Key words: Development Economics; Sports Economics; Football World Cup; Infrastructure Investment.

Transcription

1 Experiences from World Cup 2010 in South Africa first thoughts about implication for Brazil 2014 Luiz Martins de Melo (Economics Institute, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, IE/UFRJ, BRA) Abstract The paper analyses the South African experience of hosting World Cup 2010 and tries to stress some implications for Brazil There are several quite similar macroeconomic indicators. The most striking difference is the high unemployment rate in South Africa compared to Brazil. South Africa s transport infrastructure is better than the Brazilian. Brazilian proposed expenditures budget is higher than the investment carried out in South Africa. But, as well known by the researchers in sports economics, quantitative evaluation is not well equipped to capture all the intangible effects of megaevents such as the World Cup. Perhaps, the outstanding impact of hosting the World Cup in Brazil is going to be the strengthening of football as an important feature of the Brazilian culture. JEL classification: L83; L91;O16. Key words: Development Economics; Sports Economics; Football World Cup; Infrastructure Investment. 1. Introduction Brazil and South Africa have many similarities and dif ferences. They are the largest economies in Africa and Latin America respectively. They are in the group of countries called BRICS. They have a huge income inequality and poor infrastructure. They have suffered dictatorships for long periods of their histories. Brazil completed its transition to democracy in 1985 and South Africa in the early nineties of the twentieth century. Apparently the similarities end here. Their histories and their institutions, that derived from the Portuguese and English / Dutch colonization are very different. The apartheid in Brazil is primarily social. In South Africa it is racial. Brazil is a country of large miscegenation. This does not mean that there is no racism. But this has not been the strong cause of political and social unrest. International insertion of Brazil and Latin America is also very different from South Africa and Africa. It is obvious that it is impossible to deal with all these issues in this paper. They serve to point out that there are also similarities and differences in football in the same way as in society. The main difference, with respect to football, is the technique and the way this sport is embedded in the culture of each country. Football in Brazil is the national sport, almost a secular religion. Popularly it is said that in Brazil the person s character is defined by his loyalty to his football team. It is possible to change wives, political parties, religion and even sexual orientation but changing teams is unacceptable. 1

2 Brazil is the country with the most world titles and has participated in all World Cups (Melo, 2007). Football hasn t had the same social and cultural impact and the same technical performance in South Africa. However, both have similar organizational problems and poor infrastructure to host major international sporting events such as the World Cup. The remaining parts of this paper will address these issues. The first part will be a presentation of the economic and social indicators of both countries. In the second part the problems of logistics (infrastructure and governance) to host major international events and their impact on society and the economy will be analyzed. Finally, some conclusions will be presented based on the previous analysis made in the paper. 2. Brazil, South Africa and Some European Countries: A brief comparison Brazil and South Africa have some similarities and differences when economic indicators are used for comparison. The indicators shown in Table 1 make this clear. Table 1 Indicators for Brazil and South Africa Indicators Brazil South Africa GDP (current US$ billions) 1.575,2 276,4 GDP per capita (current US$1000) 8,2 5,7 GDP per capita, PPP (current international $1000) 10,3 10,1 GDP, PPP (current international $ billions) 1.978,1 492,5 GINI index 0,57 0,58 Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 72,4 51,5 Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) 90,0 89,0 Population, total 192,0 48,7 Surface area (sq. thousand km) 8.514, ,1 Unemployment Rate 7,3% 25% Source: World Development Indicators database, September 2009 When considering the indicators it is clear that there are some similarities. The Gini Index is almost the same which means that they have the same high levels of income inequality. The literacy rate is almost the same. Although Brazil gross domestic product GDP is six times larger than that of South Africa s, Brazilian income per capita is almost the same when measured by PPP methodology or 25% higher when measured by the current dollar. The levels of urban violence in the cities are almost the same. There are several differences too. Brazil has a higher life expectancy rate, despite a population almost four times bigger and a surface seven times larger than 2

3 South Africa. Brazilian unemployment rate is 7.3%. The South African unemployment rate is 25%.These two indicators could mean that, on average, the Brazilian population is better off. But when the comparison is made with the developed world the differences are quite striking. Table 2 shows figures for some developed countries compared to Brazil and South Africa. GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) Table 2 Economic Indicators GDP per capita (current US$) Country 2008 Country/Brazil 2008 Country/Brazil Brazil South Africa , ,69 France , ,42 Germany , ,42 UK , ,31 Portugal , ,79 Italy , ,69 Ireland , ,37 Greece , ,86 Spain , ,29 Source: World Development Indicators database, September 2009 It is very easy to understand the striking differences in terms of income and purchasing power among the developed countries and Brazil and South Africa. Even though Brazil and South Africa can be ranked among the most developed underdeveloped countries. The high income European countries have income per capita three to seven times higher than Brazil and South Africa. Even countries that cannot be classified as highly developed, such as Greece and Portugal, have three to four times higher income and GDP per capita. The differences in income are the result of historical development. Institutions brought about by this different historical background have set up contrasting market features, an example of which is the informal market. Brazil and South Africa have a large informal market. The personal incomes in these markets are very low. Most of the people in the European countries can afford to buy a football team jersey paying more than 80. But in Brazil and South Africa the majority of the population cannot afford this. So, they buy these jerseys from the informal market paying 15 for them in Brazil. In accordance with FIFA rules this behavior is characterized as ambush marketing. But, those survival strategies developed by poor people, provide them with some income, although very low, which is critical to 3

4 their survival. It is important to note that the minimum wage in Brazil, in the formal markets, is 220 per month. The average wage of the Brazilian economy is 520 per month. Brazilian authorities must abide by FIFA rules. They signed contracts that they have to enforce. So, what is going to happen to these people that get their income from the informal market? It is important to note that some estimates made by Brazilian research institutions 1 found that the size of the informal market could reach 40% of GDP. 3. Infrastructure and Urban Mobility One of Brazil s main problems is what has been called Brazil Cost. Road transport is responsible for more than 60% of the inputs delivery to production and final products to consumer markets. But 70% of the roads are either bad or very bad. The efficiency of the sector depends on stable investment flows for the construction, maintenance and operation of highways. This has not happened in the last thirty years 2. Only in the last three years has the investment in infrastructure increased due to the Growth Acceleration Program PAC of the Brazilian Federal Government. But, its expenditures are still below what is needed. Brazil Cost includes actions such as regulations and rules edited by regulatory agencies that are very extensive and bureaucratic making a hostile institutional environment for the investment in infrastructure. A hostile institutional environment means that it takes a long time for a bid to become an investment as it is under the constant threat of law suits by environmental agencies and public attorneys. The extensive use of road transport and the bad situation of road maintenance make road trips in Brazil very expensive and long. Besides, there is a waste of production and income. Table 3 shows comparison of countries in terms of size. Brazil is more than 6 times larger than South Africa, 15 times larger than France and 23 times than Germany. So, as the costs of transportation being very high the logistics system is inefficient and unable to provide a good service. In a country with such dimension this is a big problem. Table 3 Compared Surface Area Country Surface area (sq. km) Brazil/Country Brazil South Africa ,98 France ,50 Germany ,85 UK ,95 1 Brazilian Institute of Statistics and Geography - IBGE < 2 This is what has been called the lost decades in Brazil (Coutinho, 2005). 4

5 Portugal ,43 Italy ,26 Ireland ,16 Greece ,53 Spain ,86 Source: World Development Indicators database, September 2009 Logistics costs in Brazil are equivalent to 11.6% of GDP, or more than US$ billion. The most representative item is transportation, with 7% of Brazilian GDP. 3 From this amount, road transport is the most expensive and accounts for more than 80%. Only 31% of Brazilian roads are in good or excellent condition. The cost of freight transport by road, in Brazil, is on average 28% more expensive than if there were ideal paving conditions. There is still a common problem to the 12 host cities: the lack of airport capacity to cope with the visitor influx anticipated for Airports have undergone a process of low investment in modernization and expansion. Internal air traffic has developed very fast as the average income increased and the low tariff system has enforced by Brazilian air companies. The airports are operating close to their full capacity. The number of expected visitors for the World Cup is very high. South Africa received more than 1.0 million tourists during the World Cup. An increase of 25% compared to the same period in In the last three years, Brazil received 6.5 million, on average, per year. So, if in Brazil the growth figures for Brazil are the same as in South Africa there will be a lack of hotel rooms, with the room diaries skyrocketing, and a collapse in the infrastructure. The transportation costs in Brazil are very important for the World Cup logistic system because the distances between the host cities are extremely long. Table 4 presents the distances between São Paulo, the most important political and economic city in Brazil and the other 11 host cities. Table 4 Distance between host cities (km) to/from São Paulo Cuiabá 1634 Curitiba 408 Porto Alegre 1119 Recife 2672 Rio de Janeiro 429 Salvador In the USA, logistics costs amount to 8.7% of GDP, and 5.4% related to transport : 819,495 tourists. 2010: 1,020,321 tourists. 5

6 Manaus 3971 Brasília 1029 Belo Horizonte 586 Fortaleza 3127 Natal 3015 Source: Ministry of Transports Given the distances and the operating conditions of roads, airports and railways in Brazil, travel among the cities of the World Cup venues will be very expensive and lengthy. It would be reasonable to set up regional groups to avert the displacements of players and fans. This would save time and money and rationalize the displacements. The Brazilian population is more than twice as larger as that of Germany, the most populous country in the European Community as shown in table 5. So, the surface area and population of Brazil raise questions about as to the size and the quality of the infrastructure, especially transport, which are critical to the achievement of the World Cup. Perhaps this is the most crucial factor for the organization of the competition. If the infrastructure does not work well to the Brazilian population, when receiving a large number of visitors in a short period of time, this could be a nightmare. Table 5 Population Country/Year Population Brazil/Country Brazil 191,971,506 1 South Africa 48,687,000 3,94 France 62,277,432 3,08 Germany 82,110,097 2,34 UK 61,414,062 3,13 Portugal 10,622,413 18,11 Italy 59,832,179 3,21 Ireland 4,425,675 43,64 Greece 11,237,094 17,14 Spain 45,555,716 4,21 Source: World Development Indicators database, September 2009 Furthermore the socio-economic conditions among the regions are very different as well as weather conditions. These differentiated characteristics of each region are shown in the chart below. Chart 1 6

7 Host Cities and Brazilian Geographic Regions Southeast Region: Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo. Weather: Mild/Cold and Dry. Most developed region. Central/West Region: Brasília and Cuiabá. Weather: Hot and Dry. Brazilian main agribusiness region South Region: Porto Alegre and Curitiba. Wether: Cold and Dry. Second most developed region. Northeast Region: Fortaleza, Natal,, Recife and Salvador Weather: Hot and Humid. Very poor region North Region: Manaus Weather: Very hot and Humid. Very poor region FIFA and CBF, the governing bodies for the World Cup, are discussing a proposal that deploys the competitors among four regional groups. The proposal that was published in the Brazilian newspapers has the following regional distribution which attenuates the negative impact of long distance flights and very different weather conditions. Chart 2 World Cup 2014 Regional Groups Region 1 Host Cities Distance km Rio de Janeiro Rio de Janeiro - Belo Horizonte 350 Belo Horizonte Rio de Janeiro - Salvador 1207 Salvador Belo Horizonte- Salvador 955 Region 2 Host Cities Distance km São Paulo São Paulo - Curitiba 339 Curitiba São Paulo - Porto Alegre 851 7

8 Porto Alegre Porto Alegre - Curitiba 547 Region 3 Host Cities Distance km Manaus Manaus - Cuiabá 1445 Cuiabá Manaus - Brasília 1931 Brasília Brasília - Cuiabá 875,7 Region 4 Host Cities Distance km Fortaleza Fortaleza - Natal 435 Natal Fortaleza - Recife 628 Recife Recife - Natal 252 The World Cup in Brazil will produce huge amounts of excitement. Brazil is the country of football. The displacements of Brazilian fans and international tourists between the host cities, in the current conditions of transport logistics in Brazil is a matter of great concern. Urban mobility within host cities emulates the same problems of the country, as a whole. The average time spent commuting in Rio de Janeiro by the population to working places is two hours and thirty minutes, on average. In São Paulo a 100 km traffic jam is common on working days. During the World Cup period it is very reasonable to assume that those problems will be worsened. About to start investing heavily in the 2014 World Cup, the Brazilian government still has an incomplete budget for the championship. For example, there are no estimates regarding security, item which had the largest proportional increase in spending in South Africa. A comparison between the 2014 World Cup estimated budget and 2010 World Cup expenditures is shown in tables 6 and 7. Table World Cup - Investment Forecast US$ billion Total Investment* 9,8 Stadium/Arenas 3,0 Airports 1,8 Infrastructure (roads, underground, railways) 5,0 *Investment in Security investment is not incuded 8

9 Table World Cup - Investment US$ billion Total Investment* 4,7 Stadium/Arenas 1,6 Infrastructure (roads, underground, railways) 1,9 Security 0,2 Others 1,0 94% of the 2014 World Cup budget is for the renovation and construction of stadiums. Renovations and modernization of football stadiums and arenas will cost US$ 3.0 billion. The majority of those funds will come from the Brazilian National Development Bank-BNDES. The federal government argues that BNDES will make loans on market terms, which do not configure use of public funds. The rest, or nearly all of it, will be raised by state governments, which failed to attract private partners to finance those investments in the renovation and modernization of stadiums. The Ministry of Sports issued a document that lists the responsibilities of the expenses of the 2014 World Cup and specifies how much each of the 12 World Cup stadiums will cost and who will pay for them. In such document The Ministry of Sports made the financial estimates for the works of urban mobility needed for the competition. Besides the money from BNDES regional state government estimate to invest, from their own resources, almost US$ 0.9 billion in stadiums. The Brasilia government, for example, foresees to tap funds from its own public budget to finance the renovation of the new Mané Garrincha stadium. The amount of US$ 0.2 billion out of its total budget reform of US$ 0.5 billion will come from the Brasilia public budget. This is the most expensive stadium of all. In 2007, when the country won the right to host the World Cup for the second time, the Brazilian Football Confederation - CBF, estimated that the country would spend just under US$ 1.0 billion in stadiums. The current estimate is now 200% higher than the original one. The fact that public funds will account for the majority of all stadium expenditures is against the original plan presented to Brazilian society. It was said that private investors would carry out such investments. For instance, Ricardo Teixeira, CBF s president, stated in May 2009, that private funds were prone to finance those expenditures "The less public money is invested the better the World Cup will be. This equation is guiding the project from the beginning. The government, at all levels, will spend on works that concern them. The biggest investment will come from private enterprises. 9

10 BNDES created a credit line of up to US$ 2.7 billion for construction and renovation of the 12 stadiums for the World Cup. Each stadium project may receive up to US$ 0,225 billion. There is also a line of US$ 1 billion for the hospitality industry. The bank also has another unlimited credit line to finance the growth of urban mobility. The US$ 3.0 billion that Brazil intends to spend on stadiums are above the South Africa estimates for the 2010 World Cup arenas. South Africa spent US$ 1.6 billion. South Africa built two stadiums less than Brazil. But some projects are architecturally more daring than the Brazilian ones, such as the Soccer City in Johannesburg, and the arenas of Cape Town and Durban. The organizers of the World Cup in Brazil had planned to start the works in March 2010, but they did not. They are all in delay. Brazil s infrastructure budget is higher than South Africa s. It reflects the difference in the quality of the infrastructure, the size of the country and of the population. The South African transport infrastructure is better than the Brazilian transport infrastructure. South African roads are well maintained. The public has access to an an available network of highways which facilitated the trips between the nine host cities. The freeway between Johannesburg and Pretoria (58km) was expanded to five lanes in each direction The inauguration of the high-speed train linking the Johannesburg airport to the Sandton District, in just 15 minutes, was one of the major achievements of the World Cup organization. Making life easier for tourists and for the South African citizens is one of the most important legacies of the event. The price ticket of U.S.$ 14.00/ 11.00, four times cheaper than a taxi ride, is very affordable. Urban Mobility was one of the weaks point of the 2010 World Cup. This was due to bad logistic planning and lack of information about the new bus lines linking Soweto to the Center of Johannesburg and to the stadiums Soccer City and Ellis Park. Northern Districts, such as Sandton, Rosebank and Melrose, with a high concentration of touristic attractions, could only be reached by car, taxis or vans. There were miles of traffic jams surrounding the stadiums of Johannesburg and also in Rastenburg. In Johannesburg, thanks to the concentration of games (15) and teams in the region, the number of fans increased, causing more traffic chaos due to the insufficient transportation system in the city. This must be avoided in Brazil, especially in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, cities in which there is a chaotic public transportation system. The renovations of Johannesburg and Cape Town airports and the construction of a new one in Durban, eased air flights and airport services to passengers. The airlines offer flights into the early hours which were not allowed before the World Cup. There was training for pilots and flight controllers, leaving an important legacy for the country. One of the most important achievements of the South Africa World Cup was the telecommunications system inside the stadiums. Unlike the 2006 World Cup in Germany, where US$ were charged per internet access point in the stadium, 10

11 access was free in the ten sports venues and in the press center. The cost of this investment was US$ million/ million. The telecommunications system and internet connections outside the sports venues, even in hotels did not, however, offer the same quality. In terms of security, passport control connected to Interpol prevented the entry of more than 600 people with potential to commit crimes or who had criminal records in their countries. They were deported on the day of arrival. Often, immigration was quick and efficient. The massive presence of police on the streets decreased the violence during the World Cup. But there were some security failures in the stadiums, as the lack of control of non accredited people to press reserved places and the invasion of one fan to the dress room of England, in Cape Town, after the game against Algeria. The figures of homicide rates for Johannesburg and some Brazilian host cities are quite similar, except São Paulo as shown in table 8. In Rio de Janeiro as well as in Johannesburg, there are city neighborhoods, Copacabana, Leblon, Ipanema, Barra da Tijuca and others, that have crime rates quite identical to those in Europe. Table 8 Host Cities Homicide Rate City Homicide Rate per Johannesburg 37,3 Rio de Janeiro 34,6 São Paulo 11,0 Salvador 32,8 Source: For Brazil, Ministry of Justice. For South Africa, O Globo, 31/05/2010. The Brazilian federal, state and municipal government have committed to invest a total of US$ 5.0 billion for urban mobility in works aimed at the 2014 World Cup. From this amount, just over two thirds (67.4%) come from the federal government via BNDES. According to the array of responsibilities, however, all these works will be performed by state and local governments. The Federal Government will be responsible solely for the supervision of the works of mobility, including airports. São Paulo will be the host city most benefited by federal funds. Caixa Econômica Federal - CEF, a federal government-owned financial institution, will provide US$ 0.6 billion for the construction of the monorail Gold Line, linking the Congonhas airport to Morumbi stadium. The construction costs are US$1.5 billion, or 23% of the total invested in urban mobility, according to the document. Performing this work will be the responsibility of the state of São Paulo government. With the exclusion of the Morumbi stadium of the World Cup new plans for investment must be made. Brasilia was the city that requested less funds for mobility, despite having requested finance at its maximum level, US$ 0.5 billion for stadium renovation. CEF has granted US$ 0.3 billion for the construction of a section of light rail vehicle - VLT, which will link the airport to the city s South Wing Terminal. 11

12 3. The Legacy The majority of the literature about the economic impacts of mega events show no income and/or employment effects that are significantly positively different from zero (Hagn and Maennig, 2007 and 2008). But, Hagn and Maennig (op. cit.) hesitate to share this conclusion for several reasons. The one that is in order to the analysis developed here is:.other effects such as the feelgood benefit for the population and/or difficult to quantify image effects may be sufficiently important to justify major sporting events and/or subsidies for them via public funds. In both of the aforementioned fields of possible effects, sporting economic empiricism is still in its infancy (Hagn and Maennig, 2008: 6). The impact of hosting mega sporting events varies according to the level of development in the host city and country. With proper planning, directed to less developed areas hosting a mega event can serve as an incentive for the construction of modern transportation, telecommunications, and sports infrastructure. So, those investments will benefit the less developed areas and people that cannot afford to pay for those services. The Getúlio Vargas Foundation FGV and Ernst & Young Consulting have published an ex-ante multiplier effect study about the impact of the expenditures of 2014 The World Cup. They estimate that they will cause a chaining effect that can multiply the investments being made in the country 5 times. An increase of U.S.$ 79 billion will be injected in the Brazilian economy over the next four years to meet the demands of hosting the World Cup. Out of this total, US$ 12,4 billion will be direct investments to ensure infrastructure and for the organization of the event. Operational and tourists expenditures will generate an additional US$ 3.9 billion. Another U.S.$ 62.7 billion will come out indirectly through various sectors of the economy. They examined 55 subsectors of industry, commerce, services and construction. What they called the "World Cup effect" is particularly strong in industry and in the labor market. The study foresees that the number of foreign tourists will reach 7.4 million people in 2014 an increase of 64.4% compared to the one recorded in The expectation is that industry revenue will jump from US$ 3.0 billion recorded in 2009 to US$ 5.0 billion in According to the study which evaluated the subsectors using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of each segment, manufacturers of appliances will have an increase in its GDP by 10.2% between this year and This will also be high for strong traditional sectors of Brazilian industry like textiles, footwear, auto parts and furniture One must be very careful about these estimates. They usually overstate the effect of mega-events. One example is the tourist effect. The mega-events crowd out other potential visitors. Although they attract thousands of tourists, certainly nonsports tourists will not venture during that period. So there will be a negative impact in other entertainment activities. Even though hotels often charge two or three times their 12

13 normal rates for rooms during the World Cup, they do not double or triple the wages of their local workers. High income countries, according to the World Bank ranking, are countries that are ready to host mega-events. They have built a modern infrastructure of transport, telecommunications, energy and sanitation. They have set up a welfare state that provides health care, a good public education system and social security to their citizens. They have private firms and organizations that can afford to maintain those facilities after the mega event. High income countries inhabitants can afford to pay 50 for a football ticket every weekend. They have enough income to pay for a extra game of the European Champions League. The day match revenues are an expressive component of their turnover. Brazil and South Africa are middle income countries. Their per capita income is three to four times lower than that of the high income countries. They do not have the same of transport, telecommunications, energy and sanitation infrastructure of the developed countries. They haven t set up a welfare state that provides health care, good public education system and social security to their citizens. In Brazil there is no demand for this kind of entertainment which makes the investment in sophisticated sports facilities pay back. As already shown in the first part of this paper the difference in income explains why it is very difficult to have modern sports facilities to meet FIFA s requirements. Last season the three divisions of the Brazilian Championship took million fans to stadiums, resulting in million in gross revenues, with the first division being responsible for 72% of total. This amount represents an average ticket cost of 6.8 per supporter. The average stadium attendance in the Brazilian first division Championship in 2009 was 15.5 thousand. So, the total turnover of the three Brazilian football divisions does not cover the costs of modernization of one stadium to World Cup Even with four years to go before Brazil hosts the 2014 competition at least six of the 12 grounds to be used for games in the 2014 World Cup will turn into white elephants when the tournament ends. Brazil s football stadiums are old and crumbling. Nine of the 12 grounds are publicly owned and more than 90 percent of that total expenditure is expected to come from public funds. Stadiums in Brasilia, Cuiabá, Fortaleza, Manaus, Natal, and Recife are overly expensive. Those stadiums are in cities where there is no football team in the Brazilian National Championship and it is going to be very difficult to fill the ground on a regular basis after the Cup or where ticket prices are so low they can t pay back their investments. Stadiums in the larger and richer cities of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, and Salvador are less of a concern (Downie, 2010). But, they do have the same problem as private investors haven t been found to remodel them. 13

14 Substantial work on the stadiums has yet to start, even though Brazil was chosen as the venue for the tournament almost three years ago. Furthermore, why do spend money in lavish sports facilities that have little use after the World Cup? Why do countries like Brazil and South Africa, with their social problems, have to have the same sophisticated and complex sports facilities as the developed countries? Is it worth it? Perhaps, given the cultural importance of football for Brazilians, the most outstanding result of hosting the World Cup will be to overcome the trauma of the 1950 World Cup defeat to Uruguay. This intangible outcome is priceless. References Coutinho, L. G. Regimes macroeconômicos e estratégias de negócio: uma política industrial alternativa para o Brasil no século XXI. Lastres, H. M.; Cassiolato, J. E.; Arroio, A. (edit.) Conhecimento, Sistemas de Inovação e Desenvolvimento, Rio de Janeiro: Editora UFRJ/Contraponto, Downie, A. World Cup 2014: March of the white elephants. Financial Times, July 5, Hagn, F. and Maennig, W. Employment effects of the Football World Cup 1974 in Germany. Labour Economics 15, 2008, Hagn, F. and Maennig, W. Large sport events and unemployment: the case of the 2006 soccer World Cup in Germany. Applied Economics, 2007, 1 8, ifirst Melo, L. M. Brazilian Football: Technical Success and Economic Failure In: Football in the Americas: Fútbol, Futebol, Soccer. Londres:Institute for the Study of the Americas-University of London-School of Advanced Study, 2007, p World Bank, World Development Indicators database, September <www. databank.worldbank.org>. 14