ATOC. ATOC Good Practice Guide Control Centres : Business Process Manual

Transcription

1 Date: September 2004 ATOC Association of Train Operating Companies ATOC Good Practice Guide Control Centres : Business Process Manual Synopsis This Guide provides comprehensive advice on the structure, format and content of a Business Process Manual for use in a Train Operator Control Centre

2 Page 2 of 23 Contents Section Description Page Part A Part B Issue Record 3 Responsibilities 3 Explanatory Note 3 Supply 3 1 Purpose 4 2 Scope 4 3 Objective 4 4 Structure of the Business Process Manual 4 5 Foreword 5 6 Communication Arrangements and Protocols 5 7 Management of Train Operations 8 8 Management of Service Disruption 11 9 Management of Operational Incidents Management of Major Accidents Management of Customers (and Other Members of the Public) Management of Operational Staff Management and Maintenance of Fleet Management of Infrastructure, Plant and Premises Suggested Appendices 23 ATOC 2

3 Page 3 of 23 Part A Issue Record This Good Practice Guide is intended as a one off stand alone document. It is not the intention that it will be reviewed, nor that any amendments will be issued, on any systematic basis. As such it will not be subject to version control. Responsibilities This Good Practice Guide is made available to all member companies of the ATOC Train Operators Scheme. Recipients should ensure that copies are made available as required to those within their own organisations for whom its content is relevant. Explanatory Note This Guide is intended to reflect good practice and is advisory only. The extent to which a receiving organisation chooses to comply with any or all of its contents is entirely at its own discretion. Supply This is not a Controlled document. Copies (both printed and electronic) may be obtained from the secretary to the ATOC Train Operators Scheme. ATOC 3

4 Page 4 of 23 Part B 1. Purpose This document is intended to give guidance to Train Operators on the processes and procedures which should be detailed in Service Delivery Centre/Control Office Business Process Manuals. 2. Scope This guide is produced for the benefit of all member organisations of the ATOC Train Operations Scheme. It refers extensively to Railway Group Standards (RGS), the Network Rail Control Manual, and other Codes of Practice, in which publications additional guidance can be found. 3. Objective This document seeks to provide comprehensive guidance to Train Operator Operations Managers on the creation of a Business Process Manual in respect of: structure format content which will provide a consistent Train Operator framework for the discharge of operational responsibilities and a clear match to the Control Manual of the Infrastructure Controller, Network Rail. 4. Structure of the Business Process Manual 4.1 Suggested Minimum Content The Business Process Manual should contain at least the following 11 discrete sections:- Forward; Communications Arrangements and Protocols; Management of Train Operations; Management of Service Disruption; Management of Operational Incidents; Management of Accidents, Major Incidents, Emergencies and other Reportable Incidents; Management of Customers (and other Members of the Public); Management of Operational Staff; Management and Maintenance of Fleet; Management of and Interface with, Infrastructure, the Infrastructure Controller, Plant and Premises; Appendices. ATOC 4

5 Page 5 of 23 Details in respect of each are included in following sections of this guide. 4.2 Additional Content The Business Process Manual may also contain additional sections at the discretion of the Train Operator according to need for instance, arrangements for joint running/interface with light rail, LUL etc. 5. Foreword This section should describe:- (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) the purpose, objective and scope of the Manual; to whom the Manual is applicable, and in what circumstances; the roles and responsibilities of key Control Centre personnel; the essential external operating interfaces Network Rail Route Controls and the National Control Centre (NCC), for instance; the relationship between the Business Process Manual and the Railway Safety Case; the relationship between the Business Process Manual and other Emergency or Contingency Plans where these are compiled and held separately; (vii) the document control process for the Business Process Manual, including revision, updating and re-issue arrangements. 6. Communication Arrangements and Protocols 6.1 Overview This section should provide guidance for Controllers on communications protocols and language when using telephone or radio for routine matters and in emergencies. It should also deal with the communication hierarchy in the management of the Company, including the on-call arrangements. 6.2 Telephone Answering The Control Centre should have a standard business form and script for responding to incoming telephone calls, which may include the recipient s name/position and a simple flowchart showing how calls are then to be dealt with. 6.3 Phonetic Alphabet In order to ensure that a proper understanding is reached during safety critical conversations and when using abbreviations, signal identities, train identities, etc., the phonetic alphabet should be used at all times. ATOC 5

6 Page 6 of Radio Communications The use of radio to call the Control Centre requires Controllers to adopt the simple protocols and abbreviations which are standard when dealing with radio calls. It may occasionally be necessary to adopt these protocols when taking calls from mobile telephones when reception is poor. 6.5 Emergency Calls Establishing Key Information Dealing with Emergency calls, received by telephone or radio, requires the Controller to be both calm and organised. In all cases, the Controller will need to establish: the identity of the caller; the reason for the call; location details of the caller, of the incident; the exact nature of any immediate risks or threat to the safety of people, trains, or property; contact details for the caller Manner to be Adopted The caller may be distressed, shocked or confused, and the Controller must adopt a calm and reassuring manner whilst gathering as much information as possible to allow the emergency to be dealt with Requirements for Specific Information Certain types of incident require specific information to be gathered in a particular form, also to ensure that relevant information is collected consistently, it is recommended that a number of standard pro-forma be used. These should cover a range of incidents such as a SPAD, irregular signal sequence, station overshoot etc., and are detailed in Section On Call Arrangements The arrangements by which Company management is alerted of accidents, incidents and emergencies should be detailed in this section. These should, as a minimum, include: (i) the circumstances in which onward advice is required (types of incident, scale of incident, potential business impact, etc.); (ii) who should be advised, when and by what means (on call arrangements, both during and out of office hours); (iii) Press Office/Public Affairs contacts for media sensitive issues; (iv) Company support functions, e.g. personnel/hr, for counselling services. If the Company has a policy of paging or general alert to Managers, the arrangements which will include who is to be advised, when and in what circumstances should be detailed here. ATOC 6

7 Page 7 of Reporting to External Agencies Statutory Reporting The Control Centre may be listed as a Statutory Reporting Point for accidents and incidents. HSE/HMRI must be advised immediately in the event of any dangerous occurrence specified in RIDDOR regulations for which the Train Operator is responsible: (i) unintended collapse or partial collapse of any building or structure; (ii) any unintended contact with, or discharge from, overhead line electrification equipment; (iii) collapse, overturning or failure of any load bearing part of any lift, crane, hoist, mobile access platform, access cradle, excavator, forklift truck or tow tractor; (iv) electrical short circuit or overload attended by fire or explosion, which results in the stoppage of the plant for more than 24 hours, or which has the potential to cause death or serious injury; (v) collision between trains; (vi) collision between train and buffer stops where injury to persons occurs; (vii) employee fatality; (viii) fire affecting railway facilities which necessitates suspension of services or closure of facilities and premises for a period; (ix) fire affecting any part of a relevant transport system below ground (x) fire which causes damage and has the potential to affect the running of a relevant transport system; (xi) any case where planned procedures or arrangements have been activated in order to control risks arising from incident or undue passenger congestion at a station Network Rail Responsibilities A wide range of other reportable incidents will be the responsibility of Network Rail to report where the incidents occur on the controlled infrastructure and even where these are the responsibility of the Train Operator, i.e. incidents involving passengers or Train Operator passenger trains Reporting to British Transport Police British Transport Police should be advised of all incidents involving: suspected crime; death or serious injury to any person; fire on Train Operator property; all acts of vandalism on or to Train Operator property; disturbances on trains or at stations. ATOC 7

8 Page 8 of Passengers Notification of service disruption or potential disruption to intending passengers is an important Control Centre role. This should take effect in a number of ways: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) Warn pass and Resump notices; advice to NRES; advice to CEEFAX/ORACLE; advice to National and local media radio, television, newspapers; advice to PTE, passenger representative groups, etc. Details of the advisory medium should be shown here, to include named individuals where appropriate, telephone, fax, and pager numbers, both during and outside office hours. The circumstances and occasions on which passenger notification is required are dealt with in Section Management of Train Operations 7.1 Overview This section details the routines associated with provision of train services, including resourcing arrangements, making alterations to booked working, access to the infrastructure (and variations to it through engineering works) and liaison with other Train Operators. It also deals with the reporting, monitoring and regulating of train services, including delay attribution. 7.2 Resourcing the Train Service Normal Arrangements Under normal circumstances, the resources required to operate the planned train service are allocated or rostered in advance by: (i) (ii) (iii) Fleet resources management; Traincrew roster office for driver/trainman or conductor; Catering resources office for catering staff/travelling cleaners. Where some, or all, of these functions are provided within the Control Centre the arrangements should be detailed in the Business Process Manual. ATOC 8

9 Page 9 of Short Notice Changes The arrangements for dealing with short notice manipulation of resources and to deal with shortfall or failure should be initiated in the Control Centre in conjunction with: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Fleet Maintenance Control, or equivalent; depot Traincrew Supervisors or Managers; depot Catering Supervisors or Managers; other agencies or Train Operators when hire of fleet, crew or other manpower is necessary Resource Shortages Where a resource shortfall threatens to disrupt services or cause alterations to schedules, the Control Centre should act in accordance with the Company Commercial Guidelines in respect of service priorities. 7.3 Train Service Alterations Authority The Control Centre should be the sole authority within the Train Operator to alter or vary the planned train service. When it becomes apparent to any member of staff, agent, supplier or contractor to the Train Operator that the booked train service is, or is likely to be disrupted, the Control Centre should be advised for appropriate decisions to be made and for liaison with Network Rail Options Based on the facts as known or presented at the time, the Control Centre should consider all the options and may authorise: cancellation, or part cancellation, of services; alteration to service schedules; alteration to formation of services; alteration to traction; step up/step down of resources; special stop orders or run fast orders; diversion from normal route Liaison with Network Rail The Control Centre will be responsible for liaising with Network Rail for the agreed alterations, and for planning the restoration of booked working by the most expeditious means consistent with minimising disruption to passengers. The arrangements are described in Sections 7.4.2, and 8.3. ATOC 9

10 Page 10 of Access to the Infrastructure Access Rights Train Operator rights to access to the infrastructure are contained in the Track Access Agreement with Network Rail. These rights are reflected in the Working Timetables and any applicable alterations to these, such as contained in the weekly Special Traffic Notice Non-availability of Access In the event that the planned access to the infrastructure is not available due to: line blockage; equipment failure; adverse weather; emergency or over running engineering work. Network Rail will invoke pre-agreed contingency plans and advise Train Operators of the service alterations which will be necessary, in accordance with the Access Conditions. Where a number of Train Operators are affected, Network Rail will be expected to call a telephone conference or conferences to discuss arrangements, progress with repair/reinstatement and eventual restoration of full service. Such conferences may form part of the procedures for Service Recovery (detailed in Section 8.5) and are essential to ensure that passenger disruption is minimised Additional Access On occasions the Train Operator will have a requirement for additional access to that agreed and funded in the Access Agreement. For special or additional passenger services this will normally be planned and agreed in advance. However, where additional services are required by the Control Centre at short notice, whether passenger services, ECS, or light locomotives, permission must be requested from Network Rail and a proforma completed Monitoring of Services and Attribution of Delay The Control Centre is responsible for monitoring the train service and recording any delays which occur. The responsibility for creating the initial delay incident in TRUST lies with Network Rail and Network Rail s Delay Attribution staff will allocate a cause, or causes, according to information available. When attribution of delay is to a Train Operator responsibility code, the Control Centre should: investigate the circumstances to verify the attributed delay; accept or dispute the attributed delay with Network Rail; ascertain a reason, or reasons, for the delay occurring; request reports from any staff concerned. ATOC 10

11 Page 11 of Assessing and Managing the Consequences of Delays The Control Centre should assess any likely or possible consequences arising from the delay and liaise with Network Rail to agree regulating or prioritisation arrangements to ensure further service disruption is minimised Logs All Control Centre Sections/Desks should maintain a current log of events and actions taken using the approved logging system in the approved style/form. A master log should be maintained by the Duty Manager. 8. Management of Service Disruption 8.1 Contingency Plans The Train Operator should have available pre-prepared contingency plans which cover the range of disruptive events across the service geography and which have been consulted with Network Rail. The Control Centre will be responsible for enacting these plans at the appropriate time. 8.2 Responding to Significant Disruption In the event of significant disruption occurring to Train Operator train services, from whatever cause, the Control Centre will be responsible for coordinating the company s response and activities for the duration of the disruption. The extent and duration, or likely duration, of the disruption will dictate the scale of response required and may include: enhanced resourcing of the Control Centre; establishment of an Incident Room; establishment of media facilities; creation of emergency or contingency timetables; creation of teleconferencing facilities; special liaison with, and direction to, customer response teams and station management teams. 8.3 Optimising Provision of Train Service The Control Centre will be the focus for arranging the best possible train service in conjunction with Network Rail, bearing in mind passenger loadings, peak flows, special events taking place, the overall Commercial Guidelines of the Company and the train service provision resources available during the disruption. Where disruption can be contained by diverting services over an alternative route but insufficient crews with adequate route knowledge are available, the Control Centre should initiate discussions with neighbouring Train Operators to hire in, or share, crew resources to enable diverted services to operate, once agreement with Network Rail has been reached. ATOC 11

12 Page 12 of Prolonged Disruption When disruption is likely to be prolonged, i.e. will at least extend into a second day, the Train Operator should put in place resources and plans to create contingent or emergency timetables which can be operated robustly and reliably for the duration of the disruptive event and within the available resources of the Train Operator in terms of train sets and crews. In creating an emergency timetable, due regard must be paid to normal planned maintenance, servicing and fuelling of rolling stock (to avoid a backlog occurring, especially when rolling stock has become isolated from its normal depot facilities) and the eventual need for a straightforward transition to normal working. 8.5 Service Recovery 2003 In most circumstances where a disruptive event has occurred, the Network Rail Controller will seek to invoke the provisions of Service Recovery 2003 (SR2003) with the affected Train Operators (passenger and freight). SR2003 is an approved process for minimising service disruption and returning services to plan as quickly as practicable. The Train Operator arrangements for implementing SR2003, the provisions of the Approved Code of Practice and the working arrangements with adjacent Train Operators should be documented in a discrete plan. 8.6 Routes Used by Other Train Operators On routes used by more than one Train Operator, the best and most comprehensive service to customers is likely to be achieved through cooperation and collaboration with the other affected Operators. The framework for this collaboration should be described in the Contingency Plans, but should as far as possible seek to: maximise the number of train paths available Train Operators should consider serving intermediate stations by alternative road transport if this increases throughput and capacity over a restricted route; maximise train capacity to best match known customer demand; agree and arrange for customer tickets to be passed via alternative routes; agree special connectional arrangements where necessary, especially for last services; agree collective approaches to bus operators/light rail/lul to pass passenger rail tickets on their services; establish enhanced facilities at stations where disrupted customers or meeters & greeters are waiting, including the provision of shelter, refreshments, telephone facilities, etc.; The general arrangements for the management of customers are described in Section 11. ATOC 12

13 Page 13 of Management of Operational Incidents 9.1 Action to Take The Controller, when receiving advice of an operational incident, should take the following action: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) deal with the telephone call in accordance with the guidance in Section 6.2; record full details of the incident as far as practicable, using the templated proforma if applicable (see Section 9.2); initiate action to deal with the consequences of the incident in accordance with this Section; initiate onward advice to Network Rail and, where necessary, within the Company, and to any other agencies in accordance with Sections 6.6 and 6.7; establish a log entry to record detail and progress of the incident. 9.2 Appendices The following Control Centre processes and templated proforma should be documented as Appendices to the Business Process Manual : (i) Report of a SPAD (RT 3189); (ii) Report of a Station overrun; (iii) Report of Signal Changing Aspect; (iv) Report of Irregular Signal Sequence; (v) Report of AWS/TPWS Defect; (vi) Report of Train Failing a Booked Call; (vii) Report of Train Exceeding Maximum Permissible Speed; (viii) Report of a Near Miss; (ix) Advice of Multi-SPAD signal (NCC 4450 from NCC); (x) Advice of NIR (8250 advice to NCC); (xi) Report of Exceptional Railhead Conditions; (xii) Report of Insecure/Open Door on Train; (xiii) Report of Main Line Collision/Derailment; (xiv) Report of Fire on Train; (xv) Report of Bridge Strike; (xvi) Report of Broken Rail; (xvii) Report Signal Equipment Failure; (xviii) Report of Accident to Member of Public or Employee; (xix) Report of HABD Activation; (xx) Report of Fire on Train Operator Premises; (xxi) Report of Failure of Train to Operate Track Circuit(s); (xxii) Report of Tilt Equipment Failure (where applicable). ATOC 13

14 Page 14 of 23 Additionally, Train Operators may benefit from templating the proformas and reporting arrangements for other incidents, such as (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) Report of Train Failure; Advice of Isolation of Critical Safety Equipment on Train (EBS/ BIS/TIS/AWS/Passcom); Report of Fatality; Report of Train Striking Animals on line; Report of Rough Riding; Report of Irregular Working at Level Crossing(s); Advice of Public Complaint; Report of Safety Defect at Station(s); Report of Vandalism affecting Safe Working; Report of For Cause D & A Testing; Report of Incident/Accident Involving Powered Plant; Report of Power Failure; Advice of Emergency Speed Restriction (compilation of Late Notice Case wire); Report of Incorrect Routing. 9.3 On Train Safety Defects A number of on train systems are critical to the safe operation of the train. In most cases, trains are not permitted to enter service from a depot with one or more of these systems defective or isolated, except under special conditions. When equipment or systems become defective or fail in traffic, particular actions are mandated on Signallers and/or Controllers. Guidance to Controllers should be detailed in the Business Process Manual for the following on train systems, where applicable: (i) Automatic Warning System (AWS); (ii) Train Protection Warning System (TPWS); (iii) Automatic Train Protection (ATP); (iv) Driver s Reminder Appliance (DRA;) (v) Driver s Safety Device (DSD); (vi) Emergency By-pass Switch (EBS); (vii) Track Circuit Actuator (TCA); (viii) train radio: National Radio Network (NRN); Cab Secure Radio (CSR); Radio Electronic Token Block (RETB); (ix) Driver s Vigilance Device (DVD); (x) broken, cracked or obscured driver s cab windows/windscreen; (xi) broken bodyside windows; (xii) external door lights/indicators; (xiii) Traction Interlock Switch (TIS); (xiv) on train public address system/equipment; (xv) warning horn; (xvi) Wheel Slide Protection (WSP); (xvii) On Train Monitoring Equipment (OTMR); (xviii) Train Management System (TMS); (xix) Selective Door Operation (SDO); (xx) tilt enabling systems. ATOC 14

15 Page 15 of Management of Major Accidents 10.1 Overview This Section should describe the actions and arrangements required of the Control Centre when a Major Incident, Reportable Incident, accident or emergency is reported. It should be read in conjunction with the Train Operator Emergency Manual and describe in particular: incident command structure; dealing with the emergency services; role of Lead Operator; appointment of TOLO; establishment of Casualty Bureau; loss of critical business facilities; Network Rail responsibilities; evacuation of Control : alternative location(s) Reportable Incidents The requirements for advising HMRI of incidents for which statutory reporting is mandatory are detailed in Section Security Alerts Comprehensive plans for security preparedness and arrangements for dealing with security alerts should be contained in the Train Operator Emergency Plan. These should give guidance to staff in the event of a security alert, security threat, or security warning in respect of: stations; on train(s); lineside locations; telephoned warnings or threats. 11. Management of Customers (and Other Members of the Public) 11.1 Overview The responsibility for providing support and assistance to: passengers; other members of the public; staff in contact with the public whilst travelling on Train Operator services or using Train Operator facilities, should be delegated to the Retail/Customer Service Controller in the Control Centre. ATOC 15

16 Page 16 of Responsibilities of Retail/Customer Service Controllers The key responsibilities of the Retail/Customer Service Controller are: advice on timetables, schedules, alternative routings, connections; current running information on the UK network; advice/information on fares to conductors/revenue protection staff; advice to conductors on enforcement issues on train; authority to sanction the provision of (i) refreshments; (ii) alternative transport; (iii) emergency accommodation; overview of disabled travel arrangements; follow up with BTP of on train issues; follow up lost luggage/lost personal items; overview of Penalty Fares areas and monitoring of booking office hours; customer reports/complaints; mobilisation of retail/customer service/commercial management (via on call system) or CATS teams; mobilisation of alternative road transport Arrangements and Resources for Customer Assistance The Train Operator Customer Service/Retail/Commercial Director will be responsible for specifying the arrangements which will apply in the Control Centre and the resources which will be available to assist customers. These should be detailed in the Guidelines for Passenger Support and cover such issues as: authority of the Control Centre; CATS teams and their mobilisation/deployment; substitute road transport provision and the circumstances when/how this is to be deployed; details of taxi/ bus/ coach contracts and contact arrangements; provision of emergency accommodation for customers; disabled travel arrangements; passengers stranded on trains. 12. Management of Operational Staff 12.1 Overview This section should describe the Control Centre responsibilities for initiating actions and maintaining an overview of operational staff, particularly those involved in accident, incident or severe disruption. ATOC 16

17 Page 17 of Health, Safety and Welfare of Train Operator Staff (in general) The health, safety, welfare and well being of staff undertaking their normal duties is important to Train Operators and Control Centre responsibilities in this area include: (i) invoking the chain of care for staff in need of counselling or emotional support; (ii) initiating for cause screening for Drugs/Alcohol following a serious safety related incident; (iii) oversight of staff deployment during disruption, especially train crew e.g. altered duties, manipulation, booking on after rest; (iv) post incident management of traincrew, particularly drivers mobilising supervisory resources, at risk Register, etc.; (v) ensuring the reporting of personal accidents, assaults on duty, near misses, etc.; (vi) authorising excess working hours only where absolutely necessary; (vii) management of serious irregularities. The Train Operator procedures which relate to these responsibilities should be documented by the Human Resources Director and be briefed to Control staff Management Arrangements for Control Centre Staff The management arrangements which will apply in the Control Centre itself should be documented and include: office management arrangements; first aid and general safety arrangements; rostering arrangements; briefing arrangements; competence assessment; control of working hours. 13. Management and Maintenance of Fleet 13.1 Overview This section describes the Control Centre arrangements for the management of the Train Operator s fleet resources. These include: the procedures for allocating vehicles to operational diagrams; maintaining and populating the records database(s); liaison with depots; management of faults and failures in traffic; driver help line ; hiring out of stock to other Train Operators. ATOC 17

18 Page 18 of Fleet Director Responsibilities The Fleet Director should be responsible for specifying the arrangements which will apply in the Control Centre and the resources which will be available for managing the fleet responsibility. These should be documented by the Fleet Director. 14. Management of Infrastructure, Plant and Premises 14.1 Overview This section should describe the Control Centre interfaces with the Infrastructure Controller for the management of the operational infrastructure, plant and premises. It should also provide guidance in respect of facilities for which the Train Operator is directly responsible at stations and depots Planned Engineering Work Prior Advice of Possessions Details of Planned Engineering Works and associated possessions are contained in the Weekly Operating Notice, published by Network Rail Regional HQs, amended as necessary by weekly/daily Advice of Alterations Liaison with Network Rail re Progress of Work The Control Centre should be responsible for maintaining a close and regular liaison with Network Rail Control regarding progress of the works. If it becomes evident that the works will not complete on time, or the planed infrastructure will not be available when the possession is given up the Control Centre should assess the possible impact on services in liaison with Network Rail to determine what contingency plans, if any, require to be invoked Unplanned Alterations/Amendments to Possessions Alterations or amendments to possessions on the day/night, other than complete cancellation, will not normally be entertained and will only be permitted in exceptional circumstances. Network Rail should have closely considered the implications and risks to planned work, safety, and other work taking place; the Control Centre should consider the implications for Train Operator services before agreeing to any changes. ATOC 18

19 Page 19 of Emergency Engineering Work Where circumstances require unplanned intervention on the infrastructure by maintenance or repair staff, and where this will have an impact on Train Operator services, Network Rail should consult with the Control Centre on the arrangements to apply and the contingency plans to be invoked. Ideally, these discussions should take place as a multi-party telephone conference in order that the full implications to all Train Operators are understood, especially when service terminations or diversions are required. In concluding the optimal arrangements for the Train Operator, the Control Centre will have regard to: the immediacy of the required repair work; the implications and benefits/disbenefits of postponing repair work, where possible, to a later stage; the likely duration of any emergency possession; the impact of any emergency speed restriction being imposed either in lieu of repairs or following temporary repair Temporary and Emergency Speed Restrictions Prior Advice of Temporary Speed Restrictions Details of Temporary Speed Restrictions are contained in the Weekly Operating Notice, published by Network Rail Regional HQ, amended as necessary by weekly/daily wire from Network Rail Control Advice of Emergency Speed Restrictions Where it becomes necessary to impose an Emergency Speed Restriction (ESR), i.e. one which has not been published in the Weekly Operating Notice, Network Rail should advise the Control Centre of the arrangements which will apply Imposition of Blanket Emergency Speed Restrictions In certain circumstances high winds or exceptionally hot weather, for instance Network Rail may find it necessary to impose blanket ESRs over a defined geography. The Control Centre should reach a clear and unambiguous understanding with Network Rail as to the extent of these requirements and when they are to be imposed. Where these arrangements are likely to be very disruptive, the Control Centre should consider what contingency plans are to be invoked and ensure that these are advised out as quickly as possible Advice to Drivers The Control Centre should have in place appropriate arrangements for advising drivers of emergency speed restrictions, before they operate over the affected route. Acknowledgement/confirmation should be received that the details are being issued personally to staff or are being displayed in a Late Notice Case. ATOC 19

20 Page 20 of Seasonal Preparedness Weather Forecasts Network Rail has arrangements for receiving weather forecasts at least daily during autumn and winter and when required at other times of the year. The Control Centre should have in place the Train Operator arrangements for either liaising with Network Rail regarding the likely impact of adverse weather on planned services, or procuring a weather forecast specific to the Train Operator s needs, geography or circumstances. The Control Centre procedure for disseminating weather forecast information, and acting upon this information, should be documented in the Business Process Manual Leaf Fall Season The Train Operator should have a separate plan giving details of arrangements and procedures to be invoked during the autumn leaf fall season. These may include procedures or arrangements for: invoking special/emergency timetables; Black Day working; driver briefing; pre-preparation of rolling stock sanding equipment, WSP checks, etc.; reporting of exceptional railhead conditions; low adhesion working; Sandite application, water jetting, etc.; working of MPVs Winter The Train Operator should have a separate plan giving details of arrangements and procedures to be invoked during winter weather conditions. These may include procedures or arrangements for: protection of rolling stock stabled outdoors; snow and ice clearance measures; infrastructure protection measures; de-icing services; deployment of snow ploughs; key junction/key route strategies; operational contingency plans; management of stations. ATOC 20

21 Page 21 of Flooding Flood Warnings Network Rail has in place detailed arrangements for receiving flood warnings and acting on the information received. These are normally issued by the Environment Agency and relate specifically to water levels in rivers. However, reports of more localised situations may be received from other sources, such as Civil Police or Local Authorities. Based upon the nature and extent of the threat, Network Rail should liaise with the Control Centre to prepare appropriate contingency plans to deal with possible eventualities Localised Flooding Certain locations within the operating geography may be susceptible to localised flooding, particularly during or after heavy rainfall. These will, to some extent, be predictable and the Train Operator should have in its seasonal preparedness plans a list of such locations, compiled in conjunction with Network Rail and for which pre-agreed contingency plans have been formulated. The Control Centre should liaise closely with Network Rail when these plans are likely to be required, but also to ensure that Network Rail has taken necessary action to mitigate the effects of flood water Control of Spillages Any unplanned release or spillage of hazardous, toxic or polluting substances into the environment is a potentially serious matter. From a Train Operator perspective, the most likely sources of any such release or spillage are: diesel fuel from a traction unit; diesel fuel from a depot storage facility; chemical or solvent spillage at a depot. Network Rail is responsible for advising the relevant agencies of any such spillage and the Control Centre is required to furnish Network Rail with as much relevant information as possible, in order that: (i) (ii) Network Rail can mobilise the most effective and expeditious response to either cleanse the affected areas or minimise further environmental impact; Network Rail can advise the relevant agencies who may also wish to mobilise and respond. In order to aid the Control Centre on the information Network Rail require to collect, a copy of the Network Rail proforma shown at Section C17 of the Network Rail Control Manual, along with details of Environment Agency Thresholds for Reporting guidelines, should be held in the Business Process Manual. ATOC 21

22 Page 22 of Management of TOC Premises Security The Train Operator should have a Security Schedule which describes the security arrangements for all its offices, stations, depots and other premises when unmanned. This should detail as a minimum: rapid response arrangements when premises become insecure; response to intruder alarm activations, notably at booking offices or Travel Centres; management of on call arrangements, including those for Managing Agents where appropriate, and details of key holders Defects The Train Operator should have call off arrangements in place for contractors to attend to urgent defects and minor repairs at premises which it owns, leases or manages. Where the Control Centre is the designated first point of contact, and is required to take action, the Business Process Manual should show the necessary arrangements for: defect reporting; call off contract details and whether these provide a repair or simply make safe facility; arrangements for specialist response; contacts for utilities providers gas, water, electric, etc.; management on call arrangements. When the defect has the potential or is likely to affect services, the operational on call arrangements should be activated to ensure an appropriate degree of priority is accorded to repairs Infrastructure Defects in Depots The train operating infrastructure inside certain depots is not part of Network Rail s controlled infrastructure and in such cases the Train Operator should have maintenance, repair and renewal arrangements in place to manage these facilities. The infrastructure covered by these arrangements should include track, S&C, walkways, barrow crossings, level crossings and safe access systems. Certain signalling assets may also be included, but all overhead and third rail electrification assets remain the responsibility of Network Rail. The Depot Manager should have comprehensive arrangements for the management of this infrastructure. However, where any issue concerning maintenance, repair or renewal of these assets affects, or has the potential to affect, train services in an unplanned way, the Control Centre should initiate discussions with the Depot Manager. In the event that these actions fail to resolve or mitigate the impact on services, the relevant Operations Manager should be advised. ATOC 22

23 Page 23 of Depot Plant Similarly, the Depot Manager should have maintenance, repair and renewal arrangements in place for plant facilities at depots. These major facilities should be detailed in the Rules of the Depot and any down time, failure or partial loss of use of any such facility should be reported to the Control Centre. In conjunction with the Depot Manager, the Control Centre should review the implications and potential impact of this loss and take action as appropriate to recover lost output and mitigate the effect on services. 15. Suggested Appendices The Business Process Manual should include appendices comprising, as a minimum: Maps; Phone Numbers; Platform lengths and capacities; Loops, lengths/capacity; Emergency Turn Back facilities. ATOC 23