DATEVe:secure MAIL V1.1. ISIS-MTT-Assessment Report
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1 DATEVe:secure MAIL V1.1 DATEV eg ISIS-MTT-Assessment Report Version 1.1 Date 08. July 2004 Hans-Joachim Knobloch, Fritz Bauspiess Secorvo Security Consulting GmbH Albert-Nestler-Straße 9 D Karlsruhe Tel Fax info@secorvo.de Internet
2 Secorvo herewith confirms, that for the product manufactured by in combination with DATEVe:secure MAIL V1.1 DATEV eg Microsoft Office Outlook 2003 an ISIS-MTT-compliance assessment has been completed between 29 June 2004 and 06 July The product is ISIS-MTT-compliant with respect to the Component Conformance Statement ref. no Secorvo provided We recommend to award the ISIS-MTT-conformance label ( ISIS-MTT-Siegel ) for the product class -Client Reference-Number: Secorvo ISIS-MTT-Specification-Version: 1.1 ISIS-MTT-Test-Specification-Version: ISIS-MTT Compliance Criteria Version 1.1 ISIS-MTT-Testbed Version 1.1 Build 5 SP1 (with modifications) Karlsruhe, 08 July 2004 Fritz Bauspiess Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 2 of 59
3 Content 1 Summarized Assessment Results Test Group PROC-CERT Test Case TCPPKC Test Case TCPCRL Test Group G-SM/ED Test Case TCGSMED Test Case CMS/TCGED Test Group G-SM/SD Test Case TCGSMSD Test Case CMS/TCGSD Test Group G-SM/MS Test Case TCGSMMS Test Case CMS/TCGSD Test Group P-SM/ED Test Case TCPSMED Test Case CMS/TCPED Test Case INV/TCPSMED Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED Test Group P-SM/SD Test Case TCPSMSD Test Case CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/TCPSMSD Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 3 of 59
4 7.4 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Group P-SM/MS Test Case TCPSMMS Test Case CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/TCPSMMS Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 4 of 59
5 8.19 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD Test Group PATHVALID Test Case VALID/TCPVVALID Test Case INVALID/TCPVSIGINVALID Test Case INVALID/TCPVSIGINVALID Test Case INVALID/TCPVCERTREVO Test Case INVALID/TCPVEXPIRED Test Case INVALID/TCPVINVALIDCA Technical Data Test Procedure Installation and Configuration Performing the Tests Component Conformance Statement Annex I: Test Log FC5: Processing of public key certificates FC8: Processing of CRLs FC11: Generation of an S/MIME Message for Enveloped Data FC12: Generation of an S/MIME Message for Signed Data FC14: Generation of a Multipart/Signed S/MIME Message FC15: Processing of an S/MIME Message for Enveloped Data FC16: Processing of S/MIME Messages with signed data FC18: Processing of a Multipart/Signed S/MIME Message FC29: Processing of a valid, 3-step certificate path FC30: Processing of an invalid certificate path...58 Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 5 of 59
6 Acronyms CA CCS CRL CUT EE FC MIME MS OID PC/SC S/MIME USB Certificate Authority Component Conformance Statement Certificate Revocation List Component under test End Entity Functionality Class Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension Microsoft Object Identifier Personal Computer / SmartCard Secure MIME Universal Serial Bus Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 6 of 59
7 1 Summarized Assessment Results DATEVe:secure MAIL V1.1 in combination with Microsoft Office Outlook 2003 belongs to the product class -Client. Functionality classes 5, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 29 and 30 are declared to be conformant to ISIS-MTT and were tested during the compliance assessment. Additionally, functionality class 21 (LDAP client) was also declared to be conformant to ISIS-MTT. According to the current version of the ISIS-MTT-Test-Specification no tests are provided for this functionality class. Thus no corresponding tests had to be applied. Two test cases for functionality classes FC16 Processing of S/MIME Messages with signed data and FC18 Processing of a Multipart/Signed S/MIME Message failed. Microsoft Office Outlook 2003 crashes if it is presented a malformed signed S/MIME Message with an empty signed attributes set in test cases TCPSD-1.12 and TCPSD However albeit this failure is relevant with respect to the robustness of the CUT, it does not affect interoperability. ISIS-MTT does not permit the generation of such an empty signed attributes set. According to P3.T5.#1 and P3.T5.#2 of the ISIS-MTT specification in combination with P3.T5.[1], at least the attributes content-type and message-digest must be contained in the signed attributes set, if this set is contained in the SignerInfo field. Additionally the ASN.1 notation given in RFC 3369 and cited in ISIS-MTT 1.1, Part 3, page 25 explicitely states SignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute which also prohibits the generation of an empty signed attributes set. Thus in an ISIS-MTT compliant environment, an client never should receive such a malformed S/MIME message containing the optional field signedattrs but with an empty attributes set. there is no requirement in the ISIS-MTT specification, that an client has to be able to cope with such a malformed S/MIME message. Failing the test cases TCPSD-1.12 and TCPSD-3.11 thus does not reflect a missing compliance of the CUT with respect to the ISIS-MTT specification. Moreover the reason for this failure is located in the underlying system, namely in some runtime library of the Microsoft Internet Explorer installed with the operating system. It is therefore out of reach of the manufacturer. This failure is already on to Microsoft and is currently handled under service request number SRZ All other tests were, some with warning. Therefore the overall result of the assessment with respect to compliance to the ISIS-MTT specification has to be declared as. Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 7 of 59
8 These are the summarized results of the tests applied: FC Description Result 5 Processing of public key certificates with warning 8 Processing of CRLs with warning 11 Generation of an S/MIME Message for Enveloped Data 12 Generation of an S/MIME Message for Signed Data 14 Generation of a Multipart/Signed S/MIME Message 15 Processing of an S/MIME Message for Enveloped Data 16 Processing of S/MIME Messages with signed data failed 18 Processing of a Multipart/Signed S/MIME Message failed 29 Processing of a valid, 3-step certificate path 30 Processing of an invalid certificate path with warning The tests were based on the ISIS-MTT Specification Version 1.1, Part 1 Certificate and CRL Profile, Part 3 Message Formats and Part 5 Certificate Path Validation. The tests were performed using the ISIS-MTT testbed implementing the version of the ISIS-MTT specification. Therefore some test steps are marked as failed, however these issues are resolved by the changes made in version 1.1. Explanations are given with the individual test steps. None of the modifications in version 1.1 compared to version of the ISIS-MTT specification has a negative effect on any test steps marked as by the testbed. Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 8 of 59
9 2 Test Group PROC-CERT 2.1 Test Case TCPPKC-1 Date: Wed Jun 30 15:36:08 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (Certificate) Test step 2 (signaturealgorithm) Test step 3 (signature) Test step 4 (version) Test step 5 (serialnumber) Test step 6 (issuer) Test step 7 (validity) Test step 8 (subject) Test step 9 (subjectpublickeyinfo) Test step 10 (issueruniqueid) Test step 11 (subjectuniqueid) Test step 12 (extensions) Test case with warning with warning with warning with warning with warning Note: The warning in test step 8 is due to the fact that for the ISIS-MTT mandatory distinguished name attributes nameatbirth ( ), countryofresidence ( ), countryofcitizenship ( ), gender ( ), placeofbirth ( ) and pseudonym ( ) as well as for several ISIS-MTT recommended attributes, Outlook resp. Windows does not present the readable attribute name but the OID value to the user. For increased usability of the product in an ISIS-MTT environment, we recommend that DATEV adds a translation table from OID to attribute name to the user documentation of DATEVe:secure MAIL. 2.2 Test Case TCPCRL-1 Date: Wed Jun 30 16:04:04 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (CertificateList) Test step 2 (signaturealgorithm) Test step 3 (signaturevalue) Test step 4 (issuer) with warning with warning Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 9 of 59
10 Test step 5 (thisupdate) Test step 6 (nextupdate) Test step 7 (revokedcertificates) Test step 7 a) (usercertificate) Test step 7 b) (revocationdate) Test step 7 c) (crlentryextensions) Test step 8 (crlextensions) Test case with warning with warning 3 Test Group G-SM/ED 3.1 Test Case TCGSMED-1 Date: Mon Jul 5 10:32:35 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (Content-Type) Test step 2 (Content-Transfer-Encoding) Test step 3 (Content-Disposition) Test step 4 (MIME entity with enveloped-data) Test case failed Note: The failure in test step 1 is due to the fact that Microsoft Outlook when sending S/MIME messages uses the experimental content-subtype "x-pkcs7-mime" instead of "pkcs7-mime" as it was required by ISIS-MTT In ISIS-MTT 1.1 this experimental content-subtype MAY be used as well. Thus test step 1 hat to be considered as with respect to version 1.1 of the ISIS-MTT specification. 3.2 Test Case CMS/TCGED-1 Date: Mon Jul 5 10:32:35 CEST 2004 Test step 0 (parse ASN.1) Test step 1 (ContentType) Test step 2 (Version) Test step 3 (OriginatorInfo) Test step 4 (RecipientInfos) Test step 5 (KeyTransRecipientInfo (ktri)) Test step 6 (ktriversion) Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 10 of 59
11 Test step 7 (ktrirecipientidentifier) Test step 8 (ktrikeyencryptionalgorithm) Test step 9 (ktriencryptedkey) Test step 10 (EncryptedContentInfoContentType) Test step 11 (EncryptedContentInfoEncryptionAlgorithm) Test step 12 (EncryptedContentInfoEncryptedContent) Test step 13 (UnprotectedAttributes) Test case 4 Test Group G-SM/SD 4.1 Test Case TCGSMSD-1 Date: Mon Jul 5 10:51:02 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (Content-Type) Test step 2 (Content-Transfer-Encoding) Test step 3 (Content-Disposition) Test step 4 (MIME entity with enveloped-data) Test case failed failed Notes: The failure in test step 1 is due to the fact that Microsoft Outlook when sending S/MIME messages uses the experimental content-subtype "x-pkcs7-mime" instead of "pkcs7-mime" as it was required by ISIS-MTT In ISIS-MTT 1.1 this experimental content-subtype MAY be used as well. Thus test step 1 hat to be considered as with respect version 1.1 of the ISIS-MTT specification. The failure in test step 4 is due to a failure in test step 16/17 of test case CMS/TCGSD-1 given in the next chapter. This failure in test step 16/17 has to be considered as with respect to ISIS-MTT 1.1 as described below. Thus also this test step 4 has to be considered as. 4.2 Test Case CMS/TCGSD-1 Date: Mon Jul 5 10:51:02 CEST 2004 Test step 0 (parse ASN.1) Test step 1 (ContentType) Test step 2 (Version) Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 11 of 59
12 Test step 3 (DigestAlgorithm) Test step 4 (econtenttype) Test step 5 (econtent) Test step 6 (Certificates) Test step 7 (CRLs) Test step 8 (SignerInfoVersion) Test step 9 (SignerInfoSID) Test step 10 (SignerInfoDigestAlgorithm) Test step 11 (SignerInfoSignedAttributes) Test step 12/13 (SignerInfoSignedAttributesContentType) Test step 14/15 (SignerInfoSignedAttributesMessageDigest) Test step 16/17 (SignerInfoSignedAttributesSigningTime) Test step 18 (SignerInfoSignatureAlgorithm) Test step 19 (SignerIngoSignature) Test step 20 (SignerInfoUnsignedAttributes) Test step 21/22 (SignerInfoUnsignedAttributesSigningTime) Test case failed Note: In test step 16/17 the ISIS-MTT testbed complains about the encoding of the signing time in UTCTime format which was forbidden in ISIS-MTT but is now required in ISIS-MTT 1.1. Thus this test step 16/17 has to be considered as with respect to version 1.1 of the ISIS-MTT specification. 5 Test Group G-SM/MS 5.1 Test Case TCGSMMS-1 Date: Mon Jul 5 15:21:11 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (Content-Type) Test step 2 (Boundary of data to be signed) Test step 3 (Content-Type of MIME entity to be signed) Test step 4 (Data to be signed) Test step 5 (Boundary of signature control information) Test step 6 (Content-Type of signature control information) failed failed Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 12 of 59
13 Test step 7 (Content-Transfer-Encoding) Test step 8 (Content-Disposition) Test step 9 (MIME entity with signed-data) Test step 10 (Final Boundary) Test case failed Notes: The failures in test step 1 an in test step 6 are due to the fact that Microsoft Outlook when sending S/MIME multipart signed messages uses the experimental content-type "application/x-pkcs7-signature" instead of "application/pkcs7-signature" as it was required by ISIS-MTT In ISIS-MTT 1.1 this experimental content-type MAY be used as well. Thus test step 1 and test step 6 have to be considered as with respect to version 1.1 of the ISIS-MTT specification. The failure in test step 9 is due to a failure in test step 16/17 of test case CMS/TCGSD-3 given in the next chapter. This failure in test step 16/17 has to be considered as with respect to ISIS-MTT 1.1 as described below. Thus also this test step 9 has to be considered as. 5.2 Test Case CMS/TCGSD-3 Date: Mon Jul 5 15:21:11 CEST 2004 Test step 0 (parse ASN.1) Test step 1 (ContentType) Test step 2 (Version) Test step 3 (DigestAlgorithm) Test step 4 (econtenttype) Test step 5 (econtent) Test step 6 (Certificates) Test step 7 (CRLs) Test step 8 (SignerInfoVersion) Test step 9 (SignerInfoSID) Test step 10 (SignerInfoDigestAlgorithm) Test step 11 (SignerInfoSignedAttributes) Test step 12/13 (SignerInfoSignedAttributesContentType) Test step 14/15 (SignerInfoSignedAttributesMessageDigest) Test step 16/17 (SignerInfoSignedAttributesSigningTime) Test step 18 (SignerInfoSignatureAlgorithm) failed Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 13 of 59
14 Test step 19 (SignerIngoSignature) Test step 20 (SignerInfoUnsignedAttributes) Test step 21/22 (SignerInfoUnsignedAttributesSigningTime) Test case Note: In test step 16/17 the ISIS-MTT testbed complains about the encoding of the signing time in UTCTime format which was forbidden in ISIS-MTT but is now required in ISIS-MTT 1.1. Thus this test step 16/17 has to be considered as with respect to version 1.1 of the ISIS-MTT specification. 6 Test Group P-SM/ED 6.1 Test Case TCPSMED-1 Date: Tue Jul 6 10:25:56 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (Content-Type) Test step 2 (Content-Transfer-Encoding) Test step 3 (Content-Disposition) Test step 4 (MIME entity with enveloped-data) Test case 6.2 Test Case CMS/TCPED-1 Date: Tue Jul 6 10:45:21 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (contenttype) Test step 2 (content.version) Test step 3 (content.originator-info) Test step 4 (content.recipient-infos) Test step 5 (content.recipient-infos.ktri) Test step 6 (content.recipient-infos.ktri.version) Test step 7 (content.recipient-infos.ktri.rid) Test step 8 (content.recipient-infos.ktri.key- EncryptionAlgorithm) Test step 9 (content.recipient-infos.ktri.encryptedkey) Test step 10 (content.encrypted-contentinfo. contenttype) Test step 11 (content.encrypted- with warning Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 14 of 59
15 ContentInfo.<BR>contentEncryption-Algorithm) Test step 12 (content.encrypted- ContentInfo.<BR>encryptedContent) Test step 13 (content.unprotected-attrs) Test case with warning 6.3 Test Case INV/TCPSMED-1.1 Date: Tue Jul 6 10:49:08 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (Content-Type) Test step 2 (Content-Transfer-Encoding) Test step 3 (Content-Disposition) Test step 4 (MIME entity with invalid enveloped-data CMS object) Test case 6.4 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED-1.1 Date: Tue Jul 6 10:52:09 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (contenttype) Test case with warning with warning 6.5 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED-1.2 Date: Tue Jul 6 10:53:32 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.version) Test case 6.6 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED-1.3 Date: Tue Jul 6 10:54:46 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.recipient-infos) Test case Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 15 of 59
16 6.7 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED-1.4 Date: Tue Jul 6 10:56:09 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.recipient-infos.ktri) Test case 6.8 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED-1.5 Date: Tue Jul 6 10:57:30 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.recipient-infos.ktri.version) Test case 6.9 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED-1.6 Date: Tue Jul 6 10:58:15 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.recipient-infos.ktri.rid) Test case 6.10 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED-1.7 Date: Tue Jul 6 10:58:58 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.recipient-infos.ktri.rid) Test case 6.11 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED-1.8 Date: Tue Jul 6 11:00:51 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.recipient-infos.ktri.key-encryptionalgorithm) Test case 6.12 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED-1.9 Date: Tue Jul 6 11:02:37 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.recipient-infos.ktri.encryptedkey) Test case with warning with warning Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 16 of 59
17 6.13 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED-1.10 Date: Tue Jul 6 11:05:42 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.encrypted-contentinfo.contenttype) Test case 6.14 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED-1.11 Date: Tue Jul 6 11:21:47 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.encrypted-contentinfo.contentencryption- Algorithm) Test case with warning with warning 6.15 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPED-1.12 Date: Tue Jul 6 11:21:59 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.encrypted-contentinfo.encryptedcontent) Test case 7 Test Group P-SM/SD 7.1 Test Case TCPSMSD-1 Date: Tue Jul 6 11:31:17 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (Content-Type) Test step 2 (Content-Transfer-Encoding) Test step 3 (Content-Disposition) Test step 4 (MIME entity with signed-data) Test case 7.2 Test Case CMS/TCPSD-1 Date: Tue Jul 6 11:36:45 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (contenttype) Test step 2 (content.version) Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 17 of 59
18 Test step 3 (content.digest-algorithms) Test step 4 (content.encap-contentinfo. econtenttype) Test step 5 (content.encap-contentinfo.econtent) Test step 6 (content.certificates) Test step 7 (content.crls) Test step 8 (content.signerinfos.version) Test step 9 (content.signerinfos.sid) Test step 10 (content.signerinfos.digestalgorithm) Test step 11 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs) Test step 12 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attrtype) Test step 13 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attrvalues) Test step 14 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attrtype) Test step 15 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attrvalues) Test step 16 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attrtype) Test step 17 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attrvalues) Test step 18 (content.signerinfos.signaturealgorithm) Test step 19 (content.signerinfos.signature) Test step 20 (content.signerinfos.unsignedattrs) Test step 21 (content.signerinfos.unsignedattrs.attrtype) Test step 22 (content.signerinfos.unsignedattrs.attrvalues) Test case with warning with warning with warning 7.3 Test Case INV/TCPSMSD-1.1 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:27:40 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (Content-Type) Test step 2 (Content-Transfer-Encoding) Test step 3 (Content-Disposition) Test step 4 (MIME entity with invalid signed-data CMS object) Test case Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 18 of 59
19 7.4 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-1.1 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:29:09 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (contenttype) Test case with warning with warning 7.5 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-1.2 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:31:05 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.version) Test case 7.6 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-1.3 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:32:00 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.digest-algorithms) Test case with warning with warning 7.7 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-1.4 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:33:39 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.encap-contentinfo.econtenttype) Test case 7.8 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-1.5 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:35:25 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.encapcontentinfo.econtent) Test case 7.9 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-1.6 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:36:38 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.certificates) Test case Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 19 of 59
20 7.10 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-1.7 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:38:09 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos) Test case 7.11 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-1.8 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:39:07 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.version) Test case 7.12 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-1.9 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:40:33 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.sid) Test case 7.13 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-1.10 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:41:42 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.sid) Test case 7.14 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-1.11 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:43:22 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.digestalgorithm) Test case 7.15 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-1.12 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:45:10 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs) Test case failed failed Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 20 of 59
21 Note: When applying this test case, Microsoft Outlook crashes - which indeed has to be rated as failed. For the consideration with respect to the ISIS-MTT compliance of the CUT see the corresponding remarks in chapter 1 Summarized Assessment Results of this assessment report Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-1.13 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:46:44 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attrtype) Test case with warning with warning 7.17 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-1.14 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:48:09 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attr-values) Test case with warning with warning 7.18 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-1.15 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:49:16 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.signaturealgorithm) Test case 7.19 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-1.16 Date: Tue Jul 6 12:50:24 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.signature) Test case 8 Test Group P-SM/MS 8.1 Test Case TCPSMMS-1 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:06:14 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (Content-Type) Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 21 of 59
22 Test step 2 (Boundary (Start of MIME entity to be signed)) Test step 3 (Content-Type) Test step 4 (Data to be signed) Test step 5 (Boundary (Start of signature control information)) Test step 6 (Content-Type) Test step 7 (Content-Transfer-Encoding) Test step 8 (Content-Disposition) Test step 9 (MIME entity with signed-data) Test step 10 (Boundary (end of multi-part/signed message)) Test case 8.2 Test Case CMS/TCPSD-3 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:10:59 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (contenttype) Test step 2 (content.version) Test step 3 (content.digest-algorithms) Test step 4 (content.encap-contentinfo. econtenttype) Test step 5 (content.encap-contentinfo.econtent) Test step 6 (content.certificates) Test step 7 (content.crls) Test step 8 (content.signerinfos.version) Test step 9 (content.signerinfos.sid) Test step 10 (content.signerinfos.digestalgorithm) Test step 11 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs) Test step 12 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attrtype) Test step 13 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attr-values) Test step 14 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attrtype) Test step 15 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attr-values) Test step 16 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attrtype) Test step 17 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attr-values) Test step 18 (content.signerinfos.signaturealgorithm) Test step 19 (content.signerinfos.signature) with warning with warning Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 22 of 59
23 Test step 20 (content.signerinfos.unsignedattrs) Test step 21 (content.signerinfos.unsignedattrs.attr-type) Test step 22 (content.signerinfos.unsignedattrs.attr-values) Test case with warning 8.3 Test Case INV/TCPSMMS-1.1 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:12:50 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (Content-Type) Test step 2 (Boundary (Start of MIME entity to be signed)) Test step 3 (Content-Type) Test step 4 (Data to be signed) Test step 5 (Boundary (Start of signature control information)) Test step 6 (Content-Type) Test step 7 (Content-Transfer-Encoding) Test step 8 (Content-Disposition) Test step 9 (MIME entity with invalid signed-data CMS object) Test step 10 (Boundary (end of multipart/signed message)) Test case 8.4 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.1 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:13:28 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (contenttype) Test case with warning with warning 8.5 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.2 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:14:23 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.version) Test case Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 23 of 59
24 8.6 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.3 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:15:17 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.digest-algorithms) Test case with warning with warning 8.7 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.4 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:16:12 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.encap-contentinfo.econtenttype) Test case 8.8 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.5 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:17:43 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.encap-contentinfo.econtent) Test case 8.9 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.6 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:18:45 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.version) Test case 8.10 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.7 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:19:42 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.sid) Test case with warning with warning 8.11 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.8 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:21:08 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.sid) Test case Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 24 of 59
25 8.12 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.9 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:22:01 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.digestalgorithm) Test case 8.13 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.10 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:22:52 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.digestalgorithm) Test case 8.14 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.11 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:23:39 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs) Test case failed failed Note: When applying this test case, Microsoft Outlook crashes - which indeed has to be rated as failed. For the consideration with respect to the ISIS-MTT compliance of the CUT see the corresponding remarks in chapter 1 Summarized Assessment Results of this assessment report Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.12 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:25:30 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attrvalues) Test case 8.16 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.13 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:26:23 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs) Test case with warning with warning Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 25 of 59
26 8.17 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.14 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:27:28 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs) Test case with warning with warning 8.18 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.15 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:29:31 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attrvalues) Test case 8.19 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.16 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:30:33 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs) Test case with warning with warning 8.20 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.17 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:31:20 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.signedattrs.attrvalues) Test case with warning with warning 8.21 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.18 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:32:59 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.signaturealgorithm) Test case 8.22 Test Case INV/CMS/TCPSD-3.19 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:33:50 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (content.signerinfos.signature) Test case Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 26 of 59
27 9 Test Group PATHVALID 9.1 Test Case VALID/TCPVVALID-1 Date: Tue Jul 6 13:48:54 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (BuildAndValidateCertPath()) Test case 9.2 Test Case INVALID/TCPVSIGINVALID-1 Date: Tue Jul 6 13:52:17 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (ValidateCertPath()) Test step 2 (BuildAndValidateCertPath()) Test case 9.3 Test Case INVALID/TCPVSIGINVALID-2 Date: Tue Jul 6 13:54:09 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (ValidateCertPath()) Test step 2 (BuildAndValidateCertPath()) Test case 9.4 Test Case INVALID/TCPVCERTREVO-1 Date: Tue Jul 6 13:56:07 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (CheckStatusUsingCRL()) Test step 2 (CheckRevocationStatus()) Test step 3 (ValidateCertPath()) Test step 4 (BuildAndValidateCertPath()) Test case 9.5 Test Case INVALID/TCPVEXPIRED-1 Date: Tue Jul 6 13:56:46 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (ValidateCertPath()) Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 27 of 59
28 Test step 2 (BuildAndValidateCertPath()) Test case 9.6 Test Case INVALID/TCPVINVALIDCA-1 Date: Tue Jul 6 14:00:51 CEST 2004 Test step 1 (ValidateCertPath()) Test step 2 (BuildAndValidateCertPath()) Test case Secorvo AR_17.doc Date 08 July 2004 Page 28 of 59
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