Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar

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1 0011 NNİ İİSSAANN ÇÇAARRŞŞAAMBBAA SSAAYYI II: : Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar Karasu, Hanife Banu. Bilgi sistemleri ve denetim (Yüksek Lisan Tezi). Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 1

2 Resmi Gazete YÜRÜTME VE İDARE BÖLÜMÜ BAKANLAR KURULU KARARI 2009/14814 Millî Eğitim Bakanlığına Bağlı Her Derece ve Türdeki Örgün ve Yaygın Eğitim Kurumlarında Görev Yapan Yönetici ve Öğretmenlerin 30/3/2009 Tarihinde Aylık Karşılığı Ders, Varsa Ek Ders, Ders Niteliğinde Yönetim Görevi ile Hazırlık ve Planlama Görevi Karşılığı Ders ve Ek Ders Görevlerini Yapmış Sayılması Hakkında Karar BAŞBAKANLIĞA VEKÂLET ETME İŞLEMİ Başbakanlığa, Devlet Bakanı ve Başbakan Yardımcısı Hayati YAZICI nın Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere BAKANLIKLARA VEKÂLET ETME İŞLEMİ Devlet Bakanı ve Başbakan Yardımcısı Nazım EKREN e, Devlet Bakanı ve Başbakan Yardımcısı CEMİL ÇİÇEK in Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere Devlet Bakanı Mehmet ŞİMŞEK e, Maliye Bakanı KEMAL UNAKITAN ın Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere ATAMA KARARLARI Başbakanlık, Devlet Bakanı ve Başbakan Yardımcılığına Ait Atama Kararları YÖNETMELİK Hacettepe Üniversitesi Tıp Fakültesi Öğretim ve Sınav Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik TEBLİĞLER Ticaret Şirketlerinin Tüzel Kişiliği Bulunmayan Bir Ortaklık Yapısı ile İşlettikleri Ticari İşletmelerin Ticaret Sicillerine Tescili Hakkında Tebliğ (İç Ticaret: 2009/2) Mecburi Standardın Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair Tebliğ (No: ÖSG-2009/1) İhracı Yasak ve Ön İzne Bağlı Mallara İlişkin Tebliğde (İhracat 96/31) Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Tebliğ (No: İhracat 2009/3) Yabancı Kitap Ve Süreli Yayınlar Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Volume 27, Issue 2, Pages (March-April 2008) The shortcomings of fair-value accounting described in SFAS 157 Pages George J. Benston Analysis of the examples given by the FASB to show how fair values, defined as exit prices, should be determined in specified circumstances is revealing. Such prices require determining what hypothetical companies might pay for assets, a costly procedure at best. Even though SFAS 157 specifies exit values, several examples employ values in use and entrance values. Although transaction costs must be excluded, they often are not. Fair valuation of non-financial assets, required in certain İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 2

3 circumstances (e.g., business combinations), is particularly difficult to apply. Furthermore, exit values of such assets as work-in-process inventories and specialpurpose machines, as defined by SFAS 157, often are zero or negative. Importantly, assets and liabilities restated at exit prices yield balance sheets and income statements that are of little, if any, value to investors in ongoing firms. Further, the examples presented show that fair values could be readily manipulated. Implementation of SFAS 157, therefore, is likely to be costly to investors and independent public accountants. 2. The shortcomings of SFAS 157 fair value measures 2.1. Fair values not based on actual market prices are costly to determine and verify 2.2. Value in use and entrance values are used, contrary to SFAS 157-specified exit values 2.3. Transaction costs are used, contrary to SFAS Fair values for inventories and fixed assets that may be included in business combinations present problems that are not recognized 2.5. Fair values other than level 1 could be readily manipulated and difficult to verify 3. Conclusions 4. Analysis of the examples given in the implementation guide 4.1. Valuation premise highest and best use Example 1: The reporting entity, a strategic buyer, acquires a group of assets (Assets A, B, and C) in a business combination. The reporting entity measures the fair value of each of the assets individually [19] Example 2: Land acquired in a business combination that is used for manufacturing might be used for a residential project (20) Example 3: An IPR&D project that is incomplete and will be held up to protect other products (21 22) 4.2. Valuation techniques Example 4: Machine held and used Example 4A (not given; provided by the author): Inventories Example 4B (not given; provided by the author): Acquisition of fixed (nonfinancial) assets İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 3

4 Example 4C (not given; provided by the author): Acquisition of long-term debt Example 4D (not given; provided by the author): Consistent application of fair values to all accounts Example 5: Software asset that would be used in combination with other assets 4.3. Fair value hierarchy Example 6: Level 1 principal (or most advantageous) market (26 27) Level 2 inputs (27 28) Level 3 inputs 4.4. Transaction prices and initial fair value measurements Example 7: Interest rate swap at initial recognition 4.5. Restricted assets Examples 8 and 9: Restrictions on the sale of a security or use of land 4.6. Liabilities and credit risk (the reporting entity s credit standing is taken into account) Example 10: Structured note Does auditor tenure influence the reporting of conservative earnings? Pages David S. Jenkins, Uma Velury In this study, we examine the relation between auditor tenure and the reporting of conservative earnings. Using several measures of conservatism, we document a positive association between the conservatism in reported earnings and the length of the auditor client relationship. We further document an increase in conservatism between short and medium tenure that does not deteriorate over long tenure. Collectively, the results imply lower conservatism for short auditor tenure, which suggests that mandating auditor rotation may have an adverse affect on the conservatism in reported earnings. 2. Background İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 4

5 2.1. Definitions of conservatism 2.2. The issue of audit firm rotation 3. Methodology 3.1. Sample selection 3.2. Measurement of auditor tenure 3.3. Model development and measurement of conservatism 4. Results 4.1. Primary results 4.2. Discrete measure of auditor tenure 4.3. Correlation between tenure and firm age 4.4. Alternative measure of conservatism 5. Conclusion Acknowledgements Executive pensions, disclosure quality, and rent extraction Pages Paul Kalyta, Michel Mangan We argue that vague disclosure of supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs) may impede effective shareholder monitoring over this compensation form. Hence, CEOs with power over the board may view SERP benefits as an attractive mechanism to increase their own pay, thereby extracting rents. Our results provide empirical support of the hypothesis. Many of the variables proxying for CEO power are significant in explaining the incidence and magnitude of CEO SERP benefits. In contrast, we find little association between CEO power and cash pay, a well disclosed and monitored compensation form. The results indicate that rent extraction depends on the quality of compensation disclosure. 2. Institutional background İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 5

6 2.1. Nature of SERPs 2.2. SERP disclosure 3. Development of research hypotheses 4. Methodology 4.1. Data 4.2. Estimation of annual pension increment 4.3. Empirical models 5. Results 5.1. Descriptive statistics 5.2. Multivariate analysis 5.3. Predicted excess compensation 5.4. Limitations and additional tests 6. Conclusions Acknowledgements Appendix. Sample Eco-efficiency and firm value Pages Charlene Sinkin, Charlotte J. Wright, Royce D. Burnett Eco-efficiency refers to a process that seeks to maximize the effectiveness of business processes while minimizing their impacts on the environment. Fundamental to ecoefficiency is adoption of a management philosophy that stimulates the search for environmental improvements that yield parallel economic benefits [President s Council on Sustainable Development, 1996a. Sustainable America: A New Consensus for Prosperity, Opportunity, and a Healthy Environment. Government Printing Office, Washington DC; President s Council on Sustainable Development, 1996b. Ecoefficiency: Task Force Report. Government Printing Office, Washington DC; World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), Eco-efficiency: Creating More Value with Less Input. Geneva]. Eco-efficiency is increased by activities that create economic value while continuously reducing ecological impacts and the use of natural resources [DeSimone, L., Popoff, F., Eco-efficiency: The Business İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 6

7 Link To Sustainable Development. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA]. This study empirically examines the proposition that implementation of eco-efficient business strategies is associated with higher firm value. We posit that, firms which adopt eco-efficient business strategies and, as a consequence, achieve reduced costs and increased profits should be more highly valued by the market than similar firms that do not adopt ecoefficient business strategies. Our empirical testing supports this proposition. 2. Hypothesis development 3. Methodology 3.1. Sample selection 3.2. Research model 4. Results and analysis 5. Conclusions Auditor rotation and the appearance of independence: Evidence from nonprofessional investors Pages Steven E. Kaplan, Elaine G. Mauldin We examine the impact of audit firm versus partner rotation on non-professional investors independence-related perceptions, extending prior research on auditor rotation and independence in fact. Arguments for mandatory audit firm rotation continue to be made by regulators and investor groups based, in part, on the idea that firm rotation will incrementally strengthen independence in appearance relative to audit partner rotation. We report the results of two experiments. The first examines 5-year audit firm versus partner rotation under relatively weak or strong audit committees. We find no statistically significant difference in beliefs about how much of an income reducing audit difference management will record, or in beliefs about auditor independence, between the two auditor rotation conditions. On the other hand, we find that non-professional investors do believe more of the audit difference will be recorded, İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 7

8 and the auditors will be more independent, under a strong audit committee than a relatively weak audit committee. The second experiment provides further evidence on audit firm versus partner rotation by examining a setting involving a 26-year audit firm client relationship. Again, no statistically significant differences between the two auditor rotation conditions were found. These findings suggest that compared to audit partner rotation, audit firm rotation does not strengthen independence in appearance among non-professional investors and that non-professional investors recognize the value of strong audit committees. 2. Background 2.1. Auditor rotation 2.2. Audit committee strength 3. Methodology and results for Experiment Procedures and task 3.2. Treatment variables 3.3. Manipulation checks and demographics 3.4. Analyses of research questions 4. Methodology and results for Experiment Methodology and experimental task 4.2. Preliminary results 4.3. Analyses of auditor rotation research question 5. Summary İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 8