Ronny Wichers Schreur / Bart Jacobs Biometric Passport
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- Oswin Wood
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1 FACULTY OF SCIENCE Ronny Wichers Schreur / Bart Jacobs
2 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.1/34 Contents
3 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.1/34 Contents I. Background II. Standards & requirements III. Low level stuff IV. High level protocols V. Passports for private use? VI. Conclusions
4 I. Background Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.2/34
5 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.3/34 International developments
6 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.3/34 International developments After 9/11 international move towards stronger identification of citizens & travellers
7 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.3/34 International developments After 9/11 international move towards stronger identification of citizens & travellers US: Visa waiver program after 25 Oct 06 only for countries with biometric passport
8 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.3/34 International developments After 9/11 international move towards stronger identification of citizens & travellers US: Visa waiver program after 25 Oct 06 only for countries with biometric passport Standards developed by ICAO: International Civil Airline Organisation
9 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.4/34 Role of the Netherlands
10 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.4/34 Role of the Netherlands Large trial 2B or not 2B (6 cities, participants, Sept 04-Feb 05).
11 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.4/34 Role of the Netherlands Large trial 2B or not 2B (6 cities, participants, Sept 04-Feb 05). Philips main supplier of smartmx chips
12 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.4/34 Role of the Netherlands Large trial 2B or not 2B (6 cities, participants, Sept 04-Feb 05). Philips main supplier of smartmx chips SDU Identification (inter)nationally active as document supplier (and also within ICAO).
13 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.5/34 Own involvement
14 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.5/34 Own involvement Membership of expert council set up by ministry of internal affairs (Jacobs)
15 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.5/34 Own involvement Membership of expert council set up by ministry of internal affairs (Jacobs) Participation in enrollment procedure, resulting in test passport (Oostdijk)
16 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.5/34 Own involvement Membership of expert council set up by ministry of internal affairs (Jacobs) Participation in enrollment procedure, resulting in test passport (Oostdijk) Production of own terminal-side software (Wichers Schreur) & test development
17 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.5/34 Own involvement Membership of expert council set up by ministry of internal affairs (Jacobs) Participation in enrollment procedure, resulting in test passport (Oostdijk) Production of own terminal-side software (Wichers Schreur) & test development Role in discussion in media
18 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.5/34 Own involvement Membership of expert council set up by ministry of internal affairs (Jacobs) Participation in enrollment procedure, resulting in test passport (Oostdijk) Production of own terminal-side software (Wichers Schreur) & test development Role in discussion in media Disclaimer: no biometry experts
19 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.6/34 Passport fraud
20 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.6/34 Passport fraud Forgery of modern (NL) passports very difficult
21 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.6/34 Passport fraud Forgery of modern (NL) passports very difficult Production of passports has been centralised
22 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.6/34 Passport fraud Forgery of modern (NL) passports very difficult Production of passports has been centralised Criminal organisations collect large numbers of passports, and look for reasonable matches
23 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.6/34 Passport fraud Forgery of modern (NL) passports very difficult Production of passports has been centralised Criminal organisations collect large numbers of passports, and look for reasonable matches Look alike fraud is source of concern
24 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.6/34 Passport fraud Forgery of modern (NL) passports very difficult Production of passports has been centralised Criminal organisations collect large numbers of passports, and look for reasonable matches Look alike fraud is source of concern Hence original aim: biometric Verification
25 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.7/34 Reasonable security goal
26 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.7/34 Reasonable security goal Chip in passport with contactless access requires:
27 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.7/34 Reasonable security goal Chip in passport with contactless access requires: No identifying information is released without the consent of the passport s holder. This should include identification numbers of chips and country identification (bomb targeted at individuals/nationals).
28 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.7/34 Reasonable security goal Chip in passport with contactless access requires: No identifying information is released without the consent of the passport s holder. This should include identification numbers of chips and country identification (bomb targeted at individuals/nationals). Receiver must be able to check authenticity and integrity of contained data
29 II. Standards & requirements Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.8/34
30 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.9/34 ICAO on MRTD
31 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.9/34 ICAO on MRTD MRTD: Machine Readable Travel Document
32 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.9/34 ICAO on MRTD MRTD: Machine Readable Travel Document Open standards, for states and suppliers
33 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.9/34 ICAO on MRTD MRTD: Machine Readable Travel Document Open standards, for states and suppliers PKI task force with members from US, UK, Can, Ger, NL.
34 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.9/34 ICAO on MRTD MRTD: Machine Readable Travel Document Open standards, for states and suppliers PKI task force with members from US, UK, Can, Ger, NL. Only facial image mandatory; fingerprints, iris scan, etc. optional
35 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.9/34 ICAO on MRTD MRTD: Machine Readable Travel Document Open standards, for states and suppliers PKI task force with members from US, UK, Can, Ger, NL. Only facial image mandatory; fingerprints, iris scan, etc. optional Only integrity check mandatory; several other protection mechanisms optional
36 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.9/34 ICAO on MRTD MRTD: Machine Readable Travel Document Open standards, for states and suppliers PKI task force with members from US, UK, Can, Ger, NL. Only facial image mandatory; fingerprints, iris scan, etc. optional Only integrity check mandatory; several other protection mechanisms optional See
37 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.10/34 EU on MRTD
38 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.10/34 EU on MRTD Facial scan included before 28 Aug 06
39 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.10/34 EU on MRTD Facial scan included before 28 Aug 06 Fingerprints later, 3 year after agreement on protection mechanism
40 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.10/34 EU on MRTD Facial scan included before 28 Aug 06 Fingerprints later, 3 year after agreement on protection mechanism Basic Access Control mandatory:
41 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.10/34 EU on MRTD Facial scan included before 28 Aug 06 Fingerprints later, 3 year after agreement on protection mechanism Basic Access Control mandatory: Access key for RFID chip extracted from Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) Intended as consent to read
42 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.11/34 NL on MRTD
43 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.11/34 NL on MRTD Introduction in two stages; start < 28/6/ 06.
44 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.11/34 NL on MRTD Introduction in two stages; start < 28/6/ 06. Original aim (2002): verification only, with decentralised storage of biometric data
45 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.11/34 NL on MRTD Introduction in two stages; start < 28/6/ 06. Original aim (2002): verification only, with decentralised storage of biometric data New aims (Jan. 2005, letter on terror ):
46 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.11/34 NL on MRTD Introduction in two stages; start < 28/6/ 06. Original aim (2002): verification only, with decentralised storage of biometric data New aims (Jan. 2005, letter on terror ): identification, called on line verification central database of biometric data meant as contribution to effectivity of identification laws
47 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.12/34 Protection mechanisms
48 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.12/34 Protection mechanisms basic access ctrl passive authent. active authent. extended access ctrl to protect mechanism EU US
49 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.12/34 Protection mechanisms to protect mechanism EU US basic access ctrl access & confidentiality encryption via key from MRZ + + passive authent. active authent. extended access ctrl
50 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.12/34 Protection mechanisms to protect mechanism EU US basic access ctrl access & confidentiality encryption via key from MRZ + + passive authent. integrity of content signature by SDU (by NL) + + active authent. extended access ctrl
51 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.12/34 Protection mechanisms to protect mechanism EU US basic access ctrl access & confidentiality encryption via key from MRZ + + passive authent. integrity of content signature by SDU (by NL) + + active authent. authenticity of document signing of challenge +- NL + - extended access ctrl
52 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.12/34 Protection mechanisms to protect mechanism EU US basic access ctrl access & confidentiality encryption via key from MRZ + + passive authent. integrity of content signature by SDU (by NL) + + active authent. authenticity of document signing of challenge +- NL + - extended access ctrl confidentiality of fingerprints key exchange / sign challenge + n.a.
53 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.12/34 Protection mechanisms to protect mechanism EU US basic access ctrl access & confidentiality encryption via key from MRZ + + passive authent. integrity of content signature by SDU (by NL) + + active authent. authenticity of document signing of challenge +- NL + - extended access ctrl confidentiality of fingerprints key exchange / sign challenge + n.a. Physical: Faraday cage ; prevents eavesdrop
54 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.13/34 International PKI
55 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.13/34 International PKI Country Signing CA (NL) signs certificate of Document Signer (SDU)
56 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.13/34 International PKI Country Signing CA (NL) signs certificate of Document Signer (SDU) SDU signs security object, for passive authentication
57 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.13/34 International PKI Country Signing CA (NL) signs certificate of Document Signer (SDU) SDU signs security object, for passive authentication Passport chip contains: SDU certificate own public key (hash in security object)
58 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.13/34 International PKI Country Signing CA (NL) signs certificate of Document Signer (SDU) SDU signs security object, for passive authentication Passport chip contains: SDU certificate own public key (hash in security object) Self-signed country certificates distributed at first via diplomatic post, later electronically.
59 V. Low level stuff Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.14/34
60 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.15/34 Card info I
61 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.15/34 Card info I SmartMX Chip from Philips (P5CT072), with: 72Kbyte EEPROM contactless interface (ISO/IEC A) 3DES, RNG, RSA, SHA1 (ECC?)
62 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.15/34 Card info I SmartMX Chip from Philips (P5CT072), with: 72Kbyte EEPROM contactless interface (ISO/IEC A) 3DES, RNG, RSA, SHA1 (ECC?) High certification: level EAL5+ of Common Criteria
63 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.15/34 Card info I SmartMX Chip from Philips (P5CT072), with: 72Kbyte EEPROM contactless interface (ISO/IEC A) 3DES, RNG, RSA, SHA1 (ECC?) High certification: level EAL5+ of Common Criteria JavaCard OS: IBM JCOP41 version 2.20 Certification by German BSI ongoing
64 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.15/34 Card info I SmartMX Chip from Philips (P5CT072), with: 72Kbyte EEPROM contactless interface (ISO/IEC A) 3DES, RNG, RSA, SHA1 (ECC?) High certification: level EAL5+ of Common Criteria JavaCard OS: IBM JCOP41 version 2.20 Certification by German BSI ongoing Passport Java applet written by SDU: closed source
65 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.16/34 Card info II
66 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.16/34 Card info II Writing to chip (e.g. for visa, children etc.) not foreseen.
67 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.16/34 Card info II Writing to chip (e.g. for visa, children etc.) not foreseen. No certainty about absence of backdoors But secret access should be detectable via monitoring
68 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.17/34 Contactless issues
69 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.17/34 Contactless issues Operation distance < 10 cm; eavesdrop < 10m?
70 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.17/34 Contactless issues Operation distance < 10 cm; eavesdrop < 10m? Multiple cards may be in reach of reader
71 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.17/34 Contactless issues Operation distance < 10 cm; eavesdrop < 10m? Multiple cards may be in reach of reader Anti-collision protocol described in ISO
72 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.17/34 Contactless issues Operation distance < 10 cm; eavesdrop < 10m? Multiple cards may be in reach of reader Anti-collision protocol described in ISO With fixed identifier tree walking protocol in current SDU test passport (4 byte id) allows tracing and targeting
73 Contactless issues Operation distance < 10 cm; eavesdrop < 10m? Multiple cards may be in reach of reader Anti-collision protocol described in ISO With fixed identifier tree walking protocol in current SDU test passport (4 byte id) allows tracing and targeting SDU: deployed card will use random identifier Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.17/34
74 III. High level protocols Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.18/34
75 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.19/34 Basic Access Control I
76 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.19/34 Basic Access Control I MRZ info yields 3DES document basic access keys K ENC,K MAC, fixed for lifetime
77 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.19/34 Basic Access Control I MRZ info yields 3DES document basic access keys K ENC,K MAC, fixed for lifetime Relevant MRZ input: passport nr. + birth date + expiry date
78 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.19/34 Basic Access Control I MRZ info yields 3DES document basic access keys K ENC,K MAC, fixed for lifetime Relevant MRZ input: passport nr. + birth date + expiry date Consent & confidentiality mechanism
79 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.20/34 Basic Access Control II
80 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.20/34 Basic Access Control II Psp N P (8 byte) Rdr
81 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.20/34 Basic Access Control II Psp N P (8 byte) Rdr Psp A:=N R N P K R K Enc {A},K MAC [K ENC {A}] Rdr
82 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.20/34 Basic Access Control II Psp N P (8 byte) Rdr Psp A:=N R N P K R K Enc {A},K MAC [K ENC {A}] Rdr Psp B:=N P N R K P K Enc {B},K MAC [K ENC {B}] Rdr
83 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.20/34 Basic Access Control II Psp N P (8 byte) Rdr Psp A:=N R N P K R K Enc {A},K MAC [K ENC {A}] Rdr Psp B:=N P N R K P K Enc {B},K MAC [K ENC {B}] Rdr Session keys are then derived from K P and K R, for rest of communication.
84 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.21/34 Low Entropy I Maximal entropy somewhere between 50 and 60 bits
85 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.21/34 Low Entropy I Maximal entropy somewhere between 50 and 60 bits Actual entropy much lower
86 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.21/34 Low Entropy I Maximal entropy somewhere between 50 and 60 bits Actual entropy much lower NL: passport numbers sequential
87 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.21/34 Low Entropy I Maximal entropy somewhere between 50 and 60 bits Actual entropy much lower NL: passport numbers sequential check digit in passport number (Witteman, Riscure)
88 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.21/34 Low Entropy I Maximal entropy somewhere between 50 and 60 bits Actual entropy much lower NL: passport numbers sequential check digit in passport number (Witteman, Riscure) age can be guessed, say within 10 years
89 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.21/34 Low Entropy I Maximal entropy somewhere between 50 and 60 bits Actual entropy much lower NL: passport numbers sequential check digit in passport number (Witteman, Riscure) age can be guessed, say within 10 years entropy only 35 bits
90 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.22/34 Low Entropy II Brute force attack
91 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.22/34 Low Entropy II Brute force attack Skimming too slow: 100 guesses s 1
92 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.22/34 Low Entropy II Brute force attack Skimming too slow: 100 guesses s 1 Eavesdropped data: 1,000,000 guesses s 1
93 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.22/34 Low Entropy II Brute force attack Skimming too slow: 100 guesses s 1 Eavesdropped data: 1,000,000 guesses s 1 35 bits: crackable in hours on standard PC
94 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.22/34 Low Entropy II Brute force attack Skimming too slow: 100 guesses s 1 Eavesdropped data: 1,000,000 guesses s 1 35 bits: crackable in hours on standard PC Ministry: issuance order deeply entrenched in procedures and checks
95 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.22/34 Low Entropy II Brute force attack Skimming too slow: 100 guesses s 1 Eavesdropped data: 1,000,000 guesses s 1 35 bits: crackable in hours on standard PC Ministry: issuance order deeply entrenched in procedures and checks ICAO is studying strengthening of Basic Access Control
96 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.23/34 Passive authentication
97 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.23/34 Passive authentication Read Security Object from chip with: SDU certificate public key for active authentication hashes of all passport data SDU signature
98 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.23/34 Passive authentication Read Security Object from chip with: SDU certificate public key for active authentication hashes of all passport data SDU signature Authenticity check consists of: certificate of SDU, using NL public key signature by SDU, using certificate hashes, after reading data
99 Passive authentication Read Security Object from chip with: SDU certificate public key for active authentication hashes of all passport data SDU signature Authenticity check consists of: certificate of SDU, using NL public key signature by SDU, using certificate hashes, after reading data Cloning still possible. Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.23/34
100 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.24/34 Active authentication, against cloning
101 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.24/34 Active authentication, against cloning Passport has private (RSA) key, with public key in (signed) security document.
102 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.24/34 Active authentication, against cloning Passport has private (RSA) key, with public key in (signed) security document. Psp N R (8 byte) Rdr
103 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.24/34 Active authentication, against cloning Passport has private (RSA) key, with public key in (signed) security document. Psp N R (8 byte) Rdr Psp Sig(N R padding) Rdr
104 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.24/34 Active authentication, against cloning Passport has private (RSA) key, with public key in (signed) security document. Psp N R (8 byte) Rdr Psp Sig(N R padding) Rdr Possible risk of signing location + timing data in N R, for tracking.
105 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.25/34 Advanced Security Mechanisms I
106 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.25/34 Advanced Security Mechanisms I For fingerprint protection; optional for ICAO
107 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.25/34 Advanced Security Mechanisms I For fingerprint protection; optional for ICAO Required by EU, but no EU-standard yet
108 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.25/34 Advanced Security Mechanisms I For fingerprint protection; optional for ICAO Required by EU, but no EU-standard yet German (BSI) proposal under consideration: New Diffie-Hellman session key Some protection against eavesdrop Reader must authenticate (certificates) Certificate revocation is problematic
109 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.25/34 Advanced Security Mechanisms I For fingerprint protection; optional for ICAO Required by EU, but no EU-standard yet German (BSI) proposal under consideration: New Diffie-Hellman session key Some protection against eavesdrop Reader must authenticate (certificates) Certificate revocation is problematic Each country controls itself who can read fingerprints
110 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.26/34 Advanced Security Mechanisms II (SK P,PK P,D P ) Psp Security Doc PK P,D P Rdr
111 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.26/34 Advanced Security Mechanisms II (SK P,PK P,D P ) Psp Security Doc PK P,D P Rdr Psp PK P ( SK R, PK R,D P ) Rdr
112 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.26/34 Advanced Security Mechanisms II (SK P,PK P,D P ) Psp Security Doc PK P,D P Rdr Psp PK P ( SK R, PK R,D P ) Rdr K = KA(SK P, PK R,D P ) K = KA( PK R,SK P,D P )
113 IV. Passports for other use? Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.27/34
114 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.28/34 Secure logon via your passport
115 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.28/34 Secure logon via your passport Give your machine / local network: your passport s K ENC and K MAC your passport s public key
116 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.28/34 Secure logon via your passport Give your machine / local network: your passport s K ENC and K MAC your passport s public key Authenticate yourself via challenge-response: what you have
117 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.28/34 Secure logon via your passport Give your machine / local network: your passport s K ENC and K MAC your passport s public key Authenticate yourself via challenge-response: what you have Possibly add picture check: what you are.
118 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.28/34 Secure logon via your passport Give your machine / local network: your passport s K ENC and K MAC your passport s public key Authenticate yourself via challenge-response: what you have Possibly add picture check: what you are.
119 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.29/34 Digital signature via your passport?
120 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.29/34 Digital signature via your passport? Better not, because:
121 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.29/34 Digital signature via your passport? Better not, because: a. anyone who holds your passport can sign for you.
122 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.29/34 Digital signature via your passport? Better not, because: a. anyone who holds your passport can sign for you. b. Proof of identity requires release of your MRZ (and hence access to your chip), since: MRZ contains your name + birth date hash of MRZ signed by authorities, as part of security object
123 VI. Conclusions Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.30/34
124 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.31/34 Conclusions I
125 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.31/34 Conclusions I Biometric passports are on their way
126 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.31/34 Conclusions I Biometric passports are on their way General approach (ICAO, EU): careful.
127 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.31/34 Conclusions I Biometric passports are on their way General approach (ICAO, EU): careful. Basic Access Control weak link.
128 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.31/34 Conclusions I Biometric passports are on their way General approach (ICAO, EU): careful. Basic Access Control weak link. Protection of fingerprints not fully settled yet
129 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.31/34 Conclusions I Biometric passports are on their way General approach (ICAO, EU): careful. Basic Access Control weak link. Protection of fingerprints not fully settled yet Open communication with Ministry & SDU
130 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.32/34 Conclusions II
131 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.32/34 Conclusions II Biometry much overrated:
132 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.32/34 Conclusions II Biometry much overrated: Silly approach: same password, used everywhere (no template protection)
133 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.32/34 Conclusions II Biometry much overrated: Silly approach: same password, used everywhere (no template protection) Large scale use of biometrics uncertain
134 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.32/34 Conclusions II Biometry much overrated: Silly approach: same password, used everywhere (no template protection) Large scale use of biometrics uncertain Substantial false positives/negatives to be expected
135 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.32/34 Conclusions II Biometry much overrated: Silly approach: same password, used everywhere (no template protection) Large scale use of biometrics uncertain Substantial false positives/negatives to be expected Identification goals undermined: by widespread use in other applications if many citizens (obnoxiously) put their fingerprints on the web
136 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.33/34 Conclusions III
137 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.33/34 Conclusions III Function creep risks: Who will use passport s biometrics? Welfare authorities, banks, casinos etc.? Central storage: risks of compromise, misuse, etc.
138 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.33/34 Conclusions III Function creep risks: Who will use passport s biometrics? Welfare authorities, banks, casinos etc.? Central storage: risks of compromise, misuse, etc. Set-up for improved identity management can lead to large scale identity theft.
139 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.33/34 Conclusions III Function creep risks: Who will use passport s biometrics? Welfare authorities, banks, casinos etc.? Central storage: risks of compromise, misuse, etc. Set-up for improved identity management can lead to large scale identity theft. Real test (also for privacy!) are the in integration in backoffice databases
140 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.33/34 Conclusions III Function creep risks: Who will use passport s biometrics? Welfare authorities, banks, casinos etc.? Central storage: risks of compromise, misuse, etc. Set-up for improved identity management can lead to large scale identity theft. Real test (also for privacy!) are the in integration in backoffice databases Slow increase of use to be expected
141 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.34/34 Further reading
142 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.34/34 Further reading Juels (RSA labs), Molnar & Wagner (UC-Berkeley) at:
143 Wichers Schreur / Jacobs (IPA Fall days ) p.34/34 Further reading Juels (RSA labs), Molnar & Wagner (UC-Berkeley) at: Kc (U-Colombia), Molnar & Karger (IBM) at:
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