Runtime Enforcement of Timed Properties
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1 Runtime Enforcement of Timed Properties Srinivas Pinisetty 1,Yliès Falcone 2, Thierry Jéron 1, Hervé Marchand 1, Antoine Rollet 3 and Omer Nguena Timo 3 INRIA Rennes - Bretagne Atlantique, France LIG, Université Grenoble I, France LaBRI, Université de Bordeaux - CNRS, France MOVEP 2012, December 05, Marseille
2 Outline 1 Introduction 2 Enforcement of timed properties 3 Enforcement of safety properties 4 Conclusion
3 Verification and enforcement monitors Runtime verification verdicts Verification Monitor events ω D ϕ σ = ϕ? D σ Σ Does the run satisfy the property? Monitoring an executing system. No system model. Input: stream of events. Output: stream of verdicts. Runtime enforcement The run should satisfy the property. Monitoring an executing system. No system model. Input: stream of events (may violate the property). Output: stream of events (should satisfy the property).
4 Verification and enforcement monitors Runtime verification verdicts Verification Monitor events ω D ϕ σ = ϕ? D σ Σ Runtime enforcement events o = ϕ o σ EM ϕ memory events σ = ϕ? Does the run satisfy the property? Monitoring an executing system. No system model. Input: stream of events. Output: stream of verdicts. The run should satisfy the property. Monitoring an executing system. No system model. Input: stream of events (may violate the property). Output: stream of events (should satisfy the property).
5 Enforcement monitor (untimed case) Dedicated to a property ϕ. Possibly augmented with a memorization mechanism. events o = ϕ o σ EM ϕ memory events σ = ϕ? Enforcement mechanism An EM modifies the current execution sequence (sometimes like a filter ). reads an input sequence σ Σ. outputs a new sequence o Σ. endowed with a set of enforcement primitives. operates on the memorization mechanism. delete or insert events using the memory content and the current input. An EM behaves as a function E : Σ Σ.
6 Motivation for timed enforcement Specifying the timing behavior Allow specifying desired behavior of a system more precisely (time constraints between events). After an action a, action b should occur with a delay of at least 5 time units between them. Many application domains Domains: Real-time embedded systems, monitor hardware failures, communication protocols, web services and many more. Examples Monitor a firewall to prevent DOS attack ensuring minimal delay between input events. Monitor a web application to check if pre-conditions are met to provide a service.
7 Motivation for timed enforcement Specifying the timing behavior Allow specifying desired behavior of a system more precisely (time constraints between events). After an action a, action b should occur with a delay of at least 5 time units between them. Many application domains Domains: Real-time embedded systems, monitor hardware failures, communication protocols, web services and many more. Examples Monitor a firewall to prevent DOS attack ensuring minimal delay between input events. Monitor a web application to check if pre-conditions are met to provide a service.
8 Motivation for timed enforcement Specifying the timing behavior Allow specifying desired behavior of a system more precisely (time constraints between events). After an action a, action b should occur with a delay of at least 5 time units between them. Many application domains Domains: Real-time embedded systems, monitor hardware failures, communication protocols, web services and many more. Examples Monitor a firewall to prevent DOS attack ensuring minimal delay between input events. Monitor a web application to check if pre-conditions are met to provide a service.
9 Motivation for timed enforcement Specifying the timing behavior Allow specifying desired behavior of a system more precisely (time constraints between events). After an action a, action b should occur with a delay of at least 5 time units between them. Many application domains Domains: Real-time embedded systems, monitor hardware failures, communication protocols, web services and many more. Examples Monitor a firewall to prevent DOS attack ensuring minimal delay between input events. Monitor a web application to check if pre-conditions are met to provide a service.
10 Motivation for timed enforcement Specifying the timing behavior Allow specifying desired behavior of a system more precisely (time constraints between events). After an action a, action b should occur with a delay of at least 5 time units between them. Many application domains Domains: Real-time embedded systems, monitor hardware failures, communication protocols, web services and many more. Examples Monitor a firewall to prevent DOS attack ensuring minimal delay between input events. Monitor a web application to check if pre-conditions are met to provide a service.
11 Outline 1 Introduction 2 Enforcement of timed properties 3 Enforcement of safety properties 4 Conclusion
12 Enforcement of timed properties From untimed to timed properties enforcement New elements have to be taken into account Input/output sequences are timed words: σ = (δ 1, a 1 ) (δ 2, a 2 ) (δ n, a n ), δ i R, a i Σ. Property ϕ described by a timed automaton or a timed logic. Synthesis of the corresponding enforcer? Class of enforceable properties? Focus on safety and co-safety properties modeled by TA. Model of the enforcer? Memory + similar operations (, ). No finite structure. Requirements (What should the enforcer do?).
13 Enforcement of timed properties From untimed to timed properties enforcement New elements have to be taken into account Input/output sequences are timed words: σ = (δ 1, a 1 ) (δ 2, a 2 ) (δ n, a n ), δ i R, a i Σ. Property ϕ described by a timed automaton or a timed logic. Synthesis of the corresponding enforcer? Class of enforceable properties? Focus on safety and co-safety properties modeled by TA. Model of the enforcer? Memory + similar operations (, ). No finite structure. Requirements (What should the enforcer do?).
14 Property Defined by a timed language ϕ (R 0 Σ). A timed word σ satisfies ϕ (noted σ = ϕ) if σ ϕ. Focus on properties specified by a TA A ϕ. Safety and co-safety properties specified by TA Safety: nothing bad should ever happen (prefix closed). Co-safety: something good will eventually happen within a finite amount of time (extension closed).
15 Property Defined by a timed language ϕ (R 0 Σ). A timed word σ satisfies ϕ (noted σ = ϕ) if σ ϕ. Focus on properties specified by a TA A ϕ. Safety and co-safety properties specified by TA Safety: nothing bad should ever happen (prefix closed). Co-safety: something good will eventually happen within a finite amount of time (extension closed). Σ 1 Σ 1 \ {r} Σ 1 \ {r} r, x := 0 r, x < 5 l 0 l 1 l 2 r, x 5, x := 0
16 Property Defined by a timed language ϕ (R 0 Σ). A timed word σ satisfies ϕ (noted σ = ϕ) if σ ϕ. Focus on properties specified by a TA A ϕ. Safety and co-safety properties specified by TA Safety: nothing bad should ever happen (prefix closed). Co-safety: something good will eventually happen within a finite amount of time (extension closed). r, x := 0 l 0 l 1 g, 10 x 15 l 3 Σ 2 Σ 2 \ {r} l 2 Σ 2 \ {g}; g, x < 10 x > 15 Σ 2
17 Enforcement monitoring in a timed context Enforcement function - E ϕ E(σ, t) = ϕ Enforcement function σ, t E : (R 0 Σ) R 0 (R 0 Σ). ϕ: Property which should be enforced (specified by a TA). σ: Input timed word. Output at time t: E(σ, t) should satisfy some additional constraints [Soundness, Transparency, Optimality]. E realized as a Enforcement Monitor (EM).
18 Enforcement Monitor - EM E(σ, t) = ϕ Memory EM ϕ σ Memory Timed word Operations : stores the received event and a delay in the memory. : removes the event from memory and releases it as output.
19 Decisions (δ k+1, a k+1) (δ m, a m) (δ 1, a 1 ) (δ k, a k) = ϕ EM ϕ E(σ, t) delays obs(σ, t) σ = (δ 1, a 1 ) (δ k, a k ) (δ m, a m ) (δ n, a n ) obs(σ, t) = {σ σ σ time(σ ) t} What can the enforcer do? No insertion, deletion of events. Order of events cannot be changed. Allow to increase the delay between actions.
20 Summary of the approach ϕ Enforcement Function E(σ, t) Soundness Transparency Optimality σ Requirements: Soundness, Transparency and Optimality conditions. Enforcement Monitor: Defined as a transition system (which should satisfy the requirements). Implementation: Translation of the EM semantic rules into algorithms.
21 Summary of the approach ϕ E(σ, t) Enforcement Monitor σ Requirements: Soundness, Transparency and Optimality conditions. Enforcement Monitor: Defined as a transition system (which should satisfy the requirements). Implementation: Translation of the EM semantic rules into algorithms.
22 Summary of the approach ϕ E(σ, t) Process Implementation Memory Process σ Requirements: Soundness, Transparency and Optimality conditions. Enforcement Monitor: Defined as a transition system (which should satisfy the requirements). Implementation: Translation of the EM semantic rules into algorithms.
23 Outline 1 Introduction 2 Enforcement of timed properties 3 Enforcement of safety properties 4 Conclusion
24 Enforcement of a safety property Soundness σ (R 0 Σ), t R 0, E(σ, t) = ϕ. Transparency At any time instant t, the output E(σ, t) delays the input obs(σ, t): σ (R 0 Σ), t R 0, E(σ, t) d obs(σ, t) time(e(σ, t)) t. Optimality If E is sound and transparent, it is optimal for any σ, t if (Op1) E(σ, t) is among the longest correct timed words delaying obs(σ, t). (Op2) Every prefix of E(σ, t) has the shortest possible last delay.
25 Enforcement of a safety property Soundness σ (R 0 Σ), t R 0, E(σ, t) = ϕ. Transparency At any time instant t, the output E(σ, t) delays the input obs(σ, t): σ (R 0 Σ), t R 0, E(σ, t) d obs(σ, t) time(e(σ, t)) t. Optimality If E is sound and transparent, it is optimal for any σ, t if (Op1) E(σ, t) is among the longest correct timed words delaying obs(σ, t). (Op2) Every prefix of E(σ, t) has the shortest possible last delay.
26 Enforcement of a safety property Soundness σ (R 0 Σ), t R 0, E(σ, t) = ϕ. Transparency At any time instant t, the output E(σ, t) delays the input obs(σ, t): σ (R 0 Σ), t R 0, E(σ, t) d obs(σ, t) time(e(σ, t)) t. Optimality If E is sound and transparent, it is optimal for any σ, t if (Op1) E(σ, t) is among the longest correct timed words delaying obs(σ, t). (Op2) Every prefix of E(σ, t) has the shortest possible last delay.
27 Enforcement of a safety property Soundness σ (R 0 Σ), t R 0, E(σ, t) = ϕ. Transparency At any time instant t, the output E(σ, t) delays the input obs(σ, t): σ (R 0 Σ), t R 0, E(σ, t) d obs(σ, t) time(e(σ, t)) t. Optimality If E is sound and transparent, it is optimal for any σ, t if (Op1) E(σ, t) is among the longest correct timed words delaying obs(σ, t). (Op2) Every prefix of E(σ, t) has the shortest possible last delay.
28 EM for a safety property EM = C, C 0, Γ EM, C = (R 0 Σ) R 0 R 0 B Q is the set of configurations Initial configuration is C 0 = ɛ, 0, 0, tt, q 0 C; Γ EM = ( (R 0 Σ) {ɛ} ) Op ( (R 0 Σ) {ɛ} ) is the input-operation-output alphabet, where Op = {( ), ( ), Delay( )}; C Γ EM C EM should fulfill the soundness, transparency and optimality conditions.
29 Operations 1. σ s, δ, d, tt, q (δ,a)/(δ,a)/ɛ σ s (δ, a), 0, d, (δ ), q with: δ = shortest delay δ δ s.t. (q (δ,a) q, q G) q is defined as q (δ,a) q if δ < and q = q otherwise 2. (δ, a) σs, s, δ, b, q ɛ/(δ,a)/(δ,a) σ s, s, 0, b, q if δ 3. Delay σ s, s, d, b, q ɛ/del(δ)/ɛ σ s, s + δ, d + δ, b, q
30 Implementation E(σ, t) Process Enforcer Memory Process σ, t Algorithm: Process (l, X) (l init, [X 0]) while tt do (δ, a) await event if (post(l, X, a, δ) / G) then δ update(l, X, a, δ) if δ = then terminate Process end if else δ δ end if (l, X) post(l, X, a, δ ) enqueue (δ, a) end while Algorithm: Process d 0 while tt do await ( σ s 1) (δ, a) dequeue (σ s ) wait (δ d) dump (a) d 0 end while
31 Outline 1 Introduction 2 Enforcement of timed properties 3 Enforcement of safety properties 4 Conclusion
32 Conclusion Formal approach for enforcing timed properties Enforcer adds additional delay between input actions in order to satisfy the property. Additional constraints to ensure choosing best delay between actions. Focused on safety/co-safety properties. Algorithms to implement the enforcers. Prototypes developed using Python and UPPAAL. Ongoing/ future work Enforcing more expressive properties. New transparency conditions. Improve implementation. Test on case studies (analysis, different architectures).
33 Conclusion Formal approach for enforcing timed properties Enforcer adds additional delay between input actions in order to satisfy the property. Additional constraints to ensure choosing best delay between actions. Focused on safety/co-safety properties. Algorithms to implement the enforcers. Prototypes developed using Python and UPPAAL. Ongoing/ future work Enforcing more expressive properties. New transparency conditions. Improve implementation. Test on case studies (analysis, different architectures).
34 Example Σ 1 \ {r} Σ 1 \ {r} Σ 1 r, x := 0 r, x < 5 l 0 l 1 l 2 r, x 5, x := 0 Input σ = (1, a) (3, r) (1, r) t = 0 t = 1 t = 1 t = 1 t = 4 t = 4 ɛ/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 0, 0 >)/(1, a) (3, r) (1, r) del(1) ɛ/(ɛ, 1, 1, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(1, a) (3, r) (1, r) ɛ/((1, a), 0, 1, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(3, r) (1, r) (1, a)/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(3, r) (1, r) del(3) (1, a)/(ɛ, 3, 3, tt, < l 0, 4 >)/(3, r) (1, r) (1, a)/((3, r), 0, 3, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/(1, r) (1, a) (3, r)/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/(1, r) t = 4 del(1) (1, a) (3, r)/(ɛ, 1, 1, tt, < l 1, 1 >)/(1, r) t = 5 (1, a) (3, r)/((5, r), 0, 1, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/ɛ t = 5 del(4) (1, a) (3, r)/((5, r), 4, 5, tt, < l 1, 4 >)/ɛ t = 9 (1, a) (3, r) (5, r)/(ɛ, 4, 0, tt, < l 1, 4 >)/ɛ t = 9 Sound, Transparent and Optimal
35 Example Σ 1 \ {r} Σ 1 \ {r} Σ 1 r, x := 0 r, x < 5 l 0 l 1 l 2 r, x 5, x := 0 Input σ = (1, a) (3, r) (1, r) t = 0 t = 1 t = 1 t = 1 t = 4 t = 4 ɛ/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 0, 0 >)/(1, a) (3, r) (1, r) del(1) ɛ/(ɛ, 1, 1, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(1, a) (3, r) (1, r) ɛ/((1, a), 0, 1, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(3, r) (1, r) (1, a)/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(3, r) (1, r) del(3) (1, a)/(ɛ, 3, 3, tt, < l 0, 4 >)/(3, r) (1, r) (1, a)/((3, r), 0, 3, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/(1, r) (1, a) (3, r)/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/(1, r) t = 4 del(1) (1, a) (3, r)/(ɛ, 1, 1, tt, < l 1, 1 >)/(1, r) t = 5 (1, a) (3, r)/((5, r), 0, 1, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/ɛ t = 5 del(4) (1, a) (3, r)/((5, r), 4, 5, tt, < l 1, 4 >)/ɛ t = 9 (1, a) (3, r) (5, r)/(ɛ, 4, 0, tt, < l 1, 4 >)/ɛ t = 9 Sound, Transparent and Optimal
36 Example Σ 1 \ {r} Σ 1 \ {r} Σ 1 r, x := 0 r, x < 5 l 0 l 1 l 2 r, x 5, x := 0 Input σ = (1, a) (3, r) (1, r) t = 0 t = 1 t = 1 t = 1 t = 4 t = 4 ɛ/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 0, 0 >)/(1, a) (3, r) (1, r) del(1) ɛ/(ɛ, 1, 1, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(1, a) (3, r) (1, r) ɛ/((1, a), 0, 1, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(3, r) (1, r) (1, a)/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(3, r) (1, r) del(3) (1, a)/(ɛ, 3, 3, tt, < l 0, 4 >)/(3, r) (1, r) (1, a)/((3, r), 0, 3, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/(1, r) (1, a) (3, r)/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/(1, r) t = 4 del(1) (1, a) (3, r)/(ɛ, 1, 1, tt, < l 1, 1 >)/(1, r) t = 5 (1, a) (3, r)/((5, r), 0, 1, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/ɛ t = 5 del(4) (1, a) (3, r)/((5, r), 4, 5, tt, < l 1, 4 >)/ɛ t = 9 (1, a) (3, r) (5, r)/(ɛ, 4, 0, tt, < l 1, 4 >)/ɛ t = 9 Sound, Transparent and Optimal
37 Example Σ 1 \ {r} Σ 1 \ {r} Σ 1 r, x := 0 r, x < 5 l 0 l 1 l 2 r, x 5, x := 0 Input σ = (1, a) (3, r) (1, r) t = 0 t = 1 t = 1 t = 1 t = 4 t = 4 ɛ/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 0, 0 >)/(1, a) (3, r) (1, r) del(1) ɛ/(ɛ, 1, 1, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(1, a) (3, r) (1, r) ɛ/((1, a), 0, 1, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(3, r) (1, r) (1, a)/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(3, r) (1, r) del(3) (1, a)/(ɛ, 3, 3, tt, < l 0, 4 >)/(3, r) (1, r) (1, a)/((3, r), 0, 3, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/(1, r) (1, a) (3, r)/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/(1, r) t = 4 del(1) (1, a) (3, r)/(ɛ, 1, 1, tt, < l 1, 1 >)/(1, r) t = 5 (1, a) (3, r)/((5, r), 0, 1, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/ɛ t = 5 del(4) (1, a) (3, r)/((5, r), 4, 5, tt, < l 1, 4 >)/ɛ t = 9 (1, a) (3, r) (5, r)/(ɛ, 4, 0, tt, < l 1, 4 >)/ɛ t = 9 Sound, Transparent and Optimal
38 Example Σ 1 \ {r} Σ 1 \ {r} Σ 1 r, x := 0 r, x < 5 l 0 l 1 l 2 r, x 5, x := 0 Input σ = (1, a) (3, r) (1, r) t = 0 t = 1 t = 1 t = 1 t = 4 t = 4 ɛ/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 0, 0 >)/(1, a) (3, r) (1, r) del(1) ɛ/(ɛ, 1, 1, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(1, a) (3, r) (1, r) ɛ/((1, a), 0, 1, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(3, r) (1, r) (1, a)/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(3, r) (1, r) del(3) (1, a)/(ɛ, 3, 3, tt, < l 0, 4 >)/(3, r) (1, r) (1, a)/((3, r), 0, 3, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/(1, r) (1, a) (3, r)/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/(1, r) t = 4 del(1) (1, a) (3, r)/(ɛ, 1, 1, tt, < l 1, 1 >)/(1, r) t = 5 (1, a) (3, r)/((5, r), 0, 1, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/ɛ t = 5 del(4) (1, a) (3, r)/((5, r), 4, 5, tt, < l 1, 4 >)/ɛ t = 9 (1, a) (3, r) (5, r)/(ɛ, 4, 0, tt, < l 1, 4 >)/ɛ t = 9 Sound, Transparent and Optimal
39 Example Σ 1 \ {r} Σ 1 \ {r} Σ 1 r, x := 0 r, x < 5 l 0 l 1 l 2 r, x 5, x := 0 Input σ = (1, a) (3, r) (1, r) t = 0 t = 1 t = 1 t = 1 t = 4 t = 4 ɛ/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 0, 0 >)/(1, a) (3, r) (1, r) del(1) ɛ/(ɛ, 1, 1, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(1, a) (3, r) (1, r) ɛ/((1, a), 0, 1, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(3, r) (1, r) (1, a)/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 0, 1 >)/(3, r) (1, r) del(3) (1, a)/(ɛ, 3, 3, tt, < l 0, 4 >)/(3, r) (1, r) (1, a)/((3, r), 0, 3, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/(1, r) (1, a) (3, r)/(ɛ, 0, 0, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/(1, r) t = 4 del(1) (1, a) (3, r)/(ɛ, 1, 1, tt, < l 1, 1 >)/(1, r) t = 5 (1, a) (3, r)/((5, r), 0, 1, tt, < l 1, 0 >)/ɛ t = 5 del(4) (1, a) (3, r)/((5, r), 4, 5, tt, < l 1, 4 >)/ɛ t = 9 (1, a) (3, r) (5, r)/(ɛ, 4, 0, tt, < l 1, 4 >)/ɛ t = 9 Sound, Transparent and Optimal
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