ESMA Discussion Paper on Draft Technical Standards for the CSD Regulation. Euroclear SA/NV response

Transcription

1 22 May 2014 ESMA Discussion Paper on Draft Technical Standards for the CSD Regulation Euroclear SA/NV response Euroclear welcomes the comprehensive Discussion Paper issued by ESMA on the Draft Technical Standards for the CSD Regulation ( CSDR ). We await the future consultation from ESMA on the penalties for settlement fails and the process for collection and redistribution of such penalties. In this response, we already offer ESMA some views on these aspects. This response covers the views of all (I)CSDs within the Euroclear Group. However, Euroclear is also a Board Member of ECSDA and chairs its Public Policy Working Group and has, as a consequence, been extremely closely involved in the production of ECSDA s comprehensive consultation response. ECSDA has undertaken a detailed review of the Settlement Discipline and Buy-In measures in Articles 6 and 7 of the CSDR and Euroclear broadly concurs with the views contained in the ECSDA response. Euroclear s response should therefore, be read in close conjunction with that of ECSDA. This consultation response follows the order of the ESMA Consultation paper, but is divided into two separate sections with two separate Executive Summaries: Pages 2-18 Questions 1-20 (relating to CSDR Articles 6 and 7 ONLY) Pages Questions (relating to the rest of the CSDR ONLY) Pages Annex 1 Euroclear Proposed changes to the ESMA text on record-keeping Pages Annex 2 Euroclear Proposals for Annex III of the ESMA discussion document For further information, please contact: - Paul Symons, Head of Public Affairs Euroclear SA/NV +44 (0) Ilse Peeters, Director, Public Affairs Euroclear SA/NV +32 (0)

2 PART 1 Executive Summary (Questions 1-20 on Articles 6 and 7 only) 1. Euroclear supports the concept of a unified settlement discipline regime across the EU (particularly in the context of the launch of T2S). However, the current very low level of settlement fails indicates that they pose no significant or systemic risk to European securities markets. In March 2012, the settlement efficiency rate (as calculated by ECSDA 1 and measured by the number of transactions which settle by the end of ISD) was 98.9% in value terms and 97.4% in volume terms which represented an increase of 1.5 to 2 percentage points (in value/volume) compared to 2009 figures. Of the 1.1% of transactions that fail to settle on time by value, most will settle the following day, with a settlement fail rate of less than 0.5% on ISD+1. As a consequence, ESMA should approach the definition of the Technical Standards for Article 6 and 7 proportionately, ensuring that the scope of the regime and the size of the penalties are appropriate to the very low level of fails in Europe. 2. We believe there is a need for a study of the potential effects of a mandatory and highly prescriptive and rigid settlement discipline and buy-in regime on (i) the wide range of securities required by the CSDR and (ii) on the competitive landscape for CSDs. We are concerned that the measures set out in the CSDR to manage settlement fails are limited just to CSDs (e.g. Article 6(2) and (3)) which could lead to a migration of international business away from CSDs and an increase in internalisation of domestic securities on the books of intermediaries, which are not subject to the CSDR. This is an issue that affects all CSDs in the EU. Another risk of a very prescriptive regime is the lack of flexibility of being able to adjust the regime quickly and effectively to take into account specific market events or evolutions. Given the absence of a detailed impact assessment of the proposed regime, we believe that ESMA should adopt a flexible approach to the specification of the regime. 3. The implementation of the settlement discipline measures under the CSD Regulation should be phased or delayed until after the implementation of T2S. ESMA should not underestimate the scale of the changes required in the systems of CSDs and market firms to accommodate a harmonised settlement discipline regime (e.g. static data changes, introduction of new messages, new billing mechanisms, etc.). A typical IT project would only begin once the full specification of the changes is known (which is when the ESMA Technical Standards and Commission Delegated Acts are finalised in mid 2015). From that point a minimum of 18 months for the design, development, internal and external testing would be required before the implementation of the regime

3 Consequently, we believe that the only realistic timeline for CSDs to implement fully the settlement discipline standards is after the final T2S migration wave is completed. ESMA should note that the IT road maps of those CSDs (or CSD Groups) which are joining T2S are completely full until at least their migration to T2S, and are likely to be significantly consumed with post-migration activities, at least until such time as the final migration wave has occurred. 4. Technical aspects of settlement (such as matching standards, message standards or number of settlement batches) should not be included in binding Technical Standards. Technical standards should be designed to be future-proof and should avoid referring to specific technical settlement solutions or standards, which may soon become outdated. Constraining market development and evolution through overly prescriptive Delegated Acts and Technical Standards could well damage the competiveness and effectiveness of settlement infrastructure in Europe. 5. CSDR technical standards should establish a set of tools that CSDs could choose to employ in order to prevent settlement fails. Which tools to be used at which stage would be a decision for each CSD in consultation with its market and in particular with its Competent Authority. For example, a centralised securities lending and borrowing facility can help reduce the level of settlement fails, but will not always be an appropriate solution for all instrument types and markets. CSDR technical standards should provide a common basis for all CSDs, while allowing CSDs to pick the most appropriate tools at their disposal, based on the needs of the market(s) in which they operate. This is also in line with Recital 16 of CSDR, which states that rules concerning penalties should be adapted to the specificities of different securities markets. 6. CSDR technical standards should take into account existing standards supporting efficient matching and settlement of securities transactions such as the ESSF-ECSDA Matching Standards of However not all of those market standards are suitable for translation into binding Level 2 legislation. They reflect best practices which are often very detailed and not meant to be generally applicable. The standards are also necessarily subject to adjustments over time, in particular to reflect advances in technology and other market developments. 7. The mandatory nature of both the buy-in regime and the settlement discipline regime means that there is a real risk that intermediaries in a chain of transactions will be subject 2 ESSF-ECSDA Matching Standards (2006): and latest ECSDA status report on matching harmonisation (Nov 2013) 3

4 to multiple buy-ins and multiple settlement penalties. ESMA recognises this risk in its consultation paper, but the market has yet to find a cost effective way of managing this risk. Chains of transactions (where deliveries may have been split or partialled and where the end client may reside in a third country CSD) are extremely difficult to identify and to track when just one CSD is involved, and will be even more difficult in a T2S environment where transaction chains can cross multiple CSDs. 8. CSDs (as has been agreed for CCPs within the CSDR itself) should be explicitly exempted from Settlement Discipline fines in relation to CSD-CSD links. For a CSD to be subject to a settlement fine risks the CSD being exposed to (potentially) uncapped liabilities in relation to their own clients, particularly if the participant becomes insolvent. This risk runs counter to the aims of CSDR which is to minimise the risks to which a CSD is exposed. 9. CSDs generally should not be involved in the buy-in process (as indicated by Article 7(10)(c)), but they should not be excluded from doing so, providing such buy-in services are constructed in close cooperation with the market and with the relevant Competent Authority. Euroclear agrees with ECSDA and recommends that further discussions should take place between ESMA, market infrastructures and their users, after the consultation deadline of 22 May, to consider what processes could be put in place to enforce the CSDR buy-in rules in non-ccp scenarios. 10. Finally, it is important that the technical standards take into account the specific situation of direct holding markets and ensure a fair and equal treatment of different account holding models in Europe. ESMA should avoid putting undue strains on the direct holding models. For example, account allocation movements between the accounts of end investors managed by the same CSD participant should be exempt from late settlement penalties, as the equivalent account allocation in omnibus account markets is internalised within the books of the banks and thus not even visible to the CSD. 4

5 General Comments (i) A flexible regime to enhance competition and market efficiency We believe that the settlement discipline regime that is designed and applied by ESMA must remain, as far as possible, competitively neutral. The introduction of T2S has encouraged many CSDs to consider providing a single point of access for their existing, and potential clients, to all eligible T2S securities. This requires the development of international asset servicing by those CSDs which, in turn, means that they will compete with, inter alia, other CSDs and local agents. At the same time the two ICSDs provide a highly competitive global securities settlement service (focussed in particular on fixed income markets). We are concerned that the measures set out in the CSDR to manage settlement fails are limited just to CSDs (e.g. Article 6(2) and (3)) which could lead to a migration of international business away from CSDs and an increase in internalisation of domestic securities on the books of intermediaries, which are not subject to the CSDR. We recognise that this is a result of the CSDR s institutional and mandatory approach to Settlement Discipline (and Buy Ins), but believe that ESMA needs to show flexibility in its approach in order not to distort the competitive landscape. We recognise that ESMA will consult later this summer on the potential advice it will give to the Commission on the relevant future Delegated Act. However, ESMA must ensure that the scope of the regime and the size of the penalties is appropriate not just to the very low level of fails in Europe, but also to the (increasingly) competitive situation between CSDs and commercial banks. In addition, we note that no impact assessment has been completed to analyse the effects of applying such a mandatory regime to such a wide range of securities, most of which have never been subject to such a regime. These effects might manifest themselves in reduced liquidity and increased costs for investors. Therefore, we believe there is a need for a study of the potential effects of a mandatory and detailed settlement discipline and buy-in regime on (i) the wide range of securities required by the CSDR (many of which are not subject to such measures today) and (ii) on the competitive landscape for those CSDs that offer (or plan to offer) a wide range of domestic and international settlement services. In the absence of a detailed impact assessment of the proposed regime, we believe that ESMA should adopt a flexible approach to the specification of the regime. Finally, another risk of a very prescriptive regime is the lack of flexibility of being able to adjust the regime quickly and effectively to take into account specific market events or evolutions. We cover this point in more detail in our answers to specific Discussion Paper questions below. 5

6 (ii) Implementation Timeline We believe strongly that ESMA needs to phase the implementation of the Settlement Discipline Regime in the CSDR. This is for the following purely practical reasons. The implementation of a settlement discipline regime is a highly complex IT project requiring changes to databases, messages and billing mechanisms. In addition, these changes need to be reflected in the systems of our direct clients. To define the business specifications of such a large IT project requires a firm set of requirements, which will be the final Technical Standards and Delegated Acts. These will not be finalised before the middle of At that point the IT project can begin, running through the standard phases of design (which will require user consultation), build, internal and external testing and trialling and release. The minimum time for the launch of such a project from receipt of the specifications to final launch is 18 months. This would indicate that the very earliest time at which such a regime could go live is the very end of 2016 (ceteris paribus). However, from mid-2015 until mid-2017 the EU CSD industry (and its clients) is undertaking the largest IT outsourcing ever seen in the global post-trade industry as settlement services are outsourced to the Eurosystem s T2S service. The scale of this mandatory project, for those CSDs and clients which are participating, is enormous and means that IT road maps are full at least until migration. Therefore (and as stressed in a joint industry letter sent to EU policy-makers in November 2013 by European trade associations representing CSDs, CCPs and their users 3 ) the parallel implementation of TARGET2-Securities and of the move to a T+2 settlement cycle need to be taken into account as all sectors of the market, not just CSDs, will have their roadmaps fully consumed by these projects 4. A transition period would allow market participants, as well as infrastructures, to make the necessary adaptations and avoid an unnecessarily complex and costly implementation of some functionalities that will be provided by T2S, as well as allowing some observations as to settlement efficiency evolves in a T2S environment. We would welcome more dialogue with ESMA on this subject, but quite simply it is impractical for CSDs to be compliant with the Technical Standards for Articles 6 and 7 as part of the CSDR authorisation process. The process of implementation across Europe will take several years and alternative approaches need to be considered. 3 See 4 In addition, CSDs may have to rebuild their record keeping and archiving systems in the same period if the ESMA proposals in relation to Article 29 are implemented (see pages of this Consultation response) 6

7 Discussion Paper Answers to Questions 1-20 SETTLEMENT DISCIPLINE Q1: Which elements would you propose ESMA to take into account / to form the technical standards on confirmation and allocation between investment firms and their professional clients? Since CSDs are not directly in the scope of article 6(1) on trade confirmation, we do not comment on question 1 of the Discussion Paper. Q2: In your opinion, are there any exceptions that should be allowed to the rule that no manual intervention occurs in the processing of settlement instructions? If so please highlight them together with an indication of the cost involved if these exceptions are not considered. Automation and the promotion of straight-through processing (STP) is core to the CSD business. But we do not see how manual intervention can be prohibited, nor do we believe it would be practical or sensible to do so in a legal text. In most businesses, manual intervention is needed on occasion, in particular where corrective actions are required, or in times of crisis. Restricting manual intervention in regulatory technical standards might create more issues than it solves, especially given the difficulty of defining manual intervention (would this refer to interventions made by the CSD or by CSD participants? Does access to a CSD s graphical user interface count as manual intervention?) and the multiplicity of cases when such intervention might be required to ensure timely settlement (often in exceptional circumstances). For example, for some OTC transactions, CSD participants manually amend their instructions to reflect information received from their own clients (e.g. using an MT599 message) instead of having to cancel and re-instruct in the settlement system. Manual processes are also sometimes needed for corporate actions, redemptions/coupon payments, stripping instructions or the handling of insolvencies and similar exceptional circumstances. Settlement via direct links can, depending on the respective CSD system, also require some manual intervention for the CSD and/or its participants. The hold and release mechanism in T2S could also be termed manual intervention. Standard 11 of the ESSF-ECSDA Matching Standards 5 foresees that the instruction process in the CSD should enable the 'amendment' of transactions in non-matching relevant areas rather than the cancellation and resubmission of the trade. Such flexibility supports the smooth processing of instructions and should be preserved. 5 ESSF-ECSDA Matching Standards (2006): and latest ECSDA status report on matching harmonisation (Nov 2013) 7

8 ESMA standards should encourage automation whenever this increases the efficiency and safety of the system. But mandating automation and trying to limit the type of exceptions would be counterproductive and could actually reduce settlement efficiency, removing all flexibility for CSDs and their participants. CSDs should keep full discretion as to when (well-controlled and well-documented) manual intervention procedures are necessary. Q3: ESMA welcomes concrete proposals on how the relevant communication procedures and standards could be further defined to ensure STP. ESMA regulatory technical standards could seek to encourage the use of communication procedures and standards that facilitate STP, in line with the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures. However, Level 2 legislation should not mandate the use of specific communication standards (e.g. ISO 20022) since article 35 of the Regulation already covers this aspect, and since this would legally freeze the evolution of such standards, requiring amendment to the legally binding technical standards if a message standard needed to evolve to support the development of a competitive financial market. ESMA could introduce a general reference to the use of ISO standards in the technical standards, but a more precise reference to individual standards (e.g. to ISO15022 or ISO20022) should be avoided. ISO standards do not cover all functionalities and services offered by CSDs. In some cases, limiting CSD communication standards to ISO standards would result in the discontinuation of some services that are helpful to market participants and which support an efficient settlement process. Examples (included within the ECSDA response) include messages for static data, certain reports including settlement discipline related reporting, the SBI trade confirmation service in the French market, as well as many of the account level services offered by CSDs in direct holding markets. We note that Technical Standards for other infrastructures (trading venues and CCPs) do not go to this level of detail and given the arguments presented in the paragraph above, we believe a similar approach should be taken for CSDs. Q4: Do you share ESMA s view that matching should be compulsory and fields standardised as proposed? If not, please justify your answer and indicate any envisaged exception to this rule. Are there any additional fields that you would suggest ESMA to consider? How should clients codes be considered? (a) Compulsory matching Euroclear agrees with ESMA that, for transactions which have not been matched by a trading venue or a CCP, matching should be compulsory at CSD level, but we believe a number of explicit exceptions need to be applied to this rule, for instance: in the context of corporate actions processing; 8

9 for certain free of payment (FoP) transfers among securities accounts managed by the same CSD participant; in the context of multilateral systems without CCP intervention (i.e. when instructions are not entered into the settlement system by the CSD participants, but are received via a trade feed); for instructions which are processed as a result of a Court order (e.g. insolvency proceedings). FoP instructions between accounts opened in the name of the same participant should be excluded from the compulsory matching requirement since these are typically collateral movements, or account allocation movements, especially in direct holding markets. Nonetheless, we believe that the phrase accounts opened in the name of the same participant should be replaced by accounts managed by the same participant in order to cover all direct holding models. (b) Continuous matching Euroclear CSDs already offer real-time matching throughout business day, in line with the ESSF-ECSDA Standard 3. CSDR technical standards should include a general requirement for CSDs to offer matching possibilities throughout the business day, as a means to facilitate early matching and timely settlement. (c) Standardised matching fields We are unclear why ESMA believes that matching fields need to be harmonised and standardised in law. Standard 1 of the ESSF-ECSDA matching standards (2006) already contains a list of harmonised matching fields. The compliance rate with all of these ESSF-ECSDA matching Standards has improved steadily over the last three surveys (in 2008, 2010 and 2012). The average compliance rate in September 2013 across all markets was 82%, compared with 74% in Looking at the 8 major markets, compliance now reaches 91%. These statistics would indicate that there is no market failure in matching which needs to be addressed through legally binding standards. Mandating the use of certain matching fields would, we believe, go beyond the mandate given to ESMA under the Level 1 Regulation, and is unlikely to bring substantial benefits in terms of reducing the level of settlement fails (where settlement rates across Europe are around 98% of ISD. Fixing such fields in law would also inhibit market development. (d) Use of matching tolerance amounts In order to facilitate the matching process and timely settlement, many CSDs have introduced a tolerance amount which, according to ESSF-ECSDA Standard 17, should not exceed EUR 25. CSDs also have the option to use a lower tolerance threshold of up to EUR 2 for retail-sized transactions (below EUR 100,000). According to a 2013 survey by ECSDA 6, at least 9 CSDs have a EUR 25 threshold in place today, 12 CSDs use a lower amount, and 8 CSDs have EUR 0 tolerance. Sometimes in the latter case, the CSD offers the matching tolerance functionality in its settlement system but the amount is set at 0 at the request of participants. 6 See the ECSDA report on matching harmonisation published in November 2013: 9

10 Should CSDR technical standards recommend the use of matching tolerance amount to facilitate timely settlement, the standards should allow CSDs to determine the appropriate optional tolerance amount in consultation with their participants, from EUR 0 up to EUR 25 (or approximate counter value in the relevant currency). The use of a different tolerance amount for retail-sized transactions should remain optional. This flexibility exists in Euroclear Finland (EUR 2 instead of EUR 25) and Euroclear UK and Ireland (GBP 0 instead of GBP 10 since members can opt out of matching tolerance for retail transactions). Incentives for early input of settlement instructions Q5: Do you agree with the above proposals? What kind of disincentives (other than monetary incentives such as discounts on matching fees) might be envisaged and under which product scope? We believe that ESMA should set out in its Technical Standards a tool kit of measures which CSDs could use to incentivise early input of settlement instructions. The tools within this tool kit could include some or all of the measures described in paragraphs of the Discussion Paper. Use of the tools within this tool kit should be under the control of the CSD and its Competent Authority depending on the CSDs input and matching statistics. (a) Financial disincentives for the late input of settlement instructions The difference between the measures covered under article 6(2) and article 6(3) of the CSD Regulation is not entirely clear from the Level 1 text, but we understand that article 6(3) aims to focus on incentive measures, whether for early matching or early settlement. Early matching or early settlement means that instructions are communicated to the CSD, whenever possible, early on or before the business day rather than just before the applicable deadline. Different incentives can be developed to encourage market participants to instruct early in the business day or before, but such incentives are typically market-specific and cannot necessarily be generalised. Euroclear CSDs (FR, SE, UK) have established financial incentives for early matching, or to penalise late matching, and there is no evidence that these markets have greatly improved settlement rates compared to those markets where no such incentives exist. Given the high matching rates in other markets that do not have such financial incentives in place, it is doubtful whether the compulsory introduction of a late matching fee in all EU markets would have any benefits 7. Therefore, we believe that the introduction of a late matching fee or other financial disincentive for late matching should thus be only one tool, among many others, that a CSD can adopt if this is appropriate to enhance settlement efficiency given the local market circumstances. 7 For more details, see 10

11 The details of a CSD s tariff structure, including disincentives for late matching/late input of settlement instructions, should not be imposed by law. A progressive tariff structure is only one means of promoting early settlement and should not be imposed in those markets where no need has been identified. CSDs should be allowed, but not obliged to, use a progressive tariff structure. Finally, it should be noted that certain T+0 activities such as lending/borrowing, repo and monetary policy operations, all of which are legitimate market activities, could be penalised by a late input disincentive, which would be counter-productive to smooth market operations. (b) Hold/release mechanism and bilateral cancellation facilities Some CSDs already offer a hold/release functionality to their participants, and T2S CSDs in particular are expected to offer such a mechanism, in line with ESSF-ECSDA Standard 9. There are however different aspects to a hold and release mechanism and some CSDs only provide for part of the service (e.g. possibility to release a transaction put on hold, but not necessarily to put on hold a transaction already released), often due to a lack of demand by market participants. The technical standards should not mandate such specific technical functionalities, which are anyway difficult to define in legislation and are unlikely in themselves to significantly reduce the number of settlement fails. We however recognise that CSDs should be encouraged to offer a hold/release mechanism as part of the tool kit referenced above if there is a demand from their participants. As regards bilateral cancellation facilities, the ESSF-ECSDA Matching Standard 6 does not impose the use of bilateral cancellation facilities once instructions are matched. Today, some CSDs still allow for unilateral cancellations, for example as a way to amend an instruction ( cancel and replace ). Bilateral cancellation facilities are best practice, and CSDs should be encouraged (as part of the tool kit) to offer such functionality based on market demand. However, there is no reason to mandate this in technical standards. (c) Informing participants about unmatched instructions We agree that CSDs should provide their participants with up-to-date information on the status of their pending instructions, whether in push mode (e.g. reporting) or pull mode (e.g. access to the matching status of an instruction via an online interface or upon request). However, we do not think that the detailed mechanism of how this information needs to be accessed should be specified in Level 2 legislation (e.g. within x minutes, and with what kind of message/interface). The practical mechanisms typically depend on the technical design of each CSD s system and on participants preference based on the costs involved. We agree that participants should have an easy access to such information. Importantly, ESMA should recognise that that CSDs are not always in a position to identify the reasons why an instruction has not been matched. However, as a minimum standard, ESMA could consider making access to the details of transactions alleged to a participant available to that participant to allow the participant to manage exceptions. CSD participants are best placed to understand the business context in 11

12 which a transaction has failed to match. In the T2S platform, for example, CSDs may be able to check whether a settlement instruction is matched, but will not receive information on the underlying cause why an instruction is not matched. As a result, CSDR technical standards should contain a general requirement (as part of the toolkit) for CSDs to allow participants to access the matching status of pending instructions. But, technical standards should not require CSDs to identify and provide information on the causes for unmatched instructions, nor specify the detailed modalities (timing, format) for providing such information. (d) Other tools to incentivise early settlement Some CSDs (e.g. FR 8, SE) offer pre-matching facilities which also encourage participants to match early. As with other types of incentive measures, such facilities should not be mandated in regulation but rather be allowed so that they can be adopted in those markets where a need has been identified. We also note that, outside of the CSD environment, encouraging the use of automated trade confirmation mechanisms can assist in early matching and early settlement. System functionalities Q6: In your opinion, should CSDs be obliged to offer at least 3 daily settlements/batches per day? Of which duration? Please elaborate providing relevant data to estimate the cost and benefit associated with the different options. We agree with the general analysis provided by ESMA in paragraphs 26 to 29 of the Discussion Paper, but we are not convinced about the penultimate sentence of paragraph 29 suggesting that all CSDs should be obliged to offer at least three daily settlements (batches), unless they operate on an RTGS basis. Such a recommendation would not be a practical concern for Euroclear CSDs. However, in principle, the timing of the batches is equally as important as the number of batches, taking into account time zone differences, and the overall assessment of how optimal settlement efficiency can be achieved should be subject to discussions between the CSDs, other infrastructures, the relevant user committees and the competent authorities, and should not be defined within the technical standards. Q7: In your view, should any of the above measures to facilitate settlement on ISD be mandatory? Please describe any other measure that would be appropriate to be mandated. The technical functionalities listed by ESMA in paragraphs of the Discussion Paper should be part of a toolbox of measures (see above) to facilitate timely settlement; not all tools will be appropriate for all markets at all times. The technical standards should ensure that CSDs are allowed to pick the most appropriate tools (in conjunction with their competent authorities and their participants) to enhance 8 Although as Euroclear France is joining T2S, the pre-matching facility will be replaced by another tool, the holdrelease mechanism. 12

13 settlement efficiency in their market, but should not seek to mandate specific tools when there is no evidence that such tools would substantially benefit settlement efficiency at European level. For example, ESMA has produced no evidence as to why mandating the use of technical netting and other optimisation algorithms, partial settlement or trade shaping functionalities, is justified for all CSDs. The shaping of trades is not a function that is offered in TARGET2-Securities, and, if provided at all, can in fact be more efficiently provided at the level of the CCP or trading venue, rather than at CSD level. This appears to go beyond the Level 1 mandate granted to ESMA. Lending facilities Q8: Do you agree with this view? If not please elaborate on how such arrangements could be designed and include the relevant data to estimate the costs and benefits associated with such arrangements. Comments are also welcome on whether ESMA should provide for a framework on lending facilities where offered by CSDs. We agree with ESMA that securities lending and borrowing (SLB) facilities should not be mandated in technical standards, but rather should be considered as one possible tool to be used to prevent settlement fails. SLB facilities (where the CSD acts as agent between lenders and borrowers) are offered by CSDs today in some markets, but not all CSDs see a market demand for such services. The costs of implementing a central system will not always be justified, and it is worth noting that some of the largest markets in Europe (e.g. UK, FR) operate very efficiently without centralised SLB facilities. Given that authorised CSDs already have the possibility, but not the obligation to offer SLB services under Section B of the Annex of the Level 1 CSD Regulation ( organising a securities lending mechanism, as agent among participants of a securities settlement system ), there is no need for technical standards to mandate SLB services of CSDs, and no need for technical standards to harmonise such services. SLB services are just another part of the toolkit available to CSDs to use when deemed appropriate. Monitoring and reporting settlement fails art.7(1) Contents of the settlement fails reports sent by CSDs to regulators Q9: Do you agree with the above monitoring system description? What further elements would you suggest? Please present the appropriate details, notably having in mind the current CSD datasets and possible impact on reporting costs. Q10: What are your views on the information that participants should receive to monitor fails? Q11: Do you believe the public information should be left to each CSD or local authority to define or disclosed in a standard European format provided by ESMA? How could that format look like? 13

14 We understand that the Competent Authorities would prefer that a truly harmonised methodology is used by all EU CSDs for reporting settlement fails to their regulators. However, the costs of such a regime need to be taken into consideration. Should such a harmonised methodology be required, then it should be based on the existing ECSDA methodology of February Euroclear has been fully engaged with and fully supports the views of ECSDA in its Discussion Paper response on Q10 and Q11 and does not repeat the argumentation used by ECSDA here. Q12: What would the cost implication for CSDs to report fails to their competent authorities on a daily basis be? ESMA should seek to harmonise the frequency of CSDs reports to their regulator(s) in order to facilitate the aggregation of EU-wide data on a regular basis. Currently, most CSDs report fails to competent authorities on a monthly basis and this frequency therefore, appears appropriate, notwithstanding the possibility for authorities to request additional data from the CSD on an ad hoc basis. Daily reporting might indeed be appropriate in times of crisis, and CSDs should have the ability to generate such reports on a daily basis for this reason. But to require daily reporting appears disproportionate and overly burdensome (including for regulators), given the generally very high level of settlement efficiency in Europe. The operational and administrative costs for CSDs and national regulators having to process the data on a daily basis could be substantial compared to the benefit such reporting would bring. Buy-ins art.7(3) and (4) Q13: CSDR provides that the extension period shall be based on asset type and liquidity. How would you propose those to be considered? Notably, what asset types should be taken into consideration? Q14: Do you see the need to specify other minimum requirements for the buy-in mechanism? With regard to the length of the buy-in mechanism, do you have specific suggestions as to the different timelines and in particular would you find a buy-in execution period of 4 business days acceptable for liquid products? Q15: Under what circumstances can a buy-in be considered not possible? Would you consider beneficial if the technical standard envisaged a coordination of multiple buy-ins on the same financial instruments? How should this take place? Q16: In which circumstances would you deem a buy-in to be ineffective? 9 See 14

15 Q17: Do you agree on the proposed approach? How would you identify the reference price? CSDs generally should not be involved in the buy-in process (as indicated by Article 7(10)(c)), but nor should they be excluded from doing so, providing such buy-in services are constructed in close cooperation with the market and with the relevant Competent Authority. Euroclear agrees with ECSDA and recommends that further discussions should take place between ESMA, market infrastructures and their users, after the consultation deadline of 22 May, to consider what processes could be put in place to enforce the CSDR buy-in rules in non-ccp scenarios. Today, CSDs are typically not involved in the buy-in process, which, as recognised by the CSD Regulation, is primarily the responsibility of CCPs. Nonetheless, in the case of pure OTC transactions (i.e. transactions not executed on recognised trading venues and not cleared by a CCP), Article 7(10)(c) foresees that the CSDs shall include in their internal rules an obligation for its participants to be subject to [buy-ins]. It is unclear how the CSD could monitor and enforce such a rule, if that CSD is not undertaking the buy-in process itself. Finally, in line with our comments on the application of late settlement penalties on illiquid securities, we support a proper calibration of the buy-in procedure to take into account the constraints in relation to the liquidity of securities. In particular, illiquid securities should be subject to longer timeframes for delivery to the receiving participant. Suspension of failing participants art.7(6) Q18: Would you agree with ESMA s approach? Would you indicate further or different conditions to be considered for the suspension of the failing participant? Q19: Please, indicate your views on the proposed quantitative thresholds (percentages / months). Given the serious consequences the suspension of a CSD participant can have for financial markets as a whole, this measure should be considered only as the ultimate sanction in extreme cases and must always be subject to the prior agreement of the relevant Competent Authorities. Any quantitative threshold should in any case be reasonably low (e.g. below 75% of instructions settled on the intended settlement date, in volume or value, over a 12-month period), and should never automatically trigger the suspension of a participant. Euroclear agrees with the ECSDA proposal that falling below the threshold is simply the trigger for further action to be taken to address the situation. Settlement information necessary for executing buy-ins art.7(7) Q20: What is in your view the settlement information that CSDs need to provide to CCPs and trading venues for the execution of buy-ins? Do you agree with the approach out-lined above? If not, please explain what alternative solutions might be used to achieve the same results. 15

16 Euroclear, together with ECSDA, has strong reservations about the proposals made by ESMA in paragraphs 68 and 69 of its Discussion Paper. In particular, we do not agree with the statement that CSDs need to be able to associate the activity of each clearing member, CCP and participant to a trading venue, to a given securities account. We believe that it is the entity responsible for executing the buy-in (e.g. the CCP), rather than the CSD, which needs to be able to link a failed settlement instruction to a given counterparty (trading or clearing member). Buy-ins of CCP-cleared transactions occur successfully today and the processes used enable CSDs to access the information they need to effect the necessary buy-in. CCPs obtain the required information either through direct participation in the CSD or through indirect participation via a CSD participant. A requirement to segregate the accounts of clearing members at CSD level is thus unnecessary, and does nothing to ease buy-in execution for CCP cleared transactions. Trading venues are typically not participants in CSDs and do not have access to as much information on the settlement of transactions as CCPs. That said the Level 1 Regulation requires a trading venue to include in its internal rules an obligation for its members and its participants to be subject to the [buy-in] measures referred to in paragraphs 3 to 4a. It does not require trading venues to execute buy-ins on behalf of participants that have suffered from a fail, but only to foresee a buy-obligation in its rules. It is thus not entirely clear what kind of settlement information trading venues would need to receive from CSDs for the purpose of complying with CSDR article 7(7), particularly given in practice, there is not always a direct correspondence between trading counterparties, clearing members and CSD participants. Imposing a buy-in obligation to trading counterparties in the absence of a CCP thus raises practical problems, such as who is responsible for executing a buy-in. We note that where a CSD receives a transaction feed directly from a trading venue, it is in principle able to link a given trading counterparty and a CSD participant. This allows the CSD to send back to the trading venue the necessary information to manage the buy-in with reference to the trading counterparty, even if it appoints a settlement agent. The CSDR and the revised MiFID therefore, establish a regulatory framework facilitating access to transaction feeds. Such feeds will be covered by a contractual agreement between a trading venue and the relevant linked market infrastructures. The information flow to be provided for the purpose of executing buy-ins could be specified in these agreements, if applicable at all. The requirement for a trading member or a clearing member to open a separate account at the CSD per CCP and venue, segregated from other trading or clearing members holding securities with the same CSD participant, would introduce operational complexity into the settlement process. For example, a participant buying securities on exchange A and selling them on exchange B, both of whom would use different CCPs, would require multiple realignments to be undertaken in such a scenario. Even in the instance both exchanges used the same CCP, there would still need to be a realignment to ensure settlement can occur. Such operational complexity would likely increase the risk of settlement failures, and cause more buy-in than would be the case where a participant uses one account for all its activity. Given there is, in practice, not always a direct correspondence between trading counterparties, clearing 16

17 members and CSD participants, it is difficult to see how the proposal as it stands would help the buy-in process. The requirement to open such segregated accounts would anyway fall on the market participants, and cannot be imposed on the CSD itself, so it seems that such a requirement would go beyond the scope of the Level 1 mandate in CSDR article 7. Finally, a further segregation requirement introduced in Level 2 standards would very likely result in a sharp increase in the number of securities accounts maintained at CSD level, which would be costly and could result in capacity problems at some CSDs. Given the limited use of such accounts for the purpose of enforcing buy-ins, and in view of the implied costs, CSDR technical standards should not impose segregation requirements on trading and clearing members. As noted earlier in this paper, ECSDA has recommended that further discussions should take place between ESMA, market infrastructures and their users, after the consultation deadline of 22 May, to consider what processes could be put in place to enforce the CSDR buy-in rules in non-ccp scenarios. Late settlement penalties art.7(2) Although the ESMA Discussion Paper does not include a detailed analysis of the measures to be adopted under CSDR article 7(2) on penalties for late settlement, we expect that the European Commission or ESMA will consult on the delegated act at a later stage. We thus take the opportunity of describing what we think could constitute a workable system for late settlement penalties, consistent with the Level 1 text of the Regulation and with the other proposals made by Euroclear and by ECSDA in relation with the Level 2 technical standards on settlement discipline. The upcoming Commission Delegated Act on penalties for late settlement should: 1. Require that the penalty fee for late settlement be a fee with a fixed, per trade component aimed to cover the costs of maintaining the penalty system. Further analysis is needed on whether an ad valorem or fixed fee is appropriate per securities class. 2. Determine a minimum amount for the fixed, per trade component of the penalty fee, allowing CSDs to cover the costs of developing and maintaining the system. Some flexibility for CSDs to go beyond this minimum amount is however necessary to account for the different costs across CSDs. 3. Exempt some FoP deliveries from penalties, such as transfers between securities accounts managed by the same participant (including between the accounts of a participant and of an account holder that is not a participant in direct holding markets); 4. Exempt CSDs in CSD links from the settlement discipline regime. For a CSD to be subject to a settlement fine risks that the CSD is exposed to (potentially) uncapped liabilities in relation to their own clients, particularly if the participant becomes insolvent. This risk runs counter to the aims of CSDR which is to minimise the risks to which a CSD is exposed. 17

18 5. Allow for a differentiated rate for calculating penalties for a maximum of two asset types, i.e. distinguishing between debt securities and transactions in all other financial instruments. There should be a single daily penalty fee rate for each category. 6. Allow the calculation method to be adjusted over time to reflect changing market conditions. The upcoming Commission Delegated Act should not: 7. Impose the use of a gross (single-instruction-based) or multilateral net model to all CSDs. CSDs should be allowed to choose either model. A single model might be defined at the level of the T2S platform in the future if the Eurosystem should integrate a functionality facilitating the imposition of penalty fees by T2S participating CSDs. The CSDR technical standards on the collection and redistribution of cash penalties should give CSDs the option of (a) redistributing the penalty monies, after having deducted the part used to cover the CSD s costs of maintaining the system, to the suffering party (although this is a complex regime to build) or (b) retaining the penalties for redistribution to the wider market and/or to projects that benefit the market as a whole. The argumentation to support some of these suggestions is explained in detail in the ECSDA response to this Discussion paper, and is not repeated here. We strongly encourage ESMA to consider these suggestions when consulting on Article 7(13) and 7(14)(b)). Euroclear will respond in detail to this future consultation (building on the above principles) when the separate consultation is released later this year. 18

19 Part 2 Executive Summary (Questions only) 1. The diversity in CSD business models, activities and size, calls for proportionality in the way in which many technical standards will be implemented. For example, the CSDR Level 1 text has taken a flexible approach to the definition of CSD services. This flexibility should be upheld in the standards. 2. For the authorisation process, CSDs and their competent authorities should be allowed to use some of their current supervisory or self-assessments and reporting tools/data flows to avoid duplication. For example, CSDs may want to use their assessments under the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures, and ESCB assessments, including for CSD links. 3. The recordkeeping requirements currently proposed by ESMA should be revisited, and should not confuse CSDs with trade repositories. In line with the CSDR text, rules on recordkeeping should allow regulators to assess compliance with the CSDR. The standards on recordkeeping should therefore, not add elements to the compliance required by CSDR itself (e.g. the list of compulsory recordkeeping items, the introduction of LEIs, direct data feed to competent authorities, etc.). Based on information collected by ECSDA from 18 European CSDs, and assuming that the proposed ESMA requirements would have to be implemented, ECSDA estimates that the system development costs for the 33 CSDs in the European Economic Area would exceed EUR 75 million, possibly even EUR 115 million. The mandatory use of Legal Entity Identifiers (LEI) and of nonproprietary formats for CSD records and reporting, in particular, would be extremely costly to implement. 4. ESMA should consider an appropriate transition period for standards requiring important technical adaptations to CSDs systems. ESMA should recognise that CSDs will not realistically be able to demonstrate compliance with all technical standards during the initial authorisation process. An appropriate transition period must be foreseen, at least for the following standards: a. Settlement discipline: See page 6 above; b. Recordkeeping: Depending on the scope of the final requirements, an appropriate transition period will have to be determined to allow CSDs to amend existing systems or develop the required functionalities. 19

20 Allowing less time for such implementation might mean that CSDs would not be able to submit a complete application file for many years, a situation which would be undesirable as it would lead to uneven application of CSDR across the EU. 5. Technical standards should ensure that the recognition of third country CSDs under CSDR is not just a one-off approval, but an on-going process. Once a third country CSD is recognised, there should be follow-up arrangements to ensure ongoing supervisory equivalence. 6. Finally, for CSDs with a banking licence, ESMA should anticipate possible overlaps and avoid whenever possible inconsistencies between CSDR technical standards and applicable banking legislation (CRDIV and CRR in particular). 20