Participation in Humanitarian Aid: Sri Lanka report August 2002

Transcription

1 Consultation with and Participation by Beneficiary and Affected Populations in Planning, Managing, Monitoring and Evaluating Humanitarian Aid: the case of Sri Lanka Prepared for INTRAC by Jo Boyden with Tania Kaiser and Simon Springett and commissioned by ALNAP August

2 Acknowledgements This report is based on nine weeks fieldwork in Sri Lanka between February and April During this period the authors benefited immeasurably from the skilled translation, assistance, guidance, enthusiasm and friendship of the research team. We are deeply grateful to F. Felician, Mark Paterson, Umesh, Tharmila, Jude Simion, Anberiya Hanifa, Dr. Perinpanathan, S. Inparuban, K. Mahendren, U. Sangaralingam, M. Thushyanthan, and T.T. Mayuran. Although the authors must take full responsibility for the contents of the report and any possible errors therein, many people kindly read and commented on the various drafts. We would like to thank Alastair Kirk, Jeevan Thiagarajah, Patrick Vandenbruaene, Jason Hart, Brian Pratt, David Marsden, Phil Esmonde, Nicola Mushet, Raga Alphonsis, Jonathan Goodhand, Shah Liton, Ravi Kumar, André Griekspoor and the ALNAP Steering Group and Secretariat for their very detailed and constructive feedback. In Sri Lanka we were hosted in Jaffna by the Save the Children (UK) and in Vavuniya by Oxfam-GB. Oxfam-GB also arranged our security clearance and visas. We owe a debt of gratitude to these agencies and to their staff in both Colombo and the research sites for their hospitality, logistical support and general forbearance over the many demands we made on them. The Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies in Sri Lanka generously hosted a dissemination workshop in Colombo at which the preliminary findings from the research were shared. This event was extremely helpful to us in providing a general framework for the subsequent report. The case study was set up and organised by INTRAC and the agency provided consistent intellectual and administrative support throughout. In this regard, special thanks are due to staff members Michael Davis, Jerry Adams, Brian Pratt and David Marsden and to INTRAC consultants Tony Vaux, Peter Loizos and Jonathan Goodhand. The Global Study, of which this report is but one component, was managed initially by Peter Oakley, then research director at INTRAC. Due to his tragic and untimely death, Peter ran the project for only a short while during its initial stages. However, his leadership, vision and early insights remained an inspiration to us all throughout. 2

3 List of Acronyms Executive Summary Table of Contents Part I. Background 1. Introduction 1.1. Participation in humanitarian action 1.2. The Global Study 2. The Sri Lankan Case Study 2.1. Conceptual issues 2.2. Methodological issues 2.3. Ethical concerns 2.4. The choice of field study sites 3. The structure of this report Part II. The Operational Context 1. Country Profile 1.1. History of the conflict 1.2. Civilian experiences of conflict 1.3. Humanitarian responses 2. Operational constraints 2.1 Political intervention in humanitarian action 2.2. Psychological and emotional obstacles 2.3. Social and cultural obstacles 2.4. Negative perceptions of participation & humanitarian aid 2.5. Indifference of camp populations 3. Summary and observations Part III. Participation in Practice 1. Participation in the project cycle 1.1. Planning 1.2. Baseline assessment 3

4 1.3. Project Implementation 1.4. Monitoring and evaluation 2. The benefits of participation 2.1. Self-respect and self-efficacy 2.2. Social skills and decision-making 2.3. Self-representation, self-protection and leadership 2.4. Solidarity and empowerment of vulnerable groups: women 2.5. Solidarity and empowerment of vulnerable groups: children 2.6. A sense of ownership and the material rewards 3. Summary and observations Part IV. Mechanisms for Promoting Participation 1. Participation strategies 1.2. Deciding on the operational model 1.2. Breaking down the barriers 1.3. Social mobilisation 1.4. Change agents 1.5. Use of culturally approved idioms 1.6. Social targeting 2. Promoting participation through institutional means 2.1. Informal interaction and exchange 2.2. Formal organisations 2.3. Local and national partner organisations 3. Funding and participation 3.1. The potential of donors to promote participation 3.2. Detrimental aspects of funding 4. Summary and observations Part V. Recommendations Notes 4

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6 List of Acronyms Used ALNAP ACF CBO CHA CIDA DfID DRC EHED EPDP EPRLF ESCO GDP GS GTZ ICRC INTRAC IPKF LTTE MoU MSF NHDA NFRI PRA QIP RDF SEDEC SLA TRO TELO TNA TRRO YMCA Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (in Humanitarian Assistance) Action Contre la Faim Community based Organisation Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies Canadian International Development Agency Department for International Development Danish Refugee Council Eastern Human Economic Development (Local branch of CARITAS) Elam People s Democratic Party Elam s People s Revolutionary Liberation Front Eastern Self-Reliant Community Awakening Organisation Gross Domestic Product Grama Sevaka German Technical Co-operation International Committee for the Red Cross International NGO Training & Research Centre Indian Peace Keeping Forces Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Memorandum of Understanding Médecins Sans Frontières National Housing Development Authority Non-food relief items Participatory Rural Appraisal Quick Impact Projects Rural Development Foundation Social and Economic Development Centre (Caritas Sri Lanka) Sri Lankan Army Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation Tamil Elam Liberation Organisation Tamil National Army Tamil Relief and Rehabilitation Organisation Young Men s Christian Association 6

7 Executive Summary Part I The participation of populations assisted by international humanitarian action in measures supporting them is now widely accepted as crucial to effective social targeting, resource utilisation, accountability, sustainability and impact. For some, participation is also a fundamental right of citizenship, essential in the context of humanitarian emergencies for survival, self-protection and self-actualisation. Despite clear institutional commitments to consultation and participation at the policy level, however, there remains wide variation in practice. Indeed, there is increasing concern over the lack of consultation with and participation by disaster-affected populations in the design, management, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of relief programmes. It is against this background that ALNAP commissioned a Global Study on the subject. The intention is to reveal the mechanisms by which the voice of affected populations can be enhanced within the humanitarian system, while remaining alert to the potential difficulties in engaging in such a process in emergency contexts. The present report, which draws on primary (aid recipient) and secondary (agency) stakeholder perceptions in Sri Lanka, is the pilot in a series of five country case studies that provide the empirical evidence for the Global Study. Testing the hypothesis that the active consultation and participation of crisis-affected populations in measures to assist them is (according to aid recipients and other key stakeholders) both feasible and beneficial in terms of project outcome, it investigates current policy and field practice in three locations affected by conflict in the north and east of the island. Part II The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka between the Tamils and Sinhalese has varied in intensity and location and has been marked by a number of major episodes of severe violence. It has been experienced very differently by different sections of the population in the north and east, although displacement is a major feature of civilian life in all three of the areas where research was carried out. Humanitarian actors, local, national and international, have provided relief to camp dwellers for many years, but a growing number are now focusing also on rehabilitation and development activities in resettlement and relocation villages. Most humanitarian actors have a theory about why the participation of aid recipients in measures supporting them is beneficial and valid. Such theoretical perspectives determine the objectives, strategies and outcomes of humanitarian programmes and projects. In Sri Lanka two theoretical models predominate. The majority of agencies follow what here is termed an instrumental approach, in which the prime objective of involving aid recipients in the various activities of a project is to improve overall project performance. In other words, participation is viewed as a means towards a specific end, which is the delivery of effective projects. A far smaller number of 7

8 agencies adhere to more transformative models, in which aid as regarded as contributing to fundamental societal change. Such approaches seek to empower aid recipients to assume greater control over their lives, undertake action to improve their condition and circumstances, play an active role in political and civic processes and forge relations with others that contribute to peace and to the development and enhancement of the wider community. Many agencies are committed to beneficiary participation at the policy level but find that their efforts are thwarted in practice by a variety of constraints. Some of these constraints have to do with the security and political pressures associated with the conflict, some arise out of contrasting social and cultural values, and some derive from psychological, emotional and economic difficulties confronted by civilians or from their negative perceptions of humanitarian aid. To emphasise the many constraints to participation that predominate in war-affected areas and to highlight the differences in social and cultural ideas on the subject is not to try and dissuade humanitarian agencies from consulting and developing participatory programmes with their clients. It is intended more to alert them to the need to reflect on the potential and actual limitations and risks associated with participatory approaches. It is also intended to stress the importance of canvassing both primary and secondary stakeholder perceptions on the value added and possible dangers of participation and of engaging in regular and continuous risk assessment and project monitoring and appraisal. The factors mitigating against the more empowering and transformative models of participation in particular may be so great that it may be unrealistic for agencies to aspire to such radical goals. Humanitarian measures may need to observe more modest objectives, whilst always taking every opportunity possible to consult and inform their clients and other members of the affected population. Part III The degrees and forms of beneficiary participation vary considerably according not just to environmental opportunities and constraints but also to the objectives and underlying theoretical perspectives of humanitarian agencies. Such variations can be observed in the different stages and activities of the project cycle. Most of the agencies in Sri Lanka have adopted an instrumental view of participation that favours consulting beneficiaries (especially during baseline assessment) about their views, problems and needs, informing them and building in them the commitment and competencies necessary for active engagement in project implementation. Because project design and approval does not involve beneficiaries directly, however, most find it difficult to offer aid recipients a meaningful role in planning. This sets a precedent for engagement with beneficiaries which is not very conducive to sustaining high levels of participation throughout later stages of the project cycle. While beneficiary participation in planning is low, greater effort is made to foster participation in implementation. This commonly entails the contribution of beneficiary ideas, knowledge, labour and other skills to construction, maintenance and administration of project resources. Project monitoring during implementation is fairly informal, although in many cases it is quite regular and in some cases quite 8

9 participatory. In general, beneficiary enthusiasm for projects tends to diminish towards the end of the cycle and few agencies engage in participatory impact evaluation, even while most recognise its importance. Examples of more transformative approaches in which clients are empowered to represent themselves before the authorities, engage in autonomous collective action on community and other issues and assume control of project resources are comparatively rare. However, some projects embody certain elements of this kind of approach and some organisations are moving gradually in this direction as confidence in the cease-fire grows, more developmental approaches are being employed and civilians begin to return to their communities. It is evident that blueprint projects are not very effective in terms of fostering high levels of participation throughout the project cycle. It is also apparent that greater flexibility and openness to beneficiary involvement in the earlier stage of the cycle and in project appraisal would make a difference in this regard. But, given the political and other constraints, it is not clear that this kind of innovation is possible in many cases in the Sri Lankan context. Also, based on the reflections of a significant proportion of respondents, such innovation is not always sought by aid recipients. Despite the many limitations, there is evidence that aid-recipients can and do benefit by being better informed and consulted and by assuming meaningful roles in project implementation. These benefits include the development of important personal and social skills and a greater sense of ownership and pride in project outcomes. Overall, targeted projects with women on the one hand and with children and youth on the other have been more successful in terms of fostering beneficiary participation than more generic projects affecting whole population groups or projects with men. They have, according to the reports of aid recipients, also had more beneficial impacts. Of all groups, children and young people who have been involved in psychosocial programmes report the most radical effects. This may be because humanitarian measures normally take place in communities whilst men are at work elsewhere, or it could be due to inordinately high levels of alcohol use among men in the north and east. Part IV Levels of beneficiary consultation and participation in humanitarian aid have in the past often been very low or non-existent and such ideas and practices are not very developed in many of the more hierarchical and prescriptive cultures of the world. This implies that humanitarian actors that are committed to the approach must develop explicit means for promoting participation. These means are used in varying ways, degrees and forms depending on the model of participation adopted. In Sri Lanka humanitarian agencies are heavily reliant on locally recruited change agents to mobilise village and camp inhabitants to take an active part in project implementation. The orientation and training of these animators is of critical importance to project outcome, as is their support. Many agencies regard the recruitment of animators and mobilisation of beneficiaries as a first step in creating a more formal institutional structure (commonly a CBO) within which collective social action can be promoted and directed. These structures vary in the extent to which they become truly self-governing, autonomous entities and often in practice they remain 9

10 very dependent on the implementing agency. Management of CBO funds by implementing agencies places very real limits on beneficiary empowerment and selfefficacy. With the increased reliance on partnerships with local and national organisations, the lengthening of funding cycles and development of more open and flexible relations between donors and implementing agencies there have been some very promising trends in institutional relations in recent years. To this we should add efforts in some quarters to create less authoritarian management structures and styles and improve aid co-ordination. Certain donors have played an important role in this respect, encouraging implementing partners to avoid duplication and collaborate with each other whenever possible. These developments have considerable potential to further promote beneficiary participation. Nevertheless, there remain serious problems in some sections of the aid community in terms of political intervention in humanitarian action, high turnover in staff, inflexible and short funding cycles, competition over beneficiary populations and conflicting aims and strategies. In many cases, humanitarian actors are party to major decisions and policies that have a crucial impact on the lives of beneficiaries and yet make no effort to consult or keep affected populations informed. Such trends have the capacity to undermine agency: beneficiary relations. Part V On the basis of our findings we would suggest that consultation and the timely provision of accurate information on critical issues is greatly valued by beneficiaries and is a must in all circumstances. From the point of view of aid recipients, consultation and information provision are important instruments through which agencies demonstrate respect for their clients. They are also the means by which beneficiaries can gain a greater sense of control over their lives. Assuming that the environmental conditions are sufficiently conducive, aid implementers have the appropriate skills and capacity, donors are supportive and aid recipients view the idea favourably, more active and meaningful participation is also feasible within the field of humanitarian action. However, it has to be recognised that the employment of more participatory approaches presents many challenges. For a list of specific recommendations on how to increase beneficiary consultation and participation please refer to Part V. 10

11 I. Background 1. Introduction 1.1. Participation in humanitarian action The participation of populations assisted by international humanitarian action i in measures supporting them is now widely accepted as crucial to effective social targeting, resource utilisation, accountability, sustainability and impact. For some, participation is also a fundamental right of citizenship, essential in the context of humanitarian emergencies for survival, self-protection and self-actualisation. As such, client participation has become a central tenet of policy for a number of humanitarian agencies globally, is incorporated into many mission statements and in some cases is constitutionally enshrined. ii Thus, the introduction to the key 1994 Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct commits signatory agencies to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid. The World Food Programme provides that it will ensure that its assistance programmes are designed and implemented on the basis of broad-based participation. iii Likewise, in a section of UNHCR s Handbook for Emergencies devoted to community involvement, it is stated that: refugees must be involved in planning measures to meet their needs and in implementing those measures. The way the community is organised can help ensure that the refugees skills are made use of and that the personnel for services at the site will come from the refugees. iv The trend toward increased participation in humanitarian interventions is underpinned by a growing recognition that beneficiaries of aid are not merely the passive recipients of assistance but social actors with insights into their situation and competencies, energy and ideas that can be harnessed to improve their circumstances. More than this, they are primary stakeholders in humanitarian action with significant vested interests in humanitarian policies and interventions. They have views about possible solutions to their problems and understandings of how humanitarian measures can support broader societal objectives of peace, reconstruction and development The Global Study Despite clear institutional commitments to participation at the policy level, there remains wide variation in practice. Indeed, there is increasing concern over the lack of consultation and participation by disaster-affected populations in relief projects and programmes. It is against this background that ALNAP, an international network of humanitarian agencies, commissioned a Global Study entitled Consultation with and Participation by Beneficiary and Affected Populations in Planning, Managing, Monitoring and Evaluating Humanitarian Aid. The present report on Sri Lanka is the pilot in a series of five country case studies that provide the empirical field data for this project. The core objectives of the Global Study are: 11

12 To assess current consultation & participation practice in a range of emergency contexts; To identify examples of good practice; To identify gaps or inadequacies in current practice and contributing factors; To improve understanding of participation and consultation practice. The intention is to reveal the mechanisms by which the voice of affected populations can be enhanced within the humanitarian system, while remaining alert to the potential difficulties in engaging in such a process in conflict contexts. Thus, affected populations are situated at the centre of the study, which seeks to understand how they perceive and interact with the myriad of governmental, international, national, local and other institutions that manage, regulate, control and influence the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection. v Wherever possible, successful consultative and participatory mechanisms and initiatives whose use could be more widely promoted in the interests of greater programme effectiveness and downward accountability are identified. The five country case studies will cover a broad spectrum of humanitarian responses, including those established in the context of long-term complex political emergencies and those following rapid-onset environmental disasters. The project will yield several outputs: in addition to five country monographs, an overview volume will synthesise the key learning points from these studies and a guide on client participation in humanitarian action will be produced for practitioners. 2. The Sri Lankan Case Study Sri Lanka was chosen as a case study country by ALNAP because some relevant studies had already carried out there and these could be used for background and contextual information. It was selected as the pilot for the Global Study on the grounds that a wide diversity of humanitarian agencies have been present in the country for many years. These agencies have mounted a range of relief, rehabilitation and development interventions with war-affected populations in camps and resettlement and relocation villages, providing considerable scope for investigation of the topic of participation and development of the research methodology and methods Conceptual issues There is a major literature on client participation in aid interventions invoking a wide variety of interpretations and definitions. In this study participation is understood in its simplest sense to imply the active engagement of primary stakeholders in the planning, management, implementation and assessment of humanitarian measures affecting them. The various facets of participation include information sharing, consultation, the contribution of manual labour and other skills, involvement in decision-making and/or resource control. These facets of participation are often taken to represent increasing gradations of engagement in humanitarian measures, as follows: Information sharing; minimally informing affected populations about measures and decisions affecting them; Consultation; some level of consultation with stakeholders within programme 12

13 guidelines; Contribution of labour and other skills; input of stakeholders into construction and other forms of project implementation; Decision-making; direct involvement of affected populations in decisions made during the project cycle; Resource control; control over project resources assumed by the client population and all the major decisions over these resources and over any new initiatives are made by clients. vi We note that the study treats consultation and participation as independent but interrelated dimensions of engagement in humanitarian measures. While consultation with beneficiaries is an important aspect of participation, consultation can also occur independently in projects that do not have participatory goals and objectives. vii Testing the hypothesis that the active consultation and participation of crisis-affected populations in measures to assist them is (according to aid recipients and other key stakeholders) both feasible and beneficial in terms of project outcome, the Sri Lanka study investigates current policy and field practice in different field settings. Given the divergence in agency perspectives on participation in Sri Lanka (see Part II, section 1.2.), one of the key challenges of the field research was to compare and contrast the prevailing theories and models to establish both their suitability and impacts in the context of a long-term conflict Methodological issues This report draws primarily on qualitative data derived from primary stakeholder (beneficiary) and secondary stakeholder (agency) perceptions and to a far lesser extent from secondary sources. The literature on Sri Lanka, the conflict and responses to it, was consulted and a range of project documents reviewed. Interviews were conducted in Colombo with representatives of humanitarian agencies and with key academics and consultant practitioners in humanitarian action. The field research was carried out in three locations. General meetings with agency personnel were held in two of these locations and individual interviews were conducted with agency staff in all three. Some or all of the team met and held interviews and focus group discussions with representatives from a broad range of villages and camps in war-affected areas. Care was taken to ensure that men, women, children and members of different social and economic groups were included in the research. Where views differed, this is indicated in the body of the report. Drawing mostly on accepted Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) tools, several group-based research methods were employed during the research with crisis-affected populations. These were complemented by methods, mainly unstructured and semistructured interviews, which were employed with individual respondents and by group discussions and observation. Focus group discussions emerged as the most productive way to canvass views in a public context. One-to-one interviews provided an opportunity for triangulation and for discussion of issues that were too sensitive or complex to be raised in a public forum. 13

14 2.3. Ethical concerns Participation in Humanitarian Aid: Sri Lanka report August 2002 Many of the civilians we spoke to in the north and east of Sri Lanka have experienced multiple violations and losses. There can be considerable therapeutic value for survivors of violence and armed conflict in giving testimony of their experiences, especially if they do so in a safe environment. Respondents were at times extremely frank with us. However, there were many subjects that we felt unable to explore for fear of jeopardising people s safety or causing further distress. For the same reason, most of the information on specific incidents and violations has been excluded from the report. We were also very concerned that many people seemed to assume that we were human rights monitors with the ability to bring perpetrators of violations to justice. We repeatedly stated that this was not our function, but sometimes felt that our actual role had not been well understood. The presence of foreigners in the research team led some respondents to believe that we were agency representatives undertaking an assessment prior to delivering a good or service. This was exacerbated by the fact that many of the field visits in villages and camps were attended by a representative of an assistance-providing organisation, who sometimes also introduced the research team to the respondent group or played a facilitation or translation role. All possible efforts were made to avoid raising expectations, but the team was worried about the extent to which this remained an issue in some of the communities visited. viii Further, while every effort was made by all concerned to maintain as much neutrality as possible, the presence of agency personnel inevitably had an impact on the data gathered The choice of field study sites This case study focuses on humanitarian action in the context of a long-term, intrastate conflict. Three sites were selected for inclusion in the study: Batticaloa in the east of Sri Lanka, and Jaffna and Vavuniya/Mannar in the north. They were chosen because they have been exposed to major outbreaks of violence, represent a broad range of military, political and socio-economic contexts and have long been centres of humanitarian action. Choice of these sites enabled inclusion in the research of areas that are controlled by the government (termed by many cleared areas ), areas controlled by the LTTE ( uncleared areas) and grey areas that are controlled by government by day and the LTTE at night. They also encompass border areas, which are on the front line or on the line dividing different ethnic and/or religious groups. The majority of the population in these regions is Tamil, although there are significant Muslim populations in some areas of Batticaloa and a small number of Sinhalese in Vavuniya and Mannar in particular. The one major war-affected region that was excluded from the study is the LTTEcontrolled Vanni. It was decided that this would have proved very difficult as a field site because access and mobility are highly restricted and the possibility of doing participatory research there is very limited. The consequences of not working also in areas such as Trincomalee and Anuradhapura are that the study focuses principally on Tamil, and to a lesser extent, Muslim populations and does not include those Sinhalese people who have also been displaced or otherwise affected by conflict. There has, of course, been arguably related conflict in Sinhalese areas of the south of the country. These areas were not included in the study because there is less 14

15 humanitarian activity in the south at present than in the north, and such activity as there is tends to be focused more on the environmental as opposed to political emergency. The Batticaloa Field Study focuses on the work of Eastern Human Economic Development (EHED ix ), the YMCA and a range of local and national NGOs, including Sarvodaya, Suriya and the Women s Development Forum. These agencies work mainly in resettlement and relocation villages and engage mostly in rehabilitation and development programmes, the scope of which is extremely broad and covers micro finance, pre-school education, water and sanitation and many other measures besides. The Vavuniya/Mannar field study concentrates largely on the work of Oxfam-GB and some of its partner organisations (especially Sewa Lanka, RDF and SEED) and to a lesser extent on FORUT, UNHCR, the Danish Refugee Council and ZOA Refugee Care, Netherlands. The projects reviewed include relief initiatives (mainly services and non-food relief items) in both IDP/returnee-refugee camps and a wide variety of rehabilitation and development measures in resettlement and relocation villages. The Jaffna field study focuses principally on the work of Save the Children (UK), and to an extent on the programmes of CARE International and UNHCR. A broad mix of relief, rehabilitation and development initiatives in both IDP camps and war-affected villages were reviewed in this area. 3. The structure of this report The findings from the field research and their analysis are provided in Parts II-IV and the recommendations are given in Part V. Parts II-IV all finish with a brief summary and observations. These outline the main issues raised in the text. Given the importance of understanding how the history of an emergency and the local context more generally influence participatory efforts, Part II offers an overview of the operational environment within which humanitarian agencies operate in Sri Lanka, highlighting in particular some of the obstacles encountered. Part III focuses more on implementation and begins by exploring the various forms and levels of participation that commonly prevail during the various stages of the project cycle. Following this is a brief discussion of some of the most significant benefits associated with participation, many of which were identified by aid recipients themselves during interviews and focus groups. Part IV details the main mechanisms and strategies, operational, institutional and financial, that have been developed by agencies in Sri Lanka as a means of promoting participation and Part V provides recommendations for both implementing and donor agencies. 15

16 II. The Operational Context Part II begins with a brief history of the conflict in Sri Lanka and of the humanitarian response. This is followed by a more detailed account of the key constraints to the implementation of participatory approaches. 1. Country Profile 1.1. History of the conflict Numerous reports on the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict exist in both published and grey literatures and hence an exhaustive account is unnecessary here. x The conflict has its origins in the 1930s when certain sections of the Tamil speaking community (around 19% of the total population according to the census of 1981) were over represented in the colonial administration. xi Following Independence in 1948, the state has been dominated by the majority Sinhalese population. Over the years the government has introduced a number of discriminatory measures limiting Tamil political representation, curbing access to education and land and inhibiting the use of the Tamil language. For their part, the Tamils have consistently sought a share in power within the legislature, an aim that is refuted by the Sinhalese. The failure of successive Sinhalese-dominated governments to resolve their political differences with the Tamil leaders has led to a marked deterioration in relations between the two populations. With time, the demands of the Tamil community have become more fundamental and the means adopted by militant groups - of achieving these demands, more violent. The present claim is for a separate state, Tamil Elam, in the north and east of the island. The ethnic violence has been at its most extreme in the last two decades. The 1983 communal riots against the Tamils, which many see as the critical turning point in the conflict, led to full insurgent warfare. Several militant Tamil groups emerged in the north and east in opposition to the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) and there followed a process of continuous repression and unrest with three major periods of mass violence, known as the Elam Wars. India was heavily involved in brokering a settlement to the first of these conflicts, instigating the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, and the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) acted as mediators, arriving in the country the first time in The involvement and conduct of the peacekeepers has been interpreted variously, but there is evidence that they were far from neutral politically and perpetrated many serious violations against Tamil civilians. The LTTE, which now claims to be the sole representative of the Tamil population, engaged the IPKF in a 2-year war of attrition. The India-Lanka Accord eventually collapsed and the IPKF withdrew from the country in During the brief peace that followed the government and the LTTE held peace talks. However, these collapsed and the second Elam war ( ) broke out, with the Sri Lankan army and Tamil militant groups (which in their opposition to the LTTE, had switched sides) 16

17 fighting on one side and the LTTE on the other. Another short period of peace followed with the election of a new government that sought resolution of the conflict. But negotiations between the warring parties collapsed in April 1995 and Elam War 3 broke out. Apparently committed to bringing an end to the conflict, the UNP gained a victory in the 2001 elections and has subsequently received further electoral endorsement for its attempts to find a political settlement to the conflict from the Sri Lankan people. The armed confrontation between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka may have been intermittent, but it has lasted for almost twenty years, cost an estimated ,000 lives xii, and caused the multiple displacement (prior to the cease-fire) of around 800,000 people. xiii The economic costs of maintaining the armed forces as well as bolstering systems of public security has been extremely high, the percentage of GDP allocated to defence having grown from 0.5% of GDP in 1982 to 3.11% in 1992 and 5.3% in xiv This, in turn, has caused a further drain upon resources needed for the provision of basic government services and for the development of the economy and the country s infrastructure. The disparity between defence and social spending by the Sri Lankan government is marked. Throughout the conflict, Tamil, Sinhalese and Muslim ethnic and religious identities have been manipulated by various leaders for political ends. xv Yet, contrary to popular stereotype, the conflict has not produced a clear and straightforward division between groups. For one thing, the Muslim community has also been profoundly affected, although normally this is little acknowledged. For example, an estimated 100,000 Muslims were displaced from the north following an LTTE ultimatum in October 1990 ordering them to leave the region and many still remain in camps in Puttalam and Anuradhapura districts. xvi Second, there is a sizeable Christian minority in Sri Lanka that is composed of both Sinhalese and Tamils, blurring the division between the two. Third, while the LTTE has gradually emerged as the major political force within the Tamil community, there remain significant political distinctions and disputes within this population. And the conflict in the South showed that the Sinhalese are also seriously divided. Thus, stark distinctions based on ethnicity often mask internal political divisions and caste/class differences that are extremely powerful and have the potential to seriously undermine the participatory efforts of the humanitarian community. The present cease-fire (which came into force in December 2001), the signing of the cease-fire agreement on the 23rd February 2002 and pending talks between the government and the opposing forces, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) have brought about major changes in the lives of civilians and in the operational environment for humanitarian actors. xvii Nevertheless, at the time of field research Sri Lanka could by no means be described as post-conflict. xviii 1.2. Civilian experiences of conflict in the research sites Even though civilians throughout the island have all been affected by conflict in one form or another, civilians in the north and east of Sri Lanka have been more directly affected than others by the ethnic violence between Sinhalese and Tamils. Large numbers in these areas have lost their lives or disappeared. Large numbers have experienced multiple displacements over a long period of time and in many cases 17

18 communities and families have become separated and widely dispersed both within Sri Lanka and overseas. For those settlements subjected to frequent military incursions and shelling, displacement may occur regularly on a weekly or even daily basis. Many families have become accustomed to living in their villages by day and retreating to the forests at night. Quite apart from displacement, many civilians have been exposed to horrific violations against the person, ranging from sexual and gender violence, abuse and exploitation, to disappearances, torture and extra-judicial killings. Many have become impoverished due to mobility restrictions, prohibitions on access to cultivable lands and fishing grounds and to overall economic collapse. For the purpose of understanding in broad terms the circumstances of civilians living in the north and east, the population of these areas can be said to fall into five broad categories: 1) those in their original homes and communities who were never displaced; 2) those who are displaced and living in camps (including internally displaced and those refugees who have returned from camps in India); 3) those who are displaced and self-settled with friends and/or relatives; 4) those who have returned to their original communities (termed resettlement villages) following displacement; 5) those in relocation villages, who have left camps and have been relocated to new settlements, primarily within the district they originally came from. Civilians in all five categories were included as respondents in the study. Of the three study sites, Batticaloa District is the poorest and contains both Tamil and Muslim populations. Up to 80% of the people live in the government-held area along the coast, while only 20% (all Tamils) live in the interior in LTTE territory. Although civilians have experienced periods of extreme violence in the past and continue to be subject to harassment, kidnapping and forced recruitment by political and security bodies, the district is of less strategic interest than the other two areas and hence is more settled in many ways. In Batticaloa most families are in their original communities or have now returned to their homes following displacement, although some remain displaced and are self-settled locally. Quite a few have migrated overseas and a very small number remain in camps. As an area of critical strategic importance, the Jaffna peninsula has been subjected to major military incursions and waves of large-scale displacement. The present population of around 500,000 is thought to be about half of the original number of inhabitants and many people have fled elsewhere on the island or overseas. The peninsula is now under government control and certain high security areas remain out of bounds to civilians. Overall, the region is heavily contaminated with landmines and unexploded ordnance. A significant number of people in Jaffna have now returned to their original homes and agricultural production and farming is gradually recovering in some areas. People who remain in camps in Jaffna tend to be those originating from high security zones that are presently controlled by the SLA. The possibility that they will return to their villages within the foreseeable future is very slim. Situated next to the LTTE heartland of the Vanni and on the route to Jaffna, the original home of Tamil resistance, control of Vavuniya has now been largely wrested 18

19 from the LTTE by the Sri Lankan armed forces who maintain a heavy presence in the area. The population is more ethnically diverse than the other two regions and includes Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim communities. The first camps in Vavuniya were created in 1992 to accommodate refugee returnees from India. Among the displaced population of the region many are up country Tamils who originally came from the tea estates in the central highlands of Sri Lanka. In 1994 the camps received a new influx of displaced people from Jaffna and the Vanni. There are now 17 camps in the area that in March 2002 housed a reduced population of approximately 15,000 individuals xix Conditions in the camps, now controlled by the government, are very poor. In many cases they have deteriorated since the cease-fire because the government endorses resettlement and relocation and opposes further investment in camps. A significant number of displaced people in the area have been settled by the government in grey and border areas within the district where they are vulnerable to the fighting Humanitarian responses to the conflict The critical trends in humanitarian aid A number of international humanitarian agencies have been present in Sri Lanka since the onset of fighting and many of the local and national organisations that were engaged in development provision prior to the conflict subsequently became involved in humanitarian aid. The diversity of humanitarian programme types and approaches is great and this was reflected in the interventions reviewed by the research team. While some of the projects investigated can be clearly defined as emergency relief, others focused more on reconstruction, rehabilitation, or development in support of resettled populations and others exposed to protracted political conflict. The operational context for humanitarian measures in Sri Lanka has been highly charged. Humanitarian actors of all kinds have pointed to the delicacy of a situation in which they have been perceived by some as responding to humanitarian needs caused deliberately by warring parties as part of their politico-military strategies. A commitment to participation by recipients of aid is apparent in many quarters, although, as we argue in the report, in this kind of setting many agencies have found it quite difficult to realise such a commitment in practice. Since the outset of the gravest fighting in the mid-1980s, the humanitarian community has tried to implement its programmes in line with the principle of neutrality. This has meant supporting populations in government-controlled areas and bringing aid items in via these areas (transferring them at the Forward Defence Line) to LTTE-controlled areas where they are distributed to the local administration, international and local agencies. xx In the early 1990s the LTTE began to increase its relief capacity through the work of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), which is administered by its political wing. With time, the TRO has exerted increasing pressure over and constraints on international and local relief organisations, to the point that prior to the cease-fire, many had effectively retreated to government-controlled and grey areas. Although most agencies acknowledge that the situation of populations in LTTE territory is in many ways worse than that of people living in government areas, they argue that low levels of support to the former are attributable to unreasonable restrictions imposed by the LTTE. 19

20 Institutional responses to humanitarian need have waxed and waned as the intensity and location of violence has shifted and the overall approach has altered markedly over the prolonged period of conflict. The following broad trends can be identified: A clear historical division between development aid in the south and humanitarian aid in the north and east of the island has curtailed beneficiary consultation and participation in the latter on the grounds that this part of the country is subject to war. However, this outlook is gradually changing; A movement away from relief interventions towards rehabilitation and development (termed development-relief by some) with war-affected populations; A transition from direct implementation by international organisations to working through local and national partner organisations; A reduction in the deployment of expatriate staff to field offices; A move by some agencies from short-term to longer-term funding cycles; Increased efforts to co-ordinate humanitarian programmes; A growing recognition (by some agencies only) of the importance of client participation and international humanitarian standards; Increased utilisation of a human rights framework and support for advocacy in addition, or as opposed, to direct service provision; A shift in attention away from IDP/returnee camps and towards support for resettlement and relocation villages; An increased focus on livelihood security (especially micro-finance) and physical infrastructure in resettlement and relocation villages in particular. Agency commitments to beneficiary participation Among humanitarian agencies in Sri Lanka there is a fairly high level of acceptance of the concept of participation. Many of the agencies in the country that are involved in humanitarian action have in varying forms and degrees incorporated beneficiary participation as a major facet of their work. xxi One respondent xxii argued that the humanitarian mandate, which he regards as being in essence quite restrictive, compels agencies to introduce participatory approaches. Humanitarian aid in conflict and immediate post conflict settings tends to entail short-term projects that focus primarily on physical needs rather than broader human or societal development. This mandate presents very real challenges to project sustainability, challenges that in his view and in the view of his agency, ZOA Refugee Care, Netherlands, can only be overcome through meaningful participation by aid-recipients. That said, implementing participatory approaches in areas affected by protracted political conflict is by no means a straightforward task. Further, there remains wide variation in working definitions and understandings of the concept of participation among agency staff and major differences also in its practical application. Ideas about what participation actually entails are often quite imprecise. While most agencies agree that consultation and participation of beneficiaries are key xxiii and there can always be more consultation xxiv, it is not always evident what this amounts to in practice. Within some agencies there is disagreement about the value of and mechanisms for participation. This applies even in the more prominent agencies that have a clear institutional commitment to the approach. Indeed, it is clear that some actors regard the notion as quite problematic: 20

21 Community participation is a convenient tool for forgetting about power, conflict and the like. Caste, class, ethnicity, gender all these categories imply a power relation. Social inequality is increasing throughout the island, as is conflict. Community participation is an assumption of society which ignores caste. Talk of partners is not based on a proper social analysis of Sri Lanka. Who are the partners? Participation is a useful label for political mobilisation. People here don t get together for collective action or projects so much as for social processes that have their own dynamic for example elections.lots of agencies will use participation, but without human rights and with power conflict who will actually benefit? xxv The fact that there are wide disparities in views about participation is not merely of hypothetical interest, since the ideas and conceptualisations of humanitarian actors have major impacts on project planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. The particular framework of participation employed will exert significant influence not simply on policy and programme objectives but also on project strategies and methods, with major implications for sustainability and outcome. The dominant models of participation Most agencies have a theory about why the participation of aid recipients in measures supporting them is beneficial and valid. Such theoretical perspectives determine the objectives, strategies and outcomes of programmes and projects. Two very broad models of participation can be distinguished 1 in humanitarian work in Sri Lanka. The great majority of organisations follow what here is termed an instrumental model of participation, according to which the prime objective of involving aid recipients in the various activities of a project is to improve overall project performance. In other words, participation is viewed as a means towards a specific end, which is the delivery of effective projects. The argument is that the contribution of beneficiaries to planning, implementation and monitoring of projects reduces cost, ensures greater accountability to recipients of aid and increases sustainability. Internationally, different agencies emphasise different aspects of project performance when making the case for participation. For example, in the view of DANIDA xxvi the fulfilment of client expectations is a central indicator of programme quality and success. Oxfam s working principles stress the importance of being accountable and facilitating local ownership in the context of local capacity building. For WFP xxvii, participation makes it possible to meet food security objectives more successfully, although it is recognised that: In general, participation in emergencies tends to concentrate on consulting beneficiaries about their needs, rather than entrusting beneficiaries with control over the programme. xxviii Whatever the driving force behind it, the core purpose of the instrumental model can be seen as meeting the immediate survival and livelihood needs of aid recipients, reducing their vulnerability and promoting their self-sufficiency. More profound social structural impact is not generally envisaged. 1 These approaches are not in practice mutually exclusive but overlapping and some agencies employ both simultaneously. 21

22 Such an approach is normally implemented through multi- or single-sector interventions, project performance being measured (in some cases at least) according to international norms and standards, especially the Sphere Minimum Standards. xxix In Sri Lanka the instrumentalist model has most commonly been utilised in the provision of amenities and services such as physical infrastructure, non-food relief items (NFRI), shelter, water, sanitation, health care and, increasingly, livelihood security. xxx Given that the government undertakes island-wide distribution of dry food rations to all vulnerable populations, including war-affected populations, very few agencies (other than WFP) are involved in nutrition and food security on a continuous basis. In recognition of the multiple and profound losses and violations experienced by populations that are exposed to armed conflict and other forms of societal emergency and concerned about certain limitations intrinsic to instrumental approaches, a smaller number of humanitarian agencies are seeking to implement more transformative models. These latter models were first instituted in the field of development assistance, in which they have a very long and highly evolved history. They conceive of aid as contributing to fundamental societal change and seek to empower aid recipients to: exercise choice and assume greater control over their lives more generally; successfully undertake action to improve their condition and circumstances; play an active role in political and civic processes; forge relations with others that contribute to peace and to the development, security and general enhancement of the wider community; increase their access to resources, services and the means of securing livelihood. xxxi According to this more radical understanding of participation, the concept is both an end in itself and a fundamental right of citizenship. Entailing attitudinal, behavioural and social structural change, the transformative approach is in many ways highly synergistic with the human rights framework that is gradually becoming more influential throughout the aid world. xxxii This synergy is made explicit through adherence to the following broad principles: client entitlement and empowerment, social justice and the elimination of exclusion and inequity, attitudinal and behavioural change in the conduct of human relations, social trust and social capital, democratic participation and broader civil society development. It is to some extent inevitable that transformative models should be less common than the more instrumental approach in humanitarian interventions effected in areas of armed conflict, largely because of the multitude of constraints that prevail in such settings. 22

23 2. Operational constraints While humanitarian agencies may regard beneficiary participation as an important and mandated requirement, opportunities to engage with aid recipients depend on environmental constraints, organisational capacity and other factors. The timing, intensity and scale of civilian need during humanitarian crises are significant obstacles to participation in many cases. High levels of consultation and participation, which tend to lengthen project planning and implementation processes considerably, are not seen by most organisations in Sri Lanka as a truly viable option during an acute emergency. xxxiii The ability to apply participatory approaches in the country has been greatly impeded by the particular nature of the humanitarian crisis. The kinds of obstacles that arise in Sri Lanka occur in varying degrees and forms in many other humanitarian emergencies of political origin. They therefore merit consideration in some detail in this section. 2.1 Political intervention in Humanitarian action There are many political factors undermining active engagement by aid recipients in humanitarian action. The most prominent of these are discussed below. Poor governance Often areas affected by conflict are subject to complex governance arrangements in which civil bodies trying to provide for the care and protection of the populace are subject to the will of political authorities that are, in turn, controlled by the military. In government-held areas of the north and east, local officials exercise inordinate control over civilians. In all three of the research sites, respondents complained about excessively stringent security measures that were in force until the signing of the ceasefire agreement and the general failure to maintain adequate services in the region. In many cases, attitudes towards the LTTE and the various other Tamil militant groups were similarly damning. Some people talked about the highly repressive methods of governance employed by the LTTE, in particular the forced recruitment of children and youth, informal taxation and restrictions on mobility. Governance by force is the norm in the north and east of Sri Lanka. In these areas institutionalised force and coercion are the main form of governance. This is justified by the LTTE on the basis of legitimate grievances and by the government on grounds of security. The LTTE claim to represent the Tamil people and thereby defend their activities. Lots of things have been abdicated to LTTE-control in the MOU [Memorandum of Understanding, or cease-fire agreement]. This could be bad if they don t improve their governance. xxxiv Draconian security procedures have acted as a major constraint to humanitarian aid and thereby to beneficiary participation also. Prior to the cease-fire, most areas in the north and east were subject to curfew and access to civilians had to be negotiated through the government, the Sri Lanka Army and in some places the LTTE. Obtaining security clearance for an area, either from government / the armed forces or for UN staff from the UN security officers, meant that visits had to be planned well in advance. Permission would often entail time consuming and expensive negotiation, undermining the ability of agencies to respond to crises and new events with alacrity and flexibility and reducing programme efficiency. The measures required to obtain 23

24 clearances were also subject to regular change. For a long time the lives of camp dwellers in Vavuniya especially were dogged by the pass system, there having existed 15 different kinds of pass for a whole range of specific purposes. Children were even required to obtain permits to attend school. xxxv Following the cease-fire, civilians in the north and east have experienced comparative stability and peace and there have been many improvements in their everyday circumstances. Nevertheless, civilians remain unsure about the future and are not confident that the agreement will hold. They are aware that the military on both sides is rearming and re-grouping their forces. Military discipline remains poor in some areas and the war economy is well established. Civilians still face extortion at checkpoints, forced recruitment of children and youth, kidnappings for ransom and taxation on salaries, vehicles, businesses and other resources. And there are indications that since the cease-fire agreement the LTTE has been exerting increased influence in those government-held areas of the north and east that are populated by Tamils and Muslims. The Dangers of Participation: Adopting a participatory approach and encouraging children to take responsibility for activities, it is argued, may add to the risks. As participants become more confident and develop skills of leadership they are likely to become both more attractive to those seeking to build a new generation of young commanders, and more threatening to those who fear exactly that. Furthermore, child participation in its fullest form suggests that the young be given the space to do exactly as they decide with minimal or no involvement by adults. In a conflict situation this approach is clearly irresponsible. Field-level staff of SCN working to facilitate the establishment of the child action group in Pondagalsennai (situated in a LTTE-controlled area) were teased by local cadres that they were assisting recruitment efforts for, once the club was underway, these cadres would come in and take the children. Indeed the fear of recruitment during a period when the LTTE were allegedly conscripting many children (late 2001) was a major factor in the termination of the child action group's activities in that village. xxxvi 24

25 Intervention by political bodies in humanitarian provision Political actors play a direct role in humanitarian provision in Sri Lanka. This has highly detrimental outcomes in terms of civilian participation since it is widely recognised that official measures that are couched in terms of humanitarian assistance and civilian protection are often, in practice, the means to serve political or security interests. Humanitarian support tends to be regarded by all political groups as a good that can be bestowed or withdrawn at a whim in order to curry favour with, reward, or penalise the electorate for the political choices it makes. xxxvii We were frequently informed about distributions of blankets, clothing, pans and other NFRI made by political bodies at election time. xxxviii The highly opportunistic and spasmodic nature of provision by these political groups undermines client confidence in humanitarian action and is extremely counterproductive for agencies endeavouring to mount participatory efforts. These random yet free distributions of goods can compete with and impair longer term and more sustainable and meaningful initiatives mounted by humanitarian agencies. At the same time, as several international agencies complained, in some areas a significant proportion of humanitarian funds are diverted by political and military groups into their own coffers, or into public projects such as temple construction that win them public support. The government is a key player in the humanitarian system and in areas under its influence determines most of the key decisions, policies and actions in the field. xxxix Government is responsible among other things for the transportation and distribution of rations and the provision of physical infrastructure, health and education services to war-affected populations, the establishment and administration of camps for those displaced, and the allocation of land to those relocated. It also controls the demographic and other data that are the basis for planning humanitarian action. Similarly, in LTTE-controlled areas, TRO wields inordinate power over humanitarian agencies, international, national and local, influencing their work in many ways and at many levels and even shaping their rules and ways of implementing programmes. The role of government officials in a camp: xl When they first set the camp up, we lived in large sheds. We were told that we d have to clear the forest to make space for huts, which we did. Later on we found out that there was some money to pay us for this work, but they never gave us any. We were promised Rs 1,300 per family in materials for huts, but the planning officer only gave us Rs 500. At that time the monthly ration lasted only 15 days and we were only allowed out of the camps for 4 hours a day, so it was impossible to get hold of enough money to build a proper house. In the end, government contractors built the huts, but we are very unhappy about the standard. The posts are poor quality and some have snapped. Many huts leak, a few have even collapsed. When government inspectors come to look at the camp they aren t allowed to talk to us. They re shown the houses that have been built properly with concrete floors. Anyone who complains is threatened by the camp officer with being thrown out. We were supposed to get money to dig the well, but they cut the rate while we were doing the work. Anyway, they haven t paid us yet. The government doesn t treat us with respect. They don t distribute things properly. They brought some used clothes and dumped them.we ve been told we ll receive help for resettlement but we don t trust the government. I think they may force us to return home.we got together with some of our neighbours. We collected 25

26 15 rupees from each family to hire a video and TV. The Kachcherai [local government officials] stopped us. They cut the electricity supply. But we couldn t go out for entertainment because of the curfew. There are electricity pylons in the camp but they told us we couldn t have electricity because the huts are made When the Minister of Rehabilitation was to come to Poonthottam, all these government officials turned up the day before to clean the toilets. Some doctors came that day too. They called everyone and did health checks they pulled teeth and checked our ears. We thought this was very funny. The trouble is they were in such a rush that they pulled good teeth out as well! When the minister came, they put the electricity on. We gave him a letter listing what s wrong with the camp and telling him we don t want to be forced to go home. In many cases, the so-called humanitarian measures mounted by government are at best of minimal value and at worst overtly harmful to civilians. The monopoly by TRO over the supply of and access to services and resources is equally detrimental to civilians living in LTTE-controlled areas. The government position on participation reflects a broader political view in which Tamil civilians in the north and east are regarded as a threat to national security. Major restrictions on access of humanitarian organisations to civilian populations and on the movement of agency personnel and essential goods have commonly been imposed. This is notably the case with the embargo on the LTTE-controlled areas (which at one time covered 48 essential items, including medicines). Also extremely serious are the allegations of a number of respondents that the government has sought to use IDP/returnee camps in Vavuniya as shields from attacks by LTTE forces in the Vanni. This has put the lives of the Tamil residents of these camps at grave risk. Recent moves to resettle these displaced persons have been criticised since, it is believed, they will be given land in strategic and highly vulnerable positions that may be liable to shelling and attack. The government alleges that living in camps ensures civilian protection and allows humanitarian actors to provide services to displaced persons in a co-ordinated manner. However, we heard many complaints about government-run camps in Vavuniya, even from people who had received quite a bit of assistance. Respondents expressed resentment about not being informed or consulted, especially when policies or plans were changed, confusion over what forms of support they were to receive from whom, anger about promises that had not been fulfilled and anxiety about the true motives behind humanitarian interventions. Most often these negative responses would focus on the poor quality of relief and rehabilitation projects and the fact that aid recipients had not been allowed to contribute to decisions concerning their planning, design, or distribution, or about the manufacture of physical infrastructure inputs. Many respondents commented on the resistance of government to participation. xli As one agency member complained: design and approval takes too long and the government is too involved. This is a very hierarchical country. Meetings with government are not a dialogue. In government, everyone must listen to their manager. xlii Aside from this, government provides one of the key relief items food in an entirely non-participatory way, making it hard for agencies to foster client participation in other areas of provision. xliii 26

27 Adverse attitudes of officials Detrimental policies and actions at the institutional level within both the government and the LTTE are mirrored by the hostile attitudes of many local officials. Respondents highlighted the widespread corruption, extortion and abusive or neglectful behaviour by government officials. Staff of international aid agencies emphasised similar concerns. One mentioned how, when referring to inhabitants of IDP/returnee camps, government officials tend to use patronising, indeed pejorative, terms like inmates. xliv Another said: The government is not ready yet to take into account the wishes of the people. xlv Another still argued that assignment to a government post in the north and east is tantamount to punishment for a misdemeanour and hence it is unrealistic to expect officials in these areas to hold favourable views of civilians, or to really care about doing a good job. Interviews we held with local government officials tended to confirm this pessimistic perception. For example, a government Grama Sevaka (GS) official in Jaffna maintained that aid recipients: are uneducated people. You can t ask them or they ll all come and cause problems. xlvi When some clients in a micro credit project failed recently to repay their loans, he simply cancelled their rations, refusing to reinstate them until they had paid up. His views of IDPs were particularly deprecatory: The presence of IDPs has caused problems for the hosts because the IDPs have brought robbery, the illegal sale of arrack, and fighting (often because of alcohol). These problems didn t exist previously in the permanent population. xlvii Similarly, on the issue of self-governance, one senior official in Vavuniya stated that: We don t allow camp committees to form because they would split the camps. The camp officer is the only person suited to this job. In the Sri Lankan context, it is clearly not safe to assume that high quality measures delivered according to humanitarian principles are the prime objective of all actors involved in provision. Political intervention affects the neutrality of humanitarian aid since benefits may not be derived equally by the recipient population. When political actors become involved, crisis-affected civilians may become sceptical or even fearful of humanitarian measures. The fact that assistance is contested and politically implicated has adverse consequences also for participatory initiatives at the level of local NGOs and NGO co-ordinating bodies. In particular, because they effectively mastermind humanitarian aid, government and TRO fundamentally distort the relationship between agencies and aid recipients and actively threaten participatory efforts. Government and LTTE/TRO restrictions make spontaneous, informal and free exchanges between clients and agency staff impossible, giving agencies windows of opportunity to perform humanitarian activities rather than unrestricted access to affected communities Psychological and emotional obstacles The emotional and psychological toll Client participation requires that civilians make a major investment in humanitarian measures in terms of resources, time, energy, trust and expertise. However, it is questionable whether clients who have been exposed to a multitude of adversities over a long period of time will be prepared to make such an investment. For civilians living in the north and east, the emotional and psychological consequences of the conflict 27

28 have been far-reaching and profound and the will to engage in collective social action is likely to be severely curtailed. Households that are forced to secure their livelihood in the context of severely depleted resources and labour power are unlikely to have much time to spare for meetings, workshops and other project-related activities. Similarly, people who have been displaced and lost their belongings many times may be reluctant to expend energy on renewing their assets since in such an environment nothing appears to have permanency. In the face of so many difficulties, civilians may feel an overwhelming sense of helplessness: It appears to me that displaced people are in a desperate search for control over their lives, as many seem to feel an intense loss of trust in themselves since displacement. As many IDPs related, with the levelling of statuses and identities in the refugee camps, there is a loss of ability to summon recognition, and thus loss of one s honour and respect within the community. xlviii Individuals who are depressed or suffer other detrimental psychological and emotional effects may not be motivated to think about or work for their betterment or the future of their family or community. In a country with one of the highest reported rates of suicide in the world, the inhabitants of the north and east are exceptionally vulnerable. A survey conducted by MSF Netherlands in a camp in Vavuniya revealed suicide rates that were nearly three times higher than for the rest of the population (103.5 per 10,000). xlix Similarly, MSF France reported to us that one of the most common problems dealt with by their mobile health clinics in Batticaloa is attempted suicide by women through self-immolation. Another indicator of raised levels of psychosocial distress used by many of the agencies in the north and east is the widespread over-consumption and abuse of illicit alcohol (kassipu) by men in particular. l Circumstances such as these have led one influential member of the humanitarian community in Sri Lanka to reflect: At what point will people be able to participate psychologically and socially? I have a problem with herding people together. They may not want to be a community, especially if they re traumatised; they may wish to retain their private world. As far as I m concerned, herding people together is another kind of trauma. If people have chosen to be a community, that s different. It depends on how you do it. Differences within communities are not just down to caste but also social circumstances, personal history, whether you ve been in a welfare centre for years, interned or internally displaced. All of this makes a difference. li At the same time, it may be suggested that the seemingly greater level of participation by children in humanitarian action (a finding that we discuss in Part III) is partly attributable to the fact that they are, in certain respects, less affected psychologically. The loss of property and status which have taken lifetimes to accumulate and safeguard is potentially less devastating for the young, for whom the future may appear more extensive than the past. Without the same sense of loss, young people 28

29 here exhibit energy and desire to engage with others and to put their physical and mental capacities to use in meaningful social action Social and cultural obstacles Distinctions within communities The traditional mode of delivery of humanitarian support embodies certain social and cultural assumptions that in the context of Sri Lanka are severely challenged when more participatory methods are introduced. Ideas about participation are perceived by many as counter-cultural. Relations between people in different social groups and categories tend to be both prescriptive and hierarchical and very few civilians are accustomed to the exercise of choice, or involvement in decision-making. Even the notion of being consulted is foreign. One agency member highlighted the difficulty of applying participatory approaches in the country: The groups we work with are used to the idea of having decisions made for them. Consultation on programme design may be okay, but not involvement in decision-making. lii Part of the problem has to do with the dissonance that is inherent within participatory humanitarian measures. Relief items and other forms of humanitarian support are generally delivered at the household level, whereas participatory projects normally require households to come together into groupings of various forms. Such dissonance can create certain contradictions within recipient populations. Added to this, for many of the agencies, the community (by which is meant the village or camp) is the most effective social grouping. Humanitarian agencies tend to regard members of camps or resettlement/relocation villages as having shared interests and affinities. However, the prime cultural precedent for social action in Sri Lanka is not based on ties to a residential unit such as a village but on ties of patriarchy and patronage that, in turn, build on distinctions of caste and class. These kinds of hierarchical relations tend to be far more effective in mobilising social resources and support than membership of a camp or village. liii In such an environment, participatory efforts can sometimes exacerbate the divide between individual, household and community. In areas like Jaffna caste distinctions impose major limitations on co-operation between civilians in different status categories. liv We found clear evidence of castebased conflict over access to both economic opportunity and resources. For example, poisonous snakes were dropped into wells in one IDP camp so as to prevent their use and contamination by low-caste families. The regional co-ordinator for Care International in Jaffna observed that in order to protect principles of nondiscrimination and client participation, her agency had at times felt obliged to intervene to deselect community representatives who insisted on observing caste barriers. The LTTE has an official policy of removing caste distinction and many respondents, agency staff and beneficiaries, highlighted this as an advantage for humanitarian initiatives in LTTE-controlled areas. When events are convened or organised by people of high status, poorer and lower caste people generally feel obliged rather than choose to take part. The perceived inability to act voluntarily may negatively influence their views on participation. In poor rural communities in particular, influential individuals are vital in brokering relations with government, the host community and other outsiders. lv Indeed for many 29

30 people it could possibly be more important in terms of survival and wellbeing to sustain such vertical ties with these important individuals than to take part in humanitarian initiatives that build more egalitarian horizontal ties within the community. Particularly in Vavuniya, wealthier members of society shop keepers and traders for example tended to be far more positive about participatory projects than the less wealthy. This most likely reflects the greater capacity of these individuals and groups to take advantage of project opportunities. On the other hand, wealthier community members sometimes chose to emphasise the social distance between themselves and poorer residents. lvi One man bemoaned the fact that the losses he had incurred due to the conflict had left him in a position more lowly than others who had previously been his inferiors. He resented having to work alongside others of more humble origin and explained that he would never be able to return home in his present condition because of the shame of his decline into poverty. lvii These kinds of attitudes challenge the basic assumption of participatory approaches that they should be based on unified social groupings. The political connotations of social affiliation There are specific constraints on communities acting as a united whole in intra-state conflicts. Given the highly militarised political climate and prolonged exposure to conflict and forced migration, the war has exacerbated the feeling of household individualism that tends to be inherent in strong caste Hindu societies because of an acute sense of mistrust. All civilians are implicated in the conflict, even if unwillingly. Civilian ethnic, religious or other identities are politicised and consequently they are stigmatised by their opponents. Even though Tamils form the majority of the population in many areas of the north and east, as noted, membership of the same ethnic group does not necessarily imply shared allegiances and interests. A major source of distrust within the Tamil community arises from the varying political affiliations of this population. Whereas many appear to support the LTTE, other militant Tamil groups such as TELO, EPDP, PLOTE, or EPRLF also receive strong endorsement in some areas (especially Vavuniya). On the other hand, large numbers of civilians (possibly the majority) feel fearful of and oppressed by all of these groups since they have perpetrated many violations against Tamils. In some areas the different ethnic and religious groups live alongside each other in neighbouring villages or in separate residential districts in towns. Relations between Sinhalese and Tamil populations tend to be at best distant and at worst openly hostile. Relations between Tamils and Muslims are more complex, in that the two populations are heavily interdependent economically in many areas (Muslims are very prominent in commerce in the north and east) yet at the same time have often been opposed in the wider political struggle. During crises individuals from both communities have been known to assist people from the other side, although members of each community have also perpetrated grave violations against the other Negative perceptions of participation & humanitarian aid Responses to the key questions Crisis-affected populations (including those who are direct beneficiaries of humanitarian measures), like agencies and their staff, have very diverse ideas about 30

31 participation. At the same time, responses to questions posed by the researchers revealed that these populations do not think about consultation or participation in the same way as agency staff. When asked about HOW aid was provided, the answers were generally framed in terms of WHAT was received or improved. Hence, client perceptions focus on the concrete outcomes of participation in projects as opposed to the actual process of participation itself. lviii In quite a few of the projects in Sri Lanka in which participation is a key objective, notably those involving children and youth, client perspectives on the subject are extremely positive and many concrete benefits are recognised. However, while some people are receptive towards the idea, many others are very diffident about it. In most cases, group discussions held at the village level were lively and interesting. Yet, often there was comparatively little interest among respondents in the topic of participation in humanitarian programmes. People who spoke passionately about their experiences of conflict and flight or their hopes for returning home were hesitant to talk about projects they had been involved in and unaware of the intricacies of implementation, such as the purpose of a baseline assessment or an evaluation. Probing questions about consultation, participation in the project cycle, decision making and self-representation were largely met with bemused responses or answered with accounts of what assistance had been received and/or what was still needed. Indeed, it was very difficult at times to encourage people to focus on the topic, which did not seem to hold their attention. Hence, it became evident that participation is not always perceived by war-affected and displaced populations in Sri Lanka to be appropriate, relevant, or even beneficial. The fact that some of the measures we studied were implemented quite a few years ago (the most consistent humanitarian support having been provided in the 1990s) must be taken into consideration when trying to explain why aid recipients are not always concerned about participation in humanitarian aid. This may account for the vague and rather superficial responses at least to some extent. It may also be significant that our research was conducted following the cease-fire agreement. Civilians in the north and east are now focused on the future and on the possibility of returning home, and their interest in past assistance is greatly diminished. Indeed, respondents sometimes expressed irritation and even anger at being asked questions about benefits they had received, showing far more concern about what can be obtained to improve their present and future circumstances. Contrasting client/agency views Although hardly surprising in this difficult operational environment, it is striking how in several of the specific instances reported to us, agencies perceptions of the levels and nature of participation contrasted strongly with those of clients. Evidence from one village in Batticaloa indicates that even when the agency maintains that beneficiaries are actively involved in decision-making, they may not actually feel they are. During a focus group discussion the EHED project officer was horrified to hear inhabitants remark that they had not been consulted about the agency s interventions in the community. lix She interrupted the discussion to remind them that EHED staff had carried out a series of PRA exercises in a process of consultation and pointed out members of the group who had actually been present during these events. Once their memories had been jogged some people did recall the meetings, although they were rather vague about their purpose and clearly did not feel that it was important whether 31

32 or not they had been consultative or participatory. This would seem to indicate that even though agencies may apply participatory methods of one sort or another, these may well not represent genuine attempts to actively involve people in decisionmaking. Different groups may view the work of the same organisation very differently, depending on their expectations and on how that agency may have engaged with them. For example, views about UNHCR projects tended to be far more positive when they were implemented through non-governmental partners than when they involved government. The local presence of an agency also seemed to make a difference. Much of the humanitarian work in Sri Lanka involves fairly intermittent visits to communities rather than more intensive engagement with aid-recipients. Beneficiaries often commented disparagingly about this, indicating that their expectation of humanitarian actors is that they should spend far more time in the field accompanying civilian populations. Regular contact with beneficiaries is evidently taken as a sign of personal and institutional commitment to and solidarity with crisisaffected populations. Inhabitants of a camp lx in Jaffna were enthusiastic about their contact and relationship with UNHCR staff who were said to visit regularly. However, in another camp lxi visited on the same day, the residents complained about UNHCR and noted that the agency had not been to see them for three months. lxii Sometimes the intentions of agencies are misunderstood. In some cases, measures that are viewed by agencies as both beneficial and voluntary turn out to be thought of by clients as burdensome and obligatory. For example, donors commonly ascribe a monetary value normally around 10 to 20% of total project cost to beneficiaries labour contribution, regarding this as an effective mechanism for promoting participation. However, a number of aid recipients complained that in their view this requirement is an imposition, one that can be very onerous. Modes of delivery and impacts Civilian willingness to engage in participatory projects is likely to be much influenced by perceptions of the potential impact of projects in terms of wellbeing and survival. Civilians make active choices, taking into consideration what alternative assets and sources of support they have access to, weighing up the perceived advantages and disadvantages of investing in an intervention, what other options are open to them and what might be the cost of engaging in projects. They may not always decide in favour of involvement in humanitarian action, especially when (for whatever reason) projects and agencies are viewed critically by crisis-affected populations. In communities that have suffered multiple deprivations and violations over an extended period of time, lack of support among civilians for participatory approaches can sometimes be attributed to insufficient confidence in the ability of aid agencies to make a difference to their circumstances. Representatives of camp committees lxiii in Jaffna told us that these committees were formed initially to address the many problems and conflicts in the camps, problems that are discussed with residents first and then communicated to the agencies. However, they noted that even when agencies do become involved, often they are unable to help and frequently do not explain why. In general, the consensus was that while agencies normally understand the problems of crisis-affected populations they are seldom able to offer effective assistance. 32

33 The degree to which an organisation has really institutionalised participatory approaches within its client group must make a difference. Some projects have worked very intensively with civilian populations over many years, whereas others are relatively recent in origin and many have confined their interaction to sporadic meetings. Sometimes reticence about participation has more to do with the traditional mode of delivery of humanitarian assistance. Some agencies have very limited mandates and there may be little incentive for their clients to participate in projects simply because to do so implies a lot of effort for only modest rewards. On the other hand, people may feel obliged to participate in projects even when they are not a priority, simply out of fear of losing whatever material benefits are to be derived in the short term. Beyond this, there is a sense in which in Sri Lanka the kind of infrastructural work and indeed many of the services that humanitarian actors support is either of minimal importance to, or taken for granted by, beneficiaries whose attention is generally focused elsewhere. This is partly because, as noted, government takes care of food distribution, arguably the most critical relief component, leaving other humanitarian actors to pick up less essential elements. It may also be due to the fact that Sri Lanka is not fundamentally a poor country and that in such a context humanitarian aid may not always be lifesaving. More significantly, though, in a conflict that has lasted for nearly two decades, centralised, top-down, measures have long been the norm and indeed remain fairly entrenched in some quarters even today. Agencies have grown used to making decisions on behalf of clients and consulting them very little. lxiv If power and decision-making are seen to remain with humanitarian actors, there may be no perceived value in participating in a process that is essentially pre-determined by agencies. The divide between aid recipients and the humanitarian community can be so great that some NGOs in Sri Lanka allegedly pay people to attend training sessions and meetings (to boost coverage and impress donors). If aid beneficiaries are indeed being paid to take part in projects, any resistance to making voluntary contributions is hardly surprising. Negative images of humanitarian actors The harshest judgement of participatory efforts came from a small number of civilians in Batticaloa and Vavuniya who were highly critical of the aid community, local, national and international. They argued that aid organisations are simply conduits for the employment of local members of the middle classes. They alleged that funds intended for war-affected populations are diverted inappropriately into office accommodation, expensive vehicles, computers and other supplies and equipment. They also complained about the affluent lifestyles of expatriate staff members. There was considerable resentment of the idea that aid recipients should be expected to invest time and energy in the accomplishment of humanitarian projects when (in their view) humanitarian actors themselves have unimpeded access to luxuries that are not (again in their view) theirs by right. These kinds of perceptions are not necessarily widespread and are often based on lack of knowledge about the humanitarian aid process, but nevertheless undermine relations between agencies and crisis-affected civilians in some areas. 33

34 2.5. Indifference of camp populations One major finding of the research is that support for participatory approaches is far higher in rehabilitation and development programmes mounted in resettlement and relocation villages than in relief initiatives established in camps. Many agencies find it hard to understand why camp residents can be so reluctant to take part in participatory initiatives since the benefits, in terms of improved health, sanitation and the like, would seem to be self-evident. Quite a few staff put this reluctance down to what they perceive as the prevailing relief mentality among camp dwellers. This, they suggest, is characterised by high levels of dependency on free handouts. Temporary relief doesn t help; people need strengthening and reconciliation. People in the camps are used to receiving things. They have become very dependent. We don t work like this any longer. We select the most needy and animate others not to feel hopeless. We help them to look for options, like income generation. lxv In some cases there is a belief that camp dwellers are backward lxvi and therefore unable to foresee what is in their best interests. This is a connotation to both caste and education. However, arguments that draw on notions of a relief mentality or backwardness fail to take many important issues into account. Caution among camp dwellers about involvement in participatory programmes may derive from an extreme unwillingness to invest in facilities and resources that they would prefer to think of as only temporary. Inhabitants of Sabapathay lxvii IDP camp in Jaffna reacted angrily to the suggestion that they might benefit by engaging actively with projects. Even though most had lived in the camp for many years, some in very poor quality, overcrowded conditions, they had firmly rejected a UNHCR offer to provide materials for permanent housing on the grounds that their greatest desire was to be allowed to go back home immediately. lxviii All in all, support for participation in camps tends to be greater at the household level than at the level of the wider group. Female representatives of IDP camp committees in Jaffna provided an explanation for this, highlighting some of the difficulties associated with working at group rather than household level. lxix Since camp residents tend not to be from a single community, they observed, their needs are distinct and they should be helped accordingly. Group discussions may be very effective in villages, they argued, but families in camps should be consulted individually. The social and cultural problems associated with camp life were also mentioned, especially the difficulty of living with people who don t all have the same habits and customs. The atmosphere in the camps was described as being like a graveyard. Respondents in Vavuniya similarly emphasised the lack of community solidarity in camps. For one thing, camp life is not particularly conducive to the positive frame of mind that is needed to participate in community initiatives. One man who now lives in a resettlement village but had spent seven years in one of the Vavuniya camps remarked: we were not at peace in the camp, mostly because of the condition of our children their lack of discipline, bad habits, bad education, poor health. We didn t want to get involved in things there. But now we re happy, we re pleased about the 34

35 assistance we get now. lxx Others talked about the corrosive social effects of living in congested, dismal conditions, about the arguments and fights that frequently break out between neighbours, the rape of women and children, the destructive effect on family and community life of alcoholism and other problems. lxxi In fact, far from a mentality of dependence, wariness of participatory projects may in some cases be born of a careful and realistic assessment of the many constraints and risks involved. 3. Summary and observations The conflict in Sri Lanka between the Tamils and Sinhalese has varied in intensity and location and has been marked by a number of major episodes of severe violence. It has been experienced very differently by different sections of the population in the north and east, although displacement is a major feature of civilian life in all of the areas studied. Humanitarian actors, local, national and international, have provided relief to camp dwellers for many years, but a growing number are now focusing also on rehabilitation and development activities in resettlement and relocation villages. Many agencies are clearly committed to beneficiary participation at an institutional and policy level but find that their efforts are thwarted in practice by a variety of major constraints. Some of these constraints have to do with the security and political pressures associated with the conflict, some arise out of contrasting social and cultural values and some derive from psychological, emotional and economic difficulties confronted by civilians or from their negative perceptions of humanitarian aid. To emphasise the many constraints to participation that predominate in war-affected areas and to highlight the differences in social and cultural ideas on the subject is not to try and dissuade humanitarian agencies from consulting and developing participatory programmes with their clients. It is intended more to alert agencies to the need to reflect on the potential and actual limitations and risks associated with participatory approaches. It is also intended to stress the importance of canvassing both primary and secondary stakeholder perceptions on the value added and possible dangers of participation. This highlights the importance of engaging in regular and continuous risk assessment and project monitoring and appraisal. The factors mitigating against the more empowering and transformative models of participation in particular may be so great that it may be unrealistic for agencies to aspire to such radical goals. Humanitarian measures may need to observe more modest participatory objectives, whilst always taking every opportunity possible to consult and inform their beneficiaries and other members of the population. 35

36 III. Participation in Practice The factors mitigating against client participation in humanitarian measures in Sri Lanka may appear very powerful. Nevertheless, many of the projects and programmes that we studied incorporate significant participatory components, some quite innovative and courageous and some very effective. The evidence is that under the right conditions, consultation and participation can entail important tangible benefits for aid recipients. Yet, in all aid interventions that are built on cyclical projects with concrete stages, activities and components, it is to be expected that beneficiary enthusiasm and involvement will ebb and flow during implementation. Part III begins by examining levels and forms of participation in the various stages and activities of the project cycle and goes on to explore the key findings in relation to the positive effects of participation. 1. Participation in the project cycle 1.1. Planning Proposal development and project approval Assessment of the circumstances and needs of crisis-affected populations is generally the first point of contact between potential or actual aid recipients and humanitarian actors. In many cases this process occurs as the first stage in planning and leads to an understanding of the major difficulties confronted by a population and the subsequent identification of project beneficiaries. As such, it is a fundamental initial stage in the project during which mutual knowledge and confidence between agencies and beneficiaries is built. However, for most of the humanitarian actors in Sri Lanka there is a vital prior stage in the project cycle programme and/or project design and approval and beneficiaries are seldom, if ever, involved in these tasks. That design and approval frequently take place before baseline assessment may be due to the fact that many humanitarian agencies have worked in Sri Lanka for a long time and regard present interventions as being outgrowths of previous baseline studies. Design and approval are crucial elements in the development of humanitarian initiatives since they shape the objectives, content, overall framework, and all other aspects of intervention. Normally one would hope that aid recipients could influence project design. In many cases, however, an agency s entire programme within a particular sector, and hence each of the constituent projects, is devised according to a standardised format before consultation with beneficiaries. Indeed, most humanitarian measures follow a blue print model, in which the sector, services, operational objectives and strategies, outputs, project area, and size and make up of the target population are all defined before clients become involved. Hence, for example, Oxfam-GB projects in Vavuniya and Batticaloa adhere to a fairly standardised format and project proposals submitted by different partner organisations tend to follow the same objectives and use the same overall framework and wording. 36

37 Several respondents from within the humanitarian community conceded that this approach is not particularly conducive to beneficiary participation. Indeed, this may well be the single biggest institutional obstacle to participatory work in Sri Lanka. One staff member observed: We restrict ourselves with our own procedures. We do our project proposals before we enter a community. We then go in and do participation i.e. we get beneficiaries to agree to do things that are in our mandate. If they want something that is outside the mandate, we can t help them. Excluding aid recipients from the design process may be less of a problem if the initial proposal and accompanying log frame is broad and flexible and the funding cycle long, since this allows plenty of scope for adjustment and accommodation of aid recipients expectations at a later stage in the cycle. But it is likely to be a serious challenge for agencies operating within a specific sector, with set and measurable outputs and according to a limited time frame. In other words, blueprint models applied within the typical six-month to one-year emergency funding schedule generally encounter major difficulties when it comes to fostering and sustaining client participation throughout the project cycle. Client identification: practical factors influencing selection In a rapid onset or large-scale humanitarian emergency the identification and selection of beneficiaries is likely to be determined largely by access and urgency of need. In Sri Lanka, where the crisis is long-term and the fighting shifts in location and intensity, this decision is shaped by a diversity of actors and forces over which crisisaffected populations have no influence. Indeed, sometimes beneficiaries are not even informed about the criteria for their selection and many of those we interviewed were critical of this tendency. These criteria are normally pre-determined by agencies (often with government) as a matter of both policy and mandate. The criteria most commonly employed in Sri Lanka follow the government model and are as follows: exposure to conflict and/or displacement; monthly income of Rs 1500 or below; and eligibility for government dry-food rations. Many agencies use additional criteria, such as settlement type: some work only in IDP/returnee camps, whereas others focus solely on relocation and resettlement villages. Because they tend to have more resources and more effective support networks than camp populations, self-settled displaced people are normally excluded from humanitarian provision. Many agencies focus on people without jobs, or those with poorly paid occupations farming, fishing, toddy tapping and unskilled casual labour being a priority whereas people with permanent jobs, in government posts, or on salaries are generally left out. Some try to prioritise groups they have supported in the past. However, these longer-term ties between agencies and aid recipients are often severed by displacement or inter-agency co-ordination agreements in which agencies are assigned to operational areas where they have not worked previously. Frequency of displacement is an important criterion for some agencies. Quite a few work exclusively with female-headed households, widows and their families, or female survivors of sexual violence. Child-centred agencies generally support children under 18 years of age, pregnant and lactating women and/or families with children (especially those with a large number of dependent children). It is important to recognise that during a conflict such as that in Sri Lanka, agencies may be forced to compromise policy guidelines because of practical difficulties. Thus, 37

38 client selection is likely in most cases to be based on a mixture of policy and practical considerations. Among the practical factors influencing the choice of beneficiaries, time of arrival is important a strategy of first come first served being very common in many projects in Sri Lanka. Other practical considerations include staff safety, agency capacity, and government and/or LTTE partiality. And, prior to the cease-fire in particular, many civilians were beyond reach simply because checkpoints, security permissions and curfews limited the distance agency personnel could travel in a day. lxxii Client identification: government influence In government-controlled areas local officials decide not just on the project location and beneficiary communities but even on the individual households or families that agencies may support. The LTTE are equally as prescriptive, if not more so. Most agencies begin the aid recipient identification process by approaching the designated officials (primarily the GS in government-controlled areas) for the relevant permissions. lxxiii When deciding which individuals and groups to support, agencies are heavily reliant on household data (which are highly politicised) compiled by the GS and on the selection the GS makes from this list. Aware that personal preference, political affiliation, or corruption may influence the choices made by officials, some agencies use these data more as a preliminary guide, drawing up a final beneficiary list on the basis of their own participatory investigations and surveys. However, several admitted that it is unwise to depart radically from the GS selections for fear of compromising relations with government. lxxiv A minority of agencies, such as CARE International in Jaffna, refuse to routinely accept the convention that clients are selected by the GS. CARE indicated that the negative consequences of maintaining a degree of independence include being deliberately left out of the information loop by local officials. Nevertheless, staff argued that this is a price worth paying, considering the freedom it gives them to respond flexibly to beneficiary groups and to avoid manipulation by sometimes corrupt officials. We came across only one example of an agency directly flouting a government ruling on its choice of clientele. Beneficiary identification: the disadvantages of pre-selection The fact that aid recipients are excluded from the selection process in humanitarian interventions has several implications for their participation during subsequent stages of a project. First, the pre-determination of criteria limits flexibility, and more importantly the capacity to respond to the specific circumstances and expectations of recipients. This may convey to beneficiaries the message that agencies do not consider their priorities and concerns important. Second, outsider (agency) definitions and perceptions of vulnerability may be at variance with those generated locally. Third, agencies may not be aware of subtle social and economic distinctions within a community and thereby inadvertently favour groups that are already privileged in some way. This was a concern of several respondents. Fourth, when selection criteria focus on specific social categories, agency staff need to be extremely wary of stigmatisation as an unintended outcome, an important point made in a study of participatory programmes in Batticaloa: 38

39 The term widow in the Tamil language implies that which is inauspicious and pitiable. In this manner, any assertion of self-will or display of self-confidence by these women was squashed from the very beginning. Women in some instances resisted this classification of themselves. One example was when a group of 35 widows, most of whom were in their twenties, were mobilised by the organisation... they were emphatic that they would participate in the literacy programme and other projects on condition that they should not be referred to as widows. lxxv Fifth, use of social criteria to include some people and exclude others may have unfortunate consequences in terms of intra-community relations, as indicated in a study for the DRC in Mannar. lxxvi The agency s clients, all widows, admitted that other women in their village were jealous of them because they had been excluded from the project. There were reports in one village that disputes had broken out when some of the residents were denied loans. Excluding aid recipients from the identification process risks creating resentment and makes it hard for agencies to build relationships of transparency and trust as the basis for implementation. For example, as noted, some people (including some who have benefited from humanitarian measures) regard agency selections as unjust, emphasising their arbitrary nature or the preference given to wealthier individuals and families. Equally, many indicated that they had little or no idea why or how they had been selected, revealing considerable disquiet about this Baseline assessment Client consultation In many of the measures we studied levels of consultation with crisis-affected populations are higher during the initial assessment of need than at any other stage in a project cycle. Consultation during baseline assessment enables an agency to learn about people s assets, deficits, coping strategies and aspirations. In this way, it facilitates identification of the households or members of a population that local populations and/or agencies perceive as vulnerable. When the assessment is done well, it can generate a very positive commitment to the project, as implied by a client of the Rural Development Foundation (RDF): RDF did a six-day workshop to find out our needs. Around 45 to 60 people turned up men and women. They had a very good class and went very deeply into what we wanted. I was very impressed it was the first time I had experienced anything like it. We discussed the pros and cons of a project and they asked us what we d contribute. We said that the women and men together could contribute around Rs 90,000. We told them that a reservoir was our first priority. lxxvii An active attempt is normally made to involve all members of a community or beneficiary group in the assessment, although several agency staff and aid recipients noted that poorer families and men are sometimes underrepresented in these events because they are generally either at work during the day or drunk. In the case of 39

40 children s programmes, working children are less likely to be involved than school pupils, also because of work. lxxviii That said, doing an assessment in a context in which project proposals are written prior to undertaking the assessment and client selection is mediated by government can impair relations between agencies and affected populations. The use of PRA In most cases the assessment is conducted through the application of a range of PRA tools and methods. The PRA methodology was first introduced into Sri Lanka in the mid-90s and practically all aid workers have received some training in it. The specific tools and methods vary considerably, although commonly social mapping is used to mark out families and households in a community and identify their social and economic characteristics. Matrix ranking helps specify priority problems and needs and flow charts link cause and effect in deprivation and suffering. PRA can provide an important opportunity for listening and responding to community priorities and concerns, acting as a basis for building mutual understanding and trust. lxxix Despite wide acceptance of the methodology, in Sri Lanka agency ideas about the purpose and uses of PRA often seem rather mechanical and it is not evident that its interpretation and application really are participatory. lxxx For example, it appears that the methodology is sometimes employed merely as a means of obtaining access to a community or to attain a specific set of data. There is also a tension between the use of participatory tools and methods and the fact that initial contact with and selection of beneficiaries are mediated by government officials and other influential individuals. Even if PRA strategies are carried out in a non-extractive way, there is little evidence to suggest that they are used as a mechanism for sharing power and decision-making. Ultimately, it could be argued that because baseline assessments tend to follow on from, rather than being a precursor to, project design, the use of participatory methods is almost irrelevant, since it is solely to rubber stamp decisions already taken in Colombo. lxxxi Consequently, some humanitarian actors are rather cynical about the application of PRA methodology in Sri Lanka: PRA is being pushed on people as the thing to do rather than as an actual participatory tool. PRA is applied on people rather as a tool to work with people. Mapping is treated as an output rather than a tool for participation. There s no real follow up we should evaluate its longer-term impact. lxxxii There are specific constraints involved in the utilisation of PRA methods in a humanitarian crisis such as that of Sri Lanka. It would be unwise to presume that participatory assessments conducted in public, in an environment that has long been plagued by armed violence and displacement, will arrive at anything more than a very approximate reflection of the reality. lxxxiii The risks of beneficiary consultation We have suggested that consultation with crisis-affected populations during baseline assessment draws on the premise that aid recipients are stakeholders in humanitarian action with a crucial interest in its outcome. We have also argued that there exists a second premise, which is that such populations have knowledge and expertise that should be brought to bear in decisions and interventions affecting them. These 40

41 certainly are important operational principles. Nevertheless, it needs to be born in mind that with all the uncertainty and all the losses and changes that are associated with conflict and displacement, civilians do not necessarily have the requisite expertise or insight to carry projects forward successfully. Often, displaced people find themselves in locations where soils, flora, fauna, climate and market conditions are unfamiliar. Conflict frequently results in major changes in demand for commodities and labour. Well-laid plans are often destroyed by further outbreaks of violence or displacement. In light of this, civilians can sometimes make the wrong choices. This was emphasised to us by several respondents. For example, an elderly man in Kalkulam explained that the consultation process mounted in the village by RDF was effective, but that the inhabitants made a poor decision. They asked for goats that died due to adverse local weather conditions and pumps that they did not know how to use given the topography and precipitation patterns. Similarly, in a Save the Children (UK) income-generation programme, some clients sought productive implements for occupations in which they had no prior experience or skills. Others chose to fall in with what was known and familiar and found that over-production of certain crops merely led to a collapse in prices at the local market Project Implementation While the north and east of Sri Lanka has long been characterised as a humanitarian emergency, in practice the operating conditions and types of activities are extremely diverse, ranging from relief and welfare assistance to displaced populations in the Vanni to major reconstruction efforts in Jaffna. lxxxiv It is hard to capture such diversity in a short report. Nevertheless, certain salient features emerged from our review of implementation. Beneficiary inputs: Labour contribution The commencement of project implementation often heralds a change in the relationship between agency and beneficiary. Whereas during planning engagement between the two tends to focus on consultation and the two-way flow of information, during implementation aid recipients sometimes play a major role in the actual execution of a project. This applies to both instrumental and transformative models of implementation. Involvement in project execution may take several forms: the provision of unskilled labour in the construction of structures and amenities; the management and administration of CBOs; the contribution of funds; and engagement as change agents in social mobilisation and other activities. The more instrumental models tend to emphasise manual labour and input into administration and maintenance of facilities, whereas transformative models are more open to beneficiary input into management and control of resources. That said, overall levels of client participation in the implementation of humanitarian initiatives in Sri Lanka are quite low and many opportunities to increase participation are missed, whether through lack of agency will, capacity, or expertise. Of the three forms of contribution, manual labour is probably the most common. For example, in the water systems projects supported by Oxfam-GB and its local partners in Vavuniya, clients are involved in the construction, monitoring and maintenance of facilities. The underlying philosophy is that aid beneficiaries should be encouraged to 41

42 contribute their ideas, knowledge and skills in the realisation of this work. Many donor agencies specify that the value of the labour contributed by clients should be a fixed proportion of total project cost. In some cases, this labour input is essential for the successful implementation of a project within the agreed budget. Clients often assume a less significant role in decision-making during implementation, or have no role at all, and, with the exception of some micro-finance projects, they are seldom given full control of funds. Reluctance on the part of agencies to hand over project funds to clients may be due to a concern that attempts to foster client self-reliance may be thwarted by the very volatile environment in which they operate. As indicated, project delivery is weak in many parts of the north and east simply because of market instability and the wider political and military conditions. For example, some time ago Save the Children (UK) established a micro credit programme with two communities in Trincomalee and the funds were used to purchase goats. However, soldiers from a nearby military camp began shooting and stealing the animals, so in the event clients were unable to repay their loans. These kinds of incidents are fairly common in the region. Another issue is that many people seek micro credit out of desperation, using it for consumption rather than production. At around 40%, micro credit has had very low rates of return in many cases because people are too impoverished to be able to initiate the kinds of developmental activities that imply a longer-term investment strategy. lxxxv Beneficiary inputs: expectations of participation Involvement of aid beneficiaries in implementation raises two crucial issues. First, it is not evident what level of labour participation can and should be expected of populations who have been exposed to long-term conflict, displacement and economic deprivation. Several respondents, aid beneficiaries and agency staff, reflected on this question, although they could offer no obvious answer. In the end, the contribution that individuals and families feel able to make will normally depend to a large extent on their options, resources and priorities. In terms of beneficiary involvement, the ZOA Refugee Care Netherlands initiative in Madhukarai is possibly the most labour-intensive project we came across in Sri Lanka and many of the dilemmas of participation are illustrated by this initiative. lxxxvi An initial participatory needs-assessment established that there was a desire for toilets, houses, wells, livelihood security and roads, construction of an access road to the community being the single most important priority for all the inhabitants. Building the road was no mean feat, since it had to pass through both a large area of un-cleared forest and a reservoir, which involved raising it above the water level. Aside from the unskilled labour provided by community members, the village Rural Development Society had to hire a tractor and labourers from neighbouring settlements in order to complete the work. ZOA staff indicated that despite the obstacles, beneficiary contribution to the road construction was extremely consistent and effective. Interest in wells and latrines was lower than in the other projects in Madhukarai, mainly because by the time it came to these amenities most families had already met their more pressing needs. Also, while UNHCR had allocated funds sufficient only for shared wells, residents wanted their own wells and the idea of sharing caused much disquiet. The housing project revealed that it can be inappropriate to expect too much of crisis-affected populations in too short a period of time. lxxxvii Some clients were 42

43 very enthusiastic about building permanent housing. Nevertheless, they found the project burdensome because it involved not just construction of the actual dwelling but also brick-making. Moreover, since families were grouped into teams for this purpose, the work involved high levels of inter-dependency and co-operation which some found hard to sustain. Different sections of the population of Madhukarai had different priorities in terms of specific measures. Up-country Tamils who had lived previously on highland tea estates in which housing and sanitary facilities are provided by the owners showed little interest in constructing permanent houses and latrines and seemed content to remain in temporary shelters built with government grants. People relocated from nearby IDP/returnee camps, on the other hand, were more enthusiastic about having their own homes even though they found the construction difficult. Staff also made a distinction in this regard between recent arrivals and families that have been in the community for some time, the former (among whom many government-supported families figure) having shown less interest in improving facilities than the latter. The ZOA example shows that while there may be a strong institutional commitment to beneficiary participation, implementation requires both pragmatism and realism. Out of respect for the entitlements and integrity of populations affected by emergencies and in recognition of some of the very real constraints they face, participatory approaches should not be imposed. Acknowledging that participation can be burdensome for all concerned, especially when it involves initiatives that are not a top priority for affected populations, it is vital to negotiate and agree with clients at the outset whether there really is value added in introducing participatory mechanisms. Beneficiary inputs: developing more meaningful forms of participation The second challenge associated with client participation in project execution is to develop levels of engagement that go beyond mere information sharing, consultation, or the provision of manual labour. Meaningful participation is about listening to and supporting civilian populations, building capacity and helping them to assume control of their lives, insofar as this is possible in an area affected by conflict. In other words, participation cannot really be reduced to implementing more effective projects and requires some commitment to a more transformative approach. For one respondent, the issue of participation raises fundamental questions about the way in which agencies engage with clients: We need to go beyond involving displaced people in meeting collective needs. For example, should we hire displaced people in the NGO sector? We need to go further: get refugees into jobs; help them meet with the authorities. Participation needs to be long term. lxxxviii In a similar vein, ZOA staff members have come to think that providing unskilled labour is not necessarily the most effective basis for client participation in humanitarian action. Nor is it, in their view, the best way of ensuring accountability to aid recipients. They emphasise that since project funds effectively belong to recipients, staff members should be seen as accountable to beneficiaries rather than to donors. This has led them to advocate client involvement in the monitoring, evaluation, management and administration of projects. Thus, it was recently proposed (a proposal that met with some initial resistance from beneficiaries) that clients should monitor the performance of the ZOA agricultural officer and be responsible for developing his work plan. 43

44 1.4. Monitoring and evaluation Most agencies are committed to the development of monitoring and evaluation systems as a means of constantly reviewing project progress and of assessing outcomes and impact. Many agencies regard self-monitoring and evaluation as a critical mechanism for ensuring accountability to aid recipients, essential also for the effective implementation of a participatory model. Some agencies aim to include in evaluations people who have not benefited from projects, in order to obtain a comparative perspective. Multiple stakeholder perspectives As far as we could establish, in projects that include a monitoring component, these exercises tend to be rather informal, often involving animators or field officers meeting with beneficiaries on a fairly regular basis and listening to reports of events and activities, checking accounts and other documents. Reporting to agencies is frequently verbal. Mid-term reviews and end-of-project evaluations tend to be more elaborate and may entail a day or so of meetings with clients during which they respond to a range of questions on project outcomes and impact. In projects with multiple stakeholder groups, contrasting perspectives on the project may be obtained. When Save the Children (UK) and its partner organisation TRRO evaluated the impact of an income generation project with the Narhana Vinayagar Farmer s organisation in Kondavil, Jaffna, reviews were conducted with men, women and children. The children were very happy that specific provision had been made for them and felt that their needs had been satisfied. Wives were pleased that their husbands had tools to do their work. But generally women were not as satisfied with the project as they had expected. They had thought it would have greater impact on their lives and noted, for example, that income increases were not sufficient to cover educational requirements. The men argued that the loans were inadequate, especially given the difficult economic environment, price fluctuations and marketing difficulties. Constraints Even though we came across a few positive examples, it would seem overall that use of participatory monitoring and evaluation is not well established within humanitarian practice in Sri Lanka. lxxxix Several international agencies attributed this to the fact that until recently their local partner organisations were focused solely on the distribution of relief items and actively resisted attempts to introduce monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. For their part, some of the local NGOs complained that the international agencies normally undertake evaluations internally and do not share the outcomes. Quite apart from any institutional obstacles, it seems as though in many cases such activities have been seriously hampered by both civilian and agency displacement. Also, as beneficiaries sometimes complained, monitoring can be extremely labour intensive for all concerned and agencies may feel obliged to cut back on the activity, even whilst recognising its importance. xc In practice, after emergency assistance has been provided, agencies generally return to their development activities, monitoring of the emergency phase losing priority. Overall failure to undertake participatory evaluation reflects a more generalised loss of momentum in terms of beneficiary participation in projects as they come towards 44

45 the end of their cycle. This raises important questions about project sustainability and impact under the present terms and conditions of implementation. 2. The benefits of participation Agencies need to work actively to foster positive outcomes from participation. In this section we describe the key beneficial outcomes (largely as identified by aid recipients themselves) Self-respect and self-efficacy One of the most devastating consequences of exposure to armed violence and forced migration is the loss of control over one s life. xci Humanitarian measures that do not consult beneficiaries or keep them fully informed seem merely to compound this problem, increasing the sense of helplessness and despair. This loss of self-efficacy was particularly evident in Vavuniya in camps and programmes run by the government. In this area, clients in more participatory projects (in both camps and resettlement villages) clearly appreciate agency efforts to consult and keep them fully informed of operational objectives and strategies, expected outcomes and any changes made during implementation. The Danish Refugee Council runs a very successful project (see Part IV) in Vavuniya that aims to put government officials in touch with crisis-affected populations as a means of increasing aid recipients access to information and hence their sense of self-efficacy. Clients of Save the Children UK s development/relief project very much valued being involved in the decisions about which relief items they would receive. xcii They indicated that the selection had been a highly inclusive process in which children and all other family members had taken part. The children maintained that it is a good idea to ask children what they want and emphasised that in their experience Save the Children was the first agency to do this. The consultation and form filling took quite a long time, but respondents argued that even so it was worthwhile because the items selected were much needed. Interestingly, even while the organisation s effort to ensure consultation and choice was regarded very favourably, the group also expressed satisfaction with the standard relief package they had received from other agencies, which they saw as having adequately met needs. This suggests that in this case from the beneficiaries perspective the value of consultation and choice had more to do with being treated with respect and being given a sense of control over their lives than with mounting an effective response to basic needs. We found that even when projects run into difficulties, beneficiary satisfaction tends to remain high so long as the agency is transparent about the obstacles and makes an effort to keep everyone fully informed about what is going on. This reveals the importance of viewing aid recipients as active survivors of adversity rather than passive victims and responding to their individual problems and circumstances rather than treating them as an anonymous mass of needy humanity. 45

46 2.2. Social skills and decision-making Involvement in participatory projects can have a radical and very constructive effect on people s self-perception. It can also build their social competencies, influencing both their relationships with others and their ability to take part in broader processes of planning and decision-making. These positive effects were clearly articulated by a mixed-caste group of teenage girls who work as animators in a Save the Children UK club in Siruppiddy, Jaffna: The training has given us lots of skills In the beginning we were scared to talk to other people Before, when visitors came to our homes we couldn t talk to them, but now we can. Before, we didn t know about children s rights but now we can explain these things to other children; we can influence future generations. Now we have leadership in our villages The club has helped reduce discrimination, especially caste discrimination normally higher caste people don t mix with the lower castes but in the club we all eat and drink together. The club gives disabled children an opportunity to become involved. We visit disabled children at home and bring them here. We make no distinctions between boys and girls boys and girls mix in the drama productions and other events. This is a new way of being together. We have got some knowledge now about gender and caste and we ll pass this on to our own children. Before we were dismissed Now we are more mature. Our parents are more likely to allow us some freedom to get involved in things. They listen to us when they make family decisions. They re likely to consult us on marriage and other things. When we talk to children who are outside the club they tell us that their parents give them no freedom. We find that we talk very differently from these children. xciii One very striking observation about these comments is the extent to which they appear to challenge traditional cultural precepts on inter-generational and caste hierarchies. We have suggested that the more empowering approaches to participation may be confounded by the restrictive nature of social hierarchy and interaction in Sri Lanka. It is not clear why these young women have managed to break through entrenched social barriers. However, their experience is consistent with our overall observation that children respond more effectively to participatory measures than adults. It is also consistent with findings reported in a study of children s participation in humanitarian aid sponsored by CIDA. xciv Another striking observation about the Siruppiddy group is the ease with which the young women articulated important personal and social structural changes in their lives and the fact that they were able to attribute these so clearly to the project. Indeed, it is worth highlighting that in general children and youth showed greater ability than did adults to articulate the wider impact of projects in terms of personal change and changes in relationships within the family and community. 46

47 2.3. Self-representation, self-protection and leadership During periods of political conflict and armed violence, especially in areas subject to repressive governance, civilian protection is a key priority. At the most basic and obvious level, participatory projects enable humanitarian actors to come into close contact with civilians, providing monitoring opportunities and an ongoing external presence that may help prevent violations. In this way, the gathering of data and fulfilment of a witness function by agencies could arguably improve civilian security. On the other hand, as members of one focus group in an international agency noted, the government, military and LTTE all oppose client participation for their own reasons. Therefore, participation may under some circumstances threaten civilian security. In other words, the delivery of standardised relief packages without client consultation may be more effective in enhancing safety in some instances since this approach may be regarded by the powers that be as more neutral. Evidently, in areas affected by political strife, the relationship between civilian empowerment and protection is complex and can be very fraught. Nevertheless, the research uncovered several important examples of ways in which civilians have been able to enhance their own protection through participation in humanitarian measures. xcv The ability to negotiate with and challenge the authorities is regarded by many respondents as one important outcome of participatory projects, with major implications for protection and security. Given that there is often greater safety in numbers, this approach commonly relies on collective action based on a strong sense of shared grievance and solidarity, as female clients of an Oxfam-GB/SEED project in Sithamparapuram camp in Vavuniya revealed: Women s rights training has been good because women are the ones most affected by displacement and women have been given practical ways for resolving their problems and improving their situation. The training is very important for security and learning about what s unfair and how to report on it. Now if we re not treated well at least we know what to do. We ve had lots of military round ups. The men have been taken and tortured. One time 11 men (actually, two were children) were held. The women s group reported this to the Human Rights Commission in Colombo and the men were released. An officer from the Human Rights Commission had been to the camp to tell us what procedures to follow in this kind of situation. Before the Human Rights Commission got involved we were kicked and tortured for asking about detainees, but all this has stopped now. xcvi Quite apart from improving protection, self-representation before the authorities can also make it possible for war-affected populations to obtain access to information, resources and services. Again, women in Sithamparapuram camp had much to say on this subject: Before SEED came to the camp there was no one to listen to us. Now there is someone to listen. With their encouragement we went to town by bus to visit the Kachcheri [local government office]. We discussed our problems with the government agent and presented 11 specific concerns: he was really shocked. We told him we had no transport for emergencies and he gave us a trishaw, which we still use. Another thing: the rations are issued out in the open, 47

48 exposing us to the sun and heat. We asked the GA for a hut for shade and he gave it to us. We also asked for a post box in the camp so that the postman could collect direct from here rather than us having to go to town The shopkeepers always give us less dry rations than they re supposed to. We asked the GA for a set of scales so we can check the weights. xcvii Participation and Protection: the programmes visited for this study provided clear examples of ways in which children have been able to enhance their own protection as a consequence of participation. For example, one of the first actions of the Vivehananda Children Development Club in Sivanthivu was to address the decision of the local SLA commander to block the road to their village, thus preventing the bus from reaching them. This effectively meant the end of education for those children past grade 5 who were hoping to go to nearby Valachchenai to attend school. The only other means of public transport was the boat which was more expensive and considered dangerous, especially for the majority who were unable to swim. Walking or cycling to school would have potentially exposed children to harassment by soldiers. Previous efforts by villagers to get the road re-opened to the bus had failed. However, club members gathered the signatures of all the residents of Sivanthivu. Experience of attacks on villagers by soldiers had made them wary of direct contact with the SLA, and so the petition was handed over to ESCO staff who passed it to the head of the local NGO consortium. He, in turn, took the petition to the national consortium (CHA) in Colombo who raised the matter with the army at a very senior level. This led to an order by the local commander to re-open the road and the bus has come to the village ever since. xcviii That said, as noted, some civilian populations prefer to be represented by individuals rather than to organise themselves collectively since this mode more closely fits traditional values and practice. Indeed, assuming leadership and taking initiative can build personal confidence and a sense of personal mastery, these being important survival and coping competencies in situations of conflict. Thus, one eighteen-yearold girl remarked: people look down on us. The government and NGOs are not hiring people from the camp. But I got work as a volunteer for Oxfam. I enjoy my responsibilities. I often fight with the camp officer he thinks we are slaves. Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that leaders often face grave risk, as one camp resident noted: We aren t allowed to set up a camp committee, but we did elect our own spokesman informally. The man we had elected spoke out about the state of the place The next day the army arrested him and imprisoned him. xcix Such risks need to be taken into account by agencies who try to encourage self-representation Solidarity and empowerment of vulnerable groups: women As a means of ensuring that the most vulnerable civilians will be included in and benefit from humanitarian aid, many agencies in Sri Lanka have introduced a targeted approach that directs support specifically at those who are the most marginalised socially, economically and politically. (More on social targeting in Part IV, section 1.6.). For some agencies the choice of social category is a matter of organisational mandate. For others, for example WFP and the DRC, it tends to be based on prior 48

49 experience of civilian impoverishment and suffering during emergencies and prior experience of how civilians respond to humanitarian measures. Projects that centre on assistance to specific social groups or categories appear more likely to embody objectives of empowerment and produce longer term personal effects than those working with a broader constituency, which tend to have more limited objectives and outputs. In other words, targeted projects are more likely to emphasise the rights and efficacy of the group in question. This can enhance the sense of both personal mastery and group solidarity: We expect to be strong and to help our community in these difficult times because women are stronger than men. We learnt in our last equality training with Oxfam that often husbands are unemployed while their wives work but are still kept down. We shouldn t let this happen because we re equals. We can talk this way because we re in the society. We couldn t talk like this before as individuals we couldn t achieve nearly so much Now we have the confidence to talk to the military about our detained husbands. Now we are no longer idle and have an idea about what to do to support ourselves. We feel more confident. c Again, women in Sithamparapuram just as the young women in Siruppiddy appear to have defied apparently entrenched cultural norms on gender, human rights and other issues. Moreover, they certainly challenge the view of aid organisations that camp inhabitants are rendered inactive by a prevailing relief mentality. This indicates that under certain circumstance, given the right kind of inputs from agencies, more radical efforts at empowerment of aid recipients really can pay off in terms of confidence, solidarity and other important changes even in highly restrictive environments. However, since the research team did not have the opportunity to assess how the wider camp population perceives and treats this group of women or whether their circumstances within the family and community have been tangibly improved by the project, a certain amount of caution needs to be retained. In other words, it is not clear whether a sense of solidarity and self-efficacy is automatically associated with longer-term social structural transformation Solidarity and empowerment of vulnerable groups: children An increasing number of humanitarian agencies in Sri Lanka are choosing to work with children and young people. This is because of a general understanding that children are especially vulnerable during emergencies and have specific needs that must be met as a matter of urgency if their longer-term growth and development is not to be impaired. It is also linked to the recognition that children are often more open to new ideas and more accepting of change than adults. ci Indeed, we again emphasise that children seemed often to engage more effectively with participatory projects and were able to report greater beneficial effects than adults. cii Children involved in the CIDA study reported to have experienced enhanced confidence, increased skills and educational development and improved family relations: The enhanced confidence and sense of personal and group efficacy enjoyed by children might be seen as potentially threatening to the institution of the family based upon a strong sense of hierarchy between parents and children. 49

50 However, both parents and children expressed the clear conviction that family life had improved since the inception of programmes. Parents interviewed claimed that their children had become more polite and disciplined, that they had learned "good behaviour" and were devoting themselves more to their studies. The participants themselves confirmed this view, adding that it was because parents saw these positive changes that they had supported their activities and that parents of children who were not involved were now encouraging them to join in. Although not noted explicitly by children as a consequence of the programmes, the research team observed that programme participants have benefited immeasurably in terms of their psycho-emotional wellbeing. Aside from the benefits accruing directly to children from their participation in projects, there appear to be tangible benefits to their communities as well. Children in all of the programmes visited by the CIDA team were eager to develop activities that would enhance the life of their communities: This validates the belief of the agencies here concerned that children have an innate desire to engage in meaningful social action. In conditions of conflict and displacement the re-establishment of meaning within daily life must surely benefit children in psycho-emotional terms. Similarly, we learned of a number of community measures that had been initiated or promoted by children. In a GTZ project in Jaffna, children offered their labour for the construction of schools. GTZ explained to them that this kind of work is unsuitable for children and suggested that they should bring their parents instead, so now parents provide voluntary labour in place of their children. The involvement of youth in community work funded by the DRC led to a commitment among adults to undertake community development projects, and this in turn was associated with a noticeable reduction in alcohol consumption in the village. Children in an Oxfam-GB/RDFsupported club in Sivapuram, Vavuniya, raised Rs 7,000 through carol singing. This money is used by a local CBO to provide tea and refreshments to volunteer workers involved in the construction of a playground near the community hall. The children consider the money to be their contribution towards community development activities A sense of ownership and the material rewards One of the most tangible advantages of participation of aid recipients in humanitarian action is an increased sense of ownership of the project outcomes, whether these be in material, institutional, or other forms. This is due to the sacrifices and investment made by clients in planning, management, maintenance, project appraisal and other activities. Such commitment is understood by many agencies to be an important prerequisite for programme and project sustainability and improved efficiency in the upkeep of structures, facilities and services. These assumptions were generally born out by the research, although there are clear limits on the amount of voluntary activity people are prepared to make. In Madhukarai, clients of the ZOA programme live alongside families who have been 50

51 relocated by government and live in houses built by the government s National Housing Development Authority (NHDA). This provides an interesting opportunity to compare self-construction with construction by an agency. The village now contains 75 self-constructed ZOA houses and 100 built by the NHDA. Madhukarai inhabitants unanimously agree that the houses built with client participation are better by far in quality than those provided by the NHDA. Further, the majority of NHDA beneficiaries have made it clear that if they had been given the option they would have liked to be involved in building their own houses. While levels of material satisfaction are high among clients of the ZOA project, many of the NHDA beneficiaries complain that they feel neglected by their benefactor. That said, enthusiasm for the scheme is not necessarily a good predictor of commitment to maintenance. Many of the ZOA clients take great pride in their accomplishments, this being reflected in the high standard of care of the properties and in the well-kept gardens. Similarly, some families in the NHDA scheme take good care of their houses, working hard to improve them. However, clients in the ZOA project who had to be persuaded to contribute their part continue after construction to show little interest in upkeep. Thus, agreement with a principle (in this case self-construction) does not necessarily mean compliance in practice. As noted, it was our general observation that participation in the maintenance of communal facilities in camps tends to be low. Certainly animators working in camps have a far tougher time encouraging aid recipients to engage actively with projects than do those operating in resettlement and relocation villages. Yet, in Sithamparapuram camp in Vavuniya, latrines built by Oxfam-GB and its local partner organisation and cared for by client committees are in excellent condition. Moreover, they are in a better state by far than those constructed by government and maintained by paid labourers. The former function well and remain in good repair, whereas many of the latter are no longer in use due to very poor standards of hygiene and safety. The contrast could, of course, merely be due to government neglect of its duties. But what is more important is the unexpectedly high level of voluntarism showed by Oxfam clients in a context in which there are generally low levels of commitment to project implementation. 3. Summary and Observations The degrees and forms of beneficiary participation vary considerably according not just to environmental opportunities and constraints but also to the objectives and underlying theoretical perspectives of humanitarian agencies. Such variations can be observed in the different stages and activities of the project cycle. Most of the agencies in Sri Lanka have adopted an instrumental view of participation that favours consulting beneficiaries (especially during baseline assessment) about their views, problems and needs, informing them and building in them the commitment and competencies necessary for active engagement in project implementation. Because project design and approval does not involve beneficiaries directly, however, most find it difficult to offer aid recipients a meaningful role in planning. This sets a precedent for engagement with beneficiaries which is not very conducive to sustaining high levels of participation through to later stage of the 51

52 project cycle. Greater effort is made to foster participation in implementation, this commonly entailing the contribution of beneficiary ideas, knowledge, labour and other skills in construction, maintenance, administration and management of project resources. Project monitoring during implementation is fairly informal, although in many cases it is quite regular and in some cases quite participatory. Beneficiary enthusiasm for projects tends to diminish towards the end of the cycle and few agencies engage in participatory impact evaluation, even while most recognise its importance. Examples of more transformative approaches in which clients are empowered to represent themselves before the authorities, engage in autonomous collective action on community and other issues and assume total control of project resources are comparatively rare. However, some projects embody certain elements of this kind of approach and some organisations are moving gradually in this direction as confidence in the cease-fire grows and displaced people leave the camps to return to their communities. It is evident that blueprint projects are not very effective in terms of fostering high levels of participation throughout the project cycle. It is also apparent that greater flexibility and openness to beneficiary involvement in the earlier stage of the cycle and in project appraisal would make a difference in this regard. But, given the political and other constraints mentioned in Part II, it is not self-evident that this kind of innovation is possible in many cases in the Sri Lankan context. Also, based on the reflections of a significant proportion of respondents, such innovation is not always sought by aid recipients. Despite these limitations, there is evidence (outlined in the previous section) that certain sectors of the aid-recipient community can and do benefit by being better informed and consulted and by assuming meaningful roles in project implementation. In Sri Lanka, women, youth and children seem better able to take advantage of participatory efforts than men and better able to put them to use for personal and community development. These groups highlighted a significant number of important advantages of participation. Undoubtedly further investigation would reveal many other benefits that are not mentioned in this report. 52

53 IV. Mechanisms for promoting participation It is apparent that to be consequential and to become institutionalised throughout a programme in all projects and at all stages of the project cycle, the participation of beneficiaries must be actively and sensitively nurtured by humanitarian organisations. In this section we describe some of the key activities, structures and mechanisms for facilitating and promoting participation that have been devised by agencies in Sri Lanka. ciii 1. Participation strategies 1.1. Deciding on the operational model It has been argued that humanitarian actors need to have explicit theories of participation and make explicit choices about the approach to participation they intend to use, since these choices determine the objectives, modes of operation and outcomes of humanitarian measures. Deciding on these matters involves a clear assessment not simply of the merits of each approach, but also the weaknesses, some of which are noted in this section. Instrumental models As noted, most agencies in Sri Lanka employ instrumental approaches and strategies to beneficiary participation. civ This is possibly in recognition of the very volatile context they are operating in. Given the emphasis on sector-based measures, an instrumental approach fits closely with the traditional framework and delivery structure of humanitarian action. However, it embodies certain limitations. First, while agencies may be very familiar with thinking in terms of sectors, and in fact staff are commonly trained and recruited on this basis, beneficiaries are not and they certainly do not organise their lives in this way. Second, often the sector that an agency is mandated to cover is not the one that crisis-affected civilians themselves prioritise and this can undermine their co-operation with a project. As noted, one of the major challenges in Sri Lanka is that government largely monopolises the distribution of food rations, which are likely to be a central priority for most populations caught up in a humanitarian emergency. In many other parts of the world, the distribution of food may be used as an opportunity to engage intensively with aid recipients on a collaborative basis. In Sri Lanka, however, most agencies find that they must restrict their role to one-off measures such as shelter or the occasional distribution of nonfood relief items. This limits the potential for the development of close and collaborative relations with civilians. Third, some sectors appear to be inherently more important for clients than others. For example, respondents are generally much more enthusiastic about taking part in micro-finance and livelihood security initiatives than they are about committing 53

54 themselves to water and sanitation measures, especially in camps where latrines and other such facilities are shared. There are important gender and generation dimensions to this issue too, because women and men in different age groups have different priorities. Fourth, instrumental approaches by definition focus on immediate practical needs and this may be to the detriment of longer-term strategic interests. While it is certainly very important to address the short-term practical problems that may be extremely pressing during an emergency, the neglect of crucial strategic interests may undermine humanitarian efforts to relieve deprivation and suffering, especially in the longer term. For example, providing schooling for children may be a major priority, but many education programmes flounder in political emergencies because agencies fail to work with military and law enforcement bodies to ensure the safety of students travelling to and from school and in the classroom. Transformative models Many argue that only those programmes that aim to transform the social structural position of crisis-affected and otherwise disadvantaged populations and give them complete control of all the resources disbursed by humanitarian agencies are truly participatory. Thus, transformative models are being implemented with growing frequency in certain quarters. cv Yet there are risks and shortcomings. First, while some might argue that this kind of approach shows greatest potential for enabling beneficiaries to confront and overcome the adversities of humanitarian crises like war and displacement, it is precisely in volatile emergency contexts that implementation of more radical models is most difficult. In fact, agency staff in Sri Lanka frequently stressed that in their view it would be extremely unwise to try and employ such an approach during and in the aftermath of military action and civilian flight, not least for reasons of security or practical feasibility. Second, as we have indicated, notions of empowerment and rights do not fit well with hierarchical and prescriptive cultures. Such notions are tied to a worldview in which the individual human being exists as an autonomous entity in its own right, and this worldview is specific to Judeo-Christian cultures. Yet understandings of personhood and of how the individual fits into his/her social world are very variable across cultures. In socio-centric cultures such as that of Sri Lanka the individual is not thought to exist in isolation from the social group to which he/she belongs. Moreover, it is through fulfilment of the duties associated with membership of this group that the individual is integrated into and acknowledged by society as a whole. In other words, the idea that persons may possess rights as autonomous beings, rights that may conflict with those of the group as a whole, or at least with other individual group members, is very foreign. Thus as we have indicated in the case of Sri Lanka there is a certain disjunction between agency thinking and local views: The way people participate is very variable culturally. Obligation is more important here in Sri Lanka than rights. But the aid world likes to globalise standards for example the Sphere cvi It follows, therefore, that the more radical efforts of humanitarian agencies to foster participation through processes of empowerment and self-actualisation have the potential to bring about profound cultural change. Agencies must acknowledge to themselves that this is what they are doing, since this helps to identify the possible risks involved. Even in societies at peace, let alone those subject to war, such radical measures may cause conflict. Humanitarian actors should be fully aware of this 54

55 possibility, and must have the humility to adopt less ambitious strategies if the context seems to require it. To enhance participation without undermining the social fabric they require detailed knowledge of the local setting, must be sensitive towards and respectful of local perspectives, and prepared for intensive interaction and exchange with their aid recipients. Ultimately, there is an inherent tension between civilian empowerment and the rapid response, high turnover of (particularly expatriate) staff and low levels of engagement with beneficiaries that is characteristic of most (not all) humanitarian interventions. This tension is not easily resolved in practice. In Sri Lanka it is generally the case that intensive and ongoing exchange only occurs in work with children (and their care-givers) particularly when activities are undertaken within the framework of a psychosocial intervention. This may be a further reason why participatory activities with the young are more numerous and, apparently, more successful Breaking down the barriers Peace and reconciliation Recognising that beneficiary participation in humanitarian action is dependent on high levels of mutual understanding, tolerance and solidarity, and that conflict destroys these essential features of society, mounting participatory projects in the context of conflict implies an inevitable link with peace and reconciliation. Although this link is seldom acknowledged explicitly by humanitarian agencies in Sri Lanka, there have been a number of initiatives in the field of peace and reconciliation and this work shows important potential for creating an enabling environment for beneficiary participation in humanitarian action. In many parts of the north and east, populations of different ethnic and religious status and political affiliation live in close proximity to each other. Even during periods of comparative stability and peace there is often tension and hostility between these groups. Some of the agencies that work in this area argue for the necessity of facilitating inter-community understanding and exchange. Sarvodaya and SEDEC cvii are two agencies in Sri Lanka with a particularly strong commitment to peace and reconciliation activities and both deploy trained animators to promote this work in areas and communities embroiled in conflict. SEDEC aims to build ties between conflicting communities by increasing mutual knowledge and understanding: We have a long-term programme to bridge the gap between communities. We went to villages with the help of our regional centres and selected young men and women to train as animators. We meet monthly to learn about the situation. We run cultural programmes to show communities what young people s experiences are to create an understanding in the community of the day-to-day security problems they face. We have brought widows together from each of the different communities so that they can see that their suffering is similar and there is greater understanding between them. cviii In a volatile context such as that of Sri Lanka, the training and deployment of animators whose mission is to promote peace and reconciliation may be seen as an important first step in the development of participatory projects and approaches. Nevertheless, this work can be extremely tough and has the potential to render 55

56 animators vulnerable to political pressures and hostility and therefore needs continuous accompaniment and monitoring. Provision of information Populations in the north and east of Sri Lanka have experienced perpetual fear, harassment and repression. They have also been kept in ignorance of government intentions. In all of the research sites, and especially in Batticaloa and Vavuniya, civilians revealed considerable anxiety about the future and lack of awareness of their entitlements and government plans. The situation has definitely improved a great deal since the cease-fire, although the government, the SLA and the LTTE have all used the present more stable circumstances as a means of manipulating and controlling civilians, especially those in camps. While there are very real limits on what agencies can do during armed conflict to influence the political and military climate, the onus is on them to consult with and keep civilians informed as far as possible about administrative and judicial procedures, official policy and the like. Providing information of this kind is a very important step in creating confidence and trust, important prerequisites for meaningful participation. This was one of the most impressive aspects of an Oxfam-GB/SEED project with female residents of Sithamparapuram camp in Vavuniya, since by informing them about their civil and political rights and putting them in touch with the Human Rights Commission the initiative had greatly enhanced their competencies in self-protection. cix In an attempt to address poor information flows to and lack of empowerment of waraffected civilians, the DRC in collaboration with RDF has introduced an innovative capacity-building programme in Vavuniya. Rather than merely pouring money into relief and rehabilitation, it was decided that a more effective strategy would be to give civilians the confidence and information to enable them to demand access to existing services and remedy for their problems from the relevant authorities. The initiative involves a five-day programme in which local officials explain to camp and village inhabitants who they are and discuss their role and responsibilities within government. They also talk about the broader mandate and structure of government and how to access public services. Given that among civilians in Vavuniya there is a pervasive fear and mistrust of government, widespread ignorance of official policy and a sense of desperation about their living conditions and circumstances, this project has had a major beneficial impact and other organisations are seeking to replicate it Social mobilisation Generating a commitment to projects There is a strong tradition of civil society development at the grass roots level in Sri Lanka and before the conflict there was an abundance of societies and co-operative organisations in the north and east. Nevertheless, we have argued that because of discrimination based on divisions of caste, gender, generation and ethnicity, the social and cultural tradition of Sri Lanka is not inherently inclusive. We have also suggested that residential communities seldom provide the foundation for collective social action. Further, the long years of conflict have attacked social confidence and trust and fragmented or destroyed most of the grass roots organisations that once were so strong. Hence, most agencies find that they are starting from scratch and to foster 56

57 collective civic action must engage in a range of social mobilisation measures during the early stages of implementation. As one agency staff member argued, social mobilisation helps to: make people feel a need, come together as a group and work together in groups. This point was reinforced by a RDF client, who praised the agency saying: They [RDF] motivate us to get things done. Someone from the RDF field office lives in our village. He looks into the loans we take out and checks the repayments. People pay their money to him and he helps us decide what to spend it on. He goes from house to house and calls people to meetings. He s done a good job. cx In fact, staff of Sewa Lanka maintained that mobilisation is essential before relief is given, to avoid the development of a relief mentality. For Sewa Lanka, a typical mobilisation programme starts with meetings and discussions and moves on to group activities aimed primarily at highlighting differences between individual and team effort. Sometimes staff work alongside beneficiaries to demonstrate the merits of collective action, for example showing the advantages of doing paddy work in teams rather than alone. Staff argued that clients now refer to CBO members as shareholders and will contribute their labour on the basis of a sense of owning the organisation rather than out of obligation. Of course, one danger is that agencies use mobilisation to steer communities towards the kinds of initiatives they have already decided to implement. In Savukkady, villagers described how they had appealed to EHED to establish a savings and credit scheme for them shortly after EHED had run a workshop on loans and related topics. cxi This trend was evident in the majority of projects we studied. In general, we found that clients of psychosocial interventions tended to be more enthusiastic about participation than those assisted by measures catering to material requirements. This may be attributable to the fact that psychosocial programmes generally focus on human and societal development as opposed to mere structures or services and that this focus is more effective at reinforcing the attitudinal and behavioural change that is required by participatory approaches. On the other hand, it may due to the fact that psychosocial measures have been introduced relatively recently into the humanitarian field and therefore more readily embrace notions of empowerment, human rights and participation, which in themselves are quite new to humanitarian action. Content of mobilisation activities In the more instrumental projects mobilisation activities are likely to focus primarily on the achievement of specific project objectives, these normally having to do with implementing measures within a particular sector and according to international standards. The more transformative models tend to have a broader mobilisation agenda encompassing wider processes of social change. The DRC has outlined nine key areas of social concern and argues that addressing these is the core purpose of its social mobilisation programme in Vavuniya and Mannar. The concerns are: Organisational development Resource tenure improvement 57

58 Local governance Basic social service delivery Overcoming gender and other biases Critical collective consciousness-raising Coalition effort Advocacy Accomplishing change in these critical areas is no mean feat in a region dogged by political conflict, especially since matters such as resource tenure and local governance are generally beyond the control of civilian populations. However, these remain important substantive goals for more transformative projects to strive for. Awareness raising, advocacy and orientation From the DRC list it can be seen that there is a great deal more to mobilising communities to take part in humanitarian measures than their mere organisation, since the intention is to galvanise people to take action on specific problems and issues. While in some cases these problems and issues may be identified by crisis-affected civilians, in practice most reflect agency priorities and concerns. We have already noted that some of these priorities derive from a perspective that is very different and new for many of the populations of Sri Lanka. For example, as indicated, ideas about human rights are foreign the greater commitment being to fulfilling duties and obligations as befits one s social status. Also, many of the skills clients require in order to play an active role in projects skills such as financial administration, the development of indicators for monitoring and evaluation, CBO management, community leadership and so on are not generally found among the populations of the north and east. This suggests that social mobilisation efforts (particularly those that focus on the perspectives of agencies) must be underpinned by extensive awareness-raising and skills training activities. Such activities are vital in order to cultivate beneficiary interest in and understanding of, skills for and commitment to, a broad range of humanitarian and project-related issues. In addition, advocacy with key organisations and institutions on matters of policy and practice helps create a more positive environment in which mobilised communities can operate. cxii 1.4. Change agents Recruitment Community mobilisation and awareness raising requires active promotion, management and accompaniment. Most of the agencies in Sri Lanka that are committed to the idea of participation make extensive use of animators or change agents in community mobilisation and the promotion of a humanitarian project or objective. Many organisations recruit local volunteers as animators, these people being paid a small stipend to motivate, inform, mobilise and organise members of their own community around a particular issue or project. The key principle underlying the use of grass roots animators is that they are both agents and clients of a project, that they are themselves a part of the target population. The premise is that peers who have lived similar experiences or share the same interests with the client population are likely to have the greatest effect in terms of influencing attitudes and behaviour. Thus, children cxiii in Jaffna emphasised that they learn far more from child and youth 58

59 animators from within their own community than they do from teachers and other adults. They said of the young animators that they are better teachers, nicer and they don t punish us. Learning from them is fun. While the children had vivid recollections of what they had learned from the project in terms of hygiene, health, and safety, they said that it was difficult to remember things they had been taught at school where lessons are imparted through rote learning. Animators may be responsible for a variety of tasks, including the production and distribution of handouts and resource materials, convening and chairing meetings for the administration and maintenance of facilities and resources and undertaking awareness raising and advocacy sessions within their community. In addition, in some projects animators may assume responsibility for organising, strengthening the capacities of, or even running CBOs. Skills requirements In order to promote client participation in projects and in the formation of CBOs, a successful animator must have empathy with others, strong inter-personal and communication skills and a full understanding of project aims, objectives and strategies. For this they need to learn about the sector or topic of intervention they are to take responsibility for and to acquire a range of appropriate mobilisation and organisational skills. In terms of pedagogic methods, length, and content, the training of animators is very variable, but often includes components such as legal literacy, gender awareness, community development and mobilisation, leadership, peace and conflict resolution, these being taught alongside sector-specific components such as micro-finance or micro-enterprise development. Animators who work with children or with especially vulnerable or socially marginalised populations, such as those suffering serious psychosocial problems, may need special skills: According to the experience of staff at the Butterfly Garden, to be an effective animator with children requires both an innate sensitivity and sound training. Only gradually do the trainee animators come to work independently with children and even then they undertake continual capacity building. The approach which is sought from the trainees includes flexibility in responding to individual children and the willingness to divest themselves, to the furthest extent possible, of the power over the young that society bestows upon them as adults. Additionally, in order to facilitate children in the expression of their own innate creativity it is vital that the animator is constantly working to deepen the connection with her / his own originality. cxiv This entails serious effort on the part of humanitarian actors in finding people with the right experience and competencies and providing training to facilitate the development of additional skills. Identifying the appropriate people is not always straightforward especially since there has been a serious brain drain in the north and east due to the long years of conflict. In Sri Lanka potential animators are sometimes identified through competitions of one sort or another. One young SEED/Oxfam-GB volunteer in Sithampurupuram camp was recruited into the project by winning a prize at a Women s Day essay competition, for example. 59

60 Training Many agencies invest quite a bit of time and resources in the training of animators, also providing regular refresher courses to update and upgrade skills. Often because there is a heavy reliance on animators for successful implementation, these training programmes can be one of the most critical inputs into participatory projects made by humanitarian agencies. In terms of direct beneficial effects of participatory approaches, training of animators is one of the contributions that aid recipients in Sri Lanka most value. It was consistently the case that volunteer animators who had undergone capacity-building and thereby acquired valued skills were the most enthusiastic of the clients of humanitarian assistance. These skills are appreciated not merely because they serve to enhance community development, but also because they support personal development and consolidate the animator s role within his or her community. DRC s capacity-development programme for animators covers the following areas: The environment of the country and its impact on communities The development concept (including the distinction between an emergency and development) The meaning of community, community structure and changes that are due to conflict The concept and principles of social mobilisation and participation Community development and the role of different stakeholders in that process The role and task of a social mobiliser. Relationship building Social investigation/community study data collection Situation analysis/problem identification Tentative planning and strategising Strengthening CBOs & group formation Groundwork/community mobilisation Facilitating communities to obtain assistance from outside Implementation of projects/programmes Monitoring and evaluation Phasing out strategy for social mobilisers Problems Even when careful effort is made to identify and train animators, it can be hard for them to uphold the momentum of a project. Many agencies deploy only one animator per project village, although it was apparent from the field research that very often this is insufficient to ensure full and sustained project coverage and several animators complained to us that they lack adequate support and assistance. Among residents of many of the communities both the IDP/returnee camps and resettlement/relocation villages that we visited, awareness of and knowledge about aid projects was remarkably low in many cases even when animators were in place locally. This applied not just to short term but also to longer-term projects. There is also the problem of the continuous attrition of animators, which is sometimes due to their joining other agencies and projects. SEED recruited and trained four 60

61 animators for their water systems development project in Sithampurupuram camp, for example, but three moved on to other things, leaving one woman in charge of a massive area. This woman holds monthly meetings with camp residents, at which she discusses hygiene, water and sanitation, and with the help of the camp officer organises voluntary labour for the maintenance of facilities. However, she explained to us that she finds it very hard to manage the project on her own and admitted that the camp officer sometimes forces people to take part in maintenance activities. Because the government is pursuing a policy of resettlement and relocation and opposes additional support to camp populations, Oxfam-GB and SEED have felt unable to replace the volunteers, despite a concern that not doing so severely debilitates the project. In order to provide additional support to mobilisation efforts, many organisations develop a second tier of animators consisting normally of field officers, or staff who are employed either by international agencies or by local or national NGO partners. Finally, because change agents need to learn a variety of new intellectual skills in order to fulfil their function effectively, there is a risk that they will be elevated in status above that of other community members. This may adversely affect the relationship between change agent and other project clientele and needs careful management: In the course of time they assumed the status of being teachers of the poor, which also allowed them to mediate between the poor and the institutions outside of them. In order to break through this hierarchy, self and mutual criticism of their roles was incorporated as part of the training curriculum of change agents. cxv 1.5. Use of culturally approved idioms Pedagogic methods It is recognised by many that if social mobilisation, training, awareness raising and other such activities are to be effective in fostering beneficiary participation in projects, communication and education strategies need to be built on culturally approved idioms. As one respondent commented: People don t concentrate if you try to raise awareness through teaching, but they do if you use drama. cxvi In different parts of the world these idioms may include role-play, storytelling, metaphor, drama, narrative, song, and/or the visual arts, depending on cultural preferences. In Sri Lanka organisations such as the Theatre Action Group and the Centre for Performing Arts have provided support and training to humanitarian agencies in many of these skills. They have in particular promoted the employment of the Tamil tradition of historical drama in the dissemination of awareness raising and advocacy messages and mobilisation of communities. Use is also made of modern media, such as video and radio, as well as poster campaigns and competitions. Voluntary labour Of all cultural idioms, Shramadana, an established tradition of voluntary action in community initiatives, is possibly the most effective in Sri Lanka in terms of fostering client participation. The practice of Shramadana builds on notions of self-reliance and community participation. It involves people organising themselves to satisfy as many 61

62 of their needs as possible, often without support or intervention from outsiders. Shramadana has been promoted most actively by the Sarvodaya Movement and in many parts of the country full-time Sarvodaya volunteers are in charge of assisting communities to organise Shramadana groups. cxvii The ultimate aim of these volunteers is to create Sarvodaya Village Societies with elected executive committees whose objective is to contribute to the physical and material development of a community and also to the creation of a culture of peace. Shramadana is commonly invoked by animators in their efforts to mobilise unskilled labour for humanitarian projects, although camp residents also complained that Shramadana is sometimes enforced by government officials. Informal savings groups Another powerful idiom in Sri Lanka is the Seettu system, an informal scheme in which relatives or neighbours set up small savings groups. The precise arrangements vary quite widely, but the general rule is that members should gain regular access to funds held jointly by the group on a rotating basis. In one village we visited the group was formed by the local shopkeeper, who also received the first Seettu. He explained to us that in his group members who need emergency funds out of turn pay more and get less, while those who stick to the schedule pay less and get more, the aim being to encourage a long term and regular savings habit. The Seettu system has been a powerful source of support to families in the north and east for a very long time. In some cases the principle has been harnessed well by aid agencies who have incorporated it into their micro credit and micro finance schemes. However, we also came across cases where functioning Seettu groups collapsed following the introduction by an agency of a credit programme, indicating that humanitarian action does not always reinforce local coping strategies Social targeting The underlying rationale Many agencies feel that only by directing their projects at the most vulnerable and powerless social groups will they achieve both full community participation and outreach, whilst also meeting the humanitarian imperatives of social equity and justice. In Sri Lanka, the majority of agencies have come to regard gender as the most pervasive factor in vulnerability and social exclusion. To promote both gender equity and secure a broader impact for humanitarian measures on the family as a whole, many agencies focus their projects on women, particularly female heads of household and/or widows. A rationale for this is provided by WFP: Women in particular are key to change; providing food to women puts it straight in the hands of those who use it for the benefit of the entire household, especially children. WFP assistance will aim to strengthen their coping ability and resilience. cxviii Thus, a senior staff member of WFP argued that it is essential to target women exclusively in order to ensure their, and their children s, access to resources. cxix For WFP, this means providing for women to collect food rations and receive nutrition education, since experience has shown that men are prone to selling family rations. Distinctions in gender and generation also influence responses to participatory initiatives. The DRC cxx has found that in Sri Lanka participatory projects with women are more likely to be successful than projects with men. They argue that women 62

63 generally work together more effectively than men, especially when they are organised in groups of different caste and socio-economic status which men find difficult to deal with. GTZ staff in Jaffna expressed similar views. They maintained that family displacement and suffering and the death and out-migration of men have forced women to assume greater domestic and productive responsibility, which has in turn increased their sense of solidarity with others and their openness to new ways of thinking and acting. Interestingly, quite a few female clients endorsed these positive views of women s participation in projects. For example, women in a very successful credit society in the relocation village of Ambikaipalamkottam in Vavuniya talked with pride about their level of organisation and commitment. They cited their many achievements and scoffed at the failed attempts of men in their community to create an equivalent body, arguing that men are disorganised, often drunk, and lazy. cxxi Beyond this, several agencies noted that men and women tend to find different kinds of interventions effective, men showing greater interest in hardware projects and Targeted projects are undoubtedly among the most empowering and transformative of the humanitarian measures we saw in Sri Lanka. The research revealed that projects that target specific social groups or categories elicit more positive responses than those focusing on the community as a whole. Respondents who are involved in targeted projects were far more explicit about the benefits of participation than those in interventions of a more generalised nature. This is probably true of projects with children even more than projects with adults. Thus, the work of child-centred agencies with young people seems to have had the greatest impact in terms of personal development, strengthening of family and community relations, leadership, commitment to social change and to social action. The challenges and obstacles Precisely because they are isolated from decision-making, seldom have control over resources and may lack the sense of self-efficacy needed to take control of their lives, the more marginalised members of the population tend not to present themselves before projects. It was notable how women in communities that had been touched only lightly by humanitarian measures (for example in the LTTE-controlled areas of Batticaloa) were reticent to talk to us in public, while women who were organised CBO members were highly articulate and even quite assertive. Focusing on the least powerful sections of the population entails a major commitment on the part of agencies in terms of accessing and learning about potential beneficiaries, forging relationships with them and building their capacity. Developing knowledge of the client population The Women s Development Forum in Batticaloa works in 17 villages with 842 women, many of whom are war-widows. The organisation aims to empower widows with dependents to become self-employed and provides support for micro-finance and pre-school facilities to help facilitate this process. Potential clients are singled out by the GS, although this is only the start of the process. The agency calls those identified to a meeting at which the objectives of the project are explained. The women are asked to form a committee and to select a president, vice president, secretary and treasurer. There follows a period of some 3-4 months during which time daily visits are made to the village to build client confidence and collect data on each person s financial circumstances. One aim is 63

64 to find out about clients existing financial commitments, the concern being to prevent women from falling into double debt. But this can be quite a challenge because people do not always admit to being in receipt of loans from others. Women in the east of Sri Lanka do not traditionally leave home for paid work, but many war-widows find that this is their only viable option. Hence, they often need to develop new skills. This is another area of project activity and during the initial 3-4 months of contact with clients the organisation identifies what kind of enterprise women are interested in; for example, selling string hoppers, animal husbandry and the like. Village animators give training in these activities and workshops are held on the management of credit and loans. Despite certain clear advantages, social targeting raises some problems and concerns as an approach. First, the dynamics of power at the level of family, household and community are often both highly entrenched and complex and it may be somewhat naïve to assume that assistance given to the most vulnerable will in fact be enjoyed by them. This point was made by several respondents in Sri Lanka, especially with regard to micro-finance projects. Many such projects are directed at women. But it was emphasised that women often put themselves forward and assume responsibility for loans that are in practice utilised by their husbands or other male relatives. Not only does this mean that women may not benefit from a project, but possibly more seriously that they become liable for defaults incurred by their husbands. Second, social targeting may lead to resistance from other more powerful members of society and cause difficulties for aid recipients when they try to take on roles that depart from the tradition. The empowerment of vulnerable or marginalised groups implies major changes in the attitudes and behaviour of the wider population. Projects that work with their target population in isolation of other more powerful members of society fail to acknowledge this fact and risk creating social division and conflict. The onus is on agencies to integrate targeted projects with efforts to encourage broader processes of social change. Discussing participatory programmes with children in Batticaloa, Jason Hart notes that: The agencies studied all recognise that in order to create the opportunity for children to participate, it is vital to build interventions that take into account the group-based nature of society where children are an inseparable part of the family unit, in conceptual and practical terms, and are often an important resource for the household. cxxii Thus, in many of the programmes examined, agency staff were found to be working at the community level making painstaking efforts to talk on a regular basis with parents, teachers, religious and community leaders, explaining to them the nature of activities and addressing their concerns and fears. cxxiii In this way they have gradually been able to open up and safeguard the space for children to come together and participate in designing and undertaking activities that are generally unprecedented in the life of their communities. cxxiv 2. Promoting participation through institutional means Participatory projects are highly dependent on extensive consultation and contact among beneficiaries and mutual agency: beneficiary learning and information flows. This implies a need to create fora for interaction and exchange involving aid 64

65 recipients and agency staff. Many agencies find that participatory approaches require some kind of mechanism to both bring people together and to foster sustainability. This section explores the mechanisms for promoting collective action that are preferred by humanitarian actors in Sri Lanka Informal interaction and exchange Creating the foundations for trust and engagement Due largely to security restrictions and limited access to civilians and to the longevity and sporadic nature of the conflict, most of the interaction between agencies and aid recipients in Sri Lanka has been episodic rather than continuous. At the same time, this interaction has tended to consist of rather formal community events such as meetings, PRA exercises and workshops, organised and convened normally by agency personnel, CBO committees, or animators. This rather stilted form of exchange creates major constraints in relations among project beneficiaries and in those involving beneficiaries and agencies. When we touched on this issue, several agency personnel conceded the need for more continuous and intensive engagement with their clients. As one staff member put it: we have meetings, we do PRA activities and the like, but we don t make relationships with beneficiary communities. cxxv In practice, informal interaction with clients may be far more productive and effective in many ways than more formal events. ZOA staff, who live on the project site at Madhukarai, refer to this kind of informal interaction as hanging out. Yet one of the disadvantages of this approach, noted by the staff, is that when agency personnel or community animators make themselves available on a more continuous and informal basis they can become subject to a multitude of pressures and demands. Such demands may include the requirement to act as intermediaries in the resolution of domestic and community disputes. In meeting these kinds of demands agencies risk encouraging dependence on outside intervention. Engagement of women One of the major advantages of promoting more informal exchanges, highlighted by a member of the DRC, cxxvi is that this is likely to increase the participation of women in projects. Traditionally men have always been more prone than women to assume leadership roles within the community, generally seeking to create formal organisational structures and preferring to meet in public places. Certainly women are also very involved in many formal community based organisations but usually in a more limited role. Women are more likely than men to be engaged in domestic tasks that can be integrated successfully with less formal social mobilisation activities, whether these take place within the home, at the public well, in someone s back yard or elsewhere in a community. Women are also more likely to come to the fore if they can do so in less public and formal settings Formal organisations Despite the inclination of some staff to develop more informal mechanisms for promoting collective action, dialogue and consultation with aid recipients, most agencies recognise the need for some kind of institutional structure to consolidate participation in projects. These structures vary in the extent to which they are built on indigenous or introduced modes of organisation. 65

66 Traditional organisational structures In some cases the formation of an institutional mechanism is necessitated by the fact that clients are responsible for the administration and management of funds. In some areas of Sri Lanka it has been possible to build on traditional structures such as the temple society, the fishermen s society, the rural development society, or the credit society. These societies are generally legally constituted and registered with the government, have a constitution, and have an administrative/managerial committee with a specified structure and responsibilities. However, as already indicated, there are practical limitations to the use of traditional organisations and structures in humanitarian action, not least the fact that most have now collapsed due to multiple displacement or to a conscious process of attrition brought about by political interference: All parties to the conflict have resorted to destroying or undermining local civil society institutions. This has been carried out by threats, abductions and assassinations. Other methods such as blocking funds or other means for functioning have also been used. Over the years civil society organisations have been completely destroyed in many areas and in others have become thoroughly weakened. cxxvii While building on traditional institutional mechanisms has many advantages, it is important not to take for granted that these kinds of structures are the most appropriate for participatory humanitarian measures. As one senior member of the humanitarian community emphasised, many traditional organisations are highly authoritarian and patriarchal. Working in partnership with civil society is not very developed here. Most civil society organisations are relief-orientated, male dominated, run by ex-government officials using a charity approach. Indeed, through their beliefs, values and practices some organisations may, even if inadvertently, perpetuate the kinds of inequalities and injustices that can under certain circumstances lead to political strife and armed conflict. Another concern, highlighted by the regional co-ordinator for CARE International in Jaffna, is the tendency of people who assume leadership in a community (or any other kind of organisation, including an NGO) to begin well by truly representing their constituencies but to gradually become corrupt with time. She noted how after just a few months in office many leaders become complacent and start expressing their leadership in more authoritarian ways. CARE deals with this problem in the CBOs they assist by ensuring that leadership elections are held 11 months after an incumbent takes office. In this way, even if people stand for election more than once they tend to be more accountable and accommodating towards others if only because they need popular support in order to be re-elected. In many humanitarian crises religious bodies play a significant role in provision. Indeed, in some parts of the world participatory approaches have received strong endorsement from religious communities. Both the Catholic and Protestant churches run large social programmes throughout the north and east of Sri Lanka and have a long tradition of humanitarian action drawing on the work of both lay and religious personnel. Some aspects of this work have proved to be very participatory. Importantly, in some regions for example Batticaloa the Christian churches have 66

67 far better access to civilians in LTTE-controlled areas than other organisations. However, outside the Christian community, the populations in the north and east do not have a strong tradition of socially engaged religion. Hinduism and Islam tend to promote spiritual enlightenment and personal acts of charity but are much less committed to organised and collective action in the field of social development. Certainly some Muslim and Hindu organisations do have projects, for example some temple federations run orphanages, pre-schools, and homes for elderly and disabled people, but many of these are centre, rather than community, based and Hindu temple priests do not normally undertake community services. cxxviii Community based organisations The CBO is the institutional mechanism preferred by the majority of agencies and beneficiaries (especially men) for the administration and implementation of project activities at the local level. In Sri Lanka, most of the societies or CBOs that are involved in humanitarian action have not emerged organically from within communities but have been formed by aid agencies with the explicit purpose of facilitating, administering and/or managing projects in line with fairly instrumental goals of reaching project objectives. This has implications for their sustainability and at times also for their outreach and acceptance within the community. CBOs are especially prevalent in relocation and resettlement villages, whereas, largely because of government restrictions (particularly in Vavuniya), the ability of camp residents to form CBOs is quite limited in most cases. Also, since CBOs suit a more developmental approach to humanitarian assistance they are less well matched with the more traditional mode of relief delivery that is employed by many of the agencies operating in camps. Several of the local and national NGOs in Vavuniya have spawned large numbers of CBOS, although providing adequate support on such a scale can be difficult. Sewa Lanka has formed 88 village-level CBOs in communities throughout the district of Vavuniya and provides them with training in group formation, team building, CBO strengthening, and financial management. In most cases these organisations are set up to accomplish a specific task, such as the provision of loans or credit to support agricultural development, although generally Sewa Lanka s longer term goal is to have them gradually assume responsibility for the development of a whole village. As far as we were able to establish, the CBO is the most explicitly participatory mechanism in humanitarian action in Sri Lanka, and clients who are members of CBOs tend to be far more positive about the impact of humanitarian interventions than those who are not. What distinguishes CBO membership from many other kinds of client investment in projects is that it provides the opportunity, at least for those in the management committee, to assume administrative and managerial responsibilities rather than being confined to providing manual labour. In other words, assuming that the organisation is successful, membership of a CBO can produce far higher levels of personal gratification than mere involvement in projects. However, it should be emphasised that the extent to which these organisations become self-managed, autonomous bodies with responsibility for their own funds is highly variable. Following considerable investment in capacity building, some agencies transfer funds direct to the CBO, the money normally being administered by the CBO management committee and held in a bank account. Other agencies prefer to 67

68 hold accounts on behalf of the CBO, requiring clients to deposit funds at their project office on a regular basis. Similarly, while in some cases the CBO management committee is elected by the membership on a regular basis, often at an annual general meeting, in other cases committee members are selected by animators. High levels of intervention in CBO management may appear necessary to agencies who are wary of project failure but they raise serious questions about the sustainability of humanitarian measures and about the degree to which participation has truly been institutionalised at the community level. In many cases CBOs are divided along gender lines. Indeed, some agencies argue that mixed organisations do not function very effectively in Sri Lanka. Segregation tends to reflect observed differences in the priorities of men and women and in their responses to humanitarian emergencies, as much as agency preconceptions with regards to gender differences. As noted, while men tend to focus on micro finance and roads, reservoirs and other aspects of physical infrastructure, women are more likely to focus on nutrition, and educational and social services. That said, we encountered plenty of women s CBOs in which credit and loans are geared to self-employment and production, possibly because of the prevalence of female-headed and femalemanaged households in the north and east. cxxix It should be noted that CBO membership in Sri Lanka is not limited only to adults. There are examples of CBO formation amongst children which are also highly effective in ensuring local level participation and mobilisation. cxxx Camp Committees On the whole, residents of IDP/returnee camps in Jaffna enjoy greater freedoms than do those who live in camps in Vavuniya. Consequently, they have been able to form camp committees that are now (despite some opposition from government) organised into a federation that stretches to both the divisional and district levels. The committees are presided over by elected officials who act as camp representatives before the authorities and at the NGO council. The president of a committee is a comparatively powerful person within the camp. For example, the GS of Chunnagam South Division J/196 said that he was reliant on the Camp Committee President for the selection of beneficiaries for a UNHCR loan scheme, stating that this man had far more intimate knowledge of residents than he. cxxxi Both the NGO council for the Jaffna peninsula and the camp committees have decided to adopt a political rather than service role in relation to their constituency. The key objective of the committees is to facilitate the return of camp residents to their original homes, and to this end they co-ordinate with the NGO council in lobbying and advocacy for displaced populations throughout the peninsular. They have also applied pressure on government and the humanitarian community to improve facilities and services in the camps, although this appears to be a lesser goal. Camp committees are in a rather anomalous position. At one level, they could be said to epitomise participation by camp residents in that they play an active role in the struggle to obtain their fundamental entitlements. However, because of the political stance adopted by the committees, their possible links to the LTTE and their persistent and at times almost hostile lobbying of the humanitarian community, aid agencies tend to be wary of them. Staff of international agencies in Jaffna told us that in their view the structure does not function effectively, in that while the committees have a 68

69 just claim and a just cause, they seldom use constructive means to achieve their ends. In a sense, this reveals just how uncomfortable agencies can feel when crisis-affected populations rather than the agencies state the terms for mutual engagement Local and national partner organisations Many international organisations in Sri Lanka have now ceased to be operational and have begun instead to work in partnership with government, or local or national nongovernmental organisations. These partnerships have several important implications for participation, as we reveal in this section. The rationale for partnerships The transition from direct operational involvement to implementation through partners has been taken for granted by many as the most effective means of increasing efficiency, accountability and sustainability in humanitarian action, building local civil society capacity and reinforcing democratic governance and beneficiary participation. Also, it reflects recognition by many international agencies that they simply do not have the capacity to increase people s participation in projects and are therefore reliant on partners for this. There are a number of large and well established local and national NGOs in Sri Lanka, although not all of these are involved in humanitarian action and of those that are, not all have managed to sustain their capacity and outreach through the years of conflict. Due to the many difficulties involved, quite a few local and national agencies work in areas affected by the conflict: not in the camps and not in the delivery of relief, but rather in rehabilitation and developmental activities. We tried to find out whether there are any differences in beneficiary perceptions of the participatory approaches of national or international organisations, but no obvious trend could be discerned. For many people, gauging agency performance seems to have more to do with the nature of the intervention, degree of support, perceived benefits, the qualities of field officers and so on. However, it is apparent that agencies with a strong and supportive local presence in the form of animators and field officers and agencies that encourage CBO development are viewed more positively than agencies that turn up only intermittently. And, in the main, local and national organisations are better suited to this more intensive engagement than international agencies. Moreover, it is very clear that international agencies that work with government are consistently regarded by clients as less sympathetic towards clients than those who work with nongovernmental bodies. The limitations of partnerships As we have already noted, working with government presents many difficulties. There are also certain constraints in partnerships with NGOs. During political crises local and national NGOs may become severely debilitated by the loss of skilled personnel through displacement. Also, their neutrality may be heavily compromised by pressures from political or military groups. In many areas of the north and east the political wing of the LTTE is exercising a powerful influence over both regional NGO co-ordinating bodies and some of their individual member organisations. Such pressures have led many of the international agencies to withdraw from these consortia and in certain areas a rift is gradually emerging between international and national organisations. Other international agencies take the view that if you want to 69

70 support war-affected populations you have to work with national bodies, however politicised they may be. Another limitation, already noted, is that some respondents revealed very strong resentment of local NGOs, in part because of the resources these organisations are seen to utilise for their own purposes. cxxxii In all cases working with local and national partners in programmes that invite a high level of beneficiary participation is extremely time consuming. There is a great deal of work to be done, for example, to overcome traditional top down modes of project delivery and to build the appropriate skills. There is a need for careful appraisal of local partner NGOs prior to offering support as well as for close monitoring, accompaniment and capacity building. In Jaffna in particular, prohibitions on foreign funding of local NGOs, a brain drain due to decades of conflict, economic and service decline and isolation from wider learning opportunities in the field of humanitarian action has had a marked negative impact on local NGOs in recent years. cxxxiii International agencies have also found it difficult to work with CBOs on the peninsula because they have been scattered through displacement. Only in the past months has it become possible to fund local NGOs again, but because they are reduced in number and capacity they cannot adequately meet the partnership requirements of the international community. Staff of several international agencies expressed a very legitimate concern that under these circumstances they feel more distanced from and less accountable to aid recipients than in the past. This problem is emphasised, they argued, in advocacy projects in which service provision is minimal or non-existent. They queried whether it is possible to sustain client participation when project partners are so weak. 3. Funding and participation Funding can play a major role in either facilitating or undermining participation by aid recipients in projects and processes affecting them. In this section we examine the role of funding in this regard The potential of donors to promote participation The key players Traditionally the donor community in Sri Lanka has not been particularly engaged with the issue of conflict, although there are some notable exceptions and there are signs that things are changing, especially since the MOU. At present, 85% of development funding is received from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Japanese government. In terms of support for humanitarian interventions in the north and east the World Bank is a major player, while the Japanese government has provided more limited support. cxxxiv Other important donors of humanitarian aid are the United Nations, the European Community, bilateral donors such as Germany, Canada, Sweden, the UK, Norway, the Netherlands, Italy and the US and a range of INGOs. cxxxv Policies and strategies Donor policy has major implications for beneficiary participation in humanitarian action. Participatory approaches require a process orientation in humanitarian measures. This implies flexibility in funding cycles, approach and methods of 70

71 implementation, as well as in the outcomes sought. Participation is a slow process especially when it involves war-affected populations who have experienced multiple disruptions and losses and who have little reason to trust outsiders. It is the view of agencies such as DfID that participatory approaches require open, flexible funding arrangements based on the concept of partnership rather than on the more traditional hierarchical relationship between donor and implementing partner. cxxxvi There is also a need for greater transparency, which means that donors may seek to take part in project reviews and evaluations and to provide advice and support and understand obstacles to implementation rather than penalise agencies for failure to deliver agreed outputs. The World Bank is encouraging all its projects in Sri Lanka to adopt a Community Driven Development Approach, which could provide a major incentive for increased participation of aid recipients, although it is not clear how government and the LTTE will react to this move. Donors may have to agree to procedural changes, such as accepting self-monitoring and evaluation by clients and implementing partners rather than evaluation by outsiders hired by the donor. Finally, logical frameworks and other planning and monitoring tools must incorporate not just quantitative but also qualitative components and must also be fully adaptable to changing needs and circumstances. In this regard, certain donor organisations were mentioned to us as particularly supportive of participatory measures, largely because they are felt to understand and encourage a process orientation and are prepared to tolerate some of the delays and risks entailed in implementation. The advocacy role adopted by some of the donors in relation to government and other more conservative donors is also much appreciated in many quarters, as are efforts to improve donor co-ordination. These factors are all thought to help provide a more positive climate for client participation, although they may require major attitudinal and organisational change among donors. This theme was taken up by a senior UNHCR staff person in Vavuniya. cxxxvii He argued that in light of the changing circumstances in Sri Lanka following the MOU, his agency needs to adopt a new role: We shouldn t be thinking in terms of micro projects and money any longer. We need to be present in the Vanni and to inform those who re thinking of returning about land mines, security and services not that we should promote return. We need to move toward funding advocacy and human rights although we can expect client resistance and agencies may have difficulties with implementation Detrimental aspects of funding policy The limitations of emergency funding Some humanitarian actors in Sri Lanka are highly critical of donors who they see as frustrating attempts to improve participation by aid recipients. Staff in one of the smaller international agencies complained that donors tend only to be interested in supporting the high profile agencies with high absorptive capacity. They maintained that these agencies do not do hands on work with beneficiaries, are bureaucratic and not very participatory and that donors should be more willing to support smaller, more innovative, grass roots initiatives. One observed of donors that they like the 71

72 terminology of participation to be in proposals but their commitment to participation is not very high. There is an inherent contradiction between participatory models and traditional emergency funding arrangements in the humanitarian field. For many donors, funding for emergency operations tends by definition to be immediate and short-term, even when the humanitarian crisis itself is long-term. Moreover, the kind of flexibility that is a prerequisite for participatory projects does not always rest well with a focus on tangible, measurable outputs that characterises much relief and rehabilitation work. As the regional co-ordinator of one international NGO stated: Implementing agencies have to provide deliverables to justify their overheads and if they don t disburse deliverables they re told they are inefficient in evaluations. And in the words of another critic: By virtue of the long period of instability, funds are given for quick delivery and measurable, quantifiable impacts and this works against community mobilisation. The environment is not conducive, so funds and programmes talk a different language. And beneficiaries who ve become very dependent over time are impatient for handouts. cxxxviii That said, while most of the assistance provided to the north and east is covered by emergency budget lines, this does not mean that funding is necessarily disbursed on short-term emergency cycles. AusAid allows two-year funding, DfID supports fouryear cycles and in some cases World Vision in Batticaloa works to a 15-year cycle. In line with the funding regime recently agreed between DfID and Oxfam-GB in Vavuniya, Oxfam is now able to allow for a more organic growth of projects. The agency has set aside a period of around six to nine months for negotiation and discussion with potential and actual beneficiaries prior to delivery of any goods or services and this is regarded as a major step forward in terms of facilitating participation. Unrealistic expectations One of the main complaints, made by both agency staff and aid recipients, is that donors tend to have preconceived ideas about the levels of participation that can be expected. As indicated, many stipulate that beneficiaries must make a specified labour contribution, but often this is not perceived as a stimulus for participation so much as a means of reducing project costs. Further, many civilians find it difficult to make this kind of contribution, especially when the project is not a high priority for them and when it is on a short funding cycle. This point is illustrated by one example that we came across in a camp in Vavuniya. In an RDF project supported through UNHCR s QIP scheme it was decided to build three wells. Levels of interest in this project were high among the camp residents and they agreed to build the wells themselves, forming a CBO for the supervision and management of the resource. But in the event, implementation was delayed and due to donor pressure to complete and report on the project, RDF felt obliged to hire contractors to do the construction work. This proved a highly unsatisfactory outcome for all concerned. Camp residents complained that the work had been poorly executed on a low budget and when they showed us the well to prove their point, it was empty. RDF was also unhappy because it was apparent to them that by being forced to take a 72

73 short cut they had compromised their efforts to foster client participation in the project. Even staff at the regional UNHCR office registered their disquiet, admitting that their funding policy was forcing many agencies to dig wells themselves, thereby destroying their participatory efforts. In order to overcome these difficulties and to extend project cycles, some agencies resort to linking successive micro projects thereby beginning a sustainable and durable process. For example, ACF in Jaffna had a three-year development plan that was chopped up into six-month emergency segments so that they could obtain funding. But this merely shows how agency personnel are sometimes forced to subvert the institutional structures within which they work in order to achieve more participatory goals. 4. Summary and observations We have maintained that humanitarian agencies must have ideas about what beneficiary participation is intended to achieve in order to have clear objectives, to be fully cognisant of the costs and risks and to develop appropriate and effective operational strategies. In Part IV we began by exploring some of the factors that need to be taken into account when deciding which approach to beneficiary participation to employ. This was followed by a discussion of the means that are typically used by agencies in Sri Lanka to facilitate participation. These means are used in varying ways, degrees and forms depending on the model of participation adopted. We have argued that humanitarian agencies are heavily reliant on locally recruited change agents to mobilise people in villages and camps to take an active part in project implementation. The orientation and training of these animators is of critical importance to project outcome, as is their support. Many agencies regard the recruitment of animators and mobilisation of beneficiaries as a first step in creating a more formal institutional structure (commonly a CBO) within which collective social action can be promoted and directed. These structures vary in the extent to which they become truly self-governing, autonomous entities and often in practice remain very dependent on the implementing agency. Management of CBO funds by implementing agencies poses very real limits to beneficiary empowerment and self-efficacy. Overall, according to aid recipients, the most effective participatory initiatives are those that employ targeted strategies, supporting specific social groups or categories (especially women and children) in their capacity building and empowerment. Participatory efforts with men seem to flounder more often than do those with women. This is possibly because humanitarian measures normally take place in communities whilst men are at work elsewhere, or it could be due to inordinately high rates of alcohol use among men in the north and east. With the increased reliance on partnerships with local and national organisations, the lengthening of funding cycles and development of more open and flexible relations between donors and implementing agencies there have been some very promising trends in institutional relations in recent years. To this we should add efforts in some quarters to create less authoritarian management structures and styles within the aid community and improve aid co-ordination more generally. Certain donors have played an important role in this respect, encouraging implementing partners to avoid 73

74 duplication and collaborate with each other whenever possible. These developments have considerable potential to further promote beneficiary participation. Nevertheless, there remain serious problems in some sections of the aid community in terms of political intervention in humanitarian action, high turnover in staff, inflexible and short funding cycles, competition over beneficiary populations and conflicting aims and strategies. In many cases, humanitarian actors that are party to major decisions and policies that have a crucial impact on the lives of beneficiaries make little or no effort to consult with or keep affected populations informed. Such trends undermine agency: beneficiary relations and threaten the efforts of other agencies to be more participatory. 74

75 V. Recommendations In Part I of this report it was stated that the field research in Sri Lanka set out to test the hypothesis that active consultation with and participation by crisis-affected populations in measures to assist them is, according to aid-recipients and other key stakeholders, both feasible and beneficial. On the basis of our findings we would suggest that consultation and the timely provision of accurate information on critical issues is greatly valued by beneficiaries and is a must in all circumstances. From the point of view of aid recipients, consultation and information provision are important instruments through which agencies demonstrate respect for their clients. They are also the means by which beneficiaries can gain a greater sense of control over their lives. Assuming that the environmental conditions are sufficiently conducive, aid implementers have the appropriate skills and capacity, donors are supportive and aid recipients view the idea favourably, more active and meaningful participation is also feasible within the field of humanitarian action. However, recognising that the employment of more participatory approaches presents many challenges, the following recommendations are made: 1. There is insufficient debate within agencies about what they mean by and aspire to with regard to beneficiary participation. It is important that humanitarian actors with a commitment to the concept of participation develop a strong organisational consensus on the underlying approach, expectations and intentions of participation and that these be fully discussed and negotiated not just with staff, donors and partner organisations but also with aid recipients. 2. Participation should never be imposed. Out of respect for the entitlements and integrity of clients and in recognition of some of the very real constraints they face, participatory approaches should not be introduced in the context of humanitarian action unless there is clear understanding of what they entail and full support among civilians. Humanitarian actors should be transparent at every stage about the requirements and potential consequences of participatory programming. They need continuously to make informed choices to avoid internal contradictions in programming. Equally, it is vital to agree with beneficiaries at the outset whether there really is value added in introducing participatory mechanisms. 3. Almost anything that an agency does when it intervenes in a conflict area has a potential impact on protection, positive or negative, that can render people more or less vulnerable. cxxxix This holds true with participatory approaches to humanitarian assistance and is especially applicable in areas where civilians are prone to violations committed by political, administrative, law enforcement and military agents and exploitation by racketeers, extortionists and other criminal elements. Participatory approaches must be accompanied by a continuous process of risk assessment that examines the situation of both beneficiaries and staff. 75

76 4. When agencies attempt to work in a participatory way, this is not a 'cost free' activity. The costs should be calculated as far as possible, and decisions made on the basis of informed debate, rather than in a haphazard and unconsidered way. 5. Because of time constraints and limitations in outreach, participatory approaches may not always be useful or feasible during an acute and large-scale emergency. However, operational agencies need to be more systematic about consultation and information sharing even when they do not propose to employ participatory approaches. Evidence suggests that aid recipients are most frustrated of all by a lack of information about relief aid, government policy and other critical decisions and issues affecting them. 6. Emergency relief responses seldom have the luxury of engaging with their client population on an intensive and long term basis, although rehabilitation and development-orientated humanitarian initiatives in resettlement and relocation villages may do. In Sri Lanka most humanitarian measures are episodic in nature and beneficiary: agency relations are at times quite tenuous. Given these circumstances and the multitude of environmental constraints that prevail, it is often most realistic to adopt a more instrumental approach to participation. 7. Instrumental modes of participation are not necessarily empowering in and of themselves. This does not mean that they are worthless, since they can certainly improve project efficacy and impact, but it does imply that projects implemented using a technical or instrumental mode of participation should not then be criticised for failing to empower clients. 8. If donors require evidence of client participation from implementing partners, they should not impose systems and procedures that undermine this (for example short funding cycles, rigid external evaluations, or inflexible log frame planning). In effect, blueprint programming undermines even the possibility of participatory work. The notion of donors working in partnership with implementing agencies is particularly helpful in this regard since it implies a more fruitful mechanism for promoting participation than more traditional hierarchical relations. 9. Some agency staff feel uncomfortable about using participatory techniques knowing that their mandate may restrict them to a sector that is of little or no priority to crisis-affected populations. The inherent tension between prescriptive policies and mandates and the expectations of civilians that agencies will respond to their perceived concerns and needs adversely affects both staff morale and agency relations with beneficiaries. Implementing agencies need to decide to what extent they are prepared to respond to priorities articulated by beneficiaries, especially when these fall outside their mandate or strategic/country plan. If agencies are not prepared to deviate from their mandate and agenda, they must be open about this with beneficiaries. Agencies that are not able to respond to the concerns of civilians need to be aware that this will effectively prevent them from working towards a more transformative approach to participation. 10. Agencies that seek to promote beneficiary participation need to adhere to participatory values and practices within their own organisation, as reflected in the organisational culture, systems, structure and procedures. The attitude and 76

77 personality of individual staff members makes a major difference to the responses to participatory measures by crisis-affected populations. Also important is the degree of openness, responsiveness and flexibility of the agency as a whole. Particular attention needs to be paid to management style, staff selection and training. Some humanitarian agencies that are committed to participatory approaches have prioritised technical and managerial competencies over other skills that are more useful for engaging with beneficiaries and encouraging their active involvement with projects. Emphasis on inter-personal skills, social and cultural sensitivity and awareness, a commitment to egalitarian and democratic principles, an openness to listen, learn and change, an understanding of participatory methodology and methods and an ability to work in teams would be more helpful. 11. It is apparent that in the context of humanitarian action there are many difficulties in sustaining participation through to the end of the project cycle and levels of engagement are commonly highest at the outset. For projects to have desired impacts, however, beneficiary involvement needs to be sustained during planning, implementation and impact assessment. This means working actively to overcome systemic and contextual constraints that hamper participation throughout the cycle. On the other hand, a decline in interest in participation during implementation may reflect the low priority given to humanitarian measures, which implies the need for more effective participatory assessment of priorities and needs at the outset. 12. The transition from direct operational involvement by international organisations to implementation through local and national partners is an important step in strengthening civil society development. However, it should not be assumed that this will automatically facilitate participation especially in the context of a civil conflict such as that in Sri Lanka. Given the political, economic and other pressures on local and national partner organisations, there is a need to carefully appraise such organisations and also to provide them with continuous accompaniment and support. Working with local and national partners in participatory programmes is very time consuming since it is important to overcome traditional top down modes of project delivery, build capacity and undertake monitoring. 13. While international agencies have made efforts to build the capacity of local and national partners to implement more participatory approaches, sometimes high turnover of (expatriate) staff, unrealistic funding cycles and other problems among international organisations undermines these efforts. In other words, while international agencies are the ones most anxious to introduce participatory measures and perceive their local and national partners as being crucial in this process, they do not always take the appropriate steps themselves to promote this process. 14. Aid recipients in Sri Lanka have in some areas been involved in a myriad of relief interventions, including some that have entailed payment for participation in meetings and other programme activities. This leads to confusion and cynicism among recipients. Some agencies have made a great deal of effort to improve aid co-ordination whereas some continue to operate as if they are acting in an 77

78 environment devoid of other players. Institutional co-ordination and collaboration are essential adjuncts to successful participatory projects. 15. Choices need to be made by agencies about the extent to which they are rigidly committed to humanitarian principles, since participatory work cannot be undertaken without some engagement with political actors, if only to secure access to and safety of civilians. 16. In many cases, aid recipients in Sri Lanka showed little interest in increasing their participation in humanitarian projects and they sometimes seemed to be quite unconcerned about the work of humanitarian agencies more generally. This may be due to the rather limited role of humanitarian assistance in the country in relation to other sources of livelihood and support. However, it could be due to a focus by agencies on items and services that are not of priority interest to civilians. Given the obvious concern civilians have about issues of governance and violations by security agents, interest in participation may be greater if programming were to be more explicitly directed towards protection, security and related issues. 17. If agency engagement with the government of Sri Lanka makes it impossible to programme in a participatory way, agencies should acknowledge this and either accept the consequences or challenge the status quo. 18. Many agencies recognise that to engage in participatory programmes it is important to create, insofar as this is possible, an enabling environment in which empowerment of crisis-affected civilians does not lead to resistance and hostility by other sections of the population or by military and security forces. Many regard advocacy and awareness-raising as having an important role to play in this endeavour. However, examples of truly participatory advocacy programmes are rare, the inclination being to recruit and train animators to teach civilian populations about human rights and other related issues. Advocacy efforts need to be grounded in the perspectives and concerns of crisis-affected populations and their impact requires consistent monitoring and evaluation. Agencies that engage in advocacy without also providing direct support to crisis-affected populations risk a loss of credibility with those populations. 19. Close and developed relationships between assistance providers and aid recipients are in effect a pre-requisite for participatory work. If participatory efforts are to be meaningful, more time and attention needs to be given to building relationships, informal as well as formal, between individual agency staff and beneficiaries. This implies the need for more continuous engagement with aid recipients. 20. The use of PRA is very far from being synonymous with participation. PRA tools and methods should be employed with extreme caution. They should only be used in an open and collaborative way and not prescriptively as a means of obtaining information, forging consensus or to comply with donor agency requirements. 21. Since relief and rehabilitation are often aimed at the household rather than community level and since in Sri Lanka participation at the household level tends to be stronger, agencies need to find creative ways of bringing groups of 78

79 households together around common interests. This is important for sustainability and outreach. However, it is not apparent that traditional modes of collective organisation and action are effective in many cases. A clear assessment of the modes of organisation and action preferred by different sections of the population rather than the introduction of standardised CBO structures and mechanisms would be of great utility. The evidence regarding participatory programmes with children in Sri Lanka suggests that collective mobilisation of the young may be easier to achieve. Furthermore, mobilising the children and adolescents in community-oriented activities may provide a useful starting-point for the mobilisation of the wider community. cxl 22. Humanitarian intervention implies equal access to all civilians, regardless of personal attributes, social origin or political affiliation. Equitable distribution of assistance is a fundamental tenet of participatory approaches also. Nevertheless, in Sri Lanka the wealthier and better-educated civilians tend to have greater access to assistance. Because socio-economic and power differences between beneficiaries (especially in camps) may be very small and subtle, agencies tend to think in generic terms about communities and their constituent social categories. They often resort to stereotypic notions of household, community, gender and generation. It seems likely that participatory programming in the absence of a thorough understanding of the local society is unachievable. This implies that agencies need to be prepared to spend more time learning about the socio-political context. Rigorous application of participatory social analysis increases the likelihood of developing equitable and participatory programmes. Such an analysis should reveal: which social units and categories are operative at the local level decision making, power and conflict dynamics of gender and age/generation patterns of vulnerability assets, resource access and control social networks and systems of support coping and survival strategies 23. Agencies that are committed to participatory approaches need to reflect closely on their conceptualisations of and attitudes towards aid recipients, since these have a profound influence not merely on individual staff conduct, but also on organisational objectives and strategies. A view of beneficiaries as dependent, passive victims is unlikely to help promote their participation in projects. 24. It may be significant that some of the initiatives with the highest level of client participation are framed as psychosocial measures. We have noted that this may be due to the common focus in these measures on human and societal development and their tendency to embrace notions of empowerment as a means of overcoming adversity. We have also argued that it may be related to their integrated view of civilian need. So long as they do not adopt a narrow clinical model, psychosocial projects have the potential to be far more holistic than most other sector-based initiatives and can integrate economic, social, cultural and political components as and when appropriate. Such flexibility allows agencies to 79

80 address the concerns that are most pressing to clients and build measures around client, rather than agency, priorities. 25. In general, projects that entail a more meaningful role for beneficiaries in project execution than the provision of unskilled labour are more highly rated by beneficiaries. We saw how people who have been trained as volunteer animators or assumed a role in CBO management value the competencies they thereby develop. Many noted also how they have been able to apply these new skills in the improvement of their own and their community s condition and circumstances. 26. For many, a commitment to participation is an article of faith, based on the intuitive belief that participatory projects are more efficient and effective and respond more directly to beneficiary concerns. However, only by establishing effective baseline information and ensuring systematic participatory monitoring and evaluation will it be possible to test and validate this assumption. 27. While it is often assumed that participatory processes, which are supposed to build on local insight, knowledge, expertise and skills, will automatically be more responsive to local coping mechanisms, in practice this may not be the case. Since by definition humanitarian action occurs in contexts in which civilian livelihoods are under severe pressure, it is essential to ensure that beneficiary participation supports and does not undermine local strategies of survival and disaster management. 28. Since camp dwellers tend to show less interest in investing their time and energy in building and maintaining communal facilities which they see as temporary and since there is some evidence that camp life is not conducive to collective social action, agencies need to be cautious about introducing participatory measures in these settings. Additionally, in some areas of Sri Lanka (particularly Vavuniya) empowerment poses a threat to personal safety due to control of camps by government and security forces. Advocacy and protection come to the fore in these situations. 29. We have suggested that, for a number of possible reasons, participatory programmes with children and youth have greater impact on personal and broader societal development than do measures with adults. To an extent the success of these projects may be due to the youth of their beneficiaries, since young people often show greater adaptability and optimism in the face of conflict. However, there is more to it than this. These interventions generally entail greater consistency of contact between agencies and beneficiaries than projects with adults and couched often in terms of psychosocial development they tend to have clearer objectives in terms of the personal, social and other competencies they seek to enhance in beneficiaries. 30. Targeting assistance at female-headed households, children and other groups that are likely to be especially vulnerable seems in many ways to be justified in terms of impact. Nevertheless, humanitarian aid needs to incorporate all crisis-affected populations insofar as it is able. Since there is quite a bit of evidence that in many cases men are not well-integrated into participatory projects, agencies in Sri Lanka need to explore the reasons for this and devise more imaginative and effective 80

81 strategies for incorporating them. This may mean introducing more interventions based at the work site and more active efforts to counteract the high (and apparently growing) levels of alcohol use. 81

82 Notes i Humanitarian Action is defined broadly by ALNAP as Assistance, protection, and advocacy actions undertaken on an impartial basis in response to human needs resulting from complex political emergencies and natural hazards (ALNAP 2002). ii To study problems of displaced persons and to propose solutions conforming to justice and to the dignity of the human person Constitution of the Eastern Rehabilitation Organization (ERO) based in Batticaloa District, 1985 and as amended in 1989 and See also, WFP s Mission Statement (p.6) which commits the agency to a participatory approach. iii The Humanitarian Accountability Project, in a discussion note, states that: Humanitarian ethic requires that, where possible, people affected by disasters be given relevant information and a meaningful say in what is done on their behalf and for their intended benefit. (HAP discussion note ). iv Section on Community Involvement, P. 61 Para 32. v INTRAC (2001) Research Priorities for ALNAP s Global Study on Consultation with and Participation by Beneficiary and Affected Populations in Planning, Managing, Monitoring and Evaluating Humanitarian Aid. vi INTRAC (2001) Research Priorities for ALNAP s Global Study on Consultation with and Participation by Beneficiary and Affected Populations in Planning, Managing, Monitoring and Evaluating Humanitarian Aid. vii We note that the study is intended as a review and synthesis of perspectives and practice in relation to participation and not as an evaluation of the effectiveness or impact of individual projects or agencies. viii Obstacles to participatory work experienced by humanitarian agencies (relating to access, gatekeepers, time and logistical constraints) were encountered in some degree by the research team also. At no point was it possible for aid recipients and affected populations to take control of the research process. On the contrary, it was felt that to a large extent, the nature and scope of the research was not well understood by communities visited, despite careful and repeated explanation. It should be noted that in Sri Lanka refusing to attend a meeting on any topic when called by a high status individual or group is not considered acceptable. Therefore, many of the people who attended meetings with the research team at the village level probably did so initially out of a sense of duty, even when they subsequently became interested and committed to the process. This is also likely to be true of most agency meetings in villages and camps in the areas studies. ix The local branch of CARITAS. x See for example Bastian, S. (1999) The Failure of State Formation, Identity Conflict and Civil Society Responses - The Case of Sri Lanka. University of Bradford Centre for Conflict Resolution Working Paper 2 Department of Peace Studies; and Goodhand, J. (2001) Conflict Assessments: Aid, conflict and peace building in Sri Lanka. Conflict, Security and Development Group, Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College. xi On the grounds that the study focused on humanitarian assistance provided to war-affected populations in the north and east of Sri Lanka, the historical discussion in this section of the report is limited to the ethnic conflict between the Tamils and Sinhalese, which has concentrated mainly in these areas. However, in practice, conflict in Sri Lanka is an island-wide phenomenon and arises from a profound crisis in state formation. In all areas there are serious problems of governance, election violence, army deserters and corruption in political circles. We note in particular that there has been a major conflict in the south between different factions of the Sinhalese population, resulting from an uprising led by the JVP. xii In 2000 a US Department of State report claimed that the conflict had caused the death of approximately 60,000 people. In 1997 the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies estimated that the total deaths from the conflict since 1983 were in the region of 78,000 to 100,000. Both figures are cited in Armed Conflicts Report xiii xiv NPC / MARGA. 2001: 14. Cost of the War in Sri Lanka. xv Sriskandarajah, D. (2002) The Migration-Development Nexus: Sri Lanka case study CDR, Denmark. xvi The Refugee Council, Sri Lankan Project (2002) Sri Lanka: Return to Uncertainty. London, UK. 82

83 xvii The pro-government Tamil militant groups now support the LTTE s political position. The support of the President for the cease-fire agreement appears not be assured and there are some concerns in the south in particular that it cedes a lot of ground to the LTTE, which some allege Norway favours. xviii The Refugee Council, Sri Lankan Project (2002) Sri Lanka: Return to Uncertainty. London, UK, p4. xix Briefing Note UNHCR Vavuniya March 2002, greater Vavuniya, Sri Lanka. xx Haug, M (nd) Combining Service Delivery and Advocacy within Humanitarian Agencies: experiences from the conflict in Sri Lanka International Working Paper 10. xxi Drawing on lessons learned from their Listening to the Displaced/Listening to the Returned research in the Vanni and Jaffna, Oxfam-GB and Save the Children UK have committed themselves to: ensure the active participation of beneficiaries, especially women and children, in all stages of our activities; continue to demonstrate the importance and value of children s participation, and provide technical assistance to agencies and local authorities to encourage active listening to children s voices and consideration of their needs. xxii Raga Alphonsus, Programme Manager, ZOA Refugee Care, Netherlands. Mannar xxiii Michael Lindenbauer, Senior Protection Officer, UNHCR, xxiv Michael Lindenbauer, Senior Protection Officer, UNHCR, Colombo xxv Sunil Bastian, Research fellow and consultant on social development, International Centre for Ethnic studies. Colombo, xxvi DANIDA Guide to the preparation and management of humanitarian assistance implemented by xxvii WFP (2000) Policy Issues paper Participatory Approaches presented to WFP Executive Board October (p.6). xxviii Donors often require an explicit commitment to participation in project proposals as for example xxix A question about organisational policy and staff training on the Sphere Standards and other international norms and standards was included in virtually all of the interviews with agency personnel in Colombo and the field study areas. Possibly because Sri Lanka is not in an acute emergency, few people appeared to be very familiar with these standards and most had not received training in this field. Oxfam-GB was a notable exception to this general finding. xxx Some agencies also engage in advocacy and protection activities, although to a far lesser extent, and generally in a less participatory manner. xxxi See also INTRAC Participatory Tools for Food Security. Draft report prepared for WFP. xxxii Donors such as DfID have played a leading role in promoting human rights and empowerment approaches within humanitarian action in Sri Lanka. xxxiii Save The Children UK is one of the few agencies in Sri Lanka to have attempted to foster participation during this phase of humanitarian intervention by consulting its clients on their preferences in relation to relief items. Perceived needs included productive equipment and school supplies, items that are not normally included in relief packages. Project beneficiaries were very positive about having been consulted and in the main felt that their choice of relief items was effective. Local staff in Jaffna generally approved of the participatory model the agency had devised. However, the consultation process took 3-4 months, and was very labour intensive and time consuming and hence limited project coverage. Staff emphasised that the approach had to be abandoned during the 2000 emergency when there was no time or opportunity for such levels of consultation. Added to this, in the 2000 emergency response sector demarcations limited agency mandates and co-ordination efforts meant that individual agencies were assigned to populations with whom they had no previous connections. Since participatory approaches are generally facilitated by prior contact with and knowledge of affected populations, it is apparent that these decisions further inhibited consultative efforts. xxxiv Steve Hollingworth, Country Director, Care International, Colombo xxxv The pass system has always been our biggest problem. Just to go to Kandy you had to give three photos (that s Rs 100) and three forms (another Rs 30) to the camp officer for certification. He d pass these papers to the GS for approval. Then they d go to the camp police station. Another police station outside the camp would do an enquiry into your birth, life and everything. This could take days. Enquiries were done in order of application (using a token system) and the queues were very long. We d often have to miss meals. When the enquiry was over, they d inform the camp police station. They wouldn t tell us the results, but posted our names on a board outside their office. It sometimes took weeks for our names to appear. We got permission to leave for a set number of days and set dates, 83

84 but they d decided which days to give us and often the timing wasn t convenient. Whatever we asked for, they d always give us less. Often the pass was for an emergency we d end up missing really important events like weddings and funerals. The police enforce the pass system in the name of protection. But even now we re not allowed to go to Anurhadapura with a temporary pass. In emergencies, like accompanying someone to hospital, we have to find someone with a permanent pass to go on our behalf. This means paying Rs 3 4,000 a day, as well as their expenses. Quote taken from Focus Group Discussion with women s empowerment group (SEED/Oxfam-GB) Sithamparapuram camp, Vavuniya. xxxvi Jason Hart (2002) Participation of Conflict-affected Children in Humanitarian Assistance Programming, learning from eastern Sri Lanka, unpublished draft report for CIDA, Colombo. xxxvii For example, local Tamil militia groups allied to the government have gained control over the distribution of rations delivered from Colombo. In many areas they are able to use the power this gives them to elicit support from the local populace for many of whom this food is a lifeline. It is unclear to what extent such practices are known about or endorsed by the government. xxxviii To cite just two examples: In one settlement in Vavuniya we learned that relocation onto state land had been organised by TELO, a pro-government militant Tamil group. And in a camp in Jaffna another pro-government group, the EPDP, had constructed a pre-school. As with so many of these measures, the pre-school is now defunct due to lack of funding for teachers salaries. xxxix In general, there is far less humanitarian activity in areas under LTTE control than in areas administered by the government. This is partly because the government makes it difficult for agencies to operate in these areas and partly because the political wing of the LTTE negotiates the terms and conditions by which humanitarian organisations operate in its territory and many agencies find these unacceptable. Importantly, the evidence suggests that the LTTE is also making a concerted effort to assume control of local aid agencies in government-held areas. xl Interview with late middle aged man, camp resident. xli Respondents often observed, not without irony, that the LTTE have a far more effective grasp over civilians and are far better at securing involvement in collective action than government. The LTTE has imposed a strict code of conduct on civilians through which participation in civic projects, civil defence and public services is enforced. For example, regular school inspections by LTTE officials ensure that teachers do actually attend to their jobs. This is in stark contrast to the situation in areas under full government control, where teacher attendance particularly in remote and conflict-affected areas is very poor. However, as far as can be ascertained, both the government (or possibly the SLA) and the LTTE oppose voluntary participation in humanitarian action, largely because it poses the possibility of civilian empowerment and assertiveness and also because they distrust the idea of civilians having close ties with international aid agencies. Local government officials are certainly accustomed to calling civilians in war-affected areas to undertake shramadana, of collective social action on public works. However, we did not come across any instances in which this labour was contributed voluntarily. xlii Kazuhiro Kaneko, Programme Officer, Vavuniya, xliii Because government provides rations as an automatic benefit for all Sri Lankan families below the poverty line and all those affected by displacement, relief is perceived by civilians to be a legitimate claim of all vulnerable citizens. As expressed by one agency staff member, aid is viewed as an entitlement and culturally this goes against the idea of participation (interview with Michael Lindenbauer, Senior Protection Officer, UNHCR, Colombo ). Indeed, many civilians make a clear distinction between aid given by the government (an entitlement) and aid given by the international community (a matter of luck, or fortune). xliv Patrick Vandenbruaene, Humanitarian Adviser, UN Office of the Resident Co-ordinator, Sri Lanka, Colombo xlv Michael Lindenbauer, Senior Protection Officer, UNHCR, Colombo, xlvi Selliah Vaithiyanathan, GS Chunnagam South Division J/196, Jaffna, xlvii It should be noted that some GS officers are extremely supportive towards displaced peoples and have done a great deal to assist them, for example by putting them in contact with human rights bodies and relief agencies. Some have taken great personal risk to support and protect war-affected communities and a few have lost their lives fulfilling these functions. xlviii Newman, J. (2002) IDP Experiences from Resettlement and Relocation in Mannar and Vavuniya Districts a qualitative study report. Second draft. DRC Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme, Sri Lanka, March, p 5. xlix MSF Netherlands (2001) Assessing Trauma in Sri Lanka; Psychosocial Questionnaire Vavuniya Survey Outcomes. The Netherlands, May. Rates of traumatic stress were also reported to be high. The 84

85 majority (87 per cent) of those surveyed said that most of the time they felt unsafe and few (12 per cent) wanted to remain in the camp, most wishing to go home or move somewhere away from the fighting. l The production and sale of kassipu has become a vital survival strategy in areas subject to conflictinduced destitution, but its consumption is believed to be linked with domestic violence, perceived by many as a causal factor in the inordinately high levels of suicide and attempted suicide among women. li Jeevan Thiagarajah, Director, the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies. lii Raga Alphonsus, Programme Manager, ZOA Refugee Care, Mannar, liii The situation of children and youth, however, may be different. The village-based school constitutes a space for bringing together the younger members of different households, regardless of social status. This, in turn, provides a useful starting-point for the further mobilisation of the young, as a group, for the purposes of community-level action. In other words, formal schooling sets a precedent for young people to interact on a regular basis, away from the household and, potentially, outside the constraints of caste and class. liv Nicoleen Saminathan, Project Director, CARE International, Jaffna lv Reticence about participation among poorer sections of the population even extends to representation, since respondents in several communities in Batticaloa stated that they did not see a particular need for self-representation in negotiations with government or humanitarian agencies. They argued that they generally benefit more when represented by educated and articulate members of their community because these people can normally elicit greater respect and hence have a greater chance of ensuring that community demands and expectations are met. Others stated that they would be happy to let a priest or another local leader act on their behalf, maintaining that this prevents arguments between community members. lvi Many of the latter are low caste up-country Tamils from the central highlands of Sri Lanka who, prior to the communal violence of the 1980s in particular, lived and worked on the tea estates. This group, which provides the bulk of casual unskilled labour for the residents of Vavuniya, is often disparaged by higher caste Tamils from areas such as Jaffna. lvii Another man in a FORUT savings project complained of other members of his savings group that: they are poor and uneducated they don t have the savings habit and don t work well together; they joined the club with unrealistic expectations. He commented that the disputes continued even after FORUT tried to resolve them and he decided eventually to leave the group. Interview with middle aged married man, shopkeeper. Asikulum relocation village lviii In other words, beneficiaries are confident about citing examples of concrete effects of participatory processes, but are less concerned about the nature of the participatory process itself and have no interest whatsoever in participation as an abstract, analytical concept. lix Thanamunai Colony, 22/03/02. lx Kuruvalai Camp in Tellipalai DS (am ). lxi Thunnalai North Mary Church J/417 Welfare Centre (12). lxii Similarly, in Vavuniya, beneficiaries were generally very positive about FORUT s efforts to encourage participatory processes, yet in one resettlement village they were extremely critical, even though FORUT had provided the community with a great deal of tangible support. Inhabitants felt that the decisions about who should be included in FORUT projects were unfair and that, due to a lack of consultation, the type of assistance they had received was inappropriate. Initially this seemed like a fairly clear disapproval of FORUT s work. Yet, further enquiry revealed an even greater disquiet about government, which had created and designed the community without consulting intended beneficiaries, used contractors to build sub-standard housing and made many promises that had not been kept. In the end it became apparent that in this community FORUT comes in for criticism precisely because it is more open and accessible than government and also because dissatisfaction with government undermines its own efforts. lxiii Meeting with ten women representatives of IDP camps, Jaffna peninsula lxiv As one senior member of the humanitarian community remarked, the very enthusiastic agency reaction to the Oxfam-GB and Save the Children UK Listening to the Displaced/Listening to the Returned initiative was notable not least because it revealed just how unaccustomed agencies really are to listening to clients. lxv M.L.S. Dias, Relief and Rehabilitation Officer, SEDEC (Caritas Sri Lanka), Colombo, lxvi This term was used quite frequently by agency personnel. Discussions with the Tamil speaking members of the research team revealed that the connotations of this term in English are possibly more negative and condescending than is intended in Tamil. lxvii Focus group discussion and semi-structured interviews with residents

86 lxviii They asked instead for better temporary structures, the intention being to demolish and take these with them when they return to KKS. lxix Meeting with ten women representatives of IDP camps throughout Jaffna peninsula, lxx Interview with male resident, Asikulum relocation village. lxxi ESCO claim to limit their participatory work with children in camps in the east because of lack of appropriate facilities such as a place to gather in large numbers. lxxii In areas where exposure to relief activities has been slight, and familiarity with the mechanisms of relief provision is low, the people at the front of the queue are often the best educated and connected and, arguably, not the most needy. In Kokkadicholai village near Batticaloa one woman asserted that richer people got help again and again, while the poor were entirely neglected. Other practical considerations (for example in livelihood security projects) have to do with beneficiaries solvency and potential to repay loans, this detracting from a policy of serving the poorest and most vulnerable. In all of the projects we reviewed, elderly people were less well represented than younger adults. lxxiii Several agencies admitted that the personality of the GS officer affects choice of project area, since some are more sympathetic to humanitarian measures and to participatory projects than others and it is generally easier to work with the more collaborative ones. lxxiv The GS at Sathiyakkadu Junction, Chulipram, (interviewed 6/4/02) insisted that it is problematic when agencies attempt to use a different set of criteria. lxxv Shanthi Sachithanandam (1996 ) Participatory Approaches to Development under Civil War Conditions. The Experience in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka In Bastian, S. and Bastian, N. (eds) Assessing Participation, a debate from South Asia. Delhi, India: Konark Publishers, p.19. lxxvi Newman, J. (2002) IDP Experiences from Resettlement and Relocation in Mannar and Vavuniya Districts a qualitative study report. Second draft. DRC Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme, Sri Lanka, March. lxxvii Interview with male shop keeper, married, mid-30s, in Kanthapuram resettlement village lxxviii Jason Hart (2002) Participation of Conflict-affected Children in Humanitarian Assistance Programming, learning from eastern Sri Lanka, unpublished draft report for CIDA, Colombo. lxxix To cite an example of the use of PRA: in the Save the Children UK income generation project, a PRA ranking system was applied with 126 pre-selected families who were chosen because they all had children under the age of 18. The organisation collected baseline information on the families by doing a livelihood analysis, which allowed for screening, identification of vulnerable groups and establishing a rapport with the people. Daily routine diagrams and income and expenditure flow diagrams were used to analyse work and income obstacles. The families were also asked questions about their loan and debt history and what they had used any previous loans for. Although not traditionally a component of the relief package, income generation was an important perceived need of clients. Women and men were asked to identify what they considered to be suitable income-generating activities and a range of appropriate productive tools was included in the resultant relief catalogue. lxxx That PRA is seldom applied in a truly participatory manner is evidenced by the incomprehension of some communities about what has actually taken place during the conduct of such exercises. lxxxi Jim Worrall, Head of UNHCR Field Office, Trincomalee, lxxxii Patrick Vandenbruaene, Humanitarian Advisor in the UN Office of the Resident Coordinator Interview, Colombo 7/3/02. lxxxiii Take for example the process of vulnerability analysis, which can be extremely fraught. In the north and east of Sri Lanka moveable resources and assets (for example, jewellery, remitted income, bicycles, animals or savings) are exchanged, gifted or sold for food, transport, or protection against forced recruitment and other violations. In addition to these assets, some individuals in self-settled and re-settled populations in particular, revealed to us that they had access to substantial funds through remittances sent by relatives living in Diaspora communities in wealthy countries such as France, the US or the UK. Some of these people had also received assistance from humanitarian agencies. Undoubtedly some camp inhabitants also have access to remitted income, although the source tends to be unskilled labour in the Middle East that yields far lower rates. In the main these resources are generally hidden, not least out of fear of theft, extortion, kidnapping, black mail, or murder. In areas under LTTE influence there is the additional risk that individuals and families with assets will be subject to informal taxation. Thus, because of the need for secrecy, it can be extremely difficult for agencies to establish who really is vulnerable economically and in need of relief or other forms of humanitarian support. Some staff admitted to resorting to proxy indicators such as the state of the dwelling, but people may have many reasons for allowing these structures to fall into disrepair and not all of these reasons are necessarily connected with poverty. 86

87 lxxxiv Goodhand, J. (2001) Conflict Assessments: Aid, conflict and peace building in Sri Lanka. Conflict, Security and Development Group, Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College, P 62. lxxxv Jeevan Thiagarajah, Director, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies lxxxvi UNHCR funded the whole programme with the exception of the housing component, stipulating that grant recipients must give 10% of the total value in labour, and WFP provided additional support in the form of food-for-work. lxxxvii The ZOA houses were built according to designs done by the agency, each family choosing its preferred model. The bricks were manufactured on the spot by client teams with six people in each team. A team would produce 1,000 bricks a day. In addition to making cement moulds for wells, digging pits and constructing foundations and moulds for latrines, clients also built the foundations for the houses, and helped skilled carpenters and masons construct the walls. The government has provided Rs 52,000 per household in various grants to help cover the cost of settlement and WFP has allocated dry food rations in a food-for-work scheme. The groups were formed largely through self-selection, although ZOA insisted that at least two vulnerable families (for example, widow-headed or single parent) be included in each cluster. lxxxviii Patrick Vandenbruaene, Humanitarian Advisor in the UN Office of the Resident Coordinator Interview, Colombo 7/3/02. lxxxix An INTRAC-SAP workshop (held in Colombo March 2002) on Monitoring and Evaluating Empowerment, attended by 25 national and international NGO staff members, revealed rather weak knowledge of the basic M & E concepts. One of the main problems seemed to be a poor understanding of the original programme design and objectives, possibly indicating low levels of involvement of field staff in planning. xc Jim Worrall, Head of UNHCR Field Officer, Trincomalee xci This phenomenon manifested itself in many ways during interviews and focus group discussions with respondents. Among other things, people mentioned: the inability to earn income, feed or protect one s family; the lack of privacy in over-crowded camps; the disappearance and failure to learn the fate of loved ones; and not knowing what the future holds, or how to plan for it. xcii Focus group discussion with six women, Araly Amman Kovilady, Araly East, xciii Siruppiddy, focus group with seven female mines awareness animators aged between years, xciv Jason Hart (2002) Participation of Conflict-affected Children in Humanitarian Assistance Programming, learning from eastern Sri Lanka, unpublished draft report for CIDA, Colombo. xcv FGD 35 children aged roughly 7 to 15 Siruppiddy xcvi Young members of the Siruppiddy children s club, for example, were clear that the use of imaginative pedagogic methods such as drama, role play and visual arts had made a tangible difference to their understanding and awareness of the risks associated with UXOs and land mines. They described the ways in which they had utilised the knowledge acquired through this programme to improve personal and community safety. Focus Group discussion women s group 24 th April xcvii Focus group discussion, women s group xcviii Jason Hart (2002) Participation of Conflict-affected Children in Humanitarian Assistance Programming, learning from eastern Sri Lanka, unpublished draft report for CIDA, Colombo. xcix Interview camp resident. c Focus Group discussion women s group ci Some agencies (for example GTZ and the DRC) argue that young people provide an entry point into communities and work with young people facilitates adult participation in projects. Some agencies argue that children represent the future of a society and that in areas subject to political conflict it is particularly important to instil values of democracy and peace in the younger generations since this will have beneficial impact on society in the long term. cii This is evidenced by the work of Save the Children (UK) that was included in this study and the measures mounted by Save the Children Norway, ESCO, Butterfly Peace Garden and PPDRO and reviewed by Jason Hart for CIDA. ( See: Jason Hart (2002) Participation of Conflict-affected Children in Humanitarian Assistance Programming, learning from eastern Sri Lanka, unpublished draft report for CIDA, Colombo). ciii That said, Patrick Vandenbruaene, Humanitarian Advisor in the UN Office of the Resident Coordinator in Colombo, commented: Participation is in the jargon, in the meetings, and in the literature but when you are in the field it is hard to say exactly what you are doing to get actual participation. Interview, Colombo 7/3/02. civ For example, much of the work of those agencies that are committed to more participatory approaches (thereby excluding UNDP, MSF and ICRC) follows this model. This includes the majority 87

88 of the programmes that are operated or supported by international agencies such as WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, Oxfam-GB, Terre des Hommes, World University Services Canada, the Save the Children Alliance, ACF, GTZ, Care International, SEDEC (Caritas), and the YMCA movement, among others. cv For example, some aspects of the work of Sarvodaya, FORUT, ZOA Refugee Care, Netherlands, the Save the Children Alliance and Oxfam-GB, ESCO and Suriya Women s Development Centre, among others, are transformative in character. cvi Patrick Vandenbruaene, Humanitarian Adviser, UN Office of the Resident Coordinator, Sri Lanka, Colombo 7/3/02. cvii SEDEC is Caritas Sri Lanka. cviii M.L.S. Dias, Relief and Rehabilitation Officer, SEDEC (Caritas Sri Lanka), Colombo, cix For further information on this project, see Part IV. cx Interview male shop keeper, married mid-30s, Kanthapuram, cxi Group discussion Savukkady village, near Batticaloa cxii Utilising ideas and techniques that were first developed in the world of advertising, some awareness raising and advocacy initiatives in Sri Lanka run to a significant scale. With the support of UNICEF and involvement of Jaffna Teaching Hospital and the Faculty of Community Medicine in Kopay division, the Save the Children Landmines project conducted an awareness programme with over 2,500 school children. 200 children from 16 schools participated in a poster and speech competition. Posters designed by prize winners in three age groups were printed and distributed throughout Kopay DS division and were hung in schools, community centres, children s clubs, hospitals, government offices and many other public venues. cxiii Focus Group Save the Children club members (29 children, boys and girls, aged 6 to 14) cxiv Jason Hart (2002) Participation of Conflict-affected Children in Humanitarian Assistance Programming, learning from eastern Sri Lanka, unpublished draft report for CIDA, Colombo. cxv Shanthi Sachithanandam (1996) Participatory Approaches to Development under Civil War Conditions. The Experience in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka In Bastian, S. and Bastian, N. (eds) Assessing Participation, a debate from South Asia Delhi, India : Konark Publishers, p 203. cxvi Focus Group Save the Children club seven female animators cxvii Ariyaratne, A.T. (1999) Sarvodya Shramaadana s Approach to Peace-building in Chappell, D. (ed) Buddhist Peacework Creating Cultures of Peace, Boston; Wisdom Publications. cxviii WFP cxix Selvi Sachithandam, National Programme Officer, WFP, Colombo, 7/3/02. cxx K.K. Ranjan Senior Training and Programme Advisor, Danish Refugee Council, Anuradhapura cxxi Oxfam-GB is more sympathetic about the problems men have faced in organising themselves than are these women. The agency pointed out that the men are mainly unskilled and underpaid casual workers hired on a daily basis who are absent from the community during the day and therefore find it very difficult to become involved in income-generating activities. cxxii To be accurate, agency personnel were not uniform in their beliefs about the potential for children's participation in the given cultural context. One senior staff member, for example, expressed the view that local people are not yet ready to work in such a way that children become agents for solving their own problems. Others acknowledge the difficulties due to culture but maintain that it is possible for the young to take up such a role. cxxiii The following quote is taken from an internal Save the Children (Norway)-Sri Lanka document written in 2000: Since children have hardly any means to enforce their right to participation, they will always be dependent on the approval or allowance by the adult. We know that children cannot participate when adults refuse their participation. We therefore have to play an active and facilitating role in ensuring children's participation with very little support Taken from "Children's Participation in Conflict Situations: A Pre Study Project of Save the Children Norway Sri Lanka" January cxxiv Jason Hart (2002) Participation of Conflict-affected Children in Humanitarian Assistance Programming, learning from eastern Sri Lanka, unpublished draft report for CIDA, Colombo. cxxv K. Mahendran, Relief/Logistics Officer, Save the Children UK, Jaffna. cxxvi K.K. Ranjan Senior Training and Programme Advisor, Danish Refugee Council, Anuradhapura. cxxvii The Refugee Council, Sri Lankan Project (2002) Sri Lanka: Return to Uncertainty. London, UK, p16. cxxviii It is worth noting that religious figures have status and authority within their community and, therefore, are often poorly-placed to facilitate participation since people would wish to defer constantly to their ideas and dictates. 88

89 cxxix In one women s credit society, in Ambikaipalamkottam a re-location village in Vavuniya, incomegenerating activities included poultry rearing, farming, cigar making, mat weaving, oil manufacture, rope making and shops. The women are well organised and have regular society meetings. They consider themselves to be activists and scoffed at the ineffectual efforts of men in the village to organise their own CBO. cxxx See Jason Hart (2002) Participation of Conflict-affected Children in Humanitarian Assistance Programming, learning from eastern Sri Lanka, unpublished draft report for CIDA, Colombo. cxxxi 10/4/02 Interview with Selliah Vaithiyanathan, GS Chunnagam South Division J/196 (Covers Sabapathay Refugee Camp, Maruthanarmadam). cxxxii Further, the top positions in local NGOs are often occupied by Tamils from Jaffna, who are often high-caste. This causes bitterness in Batticaloa and Vavuniya among the local Tamil population and up-country estate Tamils. In these areas Tamils from Jaffna (whatever their caste) tend to be regarded as an elitist, self-serving group. cxxxiii Out-migration has been facilitated by strong family ties with and support from the Tamil Diaspora in Europe, the US, Canada, Australia and a range of other countries and regions. Most of those people with resources and a tertiary education have left the peninsular. cxxxiv The Japanese government for example has included 1.9 million US dollars for UNHCR, and 355,000 US dollars for ICRC in 2000, as well as vehicles for MSF in 1995, the rehabilitation of an operating theatre in Batticaloa, funds for Sewa Lanka for the construction of wells in 1999 and funds for low-income people in the north and east to improve their housing. cxxxv. 'In 1998 bilateral donor commitments for emergency aid amounted to $17.8 million.' (Goodhand, J. Conflict Assessments: Aid, conflict and peace building in Sri Lanka. Conflict, Security and Development Group, Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College 2001:62. cxxxvi Penny Thorpe, Second Secretary (Development) DfID Sri Lanka, Colombo Although not one of the major donors, DfID plays a proactive and influential role in the humanitarian sector in Sri Lanka, giving implementing partners the freedom to be experimental in their work and maintaining a hands off approach. cxxxvii Kazuhiro Kaneko, Programme Officer Vavuniya, cxxxviii Jeevan Thiagarajah, director, the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies. cxxxix James Darcy, Oxfam-GB internal working paper on protection, Oxford cxl Jason Hart (2002) Participation of Conflict-affected Children in Humanitarian Assistance Programming, learning from eastern Sri Lanka, unpublished draft report for CIDA, Colombo. 89