Supply Chain Risk Management. Operating ahead of the threat, not behind the vulnerabilities
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1 Supply Chain Risk Management Operating ahead of the threat, not behind the vulnerabilities
2 Navigation in the Meeting Room Notes box for audio information and other announcements To enlarge the slide, click on the Full Screen button. To get out of Full Screen view, select Full Screen again. You will need to be out of Full Screen view to enter question responses.
3 Navigation in the Meeting Room Q&A box for entering questions to the presenters File share box to download resources relevant to today s presentation
4 Example of a Chat Question
5 Supply Chain Risk Management Operating ahead of the threat, not behind the vulnerabilities
6 Agenda Introduction Supply Chains How is risk evaluated? Threat as an Element of Risk U.S. Government Requirements DoD Elements Involved with SCRM Summary
7 Supply Chain Threats Our adversaries are very active in trying to introduce material into the supply chain to collect [intelligence] and disrupt U.S. military operations Mr. Shedd, Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 7
8 Adversary Activity The Air Force reported an unknown number of counterfeit aircraft parts had been fastened into U.S. military weapons systems after infiltrating supply depots. In 2010, the FBI seized $143 million of counterfeit Cisco network hardware. While probing DoD s vulnerability to counterfeit parts, the GAO identified problems with microprocessors used in F-15 flight control computers, oscillators used for Global Positioning Systems navigation on more than 4,000 Air Force and Navy systems.
9 Introduction Globalization creates opportunity for foreign intelligence entities (FIE) to operate in a new battle space. The Department of Defense (DoD) is reliant on companies with global supply chains. The U.S. Government and DoD are focused on mitigating risks to supply chains. U.S. Law Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Intelligence Community Directives
10 Chat Question 1 What is Supply Chain Risk? Enter your response in the Chat box.
11 What is Supply Chain Risk? Supply Chain Risk: The risk that adversaries will insert malicious code into or otherwise subvert the design, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, or maintenance of information and communications technology (ICT) components that may be used in DoD systems to gain unauthorized access to data, to alter data, to disrupt operations, or to interrupt communications. Directive Type Memorandum (DTM)
12 What is Supply Chain Risk Management? Supply Chain Risk Management: The management of supply chain risk whether presented by the supplier, the supplied product and its subcomponents, or the supply chain (e.g., packaging, handling, storage, and transport). DTM
13 Intelligence Community Directive 731 Supply chain risk management is the management of risk to the integrity, trustworthiness, and, authenticity of products and services within the supply chain. It addresses the activities of foreign intelligence entities and any other adversarial attempts aimed at compromising the supply chain, which may include the introduction of counterfeit or malicious items into the supply chain. Intelligence Community Directive 731
14 From Beginning to End Credit: Weber State University, Student Association of Supply Chain Management
15 Dell Headquarters 15
16 A Laptop Supply Chain Credit: SourceMap
17 Information Flow in Supply Chains Upstream: From raw materials to consumer Production statuses, production outputs, inventory levels, delivery schedules Downstream: From consumer to raw materials Contracts, orders, return requests, personal information, payments 17
18 Chat Question 2 How do we evaluate risks associated with the global supply chain? Enter your response in the Chat box.
19 How do we evaluate the risks? Incorporation of all-source analysis into assessments Processes to assess threats from potential suppliers Processes to control the quality, configuration, and security Processes to detect the occurrence, reduce likelihood, and mitigate the consequences
20 Threat as an Element of Risk Foreign Intelligence Entity (FIE) Known or suspected person or group that conduct intelligence activities to Collect U.S. information Block or impair U.S. intelligence collection Influence U.S. policy Disrupt U.S. systems or programs
21 Government SCRM actions Chinese telecom companies Huawei and ZTE U.S. blocks acquisitions, mergers, or take overs of U.S. firms and eliminates the technology from U.S. systems and programs UK recommends close monitoring Australia bans bids on government contracts India mandates testing of commercial products
22 U.S. Government Requirements 2009 Comprehensive National Cyber Security Strategy 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section NDAA, Section 818 (c) (3) Intelligence Community Directive 731, Supply Chain Risk Management
23 DoD Acquisition Programs SCRM User Needs A B C Materiel Solution Analysis Technology Development Engineering and Manufacturing Development Production and Development Operations and Support Pre-Systems Acquisition Systems Acquisition Sustainment
24 DoD Elements Involved with SCRM DIA Supply Chain Risk Management, Threat Analysis Center Defense Security Service in partnership with Service and Defense Agencies
25 Summary SCRM is a proactive approach to identifying risk before it can impact a defense acquisition program Good SCRM reduces uncertainty The DoD is focused on mitigating supply chain risk for national security systems and major weapon systems Numerous DoD organizations play a role in informing decision makers on supply chain risk
26 Questions 26
27 Survey 27
28 Contacts and Resources Contact CDSE at CI Training: CI Products: 28
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