CERT-FI First 12 months. Kauto Huopio FICORA
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1 CERT-FI First 12 months Kauto Huopio FICORA
2 FICORA Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority communications regulator operating under the Ministry of Transport and Communications total staff ~230 persons academic background ~100 budgetary independence all funding from fees collected from user organisations
3 FICORA operating areas Telecommunications telecommunications regulation inspection of operators telecommunications standardisation information security Radiocommunications radiocommunicatons regulation frequency management & surveillance equipment market control
4 FICORA operating areas cont. Electronic media monitoring on TV advertising Television fees collection of television fees Postal operations regulator
5 Information security FICORA s telecommunications regulator traditional area : security issues regarding telecommunications networks and operators Present goverment program: How to administratively organise security management issues regarding telecommunications networks (..including data networks & Internet) secure telecommunications seen as key issue TIHA project result: COMSEC -> FICORA QCB -> commercial vendors CERT -> FICORA Information security unit formed
6 Information security unit: Key operating areas Telecommunications security (COMSEC) Privacy in telecommunications Electronic signatures / PKI E-commerce Observation and assistance of/to security incidents CERT-functionality
7 Unit personnel Head of unit Timo Lehtimäki Unit Secretary Aija Lindholm CERT-FI Information Security Law COMSEC Kauto Huopio Information Security Analyst CERT-FI Coordinator Jani Arnell Information Security Analyst Eeva Lantto Lawyer Sami Kilkkilä Information Security Analyst Johanna Kinnari Information Security Analyst Arsi Heinonen Information Security Analyst Kirsi Sunila-Putilin Lawyer
8 CERT FI main tasks to observe and collect information on threats concerning telecommunications infrastructure prevent harmful effects caused by telecommunications security issues inform public on observed vulnerabilities and security issues give public advice on security incident response follow up international development in the area
9 Target group Finland Telecommunications service providers traditional telcos data operators, ISP:s value added service providers Public and private sector Individual citizens
10 CERT-FI timeline planning started present personnel recruited 4Q/2001, 4Q/2002 open for business first major incident OpenSSH outbreak Jan/Feb 2002 TERENA TI Level 2 application 1Q/2003 FIRST membership application 1Q/2003
11 CERT-legislation Modifications to the Act on Telecommunications Security ( ) CERT function is given officially to FICORA telecommunications operators (including data carriers & ISP:s) are required to report significiant security events and network problems to FICORA operators are required to pay an administration fee to FICORA
12 Significiant event? basic ideology: events that one should follow anyhow concentrated portscanning significiant traffic anomalies break-in attempts attacks that have an effect to usability (naturally) successiful breakins failures on basic services (SMTP,DNS, DHCP) important routing mishaps detected software vulnerabilities social engineering attempts
13 Partners - Finland Customers/other CERT:s participate in CERT working group meets 4-5 times / year Other CERT groups inside Finland FUNET CERT (academic research network) operator CSIRT/abuse teams (Sonera, Finnet Group etc) major IT outsourcing houses (TietoEnator, Novo etc) Police various units Central Criminal Police (KRP) Computer Crime Unit Security Police (SUPO) Finnish Defence Forces
14 CERT-FI in figures - year 2002 Recorded contacts: 285 of which incidents 138 incident=event or related series of events affecting communications security
15 CERT-FI: warnings 93 compared to CERT/CC ~25 European/Finnish software enviroment no AOL Instant Messenger issues.. slightly more relaxed warning release rules vs. CERT/CC if public information, exploit exists and/or sensible resolution possibilities -> release trying to limit the Microsoft warning flood subscribers to CERT-FI-ALERT mailing list: ~800
16 Training & education WWW-site with general information on security issues general whitepaper type documents on personal firewalls security issues with P2P networks security issues with IRC / instant messaging software WLAN security popular lectures / presentations in conferences
17 CERT-FI: vulnerability coordination no real cases leading to significiant vulnerability coordination activities..yet 8 cases raported directly to CERT-FI (cc:) policy on vulnerability information handling available (finnish) being a government organisation causes additional legal considerations
18 Situational awarness all the traditional securityfocus mailing lists plus.. cisco-nsp, juniper-nsp, full-disclosure, nsp-sec NANOG, operator forums virus bulletins local finnish lists & newsgroups N websites, traffic monitors all important finnish operators under speed dial getting distilled information is not enough, must read the anyway
19 CERT-FI as part of incident response process key questions: WHAT, HOW, TO WHERE not so important: WHO Attacked enviroment in safe mode and prevention of further damage Can sanitize information Good experiences Protection of evidence Guidance to police contacts
20 Incident highlights 2002 OpenSSH breakin series Jan/Feb 2002 Slapper/Scalper OpenSSL/Apache issue Many worm-related issues (getting distribution sites of exploit code used by the worm shut down these not in Finland Assistance in the Sonera CDR case
21 A word on DDoS wasted bandwidth = money on IP capacity internal tracking / limitation resources vary from operator to operator..not to mention inter-operator tools/processes It is not just IRC servers but mail servers core routers Top attacks we ve observed are in the 1 Gbit/s range this is costing operators money tools, resources, methods to combat DDoS available!
22 Current/future concerns really nasty worms/viruses WLAN security wardriving, warchalking, warspamming, war-whatever Attacks towards network infrastructure (routers, other active network elements) first are out there groups trying to specialise themselves on transforming Cisco boxes to DDoS generators Juniper BSD-enviroment Attacks towards M2M (machine-2-machine) communications equipment with added IP connectivity
23 CERT-FI in 2003 personnell 3 -> 4 operational support systems development incident handling system IDS / attack data integration project CERT test enviroment monitoring of internet baseline noise what is arriving into a empty IP connection vulnerability evaluation platfoms (all major OS:s)
24 Contact details Telecommunicatons network sector director Mr. Tapani Rantanen Head of Information Security Unit Mr. Timo Lehtimäki Information Security Analyst / CERT-FI coordinator Mr. Kauto Huopio tel mobile
25 Contact information Viestintävirasto / CERT-FI [email protected] duty desk (office hours) fax PGP-fingerprint: 03B1 F7F F27F 15D1 A98F D351 7DA8 3CDA 0200
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