Security Models: Past, Present and Future
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1 Security Models: Past, Present and Future Prof. Ravi Sandhu Executive Director and Endowed Chair Institute for Cyber Security University of Texas at San Antonio August Ravi Sandhu 1
2 Security Objectives INTEGRITY modification AVAILABILITY access CONFIDENTIALITY disclosure Ravi Sandhu 2
3 Security Objectives USAGE purpose INTEGRITY modification AVAILABILITY access CONFIDENTIALITY disclosure Ravi Sandhu 3
4 Security Objectives USAGE purpose INTEGRITY modification USAGE AVAILABILITY access CONFIDENTIALITY disclosure Ravi Sandhu 4
5 Butler Lampson Paraphrased (I think) Computer scientists could never have designed the web because they would have tried to make it work. But the Web does work. What does it mean for the Web to work? Security geeks could never have designed the ATM network because they would have tried to make it secure. But the ATM network is secure. What does it mean for the ATM network to be secure? Ravi Sandhu 5
6 Foundational Security Assumptions Information needs to be protected In motion At rest In use Absolute security is impossible and unnecessary Trying to approximate absolute security is a bad strategy Good enough security is feasible and meaningful Better than good enough is bad Security is meaningless without application context Cannot know we have good enough without this context Models and abstractions are all important Without a conceptual framework it is hard to separate what needs to be done from how we do it We are not very good at doing any of this Ravi Sandhu 6
7 PEI Models: 3 Layers/5 Layers This lecture is focused on the policy models layer Idealized Enforceable (Approximate) Codeable At the policy layer security models are essentially access control models Ravi Sandhu 7
8 THE PAST Ravi Sandhu 8
9 Access Control Models Discretionary Access Control (DAC) Owner controls access but only to the original, not to copies Mandatory Access Control (MAC) Same as Lattice-Based Access Control (LBAC) Access based on security labels Labels propagate to copies Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) Access based on roles Can be configured to do DAC or MAC Generalizes to Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) Numerous other models but only 3 successes Ravi Sandhu 9
10 DAC: ACCESS MATRIX MODEL Objects (and Subjects) F G S u b j e c t s U V r w own r r w own rights Ravi Sandhu 10
11 DAC: TROJAN HORSE EXAMPLE ACL File F A:r A:w File G B:r A:w B cannot read file F Ravi Sandhu 11
12 DAC: TROJAN HORSE EXAMPLE A executes Program Goodies read File F ACL A:r A:w Trojan Horse write File G B:r A:w B can read contents of of file F copied to to file G Ravi Sandhu 12
13 LBAC: LATTICE STRUCTURES Top Secret Secret Confidential Unclassified dominance can-flow Ravi Sandhu 13
14 LBAC: LATTICE STRUCTURES TS, {A} TS, {A,B} TS, {B} Hierarchical Classes with Compartments TS, {} S, {A,B} S, {A} S, {B} S, {} Ravi Sandhu 14
15 LBAC: BELL LAPADULA (BLP) SIMPLE-SECURITY Subject S can read object O only if label(s) dominates label(o) STAR-PROPERTY (LIBERAL) Subject S can write object O only if label(o) dominates label(s) STAR-PROPERTY (STRICT) Subject S can write object O only if label(o) equals label(s) Ravi Sandhu 15
16 LBAC: COVERT CHANNELS High User High Trojan Horse Infected Subject Information is is leaked unknown to to the high user COVERT CHANNEL Low User Low Trojan Horse Infected Subject Ravi Sandhu 16
17 RBAC: Role-Based Access Control Access is determined by roles A user s roles are assigned by security administrators A role s permissions are assigned by security administrators Is RBAC MAC or DAC or neither? First emerged: mid 1970s First models: mid 1990s RBAC can be configured to do MAC RBAC can be configured to do DAC RBAC is policy neutral RBAC is neither MAC nor DAC! Ravi Sandhu 17
18 RBAC: RBAC96 Model ROLE HIERARCHIES USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT PERMISSIONS-ROLE ASSIGNMENT USERS ROLES PERMISSIONS... SESSIONS CONSTRAINTS Ravi Sandhu 18
19 RBAC: The RBAC Story Proposed Standard Standard Adopted RBAC96 paper Ravi Sandhu 19
20 THE PRESENT Ravi Sandhu 20
21 UCON: Usage Control Scope Privacy Protection Security Objectives Intellectual Property Rights Protection DRM Sensitive Information Protection Traditional Trust Access Management Control Usage Control Server-side Reference Monitor (SRM) Client-side Reference Monitor (CRM) SRM & CRM Security Architectures Ravi Sandhu 21
22 UCON: Usage Control Model unified model integrating authorization obligation conditions and incorporating continuity of decisions mutability of attributes Subjects (S) Rights (R) Usage Decisions Objects (O) pre-decision Continuity of Decisions ongoing-decision before-usage ongoing-usage after-usage Subject Attributes (SA) Authoriz ations (A) Obliga tions (B) Condi tions (C) Object Attributes (OA) pre-update ongoing-update post-update Mutability of Attributes UCON is ABAC on steroids Ravi Sandhu 22
23 THE FUTURE Ravi Sandhu 23
24 Application-Centric Security Models Our Basic Premise There can be no security model without application context So how does one customize an application-centric security model? Meaningfully combine the essential insights of DAC, LBAC, RBAC, ABAC, UCON, etcetera Directly address the application-specific trade-offs Within the security objectives of confidentiality, integrity and availability Across security, performance, cost and usability objectives Separate the real-world concerns of practical distributed systems and ensuing staleness and approximations (enforcement layer) from policy concerns in a idealized environment (policy layer) Ravi Sandhu 24
25 Dissemination Centric Sharing Extensive research in the last two decades ORCON, DRM, ERM, XrML, ODRL, etc. Copy/usage control has received major attention Manageability problem largely unaddressed Object Attribute + Policy Cloud Object Attribute + Policy Cloud Object Attribute + Policy Cloud Object Attribute + Policy Cloud Alice Bob Charlie Eve Susie Attribute Cloud Attribute Cloud Attribute Cloud Attribute Cloud Attribute Cloud Dissemination Chain with Sticky Policies on Objects Ravi Sandhu 25
26 Group Centric Sharing (g SIS) Brings users & objects together in a group Focuses on manageability using groups Co-exists with dissemination-centric Two metaphors Secure Meeting Room (E.g. Program committee) Subscription Model (E.g. Secure multicast) Operational aspects Group characteristics E.g. Are there any core properties? Group operation semantics E.g. What is authorized by join, add, etc.? Read-only Vs Read-Write Administrative aspects E.g. Who authorizes join, add, etc.? May be application dependant Multiple groups Inter-group relationship join add Users Group Authz (u,o,r)? Objects leave remove Ravi Sandhu 26
27 CONCLUSION Ravi Sandhu 27
28 Conclusion THE PAST Discretionary Access Control (DAC) Mandatory Access Control (MAC) Equivalently Lattice-Based Access Control (LBAC) Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) THE PRESENT Usage Control (UCON) Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) on steroids THE FUTURE Application-Centric Access Control Models Technology-Centric Access Control Models Models are all important A Policy Language is not a substitute for a good model Lots of interesting/impactful research to be done at P, E and I layers Ravi Sandhu 28
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