Attack Detection and Response with Linux Firewalls
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1 Attack Detection and Response with Linux Firewalls Michael Rash Security Architect Enterasys Networks, Inc. 03/25/2007 ShmooCon, 2007 Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 1
2 Agenda Why use iptables to detect attacks? Types of attacks that can be detected Snort rules language emulation via iptables logs and string match extension psad and fwsnort ( Honeynet iptables log data visualizations psad + AfterGlow Live Demo Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 2
3 Supplementing IDS Infrastructure? Snort and commercial IDS infrastructure is mature (subject to usual concerns around false positives), but why stop there? IDS's can themselves be targeted, both from the detection and code execution standpoints Modified Stick/Snot to send faked attacks over Tor Snort DCE/RPC Preprocessor vulnerability Defense in depth is important Host fragment reassembly issues less of a concern for iptables string matching (more on this later) Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 3
4 Major IDS Functionality We Need Signature based packet inspection packet headers application layer data Network and transport layer reassembly* Ideally, reassembly algorithms would be identical to target host Reporting Ability to respond to attacks (optional) Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 4
5 Snort Signature Language Widely accepted and deployed IDS language Updated signatures readily available; (BSD licensed) Vulnerability announcement services (idefense, Endeavor Security) provide signatures in Snort format Defines a good direction for iptables emulation Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 5
6 IDS and iptables Can specify granular packet header tests, and logging format contains nearly all interesting packet header fields Can match against connection states Useful for mitigating Stick/Snot style attacks String matching in the kernel started in the 2.4 days (patch applied via Netfilter patch o matic); made available again in Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 6
7 IDS and iptables (cont'd) Kernel textsearch (linux/lib/ts_*) infrastructure Boyer Moore and Knuth Morris Pratt algorithms String matching enabled by default in recent Linux kernels You get network layer defragmentation for free when connection tracking is used you don't have to rely on proper configuration of frag3; it is the defragmentation algorithm of the host String matching within the filter table happens after network defrag Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 7
8 Active Response / Intrusion Prevention Plenty of reasons NOT to respond (false positives, possibility of attacker abuse, possibility of fingerprinting the response mechanism) However: Can envision scenarios where controlling the shape of application layer data that can talk to local sockets is a good thing iptables can enforce the DROP target (this is prevention instead of just some weak response mechanism) Some automated attacks do not bother with obfuscation/encryption target rich environment Sometimes it is not easy to patch a production server whose uptime must remain high (assuming a patch even exists) Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 8
9 fwsnort Translates Snort signatures into equivalent iptables rules using string match extension and Netfilter connection tracking subsystem All translated Snort signatures are placed within userdefined chains, to which packets are jumped from built in chains (INPUT, OUTPUT, and FORWARD) Maintains strict separation from existing iptables policy Approximately 60% of all Snort rules (remember this is an IDS supplement) can be translated Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 9
10 fwsnort (cont'd) Emulation of Snort config variables such as $HOME_NET and $EXTERNAL_NET Reporting via LOG target (integrates with psad) Whitelists via the RETURN target Blacklists via the DROP or REJECT targets Snort signature info stored with the iptables comment match in kernel space (0.9.0 release) iptables is inline by definition; easy to configure fwsnort to use the DROP or REJECT targets Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 10
11 iptables Packet Flow Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 11
12 fwsnort Packet Flow Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 12
13 Example Snort Rule: nmap Execution via Web Server alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any > $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"web ATTACKS nmap command attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"nmap%20"; nocase; classtype:web application attack; sid:1361; rev:5;) Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 13
14 fwsnort Translation $IPTABLES A FWSNORT_FORWARD_ESTAB d /24 p tcp dport 80 m string string "nmap%20" algo bm m comment comment "msg: WEB ATTACKS nmap command attempt; classtype: web application attack; rev: 5; FWS:0.9.0;" j LOG log tcpoptions log prefix "[1] SID1361 ESTAB " Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 14
15 BLEEDING EDGE VIRUS Signature (Multiple Content Fields) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS > $HOME_NET any (msg: "BLEEDING EDGE VIRUS Trojan Spy.Win32.Bancos Download"; flow: established,from_server; content:"[aspackdie!]"; content:" 0f 6d 07 9e 6c 62 6c d2 2f 63 6d 64 9d 11 af af 45 c7 72 ac 5f 3138 d0 "; classtype: trojan activity; reference:url,securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/ve nc/data/pwsteal.bancos.b.html; sid: ; rev:6; ) Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 15
16 (translated) $IPTABLES A FWSNORT_FORWARD_ESTAB d /24 p tcp sport 80 m string string "[AspackDie!]" algo bm m string hex string " 0f 6d 07 9e 6c 62 6c d2 2f 63 6d 64 9d 11 af af 45 c7 72 ac 5f 3138 d0 " algo bm m comment comment "msg: BLEEDING EDGE VIRUS Trojan Spy.Win32.Bancos Download; classtype: trojan activity; reference: url,securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/pw steal.bancos.b.html; rev: 6; FWS:0.9.0;" j LOG log ipoptions log tcp options log prefix "[640] SID ESTAB " Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 16
17 Matrix 2.0 Server Access Signature alert udp $EXTERNAL_NET 3345 > $HOME_NET 3344 (msg:"backdoor Matrix 2.0 Server access"; content:" 0b ab ab ab logged in"; reference:arachnids,83; classtype:misc activity; sid:162; rev:4;) Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 17
18 (translated) $IPTABLES A FWSNORT_FORWARD d /24 p udp sport 3345 dport 3344 m string hex string " 0b ab ab ab logged in" algo bm m comment comment "msg: BACKDOOR Matrix 2.0 Server access; classtype: misc activity; reference: arachnids,83; rev: 4; FWS:0.9.0;" j LOG log ip options logprefix "[46] SID162 " Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 18
19 IPSec PGPNet Connection Attempt Signature alert udp $EXTERNAL_NET any > $HOME_NET 500 (msg:"policy IPSec PGPNet connection attempt"; content:" D C P B C Q B C Q "; classtype:protocol command decode; sid:1771; rev:6;) Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 19
20 (translated) $IPTABLES A FWSNORT_FORWARD d /24 p udp dport 500 m string hex string " D C P B C Q B C Q " algo bm m comment comment "msg: POLICY IPSec PGPNet connection attempt; classtype: protocolcommand decode; rev: 6; FWS:0.9.0;" j LOG log ip options log prefix "[1005] SID1771 " Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 20
21 Supported Snort Rule Options All Snort rule header options content flow (conntrack) flags offset depth dsize (length match) itype icode ttl (ttl match) tos (tos match) ipopts ip_proto resp Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 21
22 Unsupported Snort Rule Options: Lost in Translation pcre flowbits byte_test < u32 module (need a 2.6 port) byte_jump < u32 module (need a 2.6 port) asn1 window < included in iptables logs isdataat id < included in iptables logs Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 22
23 Unsupported Snort Rule Options (cont'd) icmp_id < included in iptables logs icmp_seq < included in iptables logs seq < included with log tcp sequence ack < included with log tcp sequence sameip < included in iptables logs There are a few others those that are logged can be analyzed by psad Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 23
24 iptables TCP Log Message Mar 11 20:21:22 minastirith kernel: [199] SID1361 ESTAB IN=eth1 OUT= MAC=00:13:d3:38:b6:e4:00:13:46:c2:60:44:08: 00 SRC= DST= LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=63 ID=11112 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=28778 DPT=80 WINDOW=5840 RES=0x00 ACK PSH URGP=0 OPT ( A02A041D20CC386B1) Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 24
25 iptables IP Header Coverage Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 25
26 iptables TCP Header Coverage Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 26
27 iptables UDP Log Message Mar 11 20:50:54 minastirith kernel: [153] SID IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:13:d3:38:b6:e4:00:13:46:c2:60:44:08: 00 SRC= DST= LEN=40 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=63 ID=29758 DF PROTO=UDP SPT=32046 DPT=61 LEN=20 Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 27
28 iptables UDP Header Coverage Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 28
29 iptables ICMP Log Message Mar 11 20:57:18 minastirith kernel: [98] SID IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:13:d3:38:b6:e4:00:13:46:c2:60:44:08: 00 SRC= DST= LEN=128 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=63 ID=53466 PROTO=ICMP TYPE=8 CODE=0 ID=27459 SEQ=0 Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 29
30 iptables ICMP Header Coverage Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 30
31 psad iptables log analyzer and syslog reporting Fwsnort integration Dshield integration iptables LOG visualization with AfterGlow Built in passive OS fingerprinting derived from p0f (requires log tcp options) IP options decoding (requires log ip options) Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 31
32 psad (cont'd) Can detect Snort signatures that do not require application layer tests (source routing attempts, low ttl values, ICMP source quench, Nachi worm, etc.). This is all possible by virtue of iptables LOG format completeness. Detection of many port scan types generated by Nmap Timeout based auto blocking (optional, and can be restricted to application layer matches with fwsnort) Whitelists/Blacklists Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 32
33 Honeynet Scan Challenge #34 Challenge summary: Challenge information and analysis can be found here: Honeynet systems were compromised Both Snort and iptables log data made available to the community (39MB of iptables data) Honeynet IP addresses sanitized to x.x BTW, check out Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 33
34 Honeynet Visualizations: Compromised Hosts Look for outbound connections from honeynet hosts: # psad CSV m iptablessyslog CSV fields "src: /24 dst dp" perl afterglow.pl c color.properties neato Tgif o outbound_connections.gif Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 34
35 Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 35
36 Nachi Worm Visualization Look for 92 byte ICMP echo requests # psad CSV m iptablessyslog CSV fields "src dst ip_len:92" CSV max 300 CSV regex "PROTO=ICMP.*TYPE=8" perl afterglow.pl c color.properties neato Tgif o nachi_worm.gif Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 36
37 Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 37
38 Honeynet Project Requests If providing iptables log data, please: Use log ip options Use log tcp sequence Use log tcp options More attacks can be detected, and operating systems can be passively fingerprinted Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 38
39 Live Demo... Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 39
40 No Starch Press, June 2007 Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 40
41 Questions? Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Rash 41
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