International Corporate Governance
|
|
- Morgan Parker
- 7 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Syllabus International Corporate Governance Wintersemester Articles labeled are available as a pdf-file.
2 1 st Segment - Theory of the Firm, Governance and Finance Class General Introduction, Agency Relationships (o.v.), In whose interest does the corporation work? Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling (1976): Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, pp Tirole, J. (2001): Corporate Governance, in: Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp Class Theories of the Firm and Management Alchian, A.A. and H. Demsetz (1972): Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5, pp Williamson, O.E. (1979): Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, in: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp Harm, C. (2002): Bank management between shareholders and regulators, SUERF Study No. 21, Amsterdam, Ch Class Governance and Finance Harm, C. (2002): Bank management between shareholders and regulators, SUERF Study No. 21, Amsterdam, Ch. 1.2 & 1.3. Professur für BWL, insb. Internationale Wirtschaft 2
3 2 nd Segment - Equity Governance ( I ) Class Shareholder Voting and Disclosure Pound, J. (1991): Proxy voting and the SEC, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 29, pp Pound, J. (1992): Beyond Takeovers: Politics Comes to Corporate Control, in: Harvard Business Review, March-April, pp Harm (2000): Shareholder Activism and Ownership Structure, mimeo, University of Münster. Class Boards of Directors John, K. and L.W. Senbet (1998): Corporate governance and board effectiveness, in: Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 22, pp Daily, C.M., Ellstrand, A.E. and J.L. Johnson (1996): Boards of Directors: A Review and Research Agenda, in: Journal of Management, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp Harm (2000): The Board of Directors, mimeo, University of Münster. Professur für BWL, insb. Internationale Wirtschaft 3
4 Class nd Segment - Equity Governance ( II ) Management Compensation Schemes Yermack, David (1995): Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Options Effectively?, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 39. pp Pavlik, E.L., Scott, T.W. and P. Tiessen (1993): Executive Compensation: Issues and Research, in: Journal of Accounting Literature, Vol. 12, pp Sunder, Shyam (2002): Political Economy of US Accounting Collapse, mimeo, Yale University. Harm (undated): Incentives: The Role of Carrots and Sticks, mimeo, University of Münster. Class Takeover Markets Jensen, Michael C., and Richard S. Ruback (1983): The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11, pp Caves, R.E. (1989): Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic Efficiency, in: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 7, pp Harm (2000): Takeovers and Leveraged Buy-Outs, mimeo, University of Münster. Professur für BWL, insb. Internationale Wirtschaft 4
5 Class rd Segment - Debt Governance Bankruptcy: Theory and International Evidence Franks, Julian, Kjell Nyborg, and Walter Torous (1995): A Comparison of US, UK, and German Insolvency Codes, IFA Working Paper , London Business School, Institute of Finance and Accounting, London. Easterbrook, Frank H. (1990): Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27, pp Aghion, Philippe, Oliver Hart, and John Moore (1992): The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, in: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. Class Work-Outs: International Evidence Gilson, Stewart C., Kose John, and Larry Lang (1990): Troubled Debt Restructuring: An empirical Study of Private Reorganization of Firms in Default, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27 No. 2, pp Sheard, Paul (1994): The Main Banks and the governance of financial distress, in: Aoki, Masahiko and Hugh Patrick (eds.) (1994), pp Harm, Christian (1997): The role of German banks to reduce the costs of financial distress, mimeo, Copenhagen Business School. Class Bank Regulation Harm, C. (2002): Bank management between shareholders and regulators, SUERF Study No. 21, Amsterdam, Ch. 1.3 & 3. Woodward, Susan (1988): A Transaction Cost Analysis of Banking Activity and Deposit Insurance, in: Cato Journal, Vol. 8 No. 3, pp Professur für BWL, insb. Internationale Wirtschaft 5
6 Class Debt Economies 4 th Segment - The Systemic View Harm, C. (1996): Debt Economies, mimeo, Stern School of Business. Class USA: A Managerialist system Roe, M.J. (1991): A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, in: Columbia Law Review, Vol. 91, No. 10, pp Class Law, Finance, and Growth La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny (1998): Law and Finance, in : Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6, pp Class Political Determinants of Governance Structures Harm C. (2004): Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Corruption and Other Forms of Rent-Seeking, Presentation at the 8 th ISNIE conference, Sept. 30 th Oct. 2 nd 2004, Tucson, AZ. Professur für BWL, insb. Internationale Wirtschaft 6
Economics of Bankruptcy Volume I
Economics of Bankruptcy Volume I Edited by Edward R. Morrison Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, USA ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO LAW An Elgar Research Collection ^ Cheltenham, UK Northampton,
More informationDoctoral Seminar in Accounting and Corporate Governance Research
Ph.D. COURSE: Doctoral Seminar in Accounting and Corporate Governance Research Autumn 2012 at Jönköping International Business School, quarter speed Course credits: 7.5 ECTS credits Education Cycle: Third
More informationA Literature Review of Corporate Governance
2011 International Conference on E-business, Management and Economics IPEDR Vol.25 (2011) (2011) IACSIT Press, Singapore A Literature Review of Corporate Governance Humera Khan + Faculty of Management
More informationDIFFERENT APPROACHES TO BANKRUPTCY. Oliver Hart*
DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO BANKRUPTCY by Oliver Hart* *This paper was presented at the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Paris, June 21-23, 1999. I would like to thank Philippe Aghion,
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES USING OPTIONS TO DIVIDE VALUE IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY. Lucian Arye Bebchuk
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES USING OPTIONS TO DIVIDE VALUE IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY Lucian Arye Bebchuk Working Paper 7614 http://www.nber.org/papers/w7614 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts
More informationShould Business Bankruptcy Be a One-Chapter Book?
Should Business Bankruptcy Be a One-Chapter Book? BY MITCHELL BERLIN W hat makes more economic sense? A bankruptcy system that auctions a firm s assets and distributes the proceeds among the creditors?
More informationCapital Structure and Ownership Structure: A Review of Literature
[The Journal of Online Education, New York, January 2009] Capital Structure and Ownership Structure: A Review of Literature by BOODHOO Roshan ASc Finance, BBA (Hons) Finance, BSc (Hons) Banking & International
More informationFinancial Economics II (Corporate Finance)
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS II (CORPORATE FINANCE) 1 Financial Economics II (Corporate Finance) Lecturer: Stanimir Morfov, Carsten Sprenger Class teacher: Stanimir Morfov, Carsten Sprenger Teaching objectives
More informationCHAPTER 11. Lucian Arye Bebchuk. Discussion Paper No. 227 12/97. Harvard Law School. Cambridge, MA 02138
ISSN 1045-6333 CHAPTER 11 Lucian Arye Bebchuk Discussion Paper No. 227 12/97 Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138 The Center for Law, Economics, and Business is supported by a grant from the John M.
More informationDoes an Independent Board Matter for Leveraged Firm?
Does an Independent Board Matter for Leveraged Firm? Dr Janet Lee School of Business and Information Management Faculty of Economics and Commerce The Australian National University Email: Janet.Lee@anu.edu.au
More informationTop Executive Incentives in Germany, Japan and the U.S.: A Comparison
Top Executive Incentives in Germany, Japan and the U.S.: A Comparison by Steven N. Kaplan* February 1998 ABSTRACT This paper compares top executive incentives in Germany, Japan, and the U.S. First, the
More informationFinance and Corporate Governance
Finance and Corporate Governance 2015/2016 Code: 41983 ECTS Credits: 10 Degree Type Year Semester 4311312 Management, Organization and Business Economics OB 0 1 Contact Name: Miguel Ángel García Cestona
More informationFINANCE 912 Financial Institutions
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA The Wharton School FINANCE 912 Financial Institutions Course Objective: Itay Goldstein Spring 2010 The objective of the course is to provide an introduction to the theory of
More informationCorporate Governance: Theory and Practice
Corporate Governance: Theory and Practice Dr. Malek Lashgari, CFA, University of Hartford, West Hartford, CT ABSTRACT Various theories and philosophies have provided the foundation for the development
More informationDiscussion of Franks-Sussman and Xu Bankruptcy Papers. Franklin Allen
Discussion of Franks-Sussman and Xu Bankruptcy Papers Franklin Allen Comparative Corporate Governance: Changing Profiles of National Diversity January 8-9, 2003 Tokyo, Japan Aim of bankruptcy law Efficient
More informationThe Choice Among Traditional Chapter 11, Prepackaged Bankruptcy, and Out-of-Court Restructuring
The Choice Among Traditional Chapter 11, Prepackaged Bankruptcy, and Out-of-Court Restructuring Keven Yost School of Business University of Wisconsin Madison Krannert Graduate School of Management Purdue
More informationCorporate Governance and Shareholder Activism
Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism Julian Franks London Business School and ECGI July 9 /3 Forces that make for effective corporate governance A board that makes decisions that are in the interests
More informationAcquisitions as a Means of Restructuring Firms in Chapter 11*
Acquisitions as a Means of Restructuring Firms in Chapter 11* Edith S. Hotchkiss Boston College Fulton Hall Chestnut Hill, MA 02167 Hotchkis@bc.edu (617)552-3240 Robert M. Mooradian Northeastern University
More informationBankruptcy Law: a Mechanism of Governance for Financially Distressed Firms
Bankruptcy Law: a Mechanism of Governance for Financially Distressed Firms Régis Blazy 1, Bertrand Chopard 2, and Agnès Fimayer 3 Abstract 4 This paper explores the various governance models for financially
More informationInternational Perspectives - Corporate Governance Regulations and Approaches
International Perspectives - Corporate Governance Regulations and Approaches Introduction: The recent development in regulations of corporate governance has received notable attention from academics and
More informationResolution of Corporate Distress in East Asia
Resolution of Corporate Distress in East Asia Stijn Claessens Simeon Djankov Leora Klapper * Abstract The financial crisis in East Asia in 1997-1998 led to financial distress of firms with different financial
More informationTop 15 Bankruptcies 1980 - Present
Bankruptcy Top 15 Bankruptcies 1980 - Present Company Bankruptcy Date Total Pre-Bankruptcy Assets Filing Court District Worldcom, Inc. 7/21/2002 $103,914,000,000 NY-S Enron Corp.* 12/2/2001 $63,392,000,000
More informationCorporate Finance (ECON W4280)
Tri Vi Dang Columbia University Email: td2332@columbia.edu Spring 2014 Corporate Finance (ECON W4280) Meeting time: Tu, Th 4.10-5.25 Meeting place: IAB 410 Office address: IAB 1032 Office hours: Th 11.00-12.00
More informationHARVARD UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
HARVARD UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS ECONOMICS 970 SPRING 2005 AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE FIRM Tue & Thu 7 8:30 PM Instructor: Location: Saravanan Kesavan skesavan@hbs.edu (617) 496 9890 Room: 116,
More informationBankruptcy around the World: Explanations of its Relative Use
Comments Welcome! Please do not cite without permission of the authors. Bankruptcy around the World: Explanations of its Relative Use Stijn Claessens Finance Group University of Amsterdam Roetersstraat
More informationAgency theory and corporate governance: a review of the literature from a UK perspective
Agency theory and corporate governance: a review of the literature from a UK perspective By Patrick McColgan, Department of Accounting & Finance, University of Strathclyde, 100, Cathedral Street, Glasgow.
More informationRIETI-CARF Conference What Financing Mechanisms and Organizations of Business Entities Best Facilitate Innovation? February 27-28, 2006
RIETI-CARF Conference What Financing Mechanisms and Organizations of Business Entities Best Facilitate Innovation? February 27-28, 2006 RIETI-CARF Conference What Financing Mechanisms and Organizations
More informationOwnership Duration and Firm Performance
Ownership Duration and Firm Performance Øyvind Bøhren, Richard Priestley and Bernt Arne Ødegaard Norwegian School of Management BI Jan 2005 Overview Ownership duration. Corporate Governance. Measuring
More informationIncentive Features in CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry
Kose John and Yiming Qian Incentive Features in CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry T 1. Introduction he topic of corporate governance in general, and topmanagement compensation in particular, has
More informationLife-Cycle Theory and Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: Evidence from. Dividend Policy in Thailand
Life-Cycle Theory and Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: Evidence from Dividend Policy in Thailand Yordying Thanatawee Lecturer in Finance, Graduate School of Commerce, Burapha University 169 Longhadbangsaen Road,
More informationCorporate governance. Knut Nygaard ECON1810, Spring 2011
Corporate governance Knut Nygaard ECON1810, Spring 2011 1 This lecture What is corporate governance? 2 Governance and responsibility Corporate governance: firm/manager versus financiers Corporate social
More informationFINANCIAL POLICY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF RUSSIAN COMPANIES
FINANCIAL POLICY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF RUSSIAN COMPANIES Project Leaders: Alexei Goriaev agoriaev@nes.ru Sergey Stepanov sstepanov@cefir.ru The extensive empirical evidence shows that country s financial
More informationAgency Costs of Free Cash Flow and Takeover Attempts
Global Economy and Finance Journal Vol. 6. No. 1. March 2013. Pp. 16 28 Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and Takeover Attempts Lu Lin *, Dan Lin, H. Y. Izan and Ray da Silva Rosa This study utilises two
More informationJournal Of Financial And Strategic Decisions Volume 8 Number 1 Spring 1995 INTEREST RATE SWAPS: A MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION APPROACH
Journal Of Financial And Strategic Decisions Volume 8 Number 1 Spring 1995 INTEREST RATE SWAPS: A MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION APPROACH John L. Scott * and Maneesh Sharma * Abstract The market for interest
More informationCapital Structure: Some Legal and Policy Issues
Capital Structure: Some Legal and Policy Issues by Professor Stewart C. Myers MIT Sloan School of Management Company Law Reform in OECD Countries A Comparative Outlook of Current Trends Stockholm, Sweden
More informationFinancial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Size UK Companies. By Julian Franks (LBS) and Oren Sussman (SBS, Oxford)
Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Size UK Companies By Julian Franks (LBS) and Oren Sussman (SBS, Oxford) Different approaches to corporate bankruptcy. The US: soft law. The
More informationFiling for Bankruptcy Protection, Governance Mechanisms and Corporate Disclosure
Filing for Bankruptcy Protection, Governance Mechanisms and Corporate Disclosure Walid Ben-Amar and Daniel Zeghal, Telfer School of Management University of Ottawa, Canada ABSTRACT This study examines
More informationSIMI KEDIA Associate Professor of Finance Rutgers Business School Phone: 973-353-1145 Email: skedia@rbsmail.rutgers.edu
SIMI KEDIA Associate Professor of Finance Rutgers Business School Phone: 973-353-1145 Email: skedia@rbsmail.rutgers.edu EDUCATION New York University: Ph.D in Finance and International Business, Sept.
More informationBenefits of control, managerial ownership, and the stock returns of acquiring firms
RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 26. No. 4, Winter 1995 pp. 782-792 Benefits of control, managerial ownership, and the stock returns of acquiring firms R. Glenn Hubbard* and Darius Palia** This article examines
More informationINFORMATION CONTENT OF SHARE REPURCHASE PROGRAMS
INFORMATION CONTENT OF SHARE REPURCHASE PROGRAMS Elzbieta Maria Wronska Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, Poland elzbieta.wronska@umcs.lublin.pl Abstract: The article aims to present the meaning
More informationIndustry Example: The European Market for Gas
Industry Example: The European Market for Gas Professur für BWL, insb. Internationale Wirtschaft Folie 1 Agenda 1. Characteristics of the gas market 2. The National Markets for gas 3. EU Liberalization
More informationBankruptcy Resolution in Japan : Corporation Reorganization v.s. Civil Rehabilitation. Peng Xu * Hosei University E-mail: pxu@mt.tama.hosei.ac.
Bankruptcy Resolution in Japan : Corporation Reorganization v.s. Civil Rehabilitation Peng Xu * Hosei University E-mail: pxu@mt.tama.hosei.ac.jp Very preliminary draft Abstract I present new evidence on
More informationEconomics of Corporate and Personal Bankruptcy Law
Economics of Corporate and Personal Bankruptcy Law Michelle J. White Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, and NBER miwhite@ucsd.edu August
More informationCorporate Finance. Course Teacher: Zhang Yao No. of Course: 2040126
Corporate Finance Title of the Course: Corporate Finance Course Teacher: Zhang Yao No. of Course: 2040126 Language: English Students: Oversees students Inside Class Credit Hours: 36 Extracurricular class
More informationChapter 2 Economic Theories of the Firm
Chapter 2 Economic Theories of the Firm 2.1 General Remarks Economic theories of the firm have provided much of the language and concepts of modern corporate governance and corporate law discourse. 1 Alternative
More informationLimiting Shareholder Rights
Symposium: Limiting Shareholder Rights Entrenching Management or Establishing Commitments? Tuesday, April 14, 2015 12:30-3:30 p.m. Notre Dame Law School, Faculty Meeting Room Symposium: Limiting Shareholder
More informationWho Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies? *
Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies? * Julian Franks a, Colin Mayer b and Luc Renneboog c Final version 24 April 2001 Winner of the Best Paper Prize in the Journal of Financial Intermediation,
More informationVolume Title: Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2, The. Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/blan94-3
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2, The Volume Author/Editor: Olivier Blanchard, Kenneth
More informationFUNCTION (X) INC. (the "Company") COMPENSATION COMMITTEE CHARTER
FUNCTION (X) INC. (the "Company") COMPENSATION COMMITTEE CHARTER Purpose Composition The purpose of the Compensation Committee (the Committee ) shall be as follows: 1. To discharge the responsibilities
More information3 Administration 3.1 Schedule Session 1: Monday, November 22 (0900-1200); Core Classic Theory
Discipline: Finance 1 Lecturer Bill Megginson is Professor and Rainbolt Chair in Finance at the University of Oklahoma s Michael F. Price College of Business. He is also Executive Director the Privatization
More informationManagerial Entrenchment and Open-Market Share. Repurchases: The Case of Taiwan
Managerial Entrenchment and Open-Market Share Repurchases: The Case of Taiwan Ruei-Shian Wu College of Management Yuan Ze University 135 Yuan-Tung Road Chung-Li 32003, Taiwan Phone: 886-3-463-8800 ext.2195
More informationRevolving Asset-Based Lending Contracts and the Resolution of Debt-Related Agency Problems
Revolving Asset-Based Lending Contracts and the Resolution of Debt-Related Agency Problems Richard L. Constand Jerome S. Osteryoung Donald A. Nast Small firms that do not have access to organized financial
More informationGene C. Lai. Presented at Feng Chia University
Corporate Governance, Organizational Structure, and Business Research Gene C. Lai Safeco Distinguished Professor of Insurance Washington State University Presented at Feng Chia University Outline Corporate
More informationFINA 8322: Ph.D. Seminar in Corporate Finance Spring 2014
FINA 8322: Ph.D. Seminar in Corporate Finance Spring 2014 Instructor: Christo Pirinsky Class Meets: M 10:00am-12:30pm, DUQ 357 Office: Funger Hall 507 Phone: (202) 994-2377 Office Hrs: W 4:30pm-6:30pm
More informationEuropean Summer Symposium in Financial Markets (ESSFM) Travel Costs Sponsored by the New York Stock Exchange
European Summer Symposium in Financial Markets (ESSFM) Travel Costs Sponsored by the New York Stock Exchange Monday 19 July Studienzentrum Gerzensee, 19/30 July 2004 08.15-08.30 Opening Remarks Programme
More informationCORPORATE GOVERNANCE: EFFECTS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: EFFECTS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH by Maria Maher and Thomas Andersson OECD 1999 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: EFFECTS
More informationOwnership Structure, Corporate Governance & Company Performance 1
Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance & Company Performance 1 There is a general perception that ownership concentration in a company may actually improve its performance as having a large controlling
More informationHow To Find Out If A Dividend Is Negatively Associated With A Manager'S Payout
Dividend Payout and Executive Compensation in US Firms Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya 1 I.H.Asper School of Business University of Manitoba 181 Freedman Crescent Winnipeg, MB R3T 5V4 Tel: (204) 474-6774 Fax:
More informationChapter 2 General Issues in Bankruptcy Law
Chapter 2 General Issues in Bankruptcy Law The primary aim of this book is to understand bank bankruptcy law and to make suggestions on how to improve its design. In order to be able to do this, one first
More informationVenture Capitalists As Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring
Venture Capitalists As Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring by Steven N. Kaplan and Per Strömberg* First Draft: December 2000 This Draft: January 2000 * Graduate School of Business, University
More informationJournal of Applied Corporate Finance
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance SUMMER 1991 VOLUME 4.2 The Economics of Prepackaged Bankruptcy by John J. McConnell, Purdue University, and Henri Servaes, University of Chicago THE ECONOMICS OF PREPACKAGED
More informationCORNELL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF HUMAN ECOLOGY DEPARTMENT OF POLICY ANALYSIS & MANAGEMENT PAM 5334: CORPORATIONS, SHAREHOLDERS, AND POLICY SPRING 2015
CORNELL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF HUMAN ECOLOGY DEPARTMENT OF POLICY ANALYSIS & MANAGEMENT PAM 5334: CORPORATIONS, SHAREHOLDERS, AND POLICY SPRING 2015 The directors of such [joint-stock]companies, however,
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES CORPORATE AND PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY LAW. Michelle J. White. Working Paper 17237 http://www.nber.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES CORPORATE AND PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY LAW Michelle J. White Working Paper 17237 http://www.nber.org/papers/w17237 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge,
More informationInvestor Protection and Corporate Governance* Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance* Rafael La Porta a, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes b, Andrei Shleifer a,* and Robert Vishny c a Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138
More informationComplementarities in Corporate Governance
Kiel Institute of World Economics Düsternbrooker Weg 120 D-24105 Kiel Kiel Working Paper No. 947 Complementarities in Corporate Governance A Survey of the Literature with Special Emphasis on Japan by Ralph
More informationThe Compensation Committee of Business
Management Development and Compensation Committee Charter March 4, 2015 Purpose The Management Development and Compensation Committee (the Committee ) is appointed by the Board and elected by the Shareholders
More informationThe Procter & Gamble Company Board of Directors Compensation & Leadership Development Committee Charter
The Procter & Gamble Company Board of Directors Compensation & Leadership Development Committee Charter I. Purposes. The Compensation and Leadership Development Committee (the Committee ) is appointed
More informationMaster Thesis. Title:The Choice of Bankruptcy Reorganization: Chapter 11, Prepackaged and Out-of-Court Workout. MSc Business Economics, Finance track
Master Thesis Title:The Choice of Bankruptcy Reorganization: Chapter 11, Prepackaged and Out-of-Court Workout Programme: Author: MSc Business Economics, Finance track Ke Xu ID: 10390049 Supervisor: Dr.
More informationInvestor Protection: Origins, Consequences, Reform
THE WORLD BANK Financial Sector Discussion Paper No. 1 Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, Reform Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny Financial Sector
More informationDebt and Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: Evidence from India*
Debt and Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: Evidence from India* Jayati Sarkar Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research Gen. Vaidya Marg, Goregaon (E) Mumbai-400 065, India Email: jayati@igidr.ac.in
More informationI. Introduction I.1. Preface
1 I. Introduction I.1. Preface Monitoring by minority shareholders is a topic that is receiving more attention in Germany even though shareholder activism is not a completely new phenomenon. A description
More informationBANKRUPTCY AND THE RESOLUTION OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS*
Chapter 14 BANKRUPTCY AND THE RESOLUTION OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS* EDITH S. HOTCHKISS Boston College KOSE JOHN New York University ROBERT M. MOORADIAN Northeastern University KARIN S. THORBURN Dartmouth College
More informationIntroduction to the SEC and Company Filings Overview
Morningstar Document Research 1 Introduction to the SEC and Company Filings Overview 1 About the SEC 2 Who Files with the SEC? 3 SEC Filings Overview 4 Why Can t I Find What I Need? 5 Material Events 6
More informationFBE 652. FINANCIAL ECONOMICS I
FBE 652. FINANCIAL ECONOMICS I Professors John G. Matsusaka & Oguzhan Ozbas Fall 2015 SYLLABUS Overview The two-course sequence FBE 652 and FBE 655 provides a rigorous introduction to modern corporate
More informationAre the Dis~inc~ians be~:ween Debt and ;Equity Disappearing? An Overview
Are the Dis~inc~ians be~:ween Debt and ;Equity Disappearing? An Overview Richard W. Kopcke and Eric S. Rosengren* During the 1980s, the proportion of business assets financed by debt exceeded that of any
More informationAgency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers Michael C. Jensen Harvard Business School MJensen@hbs.edu Abstract The interests and incentives of managers and shareholders conflict over
More informationThe Capital Structure, Ownership and Survival of Newly Established Family Firms
Irene Wahlqvist Sonica Narula BI Norwegian Business School - Master Thesis - The Capital Structure, Ownership and Survival of Newly Established Family Firms Submission Date 01.09.2014 Supervisor: Bogdan
More informationDeciphering the Financial Rescue Bill and Related Government Actions. October 3, 2008
Deciphering the Financial Rescue Bill and Related Government Actions October 3, 2008 Today s Gibson Dunn Panelists Michael Bopp chairs Gibson Dunn's Financial Services Crisis Group, a multidisciplinary
More informationITALIAN ASSET MANAGEMENT COMPANIES: PRODUCTS AND GOVERNANCE
ITALIAN ASSET MANAGEMENT COMPANIES: PRODUCTS AND GOVERNANCE Maria Cristina Arcuri* Abstract The importance of the asset management sector has prompted many studies to highlight the need to promote its
More informationCEO Incentives and Payout Policy: Empirical Evidence. from Europe
CEO Incentives and Payout Policy: Empirical Evidence from Europe Amedeo De Cesari Aston Business School Neslihan Ozkan University of Bristol January 15th, 2013 Abstract: We investigate how corporate payout
More informationJournal Of Financial And Strategic Decisions Volume 10 Number 1 Spring 1997
Journal Of Financial And Strategic Decisions Volume 10 Number 1 Spring 1997 EMPLOYEE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, STAKEHOLDER-AGENCY THEORY, AND THE VALUE OF THE FIRM Jeffery Heinfeldt * and Richard Curcio **
More informationCronyism and Delaware Incorporation: An Examination on Excess Compensation
Cronyism and Incorporation: An Examination on Excess Compensation Qian Xie 1 1 School of Business and Management, East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania, East Stroudsburg, USA Correspondence: Qian
More informationINSOLVENCY LAWS AROUND ANALYSIS AND RULES FOR THEIR DESIGN THE WORLD A STATISTICAL STIJN CLAESSENS* AND LEORA KLAPPER** Forum
Forum features can be a way to shed light on the importance of particular creditor rights. INSOLVENCY LAWS AROUND THE WORLD A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RULES FOR THEIR DESIGN Insolvency around the world
More informationVITA MICHAEL W. FAULKENDER. R.H. Smith School of Business Office: (301) 405-1064
VITA MICHAEL W. FAULKENDER R.H. Smith School of Business Office: (301) 405-1064 Finance Department Email: mfaulken@rhsmith.umd.edu University of Maryland College Park, MD 20742 ACADEMIC POSITIONS HELD
More informationHow To Manage A Company
PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES COMPANY COMPENSATION AND MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS CHARTER I Purposes The Board of Directors (the Board )of Pioneer Natural Resources Company
More informationA REVIEW OF THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES
A REVIEW OF THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES Popescu Luigi Universitatea Pitesti, Facultatea de Stiinte Economice, Str Republicii, Nr 71, Pitesti Email popescu.luigi@gmail.com Telefon: +40745.400.686 Visinescu
More informationAchieving the Optimal Capital Structure and its Impact on Pakistani Banking Performance
International Review of Business Research Papers Vol. 7. No. 3. May 2011. Pp. 9-24 Achieving the Optimal Capital Structure and its Impact on Pakistani Banking Performance Raheel Gohar* and Adnan Shoaib**
More informationJENNIFER N. CARPENTER
JENNIFER N. CARPENTER New York University (212) 998-0352 Stern School of Business fax: (212) 995-4233 44 West Fourth Street, Suite 9-190 carpenter@stern.nyu.edu New York, NY 10012 www.stern.nyu.edu/~jcarpen0
More informationFirm characteristics. The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/0307-4358.htm
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/0307-4358.htm How firm characteristics affect capital structure: an empirical study Nikolaos Eriotis National
More informationCorporate Governance of Banks: A Credit Rating Agency s Approach. presented by Janet Holmes
Corporate Governance of Banks: A Credit Rating Agency s Approach presented by Janet Holmes Overview Introduction Meaning of credit ratings Moody s general approach to corporate governance analysis Moody
More informationInternational Comparisons of Australia s Investment and Trading Position
Journal of Investment Strategy Volume 1 Number 3 perspectives 45 International Comparisons of Australia s Investment and Trading Position By Kevin Daly and Anil Mishra School of Economics and Finance,
More informationWhat drives firms to be more diversified?
What drives firms to be more diversified? Rong Guo Columbus State University ABSTRACT This study examines the motivations of firms that become more diversified. To get a clearer picture of what drives
More informationHow To Find Out What The Agency Cost Of Insider Trading Is
Journal Of Financial And Strategic Decisions Volume 10 Number 1 Spring 1997 CONTROLLING THE AGENCY COST OF INSIDER TRADING James S. Ang * and Don R. Cox ** Abstract This study provides a unique use of
More informationTransparency, Corporate Governance and Capital Markets
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development In Co-operation with The World Bank Group Transparency, Corporate Governance and Capital Markets Ronald J. Gilson Meyers Professor of Law and Business,
More informationFranklin Templeton Variable Insurance Products Trust
Statement of Additional Information May 1, 2016 Franklin Templeton Variable Insurance Products Trust Franklin Flex Cap Growth VIP Fund Franklin Founding Funds Allocation VIP Fund Franklin Global Real Estate
More informationHP INC. BOARD OF DIRECTORS HR AND COMPENSATION COMMITTEE CHARTER
HP INC. BOARD OF DIRECTORS HR AND COMPENSATION COMMITTEE CHARTER I. Purpose The purposes of the HR and Compensation Committee (the Committee ) of the Board of Directors (the Board ) of HP Inc. ( HP ) are:
More informationMaximizing the value of distressed assets: Bankruptcy law and the efficient reorganization of firms
Maximizing the value of distressed assets: Bankruptcy law and the efficient reorganization of firms by David C. Smith* and Per Strömberg** First Draft: October 2003 This Draft: October 2003 PRELIMINARY
More informationCorporate Governance Practices, Issues and Challenges in Sri Lanka
Social Sciences (GB14Chennai Conference) ISBN: 978-1-941505-14-4 Chennai, India 11-13 July 2014 Paper ID: C437 Corporate Governance Practices, Issues and Challenges in Sri Lanka Koperunthevy Kalainathan,
More informationNew 3.8% "Affordable Care Act" Tax May Burden Some S Corporation Shareholders
New 3.8% "Affordable Care Act" Tax May Burden Some S Corporation Shareholders Prepared By: The Tax Group Written By: Ivan H. Golden Co-author: Robert R. Pluth Jr. Electing small business trusts ( ESBTs
More information