The Metaphysical Foundations of Reproductive Ethics

Transcription

1 Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2009 The Metaphysical Foundations of Reproductive Ethics 191 Blackwell Oxford, JAPP Journal XXX Original Bertha Society Metaphysical Alvarez UK of Article Publishing for Applied Manninen Foundations Ltd Philosophy, of 2009 Reproductive Ethics The Metaphysical Foundations of Reproductive Ethics BERTHA ALVAREZ MANNINEN at least partly, based upon veiled metaphysical assumptions. Lastly, in order to show how deconstructing the metaphysical foundations of these ethical arguments can shed light on the plausibility of the latter, I will offer criticisms of the genetic account of personal identity and demonstrate how the failure of this account leads to the subsequent collapse of the moral arguments that are based upon it. The purpose of the paper is not to defend any particular view concerning diachronic personal identity. Rather, by illustrating how bioethicists tacitly incorporate metaphysical theories into their arguments, the hope is that progress can be made on these issues by attending to their fundamental philosophical claims. 1 ABSTRACT Many bioethicists working in reproductive ethics tacitly assume some theory of diachronic personal identity. For example, Peter Singer argues that there is no identity relation between a foetus and a future individual because the former shares no robust mental connections with the latter. Consequently, abortion prevents the existence of an individual; it does not destroy an already existing individual. Singer s argument implicitly appeals to the psychological account of personal identity, which, although endorsed by many philosophers such as Derek Parfit, is contentious. Singer does not attempt to defend the psychological account before applying it to the moral permissibility of abortion. Indeed, with some notable exceptions, very few bioethicists attempt antecedently to defend their chosen theory of personal identity before applying it to their ethical arguments. In this paper, I look at the issues of abortion, embryonic stem cell research, and human reproductive cloning in order to illustrate how many of the arguments made by bioethicists on these topics are, at least partly, based upon veiled metaphysical assumptions. My objective is to illustrate that progress can be made on these topics by attending to their fundamental metaphysical claims. Introduction 2008 marked an election year for the United States, and abortion and human embryonic stem cell research became ubiquitous campaign issues. That year also marked the 35 th anniversary of Roe v. Wade, the 1973 Supreme Court decision that granted women abortion rights in all US states, in addition to marking the 41 st anniversary of the United Kingdom s Abortion Act and the 18 th anniversary of the Fertilisation and Embryology Act. The ethics of abortion, human embryonic stem cell research, and now to a rapidly growing extent, also of human reproductive cloning, continue to be fervently debated. Unfortunately, not much consensus has been reached on these issues. One barrier to progress in these debates is a failure to adequately address the underlying metaphysical assumptions of important ethical claims. This is akin to trying to fix the structure of a house without first looking at its foundation. In this paper, I tease out the implicit metaphysical claims made in various discussions of reproductive ethics. First, I will briefly explain the four most prevalent theories of diachronic personal identity to which bioethicists often tacitly appeal. Second, I will look at the issues of abortion, embryonic stem cell research, and human reproductive cloning to illustrate how many of the ethical arguments made by bioethicists on these topics are,, Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. The Question of Diachronic Personal Identity When did I begin to exist? When will I die? What type of being am I, essentially? What makes me the same individual throughout time? 2 The metaphysical issue of personal identity attempts to respond to these queries about the beginning, end, and persistence conditions of a human being s identity. Below, I summarize four proposed answers to these questions. The Genetic Account of Personal Identity The phrase life begins at conception is a well-known tenet of the so-called pro-life position on abortion. Certainly there is new biological human life present at conception. But adherents of the genetic account of personal identity maintain that conception is when a new human being begins to exist who is numerically identical to (that is to say, the same individual as) a future human being. One implication of this view is that the conditions of numerical personal identity are comprised in our possession of a unique genetic code. Furthermore, the view holds that each individual began to exist whenever his or her unique genetic code first came into existence. This transpires after the fertilization of an ovum by a sperm, when syngamy occurs and the genetic material of both gametes fuse to form a new and distinct genetic code. The view that syngamy marks the beginning of a new human being, the same human being who would exist if the fertilized egg is allowed to gestate, be born, and grow up, is clearly espoused by Pope John Paul II in the Evangelium Vitae: [P]rocured abortion is the deliberate and direct killing, by whatever means it is carried out, of a human being in the initial phase of his or her existence... Some people try to justify abortion by claiming that the result of conception, at least up to a certain number of days, cannot yet be considered a personal human life. But in fact, from the time that the ovum is fertilized, a life is begun which is neither that of the father nor the mother; it is rather the life of a new human being with his own growth... It has been demonstrated that from the first instant there is established the programme of what this living being will be: a person, this individual person with his characteristic aspects already well determined. 3 According to the genetic account, each one of us persists over time as long as our unique genetic code persists over time.

2 192 Bertha Alvarez Manninen Animalism Animalism is emphatically defended by many philosophers, including Eric Olson and David DeGrazia. According to this view, a human being persists over time as long as her numerically distinct organism persists in a functional state. This view stresses that human beings are, essentially, human animals, members of the species Homo sapiens. Therefore, the conditions of an individual s numerical personal identity consist in the continuing functional existence of her organism. Olson writes: You and I are living organisms... What it takes for us to survive is the same throughout our careers: we persist, as other animals do, just in case our biological lives continue. At any point in my career I survive if and only if my vital functions those complex biochemical and mechanical activities of my atoms by virtue of which they compose a living organism are preserved. 4 DeGrazia refers to this theory as the biological view. He maintains that human identity consists in sameness of biological life. 5 DeGrazia writes: Our question is what we actually... most fundamentally are: What is our basic kind?... According to the biological approach, we human persons and, for that matter, human beings who are not persons are essentially human animals, members of the species Homo sapiens. 6 Since, according to this view, we are essentially human animals, we begin to exist whenever our respective functional organism begins to exist. We go where our organism does, we continue to exist as long as our organism continues to function, and we die when our organism ceases functioning as an integrated unit. According to some, the beginning of one s numerically distinct organism does not occur until the zygote can no longer produce multiple numerically distinct embryos. Norman Ford, for example, states that it would be hard to admit the presence of an individual human being in the zygote if, in principle, it could lose its ontological identity whenever twinning occurs in the course of development. 7 Similarly, Walter Glannon argues that: A human organism cannot begin to exist before this time, because it lacks the property or properties necessary to identify it as a distinct entity. It would be logically incoherent to say that one zygote could divide into two numerically and spatially distinct zygotes and still persist as the same zygote. This is the ontological reason for claiming that a human organism cannot exist until 14 days after fertilization. 8 These writers hold that until the zygote loses its capacity to divide into multiple organisms, the identity conditions for the future human being are undetermined. Because a human being is essentially a single human organism, and because the human zygote is not essentially a single human organism (given that it possesses the capacity to divide, regardless of whether it actually divides) a human being is not the same kind of substance as a human zygote. As DeGrazia writes, a zygote is not a uniquely individuated organism of the sort that each of us is. 9 Animalism differs from the genetic account in that it places the beginning of personal identity conditions whenever there is certainty that an individual organism exists, at approximately two weeks post-fertilization. 10 The Metaphysical Foundations of Reproductive Ethics 193 One aspect of animalism merits stressing. According to its adherents, the ability to experience consciousness is irrelevant to numerical personal identity conditions. 11 This means that, for example, because a preconscious foetus possesses an identity relation with the subsequent infant, child and adult, it may have some interest in growing into these states which abortion will thwart. Those who regard the personal identity conditions of individuals as primarily defined by their mental lives reject this aspect of animalism. The Psychological Account of Personal Identity Colloquially, the term person is coextensive with human being. However, some philosophers follow John Locke in using the term person to denote a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times, and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it. 12 Locke s definition serves as the foundation for the psychological account of personal identity (PAPI). According to the PAPI, in order for a human being to remain the same individual over time, she must continue to be rational, reflective, and self-conscious, with a strong continuous stream of memories and mental states. Therefore, a high degree of mental complexity must be present in order for a human being to become a human person, and that mental complexity must persist in order for the same human person to endure. Moreover, all persons are persons essentially, meaning that once an individual ceases to be a person (by, for example, entering a stage of severe dementia), she ceases to exist. Likewise, before personhood arises, there exists no individual who can be the same individual as any future person. In order to understand this account of personal identity, it is necessary to understand the concept of psychological continuity. Derek Parfit argues that a Person 1 at t 1 is psychologically continuous with a Person 2 at t 1+N if there is a holding of overlapping chains of strong [psychological] connectedness. 13 In explaining this position, Jeff McMahan writes that strong psychological connectedness can be understood as:... the relation between an earlier and later manifestation of a belief, value, intention, or character trait... because the number of such connections may be many or few, psychological connectedness over time is a matter of degrees. It may be strong or weak. Derek Parfit stipulates that there is strong psychological connectedness if, over any day [there are] at least half the number of direct connections that hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person. 14 That is to say, Person 1 at t 1 is psychologically continuous with Person 2 at t 1+N if the two person-states are connected by strong psychological states, such as an overlapping chain of memories, desires, character traits, goals, and beliefs. Hence, in order to answer the question, When did I begin?, it is necessary to track the relation of psychological continuity back through time to the point of its origin. 15 According to the PAPI, human foetuses and infants are not persons, given that they lack robust mental capacities. Consequently, we cannot trace the psychological continuity of a person back either to the foetal or to the infant stage of development. No human person was ever a human foetus or infant.

3 194 Bertha Alvarez Manninen The Embodied Mind Account of Personal Identity Many philosophers who accept the view that the capacity of an individual to experience mental states is an important aspect of who that individual essentially is, hesitate to accept the PAPI. This is partly due to the PAPI s implication that no person was ever a foetus or an infant. In contrast, the embodied mind account of personal identity (EMAPI) maintains that possession of some sort of mental life is both necessary and sufficient for maintaining personal identity conditions, but that the complexity of that mental life need not be as robust as the PAPI requires. According to the EMAPI, a human being must possess some capacity for consciousness in order for the human individual to exist. On this view, human beings are regarded as essentially embodied minds. McMahan writes that, a particular mind continues to exist only if enough of the brain in which it is realized continues to exist in a functional or potentially functional state. 16 In other words, the continued existence of the mind, and thus of the self, consists in the survival of enough of the cerebral hemispheres to be capable in principle, or in conjunction with the relevant support mechanisms, of generating consciousness and mental activity. 17 According to the EMAPI, there are two distinct substances that make up a human being: the human organism and the human mind. The self is identical with the latter, although it is intimately connected to the former. Adherents of the EMAPI hold that the existence of the mind is dependent upon the existence of a functional brain, and therefore while they endorse a type of mind-body dualism, they do not endorse a mind-brain dualism. 18 The EMAPI entails that all humans were once infants, since our infant self possessed the capacity for consciousness and had, as its physical basis for this capacity, the same functional brain that we currently possess. Each of us began to exist whenever our respective brain was developed enough to generate the capacity for consciousness. This occurs during the foetal stage of development, at approximately mid to late gestation. 19 Each of the four theories outlined represents a different conception of what types of things human beings essentially are and what comprises a human individual s diachronic numerical personal identity. What I have offered here are rough summaries of these views that will suffice for the purposes of this paper. In what follows, I will illustrate how arguments in reproductive ethics can be founded upon at least one of these theories of personal identity. I contend that it is necessary antecedently to investigate the plausibility of these metaphysical claims in order to evaluate the moral arguments on which they rest. Identity Claims Underlying Reproductive Ethics Abortion In the above quotation, Pope John Paul II draws a moral imperative from his acceptance of the genetic account of identity. His argument is that a new human being begins to exist at conception; this is the same human being that would exist if it embryo were fully to develop; therefore, abortion is morally wrong at any stage after conception because it kills an already existing (rather than a potential) human individual. The Metaphysical Foundations of Reproductive Ethics 195 Not all arguments against abortion are religious in nature or based upon the genetic account of identity. A well-known secular argument against abortion is Don Marquis appeal to a future like ours. Marquis argues that killing a foetus is prima facie morally wrong for the same reason that killing any human being is prima facie morally wrong: death deprives a human being of a valuable future, a future like ours. According to Marquis, a standard human foetus possesses a valuable future, and is no different than any other healthy human being in this regard. Therefore, [s]ince the reason that is sufficient to explain why it is wrong to kill human beings after the time of birth is a reason that also applies to foetuses, it follows that abortion is prima facie seriously morally wrong. 20 Marquis does not explicitly endorse a particular view about the nature of personal identity. However, a close reading reveals his tacit acceptance of animalism. Marquis writes that morally permissible abortions are rare unless they occur so early in pregnancy that a foetus is not yet definitely an individual. 21 This is reminiscent of the position endorsed by many adherents of animalism, namely that the human organism does not come into existence until about two weeks post conception (when the irreversible individuality of the embryo is confirmed) and that diachronic personal identity conditions do not exist until then. Once embryos respective individuality is confirmed, Marquis argues, when their lives are deliberately terminated, they are deprived of their futures of value, their prospects. This makes them victims, for it directly wrongs them. 22 Since according to Marquis, the embryo already possesses a future of value, the deprivation of which constitutes a serious loss for the embryo, he must grant that there exists an identity relation between the embryo and a future individual. (This must be so if the future individual s life is to constitute the current embryo s future.) Yet, neither an embryo nor an early foetus possesses the capacity for consciousness or for any type of mental life. The only identity-preserving element that an individuated embryo/foetus shares with a later individual is that both possess the same functional organism, albeit at very different stages of development. Marquis claims that the embryo or foetus has an interest in realizing its potential for a valuable life, but a zygote lacks this interest because it is not yet a definite individual. This invokes an implicit distinction between strong potentiality, or identitypreserving potential, as opposed to weak potentiality, or nonidentity-preserving potential. 23 A zygote has the potential to grow into an individual with a valuable future only in the weak sense, because it can produce that individual, but it cannot become that individual because it is not identical to her. Hence, to thwart a zygote s production of an embryo or a foetus does not harm it, since the zygote will cease to exist regardless of whether it is destroyed or permitted to produce the subsequent embryo or foetus. The embryo or foetus, however, does possess an identity relation with a future individual, since it shares the same biological organism as the later individual. This is why, according to Marquis, the embryo/foetus possesses the strong potential to become that person, and thus has an interest in growing into that person. In contrast, philosophers who adopt a view of personal identity that necessitates some degree of mentality typically espouse a more permissive position on abortion. Peter Singer, for instance, appeals to something like the PAPI. Singer acknowledges that most of us are grateful we were not aborted, or killed as infants, because our existence would have been prevented. Yet our retrospective interest in not being killed as foetuses or infants does not imply that foetuses or infants themselves have an

4 196 Bertha Alvarez Manninen interest in continued existence. 24 According to Singer, neither a foetus nor an infant shares an identity relation with a future person: I am not the infant from whom I developed. The infant could not look forward to developing into the kind of being that I am, or even into any intermediate being, between the being I now am and the infant. I cannot even recall being the infant; there are no mental links between us. 25 An infant shares the same functional biological organism with a future person, and she possesses the capacity for consciousness associated with the same brain as the future person. Yet Singer regards this as insufficient to establish an identity relation between an adult and the infant from whom the adult developed. In the passage quoted, Singer maintains, with other adherents of the PAPI, that there must be a strong degree of psychological connection between an earlier and later being for an identity relation to obtain. So too, Mary Anne Warren appeals to something like the PAPI in defending her permissive stance on abortion: [W]e are essentially people if we are essentially anything at all. Therefore, if fetuses and gametes are not people, then we were never fetuses and gametes, though one might say that we emerged from them. The fetus which later became you was not you because you did not exist at that time... [s]o if it had been aborted nothing whatever would have been done to you, since you would have never existed. 26 Here Warren maintains (though she does not argue) that human persons are persons essentially; that is, no person can exist as a non-person. Accordingly, since foetuses are not persons, no human person was ever a human foetus. Abortion prevents the existence of a future person, but it does not kill an already existing person. (Because Warren also maintains that only persons have moral status and rights, in her view abortion neither violates the foetus s rights nor harms a moral patient. For this reason, Warren considers abortion as morally innocuous an act as getting a haircut.) 27 According to Singer s and Warren s positions, abortion at any gestational stage prevents the existence of a person. Abortion does not kill any being that could be identical with any future person because no psychological connections exist between a foetus and a future person. This is one reason why Singer s and Warren s views on abortion are more permissive than, for example, philosophers like Marquis who believe the identity relation conditions with a future person already exist at the embryonic and foetal stages of development. Of course, two people who adopt the same view about personal identity will not necessarily agree about the moral permissibility of abortion. For example, DeGrazia adheres to animalism, but unlike Marquis, he does not maintain that abortion is prima facie morally impermissible. DeGrazia agrees with Marquis that each of us was once a presentient fetus, but he rejects the view that identity is the sole basis for rational prudential concern, 28 in favour of a Time-Relative Interest Account of prudential concern. According to DeGrazia, the degree to which death harms an individual is related to how strong a degree of psychological continuity she has with her future self. DeGrazia maintains that the foetal interest in continuing to live is relatively weak because, although numerically identical to a future individual, the foetus does not possess any type of psychological continuity with its future self. 29 Jeff McMahan argues The Metaphysical Foundations of Reproductive Ethics 197 in a similar vein. Because he adheres to the EMAPI, McMahan maintains that there is no identity relation between a presentient foetus and a future individual. Once the foetus obtains the capacity for consciousness, however, there exists an individual who has the identity-preserving potential to become a person... [who] can have an interest in becoming a person and can be harmed by having his potential thwarted. 30 Yet, because McMahan also argues that the moral permissibility of killing a foetus is governed by the Time-Relative Interest Account, he thinks that although a postconscious foetus has an interest in continued existence, it is a relatively weak interest, and not strong enough to override a woman s interest in preserving her bodily autonomy. Here, two philosophers with competing metaphysical assumptions about personal identity have similar views concerning the moral permissibility of abortion. The latter is due to their agreement about how to judge the strength of a foetus interest in continued existence. Competing metaphysical assumptions, therefore, do not always lead to divergent moral positions about the moral permissibility of abortion. Nevertheless, it remains true, as evidenced by Marquis, Singer s, and Warren s respective arguments, that sometimes competing moral claims can be traced back to a fundamental disagreement on a metaphysical position. Embryonic Stem Cell Research On August 9, 2001, President George W. Bush addressed the United States of America on how much federal funding he would permit for human embryonic stem cell research (HESCR). His decision was to allow federal funding for research on existing stem cell lines and to withhold federal funds from research concerned with creating new stem cell lines, because the latter entails the further destruction of embryos. Bush maintained that he had consulted ethicists and researchers on this matter, and he cited one exchange between an unnamed researcher and an unnamed ethicist in support of his decision: On the first issue, are the embryos human life well, one researcher told me he believes this five-day-old cluster of cells is not an embryo, not yet an individual, but a pre-embryo. He argued that it has the potential for life, but it is not life because it cannot develop on its own. An ethicist dismissed this as a callous attempt at rationalization. Make no mistake, he told me, that cluster of cells is the same way you and I, and all the rest of us, started our lives. 31 This exchange is pertinent to my analysis because the italicized claim directly opposes the contention that mental continuity is necessary for identity conditions to obtain between stages of a human being s life. (Five-day-old zygotes do not possess any capacity for consciousness.) Neither the EMAPI nor the PAPI can be used to defend the contention that there is an identity relation between a zygote and a later individual. Nor can the italicized claim be reconciled with the position held by some adherents of animalism, that a five-day-old human zygote is not yet an individual human organism. If one holds this view, then the zygote can be regarded as the genetic precursor of a human organism; but it is not yet that organism, and it is not yet identical to any future human being. This position underpins the British Warnock Committee Report (1984) that recommended that only embryos younger than fourteen days post fertilization (i.e. embryos at the zygotic stage of development) could

5 198 Bertha Alvarez Manninen be subjects of research experiments. This recommendation was supported, at least in part, by an appeal to metaphysical claims concerning personal identity. One reason given for the fourteen day cut-off point was that twinning was then precluded, irreversible individuality had set in, and that, therefore, the embryo was a numerically single human being. Mary Warnock claimed in a subsequent interview that before fourteen days the embryo hasn t yet decided how many people it is going to be. 32 It is reasonable to conclude that the anonymous ethicist to whom Bush refers adhered to the genetic account of personal identity, and on that basis made the moral claim that killing zygotes for research purposes is morally wrong. Pope John Paul II also adhered to the genetic account of identity, and on that basis also concluded that destroying zygotes is immoral. Because both maintain that a human being s identity conditions begin at fertilization, it is at that point that they believe that a morally considerable human being exists. Reproductive Cloning There are various types of cloning, including molecular and cellular cloning, and artificial embryo twinning. The most morally contentious form is somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). In this process an ovum is enucleated and the nucleus of a genetic donor cell is implanted in its stead. The ovum is then artificially induced to divide into a multiple-celled zygote. Theoretically, if implanted into a uterus the cloned zygote would begin to develop in the same way as a naturally fertilized egg. The resulting offspring would possess 99.8 percent of her ancestor s genes (the 0.2 percent difference is attributed to the differing mitochondrial DNA due to the use of a different ovum). Many people are morally opposed to reproductive cloning. At the same time many individuals desire access to this technology. People on both sides of this debate invoke the same account of personal identity, namely the genetic account, in support of opposing ethical judgments. The desire for reproductive cloning is sometimes regarded as narcissistic, since, it is claimed, it is often motivated by a wish to recreate oneself. 33 Leon Kass argues that cloning creates serious issues of identity and individuality... [a cloned child would] experience concerns about his distinctive identity... because he will be in genotype and appearance identical to another human being. 34 As evidence for this claim, Kass points out that those who support reproductive cloning insist that the individual whose genotype will be recreated must consent to the process. The only reason for this requirement, according to Kass, is that when someone s genetic code is recreated, the individual herself is recreated as well. He asks, for instance, [i]f the clone of Mel Gibson would not be Mel Gibson, why should Mel Gibson have grounds to object that someone has been made his clone? 35 Here Kass does not say that the clone of Mel Gibson would be closely related to Mel Gibson. Rather, he implies that the resulting clone would be Mel Gibson: that genetic sameness would be sufficient to establish an identity relation between Mel Gibson and his clone. Daniel Callahan agrees with Kass on this, and goes on to express concern that, as a consequence of the genetic sameness that would exist between a person and her clone, the latter would be deprived of her individuality. According to Callahan, genetic individuality is a precious gift of nature [that] allows us to become our own person. In contrast to the artificiality of human The Metaphysical Foundations of Reproductive Ethics 199 cloning, the natural lottery of conception makes us in our own unrepeatable image. Cloning would deprive the products of an engineered conception of that gift. 36 Some supporters of reproductive cloning also contend that genetic sameness between a person and her clone entails an identity relation between them. In his article, Even If It Worked, Cloning Won t Bring Her Back, Thomas Murray, who opposes reproductive cloning, recounts a letter read at a congressional hearing concerning the ethics of human reproductive cloning. A grieving father who wanted the opportunity to clone his dead son wrote: I decided then and there that I would never give up on my child. I would never stop until I could give his DNA his genetic make-up a chance. 37 Here, the father expresses his refusal to give up until his child received another chance at life. Because the cloned infant would possess the same genetic code as his deceased son, the grieving father believed that cloned infant would be the same child that he lost. A cloned child would not be identical to her genetic ancestor because they would be two numerically distinct human beings. The assumptions made by Kass, Callahan, and the grieving father in regard to the identity relation between a person and her clone do not concern numerical identity. The metaphysical assumption that they make, however, is that what matters for human survival, if not numerical identity, is the recreation of an individual s genetic code. Derek Parfit argues that a person could survive in the absence of numerical identity; for example, if a person s brain were severed in two and each distinct hemisphere was placed in two numerically distinct organisms. As long as both recipients possessed psychological continuity with the brain donor, Parfit argues, the brain donor experiences a type of double survival. If, as Parfit holds, what matters about a person to ensure her continued survival is the persistence of psychological continuity, then the hemisphere transplant example illustrates that survival can occur in absence of numerical identity. Like Parfit, Kass, Callahan, and the grieving father also contend that human survival can occur independently of continuing numerical identity. But unlike Parfit, who maintains that psychological continuity is what matters for survival, they implicitly maintain that what matters for survival is genetic sameness. For the grieving father, what mattered in order to ensure the continued existence of his deceased son was the recreation of his genetic code. Kass and Callahan s positions on cloning maintain that to recreate the genes of an individual would be to recreate the individual herself. 38 How Addressing Metaphysical Claims Can Shed Light on Arguments in Reproductive Ethics So far, I have explained four theories on the nature of diachronic personal identity and have shown how bioethicists, implicitly or explicitly, sometimes use these theories as the basis for their ethical claims without defending their metaphysical assumptions. Two exceptions are McMahan (2002) and DeGrazia (2005), provide detailed defences of their chosen theories of personal identity before applying them to bioethical issues. However, they are in the minority of bioethicists in this respect. Some responses to particular bioethical claims challenge the metaphysical underpinnings of the position in question. For example, one argument against Marquis position on

6 200 Bertha Alvarez Manninen abortion challenges the premise that there is an identity relation between an embryo or a foetus and a future individual. Peter K. McInerney argues that: Fetuses are very different from normal adult humans. The connections between a fetus at an earlier time and a person (or person stage) at a significantly later time are very different from the connections between the person stages at different times which compose one person. Philosophical investigations of personal identity through time have revealed the complexity of the biological and psychological connections between the earlier and later stages of one person. These significant differences invalidate the claim that a fetus has a personal future in the same way that a normal adult human has a personal future Similarly, the success of Singer s and Warren s arguments in favour of the moral permissibility of abortion partly depend on the plausibility of the PAPI. DeGrazia argues strongly against the plausibility of the PAPI, 40 and in so doing questions Singer s and Warren s positions on abortion. It is not my purpose in this paper to defend a particular view of personal identity, or to endorse a particular moral stance on abortion, HESCR, or human reproductive cloning. In what follows, I aim to illustrate the extent to which arguments made against the moral permissibility of abortion, HESCR, and reproductive cloning that are based on the genetic account of identity are vulnerable to metaphysical objections. The genetic account of identity is a pervasive view among non-philosophers on the question of when we all began to exist. (Ask someone, When did you begin?, and he or she will probably point to conception.) Similarly, as I will show below, the fear and hesitation that many people have about reproductive cloning are based on an implicit assumption of the genetic account. However, it is implausible to maintain that our personal identity is determined by the existence and continuation of our unique genetic code alone. Monozygotic (identical) twins share the same genetic code but are obviously distinct persons. Moreover, they often have different likes, dislikes, and personalities, even when they are brought up in similar environments. If the existence and persistence of a distinct genetic code were sufficient to establish numerical identity conditions over time, then identical twins would be numerically identical to each other. Since they are not, the genetic account of identity is false. If the genetic account is false, then Pope John Paul s particular argument that conception marks the beginning of a new individual, and therefore of a being who is morally considerable, is false. If moral opposition to abortion is based solely on identity concerns, then any abortificant method of birth control before individuation, e.g. the morning-after pill or the Intrauterine Device, are morally innocuous since these methods prevent the existence of an individual, as opposed to destroying an already existing one. 41 Whether one believes that abortions at subsequent stages of development are morally permissible may be influenced by which alternative theory of personal identity one supports. Contrary to what Bush and his ethical consultant concluded, the genetic account of identity can actually lend support to the moral permissibility of HESCR. Consider the fate of a surplus zygote at a fertility clinic: either it will be discarded or it can be used for research. 42 If it is used to make a stem cell line, or if the zygote is continuously divided to form new zygotes, then its unique genetic code does persist. This would The Metaphysical Foundations of Reproductive Ethics 201 provide the zygote s genetic code with a longer lifespan than it otherwise would have had. It may be objected that the original zygote has ceased to exist once it has been artificially divided or disaggregated, and therefore the research is immoral on these grounds. However, this retort sounds like the argument that many adherents of animalism make: that it is not just genetic identity that matters, but rather numerical sameness over time matters as well. But if this is the case, then one can appeal to this, as Warnock did, to justify embryo experimentation before a certain point in development (during the zygotic stage), given that numerical identity conditions are not established until approximately two weeks postfertilization. 43 If the genetic account of identity is true, then as long as the respective genetic codes of the zygotes that are used for research persist in some fashion, HESCR is morally unobjectionable as far as considerations of identity are concerned. Creating genetically diverse stem cell lines from a variety of zygotes, or artificially dividing them into genetic duplicates, should be embraced, since these practices provide a way for a zygote s genetic code to persist, in contrast to destroying them. If the genetic account of identity is false, and either animalism, the PAPI, or the EMAPI is true, HESCR cannot be opposed on identity claims alone because the destruction of a zygote five days after fertilization does nothing more than prevent the existence of an individual. According to animalism, the PAPI, or the EMAPI, HESCR destroys no one in particular because no one yet exists at this stage in development. To call the genetic account of identity into question also presents obstacles for Kass and Callahan s arguments against the moral permissibility of human reproductive cloning. Again, their respective contentions are not that the clone would be the same individual as her genetic predecessor in the numerical sense, but that there is a certain sense in which, according to Kass, a clone would be its genetic predecessor. Exactly how Kass believes a clone would be related to her genetic predecessor depends on what he takes the meaning of be to be. As I argued above, one way to make sense of Kass claim is that he (and Callahan) hold that survival can occur in the absence of numerical identity and to say that, accordingly, what really matters for human survival is the persistence of the same genetic code. The grieving father in Murray s essay certainly thought this. This common misconception of what human reproductive cloning entails is not surprising (although it is surprising that two bioethicists would perpetuate it). The media has certainly reinforced such a notion. For example, on the several occasions on which Time Magazine has addressed the issue of mammalian cloning, their cover illustrates duplicate instances of the same picture. The February cover shows two mirror image infants staring at each other, the tagline suggesting that cloning may be used by grieving parents who wish to resurrect their dead child. The November cover illustrates the hand of God as portrayed in Michelangelo s Sistine Chapel reaching to touch not just one of Adam s hands, but five identical hands. The March cover features two identical sheep, a reference to Dolly the sheep, the first cloned mammal, staring at the reader with the caption: Will there ever be another you? The clear implication is that if your genes are replicated, then you are replicated, although not in the numerical sense. In his article Uniqueness, Individuality, and Human Cloning, David Elliot argues against the belief that human clones would be carbon copies of their genetic ancestor and thus lack individuality or uniqueness. Elliot relies on the existence of

7 202 Bertha Alvarez Manninen monozygotic twins to refute the arguments against cloning proposed by Kass and Callahan. Elliot writes: [I]t is important to stress just what a natural threat natural clones (monozygotic twins, triplets, etc.) present for the concerns about the moral value of individual uniqueness. They are clearly the most serious threat to human uniqueness that we can find, much more so than would be the case with technologically assisted clones. Monozygotic or identical twins not only share the same DNA, but have the same mitochondrial DNA as well. They are usually gestated in the same women at the same time and circumstances in her body, and are standardly raised in the same cultural and familial contexts. So with natural clones (identical twins) both genetic and environmental forces standardly conspire to make them relatively nonunique individuals. 44 Our exposure to identical twins makes it clear that, although there can be much similarity between them, we do not regard them as the same individual. This is true even though identical twins share the same genetic code, the same uterine environment, and are usually raised in the same family and social context. Clones (who are arguably later-born identical twins), in contrast, would likely be subjected to a different uterine environment, a different social environment, and be raised in a family with a different dynamic than their respective genetic ancestor. This renders it more likely that clones will perceive themselves as distinct individuals. As Elliot stresses, it does not seem any more obvious that in not being biologically unique twins are made worse off. 45 Given that monozygotic twins seem psychologically healthy despite their lack of genetic distinctiveness, the bleak scenarios painted by Kass and Callahan concerning human clones lack of individuality are unconvincing. Certainly identical twins would take issue with Callahan s statement that they each lack the precious gift of uniqueness because they lack a unique genetic code. Moreover, if one twin were dying, it is unlikely that he would be comforted by someone telling him that he would survive in some fashion because his identical twin does. Despite his twin s genetic relation to him, his twin simply is, no matter what Kass says to the contrary, not him. Conclusion Many bioethicists play fast and loose with theories of personal identity. They usually do not attempt antecedently to defend these theories before using them in support of their moral claims. The goal of this paper has been to illustrate how metaphysical assumptions are implicit in many arguments in reproductive ethics, and also to show how the success of these arguments depends, at least partially, on the plausibility of the underlying metaphysical theories. As the last section illustrates, when the metaphysical foundations of an argument are tenuous, any moral arguments built upon them are equally questionable. Finally, and more generally, I hope this paper helps to bridge a gap between theoretical philosophy and a particular area of applied philosophy, and shows that a common bifurcation between theoretical and applied philosophy is misguided. Theoretical philosophers sometimes refer to applied philosophy as weekend philosophy The Metaphysical Foundations of Reproductive Ethics 203 or deny its status as real philosophy. Similarly, some applied philosophers regard theoretical philosophers as living with their heads in the clouds, with little concern for real-world issues. Both of these extremes are mistaken. Without theory, applied philosophy has nothing to apply; without application, philosophy may be perceived as moot, and therefore increasingly dispensable, in relation to practical concerns. 46 Bertha Alvarez Manninen, Arizona State University at the West Campus, New College of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences, P.O. Box 37100; Mail Code 2151, Phoenix, AZ 85069, USA. NOTES 1 In this paper my use of the term personal identity is synonymous with the term diachronic numerical identity, i.e. numerical identity over time. The four theories of personal identity that I briefly discuss each offer a different answer to the persistence question: what makes someone the same individual from one point of her life to another? 2 Given that I am comparing different theories of personal identity that answer the question, What are we fundamentally? in different ways, I will use the term individual as a placeholder for the answer given by each of these theories. 3 Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae (New York: Random House Inc., 1995), pp. 104 and 107; emphasis mine. 4 Eric Olson, Was I Ever a Fetus?, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, 1 (1997a): , p For a more extensive account of animalism, see Olsen s book The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997b). 5 David DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p DeGrazia op. cit., p Norman Ford, When Did I Begin?: Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy, and Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p Walter Glannon, Bioethics and the Brain (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p DeGrazia op. cit., p DeGrazia op. cit., pp and Ford, 1988, p DeGrazia op. cit., p. 73 and Olson, 1997a op. cit., p John Locke, Of Ideas of Identity and Diversity in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996 [1690]), Book II, chapter Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p McMahan, 2002 op. cit., p McMahan, 2002 op. cit., p Jeff McMahan, The Metaphysics of Brain Death, Bioethics, 9, 2 (1995): McMahan, 1995 op. cit., p See J. A. Burgess and S. A. Tawia, When Did You First Begin to Feel It? Locating the Beginning of Human Consciousness, Bioethics, 10, 1 (1996): Don Marquis, Why Abortion is Immoral, The Journal of Philosophy, 86, 4 (1989): Marquis op. cit., p Marquis op. cit., p. 200; emphasis mine. 23 Stephen Buckle, Arguing from Potential, Bioethics, 2, 3 (1988): Similarly, I have a retrospective interest that the precise gametes that resulted in my conception met and fused, since I would not have existed otherwise. It does not follow from this that the gametes themselves had an interest in meeting and fusing in order to conceive me. 25 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p Mary Anne Warren, Do Potential Persons Have Rights?, in E. Partridge (ed.) Responsibilities to Future Generations (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1981), p. 264.

8 204 Bertha Alvarez Manninen 27 Mary Anne Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, The Monist, 57, 1 (1973): DeGrazia op. cit., p DeGrazia op. cit., pp McMahan, 1995 op. cit., p George W. Bush (2001), On Stem Cell Research, in M. Ruse and C. Pynes (eds.) The Stem Cell Controversy: Debating the Issues (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2006), p. 11; emphasis mine. 32 Michael Lockwood, Warnock versus Powell (and Harradine): When Does Potentiality Count?, Bioethics 2, 3 (1988), p Gilbert Meliaender, Begetting and Cloning, First Things, 74 (1997): Leon Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the Cloning of Humans, in M. C. Brannigan (ed.) Ethical Issues in Human Cloning (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 1997), p Kass op. cit., p. 56; emphasis mine. Here, Kass assumes the only reason consent must granted by the genetic ancestor is because cloning recreates her identity. However, there could be a variety of other reasons to seek consent that have nothing to do with the supposed recreation of identity. For example, surplus IVF embryos cannot be used for research or donated to other couples without the consent of the genetic donors. This is because embryos are regarded as property and non-consented use of these embryos may be seen as a violation of property rights. Perhaps one s genetic information might be viewed in a similar manner. 36 Daniel Callahan, Perspectives on Cloning: A Threat to Individual Uniqueness; An Attempt to Aid Childless Couples by Engineered Conceptions Could Transform the Idea of Human Identity, Los Angeles Times 12 November (1993): B7. 37 Thomas Murray, Even If It Worked, Cloning Won t Bring Her Back, The Washington Post 8 April 8 (2001), editorial. 38 To be fair, Kass concedes that, when it comes to a cloned offspring, his nurture and circumstances in life will be different; genotype is not exactly destiny (Kass op. cit., p. 56). Nevertheless, he maintains that one must also expect parental and other efforts to shape this new life after the original or at least to view the child with the original version always firmly in mind (Kass op. cit., p. 56.). Kass is unclear here. He seems initially to argue that cloning would actually compromise the offspring s individuality. He then concedes that it would not exactly compromise individuality given the differing nurture the cloned child would experience, but that others would perceive the child as a copy and therefore treat him accordingly. It is unclear whether Kass is arguing that the cloned child s uniqueness would actually be compromised, or whether others will (erroneously) perceive it as such. 39 Peter K. McInerney, Does a Fetus Already have a Future-Like-Ours?, The Journal of Philosophy 87, 5 (1990): See DeGrazia op. cit., pp On December 13, 2008, the Vatican issued a 32-page instruction entitled Dignitas Personae ( The Dignity of Persons ), which represents the official Catholic stance on many issues in bioethics, and bans the use of the Intrauterine Device and the morning-after pill, as well as Mifepristone (the RU 486 pill). These methods of birth control can lead to the destruction of a fertilized egg (and Mifepristone can induce an abortion in the first two months of pregnancy). 42 A third option is that the embryo could be adopted by another couple seeking to reproduce, but this possibility is more difficult than it may seem. See Carl Hall s The Forgotten Embryo. San Francisco Chronicle, 20 August (2001): A-1. Available at: archive/2001/08/20/mn58092.dtl [Accessed on September 25, 2008]. 43 Some philosophers dispute the contention that the zygote s ability to divide into multiple embryos compromises its individuality. For example, David S. Oderberg. Modal Properties, Moral Status, and Identity, Philosophy and Public Affairs 26, 3 (1997): David Elliot, Uniqueness, Individuality, and Human Cloning, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 15, 3 (1998): Elliot op. cit., p Many thanks to the referees and editors of the Journal of Applied Philosophy for their helpful comments, suggestions, and their patience throughout the revisions to this paper. Thanks also to Dr. Jackie Gately and Robert Oliverio for their assistance. Many thanks to my husband, Dr. Tuomas Manninen, for his additional comments and support in all aspects of my work. Finally, to our new daughter Michelle, thank you for keeping me on track. I dedicate this paper to you.