WORKING PAPER SERIES EXPANSIONARY FISCAL CONSOLIDATIONS IN EUROPE NEW EVIDENCE NO 675 / SEPTEMBER by António Afonso

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1 WORKING PAPER SERIES NO 675 / SEPTEMBER 2006 EXPANSIONARY FISCAL CONSOLIDATIONS IN EUROPE NEW EVIDENCE by António Afonso

2 WORKING PAPER SERIES NO 675 / SEPTEMBER 2006 EXPANSIONARY FISCAL CONSOLIDATIONS IN EUROPE NEW EVIDENCE 1 by António Afonso 2 In 2006 all publications feature a motif taken from the 5 banknote. This paper can be downloaded without charge from or from the Social Science Research Network electronic library at 1 I am grateful to José Marín, Jürgen von Hagen, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions and to Renate Dreiskena for assistance with the data. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the or the Eurosystem. 2 European Central Bank, Directorate General Economics, Kaiserstrasse 29, Frankfurt am Main, Germany; antonio.afonso@ecb.int ISEG/UTL - Technical University of Lisbon, Department of Economics; UECE Research Unit on Complexity in Economics, R. Miguel Lupi 20, Lisbon, Portugal. UECE is supported by FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal), under the POCTI program, financed by ERDF and Portuguese funds, aafonso@iseg.utl.pt.

3 European Central Bank, 2006 Address Kaiserstrasse Frankfurt am Main, Germany Postal address Postfach Frankfurt am Main, Germany Telephone Internet Fax Telex ecb d All rights reserved. Any reproduction, publication and reprint in the form of a different publication, whether printed or produced electronically, in whole or in part, is permitted only with the explicit written authorisation of the or the author(s). The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank. The statement of purpose for the Working Paper Series is available from the website, ISSN (print) ISSN (online)

4 CONTENTS Abstract 4 Non-technical summary 5 1 Introduction 7 2 Expansionary fiscal consolidations Motivating expansionary fiscal consolidations Overview of previous evidence 12 3 Determination of fiscal episodes in the EU Empirical analysis of expansionary fiscal consolidations Empirical specifications Data Unit root tests Estimation results The relevance of government indebtedness Are contractions different from expansions? 27 5 Conclusion 29 Appendix Data sources 32 References 33 Figures and tables 36 European Central Bank Working Paper Series 48 3

5 Abstract In order to assess the existence of expansionary fiscal consolidations in Europe, panel data models for private consumption are estimated for the EU15 countries, using annual data over the period Three alternative approaches to determine fiscal episodes are used, and the level of government indebtedness is also taken into account. The results show some evidence in favour of the existence of expansionary fiscal consolidations, for a few budgetary spending items (general government final consumption, social transfers, and taxes), depending on the specification and on the time span used. On the other hand, the possibility of asymmetric effects of fiscal episodes does not seem to be corroborated by the results. JEL classification: C23; E21; E62 Keywords: fiscal policy; expansionary fiscal consolidations; non-keynesian effects; panel data models; European Union 4

6 Non-technical summary The frequently assumed positive correlation between private consumption and fiscal expansion may be reversed if some particular conditions are in place. For instance, a significant and sustained reduction of government expenditures may lead consumers to assume that a permanent tax reduction will also take place in the near future. In that case, an increase in permanent income and in private consumption may well occur, also generating better expectations for private investment. However, if the reduction in expenses is small and temporary, private consumption may not respond positively to the fiscal cutback. In other words, consumers might anticipate benefits from fiscal consolidation and act as described above. Non-Keynesian effects may be also associated with tax increases at high levels of government indebtedness. This kind of argument is based on the expectational view of fiscal policy. For instance, if the fiscal consolidation programme appears to the public as a serious attempt to reduce the public sector borrowing requirements, there may be an induced wealth effect, leading to an increase in private consumption, as maintained by Blanchard (1990) and Sutherland (1997). Furthermore, the reduction of the government borrowing requirements diminishes the risk premium associated with public debt issuance, contributes to reduce real interest rates and allows the crowding-in of private investment. However, if consumers do not think that the fiscal consolidation is credible, then the customary negative Keynesian effect on consumption will prevail. Fiscal episodes, expansions and contractions, were determined using the first difference of the primary structural budget balance as the relevant indicator, together with three alternative strategies. The first one was used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), and the second was used by Alesina and Ardagna (1998). The third one, proposed in this paper, assumes that a fiscal episode occurs when either the change in the primary cyclically adjusted balance is at least one and a half times the standard deviation of the overall sample in one year, or when the change in the primary cyclically adjusted balance is at least one standard deviation on average in the last two years. 5

7 The estimation results for the period 1970s-1990s, using a fixed effects panel data strategy show that the long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to general government final consumption is negative, which indicates that a reduction of government consumption increases private consumption in the long-run. The magnitude of such long-run elasticity is higher when a fiscal consolidation episode occurs. On the other hand, the results seem to indicate that a tax raise, together with a fiscal consolidation episode, could have a positive long-run effect on private consumption. Furthermore, increases of general government final consumption net of taxes negatively impinge on private consumption in the long-run. Put in other words, given an increase in government final consumption net of taxes, consumers may behave in a Ricardian way by presuming the need for future higher taxes. The long-run elasticity of social transfers is statistically significant and negative, regardless of the existence of fiscal consolidation episodes, but only for the post- Maastricht period. This negative effect on private consumption could be interpreted as an indication of a substitution effect, if the government replaces consumers in paying for, say, some health items, or as a non-keynesian effect with consumers anticipating future higher taxes to finance the current social transfers. Interacting debt threshold variables with the fiscal consolidation episodes dummies, gives additional information regarding whether the existence of a higher or a lower level of public indebtedness in the previous period makes a difference for private consumption decisions. For instance, the short-run effect on private consumption of social transfers is positive and statistically significant when there are no fiscal consolidation episodes and when the debt-to-gdp ratio is below the defined threshold (the cross-country year average). On the other hand, in the presence of a fiscal consolidation episode and if the previous period debt-to-gdp ratio was already above the debt ratio threshold, social transfers have a negative (non-keynesian) long-run effect on private consumption. The same is true for the long-run effect of social transfers. Additionally, the possibility of asymmetric effects of fiscal episodes does not seem to be corroborated by the results. 6

8 1. Introduction The fiscal adjustments that occurred in Denmark and in Ireland in the 1980s were used to first investigate the possibility of expansionary fiscal consolidations. 1 The evidence for these two countries seemed to show that a contractionary fiscal policy may well be expansionary when undertaken in a situation of public accounts distress, and co-ordinated with an adequate exchange rate policy. In other words, when an increase of public expenditures casts doubts on the sustainability of fiscal policy and on the level of the debt-to-gdp ratio, one may observe an increase of private saving and a reduction of private consumption. By the opposite reasoning, after a reduction in public spending, fiscal policy may induce an increase in private consumption. The frequently assumed positive correlation between private consumption and fiscal expansion may be reversed if some particular conditions are in place. For instance, a significant and sustained reduction of government expenditures may lead consumers to assume that a permanent tax reduction will also take place in the near future. In that case, an increase in permanent income and in private consumption may well occur, also generating better expectations for private investment. However, if the reduction in expenses is small and temporary, private consumption may not respond positively to the fiscal cutback. In other words, it appears reasonable to assume that under the right conditions, consumers might anticipate benefits from fiscal consolidation and act as described above. Non-Keynesian effects may be also associated with tax increases at high levels of government indebtedness. This kind of argument is based on the expectational view of fiscal policy. For instance, if the fiscal consolidation programme appears to the public as a serious attempt to reduce the public sector borrowing requirements, there may be an induced wealth effect, leading to an increase in private consumption, as maintained by Blanchard (1990) and Sutherland (1997). Furthermore, the reduction of the government 1 See Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). The time span of the fiscal consolidation in Ireland, , varies with authors. For instance Bradley and Whelan (1997) consider the period The dating of fiscal policy episodes is a controversial issue in the empirical analysis, as discussed below in section 3. 7

9 borrowing requirements diminishes the risk premium associated with public debt issuance, contributes to reduce real interest rates and allows the crowding-in of private investment. However, if consumers do not think that the fiscal consolidation is credible, then the customary negative Keynesian effect on consumption will prevail. Several fiscal episodes in Europe during the last two decades have given rise to a growing body of theoretical and mostly empirical literature concerning the so-called non- Keynesian effects of fiscal policy. This strand of literature contributed to challenging the broadly accepted Keynesian notion concerning the existence of a positive fiscal policy multiplier, since the expansionary fiscal contraction possibility may not be discarded so lightly. 2 This paper contributes to the existing literature on fiscal adjustments by looking at the evidence from a new angle and timing to answer the question: can expansionary fiscal consolidations be detected in the European Union? Using three different criteria to define the relevant fiscal episodes I empirically test for expansionary fiscal contractions specifically in the EU15 countries in the period The first two criteria are inspired in Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) and in Alesina and Ardagna (1998) while a third alternative criterion provides additional cross-check of the results. Moreover, I also take into account the level of government indebtedness and assess as well the possibility of asymmetric effects of fiscal episodes, using all three criteria to determine fiscal epsidodes. The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section two briefly reviews the underpinnings of expansionary fiscal consolidations and overviews the available empirical evidence. Section three uses alternative methodological approaches to determine fiscal episodes. Section four presents the empirical analysis on expansionary fiscal consolidations in the EU15 via the estimation of private consumption panel data specifications, which use 2 Bertola and Drazen (1993), Barry and Devereux (1995) and Perotti (1999) presented several theoretical explanations concerning the existence of those effects. For an overview of the topic, see also Perotti (1998) and Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998). 8

10 budgetary items as explanatory variables. Finally, section five contains my concluding remarks. 2. Expansionary fiscal consolidations 2.1. Motivating expansionary fiscal consolidations Fiscal policy may have non-keynesian effects on private consumption and investment decisions. It is therefore pertinent to identify the conditions under which a fiscal expansion may either contribute to the increase of economic activity or increase the likelihood of a recession. The basic underlying idea has been put forward by Feldstein (1982), who stated that permanent public expenses reductions may be expansionist if they are seen as an indication of future tax cuts, giving rise to expectations of a permanent income increase. Blanchard (1990), Sutherland (1997) and Perotti (1999) have argued that there is a higher probability of fiscal policy being non-keynesian when there is a significant public debt-to-gdp ratio. As the argument goes, "perverse" savings reactions are all the more likely if public debt is already high, since the private sector may fear tax increases further down the road to offset a debt explosion (OECD, 1999). According to Keynesian explanations, budget deficit reductions, after the implementation of spending cuts for instance, should result in a temporary slowdown of aggregate demand and of economic activity. According to neoclassical theory, a budget reduction would have no effect on economic activity since the supply side is supposed to be the main determinant of economic growth. Keynesian theory postulates that after a fiscal contraction, aggregate demand reduction is the consequence whatever the instruments used. Such reduction will occur either directly, through the decrease in public consumption and investment, or indirectly, when families reduce their consumption as a consequence of a lower disposable income, brought about by the increase of taxes or by the decrease of public transfers. Blanchard (1990) and Sutherland (1997) maintain that non-keynesian effects may be associated with tax increases at high levels of government indebtedness. This kind of 9

11 argument is based on the expectational view of fiscal policy. If the fiscal consolidation appears to the public as a serious attempt to reduce the public sector borrowing requirements, there may be an induced wealth effect, leading to an increase in private consumption. On the other hand, the reduction of the government borrowing requirements diminishes the risk premium associated with public debt issuance, contributes to reduce real interest rates and allows the crowding-in of private investment. However, if consumers do not think that fiscal consolidation is credible, then the usual negative Keynesian effect on consumption will prevail. Besides the above mentioned expectational channel a so-called labour market channel could also be active. For instance, Alesina and Perotti (1997a) and Ardagna (2004) mention in this context that the composition of fiscal policy may have economic effects via the labour market as a result of reducing public spending, notably salaries, instead of rising taxes. Along such reasoning Alesina and Perotti (1997b) define two types of fiscal adjustment: Type 1 adjustment, when the budget deficit is reduced through cuts in social expenditures (unemployment subsidies, minimum income subsidies) and cuts in public sector wages; and Type 2 adjustment, when the budget deficit is reduced with the increase of taxes on labour income and with cuts in public investment expenditures. For instance, according to those authors, the fiscal episode of Ireland in was a Type 1 adjustment, while the fiscal episodes in Denmark could be classified as a Type 2 adjustment. Interestingly, the theoretical possibility of the existence of expansionary fiscal consolidations echoed in the so-called German perspective of fiscal consolidations, expressed in 1981 by the German Council of Economic Experts. Such view would afterwards have an influence on the fiscal convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, calling for discipline of public accounts as a precondition for stable economic growth. 3 Blanchard (1990) presents a model where the initial level of public debt is an important determinant of the effects of fiscal policy on private consumption. For instance, the 3 See Hellwig and Neumann (1987), Bergman and Hutchison (1997) and De Bonis and Paladini (1997). 10

12 increase in taxes would have two effects: the first effect results from the fact that an increase in taxes shifts some of the tax burden from future generations to the present generations, and contributes therefore to reducing current private consumption. The second effect would be a positive wealth effect, related to the idea that an increase in taxes today will avoid an increase of taxes in the future and would also allow the longterm loss of income to be reduced. A present increase in taxes might therefore reduce the uncertainty about future fiscal policy. Following this line of reasoning, consumers can then decrease accumulated saving, some of which was probably set up as a precaution to meet future tax increases. This second effect may be the prevailing one, when for instance there is already a high debt-to-gdp ratio. Moreover, with a considerable debt-to- GDP ratio, there is a higher probability of consumers displaying Ricardian behaviour, maybe assuming there could be a fiscal policy sustainability problem ahead. 4 When public expenses keep rising beyond a certain limit, there will be also an increased probability that fiscal consolidation might occur. Bertola and Drazen (1993) define this moment as a trigger point, after which a fiscal adjustment is highly probable. When the fiscal adjustment occurs, there are expectations that there will be significant future tax cuts, leading therefore to an increase in the consumer's permanent income. The same happens with private consumption, and consumers tend to exhibit Ricardian behaviour. As Bertola and Drazen (1993, p. 12) put it, a policy innovation that would be contractionary in a static model may be expansionary if it induces sufficiently expectations of future policy changes in the opposite direction. For instance, Cour et al. (1996) maintain that Ricardian behaviour might have been in place during the fiscal consolidations of Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s. 5 In fact, an increase in public expenditures, financed by public debt, might put at risk the sustainability of fiscal policy and households would therefore increase private saving. 4 Evidence of unsustainable fiscal policies in the European Union may be found in Uctum and Wickens (2000) and Afonso (2005a). 5 The application of the Ricardian equivalence to these two countries is nevertheless contested by Creel (1998). For instance, for the EU15, Afonso (2005b) reports evidence of overall government Ricardian behaviour. 11

13 Finally, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina and Perroti (1997b) also mentions the role of exchange rates in promoting successful fiscal adjustments, since a significant exchange rate depreciation occurred before and during the fiscal consolidations of Ireland and Denmark in the 1980s. 6 Indeed, the importance of currency devaluations before/during fiscal contractions also can play a role in the success of those consolidations. See, for instance, Hjelm (2003) and Lambertini and Tavares (2005) Overview of previous evidence Available empirical evidence shows that the existence of non-keynesian effects may well depend upon the size and the persistence of the fiscal adjustment. However, the available empirical work so far does not seem to completely reject the expansionary fiscal contraction hypothesis. The composition of the adjustment is also relevant, that is, to what degree the fiscal contraction is based on tax increases and public investment or government consumption cuts. 7 Another compelling point is the fact that an increase in public expenditure will have typical Keynesian effects when the level of public debt or of the budget deficit is small. If a country has an important budget deficit or a very high debt-to-gdp ratio, a fiscal consolidation may well produce the non-keynesian effects discussed above. Table 1 summarises some of the empirical evidence found in the literature, concerning the existence of non-keynesian effects of fiscal policy. 6 Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), McDermott and Westcott (1996), Bergman and Hutchison (1997) and Creel (1998) also analyse these fiscal episodes. 7 Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997b), Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), McDermott and Wescott (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Perotti (1999), and Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000) present empirical results concerning the composition and size determinants of successful adjustments. Heylen and Everaert (2000) empirically contest the idea that current expenditures reductions are the best policy to get a successful fiscal consolidation. Von Hagen, Hughes-Hallet and Strauch (2001) and EC (2003) provide additional descriptive analysis and case studies, and Briotti (2005) reviews the literature. 12

14 3. Determination of fiscal episodes in the EU15 A critical point when assessing the existence of non-keynesian effects of fiscal policy is the choice of the measure of fiscal adjustments. The literature uses several definitions for timing fiscal contractions, relying essentially on the structural budget balance concept, the balance that would arise if both expenditures and taxes were determined by potential rather than actual output. The most commonly used measure, the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance, allows the correction of all the effects on budget balance resulting from changes in economic activity such as inflation or real interest rate changes. This measure is frequently used either as percentage of GDP or as a percentage of potential output. In the paper I will use cyclically adjusted primary budget balance as a percentage of GDP since it is a more widely used measure by the international institutions. Besides the choice of the budget measure, there are also differences in the literature as to how to define the period of a fiscal contraction or expansion. According to the chosen definition, the number of fiscal episodes changes as well as the turning points of fiscal policy. Alesina and Ardagna (1998) adopted a fiscal episode definition that allows that some stabilisation periods may have only one year. 8 On the other hand, the definition used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) decreases the probability of fiscal adjustment periods with only one year by using a limit of 3 percentage points of GDP for a single year consolidation. 9 However, the above definitions, by choosing arbitrarily 2 or 3 years fiscal adjustment periods, end up determining the number of years subjectively. In other words, in selecting the time span of fiscal episodes one incurs the risk of finding either an excessive number of periods, or of neglecting single year length fiscal episodes. 8 The change in the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance is at least 2 percentage points of GDP in one year or at least 1.5 percentage points on average in the last two years. 9 The cumulative change in the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance is at least 5, 4, 3 percentage points of GDP in respectively 4, 3 or 2 years, or 3 percentage points in one year. 13

15 In order to identify fiscal policy episodes in the EU15, I used a simple approach trying also to minimise, but not necessarily avoiding, ad-hoc definitions of fiscal episodes. Annual data for the fifteen EU countries, over the period 1970 to 2005, was collected for the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance, computed by the European Commission (a precise description of the data is given in the Appendix). Therefore, a possible measure of fiscal impulse is the first difference of the primary structural budget balance, as a percentage of GDP. With 505 annual observations available, for the group of the 15 EU countries, the average change in the primary structural budget balance is 0.04 and the standard deviation Figure 1 shows that the distribution is centred on zero but skewed to the right with a corresponding long right tail. Our definition of fiscal episode, FE, in this case defined as a fiscal consolidation, in period t, is as follows: FE t 1, if bt > γσ 1 = 1, if bt i / 2 > σ, (1) i= 0 0, otherwise where b is the primary structural budget balance in period t and σ is the respective standard deviation for the panel sample while γ is applied to determine a multiple of the standard deviation as commonly used in the literature. For simplicity I use γ= In other words, a fiscal episode occurs when either the change in the primary cyclically adjusted balance is at least one and a half times the standard deviation in one year, or when the change in the primary cyclically adjusted balance is at least one standard deviation on average in the last two years. 10 As in all the related literature, here there is also an element of arbitrariness. In this case, 1.5σ is 2.4 percentage points of GDP implying a more demanding threshold to determine a fiscal episode. 14

16 Using the definition in (1) one can determine both contractionary and expansionary fiscal episodes. In order to allow for similar definitions available in previous studies, I compute also the episodes using the definitions used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) and by Alesina and Ardagna (1998), labelled respectively measures FE1 and FE2, while the criterion defined in (1) provides our measure FE3. This will provide some robustness check for the results. Table 2 identifies the fiscal episodes in the EU15 countries, according with the proposed definitions for the fiscal episodes based in the change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance. According to Table 2, the number of years with fiscal episodes labelled as contractions ranges from 58, in the approach of equation (1), to 81, following Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) approach. Episodes of fiscal expansion are less common, ranging from 39 to 51 respectively for methods three and one, while fiscal consolidations range from 58 to 81 respectively also for methods three and one. The average duration of the reported fiscal contractions is around 2.5 years for the method inspired on Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), and around 1.8 years for the other two methods. For instance Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano (2000) reported that extreme fiscal episodes account for a high proportion of their data sample, since for a set of OECD countries they labelled around 62 per cent of the observations as a fiscal episode. Furthermore, one can also observe that, on average for the three approaches, roughly 44 per cent of the fiscal contraction episodes in the EU15 countries occurred in the 1990s. No doubt the limitations imposed by the Maastricht Treaty and by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) urged the EU countries to consolidate public finances from the mid- 1990s onwards in the run up to the European Monetary Union (EMU). It is also worth noticing that all three methods for determining the fiscal episodes identify the usually mentioned fiscal contractions of Denmark in , of Ireland in

17 and also the fiscal expansion of Sweden in Moreover, 76 and 68 per cent of the episodes determined with criterion one coincide with episodes determined respectively with criterion two and three, and 82 per cent of the episodes determined with criterion two coincide with episodes determined via criterion three. 4. Empirical analysis of expansionary fiscal consolidations 4.1. Empirical specifications The empirical strategy to assess the evidence on expansionary fiscal consolidations will rely on the estimation of private consumption specifications, which use budgetary items as explanatory variables. This is quite in line with some of the existing empirical literature. Therefore, the following baseline specification is used oecd oecd C it = c i + λ C it 1 + ω 0Yit 1 + ω 1 Yit + δ 0Yit 1 + δ 1 Yit + (2) m 1FCEit 1 3 FCEit 1TFit 1 3 TFit 1TAX it 1 3 TAX it FCit ( α + α + β + β + γ + γ ) + m 2FCEit FCEit + 2TFit TFit + 2TAX it TAX it FCit + it ( α α β β γ γ ) (1 ) µ where the index i (i=1,,n) denotes the country, the index t (t=1,,t) indicates the period and c i stands for the individual effects to be estimated for each country i. These country-specific constants are the only source of heterogeneity in the specifications. Moreover, we have: C private consumption; Y GDP; Y oecd OECD s GDP; FCE general government final consumption expenditure; TF social transfers; TAX taxes, and all the abovementioned variables are taken as the logarithms of the respective real per capita observations. FC m is a dummy variable that controls for the existence of fiscal episodes that are labelled as contractions, with m=1, 2, 3, for each of the three fiscal episode determination strategies used in the previous section. 11 Recently Hauptmeier, Heipertz and Schuknecht (2006) reviewed some of the characteristics of the main fiscal consolidations episodes reported in the EU for the 19980s and 1990s. 16

18 According to the procedure explained in (1), the dummy variable FC m assumes the following values: FC m = 1 when there is a fiscal consolidation episode and FC m = 0 when those fiscal adjustments do not occur. Additionally, it is assumed that the disturbances u it are independent and identical distributed random shocks across countries, with zero mean and constant variance. Aggregate revenue could also be used but taxes are a clearer policy variable to which consumers could be expected to react. On the other hand, results using aggregate revenue tend to confirm the relevance of the ones obtained with taxes (and this was the case). The same reasoning applies to the use of social benefits other than social transfers in kind. Additionally, the use of capital expenditures, whose magnitude is small throughout the panel sample, was mostly not relevant for private consumption. In specification (2), ω 1 and δ 1 are the short-run elasticities of consumption to income and to OECD s income respectively. Moreover, α 3, β 3, and γ 3 are the fiscal short-run elasticities of the consumption function for the case when a fiscal consolidation occurs (i. e. FC m = 1). It is straightforward to see, for instance, that -ω 0 /λ is the long-run elasticity of consumption to income. Similarly, the long-run effects for the fiscal variables, in the presence of a fiscal consolidation episode, are given by α 1 /λ, -β 1 /λ, and γ 1 /λ, respectively for general government final consumption, social transfers, and taxes. On the other hand, in the absence of a fiscal consolidation episode (i. e. FC m =0), the fiscal short-run elasticities are given by α 4, β 4, and γ 4, while the long-run effects are determined by α 2 /λ, -β 2 /λ, and γ 2 /λ, again respectively for general government final consumption, social transfers, and taxes. Theoretically one would expect, in the absence of fiscal consolidation episodes, FC m = 0, the usual Keynesian effects, that is, for instance, a positive effect of public expenditures on private consumption decisions, α 4 >0, α 2 /λ>0, and a negative effect of taxes on private consumption, γ 4 <0, γ 2 /λ<0. However, according to the theoretical underpinnings discussed in section two, if a fiscal consolidation episode occurs, the standard Keynesian 17

19 effects might be to some extent mitigated or even reversed, with private consumption reacting differently to fiscal developments. Specification (2) is a standard fixed effects model, essentially a linear regression model in which the intercept term varies over the individual cross section units. The existence of differences between the several countries should then be taken into account by the autonomous term that may change from country to country, in each cross-section sample, in order to capture individual country characteristics Data In order to assess the possibility of expansionary fiscal consolidations regimes for the EU15, I use annual data spanning the years for private consumption, GDP, taxes, general government final consumption, and social transfers. Taxes are the sum of current taxes on income and wealth (direct taxes) and taxes linked to imports and production (indirect taxes). All variables are taken as the logarithms of real per capita observations. This gives a maximum of 36 years of annual observations for 15 countries and a maximum possible of 540 observations per series. Of the 15 countries in the panel data set, 12 are currently in EMU Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain and 3 others have not adopted the euro Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom. The source of the data is the European Commission AMECO database (updated on 14 November 2005). Table 3 reports the main descriptive statistics for the aforementioned series. Data for OECD population and GDP are taken from the OECD national accounts publications Unit root tests This sub-section tests the relevant series for unit roots. The motivation behind panel data unit root tests is to increase the power of unit root tests by increasing the span of the data while minimising the risk of encountering structural breaks due to regime shifts. 18

20 Several tests for unit roots within panel data have been proposed to address dynamic heterogeneous panels. Two alternative panel unit root tests are performed in this section in order to assess the existence of unit roots in our data sample. In the first category of tests, for instance, Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) proposed a test based on heterogeneous panels with fixed effects where the null hypothesis assumes that there is a common unit root process. The basic augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) equation is y it k i it 1 + βij yit j + δx it + ε it j= 1 = α y. (3) The null hypothesis of a unit root to be tested is then H 0 : α=0, against the alternative H 1 : a<0. 12 Instead, Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) proposed a test that allows for individual unit root processes so that α in (3) may vary across cross-sections, hence relaxing the assumption that α 1 =α 2 = =α N. The null hypothesis may in this case be written as H 0 : α=0, for all i. The alternative hypothesis is now given by H 1 α i = 0, for i = 1, 2,..., N1 =, implying that some fraction of the α i 0, for i = N1 + 1, N 2 + 2,..., N individual processes are stationary. Table 4 reports the results of the aforementioned unit root tests for the relevant series. For the entire sample period the common unit root test rejects the existence of a unit root at least at the 5 per cent significance level for all series. On the other hand, the individual root test allows the rejection of the null unit root hypothesis for general government final 12 Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) mention that this type of test is particularly useful for panels of moderate size, between cross-sections and time series observations per cross section, therefore a category where this paper s data sample fits. 19

21 consumption and for social transfers, both in level and in first differences, and only in first differences for private consumption, GDP, and taxes. There are some competing results for the unit root tests, with the common unit root tests clearly rejecting the existence of a unit root. However, since the variables are already transformed as logarithmic growth rates, not using such levels would obscure the existence of a possible level relation and make more difficult the interpretation of the results. Therefore, I kept the levels specifications Estimation results The fixed effects model is a typical choice for macroeconomists and is generally more adequate than the random effects model. For instance, if the individual effects are a substitute for non-specified variables, it is probable that each country-specific effect is correlated with the other independent variables. Moreover, since the country sample includes all the relevant countries, and not a random sample from a bigger set of countries, the fixed effects model is a more obvious choice. This is particularly true if one considers the fiscal rule-based framework underlying the Stability and Growth Pact, which has been progressively implemented since the late 1990s in the EU15 countries. In this case, it would seem adequate to choose the fixed effects formalisation, even if it were not correct to generalise the results afterwards to the entire population, which is also not the purpose of the paper. 13 Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of equation (2), for the change in the logarithm of real per capita private consumption, for the three methods used in section three to determine the fiscal episodes. According to the results reported in Table 5, in all specifications both the short-run and the long-run elasticity of private consumption to income are statistically significant. The short-run elasticity is approximately in the three specifications. The long-run 13 Additionally, Judson and Owen (1999) show that even if the existence of a lagged endogenous variable could imply biased and inconsistent fixed effects panel estimators, such bias is minor when the cross section dimension is small in relation to the time dimension of the panel. This holds for an unbalanced panel and at least T=30, as in the present case. 20

22 effect of income is close to one, ranging from 0.95 to 0.97, which indicates that the relation between private consumption and income is rather stable for the EU15 countries. 14 The short-run elasticity for the OECD income is also significant. Regarding general government final consumption there is no statistically significant short-run effect on private consumption, either when there are fiscal consolidation episodes or not (even though the sign of the estimated coefficients for FCE, α 3 and α 4, is positively in line with the usual Keynesian effects). However, the long-run effect of government final consumption on private consumption turns out to be statistically significant with the first method for determining fiscal episodes and when there are fiscal consolidations (α 1 ); with method two (both with and without fiscal consolidations); and with method three when there are no fiscal consolidations (α 2 ). Interestingly, the long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to general government final consumption is negative, which indicates that a reduction of government consumption increases private consumption in the long-run. Moreover, one should also notice that the magnitude of such long-run elasticity is higher when a fiscal consolidation episode occurs (FC m = 1 in (2)), for the first two methods used to determine the fiscal episodes. Therefore, cuts in general government final consumption seem to stimulate private consumption in the long-run, with or without fiscal consolidation episodes, but that stimulus is higher in the presence of such fiscal episodes. For instance, and taking the results from method two (see column II in Table 5), a 1 euro decrease in general government final consumption is estimated to raise long-run private consumption by 24 cents, if there are no fiscal consolidation episodes, and by 39 cents when a fiscal consolidation takes place. With method one such effect is 21 and 41 cents, respectively without and with fiscal consolidations. Concerning taxes, the short-run effect does not seem to be overall statistically significant, with the exception of the first approach (column I in Table 5), indicating that a tax raise, 14 The share of private consumption in GDP has some heterogeneity across the EU15 countries, with the country average for the entire sample period ranging from in Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands to in Greece and Portugal. 21

23 together with a fiscal consolidation episode, could increase private consumption (a non- Keynesian effect). On the other hand, the coefficients of lagged taxes (γ 1, γ 2 ) always come out statistically significant, implying a similar significance for the respective longrun effect of taxes on private consumption. Since such long-run elasticity is positive, this would indicate that tax increases contribute to increase private consumption in the longrun, again in a non-keynesian fashion. This long-run elasticity is more statistically significant when a fiscal consolidation episode takes place, and its magnitude is also higher under such circumstances (γ 1 >γ 2 ), even though one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two coefficients are identical (except for the second approach, see Table 5). For instance, in the presence of a fiscal consolidation episode a 1-euro raise in taxes could contribute to increase private consumption in the long-run by cents. Another point worth mentioning is that the long-run effects of both general government final consumption and taxes are quite similar in absolute value and statistically significant, when a fiscal consolidation episode occurs (see values of α 1 and γ 1 in column I of Table 5 and their corresponding long-run counterparts, and notice also that in this case the null -α 1 =γ 1 is not rejected). Therefore, one can envisage, for this case, the longrun effect on private consumption as given approximately by 0.41*(FCE-TAX), which would imply that increases of general government final consumption net of taxes negatively impinge on private consumption. Put in other words, faced with an increase in general government final consumption net of taxes consumers would behave in a Ricardian way by presuming the need for future higher taxes. In what concerns social transfers, the results from Table 5 do not show any statistical significance, implying an absence of relevant effects on private consumption from that fiscal component. In order to assess possible effects from the institutional changes that occurred in the EU in the 1990s, alternative sub-sample periods can be considered to take into account the signing of the European Union Treaty on 7 February 1992 in Maastricht, with the setting up of the convergence criteria. Therefore, I split the time sample into the pre- and post- 22

24 Maastricht period, using 1992 as the first year of the new EU fiscal framework, and reestimated the specifications for the resulting two time intervals. This might be a way of controlling for common changes in fiscal policy as response to common problems as, for instance, the need to make additional efforts in order to comply with the EMU convergence criteria. Table 6 reports the estimation results for the post-maastricht period. Concerning the post-maastricht period the estimation results seem to be more in line with the results obtained previously for the entire time series sample, even if taxes (general government final consumption) gain (loose) statistical significance. On the other hand, the long-run elasticity of social transfers is now statistically significant and negative, generally regardless of the existence of fiscal consolidation episodes (see also that in Table 6 one does not reject the null β 1 = β 2 ). If higher social transfers lead to lower private consumption, this could be seen as an indication of a substitution effect or as a non-keynesian effect with consumers anticipating future higher taxes to finance the current social transfers. Concerning the pre-maastricht period the overall estimation results do not seem to show any significant effects, either in the short or in the long-run, from fiscal variables on private consumption. This turned out to be true for all the three measures used to determine a fiscal episode, while the existence of fiscal consolidation episodes do not seem to play a role either. Therefore, these results are not reported. As an additional test, I also estimated (2) only for the period , and since the results are not very different from the ones for the period , they are not reported in the text. One can wonder whether the evidence found on the second half of the sample is related to entry in EMU, being then consumers behaviour more responsive, and non-keynesian, to changes in taxes and social transfers The relevance of government indebtedness It has been mentioned in the literature that the effects of government spending on private consumption may depend on the level of government indebtedness. Specifically, the 23

25 effects of government spending could become less Keynesian if large increases in general government debt occur or if debt-to GDP ratios are already at a high level. To assess how different levels of government indebtedness may impinge on the responsiveness of private consumption, I considered two alternative thresholds for the debt-to-gdp ratio by using two dummy variables Byear and Bcountry. These debt ratio thresholds variables are defined as follows: Byear it 1, debt ratio year average = (4) 0, otherwise where year average is the simple average of the debt-to-gdp ratio in year t for the entire cross country sample, and Bcountry it 1, debt ratio country average = (5) 0, otherwise where country average is the debt-to-gdp ratio on average in country i for the entire sample. 15 Using the country average debt-to-gdp ratio in each year is relevant since capital markets do compare individual country positions vis-à-vis some perceived group average. Moreover, if for some years the debt ratio of a given country is clearly above the group average, notably in the EU context, the public may become more aware of the existence of fiscal imbalances and react differently. These debt threshold variables can then be interacted with the dummy variables that reflect the existence of fiscal consolidation episodes, in order to see if the existence of a 15 For instance, the period average of the debt-to-gdp ratio ranged from 10.3 and 42.1 per cent respectively for Luxembourg and Germany to 86.2 and percent respectively in Italy and in Belgian. On the other hand, the simple cross-country average for the debt ratio had a minimum value of 27.5 per cent in 1973 and a maximum value of 72.9 per cent in

26 higher or a lower level of public indebtedness in the previous period makes a difference for private consumption decisions. For instance, for the Byear dummy the testable empirical specification can be extended from (2) and written in the following way: oecd oecd C it = c i + λ C it 1 + ω 0Yit 1 + ω 1 Yit + δ 0Yit 1 + δ 1 Yit + (6) ( α FCE + α FCE + β TF + β TF + γ TAX + γ TAX ) FC (1 Byear ) + m 10 it 1 30 it 10 it 1 30 it 10 it 1 30 it it it 1 ( α FCE + α FCE + β TF + β TF + γ TAX + γ TAX )(1 FC )(1 Byear ) + m 20 it 1 40 it 20 it 1 40 it 20 it 1 40 it it it 1 ( α FCE + α FCE + β TF + β TF + γ TAX + γ TAX ) FC Byear + m 11 it 1 31 it 11 it 1 31 it 11 it 1 31 it it it 1 ( α FCE + α FCE + β TF + β TF + γ TAX + γ TAX )(1 FC ) Byear + µ. m 21 it 1 41 it 21 it 1 41 it 21 it 1 41 it it it 1 it According to the estimation results for specification (6), reported in Table 7, now general government final consumption is not statistically significant in explaining private consumption, regardless of the existence of a fiscal consolidation episode, and when the ratio is below the debt threshold. This result holds for the three different methodologies used to determine fiscal consolidation episodes. If the debt ratio is above the debt threshold and in the absence of a fiscal consolidation episode, the long-run effect of the general government final consumption (α 21 ) varies across the three methods of determination of fiscal episodes. Regarding social transfers, the short-run effect on private consumption is positive and statistically significant when there are no fiscal consolidation episodes and when the debt-to-gdp ratio is below the defined threshold (β 40 ). On the other hand, in the presence of a fiscal consolidation episode and if the previous period debt-to-gdp ratio was already above the debt ratio threshold, social transfers have a negative (non-keynesian) long-run effect on private consumption (β 31 ). The same is true for the long-run effect of social transfers (β 11 ). 25

27 The results from Table 7 indicate also that taxes have a positive (non-keynesian) longrun effect on private consumption when there are no fiscal consolidations and when the debt ratio is below the relevant threshold (γ 20 ). Additionally, for the cases when the debt ratio is above the threshold, the significance of such non-keynesian effects increases, which could be interpreted along the lines proposed by Blanchard (1990), as a reduction of uncertainty about future fiscal policy unbalances. Moreover, the robustness of the result is higher when a fiscal consolidation occurs (γ 11 ), under the first two strategies used to determine the existence of fiscal episodes (columns I and II of Table 7). 16 The alternative set of results for specification (6), using as the dummy threshold for the debt-to-gdp ratio the average in year t for the entire country sample, as determined in (5), are reported in Table 8. These additional results show that when the debt threshold is not surpassed, general government final consumption has a negative (non-keynesian) long-run effect on private consumption and this effect is of a bigger magnitude when there is a fiscal consolidation episode ( α 10 > α 20 ). This result is mostly visible for the first and third strategies used to determine the occurrence of fiscal episodes (columns I and III in Table 8), and it also holds when the country debt-to-gdp ratio is above the country average and when there is a consolidation episode (α 11 in column I). 17 Taxes depict a positive (non-keynesian) long-run effect on private consumption when the debt-to-gdp ratio is below the relevant threshold. When the debt ratio threshold is surpassed a positive and statistically long-run effect of taxes on private consumption is mostly visible when coupled with a fiscal consolidation episode (γ 11 ). 16 The interaction of the year average for the debt dummy with the fiscal episode dummy results in a split of the fiscal episodes into two roughly equal sized sub-samples (for the three methods used to determine the fiscal episodes). 17 One can mention that the use of the country average for the debt dummy interaction results approximately in a two thirds (one third) sub-sample of fiscal consolidations episodes coupled with the debt-to-gdp ratio above (below) the threshold. 26