ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME & SECURITY BILL: SUMMARY

Transcription

1 ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME & SECURITY BILL: SUMMARY INTRODUCTION: THE BILL Review of existing legislation The events of September 11 th pose a direct challenge to the UK to ensure it is as fully prepared as possible to meet the threat of terrorism. The Anti- Terrorism, Crime and security Bill is the result of an extensive review of our existing legislation so that we have the necessary powers to ensure the safety of UK citizens at home and abroad. The review of terrorism legislation which proceeded the introduction of The Terrorism Act 2000 meant that we already had in place many of the powers needed to protect UK citizens. This Bill expands on those powers already established to take account of the changed threat and to equip the UK better to face the menace of global terrorism. Purpose of the Bill The Bill is structured in 14 parts. Its purpose is to enhance our anti-terrorist and security capability. It does this via measures tackling terrorist finance; streamlining relevant immigration procedures; provisions against inciting religious hatred or violence; new offences on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); better security in dealing with pathogens and toxins; improving civil nuclear security; better security at airports and nuclear sites; extension of police powers; extension of the jurisdiction of the British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police, intelligence measures including on data retention and data gateways; an enabling power to implement by secondary legislation EU agreements on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA); and amendments to the Terrorism Act Human Rights The provisions of the Bill are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, but the Government finds it necessary to derogate from Article 5(1) of the Convention in respect of the detention powers in the Bill. It strikes a balance between respecting our fundamental civil liberties and ensuring that they are not exploited by those who would destroy them. It brings specific targeted and proportionate measures into place so that the enforcement, intelligence and other services can tackle the new terrorist threat. Justice for individuals and minorities are reaffirmed and justice for the majority and the security of our nation will be secured. Consultation We have consulted as many groups and organisations who may be affected by this Bill as possible in the short space of time available. Officials from the Home Office and the DTI have met some representatives of the communications industry to discuss the retention of communications data. Devolved Issues 1

2 The bulk of the provisions in the Bill are reserved, so that they will operate on a UK-wide basis. Where the powers are devolved, in most cases we are extending the provisions in our legislation to cover Scotland and Northern Ireland. We will be seeking the consent of the Scottish Parliament to legislate in this way (via a Sewel motion). In a small number of areas, the devolved administrations have indicated that they will bring forward similar legislation in due course, where this is necessary. Some common threads appear throughout the Bill. For ease of reference they are referred to in this document in the order in which they appear in the Bill. PART 1: TERRORIST PROPERTY Clause 1 Forfeiture of terrorist cash Clause 2 Amendments relating to section 1 Clause 3 Terrorist property: amendments Part 1 and schedules 1 and 2 of the Bill contain provisions to prevent terrorists from gaining access to their money. They complement provisions in the new Proceeds Of Crime Bill and ensure that tough investigative and freezing powers are available wherever funds could be used to finance terrorism. The introduction of account monitoring orders will enable the police to require financial institutions to provide information on accounts for up to 90 days. The existing requirement to report knowledge or suspicion of terrorist financing will be strengthened, for the regulated sector, so that it will be an offence not to report where there were reasonable grounds for suspicion. The Bill gives law enforcement agencies the power to seize terrorist cash anywhere in the UK, and the power to freeze assets at the start of an investigation, rather than when the person is about to be charged, reducing the risk that funds will be used or moved before they can be frozen. Proposals not included in this Bill We are also proposing a new multi-agency terrorist finance unit. It would be created, established and funded within the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), and fully supported by additional special branch investigative resources. Also, in order to improve financial intelligence, a new task force will bring in academic, financial and commercial expertise such as that of forensic accountancy. PART 2: FREEZING ORDERS Orders 2

3 Clause 4 Power to make order Clause 5 Contents of order Clause 6 Contents: further provisions Clause 7 Review of order Clause 8 Duration of order Interpretation Clause 9 Nationals and residents Orders: procedure etc. Clause 10 Procedure for making freezing orders Clause 11 Procedure for making certain amending orders Clause 12 Procedure for revoking orders Clause 13 De-hybridisation Clause 14 Orders: supplementary Miscellaneous Clause 15 The Crown Clause 16 Repeals Part 2 and schedules 3 and 8 of the Bill contain measures to update the Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act 1964 to allow the UK to take swifter, more targeted action to freeze the assets of terrorist individuals and groups. The Bill will widen the trigger so that we can counter threats to any part of the UK economy (such as airlines or oil companies) or threats to the life or property of a UK resident or national. PART 3: DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION Clause 17 Extension of existing disclosure powers Clause 18 Restriction on disclosure of information for overseas purposes Clause 19 Disclosure of information held by revenue departments Clause 20 Interpretation of Part 3 Part 3 and schedule 4 of the Bill contain provisions to remove current barriers which prevent customs and revenue officers from providing information to law enforcement agencies in their fight against terrorism and other crime. They 3

4 also harmonise many existing gateways for the disclosure of information for criminal investigations and proceedings. The Bill creates a new gateway giving HM Customs and Excise and the Inland Revenue a general power to disclose information held by them for law enforcement purposes and to the intelligence services in the defence of national security. This is urgently needed to ensure that known criminals are brought to justice. For example, the provisions of the Bill would allow for information on a suspected terrorist financier s bank account to be passed to the police. The Bill also clarifies and harmonises a number of existing gateways for disclosure of information from public authorities to agencies involved in criminal investigations and proceedings. The gateways will ensure that public authorities can disclose certain types of otherwise confidential information where this is necessary for the purposes of fighting terrorism and other crimes. For example, the provisions of the Bill would allow for someone working in the DTLR to pass confidential information on an individual working as a train driver if that person is known to be wanted by the police. PART 4: IMMIGRATION & ASYLUM Suspected international terrorists Clause 21 Suspected international terrorist: certification Clause 22 Deportation, removal, &c. Clause 23 Detention Clause 24 Bail Clause 25 Certification: appeal Clause 26 Certification: review Clause 27 Appeal and review: supplementary Clause 28 Duration of sections 21 to 23 Clause 29 Exclusion of legal proceedings Clause 30 Legal proceedings: derogation Clause 31 Interpretation Clause 32 Channel Islands and Isle of Man Refugee Convention Clause 33 Certificate that Convention does not apply Clause 34 Construction Fingerprints Clause 35 Destruction of fingerprints 4

5 The provisions of Part 4 are intended to prevent terrorists from abusing our immigration and asylum procedures and the safe haven we offer refugees. Clauses 21 to 32 ( Suspected international terrorists ) allow the detention of those the Secretary of State has certified as threats to national security and who are suspected of being international terrorists where their removal is not possible at the present time. Such detention would be subject to regular independent review by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. These provisions change the current law, which allows detention with a view to removal only where removal is a realistic option within a reasonable period of time. They require a limited derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR (Right to liberty and security). Such derogation is permitted during a time of public emergency, but any derogation must be limited to the extent strictly necessary as a result of that emergency. As part of the derogation procedure the government has to make clear that it satisfies itself that the UK is in a state of public emergency. It is also intended to speed up the asylum process for suspected terrorists. The Bill will exclude substantive consideration of asylum claims where the Secretary of State certifies that their removal would be conducive to the public good, and that it would not be in breach of the 1951 Refugee Convention because they are excluded from the protection of that Convention.. It will also remove Judicial Review of decisions of the SIAC in relation to the above two measures. SIAC is the body that deals with suspected terrorists' appeals against immigration decisions: it has three members hearing an appeal, one of whom has held high judicial office and another of whom has been an immigration judge. There will remain an avenue of appeal from SIAC to the Court of Appeal on a point of law. The Bill will also allow for the retention, for 10 years, of fingerprints taken in asylum and certain immigration cases. This will help prevent applicants who have had their case resolved from re-applying and creating multiple identities, which can be used in the perpetration of terrorism or other serious crimes. It is necessary because fingerprints are the only sure way of establishing a person's identity beyond doubt PART 5: RACE AND RELIGION Clause 36 Meaning of racial hatred Clause 37 Meaning of fear and hatred Clause 38 Religious hatred offences Clause 39 Religiously aggravated offences Clause 40 Racial or religious hatred offences: penalties Clause 41 Hatred and fear offences: penalties Clause 42 Saving 5

6 Over recent months, and in particular, since September 11 th, we have seen that there are some people in Britain who seek to stir up hatred against members of religious groups. For example, there have been attacks on mosques and on Muslims. We believe that people of all faiths have a right to live and practice their faith in peace. Part 5 and schedule 7 of the Bill contain provisions to tackle those who wish to exploit tensions. They extend the racially aggravated offences of assault, public order, criminal damage and harassment to cover attacks aggravated by religious hostility. They extend the provisions concerning incitement to racial hatred to cover religious hatred. They include incitement against groups abroad, and increase the maximum penalty for such offences from 2 to 7 years imprisonment. Whilst preserving the right to practice religion in peace, the Bill recognises the long-standing tradition of free speech. To be prosecuted for stirring up religious hatred, a perpetrator must use threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour intended or likely to stir up hatred against a group of people because of their religious belief. Whilst preserving the right to practice religion in peace, the Bill recognises the long-standing tradition of free speech. It will not prevent reasoned debate, humour or criticism of religions or religious practices. 6

7 PART 6: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Amendment of the Biological Weapons Act 1974 and the Chemical Weapons Act 1996 Clause 43 Transfers of biological agents and toxins Clause 44 Extraterritorial application of biological weapons offences Clause 45 Customs and Excise prosecutions for biological weapons offences Clause 46 Customs and Excise prosecutions for chemical weapons offences Nuclear weapons Clause 47 Use etc. of nuclear weapons Clause 48 Exceptions to section 47 Clause 49 Other defences to offences under section 47 Assisting or inducing weapons-related acts overseas Clause 50 Assisting or inducing certain weapons-related acts overseas Supplemental provisions relating to sections 47 and 50 Clause 51 Extraterritorial application of section 50 Clause 52 Powers of entry Clause 53 Customs and Excise prosecutions Clause 54 Offences Clause 55 Consent to prosecutions Clause 56 Interpretation of Part 7 Extension of Part 6 to dependencies Clause 57 Power to extend Part 6 to dependencies etc. Part 6 of the Bill will strengthen current legislation controlling chemical, nuclear and biological weapons (WMD). It will make it an offence to aid or abet the overseas use or development of chemical, nuclear, biological or radiological weapon. It introduces offences equivalent to those in the Chemical Weapons Act 1996 in relation to biological and nuclear weapons. This will bring legislation on biological and nuclear weapons into line with existing legislation on chemical weapons. These provisions will cover nuclear and radiological weapons, chemical weapons and biological agents and toxins. There is also a new provision for customs and excise to prosecute. 7

8 PART 7: CONTROL OF PATHOGENS AND TOXINS CONTROL OF PATHOGENS AND TOXINS Clause 58 Pathogens and toxins in relation to which requirements under this Part apply Clause 59 Duty to notify Secretary of State before keeping or using any dangerous substance Clause 60 Power to require information about security of dangerous substances Clause 61 Power to require information about persons with access to dangerous substances Clause 62 Duty to comply with security directions Clause 63 Duty to dispose of dangerous substances Clause 64 Denial of access to dangerous substances Clause 65 Powers of entry Clause 66 Search warrants Clause 67 Offences Clause 68 Offences: bodies corporate Clause 69 Offences: unincorporated associations Clause 70 Denial of access to dangerous substances: appeals Clause 71 Other appeals Clause 72 Giving of directions or notices Clause 73 Orders and regulations Clause 74 Interpretation Clause 75 Power to extend Part 7 to animal or plant pathogens, pests or toxic chemicals There is a need to ensure that terrorists do not have access to premises or substances that may be used in a potentially devastating manner such as pathogens dangerous to human, plant or animal health. The need for this has been made clearly by recent reports of lack of security at laboratories where some very dangerous pathogens are stored for study purposes. The provisions set out in Part 7 and schedule 5 will place an obligation on managers of laboratories holding stocks of specified diseases to notify their holdings, and to comply with any reasonable security requirements which the police may impose after an inspection of the premises. It will also make a requirement on managers of laboratories, on receipt of a police request, to furnish the police with the names and other details of people with regular access to the dangerous diseases held in laboratory; provision for background checks to be carried out on such people; and provision for the Secretary of State to direct that any named individual shall not be allowed access to such disease strains or the premises in which they are held. 8

9 PART 8: CIVIL NUCLEAR SECURITY Clause 76 Regulation of security of civil nuclear industry Clause 77 Repeals relating to security of civil nuclear installations Clause 78 Atomic Energy Authority special constables Clause 79 Prohibition of disclosures in relation to nuclear security Clause 80 Extra-territorial application of section 79 Clause 81 Prohibition of disclosures of uranium enrichment technology Clause 82 Part 8: supplementary The provisions contained within Part 8 are an essential but proportionate reinforcement of the civil nuclear security regulatory regime. They are needed to ensure further protection for nuclear sites, material and technology against the risks from terrorists and others. The provisions include extending the jurisdiction for the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary (UKAEAC) so that it can protect nuclear sites and nuclear material more effectively. The provisions will enable them to be deployed to all civil licensed nuclear sites, rather than at present only on premises of specified nuclear operators, and within five kilometres of such sites. The provisions also provide for regulations to be made to reinforce and update the regulatory regime for security in the civil nuclear industry. In addition they strengthen sanctions against the unauthorised disclosure by individuals of sensitive information on the security of nuclear sites, nuclear material and proliferation-sensitive nuclear technology. PART 9: AVIATION SECURITY Clause 83 Arrest without warrant Clause 84 Trespass on aerodrome: penalty Clause 85 Removal of intruder Clause 86 Aviation security services Clause 87 Detention of aircraft Clause 88 Air cargo agent: documents The aim of Part 9 is to improve enforcement of aviation security requirements and improve the ability of the police to deal with potentially dangerous situations at airports and on board aircraft. It includes provisions in respect of 9

10 the removal of Unauthorised Persons from Airport Restricted Zones and from Aircraft. At present the Aviation Security Act 1982 makes it an offence for an unauthorised person to enter an airport's Restricted Zone, or an aircraft, and to remain there after being asked to leave. However, there is no specific power to remove someone who refuses to leave. The absence of a power of removal effectively ties the hands of the police, airport authorities and aircraft operators, in dealing with potentially dangerous situations: to not be able to remove unauthorised persons from the protected area of a Restricted Zone, and particularly an aircraft, leaves the travelling public and airport/airline staff open to potential danger. The Bill gives this power of removal. It will also bring the aviation industry into line with the maritime and Channel Tunnel industries, where equivalent powers exist under the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (Section 39, as amended by the Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act 1997) and under the Channel Tunnel Security Order (Article 31(4)) respectively. PART 10: POLICE POWERS Identification Clause 89 Fingerprinting of terrorist suspects Clause 90 Searches, examinations and fingerprinting: England and Wales Clause 91 Searches, examinations and fingerprinting: Northern Ireland Clause 92 Photographing of suspects etc.: England and Wales Clause 93 Photographing of suspects etc.: Northern Ireland Clause 94 Powers to require removal of disguises: Great Britain Clause 95 Powers to require removal of disguises: Northern Ireland Powers of stop, search and seizure in Northern Ireland Clause 96 Power to stop and search in anticipation of violence: Northern Ireland Clause 97 Seized articles: Northern Ireland MoD and transport police Clause 98 Jurisdiction of MoD police Clause 99 Provision of assistance by MoD police Clause 100 Jurisdiction of transport police Clause 101 Further provisions about transport police and MoD police Identification There is a small group of cases where detainees exploit the law and do not co-operate with police identification procedures (e.g. fingerprinting). Current events have focused attention on the need to remove the scope for these unreasonable refusals. The Bill contains powers to give the police and customs services the authority to demand the removal of any item which they believe is being worn wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing identity, such as facial covering or gloves. 10

11 Ministry of Defence Police and British Transport Police Part 10 and schedule 7 will allow the British Transport Police (BTP) to act outside their railways jurisdiction when asked to assist by a constable from the local police force, the MDP or the UKAEA constabulary, and in an emergency. The changes will also give BTP officers certain powers available to local police officers, including powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and powers to enter into mutual aid agreements with other forces. Such an extension of jurisdiction will allow a BTP officer to provide better protection to the public when the officer is outside their usual railways jurisdiction. The BTP, as police officers, are expected to act in these circumstances, and it is estimated that the BTP attend some 8,000 such incidents a year. Similarly, changes proposed for the Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) will allow them to act outside MoD land when asked by a constable from the local police force, the BTP or the UKAEA constabulary or in relation to a specific incident, and in an emergency. The changes will also allow MDP to provide assistance, on request, to other forces, and extend to them certain powers in the Terrorism Act 2000 Northern Ireland A series of clauses make provision for the enhancement of police powers in Northern Ireland. PART 11: RETENTION OF COMMUNICATIONS DATA Clause 102 Codes and agreements about the retention of communications data Clause 103 Directions about retention of communications data Clause 104 Lapsing of powers in section 103 Clause 105 Arrangements for payments Clause 106 Interpretation of Part 11 Communications data has been central to the investigation into the terrorist attacks on 11 September. Part 11 contains provisions to allow communications service providers to retain data about their customers communications for access by law enforcement agencies and for national security purposes and to enable a code of practice to be drawn up in consultation with industry. The code of practice will allow communications service providers to retain data about their customers communications for access by law enforcement agencies. 11

12 The communications data referred to in the Bill is information about the use made of the communications by their customers, e.g. subscriber details, itemised billing. It does not include the content of such communications, i.e. what was said over the phone or written in an . Investigators use this data to trace criminals activities and establish links between conspirators. Currently communications service providers are obliged to erase this data when they no longer need it for billing purposes. This has a severe impact on criminal investigations. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 sets out clear limits on the purposes for which the law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies may request access to data relating to specific communications. Mass trawls or fishing expeditions are NOT permitted. The Bill allows for a voluntary code of practice to support this. It has a reserve power to review these arrangements and issue directions if necessary. Reserve power is reviewable every two years. If still needed, it must then be reviewed by an affirmative order. As soon as the power is exercised, there is no need for further review. We are not alone in seeing the need for such a change. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands all now have data retention policies in place. PART 12: BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION Clause 107 Bribery and corruption: foreign officers etc Clause 108 Bribery and corruption committed outside the UK Clause 109 Presumption of corruption not to apply Part 12 brings in provisions to strengthen the law on international corruption, which is linked to conditions which cause terrorism. They put beyond doubt that the law of bribery applies to acts involving foreign public officials, Ministers, MPs and judges (Clause 107); and take jurisdiction over crimes of bribery committed by UK nationals and UK companies overseas (Clause 108). Clause 109 is a technical provision, to ensure that the existing presumption of corruption in the 1916 Act, which it is intended to abolish, does not apply any more widely as a result of these new provisions 12

13 PART 13: MISCELLANEOUS Third pillar of the European Union Clause 110 Implementation of the third pillar Clause 111 Third pillar: supplemental Dangerous substances Clause 112 Use of noxious substances to cause harm Clause 113 Threats involving noxious substances or things Clause 114 Sections 112 and 113: supplementary Intelligence Services Act 1994 Clause 115 Amendments of Intelligence Services Act 1994 Terrorism Act 2000 Clause 116 Information about acts of terrorism Clause 117 Port and airport controls for domestic travel Clause 118 Passenger information Clause 119 Weapons training for terrorists Clause 120 Crown Court judges: Northern Ireland EU Co-operation on Justice and Home Affairs Re-enforcing police and criminal judicial co-operation with our EU partners is a key part of our response to international terrorism. EU leaders, at their summit after the US attacks, agreed a number of ambitious measures on police and judicial co-operation to help fight global terrorism. These included urgent progress on plans for joint investigative teams; on measures to simplify seizing the assets of terrorists across Europe and on measures to speed up extradition arrangements between member states. Part 13 will allow us to implement rapidly these important measures in the fight against international terrorism. Measures on police and criminal judicial co-operation agreed by the JHA Council of the EU (third pillar) can currently only be implemented in the UK by primary legislation. This is time-consuming and does not allow the UK to respond promptly on an EU-wide basis to terrorist related measures. This clause would enable them to be implemented by secondary legislation, while still maintaining parliamentary control through the scrutiny process and 13

14 through the affirmative resolution procedure that the secondary legislation would take. Measures agreed on European Community matters (for example the environment or the internal market) can already be implemented by secondary legislation. Use of noxious substances Using noxious substances, including biological agents or toxins, toxic chemicals or radioactive material for terrorist purposes will become an offence. This creates an offence of using a biological weapon for the first time, as well as giving suitable sentencing powers (up to 14 years) for the use of other substances. Hoaxes Those who send or perpetuate hoaxes cause distress and severe disruption. We are determined to ensure that they can be dealt with firmly. Section 7 of the Bill will introduce a new offence of hoaxing involving allegedly toxic substances e.g. anthrax, smallpox, acids or other similar substances. There will also be a new offence of threatening to use noxious substances in order to make people believe that there is a threat to human life or health. The maximum penalties will be 7 years Those who send or perpetuate hoaxes cause distress and severe disruption. We are determined to ensure that they can be dealt with firmly. Part 13 of the Bill will introduce a new offence of hoaxing involving allegedly toxic substances e.g. anthrax, smallpox, acids or other similar substances. There will also be a new offence of threatening to use noxious substances in order to make people believe that there is a threat to human life or health. The maximum penalties will be 7 years. Intelligence Services Act 1994 The two proposals introduce greater flexibility for intelligence gathering outside the British Islands and adapt the scope and definition of serious crime. They achieve this through extending the powers of GCHQ. These are necessary to ensure that we have the necessary powers to obtain vital intelligence to combat terrorism and serious crime. Terrorism Act 2000 Failure to disclose information about terrorism. The Bill reintroduces the offence of a general failure to disclose information about terrorism. It was previously contained within in the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in relation to Northern Ireland. The new provision will extend the provision to domestic and international terrorism. The Bill will also introduce a definition of a radioactive weapon. Amendment of schedule 7 will include internal journeys. It will equalise provisions to stop, detain and search people who journey internally with those travelling to and from the UK and Common Travel Area (CTA). Passenger & Freight Information This will give additional powers to require carriers to collect and provide information about passengers and goods to the enforcement agencies and 14

15 which can then be shared between the agencies. It is an essential power to allow law enforcement agencies to target and track terrorists. Details of the information that carriers will be required to provide is to be decided in secondary legislation. It will also be useful in targeting other serious criminals, such as drug smugglers and people traffickers. Freight information will plug an obvious gap in the intelligence gateway PART 14: SUPPLEMENTAL SUPPLEMENTAL Clause 121 Expenses Clause 122 Consequential and supplementary provision Clause 123 Repeals and revocation Clause 124 Commencement Clause 125 Extent Clause 126 Short Title SCHEDULES Schedule 1 - Forfeiture of Terrorist cash Part 1 - Introductory Part 2 - Seizure and detention Part 3 - Forfeiture Part 4 - Miscellaneous Part 5 - Property earmarked as terrorist property Part 6 - Interpretation Schedule 2 - Terrorist property: amendments Part 1 - Account monitoring orders Part 2 - Restraint orders Part 3 - Disclosure of information Part 7 - Financial information orders Schedule 3 - Freezing orders Schedule 4 - Extension of existing disclosure powers Part 1 - Enactments to which section 17 applies Part 2 - Northern Ireland legislation to which section 17 applies Schedule 5 - Pathogens and toxins Schedule 6 - The pathogens access appeal commission Schedule 7 - Transport police and MoD police: further provisions Schedule 8 - Repeals and Revocation Part 1 - Terrorist Property Part 2 - Freezing Orders Part 3 - Race and Religion Part 4 - Civil Nuclear Security Part 5 - Police Powers Part 6 - Miscellaneous 15