatP-3 messages through IRIS FORMS. This means an automatic compilation of the information is carried out instead of manually read and write the information HF- (HFEM) HFEM allows HF Mail Transfer Protocol (HMTP) transactions over HF and is described in the STANAG It uses a half-duplex Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) protocol using MIL-STD B HF modem. This secure tactical information link supports non-real time critical information exchanges. The basic operation of the HFEM consists of preparing messages on one of the HFEM Local Area Networks (LANs) Personal Computers (PCs) using any application program. These are transferred via an Exchange Server to the HFEM Gateway Server s software program for transmission via shipboard equipment and retrieving new mail from the HFEM Gateway Server. The HFEM Gateway Server Personal Computer (PC) acts as the HF equipment controller and electronic mailbox as it stores messages intended for off-ship delivery and receive messages delivered from other ships. The Synchronous Board provides the data path and control signals required to key and un-key the transmitter and initiates modem and crypto synchronisation preambles. HFEM can be installed and configured in numerous ways depending on platform status concerning radio equipment, number of systems or networks etc.

134 Enclosure 5 Page 20 (24) Maritime Secure text communication bearers Satellite Communication (SATCOM) Swedish Armed Forces participation in international missions and the growing need of more and more bandwidth to handle new Information Technology (IT) for military purposes demands a continuous SATCOM development. For national C2, administrative and logistics applications as well as welfare there is a need of SATCOM reach back-links from each mission area. In theatre, where required, for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) purposes Mobile Satellite/Tactical Satellite (MobSat/TacSat) solutions will be implemented during this period High Frequency The Swedish Armed Forces are replacing older HF systems and equipment introducing the new HF 2000 system. HF 2000 is based on automated computer controlled principles. The radio system will constitute the future HF radio system for most applications well into the 21 st century. It is fully automatic and does not require any operator control after its initial set-up. The radio system will convey time-critical tactical C2 data and text messages on all command levels. Time-critical data messages are transmitted as broadcast messages. Operational/Tactical orders, mission reports and other text based information of non-real time critical nature will normally be sent in Automatic Repeat-reQuest (ARQ) mode. There are three different modes of operation. The normal operation mode when communicating between nodes equipped with the radio system will be the synchronous mode of operation. The radio system will also be able to communicate in Military Standard (MIL-STD) Automatic Link Establishment (ALE) mode of operation. The third operation mode is manual mode of control, which is mainly intended for fixed frequency operation. However, all radio station facilities will have the ability to use all three modes of operation. The HF 2000 system supports the STANAG 5066, and therefore HF 2000 can be used for sending HFEM messages, without the HFEM gateway software mentioned above Low Frequency (LF) Swedish Armed Forces submarines have updated their systems and have today the capability to handle both Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) and Minimum Shift Keying (MSK). A Fitted For concept has been installed which gives the Submarine the capability to receive LF secure messages when the appropriate crypto device is added.

135 Enclosure 5 Page 21 (24) Land Line Swedish Armed Force s maritime assets are using ISIS for secure text over land line Air environment The secure text system for the air environment consists of two different levels: SWECCIS down to the operational HQs For the lower tactical levels the Battle Management System (SLB) is used. Some legacy systems will continue to be used as well. Within the squadrons/wings the main transmission mean is radio. From brigade level and above radio relay systems, land lines, High Frequency (HF) systems and Satellite Communication (SATCOM) are examples of possible transmission systems Ground environment Ground environment secure text systems The secure text system for the Army consists of two different levels: SWECCIS down to the Brigade HQs, and well as Manoeuvre, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support Battalions HQs. For the lower tactical levels the Battle Management System (SLB) is used. Some legacy systems will continue to be used as well Ground environment secure text transmission Within the brigades the main transmission mean is radio. From brigade level and above radio relay systems, land lines, High Frequency (HF) systems and Satellite Communication (SATCOM) are examples of possible transmission systems Secure Text Standard Primacy Swedish Armed Forces currently use a variety of national secure text messages that are not interoperable with international systems. It is Swedish defence policy to follow potential coalition partners development and implementation of ADatP-3 baselines HFEM - STANAG 5066 HFEM is a half-duplex Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) protocol using MIL-STD B ACP-127 ACP-127 is used for transmission of different text formats and it is implemented in ISIS. It is specified in Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 5500 NATO Text Formatting System (FORMETS), edition 4, ADatP-3 is a text format.

136 Enclosure 5 Page 22 (24) OTH (G) OTH (T) Gold have been tested during CWIX (Coalition Warrior Interoperability exercise) exercises the last couple of years and is now considered along with ADatP-3 for implementation into SWECCIS and ISIS as some examples Interfaces with Swedish Armed Forces legacy systems The main function and purpose of Secure text systems is provide a means to exchange secure text information amongst coalition and Swedish Armed Forces assets, as well as in national operations. National secure text systems can interface with international systems. This could be an integrated or stand-alone solution. 6. Organisational Structure To meet the requirements of secure text in a unified and joint manner the Swedish Armed Forces has formed a joint operational organisational structure. This organisational structure and hierarchy is put in place to ensure that only one approach and command of secure text for platforms within Sweden is taken. This will allow a joint service approach and allow all three services an equal stake within secure text frequency allocation, operations and planning. A full description of the joint operational organisational structure can be found in the main document to this CONOPS, the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Document for Interoperability Enabling Systems Secure Text Education and Training 7.1. Introduction Effective training by taking part of a secure text network is an important step to ensure success in future operations. There are three basic parts of training and education, general functionality of secure text, platform specific features and exercises with platforms using secure text. General education, both operational and technical will be directed from one location to guarantee a joint perspective, reduce costs and to increase understanding of the separate and joint needs of different platforms Platform specific training and education will be performed at each warfare centres to increase the understanding for the platform needs Exercises with platforms using secure text will be planned with both a combined and a joint perspective

137 Enclosure 5 Page 23 (24) 7.2. System Training When introducing a new technical system, education and training is one of the most important elements. Training is essential to ensure that all systems can be operated and maintained/supported correctly and effectively. Therefore it is important at an early stage to identify all users for these new systems, tactical as well as technical personnel. To provide an effective education, it is important that the training facilities are equipped to deal with the needs for all services (air/land/sea) and to include all system components of secure text. This will allows the correct training in the right environment. Secure text training issues are being addressed by the Swedish Armed Forces interoperability enabling systems training group. This provides a general view of the needs of education and to create training courses at educational facilities Secure Text Infrastructure The handling of cryptographic material required for secure text equipment is part of an overall national interoperability cryptographic material management system that complies with the security requirements. Specific accounting and security actions are required for interoperability cryptographic material and the associated procedures. These are detailed in the common infrastructure CONOPS. An infrastructure is required to maintain interoperability in accordance with NATO interoperability standards and standard update. A COMPLAN that dictates (or responds to allies requirements) to the use of equipment in particular military operations is required. The outcome of the COMPLAN is usually distributed as secure text messages. Network management for secure text message systems is a part of the overall management of the Swedish Armed Forces communications organisation. Secure Text operations may also require infrastructure elements that are common to the other interoperability enabling systems (TDLs, Secure Voice and IFF). These infrastructure elements are detailed in the common infrastructure CONOPS (Enclosure 6).

138 Enclosure 5 Page 24 (24) 8. Secure voice platform overview Platform Secure Text System or format CRC X ADatP-3 & USMTF ASC 890 X ADatP-3 MSS to WOC JAS 39 C/D X ADatP-3 MSS to WOC C-130 X ADatP-3 MSS to WOC Airbase X ADatP-3 (via Stand Alone) Helicopter 14 X Via mission planning system Helicopter 15 Helicopter 16 X To be determined Sea Surveillance Bn X Corvettes X ACP 127/HFEM and CBN (Computer Based Networks) MCM X ACP 127/HF-mail Submarines X HF, HFEM, LF and SATCOM Support vessels X ACP 127/HFEM Amphibious forces X HF-mail, ACP 127, AdatP-3 Rörlig UnderHålls X To be determined (RUHL) company GBAD X IS SWERAP MISSION/SWECCIS (Using format AdatP-3) TACP X Via C3 system JDLOC X OPTASK Link

139 Enclosure 6 Page 1 (24) Swedish Armed Forces Joint Infrastructure Concept of Operations (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

140 Enclosure 6 Page 2 (24) List of Contents 1. Introduction Background Aim Documentation structure Scope Assumptions Swedish Armed Forces communications infrastructure Introduction Joint capabilities Army capabilities Navy capabilities Air Force capabilities Army capabilities Interoperability enabling systems common infrastructure elements Introduction Common cryptographic infrastructure Introduction Interoperability enabling systems US COMSEC equipment and encryption Key training The Handling of US COMSEC Equipment The Handling of US COMSEC Encryption Key Materiel Incident Reporting for US COMSEC Equipment and Encryption Keys Future US Encryption Key Distribution Regional COMSEC Managers Remote Re-keying Interoperability Enabling Systems Training Introduction General common conditions for interoperability enabling systems training Coordination Cooperation Training Aids Competence Documentation Training responsibilities Interoperability assurance Background Levels of Interoperability assurance Platform Implementation capture and management Interoperability assurance supporting processes Interoperability assurance activities Potential use of gateways... 22

141 Enclosure 6 Page 3 (24) Introduction Gateway Data forwarding Afghanistan Mission Network (AMN) & Future Mission Network (FMN) Organisational structure... 24

142 Enclosure 6 Page 4 (24) Issue Status Number Date Comments Issue utkast Draft version Draft version 3 Review draft Final Issue References Reference Description A Swedish Armed Forces Joint Interoperability Enabling Systems Policy document B COMSEC User Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 26 Jun 2012 C HKV :57742 Rutiner för beställning m.m. av amerikanska kryptonycklar och signalskyddsmateriel inom Försvarsmakten D Systemplan Ledning HKV :67037 List of Acronyms A list of acronyms for this document and the other associated CONOPS and platform annexes can be found at Appendix to Ref [A].

143 Enclosure 6 Page 5 (24) Abstract. This document sets out and provides a high level description of the common infrastructure elements required to support Interoperable Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), secure voice and secure text systems employed by Swedish Armed Forces. This CONOPS document is a part of series of documents describing interoperability enablers, which the Swedish Armed Forces currently employs. This common infrastructure CONOPS document has been produced in collaboration with a number of military and government departments and organisations, on behalf of the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Headquarters, HKV. A detailed list of contributors to this CONOPS can be found in the main document, Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy document for Interoperability Enabling Systems References The information in this publication has been extracted from multiple sources. References to these documents and sources of information can be found in the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy document for Interoperability Enabling Systems

144 Enclosure 6 Page 6 (24) 1. Introduction 1.1. Background The Swedish Armed Forces are continuing to move through a transition of the implementation of interoperable communication systems for both national and international operations. The overarching purpose is to create flexible Forces with increased operational effectiveness with units available for all tasks of the Swedish Armed Forces, in the global arena, in Europe, in Sweden s immediate region and in its own territory 1. This change has required the Swedish Armed Forces to embrace international communication systems such as TDLs, IFF, Secure Voice and Secure text systems, to ensure that tactical information can be communicated between coalition partners. Furthermore, it is stated in the Swedish Armed Forces development plan 2 these new systems will now be employed on a number of platforms for national defence purposes during the timescale. To support the Interoperability enabling systems, common infrastructure elements are required to be put in place. All of the interoperability enabling system has specific infrastructure elements which are described in their respective CONOPS documentation Aim The aim of this CONOPS is to provide a joint framework to ensure a coherent description of the common infrastructure elements of interoperability enabling systems for all Swedish Armed Forces platforms to be interoperable in international/national operations. This CONOPS describe these operations in the time period of This CONOPS is a living document and will be periodically reviewed and updated to reflect the Armed Forces Interoperability enabling systems policy and operation Documentation structure This CONOPS document is part of the Swedish Armed Forces Interoperability enabling systems policy document structure. This structure has been put in place to ensure that the policy, concepts and supporting information is displayed in a joint concept manner and can be interpreted by commanders and platform authorities alike. 1 The Defence Commission report, Defence in Use, Swedish Government, DS 2008:48; Stockholm 2 Försvarsmaktens utvecklingsplan , (Förvarsmakten Utveckling Plan FMUP 2013), 2012; Stockholm.

145 Enclosure 6 Page 7 (24) It is designed to be incorporated into the system of systems architecture of the suite of Interoperability enabling systems documentation. Figure 1 illustrates where the common infrastructure CONOPS document is situated within the interoperability enabling systems document structure. Figure 1. Interoperability enabling systems policy document structure

146 Enclosure 6 Page 8 (24) The main body of this CONOPS document will describe the Joint perspective of the common infrastructure elements required for the interoperability enabling systems. Information specific to individual platforms will be addressed in detail in the platform annexes attached to the CONOPS. Platform annexes will contain information of all interoperability enabling systems (TDLs, IFF, Secure voice and secure text) and their related implementation Scope The scope of this CONOPS provides the description of the common infrastructure elements that are shared by the interoperability enabling systems (TDLs, IFF, secure voice and secure text systems) only. Infrastructure elements that are only applicable to an interoperability enabling system specific are described in their respective CONOPS documents Assumptions The following assumptions have been made: International TDL information, cryptographic material and stated interoperability enabling systems are releasable to Swedish Armed Forces in the timeframe of these documents. 2. Swedish Armed Forces communications infrastructure 2.1. Introduction The Swedish Armed Forces communication infrastructure will consist of a number of infrastructural coherent security domains. One domain will be dominated by units on the tactical level, i.e. up to battalion level. Another domain will mainly consist of units and organisations on the higher tactical level, as well as the operational and strategic levels. The Armed Forces Business Management System (PRIO), Swedish Command and Control Information System (SWECCIS), Swedish battalion level battle management system (Stridsledning Bataljon (SLB)), Joint Operational Picture System (Gemensam lägesinformation (GLI))and TDLs are all vital parts to create the foundation for the Armed Forces joint communication infrastructure on strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Also services for positioning, targeting, combat identification, and information assurance will be introduced in the time period of this documentation, and it s a prerequisite that these systems are introduced in compliance with our closest partners. To be able to utilize and share

147 Enclosure 6 Page 9 (24) information it is of vital importance that open international standards are used in all aspects possible. During the recent decade the requirements for changes in combat units tempo and performance, higher tempo and increased distances between units have created requisites for modern combat support systems, and secure voice and text solutions, also for long distance. On the tactical level units for mounted combat against highly qualified opponents will be equipped with modern Battle Management Systems (such as SLB), as well as soldier-to-soldier radio system in order to create a higher combat tempo and to ensure reduced risk of fratricide. The introduction of interoperable tactical data links and secure voice communication capabilities is crucial for the development during the time period of these documents Joint capabilities This chapter describes the interoperability infrastructure elements that are required for mainly strategic and operational levels activities. The implementation plan for the Swedish Armed Forces joint Command & Control (C2) systems for the coming decade will closely follow the Network Enabled Capability (NEC) development within North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European Union (EU). This approach ensures interoperability in all necessary aspects, i.e. nationally, in the Nordic perspective, and for Sweden as a member of EU as well as a partner to NATO. The Joint level will gradually be introduced with modern C2 capabilities in accordance with the Armed Forces Development Plan and the Materiel Plan. In the joint environment the following systems will be used to ensure C2- capabilities for the higher tactical level, as well as the operational and strategic levels: The Armed Forces Internet Protocol (IP) Wide Area Network (WAN) (Försvarsmakten (FM) IP-nät IPV6) High Frequency (HF) 2000 FM SATKOM Interoperable information exchange models (i.e. Multilateral Interoperability Programme (MIP) Joint C3 Information Exchange Data Model (JC3IEDM)) The Armed Forces Network Management System with a Network Operations Centre (NOC) SWECCIS (with appropriate Functional Area Services (FAS)) Other international systems, such as Joint Range Extension, are under consideration.

148 Enclosure 6 Page 10 (24) 2.3. Army capabilities This chapter describes the interoperability infrastructure elements that are required for tactical level ground operations. The communication infrastructure elements for the Army consist of two different levels: SWECCIS down to the Brigade HQs/Combat Support and Combat Service Support Battalions HQs, and the Battle Management System (SLB) and RAKEL 3 for the lower tactical levels. Within the brigades the main transmission mean is radio; from brigade level and above radio relay systems, land lines, High Frequency (HF) systems, and Satellite Communication (SATCOM) are examples of transmission systems. For coordination on the tactical level (Regional Headquarters, Brigade Headquarters, Infantry and Amphibious battalions, some Combat Support and Combat Service Support units, the Home Guard and Air Base units) SWECCIS, RAKEL and encrypted telecommunication devices will be used. The SLB, RAKEL, and different Tactical Radio systems will be used on battalion level and below. Some legacy systems will continue to be used as well, for example PC- DART for fire control messaging. For long distance communication SATCOM and HF radios will be used. The implementation of Internet Protocol (IP)-based solutions in as many instances as possible is an explicit goal in itself that will help ensure interoperability. As a result of the interoperability efforts of the Armed Forces a few other common infrastructure elements will also be introduced to the ground forces: Common cryptographic infrastructure (as discussed in chapter 3.2 of this document) Training (as discussed in chapter 3.4 of this document) Interoperability assurance (as discussed in chapter 3.5. of this document) Future Mission Networks (FMN) (as discussed in chapter 3.5. of this document) Gateways (as discussed in chapter of this document) For the time frame of this documentation the ground forces capability development in short, mid, and long-term is described in the following matrix. 3 The Swedish civil emergency radio system

149 Enclosure 6 Page 11 (24) Time frame C2 and (Blue Force Tracking (BFT) Secure Voice and Text Short/Medium Range Radio Communication Long Range Radio Communication Long-term Mid-term Short-term BMS for combat units FFT for other units Friendly Force Tracking (FFT) for some units PC-DART PC-DART only for Fire Control IP-based to HQs SecVx and Txt down to squad level Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) to HQs Legacy SecVx and Txt down to Coy level Legacy systems down to HQs Squad Radios. Multi-channel radios RAKEL Tactical Radios Squad Radios Multi-channel radios RAKEL Tactical Radios Tactical Radios to Plt level HF 2000 FM SATKOM HF 2000 (FM SATKOM) Only added on ad hoc basis 2.4. Navy capabilities For maritime operations the infrastructure is mainly built on wireless systems. The ships of the Navy will be fitted for/with mission specific communication equipment to ensure interoperability when deployed to operations overseas. Today the Navy has acquired a few Link-11 stand-alone systems and interoperable Secure Voice and Secure Text systems. These systems are not integrated into the on-board C2 system. During the time frame of this document TDL systems for both Line Of Sight (LOS) and Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) (i.e. Link 16 and Link 22) are intended to be integrated into the maritime C2 system (CETRIS/SAFIR). The introduction of Link 22 will closely follow other navies implementation plans. Link 22 will only be installed on the most advanced platforms. On the Navy s other vessels the national legacy link 8000 will be maintained for the foreseeable future. IFF systems will be integrated on some of naval vessels, mainly those with antiaircraft capabilities. The purpose of this is mainly to minimize the risk for fratricide. Also the Sea Surveillance Battalion will have an IFF capability. SWECCIS is the joint C2 system also used by the Navy s command structure down to single ships. The SWECCIS system contains Navy specific services for planning, execution and assessment of operations as well as a Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP). The RMP is based on an interoperable format. In the Sea Surveillance Centre the Navy s system C2SJÖC will be introduced. The Navy is contributing to the international sea surveillance agreements (Surveillance Cooperation between Finland Sweden (SUCFIS), Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS) and European Defense Agency Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR)) to ensure an enhanced control of the very busy waters surrounding Sweden.

150 Enclosure 6 Page 12 (24) The Amphibious Battalion is equipped with communication infrastructure equipment for both naval communications as well as for communication with Army units. Also RAKEL will be used by the Amphibious Battalion Air Force capabilities The Air Force infrastructure is built on both land line and wireless solutions. For the time period of this document SWECCIS with Integrated Command & Control (ICC) will be introduced. The on-going introduction of Link 16, IFF, Secure Voice and Secure Text will continue and full operational capability of the Air Force C2 system will be reached in The Air Base units legacy communication solution will be maintained in the short-term perspective. For some of the ground based units in the Air Force organization the same equipment as the Army is being used Army capabilities The Army infrastructure is built on both land line and wireless solutions. However for the lower tactical levels, radio communications are the most predominant. For the time period of this document SWECCIS with Integrated Command & Control (ICC) will be introduced down to the brigade level. For units under brigade level the SLB and legacy systems will be the basis for the Army C2 systems. The introduction of SLB will provide modern blue force tracking capabilities to the manoeuvre battalions. The civil emergency radio system, RAKEL, is used by Army units Some of the Army s units are equipped with interoperability enabling systems, i.e. GBAD, TACP and SOF along with the common national systems. 3. Interoperability enabling systems common infrastructure elements 3.1. Introduction This chapter describes the common infrastructure elements that are required by four types of Swedish Armed Forces interoperability enabling systems (TDLs, IFF, Secure voice and Secure Text). As discussed in chapter 2.3, the high level common infrastructure elements are as follows: Common cryptographic infrastructure Training Interoperability Assurance. Potential use of Gateways Afghan Mission Network/Future Mission Network (AMN/FMN)

151 Enclosure 6 Page 13 (24) 3.2. Common cryptographic infrastructure Introduction TDLs (Link 16, Link 22, Link 11 and VMF), IFF, secure voice and secure text systems share a common infrastructure element of the way Communication Security (COMSEC 4 ) and systems should be managed. The interoperability enabling systems used by the Swedish Armed Forces according to chapter 1.4 of this document require encryption keys and COMSEC equipment which has been supplied from authorities external to Sweden. In the case of the interoperability enabling systems in the scope of this document, the COMSEC equipment and encryption keys are supplied from the United States of America (US). Encryption keys and COMSEC equipment can also be provided from e.g. NATO. Information on the management and handling of US COMSEC equipment and encryption keys are set out and described in Swedish Armed Forces rules, regulations and routines 5. This section provides a high level description of the common infrastructure elements for the interoperability enabling systems from the information and instructions contained in Ref [B]. The method for distribution, storage, handling, transport, geographic use and incident reporting of US COMSEC equipment and encryption keys along with maintenance of these types of equipment are clearly described in the earlier mentioned routines 6. These rules and regulations that govern US COMSEC and encryption keys must be adhered to at all times Interoperability enabling systems US COMSEC equipment and encryption Key training The Swedish Armed Forces personnel who come into contact with the US COMSEC equipment and encryption keys are required to have training. The level of training comes at four levels: User COMSEC user Lead COMSEC User Regional COMSEC manager (position currently not fully implemented in the Swedish Armed Forces) A User is a user-trained individual who will operate systems using US COMSEC equipment over a brief period of time where encryption keys have already been 4 In Swedish called Signalskydd 5 Ref B COMSEC SOP osv and Ref [C] HKV :57742 Rutiner för beställning m.m. av amerikanska kryptonycklar och signalskyddsmateriel inom Försvarsmakten Ref [B] COMSEC SOP and HKV :57742 Rutiner för beställning m.m. av amerikanska kryptonycklar och signalskyddsmateriel inom Försvarsmakten

152 Enclosure 6 Page 14 (24) loaded. The User is not required to handle any keying material, e.g. a soldier that has a need to operate a keyed radio. The User requires only current training and information provided in a so called COMSEC Briefing. COMSEC Users are personnel that are responsible for the safeguard of receipted COMSEC equipment and keying material. COMSEC Users have been COMSEC User-trained and authorised to handle the loading of encryption keys, the encryption key loading device (Data Transfer Device (DTD) or COMSEC equipment. Lead COMSEC User (LCU) is an individual responsible for the US COMSEC equipment and keying material issued to a user location or operational unit. LCU ensures the equipment and keying material is accounted for and safeguarded in accordance with COMSEC doctrine. The LCU will also ensure that there is coordination for both national and international COMSEC equipment and encryption keys and will act as the unit s main point of contact for the Swedish based US/SWE Foreign Military Sales (FMS) COMSEC Account The LCU issues equipment and keying material to the actual users and briefs them on handling and safeguarding procedures. Regional COMSEC Managers (position currently not fully implemented in the Swedish Armed Forces) are personnel who are responsible for multiple military and civilian units in a region that uses US COMSEC equipment and encryption keys. The regional COMSEC manager will provide COMSEC user training for Swedish Armed Forces and civilian personnel in their area of responsibility and account for the region s US COMSEC equipment and encryption keys, both issued and on hand. Regional COMSEC managers will coordinate and manage the distribution of the Swedish regional US encryption keys in their area of responsibility. All US COMSEC training will be in the accordance with the Joint venture (US/Sweden) COMSEC User Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). The joint venture (US/Sweden) SOP will be provided to all Swedish Armed Forces personnel who come into contact with US COMSEC equipment and encryption keys The Handling of US COMSEC Equipment The handling of COMSEC (cryptographic) equipment has strict procedures and regulations that must be followed at all times. These procedures are under the following main areas: Approved US COMSEC equipment storage facilities. Procedures and restrictions for loading encryption keys into US COMSEC equipment. Geographic restrictions regarding the use of US COMSEC equipment.

153 Enclosure 6 Page 15 (24) Reporting responsibilities (for US COMSEC User roles as discussed in chapter ). Replacement units, service and repair of US COMSEC equipment The above required routines and procedures are fully set out and described in the Swedish Armed Forces directive for the handling of US COMSEC equipment 7. Preparations are currently being made for the establishment of a national centralised storage facility as well as a centralised handling of US COMSEC equipment releasable to Sweden. The location of the centralised storage facility will be on a military compound, most probably in the vicinity of Stockholm. In the time period of this document, the centralised storage facility will be the focal point for all incoming and outgoing US COMSEC equipment releasable to Sweden, both on a national as well as an international basis. This facility will enable a secure distribution line for all US COMSEC equipment The Handling of US COMSEC Encryption Key Materiel As with the handling of US COMSEC equipment, US encryption keys (also called keying material, (keymat)) has strict rules and procedures that must be adhered to. These rules and procedures come under the following main areas: Responsibilities for the Swedish Host controlling authority (värdnyckelansvarig myndighet (värd-nam)) The classification of US keymat The transport of US keymat The dispatch of US keymat abroad (outside Swedish national territory) Procedures for the ordering of non-stocked US keymat. Ordering procedures for temporary US keymat for exercises and operations (that are not in stock in the COMSEC Account) The above required routines and procedures are fully described in the Swedish Armed Forces directive for the handling of US keymat Incident Reporting for US COMSEC Equipment and Encryption Keys When an incident with US COMSEC materiel or encryption keys has occurred, the US COMSEC Account must immediately be informed. Procedures for reporting incidents of can be found in the Swedish Armed Forces directive for the handling of US COMSEC equipment and key materiel 9. 7 Ref [B] COMSEC User SOP osv and Rutiner för beställning m.m. av amerikanska kryptonycklar och signalskyddsmateriel inom Försvarsmakten HKV : Ref [B] COMSEC SOP and Ref C Rutiner för beställning m.m. av amerikanska kryptonycklar och signalskyddsmateriel inom Försvarsmakten 9 Ref [B] COMSEC SOP and Rutiner för beställning m.m. av amerikanska kryptonycklar och signalskyddsmateriel inom Försvarsmakten

154 Enclosure 6 Page 16 (24) Future US Encryption Key Distribution Regional COMSEC Managers US COMSEC equipment and keymat is currently only available from the central US/SWE FMS COMSEC Account located in Stockholm. Due to the current central point location of the US/SWE FMS COMSEC Account, the distribution of US COMSEC equipment and encryption keys is currently providing some operational challenges, but is foreseen to be solved in the future if the right equipment is made available. The Swedish Armed Forces plan to establish Regional COMSEC Managers at key locations throughout Sweden. The requirement for the Regional COMSEC Managers is to help facilitate the US/SWE FMS COMSEC Account in training of personnel, the distribution and management of US COMSEC equipment and encryption keys Remote Re-keying Unmanned remote sites are part of the communication infrastructure within Sweden that supports the employment of the Interoperability enabling systems. These unmanned remote sites are required to have US encryption keys to be loaded into Interoperability enabling systems on a daily/weekly or regular basis. Currently this function is being carried out manually. The Swedish Armed Forces have the ambition to implement a remote re-keying capability, to be fully operational in the time period of this document i.e Interoperability Enabling Systems Training Introduction The provision of adequate training to all relevant personnel is a complex task. This is in terms of the number of training providers, international collaboration, quality assurance, training structure and associated efficient resource utilization. In recent years, including an increased focus on ensuring personal safety has brought new demands on, not least, quality assurance and traceability of the training provided and that is available. Similarly, the Swedish Armed Forces has an ever increasing desire to carry out education cooperation with other nations with particular focus on the US, NATO and Nordic countries. A professional attitude and serious view of the entire educational process is a necessary prerequisite to enable both the introduction and the maintenance of the interoperability enabling systems.

155 Enclosure 6 Page 17 (24) General common conditions for interoperability enabling systems training There are several key elements that must be put in place that affect the entire education system and can be attributed to the concept of infrastructure Coordination The interoperability enabling systems involve several branches of Swedish Armed Forces. In addition, other nations must be considered so that no single platform/systems shall create their own training but through a coordinated manner through HKV. It is the ambition for the HKV to task one of the stakeholders to coordinate Interoperability enabling systems education and training for the Swedish Armed forces Cooperation The interaction of the Swedish Armed Forces three services (Army, Navy and Airforce), in addition to Sweden s coalition nations, is particularly important with regard to interoperable enabling systems. It is especially important to create conditions for cooperation and access to international expertise and international deployment principles Training Aids A certain amount of training is carried out in an operational environment. However, the majority of the education is carried out in facilities, simulators, or in other customized environments that are specifically designed for that training. In order to create effective training there is the requirement to have access to training materials, rigs, simulators, software, etc. available for all interoperability enabling systems Competence Competence can be the result of experience, formal training or a combination thereof. With regard to the courses and industrial training that are being used the transfer of education and knowledge is very important. These courses create the conditions necessary for the Swedish Armed Forces to be able to provide education for the system. In addition this will create the understanding of systems required for operational use Documentation The principles for interoperability enabling systems tactical operational and technical use should be documented in a structured and professional manner. The majority of training is based on access to professional documentation, and not least the perception of personal safety requires accurate and adequate supporting documentation.

156 Enclosure 6 Page 18 (24) Training responsibilities The main Swedish Armed Forces stakeholders who have the task for carrying out the education for interoperable enabling system are: Armed Forces Technical School Command and Control Regiment Land Warfare Centre Air Combat School Naval Warfare School In addition, the Air Defence Regiment, the artillery regiment and eventually other units in respect to specific systems will also have responsibility for this training task within their area of expertise. The Armed Forces Technical School is responsible for education in engineering and technical services. The Command and Control Regiment is responsible for training regarding the use of systems and methods in order to achieve tactical objectives. The Armed Forces technical school and Command and Control Regiment will both provide coordination to issues arising with education of the use of the interoperability enabling systems. Besides the above lists organizations above, there are a number of international (US, NATO and Nordic nations etc.) educational institutions that may be required to be provide Swedish Armed Forces training for interoperability enabling systems. Figure 2 illustrates the interoperability Enabling systems training organisation for the Swedish Armed Forces:

157 Enclosure 6 Page 19 (24) Figure 2 Interoperability enabling systems training organisation 3.4. Interoperability assurance Background The Interoperability assurance of the enabling systems that are listed in the scope of this document is an important issue. Interoperability assurance has many activities and processes that are required to be carried out to be able to assess the function of system/s. Generally, for Interoperability assurance Interoperability is underpinned by testing and validation. The results from testing and validation processes will then be recorded and used in comparison with other Swedish Armed Forces platforms and eventually coalition platforms implementation. All interoperability assurance and management activities for the interoperability enabling systems shall be based on NATO best practice and processes where possible and available to Swedish Armed Forces platforms Levels of Interoperability assurance There are varying levels of Interoperability assurance for Swedish Armed Forces platforms that should be achieved and demonstrated. Evaluation of Swedish Armed Forces platforms shall be in accordance with EU and NATO standards.

158 Enclosure 6 Page 20 (24) Swedish Armed Forces units are evaluated according to NATO/Partners for Peace (PfP) Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation and Feedback (OCC E&F) programme 10, either during pre-deployment training or before assuming readiness for possible participation in operations. The higher level (OCC E&F level 2, i.e. capability to conduct operations integrated in a NATO C3-structure according to NATO Standards) should be the basis for evaluation and assessment activities. OCC E&F level 2 evaluates both resources and performance. Thus, both the physical existence of a system as well as the unit s personnel abilities to operate the system is evaluated. Understanding and demonstrating interoperability is the key to a successful national interoperability capability. System of systems is an enabling mechanism containing a set of principles which will ensure that all delivered systems are procured and built with the aim of enabling enhanced capability through achieving commonality, reuse and the interoperability of independently procured systems Platform Implementation capture and management The capture of all Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) at an early stage of a programme that is implementing interoperability enabling systems is an essential task. This is to both to promote interoperability and to ensure platforms are acting in a net-centric manner. In addition to receiving information, almost all platforms participating in network centric operations contribute information to at least one type of network or another - for example by reporting sensor information, track information, identity, or their own position to the network (voice or data). The accurate capture and management of the IERs can then be used to carry out Interoperability Evaluations at an early stage of a programme life cycle. Interoperability evaluations allow for the measurement and comparison of a platform s implementation and provide a firm foundation of interoperability assurance. Capture of a platform s IERs is not only limited to early stages of a life cycle of a program. Legacy platform implementations can have IERs captured and interoperability evaluations carried out retrospectively Interoperability assurance supporting processes There are many tools and processes that may be used for carrying out an IER capture and interoperability evaluation. However, tools that support the ismart process, especially for TDL implementation are recommended for interoperability 10 Ref [1]FM UP 2013

159 Enclosure 6 Page 21 (24) assurance for other interoperability enabling systems (IFF, secure voice and secure text). ismart is an interoperability assurance and information management process for information exchange systems. The ismart process assures effective communications between complex military systems that need to exchange information to undertake their role effectively. The key feature of the process is to promote and assess interoperability i.e. effective exchange of information that supports effective operations through-life to assure coherence within the military battlefield system of systems. The process achieves this through interoperability requirement management, analysis and through-life evaluation using a holistic systems engineering process. One benefit of the ismart process is to ensure that Interoperability issues between and amongst systems are identified and thus can be addressed at an early stage in their lifecycles, thereby reducing the risk of later changes causing programme cost and schedule overruns, or performance shortfalls. Furthermore, the ismart process can be applied to legacy systems in order to identify and work around Interoperability issues in a manner that enables effective use of systems that are not 100% interoperable. The ismart process is a key facilitator of cost-effective network enabled capability Interoperability assurance activities Sweden is taken part in several multinational activities to assess a platform s interoperability capability with Swedish Armed Forces coalition partner s assets. For national purposes FMV are validating platforms operating together on a higher system level, i.e. Swedish Air Force Defensive Counter Air (DCA). Tests are set up to assess national operational capability and operational issues are collected and entered into the Interoperability Matrix (IOM. FMV can also, via distributed net (Combined Federated Battle Laboratories Network (CFBLNet)), connect to other nation s testing laboratories or platform through test rigs and arrange and carry out bilateral tests and scenarios. Sweden is following the development of a standardized methodology to use distributed systems for training and validation, i.e. the Test & Training Enabling Architecture (TENA). Sweden is participating in multinational exercises such as Coalition Warrior Exercise (CWIX 11 ) and Combined Endeavour (CE) to further assess Swedish Armed Forces platforms interoperability in a live operational environment. For specific areas Sweden are participating in the verification of platforms in more details. For example, participation in NATO Tactical Data Links Interoperability Test Syndicate ( TDLITS) for TDLs and in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) AMN Coalition Interoperability Assurance & Validation (CIAV) for C2I systems. 11 Formerly known as Coalition Warrior Demonstration CWID

160 Enclosure 6 Page 22 (24) After the completion of missions and tasks, operational information is gathered and the platforms interoperability is assessed and the results are populated into the IOM for Swedish Armed Forces Potential use of gateways Introduction There is a growing realisation within the military community that there is a potential requirement for national defence policy to share information with national, regional, international military and civil partners. These different services and partners generally have different and incompatible communications systems along with varied plans for future technology adoption. Both for international and national military organisations, there is a military ambition to connect these separate voice and/or data & computer network domains that may be similar or dissimilar in a seamless manner. To connect these different communication systems a common infrastructure element of what is commonly known as a Gateway may be required. As with many other nations, the Swedish Armed Forces deploy a vast range of sophisticated communication (data and voice) solutions that generally are not fully supportive of information exchange within and across its three different services and potential coalition partners. Therefore, in order to satisfy the demand to improve communication, (not only with international coalition partners but also across the national Swedish Armed Forces defence assets), gateways may provide a cost effective and fast solution to overcome existing and developing communication capability gaps. The Swedish Armed Force s current requirement for the employment of Gateways and associated technology is currently not known and is subject to further study and analysis Gateway There are a significant number of definitions available for the term gateway. Many of the definitions have relevance within their own specific communities and applications. However, these are not broad enough in context to provide a satisfactory definition for the purpose of this CONOPS. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper it is assumed a gateway can be described to be: A system that connects separate voice and/or data network domains to enable communication between two or more users.

161 Enclosure 6 Page 23 (24) And/or: A generic term for a C2, Communications, and Intelligence, Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) network node designed to provide interoperability by interfacing between two (or more) systems or networks that use different protocols Swedish Armed Forces is currently investigating the potential application and use of gateways and their associated for the air, ground and maritime environments Data forwarding Data forwarding is the process of receiving data from one data link and then providing the output data, using the correct format and link protocols, to another type of data link(s). In the process, a message(s) is received on one link is translated to an appropriate message(s) on another link. Data forwarding is accomplished by the selected forwarding units(s) simultaneously participating on more than one type of data link. The data that is forwarded is based on the data received and is not dependent upon the local system data of the data forwarding unit or its implementation of the received message or the forwarded message. Unlike gateway technology, data forwarding is considered to be an intelligent process due to that filtering of information can take place in the data forwarding system. Filtering within a data forwarder may check incoming data with the data already being distributed on a network. This is to ensure this data is not being replicated or contradicted.. Data Forwarding is defined as within the NATO TDL community as: where data translation follows the field-to-field mapping specified in a STANAG (for example STANAG 5616). Data forwarding requirement and capability currently is being investigated by Swedish Armed Forces Afghanistan Mission Network (AMN) & Future Mission Network (FMN) 50 nations from four continents support the UN-mandated ISAF mission. However, there is a huge challenge in regards of standardization, interoperability and communication, just to mention a few. All ISAF forces (~100,000 personnel) must move to a common network to more effectively share information and resources across Afghanistan

162 Enclosure 6 Page 24 (24) A single, consolidated and fully integrated information domain known as the AMN has been established. The AMN is the primary Coalition, Command, Control, Computer, Communication Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C5ISR) network in Afghanistan for all ISAF forces. It consists of the ISAF Secret network at the core with national extensions, such as the USprovided CENTRIXS-ISAF (CXI) and UK-provided OVERTASK and other national networks. Efforts to build the AMN are shared by ISAF, NATO Command Information Systems (CIS) Support Agency (NCSA), NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A), US CENTRAL COMMAND, the US Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and a variety of other programme managers, support agencies, and National representations. The Swedish aim is to connect its main C3 system in theatre (SWECCIS ISAF) to the AMN. This will initially provide access to the ISAF common portals, and chat. The general SWECCIS platform will over time be more and more harmonised with the FMN architecture, ensuring a greater level of interoperability for future lead coalition operations. 4. Organisational structure To meet the requirements of TDLs transitioning to a NEC concept in a unified and joint manner, the Swedish Armed Forces has formed a joint operational organisational structure. This organisation is required to ensure that only one approach to and command of interoperability enablers within Swedish Armed Forces is taken. This will allow a joint service approach and allow all three services an equal stake within interoperability enabling systems allocation, operations and planning. A full description of the joint operational organisational structure that supports the employment of the Interoperability enablers can be found in the main document to this CONOPS, Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Document for Interoperability Enabling Systems

163 Annex A Page 1 (16) Annex A Control and Reporting Centre (CRC) (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

164 Annex A Page 2 (16) List of contents 1. Introduction Background Aim Scope Assumptions Operations Introduction Joint air operations Mission description Counter Air Operations Offensive Counter Air (OCA) missions Defensive Counter Air (DCA) missions Anti-Surface Force Air Operations (ASFAO) Supporting air operations Surveillance missions SAR/CSAR missions Reconnaissance Operational use of interoperability enablers Introduction Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Friendly Force Tracking (FFT) Surveillance of potential targets and C Secure voice Secure text Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Miscellaneous Introduction Integration and Interoperability Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) Weather data integration Training and simulation Legacy systems Operator roles Introduction Battle management cell Master controller Weapons allocator Weapons management cell Fighter allocator Fighter controller Surface to Air Missile (SAM) allocator Surface to air missile controller Surveillance cell... 14

165 Annex A Page 3 (16) Track Production Officer (TPO) Identification (ID) officer Master Tracker Tactical Data link Operator (TDLO) Radar controller Communication cell Communication officer Unit Tactical Data link Operator (UTO) Technical support cell System administrator Security administrator Crypto manager Platform overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements Technical overview High level IERs Introduction 1.1. Background In the timeframe the Swedish Control and Reporting Centre (CRC) systems will be upgraded to full operability with TDLs, IFF and secure voice/text. The CRC will be central to all current and future air supporting operations within the Swedish Air Force. The primary task for the CRC is to support national operations; Air surveillance Control of JAS-39 C/D Gripen Command & Control (C2) coordination with Airborne & Surveillance Control (ASC) 890 Control and coordination of Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) Support of maritime exercises. CRC will be used in combined exercises within Sweden using interoperable methods and procedures to gain international operational experience for Swedish military units. The CRC can conduct exercises outside Sweden but within the Nordic region. For example BALTOPS, Cross Border Training or air exercises in Norway, Finland, Denmark, to the extent that the Swedish Armed Forces radar range allows. In the timeframe of these CONOPS CRC will have Full Operational Capability (FOC) for integrated air defence. Interoperability enablers such as Link 16, IFF, secure voice and secure text will allow the CRC to effectively communicate with national and international systems during training and operations within and in close vicinity of Swedish territory.

166 Annex A Page 4 (16) The CRC may exchange surveillance (C2) information with the ASC 890 during missions in a multiple C2 environment. The CRC will contribute to the Recognised Air Picture (RAP) and the Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP). This will be achieved by detecting and tracking air and surface targets using data received from sensors, ASC 890, JAS 39 C/D and the Sea Surveillance Battalion. Air and Maritime tracks may be distributed over Link 16 and over fixed landlines using Joint Range Extension Application Protocol (JREAP). Operators will co-ordinate and communicate with GBAD units and other command and control centres operating within the Area of Responsibility (AOR) using voice and data networks Aim The aim of this document is to translate the requirements from the CONOPS for the different enablers to a coherent platform description for the CRC s interoperability enabling communication systems Scope This document describes the CRC s overall mission, relationship with other platforms and breaks down the operations that will be performed by the CRC. This document then highlights the role, the specific integration and the employment of the interoperability enabling systems. Additionally, this document identifies, and in some cases, justifies the need for specific operational requirements, processing, capabilities, tools and functionality Assumptions The information contained in this annex is valid during the period The following assumptions have been made for the CRC: SENDNET will be used for receiving: Sensor information from sensors. JRE will be used to exchange Surface tracks from Sea Surveillance Battalion. A simulator will be used to stimulate and train operators within the CRC and in adjacent platforms. The simulator will have the capability to be connected to future Swedish Armed Forces joint simulation and training network(s). The CRC will have the capability to forward surveillance information from the Link 16 network to higher command (Joint Forces Command (JFC), Air Component Command (ACC ), Air Operations Centre (AOC))

167 Annex A Page 5 (16) Secure text messages will be provided to the CRC by a Command Control Information System (CCIS) and these systems may be operational and integrated with CRC. The Operational Tasking (OPTASK) Link message will be received from Joint Data link Operations Cell (JDLOC). The JDLOC Network Management Cell will initially be collocated with the CRC. JREAP may be used to overcome Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) connectivity problems with other ground based systems. The CRC will: Have the capability to relocate operator workstations between the different C2 sites in Sweden Have systems for internal and external voice communication Receive flight plans to support identification in AOR Support flight safety and co-ordinate the use of airspace with civilian Air Traffic Control Centre (ATCC) in accordance with Eurocontrol regulations. 2. Operations 2.1. Introduction Within the Swedish Armed Forces, the ACC is responsible for air operations planning and tasking using guidance provided by the JFC. The ACC primarily operates from the Joint Force Command Headquarters. The ACC is responsible for production and supervising Air Tasking Order (ATO)/Airspace Control Order (ACO) execution and making real-time decisions regarding the application of air power during air operations. The system and capabilities of the CRC will support operations and tasking according to ATO/ACO as directed by the JFC Joint air operations The CRC will conduct command and control and provide surveillance information for the following types of joint operations and missions: Counter Air Operations: Offensive Counter Air (OCA). Defensive Counter Air (DCA). Anti-Surface Force Air operations: Air Interdiction (AI). Close Air Support (CAS). Anti-Surface Warfare (AsuW). Strategic Air Operations like:

168 Annex A Page 6 (16) Attack on an adversary s vital assets, like C2 structures. Support Operations: Surveillance (Air and Sea). Search And Rescue/Combat Search And Rescue (SAR/CSAR). Air to Air refuelling Reconnaissance 2.3. Mission description Counter Air Operations Offensive Counter Air (OCA) missions The CRC will provide real-time command and control of fighter assets whose objectives are to achieve a favourable air situation or air control/superiority. Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) employed to accomplish the OCA mission include Fighter Sweep, Fighter Escort, OCA Attack, Airfield Attack and Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) Defensive Counter Air (DCA) missions The CRC will provide real-time command and control of fighter assets whose objectives are to counter (i.e. destroy, suppress, jam, etc.) the enemy s capability to employ air power against friendly forces. Specific tasks employed to accomplish the DCA missions include Combat Air Patrol (CAP), Fighter Area of Responsibility (FAOR), Point Defence, High Value Airborne Asset (HVAA) Protection, and Air Policing. The CRC will support basic GBAD co-ordination in AOR Anti-Surface Force Air Operations (ASFAO) The CRC will provide real-time command and control of air assets whose objectives are to counter the enemy s capability to employ surface forces. Specific missions employed to accomplish the ASFAO operations include AI, CAS, and ASuW Supporting air operations Surveillance missions The CRC will be able to: Perform air surveillance by detection, tracking, correlation, identification, track management, and reporting of air tracks Perform maritime surveillance by track management, correlation and reporting of surface tracks. Have the capability to perform basic sensor management Perform data forwarding

169 Annex A Page 7 (16) SAR/CSAR missions The CRC will provide real-time C2 to airborne assets conducting SAR/CSAR operations Reconnaissance The CRC will provide real-time C2 to airborne assets conducting reconnaissance missions. 3. Operational use of interoperability enablers 3.1. Introduction This chapter describes the CRC s operational employment of the following interoperability enabling systems: TDLs IFF Secure voice Secure text Figure 1 illustrates CRC s employment of the interoperability enabling systems.

170 Annex A Page 8 (16) Figure 1 - Context diagram illustrating CRC s employment of the interoperability enabling systems 3.2. Tactical Data Links (TDLs) The primary TDL employed for interoperability in the CRC will be Link 16. Link 16 will be utilised for the following capabilities: Friendly Force Tracking (FFT) Surveillance of potential targets and C2

171 Annex A Page 9 (16) Friendly Force Tracking (FFT) In all missions it is important to keep track of own and other coalition platforms, which mainly will be done with Precise Participant Location and Identification, (PPLI) and Surveillance. There are several reasons for FFT: Co-ordinate complex joint, combined and composite air operations Prevent fratricide by proactive identification with PPLI, instead of reactive identification with IFF Positive Airspace management, Force flow control and Military Air Traffic Control (MATC), which is to facilitate de-confliction when many aircraft uses a narrow airspace Provide platforms with SA Surveillance of potential targets and C2 The CRC: Is a ground based command and control system using Link 16 and potentially JREAP for tactical command and control in joint operations Will contribute to the RAP/RMP for airborne, ground and maritime assets and distribute the information on a Link 16 network and/or JREAP. Will provide Control for airborne assets. This includes mission management, mission assignment and vectoring. Will provide Link 16 surveillance information to higher command (JFC, ACC, AOC). This provides the prerequisite that the higher command has the systems for display of such information. In a joint environment the CRC will support the following functions on the Link 16 network: PPLI. Surveillance. Mission management/weapon co-ordination. Control. Electronic Warfare: Platform and system status. Link 16 Voice. Free text messages. Target sorting message (backlink). Information management (correlation of target data). In a joint environment the CRC will be supported by following functions on the Link 16 network

172 Annex A Page 10 (16) Dynamic/real-time Network Management by the Network Management System (NMS) Secure voice Secure voice over Very High Frequency (VHF)/ Ultra High Frequency (UHF) will be used as secure communication system for Line Of Sight (LOS) communication. In the CRC secure radio communication is primary used for joint and/or combined operation e.g. Fighter control and voice C2 coordination. For secure radio communication the CRC has the capability to use secure voice with external crypto device over VHF/UHF (e.g. for UHF, HQII or Second generation Anti-Jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN) and Link 16 voice. Secure voice may be used in virtually all types of air operations described in chapter 2 of this document Secure text The CRC handles secure text according to Air Defence Allied Technical Publication (AdatP-3 or United States Message Text Format (USMTF)). Secure text is handled by a CCIS that might be integrated in CRC within the time frame. The CRC receives: ACO and updates ATO and updates Air Tasking Message (ATM) Airspace Control Means Request (ACMREQ) Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) Special Instructions (SPINS) In Flight Report (IFREP) (forwarding to AOC) OPTASK LINK Secure text communication will also be used for the distribution post-mission reports, such as: Mission Report (MISREP) Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) 3.5. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) The CRC platform will have access to remote IFF Mk XII/Mk XIIA interrogators. The interrogators are collocated with radar systems/sites which are unmanned. All manoeuvring of the interrogators are done from the CRC. The information will be used for identification and correlation of radar tracks for contribution to the RAP and for Control.

173 Annex A Page 11 (16) The interrogators support interrogations for Mode 1, Mode 2, Mode 3/A, Mode C, Mode 4, Mode 5, and Mode S. Details of the operation of these modes and characteristics of the MKXII/MKXIIA IFF system can be found in the IFF CONOPS. Operation of the IFF Interrogator shall involve the following aspects: The CRC operator will have control over each individual mode. This will allow the activation or deactivation of interrogations in each mode. The CRC operator will have the ability to specify a specific target for interrogation. The CRC operator will be provided with displays, showing the settings of specific IFF Interrogator controls. The displays will also show alarm indications for the crypto, BIT etc. The CRC operator will have controls for selection of the Mode 4 KV (Key Variable), (i.e. selection of the A and/or B key). The CRC operator will have the ability to select passive decode code entry. The CRC operator will have an erase facility, which will actively erase the Mode 4 and Mode 5 KV. There will be maintainer interfaces for the changing of the operational software (updates), databases, monopulse calibration and the II/SI code for Mode S. Automatic Code Change (ACC) will not be implemented. Some or all of the CRC operator controls and displays may be provided by the host platform s C2 System (via keyboards, trackerballs and displays). 4. Miscellaneous 4.1. Introduction This chapter discusses the CRC miscellaneous activities and external relationships Integration and Interoperability Link 16 and JREAP compliant data links provides the capability for the CRC to interface with national platforms in operations within or in close vicinity of Swedish AOR. The CRC will interface with international platforms and weapon systems that are participating in combined exercises within Sweden. The CRC conducts surveillance and command and control by exchange of J-Series messages over data links.

174 Annex A Page 12 (16) The CRC interfaces with Sea Surveillance Battalion for receiving surface tracks to contribute to the RMP on the Link 16 network Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) The JDLOC supports the CRC and has the sole responsibility for network management, distribution of Link 16 network design loads and OPTASK Link. The JDLOC will be responsible for providing the CRC with Link 16 Network Specific Parameters (NSPs) and Mission Specific Parameters (MSPs). The CRC uses the network design loads, OPTASK Link and the cryptographic information to initialise the Link 16 terminals. The JDLOC will support the network managers to operate the NMS Weather data integration The CRC handles weather information via a stand-alone system Training and simulation The CRC will provide training capabilities for all Swedish Armed Forces tactical operators. A separate simulator will support the training of operators within the CRC. The simulation function will be used in the future Armed Forces Joint Training and Simulation Network Legacy systems Apart from the interoperable systems stated in the Interoperability Enabling Systems documentation, the CRC will also have the following national capability during the timeframe of this document: Distribution of RAP on the Försvarsmakten (FM) Broadcast service. 5. Operator roles 5.1. Introduction This chapter describes the different operator roles of the CRC. Operator access to the CRC system functionality is controlled through permissions assigned to operator roles and through the assignment of operator roles to specific individuals. The system design will not limit the number of each operator role that may be simultaneously in use. Any operator will be capable of simultaneously, in one operator console, to use any/all assigned roles through a single log-on authentication process.

175 Annex A Page 13 (16) Figure 2 illustrates the CRC command hierarchy, defines the functional branches that make up this hierarchy and identifies the various operator roles that will be supported by the system. Battle management Cell Master controller Weapons allocator Weapons management Cell Fighter allocator Fighter Controller Surface to air missile allocator Surface to air missile Controller Surveillance Cell Track production officer Master Tracker Identification Officer TDL Operator Radar controller Communication Cell Communications Officer Unit TDL Officer Technical support Cell System Administrator Security Administrator Crypto Manager Figure 1: CRC Operator Roles & Organization The operator roles are described in chapters 5.2 to Battle management cell Master controller The Master Controller has the overall responsibility for all tactical operations conducted at the CRC Weapons allocator The Weapons Allocator is the assistant to the master controller Weapons management cell Fighter allocator The Fighter Allocator has the overall responsibility for a team of Fighter Controllers. He will provide overall fighter management for assigned fighter assets, and supervise subordinate Fighter Controllers when they execute assigned missions Fighter controller The Fighter Controller is responsible for providing the appropriate level of C2 to assigned fighter assets ensuring mission accomplishment, tactical coordination and flight safety.

176 Annex A Page 14 (16) Surface to Air Missile (SAM) allocator The SAM allocator has the overall responsibility for a team of SAM Controllers. The SAM controller will provide overall SAM management for assigned SAM assets, and supervise subordinate SAM Controllers when executing their assigned missions Surface to air missile controller The Surface to Air Missile Controller is responsible for basic control and coordination of assigned GBAD units Surveillance cell Track Production Officer (TPO) The TPO has the overall responsibility for the RAP and CRC contribution to RMP production Identification (ID) officer The ID Officer is responsible for identification of the RAP Master Tracker The Master Tracker is responsible for the CRC tracking functions Tactical Data link Operator (TDLO) The TDLO is responsible for CRC track management (Reporting Responsibility (R2)) and air surveillance C2 coordination Radar controller The Radar Controller is responsible for the CRC sensor management and electronic measurements Communication cell Communication officer The Communication Officer is responsible for tactical communication (telephone and radio), both within the CRC and for external communication Unit Tactical Data link Operator (UTO) The Communication officer may also perform a subset of Network Management duties when the JDLOC Network Management position is unmanned, e.g : Select a network design and specify parameters for the network according to OPTASKLINK message

177 Annex A Page 15 (16) Monitor and control the interface between Link 16 terminals and the C2 system Technical support cell System administrator The System Administrator is responsible for the technical support of the CRC Security administrator The Security Administrator is responsible for security management within the CRC Crypto manager The Crypto Manager is responsible for handling and management of cryptographic materials for the CRC. 6. Platform overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements 6.1. Technical overview ISD Environment Roles TDLs Secure Voice Secure text IFF Function In service Land Ground based Joint C2 system Link 16, JREAP Secure voice over VHF/UHF (HQII or SATURN and Link 16 voice) with external crypto device CCIS, AdatP-3, USMTF IFF Mk XII/MkII A Interrogator The CRC will provide surveillance information and command and control for air assets, GBAD and maritime units using interoperable TDLs.

178 Annex A Page 16 (16) 6.2. High level IERs CRC TDL Secure Secure IFF Voice Text JAS 39 PPLI, Surveillance, Control, Fighter X X backlink ASC-890 PPLI, Surveillance, Mission X X management/weapons Co-ord. Voice, Free text C-130 N/A X X Airbase battalion N/A X N/A Swedish Naval Units ( PPLI, Surveillance, Free Text, Voice X X Corvettes/Support vessels,) Sea surveillance Bn PPLI, Surveillance, Free Text, Voice X X Swedish Army Units PPLI, Surveillance, Free Text, Voice X (GBAD/FHQ/BnHQ) E3-A/C/D AWACS PPLI, Surveillance, Mission X X management/weapons co-ord. Free text, Voice JDLOC N/A N/A OPTAS N/A K LINK Higher Command Surveillance (RAP/RMP) N/A IAW N/A (JFC, ACC, AOC) chapter 3.4 Helicopter 14 Link 16 Implementation TBD X X

179 Annex B Page 1 (14) Annex b Airborne Surveillance and Control 890 (ASC 890) (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

180 Annex B Page 2 (14) List of contents 1. Introduction Background Aim Scope Operations Introduction Air operations Mission description Surveillance Air Surveillance Maritime surface surveillance Air operations Counter Air Operations (CAO) Offensive Counter Air operations (OCA) Defensive Counter Air operations (DCA) Strategic air operations Supporting air operations Land operations Close Air Support (CAS) Air Interdiction (AI) Maritime operations Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) Maritime support operations Sea traffic control Civil operations Consequence management Support to coast guard Support to customs and immigration Support police Operational use of interoperability enablers Introduction Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Link PPLI and surveillance of blue forces Surveillance of potential targets and command and control Operator roles Command and Control (C2) Link 16 relay Secure voice Secure Text IFF Miscellaneous Introduction Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC)... 12

181 Annex B Page 3 (14) 4.3. Integration and interoperability Weather data integration Intelligence data integration Platform overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements Technical overview High level IERs... 14

182 Annex B Page 4 (14) 1. Introduction 1.1. Background Airborne Surveillance & Control (ASC) 890 is an Airborne Early Warning System with Command & Control (C2) capability (Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C)). ASC 890 will be used for international exercises and operations, as well as national exercises and operations. ASC 890, using its sensors, contributes to the Recognised Air Picture (RAP) and the Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP), and the operators on board execute C2 activities for aircraft. ASC 890 has been in operational use from Aim The aim of this document is to state the concept of operations for the ASC 890 during exercises and Peace Support Operations. This annex is valid during the period Scope This document describes ASC 890 s overall mission, relationship with other platforms and breaks down the operations that will be performed by the platform. This description then highlights the role of, the specific integration and the employment of the interoperability enabling systems. Additionally, this document identifies, and in some cases, justifies the need for specific operational requirements, processing, capabilities, tools, and functionality. 2. Operations 2.1. Introduction The main task for the ASC 890 is surveillance, which includes being able to detect, track and identify air and surface tracks, to contribute to the Recognised Air Picture (RAP) and the Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP). Furthermore, ASC 890 has the capability of providing real time picture to commanders and cooperating units and finally to conduct weapon control and support other air operations with management. ASC 890 can increase the command and control tempo, relay radio and data (using Link 16) and be tasked to control and coordinate fighting units Air operations The ASC 890 participates in the following air operations: Surveillance Air Surface

183 Annex B Page 5 (14) Air Operations Counter Air Operations (CAO) Supporting Air Operations Land Operations Close Air Support (CAS) Air Interdiction (AI) Maritime Operations Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) Maritime Support Operations Civil Operations Support to the Police Support to Customs Support to the Coast Guard Consequence Management 2.3. Mission description Surveillance Air Surveillance Air surveillance is the core capability of ASC 890. This capability includes the detection, identification, tracking, correlation and track management, and reporting of air tracks on the Link 16 network. Air Surveillance conducted from ASC 890 will contribute to Situational Awareness (SA) to both pilots and battle managers, due to its capability of detecting enemy activity at greater ranges than fixed ground radar sites. ASC 890 will also have the possibility to act as a gapfiller to fixed ground radar sites. The flexibility, mobility and coverage of the ASC 890 system are used for intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance tasking Maritime surface surveillance ASC 890 has the capability of detecting, tracking and reporting maritime surface targets. These targets are reported on the Link 16 network as surface tracks and will contribute to the maritime units capability of acting without its active sensors. With the support of the ASC 890 commanders at sea will extend their sensor range beyond the horizon. The flexibility, mobility and coverage of the ASC 890 system are used for intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance tasking.

184 Annex B Page 6 (14) Air operations Counter Air Operations (CAO) ASC 890 is employed to support both Offensive and Defensive Counter Air Operations Offensive Counter Air operations (OCA) OCAs are designed to reduce or where possible destroy an enemy s capacity to conduct his own control of the air campaign. OCA includes attacks on the enemy s air defence infrastructure, offensive sweeps, and suppression of enemy air defences. ASC 890 could be tasked to conduct close, loose or broadcast control to fighters close to or inside an enemy s territory. The ASC 890 will then provide own units (fighters) with the SA picture, which they can build their situational awareness upon. It is vital for the fighters to get early warning of enemy interceptors and to be able to track own supported resources Defensive Counter Air operations (DCA) DCA operations involve combinations of active defence and passive defence measures to prevent or reduce the effectiveness of an enemy air attack. ASC 890 could be tasked to conduct close, loose or broadcast control to the Quick Reaction Alert (QRA), to other fighters in a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) or an intercept. The tasking may be to engage the fighters to an enemy aircraft, to provide the picture to a mission commander or leader who may have the commit authority Strategic air operations ASC 890 can be tasked to support Strategic Air Operations in order to reach the political or strategic COG of a campaign Supporting air operations ASC 890 can contribute to the systematic observation of airspace by electronic means in purpose to identify and determinate movements of friendly and enemy air and surface tracks. Furthermore the ASC 890 provides opportunities for conducting Air Battle Management. The ASC 890 can be tasked for airspace surveillance, to conduct positive control and direction of friendly air defence weapon systems and transfer Link 16 information. ASC 890 can also be tasked to support Air to Air Refuelling, Special Air Operations and Search And Rescue (SAR) missions Land operations Close Air Support (CAS) ASC 890 can support CAS due to its capability to coordinate friendly air units, ground forces and Air operations Centre (AOC s) and relay voice and data (via Link 16).

185 Annex B Page 7 (14) Air Interdiction (AI) ASC 890 can support AI in terms of coordination between AOC and air, ground and maritime units and relay voice and data (via Link 16) Maritime operations Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) By using voice or Link 16 the ASC 890 is able to provide maritime units with RAP and support AAW tasks by coordinating aircraft and vessels. With its radar sensor PS890 and Link 16 the ASC 890 increases naval vessels SA which enhances their freedom of action. The Precise Participant Location and Identification (PPLI) feature in Link 16 informs the network participants providing friendly from non-friendly targets which facilitate joint operations on a tactical level. Tracks reported by the ASC 890 to maritime units are more accurate than Electronic Support Measurement (ESM) tracks. By correlating ESM tracks on the ASC 890 RAP, maritime units can identify air tracks easier and more accurate. ASC 890 with its sensor s rotary mode is able to track slow moving and hovering helicopters. By placing the ASC 890 at a lower than normal orbit altitude and close to vessels, it can detect anti-ship and sea-skimming missiles. This information (action) is relayed on the Link 16 network will give early warning that will lead to increased chance of vessel survivability Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) ASC 890 is able to support ASuW with its sea tracks added to the RMP by voice or Link 16. Support to ASuW is also provided by the possibility of coordination of sea and air units. ASC 890 can detect and track surface movements in any given area beyond friendly vessels radar-horizon, and hence support commander s decisions in ASuW operations. ASC 890 is able to track vessels in vast sea areas for intelligence purposes and coordinate military efforts.

186 Annex B Page 8 (14) Maritime support operations Sea traffic control ASC 890 can detect and track sea targets and coordinate military sea and air assets in purpose to identify unknown vessels Civil operations Consequence management ASC 890 can be tasked to coordinate and control land, sea and air rescue operations in case of a natural disaster or accident Support to coast guard ASC 890 can support the coast guard with detection and tracking of vessels and coordinate air and sea actions Support to customs and immigration ASC 890 can support customs with detection and tracking of air and sea targets and coordinate actions and/or report a target s route Support police ASC 890 can support police with air and sea surveillance information. 3. Operational use of interoperability enablers 3.1. Introduction This chapter describes the operational use of the following interoperability enabling systems by ASC 890: TDLs IFF Secure voice Secure text Figure 1 illustrates ASC 890 employment of the interoperability enabling systems.

187 Annex B Page 9 (14) Figure 1 - Context diagram illustrating ASC 890 employment of the interoperability enabling 3.2. Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Link 16 Link 16 is the primary TDL employed on the ASC 890. The functions described in to will be carried out using Link PPLI and surveillance of blue forces ASC 890 will report its own PPLI to other Link 16 participants, as well as receive other participant s PPLI for identification purposes.

188 Annex B Page 10 (14) Surveillance of potential targets and command and control The ASC 890 is an airborne surveillance and control system, using Link 16 for tactical command and control of basic joint operations. The ASC 890 will contribute to the RAP and the RMP that will be distributed over the Link 16 network Operator roles There are three operator stations in the ASC 890. Operator access to system functionality is controlled through permissions assigned to operator roles and through the assignment of operator roles to specific individuals. The system design allows any operator to simultaneously exercise any or all assigned roles through a single log-on authentication process. A possible assignment of operator roles among the three operator consoles is two Weapons Controllers and one Fighter Allocator or Mission Commander. This is only in the case that a Surveillance Officer is on board the ASC Command and Control (C2) In a joint environment the ASC 890 receives: Network configuration Crypto information Sensor information including IFF Link 16 information Link 16 relay The ASC 890 will be tasked to act as the primary Link 16 relay unit for training missions in Sweden. The ASC 890 will also act as the primary Link 16 relay unit in international collaboration missions in the absence of another airborne coalition C2 platform with a Link 16 relay function Secure voice Secure voice over Very High Frequency (VHF)/Ultra High Frequency (UHF) is used as the primary mean of voice communication in a joint and/or combined operation. It will be used in virtually all types of air operations described in chapter 2. Secure voice is required both for the ASC 980 flight deck and C2 operators. Link 16 secure Voice serves to complement to secure voice over VHF/UHF.

189 Annex B Page 11 (14) 3.4. Secure Text The ASC 890 Wing Operations Centre (WOC) handles secure text according to ADatP-3. Secure text is handled via a stand-alone system. The WOC will receive: Airspace Control Order (ACO) and updates Air Tasking Order (ATO) and updates Air Task Message (ATM) Airspace Control Means (ACM) Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) Special Instructions (SPINS) Weapons Control Order (WCO) In- Flight Report (IFREP) OPTASK Link The WOC sends: Mission Report (MISREP) 3.5. IFF The ASC 890 is equipped with an IFF Mk XII/Mk XIIA Interrogator and Transponder. The information from Interrogator is used for identification of radar tracks. The Transponder will in addition to requirements on military use meet the requirements from civil aviation authorities. The Interrogator support interrogations in the following Modes: Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3/A Mode C Mode 4 Both the use of 32 and 4096 codes are supported. When 32 codes are utilised, the Mode 1 reply indicates the mission Identity (ID) of the target. The set of 4096 codes are for national use only. Mode 1 codes also have a use as special ID or for code changing The Mode 2 reply indicates the individual unit ID. The Mode 3/A reply has both a military and civilian use as to indicate the Flight Number. Mode 3/A replies are used to correlate civil Flight Plans with the Flight ID of a target. Mode 3 codes also have a military use as Special ID or for Code changing. The Mode C reply has both a military and civilian use as to indicate the Flight Level of the target. Mode 4 is a secure IFF mode. The security is obtained by means of crypto.

190 Annex B Page 12 (14) Mode 1, 2, 3/A and C could are used for target specific interrogations or continuous interrogation, interlaced or individual. Mode 4 is used for target specific interrogations only. The Transponder support the following Modes, Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3/A Mode C Mode 4 The Mode 1 reply is one of 4096 codes that could be set manually on the Transponder or from a Remote Control Unit. The Mode 2 reply code is the ID of the airframe. The Mode 3/A reply is one of 4096 codes could be set manually on the Transponder or from a remote control Unit. The Mode C reply reports the Flight Level in 100-feet steps. This height information is taken from the Air Defence Centre (ADC) and is based on barometric pressure. The reply indicates if a target is a true friend Mode S The Mode S replies support interrogations up to Level 2. Each Mode can be individually enabled or disabled. The Transponder support Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACASII) operation in Mode S. 4. Miscellaneous 4.1. Introduction This chapter discusses ASC 890 miscellaneous activities and external relationships Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) The JDLOC supports ASC 890 and has the sole responsibility for network management, production and distribution of Link 16 network design loads, OPTASK Link and cryptographic information (including IFF codes, secure voice/secure text) and Communication Security (COMSEC).

191 Annex B Page 13 (14) The JDLOC will be responsible for providing the ASC 890 with Link 16 Network Specific Parameters (NSPs) and Mission Specific Parameters (MSPs) The ASC 890 uses the network design loads, OPTASK Link and the cryptographic information to initialise the Link 16 terminals. The input of the NSPs and MSPs, along with the Platform Specific Parameters (PSPs) will be completed at the ASC 890 Initiation Data Preparation Facility (IDPF) Integration and interoperability The ASC 890 will not be integrated with the Swedish legacy C2 system. No data or secure voice communications between the interoperability enabling systems and these Swedish national systems are possible. For flight safety reasons in national operations non-secure VHF/UHF communication with the legacy C2 system is possible Weather data integration The crews of ASC890 attend weather briefing before mission start and will, when airborne, get updates on the weather conditions. Control and Reporting Centre (CRC) or AWACS are responsible for reporting weather data updates Intelligence data integration The crews of ASC 890 are briefed on important intelligence by the squadron Mission Support Element. During the mission an IFREP may be sent (via secure voice and secure text where applicable) to the proper authorities. After a mission, the crew will file a MISREP (via secure text) and the required reconnaissance reports. 5. Platform overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements 5.1. Technical overview ISD ASC 890 in service from 2009 Environment Air Roles AEW&C TDLs Link 16 Secure Voice HaveQuick (HQ) II /SATURN (VHF/UHF) with external crypto device Secure text AdatP-3 via WOC IFF Mk XII/XIIA. (Transponder incl. mode S) Function The ASC 890 is an airborne surveillance and control system, using Link 16 for tactical command and control of basic joint operations, primarily air operations

192 Annex B Page 14 (14) 5.2. High level IERs ASC890 Link 16 Secure Secure IFF Voice Text JAS 39 C/D PPLI, Surveillance, Control, X X Fighter backlink CRC PPLI, Surveillance, Mission X X management/weapons Co-ord. Voice, Free text ASC 890 PPLI, Surveillance, Mission X X management/weapons Co-ord. Voice, Free text C130 X X Hkp 14 (FOC (X) X X planned for 2016) Hkp 15 X Hkp 16 X X Airbase 08 X Swedish Naval Units PPLI, Surveillance, Free Text, X X (Corvettes/Support vessels) Voice Amphibious X Swedish Army Units PPLI, Surveillance, Free Text, X X (GBAD/FHQ/BnHQ) E3-A/C/D AWACS ACC CAOC JDLOC Civil SSR System (X) = under consideration Voice PPLI, Surveillance, Mission management/weapons co-ord. Free text, Voice X ACO ATO OPTASK LINK X Modes 3/A, C, S

193 Annex C Page 1 (14) Annex C JAS 39 C/D Gripen (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

194 Annex C Page 2 (14) List of Contents 1. Introduction Background Aim Scope Assumptions Operations Introduction Air Operations JAS 39 C/D Missions description Fighter Sweep Fighter Escort Air Field Attack / Air Interdiction / Strategic Attack on Centre Of Gravity (COG) and similar Active Air Defence (AAD) (QRA, interception and CAP) Support of maritime component commander using Air Maritime Coordination (AMC) procedures Close Air Support (CAS) Air Reconnaissance Surveillance Operational use of interoperability enablers Introduction Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Link Fighter-to-fighter link Blue Force Tracking (BFT) Surveillance of potential targets and command and control Link 16 ground and sea unit information exchange Link 16 relay VMF Secure voice Secure text Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Miscellaneous Introduction Integration and interoperability Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) Weather data Intelligence data Integration Operator roles Platform overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements Technical overview High level IERs... 14

195 Annex C Page 3 (14) 1. Introduction 1.1. Background The JAS 39 C/D Gripen is fourth generation multi role fighter that will be central to all current and future air operations within the Swedish Air Force. To complement the JAS 39 C/D role in the operations stated in Joint Tactical Data Link (TDL), Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Secure Voice and Secure Text CONOPS the following Interoperability enabling systems will be introduced: Link 16; this is the primary interoperability enabling system TDL that was introduced from configuration version 19. Variable Message Format (VMF) IFF; with modes for both civilian and coalition co-existence. Secure voice over Very High Frequency (VHF)/ Ultra High Frequency (UHF). Secure text will be employed in the Wing Operations Centre (WOC). The JAS 39 C/D will be combat ready, with integrated interoperability enabling systems, for missions and operations within the time frame specified in the suite of Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy documents for Interoperability Enabling Systems for Aim The aim of this document is to translate the requirements from the CONOPS of the four different types of interoperability enabling systems to allow a coherent platform description of their employment/ implementation in the JAS 39 C/D Scope This document describes JAS 39 C/D s overall mission, relationship with other platforms and breaks down the operations that will be performed by the platform. This description then highlights the role, the specific integration and the employment of the interoperability enabling systems described in chapter 1.1 above. Additionally, this document identifies, and in some cases, justifies the need for specific operational requirements, processing, capabilities, tools and functionality. This annex is valid during the period It is only valid for JAS 39 C (single-seater) and D (two-seater) versions. During this timeframe the JAS 39 MS-version MS 20 (2015) will be released. MS 21 might be introduced in the end of the timeframe of this document, although this has not been confirmed.

196 Annex C Page 4 (14) 1.4. Assumptions This annex assumes a configuration of JAS 39 C/D to be at version MS 19, with a Mission Support System. It is assumed that the main focus of the use of interoperable communication systems on JAS 39 C/D, within the time frame of this document, is the following: Air-to-air-missions, with exchange of surveillance data and command and control messages, and airspace control measures Blue Force Tracking (BFT) used for de-confliction, co-ordination of Composite Air Operations (COMAOs) and fratricide prevention 2. Operations 2.1. Introduction The JAS 39 C/D contributes with the following capabilities to joint operations: Advanced all weather day and night air-to-air fighter capability Air-to-ground attack capability, including aerial denial and precision strike. Air-to-surface attack capability with advanced long range anti-ship missile. Reconnaissance Air Operations The JAS 39 C/D supports and contributes to the following types of air operations: Counter Air Operations (CAO) Offensive Counter Air (OCA), including: Fighter Sweep. Fighter Escort. Airfield attack (and attack on other air-defence structures). Defensive Counter Air (DCA), mainly active air defence operations like: Quick Reaction Alert (QRA). Interception. Combat Air Patrol (CAP). Air defence in the maritime environment. Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) using Air Maritime Coordination (AMC) procedures.

197 Annex C Page 5 (14) Strategic Air Operations like Attack on an adversary s vital assets, like command and control structures. Anti-Surface Force Air Operations Air Interdiction (AI). Close Air Support (CAS). Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), using AMC procedures. Support Air Operations Air Reconnaissance. Sea Surveillance, using AMC procedures. Land Surveillance JAS 39 C/D Missions description Fighter Sweep JAS 39 C/D may be tasked to engage an adversary s fighters, close to or inside, the enemy territory in order to proactively protect own resources. Thus, creating a favourable and secure air situation for own air operations. It is vital for the fighter sweep to obtain early warning of enemy interceptors and have the ability to track own supported resources/platforms Fighter Escort JAS 39 C/D may be tasked to protect own offensive air operations and reactively engage enemy interceptors. It is vital to have the ability to track the supported units and to get early warning of enemy activity. Exchange of internal engagement orders within all supported units from the Mission Commander, is vital Air Field Attack / Air Interdiction / Strategic Attack on Centre Of Gravity (COG) and similar JAS 39 C/D may be tasked to attack different types of ground targets, by its own or as a participant in COMAO. These targets include: Dispersed targets, Point targets Moving targets. Besides the attack of the above targets, these types of missions include battle damage assessment with reconnaissance resources. Target coordinates are normally known/assigned before take-off, but may also be distributed by a Command & Control (C2) unit or another fighter. Target co-ordinates for this mission could be a kill box, thus requiring the pilot to self-detect, recognize, identify and localize the target. This latter process could be done in close cooperation with other JAS 39 C/D s or other coalition aircraft.

198 Annex C Page 6 (14) Active Air Defence (AAD) (QRA, interception and CAP) The JAS 39 C/D may be tasked to defend an area or a position from enemy air-toground attacks. This may be done by being on a high state of readiness in ground alert. It may be carried out by participating in a CAP and then carry out an intercept, interrogate, investigate, divert or engage an enemy aircraft. JAS 39 C/D is well suited to this task with short reaction times on ground with good air-to-air modes in radar and capable armament using the AIM-120, METEOR and IRIS-T weapon systems Support of maritime component commander using Air Maritime Coordination (AMC) procedures JAS 39 C/D may be tasked to support a maritime force by contributing to: AAW - Using active air defence procedures. In this mission it is essential to exchange air surveillance data and C2 commands with a naval unit ASuW - Using JAS 39 C/D capability to detect, localize enemy ships and then attack them with the RBS15 anti-ship-missile. In this mission it is essential to exchange surface surveillance data and C2 commands Report sea targets, and thus contributing to the Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) Close Air Support (CAS) The CAS mission for JAS 39 C/D will provide support to the Land Component Commander and Special Forces (SFs) with fire support from different varieties of weapons. Show of Force (SoF) is anticipated to be an important task in this mission. The implementation of digital CAS with a TDL between the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) and JAS 39 will increase the accuracy, efficiency and reduce the risk of human error during CAS attacks. This is provided through digital exchange of target data via link, along with secure voice communication over radio. The JAS 39 will have initial implementation of digital CAS with MS 20 in The time when initial operational capability is expected may fluctuate since the capability also must be implemented on the ground forces. The anticipated format to be used is VMF and the application of associated three US Military Standards (MIL-STDs) as described in the TDL CONOPS. From 2010 the Gripen Laser Designator Pod (LDP), Lightening III+, is equipped with a C-band link for streaming LDP video. The link used by the LDP is Rover. In addition to Fire Support (FS), a JAS 39 C/D that is equipped with a LDP (including Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR)/Charged Coupled Device (CCD) sensors) may be tasked for tactical reconnaissance and consequent reporting of important targets and events to a supported ground unit.

199 Annex C Page 7 (14) Air Reconnaissance JAS 39 C/D may be tasked to support the Land Component Commander (LCC) and the intelligence service with imagery and data on designated targets and ground areas Surveillance JAS 39 C/D may be tasked to support the LCC with systematic surveillance of a designated area. For example: to supervise a cease-fire agreement. 3. Operational use of interoperability enablers 3.1. Introduction This chapter describes the operational use of the following interoperability enablers by JAS 39 C/D TDLs IFF Secure voice Secure text Figure 1 illustrates JAS 39 C/D employment of the interoperability enabling systems. 1 For further details regarding this mission, can be found in ATP-47.

200 Annex C Page 8 (14) Figure 1 - Context diagram illustrating JAS 39 C/D employment of interoperability enabling systems 3.2. Tactical Data Links (TDLs) The primary TDL employed on the JAS 39 C/D is Link 16, with the first basic implementation carried out in MS 19 version of JAS 39 C/D in Further capability will be carried out in future MS-versions. Link 16 will be utilised for the following capabilities described in to Link Fighter-to-fighter link In all missions, especially air-to-air missions, the fighter-to-fighter link, is a cornerstone of Swedish Air Force tactics. It is therefore important to always have access to a robust fighter-to-fighter link. The fighter-to-fighter link(s) must be interoperable with other coalition units, as well as only for national use. The

201 Annex C Page 9 (14) fighter-to-fighter Link-16 has been implemented since 2009, with the MS 19 version, for initial training. Full Operational Capability (FOC) was reached in For national use the SECOS-link will be used as an alternative to Link-16. A new national fighter-to-fighter link is currently being considered for implementation Blue Force Tracking (BFT) In all the defined missions in chapter 2.3 of this annex, it is imperative to keep track of other coalition vehicles/platforms. JAS 39 C/D will be able to send own position for BFT. There are several reasons for BFT: Co-ordinate complex joint, combined and composite air operations, like COMAOs and air defence operations. Prevent fratricide by proactive identification over TDL, instead of reactive identification with IFF. Force flow control and Military Air Traffic Control (ATC), which is to facilitate de-confliction when many aircraft uses a narrow airspace. Provide pilots and operators with Situation Awareness (SA) Surveillance of potential targets and command and control Especially in air-to-air missions, it is important with fast command and control communication, and short response times. Therefore, JAS 39 C/D will need TDL C2 information, which includes orders, replies to given orders, receiving airspace control means (corridors, points, areas, etc.). To obtain SA and information on potential threats, the surveillance tracks are imperative. JAS 39 C/D is mainly a weapon/weapon delivery system and regarded as a Non- C2 node Link 16 ground and sea unit information exchange With the introduction of the JAS 39 C/D MS 20 in 2015 the JAS 39 C/D will be able to send and receive Link 16 information with Ground and Sea units Link 16 relay. The JAS 39 C/D may be employed as a secondary Link 16 relay platform to overcome Line Of Sight (LOS) restrictions. The JAS 39 C/D will only provide the link 16 relay functions in the absence of an Air Surveillance and Control (ASC) 890 or other coalition platform that would normally provide this function VMF With the introduction of the MS-20 version, the JAS 39 C/D will have the capability to conduct Digital Aided Close Air Support (DA-CAS). Thereby

202 Annex C Page 10 (14) sending and receiving data on VMF TDL 2, with Land Component Commander and Special Forces. The VMF implementation used by JAS 39 C/D will be dependent on the VMF implementation of the United States (US) F-35. However it is expected that the US F-35 VMF implementation may not be defined prior to the JAS 39 C/D MS-20 version configuration is set. In this case VMF implementation to be used for JAS 39 C/D will be: MIL STD 6017 Version B VMF Message format MIL STD Version D change 1 Bearer definition MIL STD Version D Change 1 Header definition 3.3. Secure voice Secure voice over Very High Frequency (VHF)/Ultra High Frequency (UHF) is used as the primary mean of voice communication in a joint and/or combined operation. This will be carried out using HQII/ Second generation Anti-Jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN) capable radios and external cryptographic devices. Secure voice will be used in virtually all types of air operations that are described in chapter 2 of this document Secure text The JAS 39 C/D Wing Operations Centre (WOC) handles secure text according to ADatP-3. Secure text is handled via a stand-alone system. The WOC receives: Airspace Control Order (ACO) and updates Air Tasking Order (ATO) and updates Air Tasking Message (ATM) Air Control Message (ACM) Fragment Area Order (FRAGO) Special Instruction (SPINS) Weapon Control Order (WCO) In Flight Report (IFREP) OPTASK Link The WOC will transmit: Mission Report (MISREP) Details and descriptions of the above secure text messages can be found in the Secure Text CONOPS (Enclosure 5) 2 VMF comprises of a message format, bearer and header and is known as a TDL

203 Annex C Page 11 (14) 3.5. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) The JAS 39 C/D is equipped with both an IFF Mk XII/Mk XIIA Interrogator and a Transponder. The information from Interrogator is used for identification of radar tracks. The Transponder will in addition to requirements on military use meet the requirements from Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA). The Interrogator support interrogations in the following Modes, Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3/A Mode C Mode 4 Mode 5 Both the use of 32 and 4096 codes are supported. When 32 codes are utilised, the Mode 1 reply indicates the mission Identity (ID) of the target. The set of 4096 codes are for national use only. Mode 1 codes also have a use as special ID or for code changing The Mode 2 reply indicates the individual unit ID. The Mode 3/A reply has both a military and civilian use as to indicate the Flight Number. Mode 3/A replies are used to correlate civil Flight Plans with the Flight ID of a target. Mode 3 codes also have a military use as Special ID or for Code changing. The Mode C reply has both a military and civilian use as to indicate the Flight Level of the target. Mode 4 is a secure IFF mode. The security is obtained by means of crypto. Mode 5 is a high confidence secure IFF mode.. The security is obtained by means of modern crypto. Mode 1, 2, 3/A and C are used for target specific interrogations or continuous interrogation, interlaced or individual. Mode 4 and Mode S are used for target specific interrogations only. The Transponder support the following Modes, Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3/A The Mode 1 reply is one of 4096 codes that could be set manually on the Transponder or from a Remote Control Unit. The Mode 2 reply code is the ID of the airframe. The Mode 3/A reply is one of 4096 codes could be set manually on the Transponder or from a remote control Unit.

204 Annex C Page 12 (14) Mode C Mode 4 Mode 5 Mode S The Mode C reply reports the Flight Level in 100-feet steps. This height information is taken from the ADC and is based on barometric pressure. The Mode 4 reply indicates if a target is a true friend In addition to indicate if a target is a true friend a Mode 5 reply can contain additional target information with high confidence The Mode S replies support interrogations up to Level 2. Each Mode can be individually enabled or disabled. The Transponder support Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACASII) operation in Mode S. 4. Miscellaneous 4.1. Introduction This chapter discusses JAS 39 C/D s miscellaneous activities and external relationships Integration and interoperability The JAS 39 C/D is not integrated in the Swedish Airforce legacy C2 system or interoperable with JAS 39 A/B. No data (via TDL) or secure voice communication between JAS 39 C/D and these systems will be possible. For national operations and flight safety reasons, only non-secure VHF/UHF communication with the Swedish Air Force legacy C2 system will be possible. In the timeframe of this annex, the JAS 39 C/D TDL functionality is only to be used for participation in operations specified in the Joint Swedish Armed Forces policy document for interoperability enabling Systems Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) The JDLOC supports JAS 39 C/D and has the sole responsibility for network management, production and distribution of Link 16 network design loads, OPTASK Link and cryptographic information (including IFF codes, secure voice/secure text, but no crypto keys) Communication Security (COMSEC )). The JDLOC will be responsible for providing the JAS 39 C/D with Link 16 Network Specific Parameters (NSPs) and Mission Specific Parameters (MSPs) The JAS 39 C/D uses the network design loads, OPTASK Link and the cryptographic information to initialise the Link 16 terminals. The input of the NSPs and MSPs, along with the Platform Specific Parameters (PSPs) will be completed at the JAS 39 C/D Initiation Data Preparation Facility (IDPF).

205 Annex C Page 13 (14) 4.4. Weather data. The crews of JAS 39 C/D attend weather briefing before the commencement of a mission and will, when airborne, be provided with updates of weather data. The weather data updates will be reported by the CRC or Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) Intelligence data Integration. The crews of JAS 39 C/D are briefed of important intelligence by the squadron Mission Support Element. During the mission, IFREP may be sent (by secure voice communications) to the proper authorities. After the mission, the crews file a MISREP and the required reconnaissance reports Operator roles A fighter crew will assume several roles, where air-to-air, air-to-surface-roles have been explained in this annex. Other possible roles for the JAS C/D operator are: Flight lead. Communication on behalf of the element with air traffic control, Control & Reporting Centre (CRC)/AWACS and other units. Mission Commander. Control of a strike package. Information distributor. 5. Platform overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements 5.1. Technical overview ISD JAS 39 C/D version 19.in service 2010 JAS 39 C/D version 20 in service 2015 JAS 39 C/D version 21 in service 2020 Environment Roles Air Multi/Swing Role Fighter Aircraft TDLs Link 16 (Non C2), VMF-D, Rover III Secure Voice HaveQuick II /SATURN (VHF/UHF) with external crypto device Secure text AdatP3. Not in the airframe, WOC only. IFF Mk XII. (Transponder incl. mode S) Function JAS 39 C/D will with version 19 be enhanced with the above interoperability enablers. The interoperability of the Gripen system will from then be based on secure voice, secure text, IFF and Link 16. JAS 39 C/D will with version 2021 will have FOC interoperability, secure voice, secure text, IFF and Link 16.

206 Annex C Page 14 (14) 5.2. High level IERs JAS 39 C/D TDL Secure Voice Secure Text IFF JAS 39 C/D PPLI, Fighter to fighter link X X CRC PPLI, Surveillance, Control, X X Fighter backlink ASC-890 PPLI, Surveillance, Control, X X Fighter backlink C130 X X Hkp 14 - X X Hkp 15 X X Hkp 16 X X Airbase 08 N/A X Swedish Naval PPLI X X Units( Corvettes/ Support vessels/ MCM) Amphibious (X) X Swedish Army PPLI X X Units (GBAD/ FHQ/BnHQ) FAC N/A X E3-A/C/D PPLI, Surveillance, Control, X X AWACS Fighter backlink ACC ACO CAOC ATO JDLOC OPTASK LINK Civil SSR System Modes 3/A, C, S Tactical Air Party VMF X (X) TDL currently not defined

207 Annex D Page 1 (9) Annex d C-130 (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

208 Annex D Page 2 (9) List of contents 1. Introduction Background Aim Scope Assumptions Operations Introduction Air operations Mission descriptions Supply flights of cargo and personnel Reinforcement flights into combat theatre Medical Evacuation/Casualty Evacuation Airdrop missions of troops and cargo Support and evacuation to and from temporary landing zones of Special Forces (SF) and other land forces Air-to-air refuelling Operational use of interoperability enablers Introduction Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Secure voice Secure text Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Interface with national legacy systems Miscellaneous International Interfaces and Integration Mission Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) Weather data Intelligence data integration Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) Platform overview & Information Exchange Requirements Technical overview High level IERs... 9

209 Annex D Page 3 (9) 1. Introduction 1.1 Background The Swedish Air Force inventory has currently Eight C-130 Combat Delivery aircraft. Four C-130, including ground support personnel are presently listed in the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) Pool of Forces (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PfP) Planning and Review Process), European Union (EU) Force Catalogue, and United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS). The unit is also listed in EU military database to be used in case of terrorist attacks and in crises management. 1.2 Aim The aim of this document is to translate the requirements from the CONOPS for the different enablers to a coherent platform description for the C-130 interoperability enabling communication systems. 1.3 Scope This annex describes the C-130 s overall mission, breaks down the operations that will be performed by the platform, and highlights the role of, the specific integration and the employment of the interoperability enabling systems. Additionally, this annex identifies, and in some cases, justifies the need for specific operational requirements, processing, capabilities, tools, and functionality. This annex is valid for the period Assumptions The Swedish Armed Forces C-130 s are planned to receive an avionics upgrade in , prolonging service life to Another alternative being consider is to procure completely new aircraft, possibly in cooperation with other Nordic countries under the umbrella of Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). It is assumed that the C-130 Avionics Modernization Programme (AMP) will provide the Armed Forces C-130 s with IFF and Very High Frequency (VHF) /Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Secure Voice functionality.

210 Annex D Page 4 (9) 2. Operations 2.1 Introduction The C-130 unit has been earmarked to deploy in support of international conflict resolution. The unit will participate in operations including peace supportingpeace enforcement Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC), humanitarian operations and will participate in multinational operations in all kind of environments. It is therefore essential that these assets, committed to support international operations, are interoperable with potential coalition partner s platforms. 2.2 Air operations The C-130 unit is able to execute the Air Task Order (ATO)/ Airspace Control Order (ACO) and accomplish the Tactical Air Missions described below. The system and capabilities of the C-130 are flexible in order to support all varieties of operation tasked by the Air Task Force commander as a part of a multinational operation. Supply flights of cargo and personnel. Reinforcement flights into combat theatre. MEDEVAC/Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC). Airdrop missions of troops and cargo. Support and evacuation to and from temporary landing zones of Special Forces (SF) and other land forces. Air-to-air refuelling (only applicable to certain aircraft). 2.3 Mission descriptions Supply flights of cargo and personnel Supply flights of cargo and personnel consist of all types of air transport missions. These missions can be done in all kinds of environments, from routine air transport missions without any threat, until low-level flights / night flights in a hostile environment Reinforcement flights into combat theatre Reinforcement flights are transport flights made to support own forces with logistic support or personnel transports. Reinforcement flights can be carried out by the C-130 in hostile environments and during the night Medical Evacuation/Casualty Evacuation MEDEVAC is evacuation of personnel undergoing medical treatment during flight. This can be carried out with the correct medical equipment and personnel on-board the C-130 for continuous treatment during flight.

211 Annex D Page 5 (9) CASEVAC is the evacuation of personnel out of a hostile environment to an area out of danger/hostilities. The purpose of this mission is to move casualties to an area where they can receive medical care in a safe environment Airdrop missions of troops and cargo Airdrops of personnel and cargo can be carried out when landing is not possible. An Airdrop of soldiers can be done with up to a number of sixty (60) combat ready soldiers from each aircraft. Airdrops of cargo can be done with different kind of goods/stores up to a weight of about 3000 pounds (lbs.) each per pallet. Airdrops are an option when delivering supplies in all types of humanitarian relief flights when an airfield is not available Support and evacuation to and from temporary landing zones of Special Forces (SF) and other land forces Support of and evacuation of forces from temporary landing zones is a method when a suitable airfield is not available. A Temporary Landing Zone (TLZ) is created and secured by the forces that are to be supported by C-130. TLZ can be created from all types of hardened areas with a length of approximately 2400 feet. The use/operation of TLZ by the C-130 can be carried out in daylight and during night depending of the threat situation. All C-130 transport missions can use the TLZ if the requirement is to concentrate a large composite force against a single objective, and particularly, if there is a requirement for combat support forces. The optimum combination of impact and survivability may only be achieved if the forces operate as an integrated unit Air-to-air refuelling The C-130 (presently only one aircraft) can perform air-to-air refuelling. There are currently no plans for the C-130 to have the capability for air-to-air refuelling to helicopters. 3. Operational use of interoperability enablers 3.1 Introduction This chapter describes the operational use of the following interoperability enablers by C-130. TDLs IFF Secure Voice

212 Annex D Page 6 (9) Secure Text Figure 1 illustrates C-130 the employment of the interoperability enabling systems. Figure 1 - Context diagram illustrating C130 employment of the interoperability enabling systems 3.2 Tactical Data Links (TDLs) The C-130 air-to-air refuelling platform is to be equipped with a TDL associated with the planned prolonging service life avionics upgrade (AMP) in

213 Annex D Page 7 (9) 3.3 Secure voice Secure voice over Very High Frequency (VHF)/Ultra High Frequency (UHF) will be used as the primary means of voice communication in a joint and/or combined operation. It is used in virtually all types of air operations described in chapter 2 of this document. Secure voice over land line will be used in the Wing Operations Centre (WOC). 3.4 Secure text Secure text system is the primary means for the transmission of secure text messages and is used in the WOC of the C-130 Squadron for mission planning/communication. The types of messages that will be received include: Air Tasking Order (ATO) Airspace Control Order (ACO) The types of messages that will be transmitted include: Mission Report (MISREP) 3.5 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) C-130 is planned to be equipped with MK XII/MK XIIA IFF transponder systemduring the prolonging service life avionics upgrade (AMP) in The C-130 is also equipped with Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). 4. Interface with national legacy systems Secure voice over the Swedish High Frequency 2000 system (HF 2000) will be used for communication with Swedish national command and other Swedish units. Secure text over HF 2000 will be used for communication with Swedish national command and other units. 5. Miscellaneous 5.1 International Interfaces and Integration C-130 interfaces with non-sweden Defence Force, coalition partners and civilian agencies in order to exchange data critical to mission accomplishment.

214 Annex D Page 8 (9) The selection of means for communicating directly with Forward Air Controller (FAC) and Special Forces (SF) will most likely be VHF/UHF with HaveQuick II (HQII) and Second generation Anti-Jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN) capability. 5.2 Mission Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) The Command and Control (C2) structure for the C-130 will depend on whether the mission is national or international. Within Sweden s Joint force command structure, the C-130 unit is subordinate to the Air Component Command (FTS). Deployed C-130 elements are made available in support of international operations as directed by the Swedish Government. While Sweden retains full responsibility for the funding and manning of the C-130, it will, unless otherwise declared, delegate C2 function to NATO/EU or equivalent organisation. 5.3 Weather data The crews of C-130 will attend weather briefing before a mission start, and will, when airborne, be provided updates to the weather data. The updates will be reported by Control & Reporting Centre (CRC)/ or Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). 5.4 Intelligence data integration The crews of C-130 are briefed of important intelligence by the squadron Mission Support Element. During the mission, In-Flight Reports (IFREPs) could be transmitted (by voice) to the appropriate authorities. After the completion of a mission, the crew will file a Mission Report (MISREP) and the required reconnaissance reports. 5.5 Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) The Swedish Armed Forces JDLOC supports the C-130 and has the overall responsibility for operations and management of IFF systems.

215 Annex D Page 9 (9) 6. Platform overview & Information Exchange Requirements 6.1 Technical overview ISD C-130 Environment Air Roles Heavy Transport Aircraft TDLs N/A Secure Voice Land line with external crypto device Secure text AdatP-3. Not in the airframe, WOC only. IFF Mk XII/Mk XIIA. (Transponder incl. mode S) Function 6.2 High level IERs C-130 TDL Secure Voice Secure Text IFF JAS 39 C/D X X CRC X X ASC-890 X X C130 X Hcp 14, 15, 16 X Airbase 08 Swedish Naval Units (Corvettes/ Support vessels/ MCM, Sea Surveillance Bn) X X Amphibious X Swedish Army Units X X 1 (GBAD/FHQ/BnHQ) SF X E3-A/C/D AWACS X X ACC ACO CAOC ATO Civil SSR System Modes 3/A, C, S X 1 Only GBAD

216 Annex F Page 1 (7) Annex F Air base (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

217 Annex F Page 2 (7) Table of Content 1. Introduction Aim Scope Assumptions Operations General Air Operations Mission description Operational use of interoperability enablers Introduction Tactical Data Links, (TDLs) Secure Voice Secure Text Miscellaneous Interfaces and Integration Platform Overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements Technical overview High level IERs... 7

218 Annex F Page 3 (7) 1. Introduction Two Air Base battalions will be operational in The Air base battalions will consist of all material and personnel that is required for an Air Base facility, including Command and Control (C2) systems. 1.1 Aim The aim of this document is to translate the requirements from the CONOPS for the different enablers to a coherent platform description for the Air Base interoperability enabling communication systems. 1.2 Scope This annex will describe the concept of operations for the Air Base Battalion in the timeframe This document describes Air Base battalions overall mission, decomposes the operations that will be performed by the battalion, and highlights the role of, the specific integration and the employment of the interoperability enablers. Additionally, this document identifies, and in some cases, justifies the need for specific operational requirements, processing, capabilities, tools, and functionality. 1.3 Assumptions Assumptions for Air Base Operations for the time period are as follows: A deployable Air Base is required (domestic and abroad) Secure Text messages will be handled within Air Base Air Base should be operational after relocation within 30 days 2. Operations 2.1 General The Air Base Battalion will contribute to joint operations by providing Airport Of Debarkation/Embarkation (APOD/E) and will be part of the capability to deploy Swedish Air Force, as well as coalition, aircraft. The Air Base Battalion will contribute with approach and terminal control radar. This will enhance the Situational Awareness (SA) for the participants located at the air base and for other members in the joint operation. There is a possibility that Air Traffic Control (ATC) functionality is included in Air Base (APOD operation).

219 Annex F Page 4 (7) The Air Base Battalion will supports to the following types of air operations: Support Air Operations Airlift Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Survival to Operate Logistics 2.2 Air Operations The Air Base enables the operator to tactically execute the Air Tasking Order (ATO)/ Air Traffic Management (ATM) messages/information and accomplish the missions described in chapter 2.3. The system and capabilities of the Air Base will support operations and tasking as directed by the Air Component Command and will be the basis for on air raid warning and alarm decision making. The Air Base will be capable of being deployed in both domestic and abroad theatres. The mission of the Air Base could also be as an APOD and/or for support to Swedish Air Force aircraft 2.3 Mission description Generally, the Air base Battalion has the capability to operate in national operations and from an ordinary Wing air base. The battalion also includes a deployable section, organised as a task force, including the necessary capabilities for the given operation. The task force could be used in domestic or abroad missions. In national training operations, a military or civilian airfield/airport could be used as a base for operations. In an international environment two types of operations are identified: Air base support to Swedish aircraft APOD operations Air base support to aircraft normally will be executed in a non-combat zone with cooperation with several other nations as a Leading Nation or with Host Nation Support. This support will include Security, ATC and other necessary Air base support functions. Air base support to APOD operations may include operations in a combat zone. This increases the need for SA. The Recognised Air Picture (RAP) will be used as a basis for the air raid warning and alarm decision making process.

220 Annex F Page 5 (7) 3. Operational use of interoperability enablers 3.1 Introduction This chapter describes the airbase s operational use of the following interoperability enabling systems: TDLs IFF Secure voice Secure text Figure illustrates the airbase s employment of the interoperability enabling systems: Figure 1. context diagram illustrating the airbase s employment of the interoperability enabling systems

221 Annex F Page 6 (7) 3.2 Tactical Data Links, (TDLs) Within the timeframe of , Air base will not be provided with its own Link 16 system capability. However the Air base will be able to accommodate and host a Link 16 Stand Alone System (Link 16 SAS) on a temporary basis. 3.3 Secure Voice Secure telephone communication will be used for external communication with higher command and/or international participants. 3.4 Secure Text The Air base handles secure text according to ADatP-3. Secure text is handled via a stand-alone system. The Air base receives: Airspace Control Order (ACO) and updates Air Tasking Order (ATO) and updates Air Traffic Management (ATM) Air Control Message (ACM) Fragment Area Order (FRAGO) Special Instruction (SPINS) In Flight Report (IFREP) OPTASK Link 4. Miscellaneous 4.1 Interfaces and Integration Generally, the Air Base is situated at the Wing Air Base. However, the battalion has the capability to divide in two separate parts. For each part it will be necessary to have separate telecommunication systems that will be of stand-alone nature. The systems will normally be connected to each other, and other air bases or commanding infrastructures. One part of the battalion will stay on the Wing Air Base. The other part of the battalion is transportable and may be deploy to a Military Airfield or a civilian airport, domestic or abroad. Air Base can also provide functionality to create an APOD/E, if required. The Air base will be organised as a Task Force that will take part in national and international operations. The Air Base will be organised and equipped dependent on the mission requirements. Normally all functionality for handling Swedish Air Force aircraft is included. If required for APOD service, all necessary functionality can be added to simultaneously service Swedish and coalition nations aircraft. Operators will co-ordinate and communicate with air traffic in the close vicinity of the air base at start/landing (Aerodrome control), approach control, and Terminal Control (TMC). It will also be able to co-ordinate and communicate with Surface-to-Air Weapons (SAW) systems and other command and control

222 Annex F Page 7 (7) centres (i.e. adjacent Ground C2 Facility, air base operation centres, airports and Air Control Centre (ACC)/Air Traffic Control Centre (ATCC), etc.) operating within the area of responsibility (AOR). The Air Base communication infrastructure contains integrated voice, data network and Very High Frequency (VHF)/Ultra High Frequency (UHF) radio sites. 5. Platform Overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements 5.1 Technical overview ISD In service 2014 Environment Land Roles Deployable Air base system TDLs Link 16, provided by GBAD unit in case of co-location. Secure Voice VHF/UHF, with external crypto device, landline Secure text ADatP-3 IFF Function 5.2 High level IERs Air base TDL Secure Voice Secure Text IFF JAS 39 C/D X ASC-890 X C-130 X Hkp 14, 15, 16 X E3-A/C/D AWACS X CRC X ACC X ACO CAOC X ATO

223 Annex F Page 1 (8) Annex F Helicopter 14 (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

224 Annex F Page 2 (8) List of contents 1. Introduction Background Aim Scope Assumptions Operations Introduction The use of interoperability enabling systems Introduction Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Link Link Link Variable Message Format (VMF) Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Secure Voice Very High Frequency (VHF)/Ultra High Frequency (UHF) High Frequency (HF) Secure Text Interfaces with national legacy systems Introduction Integration and interoperability Miscellaneous Introduction Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) Weather data Intelligence data Integration Operator roles Platform Overview & High Level Information Exchange Requirements Technical overview High Level IERs... 8

225 Annex F Page 3 (8) 1. Introduction 1.1. Background This annex describes the implementation and employment of the interoperability enabling systems for Swedish Armed Forces Helicopter 14 (Hkp 14). To complement the Hkp 14 roles stated in Joint Tactical Data Link (TDL), Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Secure Voice and Secure Text CONOPS the following interoperability enablers will be introduced: IFF mode 1-4 and S Secure voice over Very High Frequency (VHF)/Ultra High Frequency (UHF). Secure voice over HF Link Aim The aim of this document is to translate the requirements from the CONOPS of the four different types of interoperability enabling systems (Link 11/22, IFF and secure voice) to allow a coherent platform description of their employment / implementation for Hkp 14 in the Armed Forces Scope This document describes the Hkp 14 overall missions, relationship with other platforms and breaks down the operations that will be performed by this platform. This description then highlights the role, the specific integration and the employment of the interoperability enabling systems described in chapter 1.1. Additionally, this document identifies, and in some cases, justifies the need for specific operational requirements, processing, capabilities, tools, and functionality. This annex is valid during the period Assumptions The Full Operational Capability (FOC) version of the Swedish NH90 (Hkp 14) will be delivered with all contracted equipment including mission equipment and mission management stations in The decision regarding type of TDL and Torpedo Weapons System will be made early in this time period. There is a high probability that a fully integrated solution for Hkp 14 will implemented by the end of the time period of this document.

226 Annex F Page 4 (8) 2. Operations 2.1. Introduction In the timeframe of this document Hkp 14 will carry out the following operations: Transport of troops and materiel (Tactical Troop Transport (TTT)) Medical transportation (Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) and Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)) Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) Surveillance Search and Rescue (SAR) General support to the operational community 3. The use of interoperability enabling systems 3.1. Introduction This chapter discusses the employment of the following interoperability enabling systems for Hkp 14: TDLs IFF Secure Voice Secure Text Figure 1 illustrates ASC 890 employment of the interoperability enabling systems.

227 Annex F Page 5 (8) Figure 1 - Diagram illustrating Hkp 14 employment of interoperability enabling systems 3.2. Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Link 11 The Anti-Submarine Warfare variant of Hkp 14 will have Link 11 when delivered Link 22 During the timeframe of this document, Link 22 is considered to be the next generation of Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) TDL and replacement for Link 11 for the Navy. Therefore, Link 22, as well as the national legacy Link 8000 is being considered for implementation on Hkp 14.

228 Annex F Page 6 (8) Link 16 Link 16 is currently planned to be integrated in helicopter 14 in order to fully integrate the system into the Air Component Command (ACC) /Air Operations Centre (AOC) network. Details of the Link 16 integration for Hkp 14 are yet to be determined Variable Message Format (VMF) VMF integration for the Hkp 14 is under consideration Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) In the timeframe of this document Hkp 14 will be equipped with the IFF Mk XII transponder systems covering modes 1-4 and S. The IFF Mk XIIA which also includes Mode 5 is being considered for implementation on Hkp Secure Voice Very High Frequency (VHF)/Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Secure voice over VHF/UHF is used as the primary mean of voice communication in a joint and/or combined operation. It will be used in virtually all types of helicopter operations. VHF/UHF Secure Voice implementation in the timeframe of this document is under consideration High Frequency (HF) Hkp 14 has an integrated HF communication suite. This HF radio suite will be used as a backup on low level flights, communication in mountainous terrain and for long distance/ (BLOS communication Secure Text There are requirements for secure text messaging for Hkp 14. However, these messages may not be sent directly to the helicopter, but will be sent over, for example, the mission planning system. Examples of secure text messages exchanged for the Hkp 14 mission system are: Operational Tasking (OPTASK) Link Airspace Control Order (ACO) Air Tasking Order (ATO) MISREP

229 Annex F Page 7 (8) 4. Interfaces with national legacy systems 4.1. Introduction This chapter gives a description of interface and information exchange with national legacy systems for Hkp Integration and interoperability Hkp 14 will have partial integration into the Armed Forces legacy C2 system. 5. Miscellaneous 5.1. Introduction This chapter discusses Hkp 14 miscellaneous activities and external relationships Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) The Swedish Armed Forces JDLOC provides support to the Hkp 14 for the network management infrastructure elements for interoperability enabling TDLs. The JDLOC has the sole responsibility for network management activities for Link 16, Link 11, Link 22, and VMF Weather data The helicopter crews will attend a weather brief before commencing a mission and will, if needed, be updated by CRC or other organisations including civilian Air Traffic Control (ATC) Intelligence data Integration The crews will be updated on essential intelligence by the Mission Support Element (MSE) before finalising the mission planning and an update before takeoff. Flight updates might be sent in both directions via secure voice during operations. After landing the crew will file a MISREP. 6. Operator roles An Hkp 14 crew or flight will assume several operator roles depending on its designated operational task. Examples of operational tasks are: Flight lead This will require communication with ATC, Control & Reporting Centre (CRC) or Army/Navy units Mission commander - The management of the given task and all its resources

230 Annex F Page 8 (8) ACO Management flight safety issues at a combined or joint military or civilian mission 7. Platform Overview & High Level Information Exchange Requirements 7.1. Technical overview ISD NH90IM / HKP14 in service NH90/ HKP14 FOC MEDEVAC Environment Air, Sea (including anti-submarine warfare) and Land Roles Secure voice TDLs MEDEVAC, CASEVAC, Utility, Tactical Troop transport (TTT). SAR ASW VHF/UHF HF Link 11, Link 16, Link 22, 8000 and VMF Secure Text 7.2. High Level IERs NH90/ Hkp14 Secure voice IFF Link16 JAS 39 X X X ASC-890 X X X C-130 X Airbase (X) HKP16 X HKP15 (X) Swedish Naval units X X (X) Swedish Army units X X Forward Air X Controller (FAC)/Tactical Air Party (TACP) Civilian SSR systems X Coalition Partners X X X (X) - Under consideration

231 Annex G Page 1 (8) Annex G Helicopter 15 (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

232 Annex G Page 2 (8) List of contents 1. Introduction Background Aim Scope Assumptions Operations Introduction The use of interoperability enabling systems Introduction Tactical Data Links (TDLs) VMF Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Secure voice Very High Frequency (VHF/UHF) Satellite Communication (SATCOM) Secure text Interface with national legacy systems Introduction Integration and interoperability Miscellaneous Introduction Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) Weather data Intelligence data integration Operator Roles Platform Overview & High Level Information Exchange Requirements Technical overview High Level IERs... 8

233 Annex G Page 3 (8) 1. Introduction 1.1. Background This annex describes the implementation of the interoperability enabling systems for Swedish Armed Forces A109/Helicopter 15 (Hkp 15). To complement the Hkp 15 roles stated in Joint Tactical Data Link (TDL), Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) secure voice and secure text CONOPS the following interoperability enablers will be introduced: Variable Message Format (VMF) IFF Secure voice over Very High Frequency (VHF)/Ultra High Frequency (UHF). Secure text The future implementation of Link 16 and Link 22 on Hkp 15 is being investigated Aim The aim of this document is to translate the requirements from the CONOPS of the 4 different types of interoperability enabling systems (VMF, IFF, secure voice and secure text) to allow a coherent platform description of their employment / implementation in the Hkp 15 platform Scope This document describes Hkp 15 overall missions, relationship with other platforms and breaks down the operations that will be performed by this platform. This description then highlights the role, the specific integration and the employment of the interoperability enablers enabling systems described in chapter 1.1 above. Additionally, this document identifies, and in some cases, justifies the need for specific operational requirements, processing, capabilities, tools, and functionality. This annex is valid during the period Assumptions N/A

234 Annex G Page 4 (8) 2. Operations 2.1. Introduction Hkp 15 is a light utility helicopter and will be deployed in two main configurations in the Swedish Armed Forces; for Land Based Operations and for Ship Based Operations (SBO). Hkp 15 is designed to carry out the following types of operations: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Sea Traffic Control (STC) Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) Search and Rescue (SAR) Tactical transport of equipment and personnel Surveillance Special Forces Operations (SOFs) Tactical training 3. The use of interoperability enabling systems 3.1. Introduction This chapter discusses the employment of the following interoperability enabling systems for Hkp 15: TDLs IFF Secure voice Secure text Figure 1 illustrates the Hkp 15 employment of the interoperability enabling systems.

235 Annex G Page 5 (8) Figure 1 Context diagram illustrating Hkp 15 employment of the interoperability enabling systems Tactical Data Links (TDLs) VMF The Swedish Armed Forces are currently considering the use of VMF for Hkp Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) In the timeframe of this document Hkp 15 will be equipped with the IFF Mk XII transponder systems covering modes 1-4 and S. The IFF Mk XIIA which also includes Mode 5 is being considered for implementation on Hkp 15.

236 Annex G Page 6 (8) 3.4. Secure voice Very High Frequency (VHF/UHF) Secure voice over VHF/UHF is used as the primary mean of voice communication in a joint and/or combined operation. It will be used in virtually all types Helicopter operations. VHF/UHF Secure Voice implementation in the timeframe of this document is under consideration Satellite Communication (SATCOM) SATCOM may be implemented in Hkp 15. Details of the SATCOM system are to be determined Secure text There are requirements for secure text messaging for Hkp 15. These messages may be sent to the helicopter primarily using the existing secure text systems. 4. Interface with national legacy systems 4.1. Introduction This chapter gives a description of interface and information exchange with national legacy systems for Hkp Integration and interoperability Hkp 15 will be partly integrated in the Swedish Armed Forces legacy C2 system. 5. Miscellaneous 5.1. Introduction This chapter discusses Hkp 15 miscellaneous activities and external relationships Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) The JDLOC provides support to the Hkp 15 for required network management infrastructure elements, for example interoperability enabling TDLs. The JDLOC has the sole responsibility for network management activities for Link 16, Link 11, Link 22, and VMF.

237 Annex G Page 7 (8) 5.3. Weather data The helicopter crews will attend a weather brief before commencing a mission and will, if needed, be updated by the Control and Reporting Centre (CRC) or other organisations including civilian Air traffic Control (ATC) Intelligence data integration The crews will be updated on essential intelligence by the Mission Support Element (MSE) before finalising the mission planning and an update before takeoff. Flight updates might be sent in both directions via secure voice during operations. After landing the crew will file a MISREP. 6. Operator Roles An Hkp 15 crew or flight will assume several operator roles depending on its designated operational task. Examples of operational tasks are: Flight lead This will require communication with ATC, CRC or Army/Navy units. Mission commander - The management of the given task and all its resources. ACO Management flight safety issues at a combined or joint military or civilian mission. 7. Platform Overview & High Level Information Exchange Requirements 7.1. Technical overview ISD Environment Roles Secure voice TDLs A109/Hkp 15 in service A109/Hkp 15 FOC SBO Air, Sea and Land MEDEVAC, CASEVAC, Utility, Tactical Troop transport (TTT). STC SAR SOF TBD TBD Secure Text

238 Annex G Page 8 (8) 7.2. High Level IERs A109/ Hkp15 Secure voice IFF VMF JAS 39 X ASC-890 (X) X C-130 Airbase (X) Hkp14 Hkp16 (X) Swedish Naval units (X) X (not including MCM) Swedish Army units (X) X 1 Forward Air Controller (FAC)/ Tactical Air Party (TACP) (X) (X) Civilian Secondary X Surveillance Radar (SSR) systems Coalition Partners (X) X (X) = under consideration 1 GBAD only

239 Annex H Page 1 (9) Annex H Helicopter 16 (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

240 Annex H Page 2 (9) List of contents 1. Introduction Background Aim Scope Assumptions Operations Introduction The use of interoperability enabling systems Introduction Tactical Data Links (TDLs) VMF Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Secure voice Very High Frequency (VHF/UHF) Satellite Communication (SATCOM) Secure text Interface with national legacy systems Introduction Integration and interoperability Miscellaneous Introduction Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) Weather data Intelligence data integration Operator roles Introduction Platform overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements Technical overview High level IERs... 9

241 Annex H Page 3 (9) 1. Introduction 1.1. Background This annex describes the implementation of the Interoperability enabling systems for Swedish Armed Forces UH-60M/Helicopter 16 (Hkp 16). To complement the Hkp 16 in its roles and missions the following interoperability enabling systems will be introduced: Variable Message Format (VMF) Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Mk XII systems mode 4 Secure voice over Very High Frequency (VHF)/Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Blue-force tracking used for de-confliction and fratricide prevention, not yet released for national use, only ISAF Satellite communication (SATCOM) using TACSAT (for national use) 1.2. Aim The aim of this document is to translate the requirements from the CONOPS of the 4 different types of interoperability enabling systems (TDLs, IFF, secure voice and SATCOM to allow a coherent platform description of their employment/implementation in the Hkp 16 platform Scope This document describes Hkp 16 overall missions, relationship with other platforms and breaks down the operations that will be performed by this platform. This description then highlights the role, the specific integration and the employment of the interoperability enabling systems described in chapter 1.1 above. Additionally, this document identifies, and in some cases, justifies the need for specific operational requirements, processing, capabilities, tools, and functionality. This annex is valid during the time period of Assumptions The Decision to release the SATCOM and HQII for national use is under discussion with United States of America (US). Our assessment is that this will be declared and put into service as a continuation of the Swedish participation in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission.

242 Annex H Page 4 (9) 2. Operations 2.1. Introduction In the context of this platform annex, Hkp 16 carries out the following operations: Utility cargo/combat sustainment transports Personnel and Cargo movement Search And Rescue (SAR) Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) Special Operations As a National helicopter asset the Hkp 16 supports Homeland Security missions by performing the mission of passenger and equipment movement. In addition, Hkp 16 supports disaster relief support operations such as flood and storm recovery operations, MEDEVAC, fire suppression, and SAR operations. 3. The use of interoperability enabling systems 3.1. Introduction This chapter discusses the Hkp 16 employment and use of the following interoperability enabling systems: TDLs IFF Secure Voice Friendly Force tracking (FFT) SATCOM Figure 1 illustrates Hkp 16 employment of the interoperability enabling systems.

243 Annex H Page 5 (9) Figure 1 - Diagram illustrating Hkp 16 employment of interoperability enabling systems 3.2. Tactical Data Links (TDLs) VMF VMF will be primary TDL in support of Hkp 16 operations. Therefore VMF will be used as the standard communication system for the majority of the missions dedicated for Hkp 16.

244 Annex H Page 6 (9) VMF comprises of message, a bearer and header and collectively they are known as the VMF TDL. The message format, bearer and header implementation requirements are set out in three different US Military Standards (MIL- STDS): MIL-STD 6017B VMF message standard MIL- STD D change 1 Bearer definition MIL-STD D change 1- Header In the timeframe of it may be considered that the following MIL- STDS for the implementation of VMF on Hkp 16 may change to the following versions: MIL-STD 6017C VMF message standard MIL- STD E Bearer definition MIL-STD E - Header Transition to the above MIL- STD versions will depend on the interoperability requirements of Swedish Armed Forces coalition partners during this timeframe Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Helicopter 16 is equipped with MKXIIA IFF transponder systems including Modes 1-4. Mode S will not be implemented. The IFF Mk XIIA which includes Mode 5 is being considered for implementation on Hkp Secure voice Very High Frequency (VHF/UHF) Secure voice over VHF/UHF is used as the primary mean of voice communication in a joint and/or combined operation. It will be used in virtually all types Helicopter operations. Hkp 16 plans for VHF/UHF secure voice implementation in the timeframe of this document Satellite Communication (SATCOM) As a part of the Hkp 16 radio suit there is a TACSAT capability which will be used in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations. Use of SATCOM in national operations is pending further decisions and agreements.

245 Annex H Page 7 (9) 3.5. Secure text There are requirements for secure text messaging for Hkp 16. Examples of secure text messages exchanged for the Hkp 16 mission system are: Operational Tasking (OPTASK) Link Airspace Control Order (ACO) Air Tasking Order (ATO) MISREP 4. Interface with national legacy systems 4.1. Introduction This chapter gives a description of interface and information exchange with national legacy systems for Hkp Integration and interoperability Hkp 16 will be partly integrated in the Swedish Armed Forces legacy C2 system. For national operations (training) and due to flight safety reasons, only nonsecure voice communication over VHF/UHF will be approved. 5. Miscellaneous 5.1. Introduction This chapter discusses Hkp 16 miscellaneous activities and external relationships Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) The Swedish JDLOC supports Hkp 16 for TDL network management requirements and IFF code allocation. The JDLOC has the sole responsibility for network management and VMF initialisation data (if implemented on Hkp 16) for Swedish Armed Forces Weather data The Hkp 16 crews will attend a weather brief before commencing a mission. If required the Hkp 16 crews will be updated by the Control Reporting Centre (CRC) or other organisations including civilian Air Traffic Control (ATC) Intelligence data integration The Hkp 16 crews will be provided with essential intelligence by the Mission Support Element (MSE) before finalising the mission planning and an update

246 Annex H Page 8 (9) before take-off. During flight updates might be sent in both directions via secure voice. After completion of a mission the Hkp 16 crew will file a MISREP. 6. Operator roles 6.1. Introduction A helicopter crew or flight will assume several roles depending on task. The following operator roles are provided as examples: Flight lead, Communication with ATC, CRC or Army/Navy units Mission commander Managing the allocated tasks and associated resources ACO management and flight safety issues at a combined or joint military or civilian mission

247 Annex H Page 9 (9) 7. Platform overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements 7.1. Technical overview ISD UH60M / Hkp16 in service UH60M/ Hkp 16 full MEDEVAC Environment Ground, Air, Maritime Roles MEDEVAC, Utility, Troop transport Special operations SAR Secure voice HQII (VHF/UHF) SINCGARS SIP 7.2. High level IERs UH60M/ HKP16 SECURE VOICE IFF BFT JAS 39 X X ASC-890 X X C130 X Airbase X Hkp14 (X) X Hkp15 X Swedish Naval X X units Swedish Army X X X units Tactical Air X Control Party (TACP) Civilian SSR X systems ISAF RC N X X X SFL, SPECOPS X (X) = Under consideration

248 Annex I Page 1 (12) Annex I Sea Surveillance Battalion (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

249 Annex I Page 2 (12) List of contents 1 Introduction Background Aim Scope Assumptions Operations General Maritime operations Mission description Operational use of interoperability enablers Introduction Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Secure voice Secure text Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) Miscellaneous Integration and Interoperability Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) Platform overview & High Level Information Exchange Requirements Technical overview High level IERs... 12

250 Annex I Page 3 (12) 1 Introduction 1.1 Background The Sea Surveillance Battalion consists of the Naval Communications Centre (NAVCOMMCEN) and Naval Sea surveillance Centres (NSC). MaRa the Operational Commander s NAVCOMMCEN conducts communication management in the Swedish areas of interest where the Swedish units operate. NAVCOMMCEN also implements operational communication management, frequency planning & communication planning and method development on behalf of HQ/Maritime Component Commander (MCC). The communications focus lies currently on Very Low Frequency (VLF) /Low Frequency (LF), High Frequency (HF) and Rakel 1, but is expected to be expanded to encompass tactical Very High Frequency (VHF) / Ultra High Frequency (UHF) and Satellite Communication (SATCOM) in the near future. These activities are partly national operational in nature but include international operations and international exercises. Thus, services are provided globally for Swedish interests and operations. Operations are conducted 24 hours/7 days a week from protected sites, as well as from the MCC and with a large number of remote annexes. The NSCs monitor Swedish territory and adjacent areas at sea. NCS are the main providers of the surveillance information and intelligence that goes into the Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP) at MCC Maritime Operations Centre (MOC). The NSCs collects, processes and shares sea surveillance information with other stakeholders in the Swedish Armed Forces as well as with the Swedish Coast Guard 2. The NCSs also collaborates with and provides support to other Swedish civil authorities. Additionally international development and cooperation, including exchange of surveillance information, within the framework of Sea Surveillance Co-operation between Finland Sweden (SUCFIS), Sea Surveillance Co-operation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS), European Defence Agency Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR), Maritime Safety & Security Information System (MSSIS) and Naval Co-operation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) is carried out. The NSC also participates in international exercises such as the annual Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) where cooperation with other nations is practiced and in Multi National Experiments (MNEs), in which new methods and techniques are tested. The Battalion operates 24 hour/7 days a week/365 days a year (24/7/365) and supports operations, both in Swedish territorial waters and in other waters overseas, specifically for communications. 1 Swedish National Emergency Radio System built on TETRA technology 2 According to SFS 2007:1266.

251 Annex I Page 4 (12) 1.2 Aim The aim of this Annex is to translate the requirements within the TDL, IFF, Secure Voice and Secure Text CONOPS documents to the platform level. This annex will describe how the Sea Surveillance Bn will participate and use the interoperability enabling systems for its missions and tasks. This document will also detail the high level Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) for the Sea Surveillance Bn both NAVCOMMCEN and NSC - that are associated with the Interoperability enabling systems and associated role in the stated missions and tasks. 1.3 Scope This document describes the Sea Surveillance Bn elements and relationship with other platforms. This annex also describes the different kinds of missions, and the related IERs for the Sea Surveillance Bn will be explained. 1.4 Assumptions This Sea Surveillance Bn Annex is valid during the time period National developed Data Links remain for national operations at least until 2020 or until an adequate solution(s) is/are procured and implemented covering both national and international future operations and capabilities. 2 Operations 2.1 General The Sea Surveillance Bn is located in the Stockholm, Gothenburg, southern Sweden areas and on the island of Gotland. The NSCs collect information from multiple sensors from sites in Sweden in order to establish and distribute the sea surveillance information. The NAVCOMMCEN provides communication support for the MCC and naval assets at sea but is also the NCS for HF and the KC RAKEL 4 for all Swedish Armed forces. 2.2 Maritime operations Maritime operations have a strong requirement for the RMP provided by TDLs. The Sea Surveillance Bn is continuously establishing and distributing the sea surveillance information to the MCC and to naval assets at sea as well as to the Coast Guard. 3 The Swedish Armed Forces High Frequency radio system 4 KC RAKEL = Communication centre for RAKEL - The interoperable interagency TETRA radio system that is used both between the armed forces and other authorities (e.g. police, coast guard) as well as internally in the Armed Forces. The system is based on a solid infrastructure with LOS coverage.

252 Annex I Page 5 (12) The NSCs monitors the surface, sub-surface and air space with own sensors along the Swedish coastline. The NSCs also gets sensor information from other naval assets and from the Air Force, as well as from partner nations, and use this information together with information from Automatic Identification System (AIS) and other transponder systems in order to complement its Sea Surveillance Information. The NAVCOMMCEN transmit traffic to and from the MCC and naval assets at sea over UHF/ VHF, HF and VLF/LF lines. The NAVCOMMCEN also provides communications support to Air Component Command (ACC) and Land Component Command (LCC) and supports the Armed Forces HQ with frequency plans, communications management, planning, etc The sea surveillance Bn main tasks The Sea Surveillance Bn tasks stated below are in no order of priority. The NSCs main task is to conduct Sea Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations. The NSCs also supports: Protection of Shipping Operations Coastal Defence Operations Embargo and Blockade Operations as long as they are conducted in the vicinity of Sweden Maritime Reconnaissance Operation Special Forces (SF) Operations Amphibious Operations and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operations The NAVCOMMCEN supports all of the above operations as well as some Land and Air Operations. 2.3 Mission description Surveillance and reconnaissance operation The continuous monitoring of a maritime area in order to detect violations of the Swedish border, illegal activities and other deviations from the normal behaviour in the area are essential operations. These operations might involve incidents that can lead to use of lethal force. The NSCs organic radar, optical and acoustic sensors along the Swedish coastline provides the centres with a surface, subsurface and an air picture. The picture is supplemented with information from naval vessels at sea, AIS and other transponder systems along with information from SUCFIS and SUCBAS, as well as from the Air Force Control and Reporting Centre (CRC). This information is

253 Annex I Page 6 (12) transferred to the MCC in order for MCC to establish a RMP. The information is also transferred to naval units at sea and with some filtering, also distributed to the Swedish Coast Guard. The information is transferred to naval units at sea via TDLs and to the MCC and Coast Guard over fibre/internet protocol (IP). The employment of VMF is also being considered for implementation for the Sea Surveillance Bn in the time period of this document. The NSCs are conducting operational activities 24 hours 7 days 365 days a year. 3 Operational use of interoperability enablers 3.1 Introduction This chapter describes the sea surveillance Bn s operational use of the following interoperability enabling systems: TDLs IFF Secure Voice Secure Text Figure 1 illustrates sea surveillance Bn s the employment of the interoperability enabling systems.

254 Annex I Page 7 (12) Figure 1 - Context diagram illustrating sea surveillance Bn s employment of the interoperability enabling systems 3.2 Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Information exchange to and from NSC There is an extensive requirement for information exchange to and from NSC to conduct sea surveillance and produce information for the Swedish Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP). Information is exchanged mainly through the national legacy link 8000 over IP and radio (HF/VHF/UHF) complemented with voice coordination over radio and

255 Annex I Page 8 (12) telephones. International cooperation also comprises information sharing over common IP networks. MCC Swedish maritime assets (Navy, Amph) Other NSC and SUCFIS SUCBAS E t c Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) NSC Swedish Coast Guard ASC 890 through CRC International Air assets through CRC CRC Figure 2. NSC nodes and stakeholders Figure 2 illustrates the different nodes and stakeholders of information exchange necessary for establishing a RMP. The on-going transformation in the Swedish Armed Forces regarding implementation of tactical data links and replacing legacy links will have a huge impact also on NSC in the timeframe of this document. The first challenges will be the potential implementation of Link 22 for the Navy and connection with the CRC exchanging information produced in a Link 16 environment. The need of a multilink facility will occur when Link 22 is implemented, which also will produce requirements for gateway solutions for transmission of information between different TDL systems.

256 Annex I Page 9 (12) Command and Control (C2) The Sea Surveillance Bn will be able to take part in operations as described in 2.2 above, under the Command of a MCC in a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Operation. NAVCOMMSCEN provides MCC the capability to provide C2 of the Swedish Navy and Amphibious forces independent of where the operation takes place. NCS provides the RMP information to the both the MCC as well as all Swedish Navy units, including the Amphibious Forces. 3.3 Secure voice There is an operational requirement for operators in the Sea Surveillance Bn to use encrypted voice communications for both service bulletins about radio messages and for tasking of units at sea and for transmission of sea surveillance information at times when the TDLs are not available or not in use. There is also a requirement for secure voice communications to coordinate surveillance operations with airborne assets. The secure voice networks are typically standard fix frequency HF and/or UHF/VHF communication networks with Secure Voice cryptographic equipment. In order to take part in operations in multi-dimensional threat scenarios, there is a basic requirement for Secure Voice technology using cryptographic equipment. The Sea Surveillance Bn has radio systems compatible with international radio standards. In a joint perspective, depending on the choice of the Link 16 Multi-functional Information Distribution System (MIDS) terminal, J-voice might provide this functionality (secure voice) through a Link 16 network. This functionality (J-voice) demands a high capacity of the network (high usage and allocation of time slots) from the Link 16 network. However this may not be permitted due to other or more prioritised information or frequency clearance restrictions. For this reason there is a requirement for (Joint) secure voice over UHF even if J-voice is available. Waveforms considered for this capability include Have Quick II (HQII) and Second generation Anti-Jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN). 3.4 Secure text The main type of information transmitted to and from the NAVCOMMCEN is secure text. This applies both for national and international operation and activities. Hence, there is a key requirement for the use of secure text for the Sea Surveillance Bn to be able to carry out its missions and tasks. NAVCOMMCEN has experience of using international crypto systems that are installed to operate on both radio networks with other nations as well as land lines,

257 Annex I Page 10 (12) including communications networks such as Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), with other nations. The role of the NAVCOMMCEN, in this context, is partly to be able to interact with other NAVCOMMCENs in order to ensure a common message flow within the framework of an operation and to be able to operate with other units (ships, ground units, etc.) with transmission of messages and partly to be able to convey messages to / from the MCC (ACC / LCC). The majority of the communication is currently carried out in the VLF / LF and in HF frequency ranges, but the need is expected to change to other means of communication (VHF /UHF, SATCOM, etc.). NAVCOMMCEN convey all types of messages to the maritime community. Typical information exchanged over secure text nets are; Air Tasking Order (ATO). Operational Order (Opord). Operational General Matters (Opgen). Operational Tasks (Optask) for ASW, AAW, ASuW, Comms, TDLS etc. Warning Order. Fragmentary Order (FragO). Directions & Guidance. Reports (Sitrep, Logrep etc). Requests for Rules Of Engagement (ROE) and ROE Implementation. In order to exchange information and data in different coalitions the Secure Text mentioned above needs to be complimented by a capability to communicate over Computer Based Networks with SATCOM transmission in a secure way. The information / messages are usually conveyed by transmitting ship/shore shore/ship systems as well as broadcast. Information on secure text messages can be found in the secure text CONOPS (Enclosure 5). 3.5 Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) International cooperation aimed at increasing the MSA are today conducted with various countries and organizations in Sweden s region as well as worldwide. The current international co-operations are: SUCFIS Bilateral cooperation with Finland in the Baltic Sea

258 Annex I Page 11 (12) SUCBAS - Cooperation in the Baltic Sea and adjacent areas between Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany and Denmark European Defence Agency (EDA) MARSUR - A cooperation in Europe in which sixteen countries are involved MSSIS - A worldwide cooperation with the US and other invited nations. The information exchange is based on AIS data and other information that each country wants to contribute. The EU s view is that synergies should be drawn through the overlapping co-operation between maritime organizations such as the Navy, Coast Guard and rescue organizations as the JRCC (Joint Rescue Coordination Centre). The AIS system helps to establish an overview over the merchant shipping in a specific area. All vessels of 300 gross tonnage and higher shall be equipped with AIS transponders. Although it is possible to derive from or not adhere to the AIS standard, ignore the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) requirement or deliberately pretend to be another vessel, AIS enhances the ability to establish a RMP. 4 Miscellaneous 4.1 Integration and Interoperability Implementation of Link 22 into the maritime community will be a challenge in the time period of this document. The challenge will consist of harmonisation with legacy systems and the possible replacement of legacy links to interoperable standards and formats without losing the capability to conduct 24/7/365 sea surveillance operations. Another challenge will be to connect the NSC to the CRC to exchange sea surveillance information produced by Link 16 equipped airborne assets. NAVCOMMSCEN will have the requirement to connect into interoperable communities. And this must be handled in parallel with national operations, including national operations with international partners included. 4.2 Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) The JDLOC provides support to the Sea Surveillance Bn for required network management infrastructure elements, for example interoperability enabling TDLs. The JDLOC has the sole responsibility for network management activities for Link 16, Link 11, Link 22, and VMF.

259 Annex I Page 12 (12) 5 Platform overview & High Level Information Exchange Requirements 5.1 Technical overview ISD Environment Roles TDLs Secure Voice Secure text IFF Function Ongoing Maritime Legacy link, information to and from Link-16 and future Link-22 Standard waveforms fixed frequency HF/VHF/UHF,HaveQuick II (VHF/UHF), HF with external crypto device ACP-127/HF (HFEM) and CBN (Computer Based Networks) 5.2 High level IERs NSC JRE (Link-16) Secure Voice Secure Text IFF CRC Information from X Link-16 ASC-890 Through CRC X X! JAS 39 C/D Through CRC X X! C-130 N/A X X! Hkp 14/15/16 T B D TBD X - Swedish Naval Legacy Link X X X units (Link-22) Amphibious Legacy Link X X JDLOC TBD OPTASK Link Coalition NATO/PfP Naval units Through CRC or Corvettes TBD Through NAVCOMMSCEN -

260 Annex J Page 1 (18) Annex J Corvettes (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

261 Annex J Page 2 (18) Table of contents 1 Introduction Background Aim Scope Assumptions Operations General Maritime operations Mission description Operational use of interoperability enablers Introduction Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Secure voice Secure text Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Automatic Identification System (AIS) Miscellaneous Introduction Integration and interoperability Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) Platform overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements Technical overview High level IERs... 18

262 Annex J Page 3 (18) 1 Introduction 1.1 Background The Swedish Armed Forces Corvettes fleet consist of two Gävle class and five Visby class vessels. When in operation the corvettes are usually supported by support vessels and a command resource. An international peacekeeping operation is normally conducted for up to 4 months (maximum 6 months). The corvettes, with support vessel, are organised in order to operate in a multinational Task Force structure, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) or Combined Task Force (CTF), also at a great distance from Swedish territorial waters. Unit-specific maintenance is a prerequisite for the force ability to function in multinational operations at a great distance from national maintenance resources based in Sweden. Link 16 will be introduced on the Corvettes as a Stand Alone Capability in the timeframe Along with the Tactical Data Link (TDL) Link 16 there will be an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Mk XII/XIIA Interrogator and Transponder. Secure voice radios (HaveQuick II (HQII)/SATURN compatible) will be introduced in the timeframe of this document. Secure text will also be introduced with interoperable and compatible Communication Security (COMSEC) equipment. 1.2 Aim The aim of this Annex is to translate the requirements within the TDL, IFF, Secure Voice and Secure Text Concept of operations (CONOPS) documents to the platform level. This annex will describe how the Corvette force will participate and use the interoperability enabling systems for the missions and tasks. This document will also detail the high level Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) for the Corvette platforms that are associated with the interoperability enabling systems and associated role in the stated missions and tasks. 1.3 Scope This document explains the Corvette platform elements and relationship with other platforms. The different kinds of missions, and related information requirements will be explained. 1.4 Assumptions This Annex is valid during the time period It is valid for the Visby and Gävle Class Corvette systems. If there are any differences between the different Corvette Classes regarding the implementation this will be explained in this document.

263 Annex J Page 4 (18) National developed Data Links remain for national operations at least until 2020 or until an adequate solution are procured covering both national and international future requirements and capability. 2 Operations 2.1 General The Visby class Corvette is based on a stealth concept offering emission control from a wide area of aspects. Its unique design, combined with a shallow draft, makes it ideal for operations in extreme littoral and littoral conditions, but the Corvette is also well equipped for operations in other maritime theatres. The Visby class Corvette is a multi-role ship well adapted for Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Mine Counter Measures (MCM) and Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) operations. The Gävle Class are also multi-role ships but not with MCM and Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) operations capability. 2.2 Maritime operations Maritime operations require a Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP), in many cases transmitted over TDLs. The Corvettes will be able to establish and lead an armed attack with calibrated effect and high precision within the range of its own weapons and sensors. The Corvettes are able to monitor the surface, sub-surface and air space within their own sensor range. TDLs provide the means to co-operatively compile the surface, subsurface and air pictures, and maintain awareness of larger areas than achievable from a single platform. Line Of Sight (LOS) constraints with Link 16 TDL might prevent effective exchange of data unless there is an airborne relay platform available, use of High Frequency (HF) bearer on Link 22 (data link forwarding) or Joint Range Extension (JRE) for example via satellites, in use. The Swedish Naval policy on Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) TDL is to be finally determined in the near future. For many of the missions and tasks described below it is of great importance to conduct these in conjunction with Hkp 14 and 15 (as described in Annexes F and G). The corvette s main tasks (in no order of priority) are: ASW ASuW

264 Annex J Page 5 (18) Escort (ASW/ASuW/AAW). AAW (self-defence) Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) Mine Warfare (MW) (Only the Visby class Corvette) NGS (Only the Visby class Corvette) When the Corvette force is allocated to a coalition mission, all of the above missions and tasks (or functions) may need to be performed during such an operation. 2.3 Mission description Introduction The main difference between a Swedish corvette and an ordinary Fast Patrol Boat (FPB) is that it is capable of conducting warfare in all three dimensions: Air, Surface and Subsurface. In this sense a Swedish corvette can be compared with a small frigate. Further comparison with a frigate, apart from the size and its smaller crew complement, is limited. These factors, size and crew, makes it difficult for the corvette to stay on high alert in all three dimensions over longer periods of time. These factors add to the requirement for integrated systems and coherent communication solutions Anti-Submarine Warfare(ASW) The corvette units are able to conduct ASW with great endurance in shallow water (littoral and extreme littoral) and under difficult hydrographical conditions. The corvettes are optimised for warfare against conventional submarines but also the ability to detect and combat midget submarines. The sonar suite comprises of a Hull-Mounted Sonar (HMS) and a Variable Depth Sonar (VDS). The Visby class has in addition to this, a Towed Array Sonar (TAS), sonar buoys and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) mounted sonars. ASW operation most likely comprises cooperation with other nation s frigates, helicopters and Maritime Patrol Aircrafts (MPAs). TDLs support ASW acoustic operations in order to exchange hydrographical data, coordinate sonar and frequency use, sonar tactics and to exchange subsurface contacts. TDLs are also used to coordinate weapons engagement. TAS operations will also contribute to the RMP surface picture. The TAS is fitted to both the Visby and Gävle class corvettes Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) The corvettes are able to either autonomously, or in cooperation with other units, engage and destroy any surface vessels or hovercraft. The vessels furthermore, well are suited for conducting maritime interdiction operations.

265 Annex J Page 6 (18) The weapon-systems and sensors have a good ability for operations in the littoral environment. All Corvettes have active radars, Air Interdiction (AI) Surveillance as well as Electronic Support Measurement (ESM) equipment for target acquisition and identification. It is possible to carry out an attack with precision and high probability of success. Automatic Identification System (AIS), IFF and ESM support the target identification function. When working in a Task Unit, these operations are supported by the use of TDLs to exchange target information, EW data, Weapon assignments and commands. Operations may be in cooperation with other surface combatants and air assets. TDLs provide the means to exchange surface picture information. Information is gathered from both naval and air assets. ASuW commands such as engagement orders may be issued by the ASuW Commander located on a Command & Control (C2) platform and issued to other ships. The surface picture received by TDLs will provide real-time information on surface activity. Units reporting their position and identity rapidly provide indication of friendly units in order to reduce the risk of fratricide. The information on the TDL network needs to be accurate to minimize identification and targeting ambiguities Escort (Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW)/Anti Surface Warfare (ASuW)/Anti-Air Warfare(AAW)) An Escort task requires ASW, ASuW and AAW to be conducted at the same time, in order to protect a convoy or a single ship. Escorting can be carried out by the corvette alone, in co-operation with other Swedish assets or together with coalition partners. When conducting the escort, the corvettes receive information and contribute to the situational awareness picture by the use of TDLs. This information supports ASW, ASuW and AAW. Guidance to escorted vessels is not supported via TDLs and must, therefore, be handled by other means such as voice radios Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) All Corvettes have an Anti-Air, self-defence functionality. The Swedish C2 system contains an automated function for Air Defence co-ordination. The functionality includes both hard-kill and soft-kill options. During AAW and Escort missions, it is most essential that the corvette continuously has the correct information (position and identification) on friendly aircraft and helicopters to avoid fratricide. The Visby class corvettes will be equipped with Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM) in the years after This enhances the requirements for the TDL, IFF (Mk XII/Mk XIIA systems) and secure text implementations in the Corvette.

266 Annex J Page 7 (18) Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) A corvette will, for a long period, individually or in collaboration with other units, have the ability to monitor a sea (or air) volume within its own sensor range, for example with the aim of supervising a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ). The surface picture received by data link, and by AIS information provides realtime information on surface activity. Coalition units reporting their position and identity rapidly provide indication of friendly units. Co-ordination and command for actions against an unidentified contact can be pursued through the TDL in order to limit voice traffic and to minimize the engagement time. The Visby class will be well suited for Intelligence operations either as a sensor platform or as a carrier for insertion of Special Forces (SFs). The data link and secure text systems provide a secure means for direct communication at CTF level Mine Warfare (MW) The Mine Warfare task includes planning, execution and analysis of mine clearance missions and includes mine hunting. The Visby corvette can, if necessary, autonomously conduct route surveillance and clearance of identified mines. The Visby class corvettes are able to take part in execution and analysis of route surveillance mission reconnaissance and to report important targets and events to a supported ground unit. The Visby class is able to provide air surveillance ( baby sit ) for other MCM units and hereby in need of air threat reports and IFF information. Mine situation, cleared routes and danger area information will be exchanged over TDL Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) The unit shall also be able to take part in NEO missions. However, this type of mission does not add any requirement for TDL or any other interoperability enabling system implementation Naval Gun Support (NGS) The NGS task requires that the unit (Visby class) will be able to protect and/or support Land Forces with the use of gun support. The need of real time update of position of friendly ground forces is vital to avoid fratricide. To solve this task the Variable Message Format (VMF) may be considered for implementation for the Corvettes in the future.

267 Annex J Page 8 (18) 3 Operational use of interoperability enablers 3.1 Introduction This chapter describes the operational use of the following interoperability enabling systems by Corvettes: TDLs IFF Secure voice Secure text Figure 1 below illustrates Corvettes use of interoperability enabling systems. Figure 1. Overview of use of interoperability enabling systems

268 Annex J Page 9 (18) 3.2 Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Link 22 In the timeframe of this document it is considered that Link 22 will be implemented on the Corvettes. Harmonisation with national legacy links and the impact of the implementation will be studied further in the nearest future. The most important requirement will be that the Corvettes must be able to work in the same manner (methods and procedures) for both national and international operations and exercises Platform specific Link 16 operation The Corvettes will be equipped with a Link 16 Stand Alone System (SAS). This means that the Corvette will be able to operate on a Link 16 network, receiving almost all the information that is transmitted from others in the network. The capability will also provide the Corvette with the ability to transmit and receive Precise Participant Location and Identification (PPLI) information to avoid fratricide, and for the operator to transmit and receive free-text messages. The Corvettes will not integrate Link 16 into the C2 systems and will not have a C2 capability in the time frame However, as long as the Corvettes are equipped with the Link 16 SAS and/or an interim BLOS solution (Link 11) the Corvettes will act as a Non-C2 node Precise Participant Location and Identification (PPLI) & surveillance of blue forces In all missions it is imperative to keep track of other coalition vehicles/vessels/platforms and assets. There are several reasons for this blue force tracking which are outlined as follows: Co-ordination in a complex Joint or Combined Operation Prevent fratricide by proactive identification with PPLI, instead of reactive identification with IFF Force flow control and Military Air Traffic Control that is to facilitate deconfliction when many aircraft uses a narrow airspace Provide Commanding Officers and operators with Situation Awareness (SA) Interim BLOS solution The Corvettes can in the timeframe (or until Link 22 is implemented) be equipped with an interim Link 11 system if required, named the 9LV160. The 9LV160 system comprises a workstation with stand-alone functionality for set-up and interfacing a Link 11 Data Terminal System (DTS). A subset of NATO Standardisation Agreement (STANAG) 5011 messages are integrated, such as tracks (air and surface), special points and IFF (reception only). The operational

269 Annex J Page 10 (18) picture is supported by maps and measurement vectors for the operator. Sweden has two Link 11 systems available for use Operator roles (for Link 16 SAS) In order to support operational tasking for the Corvette there is a need for a minimum of four different workstations. Functions on-board that are responsible for the different co-ordinations concerning ASW, ASuW, AAW and ISR must be able to present and work with the information in their specific environment. Operations Officer - Responsible for the tactical picture and the SA at all times for the ship. The operations officer must be able to control the situation including target information from the different arenas, Subsurface, Surface and Air, and collect the most vital information for the commanding officer s decisions. The operations officer is (for his own ship) also responsible for the overall track co-ordination between the own ship and coalition units included in the same operation. The Operations Officer will also be responsible for the co-ordination between the ship and the ground forces when conducting NGS. ASW Officer - Responsible for the co-ordination of the subsurface picture and also co-ordination of weapons allocation to hostile tracks below the surface. He is also responsible to co-ordinate sensor data between the ship and other ASW units. ASuW Officer - Responsible for the co-ordination of the surface picture and also co-ordination of weapons allocation to hostile tracks on the surface. The Anti-Surface Warfare Officer is also responsible to coordinate sensor data between the ship and other ASuW units; this includes providing information to the Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP). AAW Officer: Responsible for the co-ordination of the air picture and EW (Electronic Warfare) and also co-ordination of weapons allocation to hostile tracks in the air. The Anti-Air Warfare Officer is also responsible to co-ordinate sensor data between the ship and other AAW units; this includes providing information to the Recognised Air Picture (RAP). In addition to these functions there are a number of different operators that also need the same kind of information presented. For example, two more officers involved in the AAW and the navigational function on the bridge.

270 Annex J Page 11 (18) Figure 2 illustrates the different workstations preferred on-board the Corvettes. ISR ASW ASuW AAW OpsO Command and Control (C2) Figure 2. Corvette workstations The unit is able to take part in any kind of mission, described in 2.2 of this document under the Command of a Maritime Component Commander (MCC) in a CJTF Operation. The unit normally constitutes a coherent combat unit (task unit/task element) in a larger unit and shall be able to manage independent tasks. The unit shall have the ability to lead two additional units of corresponding capacity to its own Corvettes. C2 is performed in two parallel structures in which information flows; an administrative Chain-of-Command structure, and a strictly operational structure for tactical, time-sensitive information. Figure 3 illustrates the Command Structure in a multinational Maritime Operation.

271 Annex J Page 12 (18) Figure 3: Command Structure in a multinational Maritime Operation Figure 3 illustrates an example of a Command Structure in a multinational Maritime operation with a Swedish unit (TE) (with support) and need-line to the National Operations HQ. Forward Naval Support Unit (FNSU) represents any national support necessary close to Area Of Operation (AOO). The information flow is mainly characterised by written orders and reports, such as Operation Order (OPORD), various Operation Tasks (OPTASKs) and logistic information. The Swedish Corvette Force for international operations has an organic support function on-board its support ship and/or land based in the vicinity of the operations area. The support function could be enhanced by adding the FNSU. The total support organisation has some requirements in common with the ships supported. For instance, the same requirements for secure text as for the corvette are valid for the support organisation whether this is on-board a support ship or land-based. The operational command is adapted due to situation but could be described as conducted through a single commander for each domain (Air, Surface and Subsurface), directly subordinated and appointed by the Task Force Commander. The information flow is mainly exchange of contact-information to support the Recognised Picture in each area (RMP, RAP), engagement orders and threat alerts. Normally, each Principle Warfare Commander (PWC) controls his own voice-net (preferably secure) over HF and/or Very High Frequency (VHF)/ Ultra High Frequency (UHF). To minimize ambiguities, TDLs are used to support this

272 Annex J Page 13 (18) process. Each PWC has its own communications net, preferably Secure Voice using HF. Figure 4 illustrates the PWC communication net topology. Figure 4: Principle Warfare Commander communication net topology 3.3 Secure voice The operators (all user classes) described earlier in paragraph of this document, needs to co-ordinate the situational awareness pictures they are responsible for over secure voice communication. Usually there is a track coordinator PWC assigned in the different dimensions (air, surface, subsurface). The track co-ordinator is using voice co-ordination between the different platforms in the Task Group (TG) or Task Unit (TU), in parallel with the TDL. In a Combined operation, secure voice nets are used. These networks are typically standard fix frequency HF and/ or UHF/VHF communication networks with Secure Voice crypto equipment. In order to take part in an operation in a multi-dimensional threat scenario, there is a basic requirement for Secure Voice technology, mainly cryptographic equipment. The Corvettes has radio systems compatible with international radio standards. In a joint perspective, depending on the choice of the Link 16 Multi-functional Information Distribution System (MIDS) terminal, J-voice might provide this functionality (secure voice) through a Link 16 network. This functionality (Jvoice) demands a high capacity (allocation of time slots) from the Link 16 network, and may not be allowed due to other or more prioritised information or frequency clearance restrictions. For this reason there is a requirement for (Joint) secure voice over UHF even if J- voice is available. Waveforms considered for this capability include HQII and

273 Annex J Page 14 (18) Second generation Anti-Jam Tactical UHF Radio for Second generation Anti-Jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN). 3.4 Secure text To support the need for formal military messaging the Corvettes will, in the timeframe 2012 to 2016, be equipped with an interoperable system for secure text exchange. The secure text messages also have to be transmitted/received by, besides the Corvettes, the Swedish support element to the corvettes. For instance, The Swedish Corvettes Logistic request are normally transmitted over this system, via the Commander Task Group (CTG). The system handles both tactical Radio TeleType (RATT) as well as HF . Tactical RATT is exchanged using Allied Communication Publication (ACP) -127 type relay procedures and US Military Standard (MIL-STD) or STANAG-4285 HF Waveforms. The secure text system, in this timeframe, is installed as a Stand- Alone system in the communications cabin and is handled by the communications personnel. Future messages standards can be implemented into this system. Typical information exchanged over secure text-nets is; Air Tasking Order (ATO). Operational Order (Opord). Operational General Matters (Opgen). Operational Tasks (Optask) for ASW, AAW, ASuW, Comms, TDLS etc. Warning Order. Fragmentary Order (FragO). Directions & Guidance. Reports (Sitrep, Logrep etc). Requests (Rules Of Engagement (ROE) and ROE Implementation. In order to exchange information and data in different coalitions the Secure Text mentioned above needs to be complimented by a capability to communicate over Computer Based Networks with Satellite Communication (SATCOM) transmission in a secure way. More information on the above messages may be found in the secure text CONOPS (Enclosure 5). 3.5 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) The Swedish navy has not operated IFF systems in the past. A capability to interrogate in-coming air targets will contribute to the force protection and will also add freedom to choose levels of ROE in various situations. An IFF capability adds information both to the RAP and the RMP and may be merged with other network information such as Link 11 and 16. A transponder is

274 Annex J Page 15 (18) mandatory to all aircraft in controlled airspace contrary to the maritime AIS system where there is a limitation regarding ships size. The IFF system for Corvettes will comprise both an IFF Mk XII/Mk XIIA transponder (XPDR) and interrogator (INT). The IFF information will be integrated into the C2 system. All ships of the different corvette-classes will be equally prepared for IFF in terms of hardware, e.g. INT, XPDR and wiring. Consequently the ships will be fitted with IFF functionality. The Interrogator support interrogations in the following Modes, Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3/A Mode C Mode 4 Mode 5 Mode S Both the use of 32 and 4096 codes are supported. When 32 codes are utilised, the Mode 1 reply indicates the mission Identity (ID) of the target. The set of 4096 codes are for national use only. Mode 1 codes also have a use as special ID or for code changing The Mode 2 reply indicates the individual unit ID. The Mode 3/A reply has both a military and civilian use as to indicate the Flight Number. Mode 3/A replies are used to correlate civil Flight Plans with the Flight ID of a target. Mode 3 codes also have a military use as Special ID or for Code changing. The Mode C reply has both a military and civilian use as to indicate the Flight Level of the target. Mode 4 is a secure IFF mode. The security is obtained by means of crypto. Mode 5 is a high confidence secure IFF mode. The security is obtained by means of modern crypto. The Mode S replies are used to correlate Flight ID of a target with civil Flight Plans. Mode 1, 2, 3/A and C are used for target specific interrogations or continuous interrogation, interlaced or individual. Mode 4, Mode 5 and Mode S are used for target specific interrogations only. The Transponder support the following Modes,

275 Annex J Page 16 (18) Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3/A Mode C Mode 4 Mode 5 Mode S The Mode 1 reply is one of 4096 codes that could be set manually on the Transponder or from a Remote Control Unit. The Mode 2 reply code is the ID of the platform. The Mode 3/A reply is one of 4096 codes could be set manually on the Transponder or from a remote control Unit. The Mode C reply is used for testing purpose. The Mode 4 reply indicates if a target is a True Friend In addition to indicate if a target is a true friend a Mode 5 reply can contain additional target information with high confidence. If available, the Mode S reply is used only for testing purpose. Each Mode can be individually enabled or disabled. 3.6 Automatic Identification System (AIS) The AIS systems help to establish an overview over the merchant shipping in a specific area internationally, all vessels of 300 gross tonnage and upwards shall be equipped with AIS transponder. Although it is possible to derive from the standard, ignore the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) requirement or deliberately pretend to be someone else, AIS enhances the ability to establish a RMP. All Swedish corvettes are equipped with receivers with interfaces to either navigational systems or (and) C2 systems. Transmitting of own position is optional. 4 Miscellaneous 4.1 Introduction This chapter discusses the Corvettes miscellaneous activities and external relationships. 4.2 Integration and interoperability Link 16 SAS will be complemented by a Link 11 interim solution in the timeframe of this document. The Swedish ambition is to move towards an

276 Annex J Page 17 (18) implementation of Link 22, integration earliest around The Corvettes and especially the Visby class is the most advanced ship in the Swedish navy and adaptable to almost all kinds of warfare, especially in the littorals and the extreme littorals. The Swedish Navy has experience of communicating with tactical data links since the early 1980s. The decision today to move towards implementation of Link 16 as the primary joint data link in the Swedish Armed Forces gives the possibility to improve the tactical use of data links even in national operations (Joint). The Navy and especially the Corvettes also have the need to communicate over great distances, beyond line of sight (BLOS). This can be achieved in many ways, for example using airborne relay, JRE (Joint Range Extension) over satellite, or data link forwarding in multinational operations. Nevertheless Sweden has the need of BLOS communication also for national purposes and therefore a possible BLOS TDL solution (Link 22) is under consideration. The use of such link and in what environment needs is currently studied, and the solution may result in the replacement of the Swedish national link The exchange of real time data with helicopter 14 in many of the missions and tasks is of great importance in the timeframe of this document. If and when Link 22 is implemented this must be ensured. 4.3 Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) The JDLOC supports the corvette and has the sole responsibility for network management, production and distribution of Link 16 network design loads, OPTASK Link and cryptographic information (including IFF codes, secure voice/secure text) and Communication Security (COMSEC). 5 Platform overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements 5.1 Technical overview ISD Environment Roles TDLs Secure Voice Secure text IFF Function In service Maritime Link 16 SAS, future Link-22 Standard waveforms fix fq HF/VHF/UHF,HaveQuick II (VHF/UHF), HF with external crypto device ACP-127/HFEM and CBN (Computer Based Networks) IFF Mk XII / MK XIIA Interrogator and transponder

277 Annex J Page 18 (18) 5.2 High level IERs Corvette Link 16 (Link 22) Secure Voice Secure Text IFF CRC PPLI, X X Surveillance, Free Text, Voice ASC-890 PPLI, X X Surveillance, Free Text, Voice JAS 39 C/D PPLI X X C-130 N/A X X Hkp 14 T B D X (X) Hkp 15 X Hkp 16 X X E3-A/C/D AWACS PPLI, Surveillance, Free Text, Voice, C2 messages X X Swedish Naval units PPLI, Free Text, Voice X X X Amphibious (X) X X Swedish Army Units PPLI, Free Text, X X X (GBAD) JDLOC Coalition NATO/EU Naval units Voice Network management, Free text, Voice PPLI, Surveillance, Free Text, C2 messages OPTASK Link X X X Civil SSR System N/A Mode 3/A, Mode C, Mode S (X) = TDL at present not known

278 Annex K to Page 1 (9) Annex K MINE COUNTER MEASURES VESSELS (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

279 Annex K to Page 2 (9) List of contents 1 Introduction Background Aim Scope Assumptions Operations Maritime operations Mission description Operational use of interoperability enabling systems Command and Control (C2) Secure voice Secure text Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Miscellaneous Integration and interoperability Platform overview & High Level Information Exchange Requirements Platform overview High level IERs... 9

280 Annex K to Page 3 (9) 1 Introduction 1.1 Background The Rapid Reaction Force, Mine Counter Measures (MCMs) from the 3 rd and 4 th Naval Warfare flotilla is registered with the Force register since 1 January 2000 and consists of the following resources: Two Mine Counter Measures Vessels (MCMV) Koster class Two self-propelled acoustic and magnetic minesweeper of type Selfpropelled Acoustic/magnetic Minesweeper (SAM) One support vessel, HMS Carlskrona or the new support vessel One-team Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Mk XII/Mk XIIA Transponder, secure voice and secure text interoperability enabling systems will be introduced for the MCM Vessels. 1.2 Aim The aim of this annex is to translate the requirements within the Tactical Data Link (TDL), IFF, secure voice, and secure text Concept of Operations (CONOPS) documents to the platform level. This annex will describe how the MCM units will participate and use the interoperability enabling systems for both national and international missions and tasks. This document will also detail the high level Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) for the MCM platforms that are associated with the Interoperability enabling systems and associated role in the stated missions. 1.3 Scope This annex explains the platform elements and relationship with other platforms. The different types of missions, and related information requirements will be explained. 1.4 Assumptions Swedish National data links remain for national operations at least until 2020 or until an adequate solution are procured, covering both national and international future requirements. 2 Operations The MCM units are participating in both national and international tasks, in a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) as well as in a Combined Task Force (CTF). It is possible for the force to lead elements from other units and countries. The force shall fulfil the command requirements for Chief Task Unit (CTU).

281 Annex K to Page 4 (9) The composition of the force makes it well suited for MCM operations and Anti- Submarine Warfare (ASW) in extreme littoral and littoral waters such as base areas, archipelagos and coastal areas. 2.1 Maritime operations The MCMs are a critical part of modern littoral and extreme littoral operations where possible damage to ships from mines and/or underwater explosives are a major consideration. The main task of the MCM vessels is to define the mine and/or underwater explosives threat and secure the Sea Lines Of Communications (SLOC). The MCM vessels will be able to monitor the surface, sub-surface and air space within their own sensor range. TDLs provide the means to co-operatively compile the surface, subsurface and air picture, and maintain Situational Awareness (SA) of larger areas than is achievable from a single platform. The use of TDLs for the MCM vessels part of Maritime Operations are considered but not yet decided. The requirement needs to be determined but it s likely to be Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) due the nature of MCM vessels Operations at sea with Line Of Sight (LOS) limitations. MCM operations have always been a slow process and the demand/use of TDLs is therefore significantly less than other forms of warfare. Nevertheless, TDLs provide the most cost-effective way of integrating the MCM vessels effort into the battlespace. The unit s main tasks (no priority) will be: MCM EOD Route Surveillance Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) ASW Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) (self-defence) When MCM vessels are allocated to a coalition mission, any, or all mission tasks (or functions) may need to be performed during that assignment. 2.2 Mission description Mine Counter Measures (MCM) The planning, execution/participation in and analysis of mine clearance missions for mine hunting, will include mine-clearance divers and minesweeping with selfpropelled sweepers. The unit will be able to conduct MCM in shallow water

282 Annex K to Page 5 (9) (littoral and extreme littoral) to obtain early warning of enemy interceptors and to be able to track own supported resources Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) EOD is the process of search, localisation, positioning, identification, observation, disposal and salvage of objects at sea and on the seabed Route surveillance Route surveillance is the planning, execution and analysis of route surveillance missions Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) The unit will, individually or in collaboration with other units, have the ability to monitor a sea area within its own sensor range, primarily with a focus on the underwater threat. This is known as ISR. The surface picture received by data links will provide real-time information on surface activity. Coalition units reporting their position and identity rapidly provide indication of friendly units Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) The MCM unit is able to conduct ASW operations in shallow water (littoral and extreme littoral) under difficult hydrographical conditions. The unit can be used for warfare against midget submarines Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) MCM vessels have an AAW capability and are capable of self-defence against hostile air targets (missiles and fighters). It is most essential that the MCM vessel at all times have the right information (position and identification) on friendly aircraft and helicopters to avoid fratricide. 3 Operational use of interoperability enabling systems 3.1 Command and Control (C2) The MCM vessels will be able to take part in CJTF Operations where the Maritime Operations are conducted under the Command of the MCC. If a task unit consist of only Swedish participants then either one of the ships can act as a CTU, using Swedish national legacy link. Figure 1 illustrates MCM employment of the interoperability enabling systems.

283 Annex K to Page 6 (9) Figure 2. Context diagram illustrating the MCM employment of interoperability enabling systems 3.2 Secure voice In order to coordinate missions and tasks (2.2) the need for secure voice circuits is of great importance. If multiple tasks are conducted at the same time the requirement of secure voice circuits increases (Task Group (TG)/Task Unit (TU) tactical circuits). This includes secure voice over satellite. 3.3 Secure text In order to support the transmission of operational and tactical information (secure text messages/ Air Defence Allied Technical Publication (ADatP-3))

284 Annex K to Page 7 (9) mentioned below, in the timeframe , MCM Vessels will have HF E- mail (Standardisation Agreement (STANAG) 5066) implemented. This implementation will be of a Stand Alone character in the radio cabin and operated by the ordinary radio personnel. Operational Order (Opord) Operational General Matters (Opgen) Operational Tasks (OTASK) for ASW, AAW, ASuW, Comms, Links etc Warning order Fragmentary order (FragO) Directions & Guidance Reports (Sitrep, Logrep etc) Requests for Rules Of Engagement (ROE) and ROE Implementation 3.4 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) MCM Vessel of the Koster Class will be equipped with an IFF Mk XII/Mk XIIA Transponder. The Transponder support replies in the following Modes, Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3/A Mode C Mode 4 Mode 5 Mode S The Mode 1 reply is one of 4096 codes that could be set manually on the Transponder or from a Remote Control Unit. The Mode 2 reply code is the ID of the platform. The Mode 3/A reply is one of 4096 codes could be set manually on the Transponder or from a remote control Unit. The Mode C reply is used for testing purpose. The reply indicates if a target is a true friend In addition to indicate if a target is a true friend the reply in Mode 5 can give additional target information with high confidence. If available, the Mode S reply is used only for testing purpose. Each Mode can be individually enabled or disabled.

285 Annex K to Page 8 (9) 4 Miscellaneous 4.1 Integration and interoperability In future battlespace there is a growing need of exchanging information with data links also for the MCM vessels. However, the role of the MCM vessels and the Swedish Navy s implementation plan for tactical data links are to be decided in the future. The replacement of the Swedish national legacy link 8000 with an interoperable format or standard in order to exchange near real time information is being considered in conjunction with the implementation of Link Platform overview & High Level Information Exchange Requirements 5.1 Platform overview ISD In service Environment Maritime Roles TDLs Secure Voice Secure text IFF Function T B D Standard waveforms fix frequency HF/VHF/UHF, HaveQuick II (VHF/UHF), HF with external crypto device, Secure over satellite ACP-127/HF-mail IFF Mk XII/Mk XIIA Transponder

286 Annex K to Page 9 (9) 5.2 High level IERs MCM Vessels TDL Secure Voice Secure Text IFF ASC-890 X X JAS 39 C/D X X C-130 X X Hkp 14 TBD (X) X Swedish Naval (Legacy link) X X X units Amphibious (Legacy link) X X Swedish Army X X X Units (GBAD) Coalition NATO/EU units X X X (X) = Under consideration

287 Annex L Page 1 (8) Annex L Submarines (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

288 Annex L Page 2 (8) Table of content 1 Introduction Background Aim Scope Operations General Maritime operations /mission description Operational use of interoperability enablers Introduction Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Secure voice Secure text Miscellaneous Integration and interoperability Platform overview & high level information Exchange Requirements Platform overview High level IERs... 8

289 Annex L Page 3 (8) 1 Introduction 1.1 Background The Gotland and Södermanland submarine classes are well adapted for Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), Special Operations (SpecOps), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW). Submarine utilisation of real-time Tactical Data Links (TDLs) is not imperative to accomplish mission requirements due to the covert nature of the operations. However, means to communicate tactical Command & Communication (C2) data will be required to be able to interoperate with friendly forces. The possibility to send and receive target information as well as obtaining the recognised maritime picture is a major advantage in every covert operation. 1.2 Aim The aim of this annex is to translate the requirements within the TDL, IFF, Secure Voice and Secure Text CONOPS documents to the platform level. This annex will describe how the Submarines will participate in both national and international operations and use the interoperability enabling systems for missions and tasks. This document will also detail the high level Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) for the Submarines that are associated with the interoperability enabling systems and associated role in the stated missions and tasks. 1.3 Scope This annex explains the submarines platform elements and relationship with other platforms. The different kinds of missions, and related information requirements will be explained. 2 Operations 2.1 General The submarine s characteristic qualities make it especially well adapted for covert operations both in national and international operations. Within the framework of all types of operations, reconnaissance and special tasks are performed. 2.2 Maritime operations /mission description The submarine s main operations and missions are as follows: Reconnaissance operations (Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR)) - The submarine is used as a sensor/platform for advanced ISR acquisition.

290 Annex L Page 4 (8) Special operations (SpecOps) - The submarine is used as a reconnaissance acquisition platform and as a means of transportation for special operations units. ASuW - Carried out autonomously or in collaboration with other sea target fighting units. ASW - Reconnaissance and attack against foreign submarines, autonomously or in collaboration with other submarine attack units. Oceanographic and hydrographical survey operations - The submarine is used as a sensor/platform for advanced reconnaissance of unknown areas. 3 Operational use of interoperability enablers 3.1 Introduction This chapter describes the submarine s operational use of the following interoperability enabling systems: TDLs IFF Secure voice Secure text Figure 1 illustrates submarine s use of the interoperability enabling systems.

291 Annex L Page 5 (8) Figure 1 - Context diagram illustrating the submarine s employment of the interoperability enabling systems. 3.2 Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Platform specific link operation (to be determined) For submarines, a TDL system with a Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) capability would be preferable due to operative and tactical procedures. Only a few nations today are actually considering Link 22 on submarines. Therefore, it is of great importance to analyse the benefits versus the costs before making a decision. Hence, the Swedish Armed Forces has not yet made a decision on the way forward for implementation of TDLs on submarines. The submarines can use the TDLs for verification and correlation of the surface picture, e.g. to correlate with sensor information of the own ship. The possibility

292 Annex L Page 6 (8) to send/receive target information is of also a major interest in submarine operations. There are certain advantages if the same data link system can be used in national operations as well as in international operations Command and Control (C2) The Swedish submarine will always be under Swedish Operational Command (OPCOM) during operations in international environments. However, the submarine will normally change Operational Control (OPCON) to other suitable Submarine Operations Authority (SUBOPAUTH) during the operation. Personnel from the Swedish Maritime Component Command (MCC) will be assigned to the SUBOPAUTH were the actual command will be conducted. 3.3 Secure voice Secure voice function is required for the submarine s communication with other surface platforms during operations. Secure voice communications will be transmitted on High Frequency (HF), Very High Frequency (VHF) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Radios using external cryptographic devices and key variables. 3.4 Secure text The Submarines is equipped with a fitted for solution to receive broadcast Low Frequency (LF) transmission, Minimum Shift Keying (MSK). Fitted for in this case, means that the Submarine only needs Cryptographic equipment to be interoperable on LF. The requirement for an interoperable Communication Security (COMSEC) device is of priority. If an interoperable system is provided this would remove the requirement for COMSEC custodian of loaned equipment. At the end of the timeframe of this annex (2022) the aim is to install a Satellite Communication (SATCOM) system for communication between the submarine and the submarine control (SUBOPAUTH). In the timeframe , the Submarines will have HF (to Standardisation Agreement (STANAG) 5066) implemented. In order to support the transmission of operational and tactical information (secure text messages/adatp-3) are as follows: Operational Order (Opord) Operational General Matters (Opgen) Operational Tasks (Optask) for ASW, AAW, ASuW, Communications, Links, etc. Warning order Fragmentary order (FragO) Directions & Guidance

293 Annex L Page 7 (8) Reports (Sitrep, Logrep etc) Requests for Rules Of Engagement (ROE) and ROE Implementation This implementation for the secure text system will be of a Stand Alone nature in the radio cabin and operated by the existing radio personnel. In the period of this document it may be a requirement for Computer Based Networks on the Submarines to be able to exchange Internet Protocol (IP) based information over SATCOM in coalition operations. Today the submarines are equipped with an Inmarsat C 1 system for open transmission. 4 Miscellaneous 4.1 Integration and interoperability Future implementations and integration will be further studied. There is a need for developing a concept of operations for the use TDLs specifically for submarines. Future considerations need to include the requirement for Blue Force Tracking (BFT) or similar system to use during Special Operations with Special Operation Forces (SOF) units. 5 Platform overview & high level information Exchange Requirements 5.1 Platform overview ISD Environment In service Maritime Roles TDLs Secure Voice Secure text IFF Function TBD HF, VHF, UHF with external crypto device HF, HFEM, LF and SATCOM 1 Inmarsat plc (LSE: ISAT) is a British satellite telecommunications company, offering global, mobile services.

294 Annex L Page 8 (8) 5.2 High level IERs Submarine TDL Secure Voice Secure Text IFF SUBOPAUTH X Coalition NATO/EU (X) 2 X X Naval units SOF units X X Swedish Naval units (excluding MCM) (X) X X 2 (X) represents Swe National TDL, IO TDL option in the future

295 Annex M Page 1 (10) Annex M Support Vessels (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

296 Annex M Page 2 (10) Table of content 1. Introduction Background Aim Scope Assumptions Operations Maritime operations Operational use of interoperability enablers Introduction Tactical Data Links(TDLs) Platform specific TDL operation Operator roles Command and Control (C2) Secure voice Secure text Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Miscellaneous Integration and interoperability Platform overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements Platform overview High level IERs... 10

297 Annex M Page 3 (10) 1. Introduction 1.1. Background HMS Carlskrona is a former minelayer modified to a support vessel to the Swedish International Corvette Force and the Mine Counter Measures (MCM) Force. Along with HMS Carlskrona, Sweden also has a former commercial ship, HMS Trossö, acting in a support vessel role to the forces already mentioned. HMS Carlskrona and HMS Trossö support the Corvettes and the MCM vessels with maintenance and logistics. HMS Trossö and HMS Carlskrona are able to conduct Replenishment At Sea (RAS). This ability gives the Corvettes and MCM vessels, a high mobility and flexibility with increased endurance. Carlskrona is equipped with an Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) system with 3 antiaircraft guns (one 57mm (multi-purpose gun) and two 40 mm gun). This facilitates the self-defence capability for Carlskrona when working in or closely to the Area Of Operation (AOO). By the end of the period the Swedish Navy plan to field a new support vessel as a replacement to HMS Trossö and there may also be a new support vessel replacing HMS Carlskrona. The uncertainty concerning when HMS Trossö will be replaced will be managed in this annex by discussing the new support vessel. Carlskrona is modified and well suited to perform as an Ocean Patrol Vessel also with the capability to have an embarked helicopter on-board (A109/Helicopter (Hkp) 15). Carlskrona is also fitted to perform as a Flag ship (Commander Task Force (CTF)) with enough space on board to embark a staff of approximately 40 personnel. The ship is equipped with sufficient networks, computers and communication systems to perform these duties except from some essential interoperable systems. Carlskrona is fitted with a Link 11Tactical Data Link (TDL) system, partly integrated into the Command & Control (C2) system. HMS Carlskrona and the new support vessels can be considered to be fitted with Link 16 Stand Alone System (SAS) when required. A future TDL Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) capability (Link 22) will be determined as part of the BLOS strategy for the navy Aim The aim of this annex is to translate the requirements within the TDL, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), secure voice and secure text CONOPS documents to the platform level. This annex will describe how the Support vessels will participate in both national and international operations, and use the interoperability enabling systems for different missions and tasks. This document will also detail the high level Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) for the

298 Annex M Page 4 (10) Support vessels that are associated with the interoperability enabling systems and associated role in the stated missions and tasks Scope The scope of document explains the platform elements and relationship with other Swedish Armed Forces platforms. The different kinds of missions, and related information requirements will also be explained Assumptions It is assumed that the support ships will have a fitted for 1 to host a Link 16 or Link 11 SAS solution when required- Swedish National legacy TDLs remain for national operations for at least the timeframe of this document or until an adequate solution are procured covering both national and international future requirements. 2. Operations 2.1. Maritime operations General In support operations, the position of all support and auxiliary ships is required to be known in the Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP). This information is vital for the ships being supported by the support vessels when making the transit to the position where support will be supplied. Without this capability, a forwarder of such information/data is required, which will allow the distribution of this data into another TDL or equal system. During support operations, especially in hostile environments, HMS Carlskrona and the new support vessel have a vital requirement to receive Air and Surface threat warnings. HMS Carlskrona is proven operationally as Ocean Patrol Vessel (OPV) in the European Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atalanta. Carlskrona is also proven as Flag ship (TF 465) in Operation Atalanta Mission description Support Operations HMS Carlskrona, HMS Trossö as well as the new support vessel, will support Maritime Operations conducted by Corvettes and MCM units. The support will consist of maintenance and logistics including RAS. 1 Fitted for means the support vessel will have the necessary fixtures and preparations required to host a Link 16 or Link 11 SAS.

299 Annex M Page 5 (10) Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) HMS Carlskrona is able to conduct self-defence against air threats. IFF and Situational Awareness (SA) capability are of great importance and are required to avoid fratricide Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) HMS Carlskrona is equipped with surveillance radars and can therefore generate ISR information that can contribute to the RMP Flag ship, Commander Task Force HMS Carlskrona has the dedicated space on board to host a headquarters staff of approximately 40 personnel. Networks, computers and transmission equipment (Satellite Communication (SATCOM) and High Frequency (HF) radios) are implemented to support this role. 3. Operational use of interoperability enablers 3.1. Introduction This chapter describes the operational use of the following interoperability enablers by the support vessels: TDLs IFF Secure voice Secure text Figure 1 illustrates the support vessel s employment of the interoperability enabling systems.

300 Annex M Page 6 (10) Figure 1. Context diagram of the support vessel s employment of the interoperability enabling systems 3.2. Tactical Data Links(TDLs) 3.3. Platform specific TDL operation During the period covered in this document the Carlskrona, in its role as OPV, will be fitted with Link 11 when operationally required. When operationally required the OPV will also be able to host a Link 16 Stand Alone System.

301 Annex M Page 7 (10) In all missions it is imperative to keep track of other coalition vehicles/platforms. This is to enable: Co-ordination of platforms in a complex Joint or Combined Operation. Prevent fratricide by proactive identification with Precise Position Location Indicator (PPLI), instead of reactive identification with IFF. Force flow control and Military Air Traffic Control that is to facilitate deconfliction when many aircraft uses a narrow airspace. Provide Commanding Officers and operators with Situation Awareness (SA) Operator roles In order to support operational tasking there is a need for a minimum of two different operator workstations. Operations Officer: - Responsible for the tactical picture and the SA at all times for own ship/vessel. AAW Officer: - Responsible for the co-ordination of the air picture and also co-ordination of weapons allocation to hostile tracks in the air. AAW Officer is also responsible to co-ordinate sensor data between own ship/vessel and other AAW units, this includes providing information to the Recognised Air Picture (RAP) Command and Control (C2) HMS Carlskrona has the required space on board to host an embarked headquarters staff, supporting Task Force/Task Group Operations. The vessel is equipped with Communications and Information Systems (CIS) equipment for these tasks. However, interoperable systems for exchange of classified RMP (Over The Horizon (OTH) - Gold messages) and formal messaging is still missing Secure voice Secure voice coordination, between own/coalition assets, of tactical information are the key to succeed in conduct of operations. This will be done by High Frequency (HF), Very High Frequency (VHF) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) secure voice Secure text The Support Vessels will have HF (STANAG 5066) implemented as well as an Allied Communication Publication (ACP) 127 capability. This implementation will be of a Stand Alone character in the radio cabin and operated by the existing radio personnel.

302 Annex M Page 8 (10) In order to support the transmission of operational and tactical information (secure text messages/ Air Defence Allied Technical Publication (ADatP-3)) the following messages will be carried out: Operational Order ( Opord) Operational General Matters (OPGEN) Operational Tasks (OPTASK)for ASW, AAW, ASuW, Comms, Links etc Warning order Fragmentary Order (FragO) Directions & Guidance Reports (Sitrep, Logrep etc) Requests for Rules Of Engagement (ROE) and ROE Implementation In order to exchange information and data in different coalitions the Secure Text mentioned above requires to be complimented by a capability to communicate over Computer Based Networks with SATCOM transmission in a secure manner. Details of the above messages can be found in the secure text CONOPS (bilaga 5) Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) The Support Ship Carlskrona and the future support vessel will be equipped with an IFF Mk XII/XIIA Transponder. The Transponder support the following Modes, Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3/A Mode C Mode 4 Mode 5 The Mode 1 reply is one of 4096 codes that could be set manually on the Transponder or from a Remote Control Unit. The Mode 2 reply code is the ID of the platform. The Mode 3/A reply is one of 4096 codes could be set manually on the Transponder or from a remote control Unit. The Mode C reply is used for testing purpose. The Mode 4 is a secure Mode and the reply indicates if a target is a True Friend. The security is obtained by means of a crypto. Mode 5 is a high confidence secure IFF mode. In addition to indicate if a target is a true friend a Mode 5 reply can contain additional target information with high confidence. The security is obtained by means of modern crypto.

303 Annex M Page 9 (10) Mode S If available, the Mode S reply is used only for testing purpose. Each Mode can be individually enabled or disabled. 4. Miscellaneous 4.1. Integration and interoperability Future, possible integration of interoperability enabling systems and choice of BLOS capability will be considered in the near future. 5. Platform overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements 5.1. Platform overview ISD HMS Carlskrona at least until 2020 HMS Trossö likely until 2017 New Support Vessel from probably 2017 Environment Maritime Roles TDLs Secure Voice Secure text IFF Function Link 11 (could be Fitted for Link-16 if operational required) HF/UHF ACP 127/HFEM Transponder

304 Annex M Page 10 (10) 5.2. High level IERs Support Vessels L-11 Secure Secure Text IFF Voice CRC X X ASC-890 X X JAS 39 C/D Link 16 (X) X X C-130 X X Hkp 14 T B D X (X) E3-A/C/D AWACS X X X Swedish Naval units Legacy Link (X) X X X Support vessels (X) X X Amphibious Legacy Link X X JDLOC Planning OPTASK Link Swedish Army Units X X X X (GBAD) Coalition NATO/EU Naval units X X X X (X) - Only if fitted with Link 16 SAS

305 Annex N Page 1 (9) Annex N AMPHIBIOUS FORCES (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

306 Annex N Page 2 (9) List of content 1 Introduction Background Aim Scope Assumptions Operations Introduction Maritime operations Mission descriptions Operational use of interoperability enablers Introduction Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Secure voice Secure text Miscellaneous Integration and interoperability Platform overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements Platform overview High level IERs... 9

307 Annex N Page 3 (9) 1 Introduction 1.1 Background The Amphibious Battalion (Bn) is one of the manoeuvre battalions in the Swedish Armed Forces. In addition to the tasks that can be assigned to manoeuvre battalions from the Army, the Amphibious Bn can be given specific tasks for coastal and littoral areas of operations, both nationally and internationally. The Swedish Amphibious Forces also contains a Patrol Craft Company with vessels used for surveillance patrols, maritime control and with the capability to support in anti-submarine operations. In addition, the Patrol Craft Company can deploy boarding parties for national and international operations. The Swedish Armed Forces organise an amphibious rapid reaction force, the international Amphibious Task Unit (ATU), for participation in peace enforcement, peace keeping and humanitarian multinational and multifunctional operations. The ATU is composed of units from the amphibious battalion that are adapted for international service. It shall be possible to adapt the content of the unit with other types of abilities when requested or when other mission-specific requirements are stated/required. It shall be possible to use the ATU when the situation requires short time deployment when there is a requirement for quick intervention. The unit shall have the ability to operate up to 6 months in an operational area. 1.2 Aim The aim of this annex is to translate the requirements within the Tactical Data Link (TDL), Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), secure voice and secure text CONOPS documents to the platform level. This annex will describe how the Amphibious Forces and the ATU will participate and use the interoperability enabling systems for the missions and tasks in both national and international operations. This document details the high level Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) that is associated with the interoperability enabling systems and associated role in the stated missions and tasks. q 1.3 Scope This document explains the platform elements and relationship with other platforms. The different kinds of missions, and related information requirements will be explained.

308 Annex N Page 4 (9) 1.4 Assumptions There are currently no plans to field tactical data links to the amphibious forces in the timeframe of this document. If an immediate operational requirement for this occurs it is likely to be the Link 16 Stand Alone System redistributed from the pool of equipment in the Swedish Armed Forces. National links remain for national operations at least until 2020 or until an adequate solution are procured covering both national and international future requirements. 2 Operations 2.1 Introduction The Amphibious Forces and the ATU will be organised in order to be able to participate in national and international operations. Primary task areas for the units are estimated to be coastal areas, archipelagos, larger lakes, deltas and rivers. 2.2 Maritime operations The control of an Amphibious Operation Area (AOA) is to allow for both close protection and in-harbour protection against attacks from land as from ashore e.g. fast small boats. This ability, in combination with the capacity of the amphibious units to protect Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) allows for full use of harbours and waterways. The amphibious units will be able to take part in embargo operations through Sea Traffic Control (STC) mainly dealing with control of smaller ships and boats. This enables the Force Commander to enforce the operation mandate and stop troop movements and arms smuggling. The aim for the amphibious forces and ATU is to contribute to: Combating, with high precision, (mobile) sea and land targets as well as capture and holding terrain Opening and keeping communications and/or ports open Protection or monitoring operations, terrain and objects Contribute to a situational picture, sea and land (Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP), Recognised Land Picture (RLP)) Transport personnel and equipment within the framework of evacuation operations Protecting evacuation operations within the framework of Maritime Interdiction

309 Annex N Page 5 (9) The Amphibious forces and ATU main tasks (in no order of priority) are: To obtain and sustain control in littoral areas Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) Escort (Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)/ ASuW/Anti-Air Warfare(AAW)) Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) The amphibious units and ATU may be required to perform Fire support functions such as Close Air Support (CAS) and/or Navy Gunfire Support (NGS)) in all above mentioned tasks. 2.3 Mission descriptions To obtain and sustain control in littoral areas The units will stay in the area and use both land and the sea to obtain and sustain control of coastal and harbour areas on the ground and surface, under the surface and in the air over prolonged periods. The control will allow both close protection and in-harbour protection against attacks from land as well as attacks from ashore e.g. fast boats and divers. The Amphibious units/atu, whilst sustaining control, will also protect SLOC allowing full use of harbours and waterways. The control over the area also contains STC with means that the units are able to monitor a coastline or an archipelago area within its own sensor range with the aim of maintaining an embargo for a long period Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) The Amphibious units/atu are able to combat all types of surface vessels and hovercraft. The units weapon systems and sensors have a good ability to operate in an extreme littoral environment. It shall be possible to carry out an armed attack with a high degree of precision and safety with regard to the identification from the weapon system s maximum range to the vessel s immediate surroundings Escorting/protection (ASuW/AAW) The units are able to escort and protect vessels of high value. The task means ability to fight against surface targets and air threats in a littoral environment Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) The units are able to take part in NEO missions. However these missions have no requirement for TDL implementation.

310 Annex N Page 6 (9) 3 Operational use of interoperability enablers 3.1 Introduction This chapter describes the operational use of the following interoperability enablers by amphibious forces/atu: TDLs Secure voice Secure text Figure 1 illustrates Amphibious Forces/ATU the employment of the interoperability enabling systems. Figure 1. Amphibious units possible employment of the interoperability enabling systems.

311 Annex N Page 7 (9) 3.2 Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Platform specific The amphibious forces/atu will be able to communicate real time and near real time information with both other Navy and Army units. These systems will for the timeframe of this document mainly rely upon national legacy links. The ability of Blue Force Tracking (BFT) will be implemented during the coming years Command and Control (C2) The Amphibious/ATU units normally constitute a coherent combat unit (Bn/task unit/task element) and shall be able to manage independent tasks. The Amphibious units shall have the ability to lead one additional unit of corresponding capacity to its own. The unit is able to take part in all missions, as described in chapter 2.2, in a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Operation under the command of a Maritime Component Commander (MCC). 3.3 Secure voice Requirements to co-ordinate within the amphibious forces and other units over secure voice communication are essential. This is to be in order to fulfil different missions and tasks that may be given to the amphibious units. However, these requirements are not yet described in this issue of this document. 3.4 Secure text In order to support the transmission of operational and tactical information (secure text messages/allied Data Publication (ADatP-3)) mentioned below, in the timeframe , the Amphibious force will have HF-mail (Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 5066) implemented. This implementation will be of a Stand Alone character and operated by the ordinary radio personnel. Operational Order (Opord ) Operational General Matters (Opgen ) Operational Tasks for (OPTASK ) AAW, ASuW, Comms, Links etc Warning order Fragmentary order (FragO) Directions & Guidance Reports (Sitrep, Logrep etc)

312 Annex N Page 8 (9) Requests for Rules Of Engagement (ROE) and ROE Implementation More information of the messages listed above can be found secure text CONOPS (Enclosure 5). 4 Miscellaneous 4.1 Integration and interoperability The Swedish Royal Navy and the amphibious forces have extensive experience from communicating with tactical data links since the early 1980s. In conjunction with the implementation of the future Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) TDL (Link 22 for example) exchanging sea surveillance information also with the Amphibious forces have to be considered, either through gateway solutions or some a TDL implementation on-board some of the vessels in the units. Systems for CAS, NGS and co-operation with helicopter units, for instance, The Variable Message Format (VMF) is considered for the time period of this document but a decision on its implementation has not yet been finalised. 5 Platform overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements 5.1 Platform overview ISD Environment In service Maritime/Land Roles TDLs May host a Link-16 SAS, VMF (considered in the timeframe ) Secure Voice HF/VHF/UHF with external crypto device Secure text HF-mail, ACP-127, AdatP-3 IFF Function

313 Annex N Page 9 (9) 5.2 High level IERs Amph (ATU) TDL Secure Voice Secure Text IFF CRC X ASC-890 X JAS 39 C/D X C-130 X Hkp 14 E3-A/C/D X AWACS Swedish Naval Legacy Link X X units Amphibious Legacy Link X X SOF X X JDLOC Swedish Army Units (GBAD/ FHQ/ BnHQ) Coalition/NAT O/EU Naval/ Land units Land based system X X X X X

314 Annex O Page 1 (17) Annex O Ground Based Air Defence (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

315 Annex O Page 2 (17) List of contents 1. Introduction Background Aim Scope Assumptions Operator roles in air defence C2 Systems GBAD OC UndE GBAD operations Introduction Mission description GBAD missions and tasks GBAD system description GBADOC UndE EldE Lvkv Operational use of interoperability enablers Introduction Tactical Data Links Introduction GBAD employment of Link Information exchange in a Link 16 Network Secure voice Secure text Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Introduction GBADOC implementation UndE 23 IFF implementation EldE 70 implementation Lvkv 90 implementation Contribution to joint operations Interfaces with Swedish national legacy systems GBADOC UndE Miscellaneous Introduction Integration and interoperability Relationship with Swedish Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) Platform overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements Technical overview GBADOC... 16

316 Annex O Page 3 (17) UndE High Level IERs GBADOC UndE

317 Annex O Page 4 (17) 1. Introduction 1.1. Background In the timeframe the Swedish Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) systems will be upgraded to employ Tactical Data Links (TDLs), Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), secure voice and secure text interoperability enabling systems. In 2015 the Swedish GBAD will be reinforced with a new battalion level Command and Control (C2) system, the GBAD Operations Centre (GBADOC). In the GBAD organisation the GBADOC is the main interoperability node. All GBAD systems are equipped to participate in both national and international operations Aim This document translates the for TDL, IFF, secure voice and secure text CONOPS implementation to platform specific requirements for the Swedish GBAD units. This document describes how the GBAD units will be deploy the interoperability enabling systems for the missions and tasks described in the four joint TDL, IFF, secure voice and secure text CONOPS Scope This annex describes the use of TDL, IFF, secure voice and secure text for the GBAD for national and international operations in the timeframe for the platforms GBADOC and UndE Assumptions Joint Range Extension Application Protocol (JREAP) may be used for information exchange (surface and air) between GBADOC and C2STRIC/Command & Reporting Centre (CRC). It is also assumed that the JREAP may be used to overcome connectivity problems with other ground based systems. For information exchange within the GBAD system national data links will remain for both national and international operations. 2. Operator roles in air defence C2 Systems 2.1. GBAD OC The following operator roles are responsible for conducting the real time Air Defence (AD) operations in GBADOC: Master controller (Tactical Director) Responsible for all tactical AD operations that are conducted in the GBADOC.

318 Annex O Page 5 (17) 2.2. UndE 23 Air Surveillance Officer (Tactical Director Assistant) Responsible for Local Air Picture (LAP) production, including identification (contributing to the Recognised Air Picture (RAP)). Fire Allocator (Tactical Director Assistant) Responsible for weapons allocation and coordination. The following operator roles are responsible for conducting the real time AD operations in UndE 23: Master Tracker Responsible for radar management and tracking functions. Sensor Operator Provides support to Master Tracker in management and tracking functions. Surface Track Operator - Responsible for the Local Maritime Picture (LMP) (contributing to the Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP)). 3. GBAD operations 3.1. Introduction The GBAD units will carry out the following missions 1 : Separation Of Parties by Force (SOPF) Conflict Prevention (CP) Evacuation Operation in a non-permissive environment (EO) Assistance to Humanitarian Operations (HA) All of the above stated tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories. To be able to fulfil the above missions the Swedish Armed Forces will have access to resources that can operate transparently between these tasks. The GBAD units will have the capability to be interoperable with each other. The GBAD units will have a modular and flexible configuration. This configuration will consist of units reported to international force catalogues (UN/NATO/EU). 1 Whole spectrum of TEU, Art 17/2 the tasks identified in the European Security Strategy.

319 Annex O Page 6 (17) 3.2. Mission description GBAD missions and tasks Missions that will be carried out by GBAD during War, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Crisis Response Operations (CRO), are: 1. Protect vital units /installations/infrastructure 2. Secure freedom of movement for coalition/friendly forces This is achieved by: a. Providing Active Air Defence (ActAD) for designated vital assets and areas against attacks from Air Threats (AT) such as aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and cruise missiles, Rocket Artillery and Mortar (RAM) and Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBM). b. Protecting vital passages/bridges from air assault and attack c. Protecting friendly aircraft by minimizing and preferably eliminating the potential of fratricide. d. Providing freedom of manoeuvre for ground forces. e. Providing a correct threat evaluation and presentation of Air Protection (AP) to units, in order to have correct readiness that promotes survivability and endurance. f. Enforcing no fly zones The GBAD main task is to conduct air surveillance 24 hours a day seven days a week disseminating the LAP to: a. Increase SA for own and other units b. Enable GBAD Fire Unit (FU) engagement operations c. Contribute to the RAP A GBAD subtask is to detect incoming RAM and support Force Protection (FP) operations by disseminating RAM warning to own, coalition military units and civilians within a calculated risk area. The launcher point coordinates could be used by Artillery and other assets for Counter RAM (C-RAM) actions GBAD system description GBADOC The GBADOC is the main GBAD interoperability node and will communicate with the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters (HQ) and higher echelon units such as a Force HQ (FHQ), Brigade HQs, Air Operations Centre (AOC) and the Control & Reporting Centre (CRC and C2STRIC (Swedish national CRC)). The GBADOC is responsible for command and control (C2) of all GBAD surveillance and fire units. All GBAD force operations and engagement operations are controlled from the GBADOC. The GBADOC is responsible for mission

320 Annex O Page 7 (17) planning, defence design, war gaming, analysis, Local Air Picture (LAP) production, contributing to the Recognised Air Picture (RAP), Threat Evaluation and Weapon system Allocation (TEWA), Warning - Rocket Artillery Mortar (W- RAM) and reception and onward dissemination of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and Air Control Order (ACO) within the GBAD unit. The GBADOC includes functionality such as track correlation, track identity management, ACO integration, ATO integration, GBAD status information, Emission Control (EMCON) management, W-RAM management/dissemination, terrain and battle space visualisation and threat evaluation. The GBADOC receives and transmits tracks, target data and system information to and from UndE 23, PS 90, PS 91, EldE 97 and EldE IRIS-T units using a Swedish national data link network or encrypted UHF field radio UndE 23 UndE 23 is both radar and a C2 unit. It is the secondary GBAD interoperability node and will operate in the same way as the GBADOC but with limited number of units. UndE 23 is the backup system that will take the control if the GBADOC is disconnected or disabled. UndE 23 is splinter proof mobile self-propelled autonomous surveillance radar operating in the C-band. It has a 3D radar sensor with a coverage range of 100 kilometres (km) horizontally and 25 km vertically. The UndE 23 is equipped with small target capability and a RAM mode. UndE 23 can also detect surface targets using a surface channel. UndE 23 is able to handle 500 air targets (including RAM) and 100 surface targets simultaneously. UndE is able to detect and display jammer directions. The UndE 23 is equipped with an integrated NATO IFF Mk XII Interrogator. UndE 23 provides the GBADOC with tracks and target data via a national duplex data link network. UndE 23 receives tracks and target data from GBADOC, and other UndE 23, PS 90 and PS 91. UndE 23 includes a tactical C2 capability and can assign targets to all fire units. UndE 23 is capable of detecting RAM and includes a warning system for camp-protection. UndE 23 calculates both impact point and launcher point and the information could be used for Counter-RAM (C- RAM) actions EldE 70 EldE 70 receives tracks and target data from UndE 23 and PS 90 and via a Swedish national simplex data link. EldE 70M is equipped with IRV. EldE 70 is equipped with a NATO IFF Mk XII Interrogator.

321 Annex O Page 8 (17) EldE 70 is a man pad system with a shooting range of 8 kilometres horizontally and 5 kilometres vertically. The detailed use and employment of EldE 70 is not described in this CONOPS. The system is estimated to be replaced around Lvkv 90 Lvkv 90 (AAV 90) can receive tracks and target data from GBADOC and UndE 23 via a Swedish national simplex data link. Lvkv 90 is equipped with local tracking radar with IRV and threat evaluator and has the capability to engage both land and air targets. Lvkv 90 is equipped with an integrated NATO IFF Mk XII Interrogator. Lvkv 90 is an armoured vehicle with a shooting range of 5 kilometres horizontally and 3 kilometres vertically. The tracking radar has a range of 20 km. Lvkv 90 is not a part of the GBAD battalion and the detailed use and employment is not described in this CONOPS. 4. Operational use of interoperability enablers 4.1. Introduction This chapter describes the operational use of the following interoperability enablers by the GBAD units: TDLs IFF Secure voice Secure text Figure 1 illustrates the GBAD unit s employment of the interoperability enabling systems.

322 Annex O Page 9 (17) Figure 1. GBAD units the employment of the interoperability enabling systems Tactical Data Links Introduction The interoperability node GBADOC will be equipped with an integrated Link 16 system in The Link 16 system used in will be a fully integrated solution providing GBAD the ability of receiving and transmitting within a Link 16 network. The GBAD Link 16 system in the GBADOC will include C2-node capability. In addition to the integrated Link 16 system the GBAD unit will have access to Link 16 Stand Alone Systems (SAS). These will mainly be used to increase the

323 Annex O Page 10 (17) UndE 23 capability with a RAP reception and presentation for SA during missions where the GBADOC is not deployed GBAD employment of Link 16 In the timeframe the GBAD units GBADOC (integrated) and UndE 23 (Link 16 SAS) will be able to join a Link 16 network, when a Link 16 network is provided in the operational area. Redistribution of the RAP information will be performed to every GBAD fireand surveillance unit using a national data link Information exchange in a Link 16 Network In a joint environment the GBAD will receive and transmit (according to J-series message catalogue): Precise Participant Location and Identification (PPLI) Surveillance Electronic Warfare (EW)/Intelligence (INTEL). Mission Management (C2 to C2). Weapons Coordination. Control (C2 to non C2, non C2 to C2)). Free text messages. Information management (correlation of target data) The exact set of J-series messages to be implemented in GBADOC is specified in the FMV document LvM Format ver 2.0 u0.91, documentnumber 11FMV859-50:2. This document follows the J-series messages to be implemented in GBADOC as specified in STANAG The GBAD contributes to an increased situational awareness in joint operations for the Recognised Land Picture (RLP), the Recognised Air Picture (RAP) and the Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP) Secure voice The GBAD requires secure voice communication with ground, surface and airborne C2 systems in the area of operation. Secure voice communications will also provide GBAD with the ability to communicate with the Forward Air Controller (FAC) and directly with an aircraft (such as Close Air Support (CAS) platforms, ASC 890, E3 AWACS, etc.). Secure voice is mainly used for resolving issues regarding the RAP such as track ID conflicts, inequality in IFF information etc. HaveQuick (HQ) II or Second generation Anti-Jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN) compatible radio systems may be used.

324 Annex O Page 11 (17) The GBADOC has its main secure voice communication Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) satisfied by its secure voice implementation. However in some international missions the GBADOC may not be deployed. The secure voice requirement must then be fulfilled using UndE Secure text The GBAD will require secure text communication with ground, surface and airborne C2 platforms/systems in the area of operations. Information exchange using secure text will be enabled for both national and international missions (possibly using different Air Defence Allied Technical Publication (AdatP)-3 baselines). Secure text transmissions for GBAD will include the following standard NATO format (numbers refer to AdatP-3 message number) orders such as: Air Operation Directives (AOD), F072 Air Tasking Order (ATO), F068 Airspace Control Order (ACO), F011 Weapon Control Order (WCO), J070 Coverage Mission Order (CMO), F079 Coverage Report (COVREP), N064 Movement Request (MOVREQ), F087 Movement Warning Order (MWO), F088 Movement Execution Order (MEO), F089 Movement Completion Report (MCR), F090 Movement Report (MOVREP), N064 ACM Request (ACMREQUEST), F012 Weapons Engagement Zone Request (WEZREQ), F078 GBAD has the requirement to receive the OPTASKLINK (AdatP-3, N017) for Link 16 network design loads and cryptographic information to initialise the Link 16 terminals. The following standard formats are also used in GBAD operations (these messages are today not AdatP-3 standard messages but may be in the timeframe of this CONOPS):Special Instructions (SPINS) Surface to Air Missile (SAM) Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD) Tactical Order (SSTO) SAM SHORAD Status Report (SSREP) Additionally, free text such as Operational Order (OPORD), Situation Report (SITREP), Warning Order (WO) and Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) will be transferred using secure text systems.

325 Annex O Page 12 (17) 4.5. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Introduction Within the Swedish Army units, only GBAD is equipped with an IFF system. IFF equipment provides the GBAD units with an improved identification capability to help to reduce the risk of fratricide. In the surveillance unit UndE 23 is equipped with a NATO Mark XII compatible IFF Interrogator. The upgrade of the GBAD IFF systems to Mark XIIA (Mode 5) standard is under investigation. The upgrade may occur within the time period of this CONOPS GBADOC implementation C2 of all GBAD units is normally performed from the GBADOC. The GBADOC is therefore the primary Army unit receiver of ACO, ATO, SPINS, SSTO, etc. These documents together with IFF- and Link 16 information provide the GBADOC with vital information in order to optimise the identification process. The GBADOC will have a built in ACO (initially AdatP 3 baseline 11C and 12.2) and ATO management system to avoid the human errors that can occur during manual correlation and to make the system more efficient. The ATO management system will be able to correlate IFF information from the Link 16 network with the local GBAD IFF information UndE 23 IFF implementation The UndE 23 is equipped in with an integrated NATO IFF Mk XII Interrogator. The information from the interrogator is used for identification of radar tracks and compilation of a LAP and will be transmitted to the RAP (Link 16 network) via the GBADOC. The Interrogator in UndE 23 supports the following Modes: Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3/A Mode C Both the use of 32 and 4096 codes is supported. When 32 codes are utilised, the Mode 1 reply indicates the mission Identity (ID) of the target. The set of 4096 codes are for national use only. Mode 1 codes also have a use as special ID or for code changing. The Mode 2 reply indicates the individual unit ID. The Mode 3/A reply has both a military and civilian use as to indicate the Flight Number. Mode 3/A replies are used to correlate civil Flight Plans with the Flight ID of a target. Mode 3 codes also have a military use as Special ID or for Code changing. The Mode C reply has both a military and civilian use as to indicate the Flight Level of the target.

326 Annex O Page 13 (17) Mode 4 Mode S The Mode 4 is a secure Mode and the reply indicates if a target is a True Friend. The security is obtained by means of a crypto. The Mode S replies are used to correlate Flight ID of a target with civil Flight Plans. Mode 1, 2, 3/A and C are used for continuous interrogation, interlaced or individual. Mode 4 and Mode S are used for target specific interrogations EldE 70 implementation The EldE 70 is equipped with an integrated NATO IFF Mk XII Interrogator. The information from the Interrogator is used for identification of assigned targets and pop-up targets. The Interrogator will support at least the following Modes: Mode 1 Both 32 and 4096 codes are supported. When utilise 32 codes the Mode 1 reply indicate the mission ID of the target. The set of 4096 codes are for national use. Mode 3/A The Mode 3/A reply has both a military and civilian use as to indicate the Flight Number. Mode 3 codes also have a military use as Special ID or for Code changing. Mode 4 The Mode 4 is the only secure Mode and the reply indicates if a target is a True Friend. The security is obtained by means of a crypto. Mode 1, 3/A and 4 are used for target specific interrogations Lvkv 90 implementation The Lvkv 90 is equipped with an integrated NATO IFF Mk XII Interrogator. The information from the Interrogator is used for identification of the systems own radar tracks and pop-up targets. Depending on national data link development the IFF information from Lvkv 90 may only be transmitted to other GBAD units via voice. IFF Lvkv 90 will be equipped with IFF panoramic mode. The Interrogator supports the following Modes: Mode 1 Mode 2 Both 32 and 4096 codes are supported. When utilise 32 codes the Mode 1 reply indicate the mission ID of the target. The set of 4096 codes are for national use. The Mode 2 reply indicates the individual unit ID.

327 Annex O Page 14 (17) Mode 3/A Mode C Mode 4 The Mode 3/A reply has both a military and civilian use as to indicate the Flight Number. Mode 3/A replies are used to correlate civil Flight Plans with the Flight ID of a target. Mode 3 codes also have a military use as Special ID or for Code changing. The Mode C reply has both a military and civilian use as to indicate the Flight Level of the target. The Mode 4 is the only secure Mode and the reply indicates if a target is a True Friend. The security is obtained by means of a crypto. Mode 1, 2, 3/A and C are used for continuous interrogation, interlaced or individual. Mode 4 is used for target specific interrogations Contribution to joint operations The IFF system will be integrated into the UndE 23 and the IFF information will be transmitted to the GBADOC which can redistribute the information to other units via a Link 16 network. The GBADOC is responsible for gathering all target-, track- and system information to improve the local situational awareness (LAP). The local GBAD target identification information and the Link 16 RAP are correlated in GBADOC and the information is distributed to all GBAD fire- and surveillance units. 5. Interfaces with Swedish national legacy systems 5.1. GBADOC The GBADOC will be able to receive information (fully integrated) from the national legacy system Försvarsmaktens Broadcast system. This option is only valid when the GBAD unit is not a part of a coalition Link 16 network UndE 23 The UndE 23 will be able to receive information (fully integrated) from the national legacy air surveillance system FM Broadcast. This option is only valid when the GBAD unit is not a part of a coalition Link 16 network. The UndE 23 will also be able to send air target plot information to C2StriC using Sendnet 1.1. This task will not be performed when the GBAD unit is part of a Link 16 network.

328 Annex O Page 15 (17) 6. Miscellaneous 6.1. Introduction This chapter discusses the GBAD s miscellaneous activities and external relationships Integration and interoperability The level of implementation and integration of the interoperability enablers embraced by this CONOPS will be studied further, on a joint service base, and will address the requirement of any additional platform information exchange requirements. The information exchange requirements will be investigated using the Coalition interoperability process (CiOP) process. Future development in Swedish Armed Forces capability includes enabling the process of distributing the air SA to a larger number of units. This may also include distribution to other mission participants using compatible/interoperable communication systems. When a Link 16 network is not provided in the area of operation, GBAD will be able to distribute the LAP to the deployed CRC and other land based C2 systems to increase situational awareness. RAM information (and warning) could be included in this information dissemination Relationship with Swedish Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) With the use of the interoperability enablers (Link 16, IFF, secure voice and secure text), there is a planning design and network management overhead required to operate these systems. The responsibility of this planning and network management for all platforms, including the GBAD, overhead is held within the Swedish JDLOC. All Army platforms shall use the JDLOC to provide the Link 16 and IFF planning, support and management infrastructure. The responsibilities and details of the processes/activities required for the management overhead of the Interoperability enabling systems can be found in the JDLOC annex R.

329 Annex O Page 16 (17) 7. Platform overview & high level Information Exchange Requirements 7.1. Technical overview GBADOC ISD GBADOC in service 2015 Environment Land/Air/Maritime Roles Surface to Air Warfare, Air- and maritime surveillance, Force Protection (RAM warning) TDLs Link 16 (C2 node) JREAP Secure Voice Have Quick II (VHF/UHF) with external crypto device. Secure text IFF Function IS SWERAP MISSION/SWECCIS (Using format AdatP-3) OPTASKLINK Information received from subordinate units Production of LAP, Weapons Management, Sensors management UndE 23 ISD UndE 23 in service 2015 Environment Land/Air/Maritime Roles Air- and maritime surveillance, Surface to Air Warfare, Force Protection (RAM warning) TDLs Link 16 SAS JREAP Secure Voice HaveQuick II (VHF/UHF) with external crypto device. Secure text IS SWERAP MISSION/SWECCIS (Using format AdatP-3) OPTASKLINK IFF NATO MK XII (Mode 4 and Mode S Interrogator) Function Production of LAP, Weapons Management, Target Information

330 Annex O Page 17 (17) 7.2. High Level IERs GBADOC GBADOC TDL Secure Voice Secure Text IFF C2STRIC/CRC PPLI, Surveillance, Free Text, Voice X ACO ATO ASC-890 PPLI, Surveillance, X X Free Text, Voice E3-A/C/D AWACS PPLI, Surveillance, X X X Free Text, Voice, C2 messages JAS 39 C/D PPLI X X C-130 X X Hkp 14 X X Hkp 16 X X FAC/TACP X ACC (FTS) X ACO CAOC/JAOC PPLI, Free text, Voice, C2 messages X ATO ACO SPINS JDLOC Network management, X OPTASK Link Free text, Voice Swedish Naval Units PPLI, Free text, X X X Voice Other coalition TBD TBD TBD TBD SAMOC/GBADOC UndE 23 UndE 23 TDL (JREAP only) Secure Voice Secure Text IFF C2STRIC/CRC Surveillance, Free X ACO/ATO X Text ASC-890 X X E3-A/C/D AWACS X X JAS 39 C/D X X C-130 X X Hkp 14 X X Hkp 16 X GBADOC X X FAC/TACP X ACC (FTS) X ACO CAOC/JAOC X ACO JDLOC X Swedish Naval Units X X Other coalition SAMOC/GBADOC TBD TBD

331 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Annex P Sida 1 (26) Annex P Tactical Air Control Party

332 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 2 (26) List of contents 1. Introduction Background Aim Scope Assumptions Operations Introduction Joint operations Mission description Fire support in general Support by indirect fire Close Air Support (CAS) Target mensuration Command, Control and Communication (C3) The use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Operational use of interoperability enablers Introduction Tactical Data Links (TDLs) VMF Link VDL Secure Voice Very High Frequency (VHF)/Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Satellite Communication (SATCOM) Secure Text Combat Identification (CID) (IFF) Infrastructure Target Mensuration Interface with national systems Miscellaneous Introduction Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) Weather data Training & simulation Operator Roles Introduction TACP platform development Platform Overview & High Level Information Exchange Requirements Technical overview High level IERs... 26

333 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 3 (26) 1. Introduction 1.1. Background The Swedish Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) is a Forward Observing Team (FO-teams) with an embedded Forward Air Controller (FAC). At the international arena the TACP is considered to be equivalent to a Joint Fire Support Team (JFST). There are a great number of FO-teams in the Swedish Armed Forces without the capability to control Close Air Support (CAS), only indirect fire such as Artillery and Mortars. These FO-teams are not described or included in this document. The Swedish FAC Training Program is accredited according to Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) AP Memorandum Of Agreement (MOA) Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) (Ground) since the summer of The standard is known as the JTAC-MOA. The Swedish Training program is written to fulfil both US (JTAC-MOA) and NATO standards (STANAG 3797). Due to historical reasons Sweden has kept the name of Forward Air Controller (FAC) for Swedish terminal attack controlling personnel. The Swedish CAS system is built on international standards as stated above and therefore it will be used in the same way in both national and international operations. To guarantee the TACP s ability to support the Ground Commander (GC) in all types of operations stated in the TDL, IFF, Secure Voice and Secure Text CONOPS annexes the following interoperability enabling systems will be introduced at the TACP within the timeframe of this suite of documents: TDLs a. Variable Message Format (VMF) b. Air Force Applications Program Development (AFAPD) c. Link-16 (L-16) (only via a Gateway function) Secure voice over Very High Frequency (VHF)/Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Tactical Satellite Communication Capable radios (TACSAT) Air to Ground Combat Identification systems (CID) The Armed Forces are considering the possibility to acquire systems for accurate Target Mensuration in the timeframe of this document. The Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, FMV has, with support from the Swedish Armed Forces, described the TACP in a model based architecture using the United Kingdom Ministry Of Defence Architecture Framework (MODAF)). The model is divided in three timeframes; until 2014, until 2017 and after Some of the results have been used to produce this annex. The development of the Swedish TACP has been mainly driven and affected by the operational requirement and the situation in the International Security

334 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 4 (26) Assistance Force (ISAF). The ambition is to make the TACP more generic in the future to increase the use of this unit in all future scenarios in national and international arenas. Interoperability enabling systems, as outlined in chapter 3 of this annex, are vital for this development Aim The aim of this document is to translate the requirements from the TDL, IFF, Secure Voice, Secure Text and Joint Infrastructure CONOPS to allow a coherent platform description of their employment/implementation for the TACP Scope This document describes the TACP s overall mission, relationship with other platforms and breaks down the operations that will be performed by this platform. This description then highlights the role, the specific integration and the employment of the interoperability enabling systems described in chapter 1.1 above. Additionally, this document identifies, and in some cases, justifies the need for specific operational requirements, processing, capabilities, tools and functionality. This annex is valid during the period Assumptions The following assumptions have been made for the TACP: The TACP s are primary operating at Battalion level or lower under a solid and functional Command, Control and Communication (C3) Structure inside of the Ground Environment. The use of CAS is based on international standards (ATP and JP ). Swedish TACP should be able to perform terminal air control of national and international CAS platforms on the Swedish territory as well as on the international arena. The Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) for CAS are equal in both scenarios. This annex refers to Combat Identification (CID) as an Active or a Passive equipment. It operates in the Visual or in the Infrared (IR) spectrum and as Query and Response equipment according to the STANAG 2129 Edition 8 - Identification of Land Forces on the Battlefield and in an Area of Operation. Combat Identification Servers (CIDS) will be operational in both the international and the national arenas within the timeframe of this document.

335 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 5 (26) 2. Operations 2.1. Introduction The TACPs in the Swedish Armed Forces are used in all types of manoeuvre battalions, including the Amphibious Bn as well as the Artillery Bn. TACP is normally operating in a Battalion or a Brigade scenario. The FAC is the advisor for the Ground Commander (GC) in the use of airpower, artillery and mortar support. Swedish FACs are educated and trained to control all types of CAS capable aircrafts, helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), indirect fire from artillery, mortars and Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) according to NATO standards. Swedish Armed Forces will field lightweight FAC equipment for the dismounted TACP in the beginning of the timeframe of this CONOPS. The equipment will support Digital Aided (DA) CAS Tactics Techniques & Procedures (TTPs) and will be stand-alone from national C3 systems when fielded. The integration with future C3 systems will be realised towards the end of this CONOPS timeframe. The Operational scenario described in this document for the TACP is by definition Joint in all situations. This document only describes the Joint operation scenario as a part of the Ground Operation Joint operations The primary role for the SWE TACP is to integrate the Air Operation into the planning and execution of the Land Operation by supporting the GC with CAS. The Swedish Armed Forces defines CAS as: Air activity against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Such action requires the involvement of a qualified FAC 1. The primary mission for the TACP in national and international scenarios is to integrate the use of all available CAS assets into the combat situation by being the FAC who conducts the terminal attack control of each air mission. Secondarily, the TACP is supporting the GC in the use of indirect fire (artillery and mortars) according to the plan for the combat situation by being a Forward Observer (FO). Above this, the TACP is supporting the GC in collecting vital Intelligence (INTEL) for the targeting process by using all available ground and aircraft based sensors. Beside that the TACP normally becomes the natural communication node between the ground and air assets to increase Situational Awareness (SA) for both air and ground units. All indirect fire support missions (CAS, Artillery,

336 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 6 (26) Mortars and NGS) within the Swedish Armed Forces are done according to international standards. The use of voice procedures and digital aided procedures over secure communication systems is vital and essential for the TACP to accomplish their mission to support the GC with CAS at both the international and the national operations Mission description Fire support in general Swedish Armed Forces describes fire support as: the fire support given from Artillery and Mortars as well as the use of CAS and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) platforms. In the ideal world the user (the supported GC) should not have to be concerned about the type of fire support that is provided as long as it fulfils its purpose. The Fire Support Officers at Brigade and Battalion level in the Swedish Armed Forces are responsible for planning and execution of the use of Indirect Fire Support at each level. The FO and the FAC is normally the executor of the use of indirect fire support and normally have the clearance authority depending on given Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the scenario. All Swedish platoon leaders should be able to support a FO or a FAC in controlling indirect fire and/or CAS (type 2) as an observer over tactical radio nets at company or battalion level. This is the Swedish method of gaining the Joint Fires Observers (JFO) capability to the ground forces. There are no plans for certifying JFO or Airborne FAC (FAC-(A)) personnel in the Swedish Armed Forces. The development of the national capability in conducting joint operations (Joint Fires) at Brigade or higher level is prioritized for the Swedish Armed Forces in this annex timeframe Support by indirect fire SWE TACP will have the capability to control both national and international artillery and mortar assets on secure communications. Indirect Fires can be done by voice or digital procedures. Swedish national TTP for indirect fires are based on the use of Digital Aided (DA) Equipment with a national system. Voice TTP is used as reserve alternative in case of system breakdown and when supported by international indirect fire support systems. In the national scenario the Swedish TACP and FO teams are capable of supporting the GC with indirect fire support over both secure voice and secure 1 FM UP 13 - HKV :53070 FMUP Bilaga 3

337 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 7 (26) text with a national cryptographic materiel including frequency hopping algorithms. At a minimum, the Swedish TACP are planned to be able to support the GC with indirect fire over secure communication (type 1 crypto) in all types of national and international operations within the timeframe of this TACP annex Close Air Support (CAS) TACP will have the capability to control both national and international CAS assets by using voice TTPs or digital aided CAS TTP. Swedish TACP is at the moment using voice TTPs in both national and international operations due to lack of digital aided CAS software. Swedish TACPs use of secure communication is at the moment restricted to the ISAF operation due to the limited access to US type 1 capable radios. Sweden has fielded a Video Downlink (VDL) system. TACP in the Swedish Armed Forces are planned to be able to support the GC with CAS over secure communication with voice and digital TTP and with the use of VDL receivers in all types of national and international operations with all available CAS platforms within the timeframe of this TACP annex Target mensuration The TACP capability to produce accurate target grids is normally one of the biggest issues when supporting the GC. The need for accurate grids is most critical when deploying precision ammunition like IAM (Inertial Aided Munitions). The use of IAM is very depending on the restrictions given in the ROE (Rules of Engagement) for the operation. The Joint Publication and the NATO Allied Technical Publication (ATP) describe the Target Location Error (TLE) as the difference between a set of target coordinates generated and the actual location of the target. In order to facilitate the communication of targeting accuracy, TLE is characterized in six categories. The first row presents the categories of TLE which range from best (CAT 1) to worst (CAT 6) and are used to classify the coordinate accuracy of any coordinate generating system. CAT feet 0-6 m TARGET LOCATION ERROR CATEGORIES CAT feet 7 15 m CAT feet m CAT feet m Table 1. Target location error categories CAT feet m CAT 6 >1001 feet >305m Or Large Elliptical Error Rules Of Engagement (ROE) normally state highest (worst) allowed CAT for engaging target. When using IAM, the bomb is guided to a designated impact

338 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 8 (26) angle and azimuth over the coordinates entered into the ammunition via the aircraft system. Therefore, great care must be taken to ensure that the most accurate target location (i.e. lowest TLE) is obtained and correctly fed into the weapon/system. The tactical situation (type of target, desired weapons effects, closest friendly forces, etc.) together with the given ROE, determines the acceptable TLE. The TACP capability to produce a CAT 1 grid is therefore crucial for the capability of engaging targets with, for example, the artillery shell EXCALIBUR - XM982 (Trajectory correctable ammunition), IAM like GBU-49 (Enhanced Payway II), GBU-39 (SDB-II) from a JAS 39 C/D Gripen or any other coalition aircraft. The Swedish TACP is currently not capable of produce CAT 1 coordinates with their own equipment. The national Battle Management System (BMS) is planned to support this requirement within the timeframe of this CONOPS Command, Control and Communication (C3) There are three main reasons for using the support of adequate C3 systems for the TACP: Co-ordinate complex joint, combined and composite air- and ground operations, like a joint operation with CAS, Indirect Fire, UAS and helicopters inside a High Density Airspace Control Zone (HIDACZ). Increase own SA (both Air and Ground Units) to prevent fratricide with proactive identification over TDL by using the CID-servers, instead of reactive identification with IFF and other Combat Identification equipment like Infra-Red (IR)-beacons and marker panels. The TACP is a supporting unit to the GC. The TACP is depending on his capability to have a good SA at the supported unit and on the supporting platforms. The TACP should be a part of the supported unit C3 system to be able to do his job in a safe and proper way. The TACP is normally the only communication link between the Air and Ground units at the combat field. By using the communication link to the air assets the TACP can improve the SA on the GC by adding the airspace situation to the GC in their tasks to control the dedicated airspace. The BMS system capability to interact with other nations BMS over TDL is crucial for the Ground Unit capability to have a good SA in the field. This annex will only describe the need of enablers for the TACP to bring the effect on the target. C3 systems need for interoperability enablers in this annex is described in the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Document for Interoperability Enabling Systems. Swedish C3 system at Battalion level will be built as a Blue Force Tracking (BFT) system with an attached Fire Support Module (FSM). The FSM is only handling technical issues for fire support tasks such as the target information like

339 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 9 (26) Call For Fire (CFF) or the CAS brief (9-liner). The FSM depends on the BFT system communication capability since it does not have its own communication to external platforms. Currently, the Swedish TACP only has the capability to interact with the airspace assets via voice procedures. Sweden will field a stand-alone TACP software (a FSM for the TACP) in the beginning of This software is planned to have the capability of communicate via VMF and Link 16 (if connected to an ASOC Gateway for Link 16) to support the DA CAS capability. The future national BMS/FSM is planned to be an integrated solution for CAS and indirect fire support and meets the requirements for communication over VMF and Link The use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) UAS are available on many levels at the battlefield. Swedish TACP will mainly use UAS as an ISR asset. The TACP is capable of controlling a UAS in the support of the GC. UAS are normally used to collect INTEL and increase the SA for the GC. The platform is treated as any other aircraft inside the airspace by the FAC. The communication to the UAS can be done over secure communication on VHF/UHF as with fixed wing platforms Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) BDA is normally carried out after an attack at any target. The TACP has the possibility to use its own sensors to observe and document the attack on the target. The use of VDL is a beneficial way of doing a BDA during the attack and directly after hitting the target. This streamed video can be stored on the TACP field computer. VDL can be done over Ku-band, C-band, L-band, S-band, and UHF. At the moment the VDL normally is analogue and unsecure, but Sweden anticipates that the link will be digital and encrypted for standard. Swedish VDL receivers are planned to be enhanced to handle encryption and digital reception. 3. Operational use of interoperability enablers 3.1. Introduction The TACP is the unit on the ground that brings joint fire to effect. As the link between the GC and the air asset they are the ultimate Joint Fire enabler. To be able to bring the true effect of joint fire to the fight at the national and the international arena they will need access to the enablers in this suite of documentation. This chapter describes the operational use of the following enablers TDLs Secure voice Combat Identification systems (CID/IFF) Infrastructure

340 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 10 (26) Target mensuration Capability yet to be determined Figure 1 illustrates the TACP s employment of the interoperability enabling systems. Figure 1 Context diagram illustrating the TACP s employment of the interoperability enabling systems Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Digital systems that are meant to aid aircrew and terminal attack controllers in exchanging CAS missions has come to a greater importance due to the reduction of possible errors in passing target information and the reduction of time spent to develop CAS briefings. However, verbal radio calls will remain the principal means of communication. The use of TDL will permit JTACs and aircrew to digitally exchange messages, such as check-in and 9-line brief, and can be particularly beneficial in situations

341 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 11 (26) involving high operational tempo, language familiarity/issues, or communications jamming. Swedish TACP will primarily use VMF as the protocol for DA CAS at the national arena due to the implementation of VMF in JAS 39 C/D version 20. At the international arena Swedish TACP will be able to use AFAPD, VMF and Link 16 to transmit the information since the software gap-filler FACNAV is supporting all of these protocols. Sweden has the ambition to fulfil block 1 (see 3.2.1) and follow the development of block 2 and 3 in the Coordinated Implementation (CI) of DA CAS Change and Control Board (CCB) within the timeframe of this CONOPS. MTS 2 and SADL 3 will not be implemented in Swedish DA CAS systems. Swedish TACP is planned to use the Norwegian software FACNAV to conduct DA CAS until the national BMS is fielded with a DA CAS capability after The list below shows what types of TDLs used at different CAS platforms. Swedish TACP refers to the information in the table 2. 4 SWE and U.S. strike aircraft LINK 16 AFAPD VMF JAS 39 X X AH-1 AH-64D A-10 X A/V-8B F/A-18 A+/C/D X X F/A-18 E/F X X F-16 (Capability varies by model) X X F-15E X AC-130H X AC-130U X B-52 X B-1 X SWE and US JTAC/FAC systems LINK 16 AFAPD VMF FACNAV (Swe Gap-filler for DA CAS X X at TACP) (via GW) X SWE BFT with FSM X X FOS X PFED X 2 US Multi-spectral Targeting System 3 US Air Force Situational Awareness Data Link 4 According to the draft of DA CAS TTP 18 April 2012 with Swedish information added

342 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 12 (26) TLDHS X X BAO Kit X TACP-CASS (MRAP/STRYKER) X X TACP-CASS w/ ASOC Gateway X X X VMF Table 2. Strike aircraft and JTAC/FAC systems VMF is a line of sight, point-to-point TDL network that typically includes the flight/section of aircraft and the joint terminal attack controller (JTAC). VMF is primary used to exchange mission data in order to attack targets. VMF will be the primary TDL for DA CAS in Sweden due to the implementation of VMF in JAS 39 C/D Gripen. The DA CAS implementation at the TACP will focus on the capability to conduct terminal attack control of CAS over Combat Net Radios (CNR). According to the Block 1 in the DA CAS CI CCB the following VMF messages will be the most important to implement: Free Text (K01.1) Aircraft On-Station (K02.34) CAS Aircrew Briefing ( 9 Line ) (K02.33) Aircraft Depart Initial Point (K02.35) Request for K02.57 Aircraft Attack Position and Target Designation (K02.59) Aircraft Attack Position and Target Designation (K02.57) CAS Battle Damage Assessment (CAS BDA) Report (K02.28) Tactical Image Transfer (K04.17) (Optional) Information Request (K01.3) Current VMF capability is referred to as A/C/C. The letters refer to the current versions of three MIL STDs which stand for: 6017 A VMF Message, format) C VMF Message, Header) C Radio and Modem, Bearer DACAS Coordinated Implementation (DACAS CI), Blocks 1 and 2, will be based on a newer version of standards: B/Dch1/Dch1 which stands for: MIL-STD 6017 Version B VMF Message format MIL Version D Change 1 VMF Message, Header MIL-STD Version D Change 1 Radio and Modem, Bearer Sweden will implement VMF in JAS 39 and on the TACP according to B/Dch1/Dch1 VMF standard.

343 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 13 (26) Block 2 in the coordinated implementation consists of ECP 5 (Common Data Load): Development OPTASK CNR segment message and a Common Initial Data Load format ECP 6 Joint Tactical Air Request (JTAR): Coordinate a Joint, interoperable, digital JTAR process ECP 7 (FAC(A) Functionality): Provide FAC(A) with Terminal Attack Control VMF messaging capability outlined for JTACs in Block 1 ECP 8 (UAS as Strike): Implement the Block 1 Terminal Attack Control VMF messaging over UAS voice channels ECP 9 (NEW): Coordinate the digital exchange of NEW control and reporting messages (J11.x over CNR network) ECP 10 (Multi-Target CAS Briefs): Execute multiple static targets in a single CAS 9-line with Block 1 VMF messaging ECP 11(BLOS / SA) Coordinate the digital exchange of SA information from BLOS sources prior to CAS Check-in; Coordinate the transition of digital information from one network to another Link 16 J-series messaging in support of CAS normally occurs over Link 16 and SADL networks. Link 16 and SADL are line of sight, non-nodal networks that provide digital communications among many participants. JTACs and TACPs typically do not have direct access to Link 16 and SADL terminals. JTACs and TACPs participate in J-series message networks via both ground and airborne gateways. The Link-16 will increase the airspace SA on TACP. Swedish TACP will only be able to communicate via Link 16 if connected to an international ASOC Gateway. The workflow for DA CAS TTP is the same for Link 16 and VMF as stated in the figure 2.

344 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 14 (26) Figure 2: Anticipated workflow for JTAC communicating with Link 16 and VMF capable A/C 5 Table 3 shows CAS Mission Flow: Voice to DACAS Protocols 6. 5 According to the draft of DA CAS TTP 18 April According to the draft of DA CAS TTP 18 April 2012

345 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 15 (26) Digital 2 Aided CAS Protocol 3 CAS Mission Flow 1 Voice VMF 4 AFAPD 5 J-Series Message (Link 16 / SADL) 7 1. Routing / K1.01 FT Voice (J28.2) Free Text (FT) Safety of Flight 2. JCAS Aircraft Check-in K2.34 OSR X On Station Report (J28.2) FT K1.01 FT Voice (J28.2) FT 3. Situation Update 4. Gameplan K1.01 FT Voice (J28.2) FT 5. CAS Attack K X Brief (9-Line) 8 Line Brief Line Brief (J3.5) Land Track(s), J28.2 FT and (J12.0) Mission Assignment (MA) if needed 6. Remarks / K1.01 FT Voice (J28.2) FT Restrictions 7. Readbacks Voice (WILCO) Voice (J12.6) Target Sorting Message (TSM) and voice 8. Correlation as required K2.57 APTD Voice (J12.6) TSM if needed and voice 9. Conduct the attack 9 K2.58 Voice Voice clearance or abort as required 10. Repeat 4-9 as Repeat 4-9 Repeat 4- Repeat 4-9 as required required BDA K02.28 BDA Voice (J28.2) FT 12. Routing / Safety of Flight K1.01 FT Voice (J28.2) FT Table 3. CAS Mission Flow Table 3 Notes: 1. The CAS mission flow used here is taken from MAWTS-1 TACP TACSOP dated 23 May 2011, page Text highlighted in yellow are digital messages used to convey some portion of information exchanged during CAS mission execution. 3. Digital communication protocols in use today as an aid to JCAS execution are Variable Message Format (VMF), Air Force Application Program Development (AFAPD) sometimes referred to as IDM, Marine Tactical System, and J-series messages over beyond line of sight Link 16 and Situation Awareness Data Link (SADL) networks. 4. The Variable Message Format (VMF) is found on all USN and USMC F/A-18 aircraft. That is not to say all F/A-18s fly with the same VMF implementation. A-10C and some B-52 aircraft also employ VMF communications. VMF is a line of sight, pointto-point network that typically includes the flight/section of aircraft and the joint terminal attack controller (JTAC). There is a VMF coordinated implementation effort

346 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 16 (26) underway with the goal of minimizing discordant VMF communications throughout DOD and coalition partners. 5. The Air Force Application Program Development (AFAPD) is found on some F-16 block 40/50 platforms and to a very limited extent B-52s. AFAPD is a line of sight, point-to-point network providing limited digital communications between the flight and JTAC or TACP. 6. J-series messaging in support of CAS normally occurs over Link 16 and SADL networks. Link 16 and SADL are beyond line of sight, non-nodal networks that provide for digital communications among many participants. JTACs and TACPs typically do not have direct access to Link 16 and SADL terminals. JTACs and TACPs participate in J-series message networks via gateways both ground and airborne. 7. Will comply and cannot comply messages provided in response to digital 9-lines are not included in the matrix for brevity purposes. 8. Depart Initial Point for brevity is not listed in the matrix VDL VDL is normally an unsecure analogue signal streamed from the aircraft and received by the TACP in a VDL receiver at the C-band ( MHz). The international development is going towards the use of digital and encrypted signals. The VDL is used to reduce the risk of fratricide and confirmation of BDA. The Swedish VDL receiver is capable of receive at the L-Band ( MHz), S-Band ( MHz) C-Band ( MHz). The waveform is a National Television System Committee (NTSC) FM Analogue Video according to ITU-R F Pre-emphasis filtering or a Digital H.261 FSK. The access to future crypto for the VDL is crucial for the SWE TACP to be interoperable with the coalition aircrafts in future operations. VDL is part of the DA CAS TTP and is an integrated part of FACNAV software. The use of VDL is following TTP given in JP and ATP Sweden will work for the access of encrypted capable receivers within the timeframe of this CONOPS Secure Voice Secure voice over LOS (VHF/UHF) and BLOS (SATCOM) is used as the primary mean of voice communication in a joint and/or combined operation. This will be carried out using Type 1 Crypto and SATCOM capable radios with external cryptographic devices like VINSON or ANDVT. Secure voice will be used in virtually all types of air operations described in this document.

347 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 17 (26) Swedish TACP is at the moment capable of secure voice (LOS and BLOS) over type 1 Crypto within ISAF. Sweden has the ambition to use secure voice (LOS) at the national arena between TACP and JAS 39. Swedish TACP is using SY-117-F and SY-152 as the multiband radio with type 1 crypto. CYZ-10 or KYK-13 will be the crypto loading device Very High Frequency (VHF)/Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Secure voice communication is used to keep operations security on a high level in the operational environment. Secure voice over VHF/UHF is used as the primary mean of voice communication in a joint and/or combined operation. VINSON crypto is normally used for LOS communication. It will be used in virtually all types of TACP operations. Sweden has acquired a limited number of type one crypto capable radios (SY 117-F and PRC-152) aimed for the ISAF operation. There are no such radios at the national arena. Sweden will request access of type 1 crypto capable radios for national operations within the timeframe of this document Satellite Communication (SATCOM) SATCOM and HF is the mainly used BLOS communication to higher command echelons in the combined operational environment. SATCOM is normally used at the JARN (Joint Air Request Net) for requesting CAS platforms or higher command C2 networks in international operations. VINSON,ANDVT or KG84 cryptos are normally used with SATCOM for communication, depending on what bandwidth is used at the specific net. (Wide Band nets usually use VINSON, Narrow Band nets normally use ANDVT). Sweden has procured a limited number of SATCOM capable radios in ISAF (PRC152 and SY 117-F). Sweden will during 2012/2013 purchase SATCOM simulators to facilitate training before deploying to international operations. SATCOM is not anticipated to be used as a BLOS communication in national operations by the TACP Secure Text The distribution of SPINS, ATO and ACO will be distributed to the TACP at a secure line through the ordinary C3 system in the chain of command. This is therefore not mentioned in this document. Sweden refers the use of VMF messages over a secure VHF/UHF communication as a TDL Combat Identification (CID) (IFF) CID can be aided by Active or Passive equipment. Equipment that aids CID operates in the Visual or in the Infrared (IR) spectrum and as Query and Response equipment according to the STANAG 2129 Edition 8 - Identification of Land Forces on the Battlefield and in an Area of Operation. The TACP is using CID

348 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 18 (26) enabling equipment to verify own positions between air and ground units in conduct of CAS. The TACP is using visual equipment such as mirrors, overt pointers (green laser), overt marker panels (orange panels) in daylight operations. The Infrared (IR) equipment is used mainly in night operations and can be; IR-pointers, IRmarker panels, IR-beacons. Non-visual systems (for human eye) used as CID equipment can be thermal beacons visible to the Lightening III POD or other LDPs. Systems for Query and Response between ground forces will probably be used at the soldier level as a part of the Swedish LS3 system (LedningsStödSystem Soldat). This CID enabling equipment above can be complemented by the future use of CID servers (CIDS) through Link 16 via ASOC Gateways. The use of CIDS is a subject for further investigation and therefore to be decided Infrastructure The use of Tactical Data Links and voice communication at the TACP will be based on the use of secure communications. The Swedish use of secure communication with the required interoperability is based on US Type 1 Crypto. VMF (and Link 16) will be used to communicate mission data within DA CAS TTP. Combat Identification can be made through methods in support of technical systems. The possibility to use these systems in the daily training at the national arena and in case of protecting the homeland when receiving support from other nations gives the TACP the daily train as you fight scenario which is vital for a successful training and a functional chain of command to receive international air support in wartime. It is therefore crucial that Swedish Armed Forces Ground units and TACP has the infrastructural support in the handling of COMSEC equipment and crypto Target Mensuration The Swedish TACP is currently unable to conduct target mensuration above CAT 2 (7-15m) with own equipment. To carry out the desired effect using IAM, such as GBU-39 (JDAM) or EXCALIBUR - XM982, is therefore not possible unless a target grid is given from the supporting Aircraft or any other asset. In international operations with the support from international CAS platforms SWE TACP must be able to deliver accurate grids according to the actual ROE in the operation. If CAT 1 grid is mandated to release a certain type of weapon (i.e. JDAM) Sweden must set a national caveat for many of the weapons used in CAS operations. If the Swedish TACP should be able to use all available CAS

349 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 19 (26) assets in all types of international operations Sweden need a release of target mensuration systems like PSS-SOF. This type of system is currently not available for Sweden. For national operations the Armed Forces intent is to use a system called Rapid Mapping which is based on scanning of the terrain from an aircraft. This system is not possible to use in operations without Air Superiority and a certain time of preparation before entering the Area of Operation (AOO) Interface with national systems The Swedish FAC Equipment for the dismounted TACP will be able to interact with VMF, AFAPD, Link 16, secure voice, secure text and CID systems in international operations, and in national operations if requested. The implementation of these enablers into the national BMS/FSM will be done within the timeframe of this document. 4. Miscellaneous 4.1. Introduction This chapter discusses TACP s miscellaneous activities and external relationships Relationship with Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC) The JDLOC supports TACP and has the sole responsibility for network management, distribution of VMF initialisation data and OPTASK Link Weather data Weather data is sent to the TACP trough the normal chain of command and the C 3 system Training & simulation The Swedish Armed Forces training for TACPs is conducted at the School House at the Artillery Regiment in Boden. The School House is evaluated and accredited in accordance with the JTAC MoA earlier mentioned in this annex. 5. Operator Roles 5.1. Introduction The role for the TACP is to support any given GC in a given combat situation. To fulfil that task the personnel in the TACP must act in the following roles. The TACP consists of a Squad commander (FAC), Deputy Squad Commander (FO), FAC-Assistants, Signallers and Drivers. The TACP can be between 4-8

350 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 20 (26) persons depending on what type of ground unit and the tactical organization. The figure 3 illustrates what type of role every person in the group can have in a given situation. Figure 3. TACP organisation The Squad Commander is in command of the team and has the tactical command of the group. o The Terminal Attack controller has the clearance authority of the attack By giving CLEARED HOT, CONTINUE DRY at Show of Force attacks or CLEARED TO ENGAGE at Type 3 Controls The Air Power Advisor is the advisor for the Ground Commander. The Target Position Marker marks the target with appropriate equipment/methods o By using Laser Designator, IR Laser pointer or Green Laser pointer The Target Acquisitioner determines the grid of the target with appropriate equipment o GPS, Laser Range Finder in various forms (PLRF 15 MAG, Vector 21 NITE or FOI 2000) The Laser Designator Operator handles the laser designator at the command from the Terminal Attack Controller o By using the LF 28A

351 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 21 (26) The Friendly position marker marks the own position of the TACP with appropriate equipment 6. TACP platform development The following charts shows the TACP platform development in three time perspectives; 2014, 2017 and beyond The development is mainly focused on reducing weight and to move from a number of separate stand-alone tools to a systems solution with more integrated tools using TDL (VMF, AFAPD or L-16) over secure communication. Not earlier than 2019 will there be a functional C3 system with a Link 16 capability in the ground units. The goal is to build a kit with a weight less than 10 kg (22 lb.).

352 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Annex P Sida 22 (26) 2014 until 2016

353 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 23 (26) 2017 until 2019

354 HÖGKVARTERET Datum Beteckning Sida 24 (26) 2017 until 2019

355 Annex :xxxxx Page 25 (26) 7. Platform Overview & High Level Information Exchange Requirements 7.1. Technical overview ISD FAC/TACP System 2014 FAC/TACP System 2017 FAC/TACP System Environment Land/Air/Maritime Roles Air to Surface Warfare TDLs Link 16 (C2 and target information, BLOS communication ) VMF (target information) AFAPD SATCOM Secure Voice Secure text CID IFF Function Have Quick II (VHF/UHF) with VINSON HF with 8201 MTT Crypto (national) SATCOM with ANDVT or VINSON IS SWERAP MISSION/SWECCIS (Using format ADatP-3) HF with 8201 MTT Crypto (national) VMF with VINSON Crypto SATCOM with KG-84 Crypto Visual (overt panels and pointers) Infrared (IR-laser pointers, IR-panels, IR-beacons) Query and Response (IFF) TBD Provide safe and secure CAS at the international arena according to AJP and JP 3.09 (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

356 Annex :xxxxx Page 26 (26) 7.2. High level IERs TACP TDL (VMF, L-16, TACSAT) Secure Voice C2STRIC/CRC TACSAT, L-16 (via GW) X ASC-890 TACSAT, L-16 (via GW) X E3-A/C/D TACSAT, L-16 (via GW) X AWACS JAS 39 C/D VMF X C-130 X Hkp 14 X Hkp 16 TACSAT X GBAD L-16 (via GW) X Coalition A/C VMF X JDLOC Network management X Secure Text IFF

357 Annex R Page 1 (20) Annex R Joint Data Link Operations Cell (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

358 Annex R Page 2 (20) List of contents 1 Introduction Background Assumptions Aims Scope Definitions Tactical Data Links (TDLs) IFF Secure voice Secure text Operations General JDLOC mission statement National Operations International operations Guest forces JDLOC organisation General JDLOC structure Officer Commanding (OC) JDLOC Network Planning Cell (NPC) Network Design Cell (NDC) OPNET Management Cell (OMC) Functional responsibilities for JDLOC General Interoperable TDLs General Philosophy for multi TDL management Frequency Clearance Agreement (FCA) Link 16 (MIDS/JTIDS) General Planning Design Operational Network (OPNET) Management Link General Planning OPNET Management Link General Planning OPNET Management... 16

359 Annex R Page 3 (20) VMF General Planning Design OPNET Management TDL Operators Liaison General Unit TDL Officers (UTOs) TDL Operators Group (TOG) Identification Friend and Foe (IFF) General IFF Modes 1-4 and Mode S Planning Management Mode Mode 5 Planning Mode 5 management Supporting documentation and processes General Link 16 SOPs List of Acronyms A list of acronyms for this document and associated CONOPS can be found at Appendix A.

360 Annex R Page 4 (20) 1 Introduction 1.1 Background Tactical Data Links (TDLs) require a pre-defined organisation for planning and management of the infrastructure to ensure successful execution operations. This is particularly important for Multi Information Distribution System (MIDS)/Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) terminals in a Link 16 network. Link 16 employs a node-less architecture for robust and automated data exchange. The organisation that has the responsibility and will provide the management of Interoperable TDLs for Swedish Armed Forces will be the Joint Data Link Operations Cell (JDLOC). The structure and intent of the JDLOC is to employ a joint service approach (Air Force, Navy and Army) to ensure optimum network deployment for all services. To further reinforce this joint approach, the JDLOC will be manned with representatives from all three services and will be under the command of Swedish Armed Forces Network and Telecommunication Unit (FMTM). Responsibilities for the JDLOC in this annex will only be described at a high level. 1.2 Assumptions It is assumed that during the time period of this annex Link 16 is the primary TDL for training, exercises for Swedish Armed Forces in both national and international operations. National and some international operations may be conducted using legacy systems in coexistence with the interoperable TDLs. JDLOC is responsible for providing the management function for operations involving networks made up of more than one TDL. This is known as multi-link TDL operations. 1.3 Aims The organisation and procedures of the JDLOC covers many areas, both technical and operational. The aim of this annex to set out the structure, role, support and responsibilities of the JDLOC for training, exercise, international and National Swedish Armed Forces operations as described in the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Documentation for Interoperability enabling systems Scope The scope of this document covers all of the interoperability enablers stated in the TDL, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), secure voice CONOPS documentation,

361 Annex R Page 5 (20) where a stated central coordinated support/infrastructure function is required from the JDLOC. 1.5 Definitions Within the context of this annex the definition of interoperability enabling systems means all interoperable TDLs, IFF, secure voice and secure text systems Tactical Data Links (TDLs) Within the context of this document, interoperable TDLs are defined as Link 16 (MIDS/JTIDS), Link 11, Link 22 and Variable Message Format 1 (VMF) IFF Within the context of this document (JDLOC annex M), IFF systems are defined as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Mk XII (Modes 1-4 and mode S) and Mk XIIA (Mode 5) Secure voice Within the context of this document secure voice systems are defined as systems that allow voice information exchange up to and including the level of secret and are protected by cryptographic devices/materiel with or without frequency hopping patterns Secure text Within the context of this document, secure text systems are defined as systems that allow text and data exchange up to and including the level of secret and protected by cryptographic devices/materiel. Interoperable High Frequency (HFEM) and any other systems that conform to the format that is described in the NATO document Allied Data Publication (ADatP) -3 is considered as secure text communications. 2 Operations 2.1 General The JDLOC supports operations and tasking of Swedish Armed Forces platforms and systems as directed and described in the Joint TDL, IFF, secure voice and secure text CONOPS. The JDLOC will be the responsible entity within Swedish Armed Forces for the design, planning, managing and monitoring of all operations involving interoperability enablers (TDLs, IFF, secure voice) as well as the Swedish national SECOS Link. 1 VMF consists as a message format, header and bearer which collectively is known as an TDL

362 Annex R Page 6 (20) JDLOC is responsible for the management of TDL activity during operations within the Swedish Area Of Interest (AOI) for both national and training missions. For out of area operations when Sweden is not the lead nation, network management and other JDLOC activities will be conducted by the Framework /Lead Nation. In this case the JDLOC personnel will provide liaison with the lead nation and support to all Armed Forces platforms. 2.2 JDLOC mission statement The primary and foremost important mission for the JDLOC is to provide a joint service network management to the Swedish Armed Forces. The primary and foremost mission for the JDLOC is to provide a joint service to all operations involving TDL and support to the interoperability enabling systems stated in Reference A. 2.3 National Operations JDLOC provides the full functional support, as described in chapter 4 of this document to all participating Swedish Armed Forces platforms. This also includes training and interaction between civilian assets and military authorities. 2.4 International operations JDLOC provides functional support, as described in chapter 4 of this document, for all participating Swedish Armed Forces platforms within an international operation/exercise. When Sweden is a troop contributing nation to an international operation, the JDLOC only provides support to certain TDL network design and planning activities. The JDLOC will provide aspects of infrastructure support for the other interoperability enablers detailed in chapters to and chapters 4 3 and 4.4. Details of level of support to these enablers in international operations are yet to be detailed. The JDLOC may also carry out TDL Operational Network (OPNET) management activities within the context of Swedish Armed Forces participation in an international operation/exercise if required. 2.5 Guest forces On occasions when visiting forces/platforms require operating/using Link 16 or any of the other interoperability enabling systems that require specific permissions to be used in Swedish Area Of Interest (AOI), the JDLOC is the sole focal/contact point.

363 Annex R Page 7 (20) Guest forces procedures 2 include planning/design/clearance activities for both coalition operations with Swedish Armed Forces platforms or if a guest forces want to operate singularly within Sweden s AOI. Details of guest forces procedures are outlined in chapters 4.2 (interoperable TDLs), 4.3 (IFF) and 4.4 (secure voice). 3 JDLOC organisation 3.1 General The JDLOC is an integral element of the interoperability organisation that is required for the successful employment of the interoperability enabling systems enablers employed on Swedish Armed Forces platforms. JDLOC will be manned with personnel from the Swedish Armed Forces Network and Telecommunication Unit (FMTM). Planning and management of TDL in operations are carried out by JDLOC by communicating directly with units and Joint Forces Command. Day to day liaison with units, both national and foreign, will also be the responsibility of JDLOC. The JDLOC office is currently located in the Swedish Armed Forces HQ in Stockholm. 3.2 JDLOC structure The JDLOC has many roles, responsibilities and functions to support and to ensure that TDL operations will be carried out successfully. Therefore, the chain of command, structure, inputs and outputs that relate to the organisation JDLOC has been set out. The JDLOC is responsible to the Joint TDL (JTDL) Directorate for its policy and direction regarding TDL and the other interoperability enabling system issues. The JDLOC provides feedback to the JTDL Directorate and the operator community on how operations involving TDL/interoperable enabling system are being carried out within the Swedish Armed Forces. All operational input including guest forces to the JDLOC are officially notified through Swedish Armed Forces Joint Forces Command. The JDLOC comprises of three internal cells, each responsible respectively for Network Planning, Design and Operational Network (OPNET) Management for TDL operations. Figure 1 shows a block diagram of the different elements of the 2 Guest forces procedures document FMTM _10291

364 Annex R Page 8 (20) JDLOC. The different cells are responsible for the management and planning activities as recommended by AdatP-33. Joint Forces J6 Swedish Armed Forces Joint Communication Agency Swedish Armed Forces TDL Directorate Planning cell JDLOC OC Design cell Management cell Unit TDL Officer TDL Operators Group Figure 1. JDLOC organisation structure Officer Commanding (OC) JDLOC The OC JDLOC has the coordination and command responsibility for the JDLOC. The OC JDLOC acts as the focal point for external entities (military, civilian and industry) for the operation of interoperability enabling systems in Sweden s AOI. OC JDLOC is responsible for the management, distribution and maintenance of interoperability enabling systems management policy and directives to the operator community. OC JDLOC is responsible to the Joint TDL Directorate, Joint Forces Command and FMTM for the overall management and planning for TDLs in operations.

365 Annex R Page 9 (20) OC JDLOC is chairman of the TDL Operators Group (TOG). The TOG discusses and addresses operational issues of the use of interoperable TDLs in Sweden. Further details of the TOG can be found in chapter of this document Network Planning Cell (NPC) The NPC is responsible for ensuring that all missions supported by interoperability enabling systems in the Swedish Armed Forces have the necessary planning arrangements in place for both national and international operations. JDLOC NPC functions are further described in chapter 4 of this annex Network Design Cell (NDC) The JDLOC NDC is the sole responsible authority within the Swedish Armed Forces that has been delegated the authority to produce and manage network design files for all Swedish Armed Forces platforms. JDLOC NPC and network design functions are further described in the chapter 4 of this annex OPNET Management Cell (OMC) The primary aim of OMC is to achieve, maintain and improve an optimal network performance and information exchange during operations. OMC functions are further described in chapter 4 of this annex. 4 Functional responsibilities for JDLOC 4.1 General The purpose of this section is to provide brief descriptions of JDLOC s functional responsibilities and roles for the following interoperability enabling systems: IO TDLs (Link 16, Link 11, Link 22 and VMF) IFF Secure voice systems To Be Determined (TBD) will be marked against items where details of functional responsibilities are not yet defined or decided upon. These areas will be updated in later versions of this document. Figure 2 illustrates the JDLOC s employment of the interoperability enabling systems.

366 Annex R Page 10 (20) Figure 2 Context diagram illustrating the JDLOC s employment of the interoperability enabling systems. 4.2 Interoperable TDLs General Interoperable TDLs in general have a number of activities that are required for the planning, design, execution and management (maintenance and adjustment) to ensure optimal employment in the battlespace. It is the intention of this chapter to describe the functional activities that are required to manage the suite of interoperable TDLs employed by Swedish Armed Forces platforms.

367 Annex R Page 11 (20) Philosophy for multi TDL management When employing platforms who have a variety of interoperable TDLs, it is essential that the management of these enablers is carried out in a coordinated manner. Therefore, the forthcoming adoption of other Interoperable TDLs, the Swedish Armed Forces now will employ a multi TDL philosophy to carry out management activities for these interoperable TDLs. The coordinated manner of multi TDL management requires one centre of excellence to carry out this function. The JDLOC will have the responsibility to carry out and manage Multi TDL management functions for the Swedish Armed Forces. The multi TDL management philosophy addresses the following TDLs that are prescribed in the Joint TDL CONOPS: Link 16 Link 22 Link 11 VMF During the support to an operation that may involve the employment of more than one interoperable TDL, planning for that operation shall be carried out with multi TDL operations being considered. It is expected that the JDLOC will use a multi TDL planning tool to carry out the multi TDL network planning function in the future. Chapters to of this annex provide a brief overview of each TDL s management function that will be carried out by the Swedish Armed Forces JDLOC. Due to the multi TDL environment that is being planned to be employed by Swedish Armed Forces platforms, data forwarding may be a requirement between the different TDLs. It is anticipated that Data forwarding operations between the TDLs could require a planning overhead. It is expected in this time frame of the CONOPS that the planning and management of data forwarding between TDLs and/or any future ground gateways, will be the responsibility of the Swedish Armed Forces JDLOC. The joint infrastructure CONOPS describes functions of gateways and data forwarding Frequency Clearance Agreement (FCA) The use of TDLs (especially Link 16) in the Sweden Flight Information Region (FIR) is subject to the regulations and restrictions imposed by the Swedish Civil Aviation Authorities (Transport Styrelsen (TS) and Post & Telestyrelsen (PTS)).

368 Annex R Page 12 (20) The TS/PTS and the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters (HKV) have agreed that use of JTIDS/MIDS (Link 16) within the Sweden s FIR is allowed in peacetime subject to a non-interference basis to civilian Air Traffic Navigation Aids (NavAids) that operate in the same frequency band. To ensure the safe operation of TDL in Sweden, the TS have imposed restrictions and regulations for the use of TDL. These restrictions are set out in Sweden s FCA. The JDLOC is responsible for ensuring that all interoperable TDL operations (national, training and guest forces) within the Swedish FIR are co-ordinated and comply to the conditions set out in the Swedish FCA. The JDLOC has the responsibility of the revision and maintenance of the Link 16 FCA Link 16 (MIDS/JTIDS) General The JDLOC Link 16 network management functional responsibilities are in three main areas: Network Planning Network Design OPNET management All of the above functions are coordinated and led by the JDLOC OC function Planning It is the responsibility of the JDLOC to provide Link 16 network planning support to national platforms, visiting forces and industry for all Link 16 operations and trials in Swedish FIR and international operations. The NPC functional responsibilities within the network planning discipline are: Tactical Link 16 planning Provision of cross border coordination and information for the international community Coordinate the information contained in, production and distribution of the OPTASK LINK message. Support of Swedish platforms involved international missions. Guest forces procedures. All Link 16 network planning activities are now coordinated with other TDLs (Link 11, Link 22 and VMF) planning in line with the multi TDL management philosophy for the Swedish Armed Forces JDLOC.

369 Annex R Page 13 (20) Design The nature and architecture of Link 16 requires a detailed network design and support process to be put in place. This process requires a specialist team, tools and the appropriate training (both classroom courses and work experience). The NDC is the sole authority responsible for: Provision of the necessary Link 16 network designs for Swedish Armed Forces platforms and operations. Ensuring that all networks designed and used in Sweden meet the criteria required for Swedish Armed Forces platforms and regulations laid out in the Swedish Link 16 FCA. The conversion of all other network designs required for use by Swedish Armed Forces units/platforms. Liaison and co-ordination with other network design facilities and exchange network design information in accordance with a common exchange format file International Network Design Exchange (INDE). Swedish Armed Forces units shall only utilise Link 16 Initialisation Data (ID) received from the JDLOC, unless specifically authorised to utilise ID received directly from other network design or network management agencies. After the production and conversion of a Link 16 network, the NDC is responsible for distributing the network design/load. The NDC ensures that the network design is distributed to all network participants in a timely manner ready for operations. NDC provides support and management of Swedish Armed Forces network design problem and issues connected to these problems. Network design issues from the TDL operating community are communicated to the NDC via the TOG Operational Network (OPNET) Management The aim of OPNET Management Cell (OMC) is to achieve, maintain/optimise (both FCA agreement parameters and optimal network performance) and improve Link 16 network performance and information exchange. JDLOC OMC has the sole responsibility for Link 16 OPNET management activities in the Swedish FIR. The OMC is the sole authority responsible for: Provision of day to day TDL liaison to the operating community. Functional responsibility to duty network manager. Responsible for FCA compliance in operation.

370 Annex R Page 14 (20) The OMC has the capability to provide OPNET management in terms of realtime and non-real time support. Real time management will be carried out by dynamic management and monitoring of network operations in Swedish FIR. The dynamic management creates a wider flexibility and creates tactical opportunities in a live network. During operations the OMC can perform a recording of a live network for validation and post mission analysis. Non real time OPNET management is carried out by the OMC in a procedural manner (e.g. compiling and storage of operational records /JTIDS Activity Report (JAR)) Link General The employment of Link 11 is currently limited for Swedish Armed Forces platforms. However, the JDLOC has the responsibility for Swedish Armed Forces platforms for coordination, planning and tasking of Link 11 activities within the Swedish AOI. Details of the exact procedures for planning and management are yet TBD. The details set out in chapters provide guidance to JDLOC management activities for Link 11. Link 11 operations will be managed in line with the JDLOC s multi TDL management philosophy Planning The JDLOC maps requested Link 11 activity by participant location, activity and date/time in order to define and designate the necessary Link 11 Network Groups. Link 11 activities will normally be tasked within the Weekly OPTASK LINK message using standard Link 11 Segment formatting and referenced to the Standing OPTASK LINK message relevant to Sweden s AOI. In missions/operations, when Sweden is not the lead Nation, (either in Sweden s AOI or out of area) the JDLOC act as the main contact with other nation s Data Link Management Organisations (DLMOs) for Link 11 planning activities OPNET Management OPNET Management of Link 11 operations are routinely delegated to a Command & Control (C2) unit operating within the net, whilst JDLOC retain overall management responsibility. During missions abroad and outside Sweden s AOI, the management of Link 11 could be delegated to a C2 unit. However, regular liaison between the delegated management unit and the JDLOC takes place.

371 Annex R Page 15 (20) Link General The nature and architecture of the Link 22 system and its methods of operation requires certain amount of functional activities to be carried out by the JDLOC. The details set out in chapters provide guidance to JDLOC management activities that will need to be carried out for Link 22 operations. Link 22 operations will be managed in line with the JDLOC s multi TDL management philosophy Planning Link 22, in common with other TDLs, requires a significant amount of planning prior to operations. Some of this planning will be carried out centrally, while other activities will be carried out by those platforms allocated a management role. Link 22 will rarely be operated in isolation to other TDLs and communication systems. Therefore Link 22 planning considers the wider multilink scenario in its operation. Link 22 planning has three main planning phases: Strategic Operational Tactical Strategic Planning Phase At the Strategic Planning level, the Link 22 specific information is generally high-level and will be subject to subsequent change. However, it will provide a basis for early scoping of the operational requirement. Operational Planning phase The Operational Planning phase defines the precise communications requirements in support of the planned operation and translates those requirements into communication and network operating (link 22 design) parameters for promulgation via the OPTASK LINK message and subsequent initialisation by all intended Link 22 network participants. This phase of planning makes provision for Link 22 participants from other regions, including units in transit through areas of operation. Tactical Planning Phase During the Tactical Planning phase, the operational tasking for Link 22 platforms (Air Tasking Orders (ATOs), Operational Statistics (OPSTATS) Coordinated Air Sea Procedures (CASPS), Exercise Schedules, etc.) must be matched to the Link

372 Annex R Page 16 (20) 22 section of the Multi Link Management Plan. Any minor adjustments to the Link 22 network architecture of the Link 22 network management structure can be made at this stage, using the OPTASK LINK Update messages as necessary. However, the primary output for this phase of planning is the Link 22 Supernetwork structure required to support the mission requirements OPNET Management Generally, the majority of TDLs require a degree of network management. However due to the complexity of Link 22 Super Networking, and the use of concurrent multiple media types (HF, UHF and frequency hopping) Link 22 may require more planning management than other TDLs. Much of this management is automated or semi-automated; however operator authorisation activities may be required. The management of operator authorisation is expected to be the responsibility of the Swedish Armed Forces JDLOC. Link 22 network management is divided into 3 levels: Super Network Management Relates to the functions required to monitor and optimise the entire Super Network (SN). This is carried out by the SN Management Unit (SNMU). Network Management The functions related to the monitoring and optimisation of a single Link 22 network. The Network Management Unit (NMU) will carry out this function. NILE Unite (NU) Management This is carried out by individual NUs VMF General At the time of writing this CONOPS, exact procedures for planning and management are not in place to support VMF operations. The details set out in chapters provide guidance to JDLOC management activities that will need to be carried out for operations supported by the VMF TDL system. VMF operations will be managed in line with the JDLOC s multi TDL management philosophy Planning VMF requires a network management infrastructure to support its operation. Planning activities are required to ensure that VMF operations will function as intended in their operational concept. All VMF activities for operations within the Swedish AOI will found and detailed within the OPTASK/Communication Tasking (COMTASK) LINK message produced and distributed by the JDLOC.

373 Annex R Page 17 (20) As the central agency responsible for all Sweden s TDLs, the JDLOC will act as the overall Ground Network Controller (GNC) for all Swedish VMF activity. As part of the VMF Co-ordination Cell responsibilities, the JDLOC will maintain the Swedish Armed Forces VMF Unit Reference Number (URN) allocation Look-Up Table that details the unique URNs allocated to Swedish Armed Forces platforms and assets. VMF planning activities will be carried out in accordance to the JDLOC multi TDL philosophy Design To support VMF operations there is a requirement for the JDLOC to carry out Network Design activities. This will be carried out using a specialist VMF network design tool by the JDLOC NDC. VMF network design activities will include the production and distribution of an Initialisation Data Set (IDS) for all VMF participants. This will be produced by a VMF network design tool. Current details of network design have not been fully defined and are subject to on-going investigations OPNET Management The JDLOC currently have no VMF OPNET Management capability. Once VMF networks have been planned and tasked as part of the overall multi TDL architecture/philosophy, on-line management of the individual networks will be delegated to one of the participating VMF Units (VUs). VMF management tools may be developed as part of the JDLOC multi-link management philosophy backbone programme, at which point full OPNET Management procedures will be developed. From a JDLOC perspective, OPNET management of VMF is envisaged to be wholly procedural. It is expected that there will be no VMF on-line dynamic and real time management capability that will be required TDL Operators Liaison General The JDLOC TDL operator liaison role comes under two main functions: Unit TDL Officers (UTOs) TOG Unit TDL Officers (UTOs) To carry out its management function and support to TDLs efficiently, the JDLOC require having access to liaison contacts with operational platform

374 Annex R Page 18 (20) authorities. An UTO is assigned to every platform that employs a TDL or interoperable enabling systems that is described in this annex TDL Operators Group (TOG) The operational community for Link 16 and the other interoperable TDLs described in this document will have many operational/infrastructure issues that may not be raised on a day-to day basis. The TOG holds regular meetings to ensure that issues that may arise over a period of time are dealt with in a coordinated manner. The TOG is attended by representatives of the TDL community and UTOs. It is the responsibility of OC JDLOC to chair, administrate and provide lead for the running and management of the TOG. 4.3 Identification Friend and Foe (IFF) General During exercises/education and prior to international missions when employing IFF it is the intention to operate Modes 1, 2, 3/A, C and 4 in accordance with approved NATO document such as Allied Communication Publication (ACP)160D with supplement 1E. The JDLOC will support the operational management processes for the above activities. JDLOC have the authority and responsibility for the provision of temporary authorisation issued in exercises with the international units within Sweden s FIR IFF Modes 1-4 and Mode S Planning It is the responsibility of the JDLOC to provide IFF planning support to national platforms, visiting forces and industry for all military IFF operations and trials in Swedish FIR. The JDLOC will attend the relevant operational planning conferences to obtain IFF planning information. JDLOC provides authorisation to the number of IFF platforms etc. as set out in the current IFF FCA 3. During major exercises if IFF number of platforms goes beyond the limits set out in the FCA, the JDLOC shall limit the volume of IFF usage unless specific prior authorisation has been given from Sweden s TS. 3 [Ref x] HKV _ 64287

375 Annex R Page 19 (20) Management The use/operation details of IFF within Sweden FIR/AOI is logged by the JDLOC and saved for 3 months. Coordination of IFF activities takes into consideration the volumes and activities within geographical areas. The JDLOC carries out the management of IFF operations by procedural techniques/methods only and has no dynamic or real time monitoring capability Mode 5 Mode 5 is expected to replace Mode 4 as entry requirement from For coalition operations together with other nations or organisations, Mode 4 may be the only secure IFF mode available and employed Mode 5 Planning TBD Mode 5 management TBD 5 Supporting documentation and processes 5.1 General The structure and function of the Swedish Armed Forces JDLOC has been has been and continues to be developed by supporting documentation and processes. These documentation and processes are designed to ensure that responsibilities and roles of the JDLOC are investigated and allow the JDLOC to develop to manage the development of interoperability enabling systems. This approach also allows the target user community to be fully informed of JDLOC s developing functions. To describe the function, role and responsibilities of the JDLOC in a detailed manner a set of SOPs has been produced and maintained by the JDLOC. Chapter 5.2 describes in more detail the purpose of this document. 5.2 Link 16 SOPs In the structure in the suite of the Swedish Armed Forces interoperable enabling systems policy documentation [ref A], the lowest level of documentation are SOPs. It is the purpose of the Link 16 SOPs to set out a detailed, clear and unambiguous set of procedures for the use of all users and stakeholders on how the JDLOC will

376 Annex R Page 20 (20) carry out its day-to-day operation and support of the specific interoperability enabling systems (TDLs, IFF and secure voice systems).

377 Appendix A Page 1 (17) Appendix A to Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Documentation for Interoperability Enabling Systems List of Contributors and Abbreviations (UH) Mailing Address Visiting Address Telephone Fax , Internet Högkvarteret SE Stockholm SWEDEN Lidingövägen exp-hkv@mil.se

378 Appendix A Page 2 (17) List of References Ref Document Comments A Swedish Armed Forces Interoperability Enabling systems Policy Document B TDL CONOPS C IFF CONOPS D Secure Voice CONOPS E Secure Text CONOPS F Common Infrastructure CONOPS G Annex A CRC H Annex B ASC 890 I Annex C JAS 39 C/D Gripen J Annex D C130 K Annex E - Airbase L Annex F Helicopter 14 M Annex G Helicopter 15 N Annex H Helicopter 16 O Annex I - SjöC P Annex J Corvettes Q Annex K Mine Counter Measure vessels R Annex L Submarines S Annex M Support Vessels T Annex N Amphibious forces U Annex O Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) V Annex P Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) W Annex R Joint Data Links Operation Cell (JDLOC)

379 Appendix A Page 3 (17) 1. Introduction This appendix to the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy Document for Joint Interoperability Enabling Systems provides the complete list of contributors to the production of this documentation set and all abbreviations and acronyms contained in the documents. 2. List of contributors The Swedish Armed Forces Joint Policy for Interoperability Enabling Systems documentation set has been produced in collaboration and consultation with the following departments and organisations on behalf of the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters: LEDS INRI LED CIO INSS J0 INSS J5 INSS J6 INSS SFL ATS G5 MTS M6 FTS A0 FTS A6 PROD LEDUND PROD ARMÉ PROD MARIN PROD FLYG MUST FMTS FMTM Lv 6 A9 Supreme Commander s Staff, Policy & Plans Department Supreme Commander s Staff, Chief Information Officer Department Joint Forces Command, Operational Requirements Department Joint Forces Command, Policy & Plans Department Joint Forces Command, Communications and Information Systems Department Special Forces Command Land Component Command G5 (Plans) Maritime Component Command M6 Air Component Command A0 Air Component Command A6 Training and Procurement Staff, C4ISR Department Training and Procurement Staff, Army Department Training and Procurement Staff, Naval Department Training and Procurement Staff, Air Force Department Military Intelligence and Security Staff Swedish Armed Forces Technical School Swedish Armed Forces Network and Telecommunications Unit Air Defence Regiment Artillery Regiment

380 Appendix A Page 4 (17) LSS SSS FMV Swedish Delegation to NATO HQ US EUCOM Air Combat Training School Naval Warfare Centre Swedish Defence Material Administration Brussels US European Command

381 Appendix A Page 5 (17) List of Abbreviations Abbreviation Description 24/7/65 24 hour/7 days a week/365 days a year AA Aircraft Mode S Address AAR Air to Air Refuelling AAW Anti-Air Warfare ACASII Airborne Collision Avoidance System II ACC Air Control Centre ACC Air Component Command ACC Automatic Code Change ACM Airspace Control Means ACMREQ Airspace Control Means Request ACO Airspace Control Order ACP Airspace Control Plan ACP Allied Communication Publication ActAD Active Air Defence AD Air Defence ADC Air Defence Centre ADATP Allied Data Publication AEW Airborne Early Warning AEW&C Airborne Early Warning & Control AF Architectural Framework AFAPD Air Force Applications Program Development AH Attack Helicopter AI Air Interdiction AIS Automatic Identification System ALE Automatic Link Establishment ALO Air Liaison Officers AMC Air Maritime Coordination Amd Amendment AMP Avionics Modernization Programme ANFT Alpha Numeric Free Text AP Air Protection APOD Aerial port of Debarkation APOD/E Aerial of Debarkation /Embarkation AOA Amphibious Operation Area AOD Air Operation Directives AOI Area Of Interest AOO Area Of Operation AOR Air Of Responsibility ARQ Automatic Repeat-reQuest ASC Air Surveillance and Control ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange

382 Appendix A Page 6 (17) Abbreviation ARQ ASOC ASFAO ASTOR ASuW ASW AT AT ATC ATCC ATM ATM ATO ATP AWACS BALTOPS BAO BDA BG BIT BLOS BMD BMS Bn Bn HQ C2 C3 C4ISR C5ISR CAA CAO CAOC CAP CAS CAS CASBDA CASPS CASEVAC CAT CBN CBRN CCB Description Automatic Request Air Support Operations Centre Anti-Surface Force Air Operations Air Stand Off Radar Anti-Surface Warfare Anti-Submarine Warfare Air Threats Air Transport Air Traffic Control Air traffic Control Centre Air Traffic Management Air Tasking Message Air Task Order Allied Tactical Publication Airborne Warning and Control System Baltic Operations Battle Air Operations Battle Damage Assessment Battle Group Built In Test Beyond Line Of Sight Ballistic Missile Defence Battle Management System Battalion Battalion Headquarters Command & Control Command, Control & Communication Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance Coalition, Command, Control, Computer, Communication Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Civil Aviation Authority Counter Air Operations Combined Air Operations Centre Combat Air Patrol Close Air Support Collaboration at Sea CAS Battle Damage Assessment Coordinated Air Sea Procedures Casualty Evacuation Category Computer Based Network Chemical Biological Radiological & Nuclear Configuration Control Board

383 Appendix A Page 7 (17) Abbreviation Description CCD Charged Coupled Device CCRB Configuration Control and Review Board CDM Concept Data Modelling CE Combined Endeavour CENTRIXS Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System CFBLNet Combined Federated Battle Laboratories Network CFF Call For Fire CI Coordinated Implementation CIAV Coalition Interoperability Assurance & Validation CIDS Combat Identification Servers CIK Crypto Ignition Key CIMCEL Civil/Military SSR Environment Liaison CIMIC Civilian Military Cooperation CiOP Coalition interoperability Process CMO Coverage Mission Order CMO Crisis Management Operations CI Coordinated Implementation ( CIS Command Information Systems CJTF Combined Joint Task Force CNR Combat Net Radio COAL WNW Coalition Wideband Networking Waveform COG Centre of Gravity COMAO Composite Air Operation COMPLAN Communications Plan COVREP Coverage Report COMINT Communications Intelligence CommOff Communications Officer COMSEC Communications Security COMTASK Communication Tasking CONOPS CONcept of OPerationS CONEMP CONcept of EMPloyment CONUSE CONcept of USE COP Common Operational Picture CP Conflict Prevention C-RAM Counter Rocket Artillery Mortar CRC Control & Reporting Centre CRO Crisis Response Operations CS Combat Support CSAR Combat Search & Rescue CSMA Carrier Sense Multiple Access CSS Combat Service Support CST Common Staff Target CTF Combined Task Force CTG Commander Task Group

384 Appendix A Page 8 (17) Abbreviation CTU CVI CWID CWIX DA DAMA DCA DA-CAS DACASCI DCOM OPS DEAD DISA DED DLMO DLOC DLWG DOD DTD DTS DTU EAW ECM ECP EDA EDAC EEI ELINT EMCOM EO EOD EPLIRS EPM ERV ESM ETD EU EU BG EUMC EUMS EUNAVFOR EUNEC EU OPS WAN EUROCAE EUROCONTROL Description Chief Task Unit Code Validity Interval Coalition Warrior Demonstration Coalition Warrior Interoperability exercise Digital Aided Demand Assigned Multiple Access Defensive Counter Air Digital Aided Close Air Support DACAS Coordinated Implementation Deputy Chief of Joint Operations Destruction of Enemy Air Defences Defense Information Systems Agency Data Element Dictionary Data Link Management Organisation Data Link Operations Cell Data Link Working Group Department Of Defense Data Transfer Device Data Terminal System Data Transfer Unit Early Airborne Warning Electronic Counter Measures Engineering Change Proposal European Defence Agency Error Detection And Correction Essential Elements of Information Electronic Intelligence Emissions Control Evacuation Operation in a non-permissive environment Explosive Ordnance Disposal Enhance Position Reporting System Electronic Protection Measures ECM Resistant Voice Electronic Support Measurement Electronic Transfer Device European Union European Battle Group EU Military Committee EU Military Staff European Naval Force European Union s NEC EU Operations Wide Area Network European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation

385 Appendix A Page 9 (17) Abbreviation Description EW Electronic Warfare FAC Forward Air Control FAC-(A) Airborne Forward Air Control FAOR Fighter Area Of Responsibility FAS Functional Area Services FC Frequency Clearance FCA Frequency Clearance Agreement FFT Friendly Force Tracking FHQ Force Headquarters FIN Finland FIR Flight Information Region FLIR Forward Looking Infrared FM Försvarsmakten FMN Future Mission Networks FMS Foreign Military Sales FMUP Försvarsmaktens UtvecklingsPlan FMV Förvarets Materielverk (Defence Material Administration) FNSU Forward Naval Support Unit FOC Full Operational Capability FPG Fast Patrol Boat FRAGO Fragmentary Order FS Fire Support FSK Frequency Shift Keying FSM Fire Support Module FTS Flygtaktiska Staben GBAD Ground Based Air Defence GBADOC Ground Based Air Defence Order Centre GBU Guided Bomb Unit GC Ground Commander GC2F Ground Command & Control Facility GC2FI Ground Command & Control Facility Interim GER Germany GLI Gemensam lägesinformation GNC Ground Network Controller HA Assistance to Humanitarian Operations HCI Human Computer Interface HEU Higher Echelon Units HF High Frequency HFEM HF HIDACZ High-Density Airspace Control Zone HKP14 Helicopter 14 HKV Högkvarteret, Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters HMS Hull-Mounted Sonar HMTP HF Mail Transfer Protocol

386 Appendix A Page 10 (17) Abbreviation Description HQ HeadQuarters HQ11 Have Quick 11 HVAA High Value Airborne Asset IAM Inertial Aided Munitions IAS International Amphibious Task Unit IBS International Broadcast System ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation ICC Integrated Command & Control ICD Interface Control Documents ID Identification ID Initialisation Data IDO Identification Officer ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICO Interface Control Officer IDLS International Data Link Society IDPF Initiation Data Preparation Facility IDS Initialisation Data Set IEDD Improvised Explosive Devices Disposal IER Information Exchange Requirement IFF Identification Friend or Foe IFREP In Flight Report IKS International Corvette Force IMO International Maritime Organisation INDE International Network Design Exchange INT Interrogator INTEL Intelligence INTREP Intelligence Report INTSUM Intelligence Summary IO InterOperability IOM InterOperability Matrix IOR InterOperability Requirement IP Internet Protocol IPO International Programme Office ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISD In Service Date ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance IT Information Technology JAR JTIDS Activity Report JC3IEDM Joint C3 Information Exchange Data Model JC3SC Joint C3 Support Centre JC2TF Joint Command and Control Training Facility

387 Appendix A Page 11 (17) Abbreviation JC3B JCAS JDAM JTDLMP JDLOC JFACC JFC JFLCC JFMCC JFO JFST JOA JOC JOP JP JREAP JRE JSTARS JTAC JTAR JTDE JTIDS JTRS Kbps keymat KFOR Km KV L11 SAS LAN LAP lbs LDP LF LORAD LMP LMT LOP LOS LS LVT MANPAD MARSUR MATC Description Joint Command & Control, Communication Joint Close Air Support Joint Direct Attack Munitions Joint Tactical Data Link Management Plan Joint Tactical Data Link Operations Centre Joint Force Air Component Command Joint Forces Command Joint Force Land Component Command Joint Force Maritime Component Command Joint Fires Observers Joint Fire Support Team Joint Operating Area Joint Operations Centre Joint Operational Picture Joint Publication Joint Range Extension Application Protocol Joint Range Extension Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Joint Terminal Attack Controller Joint Tactical Air(strike) Request Joint Tactical Data Enterprise Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Joint Tactical Radio System Kilo bits per second keying material Kosovo Force Kilometre Key Variable Link 11 Stand Alone System Local Area Network Local Air Picture Pounds (unit of weight) Laser Designator Pod Low Frequency Long Range Air Defence Land Maritime Picture Liaison and Monitoring Team Local Operating Procedure Line Of Sight Luftfartsstyrelsen (Swedish Civil Aviation Authority) Low Volume Terminal MAN Portable Air Defence Maritime Surveillance Military Air Traffic Control

388 Appendix A Page 12 (17) Abbreviation MCC MCCIS MCM MCR MEDEVAC MEO MEO MERAD MEZ MHz MIDS MIL STD MIO MIP MISREP MMHS MNEs MPA MOA MobSat MoDAF MOF MOOTW MOPS MOT MOVREP MOVREQ MSA MSAM MSE MSK MSP MSSIS MSSR MTF MTS MW N/A MWO NAF NATMATC NATO NATO RTO NAVCOMMSCEN Description Maritime Component Command Maritime Command and Control Information System Mine Counter Measures Movement Completion Report Medical Evacuation Maritime Embargo Operations Movement Execution Order Medium Range Air Defence Maritime Exclusion Zone Mega Hertz Multi-functional Information Distribution System Military Standard Maritime Interdiction Operations Multilateral Interoperability Programme Mission Report Military Message Handling System Multi National Experiments Maritime Patrol Aircraft Memorandum Of Agreement Mobile Satellite Tactical Satellite Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework Maritime Order Format Military Operations Other Than War Minimum Operational Performance Standards Monitoring Team Movement Report Movement Request Maritime Situational Awareness Medium range Surface to Air Missile Mission Support Element Minimum Shift Keying Mission Specific Parameter Maritime Safety & Security Information System Monopulse Secondary Surveillance Radar Message Text Formats Marine Tactical System Mine Warfare Not Applicable Movement Warning Order NATO C3 Architecture Framework NATO Air traffic Management Committee North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NATO Research and Technology Organisation Naval Communications Centre

389 Appendix A Page 13 (17) Abbreviation NBD NBG NC3A NC3B NCAGS NCO NCS NCSA NDC NEC NEO NIC NIS NGO NGS NL NM NMS NMU NNEC NOC NOR NORDCAPS NPC NPG NRF NSA NSC NSE NSP NU OOA OC OCA OCC OCC OCC E&F OMCOMC OMLT OPCOM OPCON OPGEN OPNET OPORDER Description Network Based Defence Nordic Battle Group NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency NATO C3 Board Naval Co-operation and Guidance for Shipping Non Commissioned Officer Net Control Station NATO Command Information Systems (CIS) Support Agency Network Design Cell Network Enabled Capability Non-combatant Evacuation Operation National Intelligence Centre NATO Identification System Non-Governmental Organisation Naval Gun Support Netherlands Nautical Mile Network Management System Network Management Unit NATO Network Enabled Capability Network Operations Centre Norway Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support Network Planning Cell Network Participant Group NATO Response Force National Security Agency Naval Sea surveillance Centres National Support Element Network Specific Parameter NILE Unit Out Of Area Officer Commanding Offensive Counter Air Operational Capabilities Concept Operational Contingency Constraint Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation and Feedback OPNET Management Cell Operations Mentoring and Liaison Team Operational Command & Control Operational Control Operational General matters Operational Network Operation Order

390 Appendix A Page 14 (17) Abbreviation OpsO OPTASK LINK OPV Orbat ORS OSCE OPSTATS OTAR OTC OTG OTH OTH-T PARP PC PE PFED PfP PIDD PIN PIR PK PoC PPLI PSO PSP PSS-SOF PTS PWC PYSOPS QRA QRF RAM RAP RAS RATTY RELNAV RLMT RLP RMP ROE ROV SA SAC SADL Description Operations Officer OPTASK Data for Links Ocean Patrol Vessel Order of Battle Operational Requirements Specification Organisation for Security & Co-operation in Europe Operational Statistics Over The Air Re-keying Officer in Tactical Command OTH (T) Gold Over The Horizon Over-The-Horizon-Targeting Partnership Review Process Personal Computer Peace Enforcement Pocket Forward Entry Device Partnership for Peace Platform Implementation Difference Document Platform Identification Number Platform Interoperability Requirement Peace Keeping Point of Contact Precise Participant Location and Identification (message) Peace Support Operation Platform Specific Parameter Precision Strike Suite for Special Operations Forces The National Post and Telecom Agency (Post & Telestyrelsen) Principle Warfare Commander Psychological Operations Quick Reaction Alert Quick Reaction Force Rocket Artillery Mortar Recognised Air Picture Replenishment At Sea Radio TeleType Relative Navigation Regional Liaison and Monitoring Team Recognised Land Picture Recognised Maritime Picture Rules of Engagement Remotely Operated Vehicle Situation Awareness Stand Alone Capability Situation Awareness Data Link

391 Appendix A Page 15 (17) Abbreviation Description SAM Self-propelled Acoustic/magnetic Minesweeper SAM Surface to Air Missile SAR Search And Rescue SATCOM Satellite Communications SATURN Second generation Anti-Jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO SAW Surface to Air Warfare SAW Surface to Air Weapon SBO Ship Based Operations SDB Small Diameter Bomb SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defences SecVx Secure Voice SENDNET Sensor Data Net SF Special Forces SHORAD Short Range Air Defence SIF Selective Identification Feature SIMPLE Standard Interface for Multiple Platform Link Evaluation SINCGARS Single Channel Ground And Airborne Radio System SITREP Situation Report SLB StridsLedning Bataljon SLOC Sea Lines Of Communication SME Subject Matter Expert SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol SN Super Network SNMU SN Management Unit SNSM Swedish National Secure Mode SOA Service Orientated Architecture SoF Show of Force SOP Standard Operating Procedure SOPF Separation Of Parties by Force SOS System Of Systems Spec Ops Special Operations SPINS Special Instructions SPOD Sea Port Of Debarkation SSR Secondary Surveillance Radar SSREP SAM SHORAD Status Report SSS System Segment Specification STC Sea Traffic Control SSTO Sam SHORAD Tactical Order STDL Satellite Tactical Data Link S-TADIL Satellite Tactical Digital Information Link J (USN Satellite Link 16 STANAG Standardization Agreement STC Sea Traffic Control STO Station/Ship/Battalion TDL Officer SUBOPAUTH Submarine Operations Authority

392 Appendix A Page 16 (17) Abbreviation SUCBAS SUCFIS Sw AF SWAFRAP SWECCIS TA TAC TACAN TACOM TACOMS IOP TACON TACP TacSat TAS TBD TBMF TCAS TDES TDL TDLITS TDLO TENA TEWA TG TI TOA TOG TPO TLHDS TLZ TMC TOA TOG TRB TS TSS TST TTEM TTP TU Description Sea Surveillance Co-operation Baltic Sea Sea Surveillance Co-operation between Finland Sweden Swedish Air Force Swedish Airforce Rapid Reaction Force Swedish Command and Control Information System Transport Agency Terminal Attack Controller Tactical Air Navigation Tactical Command Tactical Communications Post 2000 Interoperability Point Tactical Control Tactical Air Control Party Tactical Satellite Towed Array Sonar To Be Determined Tactical Battle Management Functions Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System Tactical Data Enterprise Services Tactical Data Link Tactical Data Link Interoperability Test Syndicate Tactical Data Link Officer Test & Training Enabling Architecture Threat Evaluation and Weapon system Allocation Task Group Target Identification Transfer Of Authority TDL Operators Group Track Production Officer Target Locating Designation and Hands off System Temporary Landing Zone Terminal Control Transfer Of Authority TDL Operators Group Trouble Reporting Bord Transport Styrelsen Totalförsvarets Signalskyddsskola Time Sensitive Target Taktisk Teknisk Ekonomisk Målsättning, (Tactical, Technical, Economical, Objective) Tactics Techniques & Procedures Task Unit

393 Appendix A Page 17 (17) Abbreviation UAS UAV UHF UK UN UNSAS URN US USAF USMTF USN UTO VDL VDS VHF VMF VU värd-nam WAN WCO WEZREQ WOC W-RAM XPDR Description Unmanned Aerial Systems Unmanned Air Vehicle Ultra High Frequency United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Standby Arrangement System Unit Reference Number United States of America US Air Force US Message Text Format US Navy Unit TDL Officer Video Downlink Variable Depth Sonar Very High Frequency Variable Message Format VMF Unit värdnyckelansvarig myndighet Wide Area Network Weapons Control Officer Weapons Engagement Zone Request Wing Operations Centre Warning- Rocket Artillery Mortar Transponder

394 Appendix B Page 1 (20) Appendix B Platform Implementation Matrices

395 Appendix B Page 2 (20) List of contents 1. Introduction Legend to platform implementation matrices: Matrix A Control & Reporting Centre (CRC) Matrix B ASC Matrix C - JAS 39 C/D Gripen Matrix D C Matrix E Air base Matrix F Helicopter Matrix G Helicopter Matrix H Helicopter Matrix I Sea Surveillance Battalion (SjöC) Matrix J - Corvette Matrix K Mine Counter Measures Vessels Matrix L Submarines Matrix M Support Ships Matrix N Amphibious Force Matrix O Ground based Air Defence (GBAD) Matrix P Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) Matrix R Joint Data Links Operations Cell (JDLOC)... 20

396 Appendix B Page 3 (20) 1. Introduction This appendix B to the Joint Swedish Armed Forces Interoperability enabling systems Policy Document [reference A] provides a summary of the implementation of interoperable systems on Swedish platforms. The following matrices contain details of Swedish Platform interoperability enablers (TDLs, IFF, secure voice and secure text systems) implementation plans. Implementation information is provided for the following platforms: CRC ASC 890 JAS 39 C/D Gripen Tp 84/C-130 Air base Helicopter 14/NH-90 Helicopter 15/A109 Helicopter 16/UH-60M Sea Surveillance Bn/SjöC Corvettes Mine Counter Measures vessel Submarines Support Ships Amphibious Forces Ground Based Air Defence Tactical Air Control Party Joint Data Link Operations Cell 2. Legend to platform implementation matrices: The following legend and information explains how to interpret the information contained in the tables/matrices. P = Primary Link/Enabler I = Interim Link/Enabler S = Secondary Link T = Tertiary Link * = Implementation under consideration = A member of the J-Series Family of TDLs, implemented in accordance with the appropriate Standardization Documents. = Non-member of J-Series Family of TDLs implemented and maintained on the specified platform or system in accordance with the appropriate Standardization Documents. = Other interoperability enabling systems (e.g. IFF, VMF, etc.) implemented in accordance with the appropriate Standardization Documents. Where appropriate, clarification and supporting notes are included for each platform matrix. The information provided in this annex may be subject to updates.

397 Appendix B Page 4 (20) 3. Matrix A Control & Reporting Centre (CRC) Service Platform/ System Version Role/s Air CRC Ground based C2 Year Link 1 T 1 T 1 T 1 T 1 T 1 T 1 T 1 T 1 T 1 T 1 T 1 Link 16 S S P P P P P P P P P Link 11 Link 22 Swe Link 8000 VMF IFF P P P P P P P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 Secure Voice P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 High Frequency (HFEM)/ACP 127 ADatP-3 P P P P P P P P P P P Over The Horizon (OTH) Gold CBN Notes 1 Used for Air Situation Data Exchange only 2 Mode 5 implemented along with existing modes 3 Potential HaveQuick (HQ) II/ Second generation Anti-Jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO (SATURN) Functionality with crypto devices

398 Appendix B Page 5 (20) 4. Matrix B ASC 890 Service Platform/ Version Role/s System Air ASC 890 Airborne C2 Year Link 1 Link 16 P P P P P P P P P P P Link 11 Link 22 Swe Link 8000 VMF IFF P P P P P P P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 Secure voice P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 HFEM/ACP 127 ADatP-3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 OTH Gold CBN Notes 1 Mode 5 implemented along with existing modes 2 HQ II / SATURN compatible with crypto devices 3 ADatP-3 in WCO and MSS only

399 Appendix B Page 6 (20) 5. Matrix C - JAS 39 C/D Gripen Service Platform/ Version Role/s System Air JAS Gripen C/D Multi Role fighter Year Link 1 Link 16 P P P P P P P P P P P Link 11 Link 22 Swe Link 8000 VMF P P P P P P P P P P P IFF P P P P P P P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 Secure Voice P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 HFEM/ACP 127 ADatP-3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 OTH Gold CBN Notes 1 Mode 5 implemented along with existing modes 2 HQ II and/or SATURN capable radios with crypto devices 3 ADatP-3 in WCO and MSS only

400 Appendix B Page 7 (20) 6. Matrix D C-130 Service Platform/ Version Role/s System Air Hercules C-130 Tactical Air Transport Year Link 1 Link 16 Link 11 Link 22 Swe Link 8000 VMF IFF P P P P P P P P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 Secure Voice P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 HFEM/ACP 127 ADatP-3 P 4 P P P P P P P P P P OTH Gold CBN Notes 1 Mode 5 implemented along with existing modes 2 HQ II and/or SATURN capable radios 4 ADatP-3 in WCO and MSS only

401 Appendix B Page 8 (20) 7. Matrix E Air base Service Platform/ Version Role/s System Air Air base Year Link 1 Link 16 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 Link 11 Link 22 Swe Link 8000 VMF IFF Secure Voice P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 HFEM/ACP 127 ADat-3 P P P P P P P P P P P OTH Gold CBN Notes 1 Fitted for Link 16 Stand Alone System Only 2 HQ II and/or SATURN capable radios with crypto devices

402 Appendix B Page 9 (20) 8. Matrix F Helicopter 14 Service Platform/ Version Role/s System Air Helicopter Hkp 14 (NH-90) Year Link 1 Link 16 * * * * * * * * Link 11 Link 22 * * * * * * Swe Link 8000 VMF IFF P P P P P P P P Secure Voice P P P P P P P P HFEM/ACP 127 ADatP-3 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 OTH Gold CBN Notes 1 ADatP-3 used in MSS/WOC

403 Appendix B Page 10 (20) 9. Matrix G Helicopter 15 Service Platform/ Version Role/s System Air Helicopter Hkp 15 (A109) Year Link 1 Link 16 * * * * * * * * Link 11 Link 22 * * * * * * Swe Link 8000 VMF IFF * * * * * * * * * Secure Voice HFEM/ACP 127 ADatP-3 * * * * * * * * * OTH Gold CBN Notes

404 Appendix B Page 11 (20) 10. Matrix H Helicopter 16 Service Platform/ Version Role/s System Air Helicopter Hkp 16 (UH-60M) Year Link 1 Link 16 Link 11 Link 22 Swe Link 8000 VMF * * * * * * * * IFF P P P P P P P P Secure Voice P P P P P P P P (VHF/UHF/SATCOM HFEM/ACP 127 ADatP-3 * * * * * * * * * OTH Gold CBN Notes.

405 Appendix B Page 12 (20) 11. Matrix I Sea Surveillance Battalion (SjöC) Service Platform/ Version Role/s System Maritime SjöC Sea Surveillance Year Link 1 Link 16 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 Link 11 Link 22 P P P P P P Swe Link 8000 P P P P P S S S S S S VMF IFF Secure Voice P P P P P P HFEM/ACP 127 P P P P P P ADatP-3 OTH Gold CBN Notes 1 Link 16 using JREAP

406 Appendix B Page 13 (20) 12. Matrix J - Corvette Service Platform/ System Version Navy Corvette Visby Class and Gävle/Sundsvall Class Role/s ASW,ASuW Anti-Air Warfare AAW, MCM and NGS operations. Year Link 1 Link 16 S 1 S 1 S 1 * * * * * * * * Link 11 I 2 I 2 I 2 Link 22 * * * * * * * * Swe Link 8000 P P P S S S S S S S S VMF * * * * * * * * * * * IFF P P P P P P P P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 Secure Voice P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 HFEM/ACP 127 P P P P P P P P P P P ADatP-3 P P P P P P P P P P P OTH Gold * * * * * * * * * * * CBN * 5 * 5 * 5 * 5 * 5 * 5 * 5 * 5 * 5 * 5 Notes 1 Link 16 Stand Alone System Only 2 Link 11 Interim Capability (Stand Alone System) 3 Mode 5 implemented along with existing modes 4 HQII and/or SATURN capable radios with crypto devices 5 Computer Based Networks such as CENTRIXS, EU OPS WAN etc. will be fitted on-board depending on tasks and coalition

407 Appendix B Page 14 (20) 13. Matrix K Mine Counter Measures Vessels Service Platform/ Version Role/s System Navy MCMV Koster Anti-mine warfare Year Link 1 Link 16 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 Link 11 Link 22 * * * * * * * * Sw Link 8000 P P P P P S S S S S S VMF * * * * * * * * * * * IFF P P P P P P P P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 Secure Voice P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 HFEM/ACP 127 P P P P P P P P P P P ADatP-3 P P P P P P P P P P P OTH Gold * * * * * * * * * * * CBN Notes 1 Fitted for Link 16 Stand Alone System Only 2 Mode 5 implemented along with existing modes 3 HQ II and/or SATURN capable radios with crypto devices

408 Appendix B Page 15 (20) 14. Matrix L Submarines Service Platform/ Version Role/s System Navy Submarines Year Link 1 Link 16 Link 11 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 Link 22 * * * * * * Swe Link 8000 P P P P P S S S S S S VMF * * * * * * * * * * * IFF Secure Voice P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 HFEM/ACP 127 P P P P P P P P P P P ADatP-3 P P P P P P P P P P P OTH Gold * * * * * * * * * * * CBN Notes 1 Fitted for Link 11 Interim receive-only capability 2 HQII and/or SATURN capable radios with crypto devices

409 Appendix B Page 16 (20) 15. Matrix M Support Ships Service Platform/ Version Role/s System Navy Support ships Year Link 1 Link 16 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 P 2 Link 11 I 3 I 3 I 3 I 3 I 3 Link 22 * * * * * * Swe Link 8000 P P P P P S S S S S S VMF * * * * * * * * * * * IFF P P P P P P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 Secure Voice P 5 P 5 P 5 P 5 P 5 P 5 P 5 P 5 P 5 P 5 P 5 HFEM/ACP 127 P P P P P P P P P P P ADatP-3 P P P P P P P P P P P OTH Gold * * * * * * * * * * * *6 *6 *6 *6 *6 *6 *6 *6 *6 *6 *6 CBN Notes 1 Link 16 Stand Alone System Only 2 Link 16 integration into C2 system under consideration 3 Link 11 Interim Capability (Stand-Alone System) 4 Mode 5 implemented along with existing modes 5 HQ II and/or SATURN capable radios with crypto devices 6 Computer Based Networks such as CENTRIXS, EU OPS WAN etc. will be fitted on-board depending on tasks and coalition.

410 Appendix B Page 17 (20) 16. Matrix N Amphibious Force Service Platform/ Version Role/s System Navy Amphibious Forces Year Link 1 Link 16 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 Link 11 Link 22 Sw Link 8000 P P P P P P P P P P P VMF * * * * * * * * * * * IFF P 2/3 P 2/3 P 2/3 P 2/3 P 2/3 Secure Voice P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 HFEM/ACP 127 P P P P P P P P P P P ADatP-3 P P P P P P P P P P P OTH Gold * * * * * * * * * * * CBN Notes 1 Link 16 Stand Alone System Only 2 Transponder fitted to Stridsbåt 90 (Combat Boat 90) limited numbers only 3 Mode 5 implemented along with existing modes limited numbers only 4 HQ II and/or SATURN capable radios with crypto devices

411 Appendix B Page 18 (20) 17. Matrix O Ground based Air Defence (GBAD) Service Platform/ Version Role/s System Army Army Units GBAD Air defence Year Link 1 Link 16 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1 P 1/2 P 1/2 P 1/2 P 1/2 P 1/2 P 1/2 Link 11 Link 22 Sw Link 8000 VMF IFF P P P P P P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 P 3 Secure Voice P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 P 4 HFEM/ACP 127 ADatP-3 P P P P P P P P P P P OTH Gold CBN Notes 1 Link 16 Stand Alone System Only 2 Link 16 integrated solution under consideration 3 Mode 5 implemented along with existing modes 4 HQ II and/or SATURN capable radios with crypto devices

412 Appendix B Page 19 (20) 18. Matrix P Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) Service Platform/ Version Role/s System Army Army Units TACP Forward Air Control, Forward Observer Year Link 1 Link 16 Link 11 Link 22 Sw Link 8000 VMF P P P P P P P P P P P IFF Secure Voice P P P P P P P P P P P HFEM/ACP 127 ADatP-3 OTH Gold CBN Notes