INTERNET ATTACKS AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
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1 INTERNET ATTACKS AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Kleissner & Associates IAEA, 1-5 June 2015, Vienna/Austria International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World
2 Programmer and security researcher Prague, Czech Republic Employee at the antivirus company Ikarus 2010 Austrian military 2012 External employee at a bank 2013-now CEO & Founder of Kleissner & Associates s.r.o. Main fields: Windows security, banking, malware
3 1. Administrative computers of NPP Could be used as entry point for targeting industrial computers. Often have lower security standards and according to Virus Tracker many general infections. An attacker could be interested to steal sensitive documents. 2. Industrial Computers Usually air-gapped for security reasons. USB thumb drives could defeat this air-gap, as done with Stuxnet in connection with exploits. Or via social engineering (delivering fake updates).
4 Backdoors can be potentially used by anyone else Abandoned botnets could be taken over by anyone Infections often disable antivirus and firewalls and therefore make the system more vulnerable Bots might remain for decades => Even if the C&C protocol is properly secured, the encryption technology might get broken in the future; Example: Conficker A with 1024 bits RSA encryption Stuxnet infections can be controlled by anyone who owns the C&C domains (!), due to lack of proper protocol encryption
5 Operation Olympic Games since 2006, signed off by the Bush administration [1] Discovered in June 2010 by Virusblokada antivirus company [2] Multiple versions uncovered by security companies [3] A lot of research by Symantec and Kaspersky Based on Tildet platform just as Flame, Duqu and Gauss [4] Targeting nuclear power plants, specifically Natanz, Iran according to reports Modifies S7P projects (the programs for controlling the industrial machines) Kill switch set to June 24, 2012 no more spreading then [5]
6 The Windows executable file format (PE) has multiple digital artifacts: Compilation Timestamp Resources -> Version numbers Rich Header with additional linker information Debug information (PDB file path) and strings Historical domain information reveals dates and whois info of domains. Researchers can link different domains to the same owners through DNS records and whois information (by use of reverse lookups).
7 Detects infected machines by sinkholing (registering C&C domains) More than 2.5 million devices per day seen Including Stuxnet, Flame & other espionage attacks We have Stuxnet since 2013 in the system!
8 153 unique identifiers as reported by Stuxnet 221 unique decoded Stuxnet requests 268 unique IP addresses 419 infection records in Virus Tracker
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11 The data as it arrives at the Virus Tracker sinkhole: :00:43 Pars Online PJS APT Stuxnet Iran, Islamic Republic of Pars /index.php?data=66a96e28c013f8202df26332f5f8fcb5ff6b4f896e53b077fd1ccdabb8493f9b5390d446f2a 7645fa21d659d3fb4a87fe20af1d5f5e6c875c2bfe58f280ca956dc8427bdea6c5b1ee87734ff1da972a54fa39 1baa9e542c0b4fded6951ff24f0ba4fb4ce453ed141def05ad8cd19d613f0e5dfd9d21ed0b9f1cf7454c466a5e 757c0f81862fe2db9a907879d59d678d391
12 The data as it arrives at the Virus Tracker sinkhole: :00:43 Pars Online PJS APT Stuxnet Iran, Islamic Republic of Pars <- our sinkhole C&C server /index.php?data=66a96e28c013f8202df26332f5f8fcb5ff6b4f896e53b077fd1ccdabb8493f9b5390d446f2a 7645fa21d659d3fb4a87fe20af1d5f5e6c875c2bfe58f280ca956dc8427bdea6c5b1ee87734ff1da972a54fa39 1baa9e542c0b4fded6951ff24f0ba4fb4ce453ed141def05ad8cd19d613f0e5dfd9d21ed0b9f1cf7454c466a5e 757c0f81862fe2db9a907879d59d678d391 Hex encoded and XOR encrypted information!
13 The infection sends this information to the command & control server: Unique identifier of the Stuxnet infection (GUID) Main internal IP address Computer Name Domain Name IP address of interface 1 IP address of interface 2 IP address of interface 3 Windows major and minor version Windows Service Pack version Whether Siemens SCADA software is installed Project path of a found SCADA program
14 STUXNET INFECTION ID: F6A01E50-AF B6E27731FFD5 Main IP: OS: Windows 5.1 Service Pack: 3 Scada installed: Yes! Computer: GERDOO-7A1D2321 Domain: MSHOME IP Interface 1: IP Interface 2: S7P: C:\Program Files\Siemens\Step7\S7Proj\04082_19\ s7p STUXNET INFECTION ID: F4BBB568-A3BC-4062-A37D-C8664B Main IP: OS: Windows 5.1 Service Pack: 3 Scada installed: Yes! Computer: H-C16EBB Domain: WORKGROUP IP Interface 1: IP Interface 2: S7P: C:\Program Files\Siemens\Step7\S7Proj\04082_19\ s7p STUXNET INFECTION ID: 03C28E58-8C9F-4BF2-83AE-0102FEF9B19C Main IP: OS: Windows 5.1 Service Pack: 3 Scada installed: Yes! Computer: NEWTECH Domain: WORKGROUP IP Interface 1: IP Interface 2: S7P: C:\Program Files\Siemens\Step7\S7Proj\04082_19\ s7p
15 STUXNET INFECTION ID: F6A01E50-AF B6E27731FFD5 Main IP: OS: Windows 5.1 Service Pack: 3 Scada installed: Yes! Computer: GERDOO-7A1D2321 Domain: MSHOME IP Interface 1: IP Interface 2: S7P: C:\Program Files\Siemens\Step7\S7Proj\04082_19\ s7p S7P project path of an Industrial program STUXNET INFECTION ID: F4BBB568-A3BC-4062-A37D-C8664B Main IP: OS: Windows 5.1 Service Pack: 3 Scada installed: Yes! Computer: H-C16EBB Domain: WORKGROUP IP Interface 1: IP Interface 2: S7P: C:\Program Files\Siemens\Step7\S7Proj\04082_19\ s7p STUXNET INFECTION ID: 03C28E58-8C9F-4BF2-83AE-0102FEF9B19C Main IP: OS: Windows 5.1 Service Pack: 3 Scada installed: Yes! Computer: NEWTECH Domain: WORKGROUP IP Interface 1: IP Interface 2: S7P: C:\Program Files\Siemens\Step7\S7Proj\04082_19\ s7p
16 STUXNET INFECTION ID: F6A01E50-AF B6E27731FFD5 Main IP: OS: Windows 5.1 Service Pack: 3 Scada installed: Yes! Computer: GERDOO-7A1D2321 Domain: MSHOME IP Interface 1: IP Interface 2: S7P: C:\Program Files\Siemens\Step7\S7Proj\04082_19\ s7p S7P project path of an Industrial program STUXNET INFECTION ID: F4BBB568-A3BC-4062-A37D-C8664B Main IP: OS: Windows 5.1 Service Pack: 3 Scada installed: Yes! Computer: H-C16EBB Domain: WORKGROUP IP Interface 1: IP Interface 2: S7P: C:\Program Files\Siemens\Step7\S7Proj\04082_19\ s7p STUXNET INFECTION ID: 03C28E58-8C9F-4BF2-83AE-0102FEF9B19C Main IP: OS: Windows 5.1 Service Pack: 3 Scada installed: Yes! Computer: NEWTECH Domain: WORKGROUP IP Interface 1: IP Interface 2: S7P: C:\Program Files\Siemens\Step7\S7Proj\04082_19\ s7p Stuxnet infections in the same internal network behind 1 public IP
17 Those 3 Iranian infections compared: Public IP OS Computer Domain IP 1 IP Windows 5.1 GERDOO-7A1D2321 MSHOME Windows 5.1 H-C16EBB WORKGROUP Windows 5.1 NEWTECH WORKGROUP Public IP is the one as seen by Virus Tracker when the infection checks in. The other info is listed as it was sent by the infection.
18 Date IP Stuxnet Id Country ASN Organization by IP lookup 7/25/ : F6A01E50-AF B6E27731FFD5 Iran AS16322 Rasaneh Pardaz Sepahan Co. 9/8/ : F4BBB568-A3BC-4062-A37D-C8664B Iran AS16322 Parsonline-Dynamic-Pool 11/19/ : C28E58-8C9F-4BF2-83AE-0102FEF9B19C Iran AS16322 Parsonline-Dynamic-Pool 9/1/ : CD994AB8-46EA-4461-AC05-35B017764F47 Iran AS48309 Rasaneh Pardaz Sepahan Co. 9/12/ : B-B A7CE-C B0AA Iran AS12880 Pars Special Economic Energy Zone,Boushehr,IR 11/30/ : ACB0AE D-8CC1-ECFFA7DCB5F1 China AS4837 China Unicom Liaoning province network 12/5/ : ACB0AE D-8CC1-ECFFA7DCB5F1 China AS4837 China Unicom Liaoning province network screenshot for reference:
19 Thanks for attending the presentation! Questions? For any information please contact: Address Na strži 1702/ Praha Czech Republic 2015 Kleissner & Associates s.r.o.
20 [1] NYT, David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran [2] KREBS, B., Experts Warn of New Windows Shortcut Flaw [3] W32/Stuxnet Dossier, Symantec [4] Kaspersky, Gauss: Nation-state cyber-surveillance meets banking Trojan [5] MURCHU, L., Interview
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