Monitoring sítí pomocí NetFlow dat od paketů ke strategiím
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1 Monitoring sítí pomocí NetFlow dat od paketů ke strategiím Martin Rehák, Karel Bartoš, Martin Grill, Jan Stiborek a Michal Svoboda ATG, České vysoké učení technické v Praze Jiří Novotný, Pavel Čeleda a Vojtěch Krmíček ÚVT, Masarykova Univerzita
2 CAMNEP Project Network security monitoring Intrusion detection system Includes: Anomaly detection techniques Aggregation of more opinions Fusion mechanism Adaptation process Game theory
3 CAMNEP Goals & Assumptions Improve the error rate lower false positives same false negatives Validation & Stability reliable response to typical threats traffic-independent response Management self-optimization and selfconfiguration Reasonable-sized traffic Reasonable attack types Not-real time (minimal response delay 40 sec.) Integrates with other defense techniques Low predictability by opponent Structured, actionable output
4 Network Behavior Analysis Processes NetFlow data no content source, destination IP address/ port + protocol bytes, packets, (flows) flags (TCP) Aggregation 1-15 min. interval (typ. 5 min.) widely available, quality varies, IETF standard Anomaly detection methods Broad decision rules Statistical traffic prediction and analysis
5 CAMNEP: System overview
6 Architecture Levels by speed: Up to 10 M packets ps Up to 10 K flows ps Detected flows (10K fps) Events ( per 5min) Plans/ Attack Trees Adaptation processes
7 Data Acquisition Layer Network probe Collector + preprocessing COMBO card High-performance hardware probes 10 Gbits/sec full volume nfdump/nfsen collector NetFlow/IPFIX protocol Customized plugin for: Open-source Swiss led effort Actively maintained Data preprocessing Communication with CAMNEP engine
8 Detection Layer Overview Flows to categories Multiple AD methods Multiple trust models Multiple aggregation methods Agent-based Dynamic Several layers of learning
9 Anomaly Detection Methods MINDS TAPS number of connections Trends, aggregated by: srcip, dstip, srcipdstport, dstip-srcprt Scan detection Dest. ports/dstip, flow size entropy Aggregated by srcip
10 Anomaly Detection Methods Principal Component Analysis used to generalize the traffic model by dimensionality reduction Aggregated by source IP Captures relationships between traffic sources Lakhina Volume Lakhina Entropy Models flows, packets, Models traffic characteristics header and bytes for larger value distributions traffic sources
11 Anomaly Detection Methods Xu Traffic characteristics dstip, srcprt, dstprt distribution entropies Aggregated by traffic source Xu-dstIP Traffic characteristics srcip, srcprt, dstprt distribution entropies Aggregated by traffic destination
12 Anomaly Detection Methods Method/Attack Malware Brute force Horizont Vertical al Sc. scannin Fingerpri g nt. DoS/DDoS Flooding/Sp oof. MINDS *** **** **** *** Xu ** **** *** *** Xu-dst IP * * ** ***** Lakhina - Volume ** *** *** **** Lakhina - Entropy *** **** ** *** TAPS *** ***** ***** **
13 Detection Layer Overview Flows to categories Multiple AD methods Multiple trust models Multiple aggregation methods Agent-based Dynamic Several layers of learning
14 Identity and Context Example Identity srcip = dstip = srcprt = 2430 dstprt = proto = TCP packets = 8699 bytes = 8,100,000 Context (Xu) H(dstIP)= 0.2 H(srcPrt)= 0.3 H(dstPrt)= 0.3
15 Trust Modeling Reduction of false positives by: Multi-source aggregation Historical experience aggregation Incremental, unsupervised learning Automatic identitycontext construction Associated trust model
16 Trust Aggregation Error reduction Feature diversity Algorithm diversity Multistage error reduction: AD Trustfulnes s
17 Trust Aggregation Importance
18 Self-Management and Adaptation Monitoring: Self-monitoring Self-evaluation Defect detection Reflection: Component generation Component selection Component combination Component repair
19 Dynamic Classifier Selection Unsupervised Dynamic: Background traffic Model performance Attacks Strategic behavior Evasion Attacks on learning
20 Adaptation Architecture Monitoring & evaluation Challenge insertion Challenge insertion control Challenge selection strategy Adaptation Aggregation function selection Aggregation function creation
21 Monitoring: Challenge Insertion Unlabeled background input data Insertion of small set of challenges Legitimate Malicious Response evaluation Problems: Noise, challenge nonuniformity, distribution, system compromise
22 Challenge Insertion Control
23 Results Processing level FP TP Average of anomalies 58 2 Arithmetic average of trustworthiness Individual anomaly detection algorithm Adaptive aggregation of trustworthiness
24 Architecture Levels by speed: Up to 10 M packets ps Up to 10 K flows ps Detected flows (10K fps) Events ( per 5min) Plans/ Attack Trees Adaptation processes
25 Incident Classification & Reporting
26 From research to product
27 Conclusions CAMNEP uses advanced AI methods to tackle real business problems: Automatically reduces and maintains the error rate Reduces downtime and fault rate Monitors system performance Optimizes system performance Resists strategic behavior of informed opponent
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