ORDER OF THE COURT 31 October 2013

Transcription

1 ORDER OF THE COURT 31 October 2013 (Interpretation of a judgment Advisory Opinion Application manifestly inadmissible) In Case E-2/12 INT, HOB-vín ehf., APPLICATION under Article 39 of the Statute of the Court and Article 95 of the Rules of Procedure for an interpretation of the judgment of the Court of 11 December 2012 in Case E-2/12 HOB-vín [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1092, THE COURT, composed of: Carl Baudenbacher, President, Per Christiansen (Judge- Rapporteur) and Páll Hreinsson, Judges, Registrar: Gunnar Selvik, makes the following Order I Facts, procedure and the arguments of the applicant 1 By letter dated 11 October 2013, HOB-vín ehf. ( the applicant or HOB-vín ) lodged an application under Article 39 of the Statute of the Court and Article 95 of the Rules of Procedure ( RoP ) for an interpretation of the judgment of the Court of 11 December 2012 in Case E-2/12 HOB-vín [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep In that judgment, the Court replied to a request for an Advisory Opinion from Reykjavík District Court on the compatibility with the EEA Agreement of national rules under which a State monopoly on the retail sale of alcohol may refuse, under certain conditions, to accept for sale alcoholic beverages that are

2 2 lawfully produced and marketed in another EEA State. The request contained five questions. 3 The applicant requests, first, clarification of the answer provided by the Court to the fifth question from Reykjavík District Court. It submits that the Court has not answered the question conclusively or clearly. In the applicant s view, the question concerned whether the State Alcohol and Tobacco Company of Iceland ( ÁTVR ) could be liable to pay compensation pursuant to the principle of State liability under the EEA Agreement. However, according to the applicant, the answer given by the Court does not address the liability of ÁTVR. It is limited to stating that the Icelandic State could be liable to pay compensation for the conduct examined in the judgment. 4 Second, according to the applicant, some readers have doubts about whether the Court has answered the questions put to it concerning whether Article 11 EEA was contravened. However, HOB-vín considers that the Court s answers imply that Article 11 EEA was in fact violated, since Directive 2000/13/EC of 20 March 2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs, on which the Court based its answers, is merely a more detailed application of Article 11 EEA. 5 To remove all doubt, HOB-vín requests that the Court issue a statement explaining these aspects of its judgment. II Findings of the Court 6 Article 88(1) RoP provides that the Court may, where an action is manifestly inadmissible, by reasoned order, and without taking further steps in the proceedings, give a decision on the action. In the present case, the Court considers that it has sufficient information in the application to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings. 7 Article 39 of the Statute of the Court states that, if the meaning or scope of a judgment is in doubt, the Court shall construe it on application by any party establishing an interest therein or by the EFTA Surveillance Authority. 8 Pursuant to Article 95 RoP, an application for interpretation of a judgment shall be lodged in accordance with the general requirements for the form and content of applications set out in Articles 32 and 33 RoP. In addition, Article 95(1)(b) RoP states that the applicant must specify the passages for which an interpretation is sought. 9 When interpreting the main part of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice ( SCA ), the Statute of the Court or the RoP, the Court is not required by Article 3(1) SCA to follow the reasoning of the EU courts concerning parallel provisions of

3 3 EU law. However, the Court has repeatedly recognised the principle of procedural homogeneity and referred, in particular, to considerations of equal access to justice and of compliance with judgments rendered in infringement proceedings for parties appearing before the EEA courts (see Case E-14/11 DB Schenker v ESA [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1178, paragraph 77 and case law cited). Therefore, the case law of the EU courts is nevertheless relevant when the expressions of the main part of the SCA, the Statute of the Court or RoP that are to be interpreted are identical in substance to those in EU law (see Case E- 15/10 Posten Norge v ESA [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 246, paragraphs 109 and 110). Moreover, the Court has held that homogeneity cannot be limited to the interpretation of provisions whose wording is identical in substance to parallel provisions of EU law (see DB Schenker v ESA, cited above, paragraph 78, and order of the Court of 7 October 2013 in Joined Cases E-4/12 and E-5/12 Risdal Touring and Konkurrenten.no v ESA, not yet reported, paragraph 104). 10 The wording of Article 39 of the Statute of the Court is identical in substance to Article 43 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union ( ECJ ). Article 95 RoP corresponds in substance to Article 158(3) to (6) of the Rules of Procedure of the ECJ, and Article 129(1) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. Therefore, when assessing applications for interpretation pursuant to Article 39 of the Statute of the Court and Article 95 RoP, the Court finds it appropriate to take account of the reasoning in the case law on the corresponding rules in EU law. 11 According to the Court s settled case law, Article 34 SCA establishes a special means of judicial cooperation between the Court and national courts with the aim of providing the national courts with the necessary interpretations of elements of EEA law in order to decide the cases before them. Under this system of cooperation, which is intended as a means of ensuring a homogenous interpretation of the EEA Agreement, a national court or tribunal is entitled to request the Court to give an Advisory Opinion on the interpretation of the Agreement (Case E-18/11 Irish Bank [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 592, paragraphs 53 to 54, and case law cited; for the different legal situation concerning courts against whose decisions there is no remedy under national law, see paragraphs 57 to 58, and Case E-3/12 Jonsson, judgment of 20 March 2013, not yet reported, paragraph 60). 12 Article 34 SCA provides for direct cooperation between the Court and the national courts irrespective of any steps taken by the parties to the main proceedings. In the course of such proceedings, the parties are merely invited to submit observations within the legal framework set out by the court making the request (see, for comparison, orders of the ECJ in Cases 40/70 Sirena [1979] ECR 3169, and C-116/96 REV Reisebüro Binder [1998] ECR I-1889, paragraph 7).

4 4 13 Therefore, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine the need for an Advisory Opinion in light of the particular circumstances of the case (see, inter alia, Irish Bank, cited above, paragraph 55 and the case law cited). 14 It is also the task of such courts alone to assess whether they consider that sufficient guidance is given by an Advisory Opinion or whether it appears to them that a further request to the Court is required. 15 The parties to the proceedings before the national court are not parties to Advisory Opinion proceedings before the Court. Accordingly, the provisions on the interpretation of judgments in Article 39 of the Statute of the Court and Article 95 RoP do not apply to a judgment given as a reply to a request for an Advisory Opinion under Article 34 SCA (see, for comparison, Sirena, and Reisebüro Binder, paragraph 8, both cited above, and order of the ECJ in C-345/09 INT Baumann [2011] ECR I-28*, paragraph 5). The Court adds that, if the parties to the proceedings before the national court consider that the answers given by the Court are not sufficiently clear, they may at any time ask that court to submit a new request for an Advisory Opinion (see, in that respect, Case E-6/01 CIBA Speciality Chemicals Water Treatment and Others [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 281, paragraphs 3 to 7). 16 In the EU pillar, it has now been codified in Article 104 of the Rules of Procedure of the ECJ that the rules relating to the interpretation of judgments and orders do not apply to decisions given in reply to a request for a preliminary ruling. 17 Consequently, the application must be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. 18 For the sake of order, the Court adds that the application does not fulfil the general requirements regarding the form and content of applications set out in Articles 32 and 33 RoP. Nor does it, at least with regard to the second issue for which clarification is requested, fulfil the specific requirement, pursuant to Article 95(1)(b) RoP, that the passages for which interpretation is sought be specified.

5 5 On the grounds stated above, THE COURT hereby orders: The application is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. Carl Baudenbacher Per Christiansen Páll Hreinsson Luxembourg, 31 October 2013 Gunnar Selvik Registrar Carl Baudenbacher President