The Bermuda (Re)Insurance Market Remains Resilient

Transcription

1 19th annual Bermuda Insurance Survey 2013 with analysis by Standard & Poor s The Bermuda (Re)Insurance Market Remains Resilient Bermudian property and casualty (P&C) (re) insurers showed their financial resilience in 2012 amid catastrophe losses, decreasing investment income, increasingly competitive pricing, a tepid economic recovery in the U.S., and the eurozone crisis. They generated strong operating performance with a combined ratio of 91.7% and a return on average equity (ROAE) of 11.2%, compared with a weaker 104.1% and 1.0%, respectively, in The Bermuda Top 10 By Capital & Surplus ($000s) 1 ACE Limited 27,531,000 2 XL Group plc 11,856,397 3 PartnerRe Ltd. 6,933,496 4 Everest Re Group, LTD 6,733,467 5 AXIS Capital Holdings Limited 5,779,761 6 Arch Capital Group Ltd. 5,168,878 7 Validus Holdings, Ltd. 4,455,107 8 Oil Insurance Limited 3,611,771 9 Catlin Group Limited 3,511, RenaissanceRe Holdings Ltd. 3,507,056 by Total Assets ($000s) 1 ACE Limited 92,545,000 2 XL Group plc 45,387,779 3 PartnerRe Ltd. 22,980,432 4 Everest Re Group, LTD (1) 19,777,907 5 AXIS Capital Holdings Limited 18,852,344 6 Arch Capital Group Ltd. 17,816,762 7 Catlin Group Limited 14,041,149 8 Allied World Assurance Company Holdings, AG 12,029,946 9 Alterra Capital Holdings Ltd. 10,677, Aspen Insurance Holdings Limited 10,311,000 By Taoufik Gharib Economic losses from natural catastrophes and man-made disasters reached $186 billion in 2012, according to the latest Swiss Re s Sigma report. Insured losses amounted to $77 billion, making 2012 the third most costly year on record. The Bermudian (re) insurers overall strong enterprise risk management (ERM) capabilities have helped them manage these risks and generate strong earnings. In fact, their ERM practices have been tested through catastrophes and financial crises over the past decade. Moreover, Bermuda-based (re)insurers overall are strongly capitalized, and their risk-adjusted capital adequacy ratios are mostly redundant at their respective rating levels as of year-end As a result, they remain on stable footing entering This strong capital base and generally flat renewal rates may have been the impetus by Premiums Earned ($000s) 1 ACE Limited 15,677,000 2 XL Group plc 5,765,982 3 PartnerRe Ltd. 4,485,939 4 Everest Re Group, LTD 4,164,628 5 Catlin Group Limited 3,603,511 6 AXIS Capital Holdings Limited 3,415,463 7 Arch Capital Group Ltd. 2,935,140 8 Aspen Insurance Holdings Limited 2,084,000 9 Endurance Specialty Holdings Ltd. 2,013, Hiscox Ltd. 1,899,455 by Net Income ($000s) 1 ACE Limited 2,706,000 2 PartnerRe Ltd. 1,134,514 3 Everest Re Group, LTD 828,954 4 XL Group plc 730,388 5 Oil Insurance Limited 646,103 6 Arch Capital Group Ltd. 593,397 7 RenaissanceRe Holdings Ltd. 566,014 8 AXIS Capital Holdings Limited 547,241 9 Allied World Assurance Company Holdings, AG 493, Validus Holdings, Ltd. 408, Insurance Special Bermudian Business 1

2 for many of the Bermudian players to return capital to their shareholders through special dividends, increased regular dividends, and share buybacks. However, within the group some companies are significantly better capitalized for their rating level compared with the median result, while others have less of a cushion. Standard & Poor s Ratings Services views excess capital as a strength, because it provides a cushion to the inherent severity risk that most Bermudian (re)insurers underwrite and for possible modeling errors when evaluating their catastrophe exposures. The participants in our Bermuda Market Survey reported underwriting capital (defined as shareholders equity plus total debt) of $116 billion and net premiums written of $58 billion for 2012 compared with $74 billion and $46 billion, respectively, in Despite the challenges in 2012, underwriting capital for the survey participants was up 9.1% from the 2011 level of $106 billion, as a result of strong reported net income of $11 billion in 2012 relative to slightly less than $1 billion in The level of share repurchasing in 2012 was more than 130% ($3.8 billion) of the amount repurchased in 2011 ($2.8 billion) by the survey participants. Repurchasing shares has been an attractive way for publicly listed companies to manage their valuation metrics, especially because the survey participants that are publicly listed have broadly traded at a 15% to 25% discount to book value during the past few years. During the past five years, investment income has contributed between 9.9 (in 2008) and 6.0 (in 2012) percentage points to the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) return on underwriting capital a common industry metric. This has been possible because the size of the survey participants invested assets was more than twice that of their underwriting capital. However, the investment income contribution to EBIT has been gradually declining because of low interest rates. The five-year ( ) average EBIT return on underwriting capital for the survey participants was 9.0% and reached the highest level of 18.4% in Similarly, over the past five years, the survey participants obtained a ROAE of 8.3% and were able to exceed the 15% target only in 2009 (ROAE of 18.6%), whereas in the other four years were hurt by the financial crisis, record catastrophe losses, and decreasing investment income. P&C (re)insurers face several key challenges in 2013, in our view: investment yields are dwindling, reserve releases are diminishing, and growth opportunities are limited in the developed markets. While natural catastrophe losses in 2012 were less than 50% of those of 2011, most Bermudian (re)insurers maintained healthy capital positions contributing to the competitive pricing. Institutional investors increased interest in the property catastrophe market could exacerbate this price competition. Pricing changes in the reinsurance market overall, however, have been somewhat flat during 2013 renewals. In general, international property-catastrophe rates were flat to minus 5%. U.S. loss-free property catastrophe treaties were also flat to minus 5% and plus 10% on loss-affected accounts. In other words, Hurricane Sandy had a stabilizing effect on market pricing. Last year was particularly difficult for the marine market, which has suffered one of its Top Business Issue in Bermuda Rated Either 1 or 2 Top Business Issue in Bermuda worst underwriting years in recent history, according to the Willis Re report. In addition to the Costa Concordia disaster and the deterioration of the Rena loss from 2011, Hurricane Sandy is widely expected to be the largest-ever marine loss with a disproportionate impact on the marine market. There are large losses coming from yachts and pleasure craft, general cargo, imported cars, specie, and inland marine. In addition, during the Jan. 1, 2013, marine renewals were especially late due to uncertainty surrounding losses emanating from Sandy. Many buyers have increased retentions on loss affected programs to mitigate rate increases of a minimum of plus 15%. Frequency and severity of losses in longer tail lines continue to decline and buyers continue to retain more. Not surprisingly, companies participating in our survey ranked renewal rates, investment returns, regulation, cost control, and growing market share vs. profitability as their top five key business issues. 2 Bermudian Business 2013 Insurance Special

3 Contribution Analysis:EBIT Return on Average Uberwriting Capital (ROAC) Dwindling Investment Yields The Bermudian (re)insurers investment yields have continued to decline amid low interest rates during the past few years and are currently at levels not seen in recent history. The survey participants achieved a 2.9% net yield on invested assets and cash and cash equivalents in Their investment yield has continued to decline in the past five years from a recent high of 4.4% in As of year-end 2012, the (re)insurers total invested assets and cash and cash equivalents reached $240.5 billion, an increase of 6.6% relative to year-end 2011, because of their strong operating results. At the end of 2012, their asset allocation included: 34% of corporate debt securities, 15% of foreign government debt securities, 11% of U.S. government and government agency debt securities, 24% of mortgage and assetbacked securities, 4% of equities, and 13% of other investments. Most (re)insurers have willingly tradedoff investment risk for underwriting risk and have maintained relatively conservative investment portfolios over the past few years. Typically, the duration of fixed-income investments for the Bermuda (re)insurance market is between three and four years, with an average credit rating of between A and AA. As a result of the significant drop in investment yields from historical levels, the property and casualty (re)insurance market is going to need to adjust pricing upward to achieve the level of returns required by its shareholders. As of year-end 2012, the Bermudian (re)insurers collectively had virtually no exposure to the European periphery countries (i.e. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) sovereign debt. The survey participants non-u.s. government debt holdings represented approximately 15% of total invested assets (excluding cash and cash equivalents) at year-end 2012 and this allocation has been relatively constant over the past five years. During the same period, realized and unrealized capital gains and losses have contributed significant volatility to P&C (re)insurers financials. As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, the survey participants reported realized capital losses of $7.4 billion compared with $2.6 billion of realized capital gains in Improving Product & Geographic Distribution Bermuda continues to be a property and property catastrophe underwriting hub with these two lines of business representing about 35% the Bermudian gross premiums written in In fact, the Bermudians underwrite about one-third of the global property catastrophe business. Other lines of business such as casualty constituted 13%, professional liability 8%, accident and health 6%, marine and aviation 6%, excess liability 4%, life 3%, general liability 3%, workers compensation 1%, terrorism less than 1%, and 21% in other lines of business. Excess liability, general liability, and professional liability have been gradually contributing to the top line growth and strengthening the Bermudians value proposition. Quoted Investment Composition 2013 Insurance Special Bermudian Business 3

4 Gross Premiums by Line of Business Calendar tear vs. accident year loss & lae ratio The Bermudian (re)insurers continue to generate the bulk of their premiums from the North American market. In 2012, about half of their gross premiums written were from North America, 19% from Continental Europe, 7% from Bermuda, 7% from the U.K., 7% from Asia-Pacific, and about 10% from the rest of world. The 2012 geographic distribution did not materially change from Some Bermudian (re)insurers may limit their exposure to regions that experienced heavy catastrophe losses in 2011 and 2012, especially where the catastrophe models do not adequately reflect the exposures (e.g. Asia-Pacific). We have noticed an increased interest by the Bermudian (re)insurers in expanding into non-catastrophe-exposed short-tail classes of business, such as accident and health, crop, and surety. As a result, we could see some margin compression in those classes of business due to increasing competition. Will Underwriting Results Continue To Benefit From Favorable Reserve Releases? Over the past five years ( ), the Bermudian (re)insurance market s calendaryear results have benefited from favorable prior-year loss reserve development. During the same timeframe, the Bermudians released a total of $18.3 billion in reserves, which represented 7.1 percentage points on the combined ratio. The favorable prior-year developments have come largely from the recent hard market years (i.e., 2002 to 2005). The survey participants calendar-year combined ratio benefited from 8.6 percentage points in 2008 down to 5.9 percentage points in 2012 of favorable prior-year development. Because the (re)insurers premium leverage (defined as the ratio of net premiums written to underwriting capital) has been around 0.5x to 0.6x, the benefit to the EBIT return on underwriting capital has been about half the impact on the calendar year combined ratio. We believe that the remaining redundancies associated with these hard market years are limited. As a result, we expect the ongoing benefit derived from favorable prior-year development to be greatly diminished relative to that of the past few years. Although we believe that loss reserves are generally adequately reserved among the Bermudian (re)insurers that Standard & Poor s rates, some could experience adverse development on the more recent accident 4 Bermudian Business 2013 Insurance Special

5 Net Premiums Written to Capital & Surplus (All amounts in billions of US Dollars) Composition of Net Premiums Earned (All amounts in billions of US Dollars) years. We also believe that the reserve redundancy and increased likelihood of adverse development could make disciplined, profitable underwriting a ratings differentiator in the next few years. Given the current pricing environment, relatively low investment yields, and our expectation for diminishing prior-year reserve redundancies, we expect the participants to generate an EBIT return on underwriting capital in the low teens, assuming normalized catastrophe losses. Although this expectation is in line with the five-year ( ) average EBIT return on underwriting capital, we expect the contribution to be more evenly split between underwriting activities and investment activities. Robust Balance Sheets The Bermudian (re)insurers benefit from strong balance sheets with limited exposure to intangibles and A&E (asbestos and environmental liability). As of year-end 2012, the surveyed companies total assets included: quoted investments 64%, other investments 4%, cash and cash equivalents 6%, reinsurance balances receivable 7%, other assets 17%, and goodwill and other intangibles 2%. The debt leverage also declined to 12.4% as of year-end 2012 from 13.5% as of year-end 2011 (it was 17.7% in 2008). Furthermore, the EBIT adjusted to interest coverage improved to 12.4x in 2012 from 5.0x in Insurance Special Bermudian Business 5

6 The Top 10 Reinsurers NPE Rose The three companies (i.e., ACE Limited, XL Group plc, and PartnerRe Ltd.) leading the top-10 list remain unchanged from last year with regard to market share measured by net premiums earned (NPE). Also, their position within the list is the same as last year, with ACE Limited in the pole position followed by XL Group plc (No. 2), and PartnerRe (No. 3). The top five is rounded out by Everest Re Group Ltd. (No. 4) and Catlin Group Limited (No. 5). The top 10 as a group incresed their NPE on a year-over-year basis by 3.1% to $46.0 billion in 2012 from $44.7 billion in The premium growth was lead by Arch Capital Group Ltd., Aspen Insurance Holdings Limited, and XL Group plc. Arch Capital Group Ltd. s NPE grew 11.6% in 2012 to $2.94 billion compared with $2.63 billion in 2011, owing to increases in its insurance programs, professional liability, accident and health, offset by a reduction in the onshore energy business. The company s reinsurance growth was primarily in U.K. motor and mortgage business. Aspen Insurance Holdings Limited s NPE increased 10.3% in 2012 to $2.08 billion, from $1.89 billion in 2011, due predomintently to the continued development of its U.S. insurance platform including property and programs business. Growth in the marine, energy, and transportation insurance lines was mainly due to increased premiums All Companies Surveyed: Total Asset Composition for marine, energy, and liability businesses that achieved significant rate increases following a series of industry losses in In addition, NPE s growth in the reinsurance segment arose from property and casualty reinsurance business. XL Group plc s NPE rose 8.2% in 2012 to $5.77 billion from $5.33 billion in Its North America property and casualty, professional, and specialty businesses and favorable amendments to certain prior year premium estimates were responsible for the increase, partially offset by lower production in its international property as a result of underwriting actions for business that did not meet its return requirements and from ceded reinstatement premiums for marine and Sandy losses. XL also grew its reinsurance NPE, reflecting overall growth in recent quarters from the Bermuda and international businesses. In 2012, the 21 survey participants reported a ROAE of 11.2% compared with 1.0% in Oil Insurance Limited was No. 1 with a ROAE of 19.45%, which was mostly driven by its investment returns. OIL has an aggressive investment strategy with a higher allocation to equity securities and alternative investments than peers. Top Ten Companies 2011: Return on Average Equity* 6 Bermudian Business 2013 Insurance Special

7 Most of the survey participants are global (re)insurers and have sizable operating entities domiciled in other jurisdictions. Bermuda is the domicile for the ultimate parent company for 16 of the 21 survey participants. The others are domiciled in Switzerland (3), the U.K. (1), Ireland (1), and Luxembourg (1). It is worth noting that on Aug. 23, 2012, we raised our financial strength rating on Validus Reinsurance Ltd. to A from A- and our counterparty credit rating on its holding company, Validus Holdings Ltd., to BBB+ from BBB. The outlook is stable. Validus Reinsurance Ltd. has shown strong operating performance since inception, with earnings volatility somewhat mitigated through its strong catastrophe research and modeling functions. Validus has built a strong competitive position under its two underwriting platforms, Validus Re and Talbot, providing diversification in terms of reinsurance versus primary business, geographic spread, and specialized short-tail lines of business. In addition, on Dec. 11, 2012, we revised our outlook on XL Group and its operating subsidiaries to positive from stable. The outlook revision reflects our view that management has successfully defended XL s franchise, which was under significant pressure following the financial market crisis in This was accomplished by divesting its financial guarantee business, deleveraging its balance sheet, and managing down the risk in its investment portfolio. Furthermore, management has renewed XL s focus on P&C insurance and reinsurance and has placed the life reinsurance operations in run-off Catastrophe Losses Had A Limited Impact On The Bermudian Players Standard & Poor s did not take any negative rating actions on the Bermudian (re) insurers because of their 2012 catastrophe losses. Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters economic cost totaled about $186 billion in 2012, according to Swiss Re s Sigma, compared with $403 billion in 2011, the year with the highest economic losses on record. Natural catastrophe insured losses were more than $71 billion in This makes 2012 the third-most expensive year for the insurance industry, after 2011, the year in which record earthquakes and floods contributed to losses of over $126 billion, and 2005, when Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita alone caused claims of over $100 billion. Most of the losses in 2012 arose from Hurricane Sandy, the summer drought, and several thunderstorms in the U.S. While insured catastrophe losses declined in 2012 from 2011, they were still above the average of recent years. For the first time since 2008, a hurricane (Sandy) was the costliest event with insured losses of $35 billion. This figure includes $20 billion to $25 billion of private insured loss and flood claims covered by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Hurricane Sandy had a limited impact on the Bermudians underwriting results and is viewed as a 1 in 50 year U.S. industry event. It contributed 6.8% percentage points to the combined ratio in 2012, which confirmed our earlier announcement that Sandy will be an earnings rather than a capital event for the industry. The primary insurers in the U.S. retained much of the loss, especially large national carriers that have the highest market shares in the affected states. If Hurricane Sandy happened five years ago, it would have affected more reinsurers. Over the past few years, the primary carriers in the U.S. have gradually increased their retentions to manage their premiums growth target in a weak economy. The second largest insured loss in 2012 was crop failure, which resulted in record drought-related agricultural losses of $11 billion including the Federal scheme. The 2012 U.S. crop failure is viewed as a 1 in 30 year to 1 in 40 year event. Crop insurers saw some of the worst underwriting results on their books of business since the drought of As bad as the results may be, however, they were manageable because of loss sharing from the U.S. government and diversification with other lines of business. Furthermore, the Bermudian (re)insurers losses were not material. Bermudian (Re)Insurers Recognize The Importance Of ERM Since Standard & Poor s introduced its ERM criteria in 2005, it has found that, in general, the Bermudian (re)insurers have a sophisticated ERM framework. Overall, we consider the Bermudians ERM capabilities to be strong, and they are among the leading practitioners in the industry. Despite the significant and unusual natural catastrophe events over the past few years, accompanied by financial market volatility in Europe and the U.S., Standard & Poor s ERM scores for the Bermudian (re) insurers have remained relatively stable. In fact, more than 85% of the Bermudian (re) insurers have ERM scores that are better than adequate ( adequate with strong risk controls, adequate with positive trend, strong, or excellent ). Furthermore, more than 60% of them have ERM scores of strong. Because of the inherent risks (e.g., catastrophe risk) and the potential volatility of earnings, the Bermudian (re)insurers risk-management practices are of high importance to the rating. We view RenaissanceRe s ERM program as excellent. The company has a significant property catastrophe risk exposure across the world. RenaissanceRe differentiates itself from (re)insurers that we consider to have strong ERM capabilities through wellseasoned and sophisticated ERM practices that have resulted in earnings volatility that 2013 Insurance Special Bermudian Business 7

8 cused on a limited number of specialty lines. Recognizing the inherent volatility of their business, the Bermudians tend to stay away from aggressive investment strategies. Notwithstanding the delay of the implementation date of the Solvency II Directive to 2016 from 2014, the Bermuda Monetary Authority (BMA) will continue efforts to meet an EU equivalency standard that is part of the directive, according to Shelby Weldon, the BMA director of insurance, licensing, and authorization (The Royal Gazette, Feb. 19, 2013). We believe that the Bermudian companies will continue to enhance their ERM programs as their risk profiles continue to evolve. Furthermore, we expect the companies ERM to effectively address the growing complexity of risk overtime. We believe that Bermudian (re)insurers with well-constructed and well-implemented ERM frameworks will likely minimize the risk of losses outside their predetermined tolerance guidelines. In addition, the ones with strong ERM practices and strong SRM are better equipped to manage the various pressures that weigh on the profitability of the industry one that will likely continue to be tried by shortcomings in the global economy, (re)insurance pricing cycles, and capital markets in the next few years. We also consider these entities to be well-positioned to quickly identify and exploit niches of profitability, and take advantage of any potential market dislocation. Growth Strategies Can Be Tricky Developed economies and products are becoming saturated, so smart product innovation will help differentiate among the Bermudian players. Furthermore, successful Bermudian (re)insurers will be able to evolve and support the industrialization of emerging economies (e.g., Latin America, Middle East, and Asia Pacific) and the capital market needs (e.g., alternative capital). However, profitability in the emerging markets could be questionable especially when entering lines of business or regions where prices do is within its risk tolerance and in accordance with its risk profile. At the same time, RenaissanceRe has been able to take advantage of its modeling capabilities and strategic risk management (SRM) framework to exploit profitable niche segments. We believe that the company s long-standing commitment to ERM is an important factor in its strong operating performance through longer time horizons (three to five years). In addition, RenaissanceRe s competitive advantage lies in its robust process for evaluating risk/reward trade-offs and its ability to efficiently unite various catastrophe risk exposures with the most appropriate sources of capital. Sources include capital from various third parties facilitated through a number of investment vehicles fashioned by RenaissanceRe. The diverse array of capital sources augments RenaissanceRe s financial flexibility, affording the company alternatives (i.e., sidecars, joint ventures) to more traditional forms of capital such as debt and equity securities. In times of stress, particularly after large catastrophes, the ability to access these capital sources allows RenaissanceRe to more efficiently exploit favorable market conditions, enhancing the company s competitive position. Most of the Bermudian (re)insurers have benefited from their relatively brief operating history, as they are not saddled with legacy operational and risk-management issues. They have focused on ERM since inception, and their risk-management framework and processes are ingrained in the organizational culture. The Bermudian companies have embedded strong risk controls into their daily operations. In addition, they have invested a significant amount of time and money into their risk management tools, models, and systems as they continue to use and refine them. Most of the Bermudians are relatively small to mid-size companies, more nimble, and with fewer offices than the larger carriers on both sides of the Atlantic. Although the classes of 2001 and 2005 (re)insurers expanded into additional lines of businesses, they remain fonot adequately reflect risks or companies expose themselves to unknown risks. In 2011, the industry received a stark reminder that large losses can arise from nonpeak diversifying zones that were meant to balance a company s book. It is crucial that when reinsurers write business in these areas, they are being properly paid for the risk and protecting themselves by writing tight terms and conditions into contracts. That said, growth opportunities rarely lend themselves to tight underwriting practices. Over the past few years, we have witnessed an increased interest by institutional investors, such as pension funds and hedge funds, in the property catastrophe market. These investors are attracted to this market because of its low correlation risk to the investment markets and its higher expected returns. It seems that many Bermudian (re) insurers are embracing, with open arms, this new capacity that is entering the market through special vehicles (i.e., sidecars, publicly traded and private catastrophe funds). The Bermudians have been staffing their capital market divisions to take advantage of this trend. They are using these vehicles to manage their peak zones, mostly for retrocession business, while generating fee income that will reduce their expense ratio and could add up to 150 basis points to their ROE. This convergence of capital market and traditional reinsurance could enhance the (re)insurers operating results and strengthen their competitive positions, if executed properly. However, this convergence could raise some concerns. Among other things, a conflict of interest if a clear allocation rule between the rated paper and the collateralized vehicle is not appropriately established. In addition, the alternative capital trend or evolution could become a crowed trade where an increasing amount of capital is chasing a limited amount of premiums. As a result, the commoditization of the business could weaken underwriting standards and deteriorate price adequacy. 8 Bermudian Business 2013 Insurance Special

9 The convergence of the capital market and traditional reinsurance has been fueled by the low interest rates. However, the jury is still out. Let s see how this hot money will behave if interest rates go up or if we experience a big loss. Looking Ahead Collectively, the Bermudian players fared well despites the 2012 setbacks. We view their ERM frameworks to be strong and a real differentiator between losers and winners. A Bermudian (re)insurer s ability or failure to adapt to the constantly evolving landscape could affect the credit ratings. The Bermudian (re)insurers that maintain strong risk-adjusted capitalization, strong underwriting discipline, and can react quickly and profitably to market opportunities will likely be able to differentiate themselves from their competitors, even in the current market conditions. These companies will also be best positioned to exploit a widespread turn in the market if and when it comes and we could consider raising the ratings on some of them. However, many pitfalls could lead to weakening risk profiles and possibly downward revisions in our ratings. Following the herd mentality could cause a (re)insurer to enter lines or regions at times when prices do not adequately reflect risks. Taking unnecessary or unmeasured risks on either side of the balance sheet could put capital levels at risk. Similarly, inflexible and thin capital positions or a lack of appropriate SRM processes could lead to missed opportunities leaving these (re)insurers on the sidelines when the market does turn. Publicly-Traded companies Stock Exchange Symbol 52 week Book value Basic Common high/low per common Market/book earning Fully diluted Stock Price (jan. 1-dec.31) P/E Ratio share value ratio per share earnings Curr Prior Curr Prior Curr Prior Curr Prior Curr Prior Curr Prior Curr Prior ACE Limited ACE / / Allied World Assurance Company Holdings, Ltd Alterra Capital Holdings Ltd. Arch Capital Group Ltd. Argo Group International Holdings, Ltd. Aspen Insurance Holdings Limited AXIS Capital Holdings Limited AWH / / ALTE / / ACGL / / AGII / / AHL & AHL BH / / AXS / / Catlin Group Limited (1) CGL / / Endurance Specialty Holdings Ltd. ENH / / Hiscox Ltd. (2) HSX.L / / Lancashire Holdings Limited (3) Montpelier Re Holdings Ltd. LRE / / MRH / / PartnerRe Ltd. PRE / / RenaissanceRe Holdings Ltd. RNR / / Validus Holdings, Ltd. VR / / XL Group plc XL / / (1) Catlin Group Limited common stock price and 52 week high/low are denominated in GBP; all other amounts shown in USD. (2) Hiscox Ltd. s common stock price and 52 week high/low are denominated in GBP; all other amounts shown in USD. (3) Lancashire Holdings Limited common stock price and 52 week high/low are denominated in GBP; all other amounts shown in USD. 9 Bermudian Business 2013 Insurance Special

10 19th Annual Bermudian Business and Deloitte (In US $000s) Capital & Surplus S&P s Rating (1) S&P s Outlooks (2) S&P s erm score Basis of Accounting for Survey Response Current Prior Premiums Earned Current Net Income Current Insurance Regulation Class Date of Incorporation ACE Limited AA- Stable Strong US GAAP 27,531,000 24,332,000 15,677,000 2,706,000 Class 4 8/30/85 Allied World Assurance Company Holdings, AG A Stable Strong US GAAP 3,326,335 3,149,022 1,748, ,007 Class 4 11/13/01 Alterra Capital Holdings Ltd. A Stable Strong US GAAP 2,839,722 2,809,235 1,362, ,806 Class 4 8/20/99 Amlin AG A Stable Strong Other 1,625,336 1,350, , ,174 Class 4 10/28/05 Arch Capital Group Ltd. A+ Stable Strong US GAAP 5,168,878 4,592,074 2,935, ,397 Class 4 3/1/95 Argo Group International Holdings, Ltd. Aspen Insurance Holdings Limited A- Stable Adequate US GAAP 1,514,100 1,479,000 1,186,500 52,300 Class 4 10/5/99 A Stable Strong US GAAP 3,489,000 3,156,000 2,084, ,800 Class 4 5/23/02 AXIS Capital Holdings Limited A+ Stable Strong US GAAP 5,779,761 5,444,079 3,415, ,241 Class 4 11/8/01 Catlin Group Limited A Stable Strong US GAAP 3,511,867 3,297,741 3,603, ,601 Class 4 6/25/99 Endurance Specialty Holdings Ltd. Everest Re Group, LTD A+ Stable A Stable Strong US GAAP 2,710,597 2,611,165 2,013, ,516 Class 4 11/30/01 Adequate with Strong Risk Controls US GAAP 6,733,467 6,071,375 4,164, ,954 N/a 2/24/00 Hiscox Ltd. A Stable Strong Other 2,246,766 1,934,084 1,899, ,256 Class 4 12/12/06 Lancashire Holdings Limited A- Stable Adequate with Positive Trend Other 1,387,400 1,326, , ,700 Class 4 10/12/05 Montpelier Re Holdings Ltd. A- Stable Strong US GAAP 1,629,400 1,549, , ,600 Class 4 11/14/01 Oil Casualty Insurance, Ltd. BBB+ Stable Adequate US GAAP 489, ,117 75,373 28,359 Class 3b 5/14/86 Oil Insurance Limited A- Stable Adequate US GAAP 3,611,771 3,033, , ,103 Class 2 12/14/71 PartnerRe Ltd. A+ Stable Adequate with Strong Risk Controls US GAAP 6,933,496 6,467,542 4,485,939 1,134,514 Class 4 8/24/93 RenaissanceRe Holdings Ltd. AA- Stable Excellent US GAAP 3,507,056 3,608,533 1,069, ,014 n/a 6/7/93 Tokio Millennium Re Ltd. AA- Negative Strong US GAAP 1,173,340 1,050, , ,122 Class 3B 3/15/00 Validus Holdings, Ltd. A Stable Adequate with Strong Risk Controls US GAAP 4,455,107 3,448,425 1,873, ,438 Class 4 10/19/05 XL Group plc A Positive Strong US GAAP 11,856,397 10,756,130 5,765, ,388 Class 4 3/16/98 total 101,520,267 91,927,986 56,817,682 10,834,290 (1) All the ratings in this table are financial strength ratings of the lead rated operating companies with each group as ofapril 1, 2013 (2) Outlooks can be positive, negative, or stable, and signal a potential change in an interactive rating over the next 2-3 years. ^ Information not provided by respondent. 10 Bermudian Business 2013 Insurance Special

11 Insurance survey Type of Insurance as % of Premiums Breakdown of Premium as Class of Business Risk Breakdown of Gross Premium by Geographic Region Direct Reinsurance Marine & Aviation Financial Guarantee Accident & Health Property Property Catastrophe Professional Liability Excess Liability General Liability Casualty Finite Workers Compensation Life Terrorism Other UK North America Europe Asia, Australia & New Zealand Bermuda Rest of World 84% 16% 0% 0% 22% 36% 2% 0% 0% 0% 34% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 60% 17% 16% 0% 7% 67% 33% 0% 0% 0% 12% 0% 19% 24% 10% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 58% 10% 6% 26% 0% 45% 55% 11% 0% 2% 35% 0% 21% 9% 5% 9% 0% 2% 0% 0% 6% 0% 74% 16% 0% 0% 10% 0% 100% 1% 0% 0% 18% 29% 0% 0% 10% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 38% 26% 26% 8% 0% 3% 69% 31% 2% 0% 3% 27% 8% 13% 19% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 1% 22% 0% 67% 20% 7% 2% 3% 82% 18% ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 52% 48% 0% 0% 0% 21% 12% 0% 0% 0% 21% 0% 0% 0% 0% 46% 7% 43% 4% 5% 0% 41% 56% 44% 8% 0% 4% 23% 9% 28% 0% 12% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 15% 0% 46% 38% 0% 16% 0% 63% 37% 23% 0% 0% 12% 0% 0% 0% 0% 21% 0% 0% 0% 0% 44% 51% 23% 9% 6% 11% 0% 56% 44% 2% 2% 0% 16% 15% 7% 11% 0% 11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 36% 2% 68% 6% 2% 23% 0% 25% 75% 2% 0% 1% 43% 0% 8% 14% 18% 5% 0% 8% 0% 0% 0% 10% 61% 3% 7% 2% 17% 73% 27% 6% 0% 1% 25% 3% 26% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 36% 21% 41% 13% 5% 0% 20% 68% 32% 18% 0% 0% 43% 31% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 36% 5% 7% 0% 51% 19% 81% 0% 0% 0% 7% 48% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 45% 33% 0% 0% 0% 66% 0% 41% 59% 0% 0% 0% 19% 0% 0% 42% 0% 40% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 0% 100% 13% 0% 0% 14% 11% 0% 0% 0% 13% 0% 0% 17% 0% 33% 0% 37% 41% 11% 0% 11% 2% 98% 0% 0% 0% 5% 79% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 0% 64% 4% 6% 0% 26% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 72% 7% 0% 2% 9% 0% 3% 0% 1% 6% 0% 0% 3% 6% 91% 0% 25% 75% 36% 0% 1% 16% 28% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 18% 0% 28% 6% 2% 0% 64% 72% 28% 2% 0% 0% 19% 7% 22% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 0% 44% 0% 42% 47% 0% 11% 0%

12 Balance Sheet data (In (US$ 000S) $000s) ASSETS Cash & Cash Equivalents Quoted Investments Other Investments Reinsurance Balances Receivable Other Assets Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets Total Assets Loss Reserves Unearned Premium Reserve ACE Limited 615,000 57,548,000 2,716,000 4,147,000 22,544,000 4,975,000 92,545,000 42,416,000 6,864,000 Allied World Assurance Company Holdings, AG 865,364 6,626,454 1,307,483 1,418,516 1,492, ,741 12,029,946 5,645,549 1,218,021 Alterra Capital Holdings Ltd. 694,756 6,928, , ,705 1,841,046 54,751 10,677,078 5,849,889 1,031,633 Amlin AG 101,125 1,542, , , ,725-3,261,112 1,047, ,844 Arch Capital Group Ltd. 371,041 11,613,989 1,077,251 1,870,037 2,846,185 38,259 17,816,762 8,933,292 1,647,978 Argo Group International Holdings, Ltd. Aspen Insurance Holdings Limited 95,800 3,919, ,000 1,320, , ,300 6,688,900 3,223, ,200 1,464,000 6,647,000 45,000 1,058,000 1,078,000 19,000 10,311,000 4,780,000 1,121,000 AXIS Capital Holdings Limited 759,817 12,703, ,437 3,338,640 1,109,500 97,493 18,852,344 9,058,731 2,454,692 Catlin Group Limited 2,474,066 6,299,747-1,502,505 3,044, ,044 14,041,149 6,685,840 2,552,113 Endurance Specialty Holdings Ltd. 1,124,019 4,997, , ,615 1,276, ,000 8,794,972 4,240, ,244 Everest Re Group, LTD (1) 1,397,429 14,582, , ,081 2,542,630-19,777,907 10,069,055 1,322,525 Hiscox Ltd. (2) 1,071,989 3,922,218 14, ,834 1,146, ,476 7,149,624 3,150,634 1,081,844 Lancashire Holdings Limited 295,800 1,874, , ,100-2,639, , ,300 Montpelier Re Holdings Ltd. 330,800 2,779, , , ,200-3,810,100 1,112, ,100 Oil Casualty Insurance, Ltd. 116, , , ,297 1,231, ,412 78,273 Oil Insurance Limited 671,927 5,603, ,259 6,450,657 2,461,518 - PartnerRe Ltd. 1,121,705 15,639,869 1,264,102 1,991,991 2,292, ,650 22,980,432 12,522,615 1,534,625 RenaissanceRe Holdings Ltd. 325,358 4,748,863 1,611, , ,712 8,486 7,928,628 1,879, ,517 Tokio Millennium Re Ltd. 279,046 1,157, , , ,247 4,874 2,192, , ,729 Validus Holdings, Ltd. 1,219,379 6,199, , ,402 1,419, ,962 10,020,264 3,517, ,362 XL Group plc 2,618,378 31,633,429 2,346,754 58,428 8,322, ,527 45,387,779 20,484,121 3,755,920 total 18,012, ,749,047 14,749,676 22,076,865 54,019,907 7,978, ,586, ,582,219 29,106,920 (2) Hiscox Ltd. balance sheet amounts were translated from GBP to USD using the year end closing rate of Bermudian Business 2013 Insurance Special

13 fiscal 2012 Liabilities and Capital & Surplus Debt Other Liabilities Total Liabilities Common Stock Preferred Stock Additional paid In Capital Retained Earnings Unrealised Investment Gains (losses) Other Total Capital & Surplus Total Liabilities and Capital & Surplus 5,070,000 10,664,000 65,014,000 9,591,000-5,179,000 10,033,000 2,633,000 95,000 27,531,000 92,545, ,215 1,041,826 8,703, , ,985,173 - (113,818) 3,326,335 12,029, , ,302 7,837,356 96,060-1,721, , ,172-2,839,722 10,677, ,876 1,635,776 10, , , ,517 1,625,336 3,261, ,000 1,666,614 12,647, ,036 5,364, ,017 (1,025,839) 5,168,878 17,816, , ,200 5,174,800 31, , , ,500 (205,500) 1,514,100 6,688, , ,000 6,822, ,517,000 1,544, ,000 10,000 3,489,000 10,311, , ,915 13,072,583 2, ,843 2,179,034 4,497, ,328 (1,750,379) 5,779,761 18,852,344 91,807 1,199,522 10,529,282 3, ,785 1,960,728 1,225,149 - (267,413) 3,511,867 14,041, , ,916 6,084,375 43,116 17, ,915 1,969, ,731 10,732 2,710,597 8,794, , ,699 13,044, ,946,439 5,613, ,049 (1,363,958) 6,733,467 19,777, ,380 4,902,858 33, ,698 1,706,043-40,279 2,246,766 7,149, , ,200 1,251,600 84, ,900 35, ,800 1,387,400 2,639, , ,100 2,180, ,000 1,056, ,700 (3,300) (23,100) 1,629,400 3,810, ,334 84, , , ,471 1,231, ,368 2,838, ,654-3,266, ,611,771 6,450, ,000 1,239,696 16,046,936 85,460 35,750 3,861,844 4,952,002 - (2,001,560) 6,933,496 22,980, ,775 1,790,903 4,421,572 45, ,000-3,043,901 13,622 3,991 3,507,056 7,928, ,003 1,019, , , ,978 30,992 1,370 1,173,340 2,192, , ,423 5,565,157 18,886-2,160,478 1,844, ,327 4,455,107 10,020,264 1,672,778 7,618,563 33,531,382 2,987-8,584, ,321 1,476,453 1,389,883 11,856,397 45,387,779 14,411,685 30,965, ,066,710 10,755,607 2,040,362 33,674,570 52,668,432 6,351,964 (3,970,668) 101,520, ,586,977

14 Operating data (IN US $000s) Loss Ratio (1) Expense Ratio (1) Combined Ratio (1) Capital & Surplus Ratios % Change from Prior Period Current Prior Current Prior Current Prior Net Premiums to Capital & Surplus Loss Reserve to Capital & Surplus Capital & Surplus Net Premium Written Loss Ratio (5) (weighted av. 5yr.) Gross Premium Written Ceded Premiums ACE Limited 65.70% 66.00% 28.20% 28.70% 93.90% 94.70% 58.39% % 13.15% 4.57% 62.14% 21,593,000 (5,518,000) Allied World Assurance Company Holdings, AG Alterra Capital Holdings Ltd. (9) 65.14% 65.83% 29.34% 30.13% 94.48% 95.96% 55.25% % 5.63% 19.82% 57.26% 2,329,271 (491,448) 67.99% 66.50% 30.78% 31.49% 98.76% 97.99% 46.39% % 1.09% -7.82% 70.53% 1,968,610 (651,368) Amlin AG 58.57% 92.90% 19.55% 19.50% 78.11% % 61.94% 64.42% 20.36% 4.14% 63.64% 1,135,589 (128,820) Arch Capital Group Ltd % 65.64% 31.71% 32.66% 95.13% 98.30% 59.05% % 12.56% 14.17% 62.34% 3,869,161 (816,926) Argo Group International Holdings, Ltd. Aspen Insurance Holdings Limited (3) AXIS Capital Holdings Limited (10) 63.01% 79.77% 41.45% 39.44% % % 82.19% % 2.37% 16.11% 66.31% 1,745,700 (501,200) 59.45% 82.37% 32.29% 30.86% 91.75% % 64.40% % 10.55% 16.49% 65.09% 2,583,000 (336,000) 61.37% 80.70% 30.93% 29.17% 92.30% % 57.74% % 6.17% -2.40% 62.74% 4,139,643 (802,187) Catlin Group Limited (7), (8) 56.00% 70.02% 34.00% 32.60% 90.00% % % % 6.49% -0.04% 60.82% 4,971,597 (1,138,301) Endurance Specialty Holdings Ltd % 84.53% 26.87% 28.51% % % 74.87% % 3.81% 2.51% 67.40% 2,549,026 (519,531) Everest Re Group, LTD 65.92% 90.85% 27.86% 27.62% 93.78% % 60.61% % 10.91% -0.68% 71.72% 4,310,537 (229,466) Hiscox Ltd. (5) (6) 44.40% 60.20% 41.40% 39.30% 85.80% 99.50% 89.45% % 16.17% 6.65% 49.67% 2,481,354 (471,732) Lancashire Holdings Limited 29.88% 31.73% 20.49% 19.56% 50.38% 51.29% 41.52% 38.73% 4.57% 1.95% 33.40% 724,300 (148,200) Montpelier Re Holdings Ltd % 98.30% 34.52% 32.76% 80.97% % 37.79% 68.27% 5.17% -1.33% 55.11% 735,300 (119,600) Oil Casualty Insurance, Ltd % 0.52% 10.32% 3.47% % 3.99% 22.33% 87.73% 6.15% % 61.56% 145,870 (36,551) Oil Insurance Limited 91.09% % 0.05% -0.14% 91.13% % 18.62% 68.15% 19.08% 23.75% 89.69% 672,485 - PartnerRe Ltd % 96.70% 20.89% 28.70% 83.41% % 65.95% % 7.20% 1.93% 68.35% 4,718,235 (145,375) RenaissanceRe Holdings Ltd % 90.55% 27.39% 28.08% 57.80% % 31.44% 53.59% -2.81% 8.88% 25.60% 1,551,591 (448,934) Tokio Millennium Re Ltd % 82.17% 34.00% 26.50% 75.59% % 62.01% 45.80% 11.65% 35.28% 43.37% 829,253 (101,681) Validus Holdings, Ltd % 69.05% 33.37% 30.30% 86.72% 99.35% 41.73% 78.96% 29.19% 1.28% 55.21% 2,166,440 (307,506) XL Group plc 65.31% 76.56% 30.95% 30.90% 96.25% % 50.24% % 10.23% 9.64% 66.70% 7,175,130 (1,218,109) 72,395,092 (14,130,935) (1) Loss, expense & combined ratio only for non-life business. (2) Return on Equity = Net Income / Average of CY Capital & Surplus and PY Capital & Surplus. (3) Aspens operating ROE is a non-gaap financial measure which (1) is calculated using operating income and (2) excludes from average equity, the average after-tax unrealized appreciation or depreciation on investments and the average after-tax unrealized foreign exchange gains or losses and the aggregate value of the liquidation preferences of their preference shares. (4) Loss ratio (5 year average) = sum of loss and LAE (five years) / sum of premiums earned (5 years). For those respondents that provided less than five years of data, the average has been calculated over the number of periods provided. (5) Hiscox Ltd. income statement translated from GBP to USD using average rate of for the relevant year. (6) Hiscox Ltd. expense ratio and combined ratio excluding FX impact is 40.5% and 84.6%, respectively. (7) Catlin net income is net of preference share dividend of $43.5m (8) Catlins reported return on equity is 11.28% as opening equity is used in their calculation. (9) Alterra premiums earned exclude life premiums of $2,517 and Losses and LAE excludes Life claims of $55, Bermudian Business 2013 Insurance Special

15 CURRENT PERIOD Net Premiums Written Change in UPR Premiums Earned Losses & LAE CommisSions & Brokerage Other Underwriting Expenses Underwriting gain/(loss) Investment Income Earned (excluding realized gains/ losses) Realized Capital Gain/(Loss) Change in unrealized Gains/(Losses) Interest Expense on debt Other Income (Expenses) Tax Benefit (Expense) Net Income Return on Equity (2) Return on Revenue 16,075,000 (398,000) 15,677,000 10,174,000 2,446,000 2,096, ,000 2,181,000 78,000 - (250,000) 6,000 (270,000) 2,706, % 16.22% 1,837,823 (88,925) 1,748,898 1,139, , ,321 96, , , ,155 (55,405) (3,316) (18,440) 493, % 10.72% 1,317,242 45,464 1,362, , , ,001 16, ,964 19,240 44,738 (35,644) (55,389) (11,885) 143, % 6.01% 1,006,769 (36,797) 969, , ,918 45, ,320 18,506 (1,162) (13,322) (429) 276, % 22.30% 3,052,235 (117,095) 2,935,140 1,861, , , , , ,840 - (28,525) (2,857) 4, , % 12.60% 1,244,500 (58,000) 1,186, , ,500 27,300 (52,900) 118,800 25,700 (4,300) (23,700) 3,100 (14,400) 52, % 3.46% 2,247,000 (163,000) 2,084,000 1,239, , , , ,000 26,800 (25,000) (31,000) (52,000) (15,000) 280, % 13.14% 3,337,456 78,007 3,415,463 2,096, , , , , ,119 (25,650) (61,863) (159,172) (3,287) 547, % 11.63% 3,833,296 (229,785) 3,603,511 2,020, , , , ,453 34, (6,790) 9, , % 7.01% 2,029,495 (15,595) 2,013,900 1,520, , ,872 (48,146) 173,326 70, (36,174) 5,564 (3,346) 162, % 4.31% 4,081,071 83,557 4,164,628 2,745, , , , , ,400 - (53,683) (30,396) (110,572) 828, % 16.37% 2,009,622 (110,167) 1,899, , , , ,207 72,419 14,375 59,670 (13,636) (58,959) (14,820) 329, % 14.12% 576,100 6, , , , ,100 33,200 11,800 17,800 (14,500) (82,800) (1,900) 252, % 42.21% 615, , ,400 96, , ,300 67,100 56,700 25,700 (20,400) (18,500) (300) 227, % 21.88% 109,319 (33,946) 75, ,583 7,782 - (32,992) 19,843 36,419 28,599 (12,523) (10,987) - 28, % % 672, , , (215) 59, , , ,690 (705) (21,385) - 646, % 18.52% 4,572,860 (86,921) 4,485,939 2,804, , , , , ,899 (48,895) (421,474) (204,284) 1,134, % 18.24% 1,102,657 (33,302) 1,069, , , , , ,375 80,739 82,909 (23,097) (191,784) (1,429) 566, % 38.64% 727,572 (112,513) 615, , ,953 35, ,158 32,949 1, (60,948) (1,767) 122, % 20.81% 1,858,934 14,282 1,873, , , , , ,936 18,233 17,585 (39,060) 57,534 (2,501) 408, % 18.40% 5,957,021 (191,039) 5,765,982 3,765, , , ,138 1,012,348 19,319 - (172,205) (311,184) (34,028) 730, % 11.52% 58,264,157 (1,446,475) 56,817,582 35,216,293 10,176,931 6,700,147 4,724,311 6,668,659 1,512,897 1,069,885 (921,015) (1,429,065) (694,817) 10,834, % (10) AXIS Capital Holdings Ltd. s expense and combined ratios per the 10-K are 34.8% and 96.2% for 2012 and 31.6% and 112.3% for 2011, which include corporate expenses of $129.7m and $77.1m for 2012 and 2011 respectively.

16 Company officers Chief Executive Officer Chief Underwriting Officer Chief Financial Officer ACE Limited Evan G. Greenberg ^ Philip V. Bancroft Allied World Assurance Company Holdings, AG Scott Carmilani Michael Hoffman Tom Bradley Alterra Capital Holdings Ltd. W. Marston Becker ^ Joe Roberts Amlin AG Rob Wyatt (Amlin AG, Bermuda Branch) Arch Capital Group Ltd. Constantine Iordanou ^ Mark D. Lyons Argo Group International Holdings, Ltd. Mark Watson Andrew Carrier Jay Bullock Aspen Insurance Holdings Limited Christopher O'Kane Kate Vacher (Underwriting Director) John Worth AXIS Capital Holdings Limited Albert Benchimol ^ Joseph Henry ^ Elizabeth Murphy (Amlin AG, Bermuda Branch) Catlin Group Limited Stephen Catlin Paul Brand Benjamin Meuli Endurance Specialty Holdings Ltd. David S. Cash Joan De Lemps Michael J. McGuire Everest Re Group, LTD (2) Joseph V. Taranto John Doucette Craig Howie Hiscox Ltd. Bronek Masojada Robert Childs (2012)/ Richard Watson (Current) Stuart Bridges Lancashire Holdings Limited Richard Brindle Alex Maloney Elaine Whelan Montpelier Re Holdings Ltd. Christopher Harris ^ Michael Paquette Oil Casualty Insurance, Ltd. Robert D. Stauffer Jerry Rivers Ricky E. Lines Oil Insurance Limited Robert D. Stauffer George F. Hutchings Ricky E. Lines PartnerRe Ltd. Costas Miranthis Emmanuel Clarke (Global (Non-U.S)), Tad Walker (N.A.) Bill Babcock RenaissanceRe Holdings Ltd. Neill Currie Kevin O'Donnell Jeffrey Kelly Tokio Millennium Re Ltd. Tatsuhiko Hoshina Edwin Jordan Kiichiro Hatakeyama Validus Holdings, Ltd. Edward J. Noonan Jeff Clements Jeffrey Sangster XL Group plc Michael S. McGavick ^ Peter Porrino ^ Information not provided by respondent. How the Survey was done For this 19th annual Bermudian Business/Deloitte Bermuda Insurance Survey, financial data was obtained from Bermuda-based insurance and reinsurance companies with fiscal years ending in Deloitte compiled the financial data provided by survey participants. Industry commentary and analysis contained in the survey was prepared by Standard & Poors based upon the compiled financial data. The survey includes a few metrics that are commonly used in the industry. However, the metrics in the survey may be calculated differently from Standard and Poor s rating criteria (e.g. EBIT return on underwriting capital) or may not be included in the rating criteria (e.g. price to book value). The 19th annual Bermudian Business/Deloitte Bermuda Insurance Survey will go online at both the Bermudian Business and Deloitte websites and www. deloitte.com/bm. 16 Bermudian Business 2013 Insurance Special