FEMA Needs To Track Performance Data and Develop Policies, Procedures, and Performance Measures for Long Term Recovery Offices

Transcription

1 FEMA Needs To Track Performance Data and Develop Policies, Procedures, and Performance Measures for Long Term Recovery Offices October 30, 2014 OIG D

2 HIGHLIGHTS FEMANeedstoTrackPerformanceDataand DevelopPolicies,Procedures,andPerformance MeasuresforLongTermRecoveryOffices October30,2014 WhyWeDid This Between1994and2013,FEMA operatedsevenlongterm RecoveryOffices.FEMA obligatedandspentmorethan $4billioninadministrativecosts andmorethan$1billionin salariesfortheseoffices. Ourauditobjectivewasto determinewhetherfema s policies,procedures,and performancemeasuresfor establishing,operating,and closinglongtermrecovery OfficesmeetFederalstatutes andareconsistentlyapplied. WhatWe Recommend Wemadetwo recommendationstofema that,whenimplemented,will allowfematomanagelong TermRecoveryOfficesmore consistentlyandeffectively. ForFurtherInformation: ContactourOfficeofPublicAffairsat (202)254Ͳ4100,or usat DHSͲOIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov WhatWeFound FEMAdoesnottrackcostsordataassociatedwith performancemeasuresforlongtermrecoveryoffices. Withouttrackingcostsordata,FEMAcannotdetermine whethertheseofficesarecosteffective.femaestablishes, operates,andcloseslongtermrecoveryofficeswithout standardizedpolicies,procedures,andperformance measures.withoutthesecontrolsinplace,femaisatriskfor mismanagementoffederaldisasterfundsandcannotensure consistencyinestablishingandmanagingtheseoffices. CorrectingthesedeficiencieswillprovideFEMAthe informationandguidanceitneedstodeterminewhether LongTermRecoveryOfficesarecosteffective.Inaddition, FEMAcanbetterensureconsistencyinestablishingand managingtheseoffices. FEMAResponse FEMAconcurswithourrecommendations.FEMAplansto determinethecosteffectivenessofvariousmodelsfor managinglongtermrecoveryoffices.thesemodelswill examinepostͳdisastercoordinationanddeliveryofdisaster assistancetoassistfemaindevelopingdecisionͳmaking guidanceforidentifying,tracking,andreportingontheneed forandcosteffectivenessoftheseoffices.femaiscurrently documentingtheprocess,procedures,performance measures,lessonslearned,andbestpracticesusedtoscope andestablishthesandyrecoveryoffice.fema'swritten responsetousforthisreportisduein90days. OIG D

3 Washington, DC OCT MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: Elizabeth Zimmerman... ministrator, Response and Recovery ncy Management Agency '"'"'-''>--- Assis or General Office of Emergency Management Oversight SUBJECT: FEMA Needs To Track Performance Data and Develop Policies, Procedures, and Performance Measures for Long Term Recovery Offices Attached for your information is our final letter report, FEMA Needs To Track Performance Data and Develop Policies, Procedures, and Performance Measures for Long Term Recovery Offices. We incorporated the formal comments from the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the final report. The report contains two recommendations aimed at improving the management of Long Term Recovery Offices. Your office concurred with both recommendations. Based on information you provided in the response to the draft report, we consider the recommendations resolved with a target completion date of March 31, Once your office has fully implemented the recommendations, please submit a formal close-out letter to us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendations. The request should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed-upon corrective actions. Please a signed PDF copy of all responses and closeout requests to the Office of Emergency Management Oversight at OIGEMOFollowup@oig.dhs.gov. Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the. We will post the report on our website for public dissemination. Major contributors to this report are Kaye McTighe, Director, Headquarters Office; Nigel Gardner, Audit Manager; Christine Alvarez, Auditor-in-Charge; and Kimberly Letnaunchyn, Program Analyst. OIG D

4 Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Tonda L. Hadley, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audit Services, Office of Emergency Management Oversight, at (214) Attachment 2 OIG D

5 Background WhenthePresidentdeclaresaFederaldisaster,theFederalEmergencyManagement Agency(FEMA)RegionalOfficethatservicestheaffectedStateisresponsiblefor responseandrecoveryefforts.theregionalofficeopensajointfieldofficeto coordinateeffortswithitsdisasterpartners.whenajointfieldofficecloses,the disasterprogramsusuallytransferbacktotheregionaloffice.incaseswherestateand localcommunityofficials,businesses,andcitizensneedadditionalrecoveryassistance, FEMAmayopenaLongTermRecoveryOffice.Theseofficesopenbecausethesize, severity,orthenumberofdisastersoverwhelmstheregionaloffice.figure1showsthe progressionofthedisasterresponseandrecoveryresponsibilitythroughfema. Figure1:DisasterFlowchart Disaster Declaration RegionBegins Response Region Continues Response No JointField OfficeOpens JointField OfficeCloses Yes CanRegion Resume Responsibilityof Disaster No LongTerm Recovery OfficeOpens LongTerm Recovery OfficeCloses Region Resumes Responsibility fordisaster Yes Source: DHS OIG ThestructureofLongTermRecoveryOffices,inpart,mirrorsdivisionswithinthe RegionalandJointFieldOfficestoensureasmoothtransitionbackintoregional operations.forexample,eachofficehaslogistics,finance,andoperationsdivisions. ResultsofAudit Weestimatethat,between1994and2013,FEMAobligatedandspentmorethan $4billioninadministrativecostsandmorethan$1billioninsalariesforthesevenLong TermRecoveryOffices.Theseofficeswereresponsiblefor26majordisaster declarationstotaling$66billioninobligatedfunds.however,femadoesnottrackcosts 3 OIGͲ15Ͳ06ͲD

6 orperformancedatafortheseoffices.asaresult,femacannotdeterminethecost effectivenessoflongtermrecoveryofficeoperations.inaddition,femahasnot createdstandardizedpolicies,procedures,andperformancemeasuresforlongterm RecoveryOfficeoperations.Withoutthem,FEMAcannotensureconsistencyin establishingandmanagingtheseoffices. InJanuary2014,FEMAopenedanadditionalLongTermRecoveryOfficeforHurricane Sandy,responsiblefortherecoveryeffortsinNewYorkandNewJersey.Federal spendingforhurricanesandywilllikelysurpassallbutonepreviousdisaster(hurricane Katrina).Therefore,itisimperativethatFEMAshould(1)identify,track,andreport performancedatathatshowscosteffectivenessforlongtermrecoveryoffices;and (2)implementstandardizedpolicies,procedures,andperformancemeasuresto establish,operate,andcloselongtermrecoveryoffices. FEMADoesNotTrackLongTermRecoveryOfficeCostsorPerformanceData FEMAdoesnottrackcostsordataassociatedwithperformancemeasuresforLongTerm RecoveryOffices.Withouttrackingcostsordata,FEMAcannotdeterminewhetherLong TermRecoveryOfficesarecosteffective. Costs FEMAcouldnotverifythecostsofeachLongTermRecoveryOffice.TheFederal Managers'FinancialIntegrityActof1982(Act),inpart,requiresthatFederalagencies properlyrecordandaccountforrevenuesandexpendituresapplicabletoagency operationstomaintainaccountabilityfortheirassets.femaassertsthatitisnotin violationofthisactbecausefema sfinancialsystemtracksoveralldisastercosts. However,FEMAcouldnotprovidethecostsbylocation.Tofullyaccomplishthegoalof theact,femashouldbetrackingthecostsforeachlongtermrecoveryoffice. FEMAprovidedtheoveralldisastercostsrelatedtosevenLongTermRecoveryOffices. WeworkedwithFEMAtoanalyzethesecostsandmutuallyagreedtoestimatethat FEMAobligatedandspentmorethan$4billioninadministrativecostsandmorethan$1 billioninsalariesforthesevenoffices.withouttrackingcosts,femaisunableto determinewhetherlongtermrecoveryofficeoperationsarecosteffective.further, FEMAneedstotrackimportantdatasuchasofficespending,disasterprogram workload,andnumberoflongtermrecoverypersonneltodetermineeconomiesof scale. 4 OIGͲ15Ͳ06ͲD

7 DataAssociatedwithPerformanceMeasures Inaddition,FEMAisnottrackingdataassociatedwithperformancemeasures. Performancemeasurementistheongoingmonitoringandreportingofprogram accomplishments,particularlyprogresstowardpreͳestablishedgoals.performance measuresmayaddress(1)thetypeorlevelofprogramactivitiesconducted(process), (2)thedirectproductsandservicesaprogramdelivers(outputs),or(3)theresultsof thoseproductsandservices(outcomes).withouttrackingsuchdata,femacannot determinewhethertheeconomiesofscalearecosteffective. Forexample,FEMAmirrorsitsLongTermRecoveryOffices,inpart,aftertheoperations intheregionalandjointfieldoffices.allthreeofficetypeshavelogistics,financial,and OperationsDivisions.Theseparalleldivisionsexisttoallowforasmoothtransitionof disasteroperationsbacktotheregionalofficewhenregionalofficialsdecidetheyno longerneedalongtermrecoveryoffice. FEMANeedsStandardizedPolicies,Procedures,andPerformanceMeasuresforLong TermRecoveryOffices FEMAestablishes,operates,andclosesLongTermRecoveryOfficeswithout standardizedpolicies,procedures,andperformancemeasures.twofederalstatutes, therobertt.stafforddisasterreliefandemergencyassistanceactandpostͳkatrina EmergencyManagementReformActof2006,authorizeFEMAtoestablishfieldoffices, includinglongtermrecoveryoffices.however,thesestatutesdonotprovide proceduralguidanceorperformancemeasuresfortheseoffices. TheGovernmentPerformanceandResultsActof1993institutedagovernmentͲwide requirementthatagenciessetgoalsandreportannuallyonperformance.accordingto thegovernmentaccountabilityoffice(gao),mostfederalagenciesnowuse performancemeasurestotrackprogresstowardsgoals. 1 Withoutstandardizedpolicies,procedures,andperformancemeasures,FEMAofficials, attheirdiscretion,determinetheoveralloperationoflongtermrecoveryoffices. FEMAregionalofficialssaidthatthefactorstheyconsiderindecidingtoopenorclosea LongTermRecoveryOfficeinclude:thevolumeofIndividualAssistanceapplications opened,publicassistanceprojectapplications,publicassistanceprojectrevisionsand HazardMitigationprojectssubmitted;andtheamountofinsuranceclaimsanddollars paid.weaskedfematoprovideuswithcopiesofthereportsitusedtodecidewhether 1 PerformanceMeasurementandEvaluation:DefinitionsandRelationships,GAOͲ11Ͳ 646SP,May2, OIGͲ15Ͳ06ͲD

8 toopenorclosealongtermrecoveryoffice.theywereabletoprovideuswithreports showingdatafemaassessedfortheclosure,butnottheestablishmentoflongterm RecoveryOffices.Inaddition,thesereportswerenotstandardizedandnoteveryregion usedthem.femaofficialssaidthatthekeydecisionpointforestablishingandclosinga LongTermRecoveryOfficerestsontheregionalofficials disasterknowledge for determiningtheneed,operation,andclosureoftheseoffices.femaalsosaidtheability anddesireoftheaffectedstatetocloseoutdisasterrecoveryworkquicklyaffectsthe operationsandclosureofthelongtermrecoveryoffices. AsaresultofusingthissubjectivedecisionͲmakingprocessandtheaffectedStates abilityanddesiretocloseoutthedisaster,longtermrecoveryofficesremainopenfor inconsistenttimeframes.table1showsthat,asofoctober2013,femahadopened sevenlongtermrecoveryofficesandhadclosedfour. Table1:FEMALongTermRecoveryOffices, FEMA Region State Opened Closed/Status LTRO 1 Agein Months Major Disasters Managed TotalObligated DisasterFunds* Average#of Staff RegionIV Mississippi 4/2006 Open ,070,369, RegionIV Florida 5/2005 1/ ,252,934, RegionIV Alabama 6/ / ,027,409, RegionVI Texas 4/2006 2/ ,930,083, RegionVI Louisiana 5/2006 Open ,458,602, RegionVII Iowa 8/ / ,909,841, RegionIX California 1/1994 Transitionedto anareafield OfficeͲ ,095,285, TOTALS 26 $65,744,525,917 Source:FEMAHeadquartersandFEMARegionIV,VI,VII,andIX;FEMADisasterFinancialStatusReports fromaugust2013;andfemafinancialinformationtoolreportsfromnovember LongTermRecoveryOffice *TotalObligatedDisasterFundsarecalculatedfromthetimeofthedisasterdeclarationuntildisaster closureoroctober31,2013,whichevercamefirst. InJanuary2014,FEMAopenedanadditionalLongTermRecoveryOfficeforHurricane Sandy,responsiblefortherecoveryeffortsinNewYorkandNewJersey.Hurricane Sandyislikelytobeoneofthemostcostlydisastersinhistory.AsofJanuary2014, FEMAhadalreadyobligatednearly$7billionindisasterfundsforHurricaneSandyin NewYorkandNewJerseyandemployedover700staffforLongTermRecoveryOffices inthosetwostates. FEMAofficialsrecognizethelackofstandardizedpolicies,procedures,andperformance measuresforlongtermrecoveryoffices.withoutthesecontrolsinplace,femaisat riskformismanagementoffederaldisasterfundsandcannotensureconsistencyin 6 OIGͲ15Ͳ06ͲD

9 establishingandmanagingtheseoffices.however,severalfemaregionalofficialssaid theyhavedevelopedindividualpracticesforthelongtermrecoveryofficesusingtheir knowledgeofdisasteroperationsandregionalofficecapabilities.additionally,since September2013,severalFEMAregionalofficesbegansharingtheirpracticeswithFEMA RegionII,whichisresponsibleforHurricaneSandyrecoveryinNewJerseyandNew York.Finally,before2008,FEMAheadquartersdevelopedadraftdirectiveoutlining LongTermRecoveryOfficeoperations.However,FEMAheadquarters leadershiphas notimplementedthatdirective. Conclusion FEMArisksmismanagingdisasterrelieffundsbecauseitdoesnottrackcostsor performancedataandhasnotcreatedandimplementedstandardizedpolicies, procedures,andperformancemeasuresforlongtermrecoveryoffices.correcting thesedeficiencieswillprovidefematheinformationandguidanceitneedsto determinewhetherlongtermrecoveryofficesarecosteffective.inaddition,fema canbetterensureconsistencyinestablishingandmanagingtheseoffices. Recommendations WerecommendthattheAssociateAdministratorforResponseandRecovery,Federal EmergencyManagementAgency: Recommendation#1:Identify,track,andreportcostsandperformancedatathatshow costeffectivenessforlongtermrecoveryoffices. Recommendation#2:Implementstandardizedpolicies,procedures,andperformance measurestoestablish,operate,andcloselongtermrecoveryoffices. 7 OIGͲ15Ͳ06ͲD

10 ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis WereceivedandreviewedwrittencommentsonthedraftreportfromFEMA sassociate AdministratorforPolicy,ProgramAnalysisandInternationalAffairs.FEMAconcurswith ourrecommendations. BasedontheinformationFEMAprovided,weconsiderrecommendation#1asresolved andopen.femaiscurrentlydeterminingthecosteffectivenessofvariousmodelsfor postͳdisastercoordinationanddeliveryofassistance.thisinitiativewillestablishcriteria fordeterminingthecosteffectivenessandapplicabilityofonemodelversusanother basedonhistoriccostdataandprojectionsofpotentialcostsavings.femawillthen developdecisionͳmakingguidanceforidentifying,tracking,andreportingontheneed forandcosteffectivenessoflongtermrecoveryofficesversustransitioningsupportto thefemaregionorotheroptions.fema sestimatedcompletiondateismarch31, BasedontheinformationFEMAprovided,wealsoconsiderrecommendation#2as resolvedandopen.femaiscurrentlydocumentingtheprocess,procedures, performancemeasures,lessonslearned,andbestpracticesusedtoscopeandestablish thesandyrecoveryoffice.thesandyrecoveryofficeapproachandoigfindingswill assistthefemainitiativetoupdateandimplementpreviouslydevelopeddraft guidance,procedures,andperformancemeasurestoestablish,operate,andcloselong TermRecoveryOffices.FEMA sestimatedcompletiondateismarch31,2015. AppendixBincludesacopyofthemanagementcommentsintheirentirety. 8 OIGͲ15Ͳ06ͲD

11 AppendixA Objectives,Scope,andMethodology TheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)OfficeofInspectorGeneral(OIG)was establishedbythehomelandsecurityactof2002(publiclaw107о296)byamendment totheinspectorgeneralactof1978.thisisoneofaseriesofaudit,inspection,and specialreportspreparedaspartofouroversightresponsibilitiestopromoteeconomy, efficiency,andeffectivenesswithinthedepartment. TheobjectiveofthisauditwastodeterminewhetherFEMA spolicies,procedures,and performancemeasuresforestablishing,operating,andclosinglongtermrecovery OfficesmeetFederalstatutesandareconsistentlyapplied. WeinterviewedFEMAHeadquartersofficialsandFEMARegionalofficialsinFEMA RegionsIV,VI,VII,andIX;reviewedFederalstatutesandregulationsanddraftFEMA policiesandprocedures;analyzeddisastercostdataforthedisastersmanagedbythe sevenlongtermrecoveryofficesfortheperiodjanuary1994throughoctober2013. Usingthedisastercostdata,weestimatedtheLongTermRecoveryOfficesoperating costs.forthis,weusedtheoveralldisasteroperationsobligationsandexpendituresand eliminatedcostsnotdirectlyattributedtotheoperationofthelongtermrecovery Offices.Wethenadjustedthosecostsandobligationstoreflecttheestimatedcost attributedtothelongtermrecoveryofficesandotherdisasterofficesthroughoctober 2013.WealsocompiledstaffinganddisasterfunddataforNewJerseyandNewYorkfor HurricaneSandytodetermineitscurrentfinancialimpactonLongTermRecovery Offices;andperformedotherproceduresconsiderednecessarytoaccomplishour objective. Wedidnotassesstheadequacyoftheagency sinternalcontrolsapplicabletolong TermRecoveryOfficeoperationsbecauseitwasnotnecessarytoaccomplishouraudit objectives. WeconductedthisperformanceauditbetweenJune2013andMarch2014pursuantto theinspectorgeneralactof1978,asamended,andaccordingtogenerallyaccepted governmentauditingstandards.thosestandardsrequirethatweplanandperformthe audittoobtainsufficient,appropriateevidencetoprovideareasonablebasisforour findingsandconclusionsbaseduponourauditobjectives.webelievethattheevidence obtainedprovidesareasonablebasisforourfindingsandconclusionsbaseduponour auditobjectives. 9 OIGͲ15Ͳ06ͲD

12 AppendixB ManagementCommentstotheDraftLetterReport 10 OIGͲ15Ͳ06ͲD

13 11 OIGͲ15Ͳ06ͲD

14 AppendixC ReportDistribution DepartmentofHomelandSecurity Secretary DeputySecretary ChiefofStaff DeputyChiefofStaff GeneralCounsel ExecutiveSecretary Director,GAO/OIGLiaisonOffice AssistantSecretaryforOfficeofPolicy AssistantSecretaryforOfficeofPublicAffairs AssistantSecretaryforOfficeofLegislativeAffairs DHSComponentLiaison ChiefPrivacyOfficer FederalEmergencyManagementAgency Administrator ChiefofStaff AssociateAdministrator,ResponseandRecovery Director,OfficeofRegionalOperations ChiefFinancialOfficer AssociateAdministratorforPolicyandProgramAnalysis Director,ProgramAnalysisandEvaluationDivision Director,RiskManagementandCompliance OIGPortfolioManager,OfficeofPolicyandProgramAnalysis OfficeofManagementandBudget Chief,HomelandSecurityBranch DHSOIGBudgetExaminer RecoveryAccountabilityandTransparencyBoard Director,Investigations,RecoveryAccountabilityandTransparencyBoard 12 OIGͲ15Ͳ06ͲD

15 Congress CongressionalOversightandAppropriationsCommittees 13 OIGͲ15Ͳ06ͲD

16 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General Public Affairs at: Follow us on Twitter OIG HOTLINE To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at and click on the red "Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at (800) , fax our hotline at (202) , or write to us at: Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305 Attention: Hotline 245 Murray Drive, SW Washington, DC