Force Tracking System in SOF applications

Transcription

1 AARMS Vol. 8, No. 4 (2009) TECHNOLOGY Force Tracking System in SOF applications ATTILA GULYÁS J6 Joint Force Command Hungarian Defence Forces, Hungary Identification is necessary; the missing of data can be lethal. This new era called digital battlefield force us to make sacrifices to join the information flow. Hungarian Defence Forces are to purchase a NATO standard-level field Command and Control (C2) system for infantry troops. Is it possible to use that C2 system in special operations forces missions? Can data be sent via G/A connections? Is it necessary to inform the commanders from Hungarian combat and transport vehicles grids even our dismounted soldiers through the electromagnetic field as digital data? It can be real in near-term solutions in ISAF applications using NATO enabled Friendly Force Tracking systems with near real-time G/A/G Situation Awareness data. I would like the reader to make sense of the possibility of resolving the identification manners of our troops in the operational areas of Afghanistan. Introduction The Friendly Force Tracking (FFT) Ground-to-Air Interoperability Workshop, which was convened at the NATO HQ on May 2008 to support development of this capability in NATO, resulted in relevant information to leverage a near term, estimated 2 8 years FFT Ground-to-Air Interoperability capability in NATO. That information flow shows us all the operational requirements we need to fulfil if we would like to be a member of the common NATO FFT system. The operational requirement states that Aircrew of weapon delivering aircraft require real-time, validated and precise information of the disposition of own troops within the vicinity of a designated target area to ensure that delivery of the weapon will not endanger own forces. Using this requirement as a starting point we can discuss developed a consensus on the way ahead for the near-term Hungarian requirements regarding FFT in Special Operations Forces (SOF) applications. My aim is to identified a practical and cost-effective solution that is based on leveraging an FFT Ground-Air (G/A) Interoperability service out of NATO existent systems and services, as FFT and LINK-16. The pragmatic and flexibility characteristics of Hungarian future-solutions should be reinforced in the sense that it will make it possible to smoothly evolve to medium-and long term response to other Received: January 20, 2010 Address for correspondence: ATTILA GULYÁS [email protected]

2 NATO operational requirement duly synchronized with the Combat Identification (CID) recent systems of NATO members. It should be clear that our troops requirements are Situation Awareness-based (SA) and, as such, it does not guarantee that particular target engagement is safe to the friendly forces (FF). My aim have to be to advise on the presence of FF close to the area of engagement and with that contribute for eventual non-engagement decisions based on that non-real time information, resulting in maximum positioning errors of FF of less than 1 km when NATO different NATO rules or requirements (p.e. ISAF PSR CIS 018b) are implemented. Near realtime FFT SA information is vital whenever there is a high risk of endangering own forces in-theatre. It should be stressed that any service will not support engagement decisions on targets but it rather supports non-engagement target decisions whenever the risk of endangering own forces exist or is unbearable, since FFT may only provide near realtime SA information of ground forces to the coalition Weapon Delivering Air Assets (WDA) and to other friendly assets as required. In most cases non-engagement target decisions to not endanger own forces are rather conservative decisions and consequently a near real-time feedback capability on the friendly forces disposition as FFT might provide is often enough to abort an engagement mission. I am sure that NATO Force Tracking System (FTS) will evolve progressively to a near real-time application whose the next step will be implementation of ISAF PSR CIS 018b, i which requires that all ground tracks should be reported whenever they move more than 800 meters or every 5 minutes, the one that occurs first. This assumptions seems reasonable for Hungarian SOF, since one of the main NATO goals is to develop a near real-time and validated SA capability for which NATO Friendly Force Information (NFFI) is a primary source and since FFT is recognized as one of the capabilities to gain Information and Decision Superiorities and for the realization of NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC). It will not be possible to take informed and timely decisions on the own ground forces without knowing their position, disposition and status, meaning without FFT. Directions NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) established 1Q-2008 the following operational requirement to provide information of ground forces disposition to WDA (described above yet): Aircrew of weapon delivering aircraft require real-time, validated i ISAF PSR CIS 18b is a requirement to enhance the functionalities of the ISAF FTS. 602 AARMS 8(4) (2009)

3 and precise information of the disposition of own troops within the vicinity of a designated target area to ensure that delivery of the weapon will not endanger own forces. This overarching requirement could be a long-term and complex effort and to be completely fulfilled requires implementation of a real-time robust CID capability to avoid fratricide and enhance combat effectiveness. To minimize known current shortfalls in terms of friendly-fire coming from the air, the far reaching requirement should be addressed through a stepwise evolutionary approach leading to a final integrated CID solution. It is known that the FFT is the most valuable in providing near real-time SA and it is the most readily available capability to contribute requirements to avoid endangering own forces on the ground especially to support decision-makers to abort the attack mission and take nonengagement decisions, but it does not replace the need for real-time Combat Identification system for air-to-ground identification to support positive informed engagement decisions on the target without endangering own forces. In order to contribute to avoid or minimize future G/A fratricide events in NATO operations, mostly especially in ISAF we need to achieve a quick-win Initial Operational Capability (IOC) regarding FFT G/A interoperability and to initiate the path to the longer-term Final Operational Capability (FOC) for this capability based in a overarching CID architecture (Figure 1). Figure 1. ii Current national Force Tracking capability in NATO ii LTC Joe Chacon NATO ATC, brief of FFT Ad Hoc Working Group 27 October 2008 AARMS 8(4) (2009) 603

4 Nowadays many NATO countries use their own FFT systems for NFFI exchange. The main difference between FFT solutions is the manner or level of communications data exchange. The two different types are: FFT system that send data via military satellite, battalion (Bn) level and above only (below Bn level they use high frequency HF and/or Very High Frequency VHF transponders, moreover wireless nets in gigahertz frequency-range). FFT system in that each combat or transport vehicle (even a dismounted soldier) can send NFF information via military satellite to higher HQ (not only to the battalions Command Posts). The best way for Hungarian land forces (infantry) is the communications link via satellite. Concerning that it could be extremely expensive solution to develop our peacekeeping and military assistance troops capability to personal vehicletransponders. The near-term Hungarian plans consisted on that proposal however; HF and/or VHF communication links are going to be the way we go. It can be different in SOF applications. Because of SOTU s manoeuvres and operational task it is not possible to send data (positions grids, identification data, device (vehicle-troop) specified data) via long wire antennas as Near Vertical Sky Incident connection (NVSI) and/or Line Of Sight (LOS) so the only way can accomplish the connection is via mil satellite (TACSAT). Be that as it may our highest task is to provide interoperability for NFFI between nations and NATO Control Suites (see Figure 2). NATO STANAGs as Interim NFFI Standard for Interoperability of FTS (D-doc) and STANAG 5527 (not implemented yet) show the NFFI data format (p.s. *XML) that is extensively tested during Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstrations (CWID) over last three years and Supports Network Enabled Capabilities with multiple interfaces. If Hungary purchases a FTS to use it in operational theatre we have to consider the facts that without reliable interoperability it may not work. In Figure 3 I would like to show the reader the recent capability of interoperability in ISAF war theatre regarding to the leading nation (USA) and the coalition forces strength (Germany, France). Stepping in to these coalitions s FT systems is vital for HUN SOTU and later HUN SOTG (2011) and it could be more relevant when Hungarian Joint Tactical Air Controller (JTAC) or Forward Air Controller (FAC) servicemen will commence their service as a SOTU s team-member. 604 AARMS 8(4) (2009)

5 Figure 2. iii Interoperability infrastructure of FFT FFT NATO-National interoperability in ISAF Figure 3. iv iii LTC Joe Chacon NATO ATC, brief of FFT Ad Hoc Working Group 27 October 2008 iv R. Porta NC3A, brief of FFT interoperability, 05 February 2009 AARMS 8(4) (2009) 605

6 At the end of the FTS process we have to accomplish the NFFI D-doc all requirements for the complex interoperability as you can see on Figure 3. We can understand now it is so important not only the G/A interoperability but also the Ground/Ground (G/G) or Ground/Maritime (G/M) connections. Just only a complex and rapid, ready and reliable FTS can provide the maximised defence and interoperability between nations in operational area. Figure 4. The service solution is based in conveying FFI to WDA through Link-16 the only NATO-wide standardized Tactical Air Data-Pipe that is available to the Alliance and spreading. Currently it is known that many Alliance WDA are not Link-16 equipped, however the Defense Planning Force Goal 2780 requires that by the beginning of 2012 (by the time this service will become mature in-theatre) nations should install Link-16 voice and data capability (STANAG 5516) in all combat aircraft made available for NATO operations, and in ground based command and control facilities and any other headquarters and units requiring communication with aircraft and helicopters deployed on NATO operations (see Figure 4). This means that Link-16-equipped units are expected to increase in numbers through the course of the next years. Force Goal 2860 requires nations that by the beginning of 2011, all military units (ground/company, air/air asset and naval/ship) designated to the NRF, and by the beginning of 2012, all units that could be made available to NATO operations should be able to be tracked by a national FTS, meaning that FFT coverage is expected to increase very much on the next years. Since minimizing fratricide in the battle-space is an important NATO 606 AARMS 8(4) (2009)

7 strategic objective, all duly balanced efforts in terms of their cost/efficiency ratio, which can satisfactorily contribute to that end should be taken into good consideration by NATO. As concluded by the FFT Ground-to-Air Interoperability Workshop, in spite of its limitations, a near-term solution based on conveying FFI to the WDA through Link-16 provides the best relative results for the near-term and will create momentum for a final solution to be found within CID with the contribution of FFT. It is truly important to note that while CID solutions are being sought a CID robust industrial solution is not expected to be developed and fielded to this FFT solution applies. So, adoption this FFT solution, recognizing at the same time its limitations, is also assuring that this NATO shortfall will be minimized on the next 8 years. As stressed before, this service will support non-attack decisions only; it will not guarantee that an attackdecision will not result in fratricide or in endangering own forces. Ongoing improvements in existing NATO and national FFT and CID capabilities and current national efforts to equip air assets with Link 16 will steadily improve the usefulness of the FFT ground-to-air interoperability service to contribute to fratricide prevention and, additionally, will act as an enabler to conduct effects-based operations, by enriching the SA and allowing a more efficient C2. The most important developments that are stimulated by this FFT service are improvements on FFT timeliness and coverage (more units using FFT trackers) and fielding of Link 16 on Air Assets engaged in NATO operations. As these aspects improve, more useful will be this service to NATO operations. For example, decreasing the FFT timeliness by increasing the PPLI reporting rate (the frequency that FFT trackers report their position) will improve the real-timeliness of the service, an extremely important factor to avoid. We have to make some assumptions: The approach is focusing on the ISAF operation as its primary fielding, but supports also the NRF and other near-term NATO-led operations. The FFT network timeliness and coverage characteristics will steadily improve over time and at least ISAF PSR CIS 018b will be implemented as a matter of urgency. An appropriate Link 16 network is available in-theatre when fielding this nearterm solution. The WDA is Link 16 capable. FFI is available and can be accessed through a standard interface. Current and available NATO systems, services and protocols only are to be used which should lead to a very cost-effective solution. AARMS 8(4) (2009) 607

8 Current and available systems, services and protocols should not be affected by the envisaged technical solution. Time mentioned in the FFI message to be conveyed to the WDA is referring to the moment that status of the track was originated. It is assumed that the FFI is available at a lower or the same security level as the Link 16 radio communication network. It is assumed that all necessary accesses to required systems, interfaces and information are granted for development and deploying the near-term FFT Ground-to-Air Interoperability service. It is assumed that in-theatre connectivity via Link-16 between the WDA, the FFT Ground-to-Air Interoperability service and, if applicable, the WDA controlling unit is granted. This connectivity might depend on an airborne platform that has got Line of Sight to all relevant players or through the use of JREAP (STANAG 5518). The service and, if applicable, the WDA controlling unit shall be further connected to the respective FFT network. Definitions The next section contains the concept definition to ensure the development of the service. In this section the different key role-players and stakeholders of the service are described, followed by a description of the functionality of the service. Key Role Players The identified heterogeneous key role-players for the service are: The Target. The WDA. The Friendly Ground Force. Target With respect to provision of FFI to WDAs and the required establishment of triggers for transmission of this information, two types of targets are distinguished: Dynamic Targets: Dynamic Targets are objects or people that actually have been identified as a hostile track by a unit in the field and that have not been predetermined. Planned targets: Planned Targets are objects or people that are pre-determined to be attacked assigned. 608 AARMS 8(4) (2009)

9 Weapon Delivering Air Asset (WDA) The Weapon Delivering Air Asset is an air platform capable of delivering weapons. The role of the WDA for the service is represented by a friendly military air platform that is capable of being tasked to attack hostile forces. A WDA becomes of interest to the service as soon as a ground or close-to-ground target (from now on ground target ) is assigned to it since further engagement of the target may endanger own forces on the ground. The Friendly Ground Force From a dissemination service perspective, the friendly ground force might be in the proximity of a possible target in the sense that it may be endangered by the WDA target engagement. The existence and location of the relevant friendly ground forces need to be communicated to the WDA in order to contribute to prevention of air-to-ground fratricide. The definitions are important to understand the importance of FFT regarding to Hungary near-time aims to join the huge cloud of international (NATO) FFT-network. One solution for functional requirements goal of Hungary Friendly Force Tracking (FFT) for Hungarian land forces and of course, for Hungarian Special Operations Task Units (HUN SOTU) and Task Group (HUN SOTG) must be the capability to monitor the precise location and identification of friendly forces in NATO-led operations in near-real time, and to exercise Command and Control (C2) on these forces, as required in Minimal Military Requirements (MMR). FFT (which is synonymous with Force Tracking System, Blue Force Tracker (BFT) and Force Tracker (FT) is a deployed land-force sensor that tracks unit position with accuracy and automatically reports unit position and status information to the chain of command in near real time. In other words, Force Tracking is a major basic service to enable Information and Decision Superiority at the different command echelons, from the Tactical to the Operational and Strategic levels, to conduct present and future coherent and efficient Effects-Based Operations, where preventing fratricide and collateral damage is of critical importance. Figure 05 shows a simple architecture of the service could be implemented. On one side the service receives and maintains an updated FFT picture of the deployed friendly forces in-theatre. On the other, the service interacts with the WDA through the intheatre Link 16 network. On this interface the service receives triggers from the WDAA through selected Link 16 messages requesting a push of the FFT data around a potential WDA target. The service responds to those triggers by sending the relevant friendly AARMS 8(4) (2009) 609

10 tracks located around the potential target using a J3.5 message (Land Track Report). This also requires development of an algorithm that will select the friendly tracks around the target that should be sent to the WDA. This algorithm could incorporate different criteria (selected by the service s operator) to select the tracks around the target to be sent to the WDA. Figure 5. There are several issues that can be raised in leveraging this capability, including that Link 16 is not used in all NATO WDAs, that the FFT network has a high latency, and that there is a need to properly manage, correlate and fuse Link 16 and FFT tracks within the Ground-to-Air service and Link 16 network, etc (see Figure 5). 610 AARMS 8(4) (2009)

11 Some of these issues could be minimized or nearly overcame, others will be more challenging. As to the fact that Link 16 is not used in all WDA there is a NATO Force Goal for all aircrafts and helicopters that will be deployed in NATO operations to be equipped with Link 16. As to the FFT timeliness (currently around 10 minutes) there is an ISAF PSR to increase the FFT data rate in ISAF to 5 minutes or 800 meters vehicle displacement and this issue can be further minimized by increasing the S-band satellite bandwidth used to connect the FFT trackers to the FFT control suite. Evolving the ISAF FTS capabilities themselves as to the need to manage and correlate the FFT and Link 16 data that could be done within the FFT Ground-to-Air Service (a relatively challenging task) and should be done at the Link 16 level as well (see Figure 6). Figure 6. v v Rui Francisco, Commander (PRT N) ISB Staff Officer; brief of FFT G/A interoperability short-time requirement, 29 October 2008; AARMS 8(4) (2009) 611

12 NFFI sources NFFI now is the current interim standard for FFT Interoperability (NC3B SC/5 SC/7 NFFI D-doc, 2006). The definition of the NFFI message standard is based on a number of standard definition or data modelling sources. Sources are below (Figure 7) distinguished into primary and secondary. The first is the most relevant ones and is taken into account more extensively. STANDARD SCOPE OF USE DESCRIPTION OF USE C2IEDM v. 6.15a many data elements used as main reference for data element definition. JC3IEDM ed. 3 some data elements used as reference for the definition of some data elements. STANAG 1059, Ed 8 NATO-agreed country codes used for definition of country codes STANDARD SCOPE OF USE DESCRIPTION OF USE ISO country codes used for definition of country codes not in STANAG 1059 AC/322-D(2004)0021 security markings used for security label definition APP-6(A) (STANAG 2019) unit symbol used for definition of unit characterization Figure 7. Standards used in NFFI Primary Definition Sources The Multilateral Interoperability Programme (MIP) Block-2 Data Model - Command and Control Information Exchange Data Model (C2IEDM). This is the most extensive authoritative and available data model for Land Command and Control. The Joint C3 Information Exchange Model (JC3IEDM) is the most extensive authoritative and available data model for Joint Command and Control. STANAG 1059 Ed. 8 is based on International Standards Organization (ISO) and this is the main standard used for country codes. AC/322-D(2004)0021 defines the standard for security markings. NATO APP-6(A) or STANAG is the standard for symbology for land military units. Secondary Definition Sources ADatP-3/STANAG 5500, in particular the OWNSITREP Message Text Format (MTF). This message definition applies to the reporting of the status and location of friendly land units. Link-16 (in particular the J3.5 message), definition source for the forwarding of land tracking data to air- platforms and systems. Variable Message Format (VMF) message format is used in FTS s in the USA. USA Blue Force Tracking (BFT) Community of Interest (COI) Information Exchange Standard (IES) and in particular the Core Data Element. The IES is the emerging data model for the USA 612 AARMS 8(4) (2009)

13 BFT COI. STANAG 4579 (NATO Battlefield Target Identification (BTID) differs from FFT but is closely related. One possibility of information sharing in Hungarian SOTU s (HUN SOTG) In a SOF Protected Core Networking (SPCN) environment, flexible and robust communications between information domains are possible. However, general PCN does not provide any information sharing solutions. In order to share information between securities domains, SOF information sharing solutions must be implemented in the information domains, differentiating which information is releasable to another party and which is not. These solutions are often referred to as cross domain solutions. When interconnecting networks, boundary protection services are used to enforce the proper separation between the NATO SOF or other coalition networks. This is to ensure that unauthorized users are not able to access the network that is being protected. While strong boundary protection is necessary in order to interconnect networks, it is not sufficient in order to share information. For this, additional mechanisms are necessary that are able to differentiate information according to reliability and possibly to sanitize information for release to a certain level. This requires information to be labelled and a mechanism to verify labels and prevent any information leakage when releasing information to another security domain. If information in an SOF information domain should be differentiated, information must be labelled according to a given scheme. Having a standard way of labelling information object will ensure that information from multiple sources can be understood the same way with regard to the label, making it possible for the same release mechanism to act on multiple types of information. The labelling of FFT tracks in particular should follow the standard of labelling information objects, when such a standard becomes available. When interconnecting networks and releasing information the risk of leaking information to unauthorized parties, could increase. This needs to be mitigated by assurance in border protection, label verification, information sanitation, as well as the assurance of the label itself. The assurance requirements vary according to the interconnected networks, e.g. the assurance requirement will be higher when connecting a NATO Secret network to a public network compared to connecting a NATO Secret network to a NATO Confidential or NATO Restricted network. Ways or devices to share information between domains can be information diodes, guards, or information exchange gateways (IEG). A goal in the protection of information is to move from the current model of protecting the information confidentiality of SOF information when it is transferred between AARMS 8(4) (2009) 613

14 security domains, to protection of the individual information objects at all times, regardless of whether it is being transmitted or stored. This is referred to as object level protection in the NNEC FS. True object level protection with multi-level security possibilities is not expected to be widely available in the timeframe of the FFT. Labelling and handling of objects, like object level, in system high networks is expected to be available earlier. Conclusions In my work I would like to identify a practical and cost-effective solution that is based on leveraging a FFT Ground-to-Air Interoperability service out of NATO existent systems and services (e.g. FFT and Link 16). The flexibility characteristics of this solution should make it possible to smoothly evolve to a medium- and long-term response to ACO s operational requirement duly synchronized with the Combat Identification (CID), work that is being led by the Identification Sub-Committee (SC/7), while it addresses the most urgent ACO requirement for the near-term by supporting non-engagement decisions only with near real-time FFT Situational Awareness information whenever there is a high risk of endangering own forces in-theatre. In fact this near-term service will not support engagement decisions on targets in the sense that it will not guarantee that they will be safe to the friendly forces in the area, but it supports non-engagement target decisions whenever the risk of endangering own forces exists or is unbearable, since FFT may only provide near real-time Situational Awareness information of ground friendly forces to the coalition Weapon Delivering Air Assets. Since in most cases non-engagement target decisions to not endanger own forces are rather conservative decisions, a near real-time feedback capability on the friendly forces disposition as this FFT Ground-to-Air solution may provide is often enough to abort an engagement mission. This is as much important as within the current effective-based operations paradigm that NATO wishes to pursue, frequently a conservative non-engagement decision is less costly in terms of own and side effects than an uncertain engagement-decision. I assume that the current NATO Force Tracking Systems (FTS) will evolve progressively to a near real-time application whose the next step for the ISAF FTS will be implementation of ISAF PSR CIS 018b16 which requires that all ground tracks should be reported whenever they move more than 800 meters or every 5 minutes, the one that occurs first. The concept, architecture and the detailed functional requirements for this service were established as the basis to start the implementation project of this service in 614 AARMS 8(4) (2009)

15 NATO, with ISAF as the first implementation priority within an effort to contribute to avoid or minimize possible fratricide events coming from Air-to-Ground engagements in ISAF and in other future NATO operational theatres. The service aims to be the triggering and foundation document to initiate a quickwin FFT Ground-to-Air Interoperability service implementation project for the nearterm to respond to the needs registered in different NATO operational theatres for an automated service to contribute to prevent Friendly Forces fratricide coming from the air, recognized as the most dangerous in terms of possible casualties. The near-term functional requirement for this service aims to set the path and eventually be the precursor for the long-term implementation of the service that most probably will be based on future CID capabilities, yet to be developed and fielded (not expected to be widespread and robustly fielded for the near-term: 2 to 8 years from now, i.e., during the time period this solution applies). Limitations of this FFT capability have been identified. Some of these would be reduced/mitigated, especially by the evolution/enhancement of the: FFT capability: in terms of FFI reporting rate (improved timeliness of data) and coverage (expansion of FFT trackers in-theatre). Link 16: Expansion of Link 16 in Air Assets engaged in NATO Operations. As to the first limitation, the current 10 minutes reporting rate should be improved through implementation of ISAF PSR CIS 018b, wherein it is required to reduce the refreshment rate to a flat rate of 5 minutes for all users or every 800 m. The system should be able to update at whichever of the time period or distance moved occurs first. On the other side, ACO could accept the FFT ground data with the timeliness as it is, under the general condition that its final transmission to the WDA s through the nearterm FFT Ground-to-Air Interoperability service shall be always an operational decision based on the guidance for the specific situation. Notice however, that improvement of the reporting rate depends strongly on the contracted satellite bandwidth, which NATO can decide to increase if operational circumstances change or justify, and in this case the FFT picture received on the FFT master server and consequently on the near-term FFT Ground-to-Air Interoperability service would get closer to real-time with positive impacts on the usefulness of the service for fratricide avoidance. As to coverage, at the moment, in ISAF the coverage is around 25% of the military units which would increase when more FFT trackers will be procured within the referred PSR. Coverage also increases as other nations connect their FTS with the ISAF Force Tracking System through the multinational FFT network. As fitting Link 16 in Air Assets, many nations have already or are in the process of equipping their air assets with Link 16. AARMS 8(4) (2009) 615

16 On the other side, the near-term FFT Ground-to-Air Interoperability service requirement will act as an additional stimulus for overall improvement of the FFT capability in NATO and for air assets engaged in NATO operations to be fitted with Link 16. Figure 8. vi USMC serviceman is tracking their troops in a combat vehicle Motto: Each day of operations without appropriate FFT support is one of increased risk to our soldiers Chairman of the Military Committee 3 August References 1. NATO Standardization Organization; October NATO Message Text Formatting System; ADatP-3, Change 4 / STANAG 5500 Edition 5 (NATO Unclassified) 2. NC3A, HALLINGSTAD, G., PORTA, R.: April 2006 Interoperability of Friendly Force Tracking Systems in Coalition Operations; NC3A Technical Note 1182 (NATO Unclassified) 3. Multilateral Interoperability Program (MIP); 21 January 2005 Command and Control Information Exchange Data Model (C2IEDM); Version 6.15a (Unclassified) 4. Multilateral Interoperability Program (MIP); 9 December 2005 Joint C3 Information Exchange Data Model (JC3IEDM); Edition 3.0 (Unclassified) 5. NATO, Military Agency for Standardization (MAS); December 1999 Military Symbols for Land-Based Systems; APP-6(A)/STANAG 2019, Edition 4 (NATO Unclassified) 6. NATO Standardization Organization; 19 February 2004 Character Codes for Geographical Entities; STANAG 1059, Edition 8 (NATO Unclassified) 7. Federal Information Processing Standard; April 1995 Countries, Dependencies, Areas of Special Sovereignty, and Their Principal Administrative Divisions; FIPS PUB 10-4, International Standards Organization (ISO) Codes for the representation of names of countries; ISO USA Department of Defense; 1 April 2004 Variable Message Format (VMF); MIL-STD-6017 (Unclassified Limited Distribution) vi Source: AARMS 8(4) (2009)

17 9. USA Blue Force Tracking (BFT) Community Of Interest (COI) Data Management WG; April 2007 BFT COI Information Exchange Standard (BFT COI IES); Version 1.0 Draft (Unclassified) 10. NATO Military Agency for Standardization (MAS); August 2001 Battlefield Target Identification; STANAG 4579 C3, Edition International Standards Organization (ISO) Data elements and interchange formats Information interchange Representation of dates and times; OSI/FDIS 8601:2000(E) 12. WGS 84 USA Department of Defense National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS 84) (Unclassified) 13. European Atlantic Partnership Council Guidance on the use of metadata element descriptions for use in NDMS; EAPC (AC/322-SC/5) N (2006) NATO C3 Board; 16 March 2007 INFOSEC Technical and Implementation Guidance for Electronic Labelling of NATO Information; AC/322-D (2004) 0021 (NATO Unclassified) 15. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Internet Standard; September 1981, Transmission Control Protocol DARPA Internet Program Protocol Specification; RFC Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Internet Standard; 28 August 1980 Transmission Control Protocol; RFC NATO Standardization Agency; 2007 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions; AAP-6 (2007) AARMS 8(4) (2009) 617