Defense Contract Management Agency Acquisition Workforce for Southwest Asia

Transcription

1 Report No. D April 8, 2010 Defense Contract Management Agency Acquisition Workforce for Southwest Asia

2 Additional Information and Copies To obtain additional copies of this report, visit the website of the Department of Defense Inspector General at or contact the Secondary Reports Distribution Unit at (703) (DSN ) or fax (703) Suggestions for Audits To suggest or request audits, contact the Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing by phone (703) (DSN ), by fax (703) , or by mail: ODIG-AUD (ATTN: Audit Suggestions) Department of Defense Inspector General 400 Army Navy Drive (Room 801) Arlington, VA Acronyms and Abbreviations ACO Administrative Contracting Officer CCAS Contingency Contract Administration Services DAU Defense Acquisition University DAWIA Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation FRAGO Fragmentary Order GAO Government Accountability Office JCC I/A Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program MOA Memorandum of Agreement QAR Quality Assurance Representative SWA Southwest Asia TWCA Theater-Wide Contract Administration USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

3 INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA April 8, 2010 MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY DIRECTOR, DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY SUBJECT: Defense Contract Management Agency Acquisition Workforce for Southwest Asia (Report No. D-20 I 0-051) We are providing this report for review and comment. We considered management comments on a draft of this report from the Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, when preparing the final report. The Director's comments were responsive to the intent of the proposed recommendations. DOD Directive requires that recommendations be l'esolved promptly. Based on Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, comments, we revised final report Recommendations A.I.a. and B.1. We request further comments from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on. Recommendation B.! by May 10,2010. We also request that the Director, Defense Contract Management Agency, verify the implementation of Recommendations A.2. and B.2.b by May 10,2010, or provide specific date(s) when the recommended actions will be completed. Ifpossible, send a.pdf file containing your comments to audacm@dodig.mil. Copies' of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We are unable to accept the / Signed / symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). We appreciate the coul1esies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) (DSN ). " ~IE, Richard B. Jolliffe Assistant Inspector General Acquisition and Contract Management

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5 Report No. D (Project No. D2008-D000AB ) April 8, 2010 Results in Brief: Defense Contract Management Agency Acquisition Workforce for Southwest Asia What We Did Our objective was to determine Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) requirements to support Southwest Asia (SWA) contracting operations and the number of available DCMA civilian, military, foreign national, and support contractors supporting the operations. Specifically, we determined whether DCMA identified its requirements to support SWA contracting operations. We also evaluated whether a sample of the DCMA acquisition workforce for SWA was adequately trained and certified. What We Found As of December 31, 2008, DCMA provided contract oversight and contract administration for contract actions valued at $1.3 trillion. DCMA could not determine its resource requirements for contractor oversight and contract administration in SWA because: DCMA is reactive rather than proactive in assuming its role to provide contractor oversight and contract administration, DCMA did not define its acquisition workforce requirements to support contracting operations in SWA, AT&L does not require Defense agencies to document acquisition workforce requirements, and DCMA must be delegated contractor oversight and contract administration responsibility for work in SWA. DCMA Southwest Asia personnel did not have the proper training and certification for contingency contracting positions in SWA. Specifically, of the 221 DCMA personnel training records reviewed from a universe of 1,170 from FY 2004 through FY 2009: 103 DCMA personnel were not fully qualified for the position occupied, and 57 quality assurance representatives did not have or could not produce proof of Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act certification. In addition, of the 75 position descriptions DCMA provided, 30 position descriptions were either incorrect or did not have a requirement for certification. What We Recommend The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) review quarterly DCMA Southwest Asia acquisition workforce requirements and reduce the grace period to obtain required certifications to 6-months for contingency operations. The Director, DCMA, define acquisition workforce requirements for Southwest Asia, review and update personnel training records to ensure candidates possess required training and certification before deployment on contingency operations. Management Comments and Our Response The Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, responded for USD(AT&L) and the Director, DCMA. His comments were generally responsive. Based on the Director s comments, we revised the recommendation on the grace period to obtain required certifications for personnel assigned to support contingency operations from 24 months to 6 months. We request further comments from the USD(AT&L) on the revised recommendation. His comments also noted that four recommendations had been or would be implemented in December 2009 or January We request that the Director, DCMA, provide verification that two of the agreed-to recommendations have been implemented or provide specific date(s) when the recommended actions will be completed. i

6 Report No. D (Project No. D2008-D000AB ) April 8, 2010 Recommendations Table Management Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Recommendations Requiring Comment B.1. No Additional Comments Required A.1.a, A.1.b Director, DCMA A.2., B.2.b B.2.a, B.2.c, B.2.d Please provide comments by May 10, ii

7 Table of Contents Introduction 1 Objectives Background Review of Internal Controls Finding A. Acquisition Workforce Requirements 5 Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response 9 Finding B. Defense Contract Management Agency Workforce Qualifications 12 Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response 18 Appendices A. Scope and Methodology 22 B. Prior Coverage 23 C. Gansler Commission Report Recommendations 25 D. Sample Methodology 28 E. Administrative Contracting Officers in Southwest Asia 29 Management Comments Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 30

8 Introduction Objectives The overall objective of this audit was to determine Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) requirements to support Southwest Asia (SWA) contracting operations and the number of available DCMA civilian, military, foreign national, and support contractors supporting the operations. Specifically, we determined whether DCMA identified its requirements to support SWA contracting operations. In addition, we evaluated whether the DCMA acquisition workforce for SWA was adequately trained and certified. Background DOD Criteria DOD Instruction , Reporting Management Information on DOD Military and Civilian Acquisition Personnel and Positions, November 1, 1991, established a management information system capable of providing standardized information on acquisition positions and on persons serving in acquisition positions. In addition, the instruction attempts to create a DOD-wide capability for monitoring, reporting, and tracking the composition, education, experience, and training status of the acquisition workforce and to establish uniform procedures for submitting manpower, personnel, and assignment information on selected DOD acquisition workforce civilian and military personnel. The instruction also establishes procedures for reporting functional and training-related data on selected DOD civilian and military personnel to evaluate the mandatory training requirements and status of the acquisition workforce. DOD Manual M, Acquisition Career Development Program, November 1995, established the DOD Acquisition Career Development Program. The manual includes procedures for effective career development of the acquisition workforce in the Department of Defense and incorporates the requirements of section 1746, title 10, United States Code. The program establishes experience, education, and training standards for specific acquisition workforce position categories and career fields, provides for certification guidelines of acquisition workforce members, and provides career paths for the acquisition workforce. DOD Instruction , Operation of the Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Workforce Education, Training, and Career Development Program, December 21, 2005, replaced DOD Manual M. The instruction provides revised uniform guidance for managing acquisition workforce positions and career development. DCMA DCMA is the DOD Component that works directly with Defense suppliers to help ensure that DOD, Federal, and allied Government supplies and services are delivered on time, at 1

9 projected cost, and meet all performance requirements. DCMA directly contributes to the military readiness of the United States and its allies, and helps preserve the nation s freedom. DCMA professionals serve as information brokers and in-plant representatives for military, Federal, and allied Government buying agencies during the initial stages of the acquisition cycle and throughout the life of the resulting contracts. DCMA provides contract administration services to the DOD acquisition enterprise and its partners to ensure the delivery of quality products and services to the warfighter. DCMA reported that its civilian staffing decreased from 19,403 full-time equivalents as of October 1, 1992, to 9,423 as of December 31, 2008 (a 51 percent decrease). DCMA military staffing decreased from 570 on January 1, 2003, to 542 as of December 31, From October 1, 1999 through December 31, 2008, the number of DCMAadministered contracts increased from 309,000 to 321,000, while the obligated value of those contracts increased from $866 billion to $1.3 trillion (50 percent increase). Conversely, during the same period the number of contractors administered by DCMA decreased from 18,600 to 18,500. DCMA International DCMA International is one of six DCMA product divisions. As of July 2009, DCMA International was staffed with more than 500 civilian and military personnel in 26 countries performing contract administration, business, and performance oversight of more than 10,000 contracts valued in excess of $8 billion dollars. 1 DCMA International is also responsible for DCMA s contingency contracting administrative mission in direct support of the overseas contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DCMA Combat Support Center The DCMA Combat Support Center (a component of DCMA Headquarters) performs critical communications and emergency planning for all actions and events that affect Defense contractors. Its two major roles are to be a central communication and integration link between DCMA, the Joint Staff, and the field activities; and to establish the policy for how DCMA is to perform as a stand-alone combat support agency. As of July 2009, the Combat Support Center was staffed with 34 civilian and military personnel. Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan The Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC I/A) provides contracting support of supplies, services, and construction in a manner that directly supports the operational Coalition Forces mission in the relief and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. An October 19, 2007, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) memorandum required that upon award of any 1 DCMA officials stated that the $8 billion does not include the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) because the prime contract management office captures the value of LOGCAP contract actions. 2

10 contract, the DOD procuring contracting officer assigns contract administration to the JCC I/A for the portion of the contract relating to Iraq or Afghanistan. An October 25, 2007, Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy memorandum required that DOD procuring contracting officers assign contract administration to the JCC I/A to oversee contractor compliance with policies, directives, and contract terms and conditions. The memorandum also directed the JCC I/A to reassign all other Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 42, Contract Administration and Audit Services, contract administration responsibilities to DCMA or a similar organization with relevant contract administration capabilities. Memorandum of Agreement On April 30, 2008, the Commander, JCC I/A, and the Director, DCMA, signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) documenting the mutually agreed to Concept of Operations between JCC I/A and DCMA for the execution of the Theater-Wide Contract Administration (TWCA) mission. The MOA outlined the procedures for the delegation of contract administration to DCMA. The MOA noted that after the procuring contracting officer delegates contract administration to the JCC I/A, a JCC I/A operations officer would notify a DCMA theater-wide administrative contracting officer through a delegation letter of JCC I/A intention to re-delegate contract administration to DCMA. In the MOA, DCMA agreed to administer contracts including armed security, translator, and interpreter contracts; hazardous materials contracts; and foreign military sales contracts. DCMA also agreed to perform multiple contract administration activities including Government property administration support, commodity-specific quality assurance support, and material surveillance and receipt inspections on high-risk items such as ammunition. Contract actions subject to DCMA administration included theater-wide indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity and blanket purchase agreement actions, and regional contracting centers indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity and blanket purchase agreement actions with multiple payments. Contracts not generally delegated to DCMA under the agreement included simple commodity contracts, commodity contracts, and service contracts under the simplified acquisition threshold; and regional contracting centers indefinite-delivery, indefinitequantity and blanket purchase agreements with orders requiring only one delivery. In accordance with the MOA, DCMA will not accept delegation of construction contracts. In the event of a disagreement on actions to be delegated, the MOA established a joint resolution board, consisting of JCC I/A and DCMA personnel, to discuss the issues and determine what actions will be performed and by whom. JCC I/A Contract Actions Delegated to DCMA According to DCMA, the total value of all contracts delegated to JCC I/A during FY 2008 was $7.5 billion encompassing 41,125 contract actions. During FY 2008, DCMA accepted TWCA delegations from JCC I/A of 756 contract actions valued at $6.6 billion. 3

11 JCC I/A delegates approximately 2 percent of its workload and 88 percent of its contract dollar value to DCMA. 2 Review of Internal Controls DOD Instruction , Managers Internal Control (MIC) Program Procedures, January 4, 2006, requires DOD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. We identified internal control weaknesses for DCMA. DCMA officials did not establish adequate internal controls to define its acquisition workforce requirements to support contracting operations in SWA or ensure that the acquisition workforce personnel for those operations were appropriately trained and Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certified. Implementing recommendations in Findings A and B will improve internal control deficiencies identified in this report. A copy of this report will be provided to the senior official responsible for internal controls in DCMA and in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 2 DCMA officials provided the amount; however, we did not validate the data as it was not within the scope of our audit. 4

12 Finding A. Acquisition Workforce Requirements DCMA could not determine its resource requirements for contractor oversight and contract administration in SWA. This occurred because: DCMA is reactive rather than proactive in assuming its role to provide contractor oversight and contract administration in SWA, DCMA did not define its acquisition workforce requirements to support contracting operations in SWA, AT&L does not require Defense agencies to document acquisition workforce requirements, and DCMA must be delegated contractor oversight and contract administration responsibility for work in SWA. As a result, DCMA is at high risk for not meeting its mission requirements in SWA to support overseas contracting operations. Also, the constant turnover of DCMA staff and lack of written plans results in gaps in the contractor oversight process. DCMA Acquisition Workforce in Southwest Asia We requested that DCMA document the number of DCMA civilian, military, foreign national, and support contractors supporting SWA operations. As of May 2009, the DCMA SWA Acquisition Workforce included 268 military and civilian full-time equivalent personnel. DCMA officials noted that DCMA requested and received FY 2008 and 2009 funding from the Office of the USD(AT&L) to support DCMA emergency-essential contingency support positions on a continuing basis. DCMA reported no contractor or foreign national personnel as part of its acquisition workforce. DCMA officials stated that contractor and foreign national personnel are not performing FAR Part 42 contract administration functions in SWA. DCMA officials also stated that DCMA does not (nor is required to) report the number of contractor and foreign national personnel in the acquisition workforce. However, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract requires contractor personnel to perform contract administration functions. As a result, an unknown number of contractor and foreign national personnel may be supplementing the contract administration workforce. DCMA personnel admitted that they have no model or method for determining the optimum SWA workforce. DCMA Contract Administration of LOGCAP Contract The Army awarded the LOGCAP III contract to Kellogg, Brown, and Root in 2001 and delegated the responsibility of managing the LOGCAP III contract to DCMA in August Although DCMA was delegated contract administration authority for the LOGCAP III contract, DCMA relied on the prime contractor to perform quality assurance, inspections, and repair in those facilities. DOD Inspector General (IG) Report 5

13 No. IE , Review of Electrocution Deaths in Iraq: Part I Electrocution of Staff Sergeant Ryan D. Maseth, U.S. Army, July 24, 2009, found that the prime contractor did not advise DCMA of electrical deficiencies in facilities that soldiers and contractors occupied. As a result, one service member died in those facilities due to faulty electrical wiring and improperly grounded electrical equipment. The report stated that the Government in good faith relied upon the contractor to provide qualified people to do the work as part of the workmanlike standard and quality provisions provided for under the terms of the contract. In addition, the report stated that LOGCAP III Support Unit contracting officer acceptance of prime contractor assumptions during contract negotiations resulted in a false perception that buildings and peripheral equipment were in acceptable condition during the transfer of Radwaniyah Palace Complex facility operations and maintenance to LOGCAP III. The U.S. Army Sustainment Command awarded contract W52P1J-07-D-0010 on February 16, 2007, to support the LOGCAP oversight duties in performing contingency operations in SWA. DCMA officials stated they were responsible for administering contract W52P1J-07-D DCMA officials also stated that the W52P1J-07-D-0010 prime contractor was not performing FAR Part 42 contract administration functions; rather, the prime contractor was performing contract administration over the actions of W52P1J-07-D-0010 subcontractors. DCMA officials noted that the prime contractor kept them informed of their work on the contract. Furthermore, contract W52P1J-07-D clearly stated the prime contractor was to perform contract administration. We concluded that DCMA officials did not consider the prime contractor s work to be FAR Part 42 contract administration functions, nor did they consider contractor personnel to be part of the acquisition workforce. We plan to perform a follow-on audit of this contract during FY Resource Requirements for Contractor Oversight and Contract Administration DCMA could not determine its resource requirements for contractor oversight and contract administration in SWA because DCMA is reactive rather than proactive and it had no defined workforce requirements. In addition, DCMA does not have contract oversight authority unless or until it receives a delegation of contract administration from the contracting authority. DOD IG Report D , Challenges Impacting Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom Reported by Major Oversight Organizations Beginning FY 2003 through FY 2007, July 18, 2008, stated that DOD continues to face long-standing problems including: lack of adequate contract oversight personnel, limited visibility over contractors and contractor activity, and limited collection and sharing of institutional knowledge. The lack of personnel to perform contractor oversight was more severe for demanding contracting environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Without an adequate number of 6

14 personnel to perform oversight of the contractors, DOD increases its risks that contractors are not meeting contract requirements. 3 Acquisition Workforce Planning DCMA officials stated that they are reactive rather than proactive in supporting SWA contract operations because the contract workload guides their acquisition workforce planning requirements. DCMA officials also stated that they cannot plan ahead for the number of personnel needed in SWA to support contracting operations because they do not know what the contract workload will require in acquisition workforce personnel over the next 6 months. If the Office of the USD(AT&L), JCC I/A, and DCMA do not plan on at least a quarterly basis to support contracting operations in SWA, they risk acquisition workforce personnel shortages and may not be able to provide continuous contract oversight and administration. Acquisition Workforce Requirements DCMA officials did not define their acquisition workforce requirements to support contracting operations in SWA. DCMA officials also noted there is no mathematical model to determine how many personnel are needed to support contracting operations. The DCMA SWA field commanders generate requirements for additional personnel through an to DCMA International. DCMA International validates the requirement for additional personnel. After verification, the DCMA Combat Support Center fills the requirement and within 90 days personnel are deployed for 6 months to support contracting operations in SWA. DCMA officials noted that all notifications for additional personnel are generated through . Requirements to Document Acquisition Workforce DCMA officials stated that they have no acquisition workforce plan and there was no DOD guidance that required DCMA to formally define its workforce requirements. We reviewed DOD policy and guidance and found no existing criteria that require Defense agencies to document acquisition workforce requirements. However, without a plan that realistically accounts for the ongoing and future workload and the workforce needed, DCMA cannot effectively transfer knowledge of the many programs it oversees to its highly transitory acquisition workforce or oversee the programs. AT&L should provide guidance requiring Defense agencies to document their acquisition workforce requirements. Delegation Letters DCMA officials stated that they have no authority to perform work on a contract until they receive a JCC I/A delegation letter. The JCC I/A delegation letters guide the DCMA acquisition workforce requirements to support contracting operations in SWA. However, JCC I/A has taken several months to notify DCMA in a delegation letter to provide 3 Also noted in GAO Report No. GAO , Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-Standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, December

15 contract administration functions. For example, a February 27, 2008, JCC I/A delegation letter to DCMA to perform contract administration functions covering security and translator contracts was for a contract with a start date of April 26, Another contract under the same delegation letter had a start date of October 1, Therefore, DCMA may not have contract oversight and administration over a contract until several months after the start date. Meeting DCMA Mission Requirements DCMA may be unable to meet its mission requirements in SWA to support overseas contracting operations. See Appendix C for a detailed discussion of the Gansler Commission Report recommendations and subsequent DoD actions. The constant turnover of DCMA staff and lack of written documentation inhibits continuity of operations and effective knowledge transfer within the acquisition workforce. Planning documentation would provide assurance that DOD assets are safeguarded from fraud, waste, and abuse, and ensure that the warfighter is not adversely impacted due to lack of oversight. In June 2009, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan 4 issued an interim report to Congress, At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report noted that DCMA was responsible for applying a uniform set of oversight procedures to ensure that DOD contractors are held accountable for failure to comply with laws, regulations, and contract terms and conditions. The Commission noted that inadequate oversight, combined with poorly written statements of work, lack of competition, and contractor inefficiencies have contributed to billions of dollars in wasteful spending. The Commission noted that the lack of Government subject matter experts allowed safety hazards and contractor inefficiencies to go undetected. The Commission noted that DCMA should be staffed with additional administrative contracting officers and quality assurance representatives. The Commission also noted that the scarcity of property administrators would impede management of the vast amount of material in theater. Further, the lack of trained and experienced Government oversight personnel, such as quality assurance representatives, greatly increases the risk of contractors failing to properly execute the terms and conditions of the contract. Management Corrective Actions In March 2009, the Director, DCMA, announced that senior leadership had agreed on the key elements of a strategic plan, finalized plans for a functional alignment, and identified the following priorities that DCMA must focus on: grow and retool the Agency workforce through an intern program and increase emphasis on external recruitment and internal development; 4 In 2008, Congress established the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan in response to increasing indications of widespread waste, fraud, and abuse in Government contracting. 8

16 develop and assess functional skills requirements needed to renew workforce competence in core processes starting with contracting, quality, and engineering; and establish policy infrastructure, define policy structure, and promulgate policy and process guidance. As of July 2009, DCMA had established a team to develop a detailed Concept of Operations for its planned realignment. In August 2009, DCMA published a strategic plan for FY 2009 through FY Conclusion DCMA can not readily identify what resources it needs to provide contract oversight and contract administration in SWA because it must rely on receiving a delegation letter from the JCC I/A before determining the number of personnel that will be needed. AT&L needs to provide guidance to help Military Departments and Defense agencies identify acquisition workforce requirements. DCMA needs to define requirements for its civilian and military acquisition workforce to support contracting operations in SWA and ensure continuous contractor oversight and contract administration. In a Defense AT&L interview, Taking DoD Contracting From Good to Great, May-June 2009, the Director, DCMA stated that human capital staff members have been diligently working on creating an updated Strategic Human Capital Plan focused on creating a vision for the DCMA workforce of the future. The plan would focus on building and managing an acquisition workforce that can meet current and future needs. The Director also stated that DCMA would use workforce development funds to grow its workforce and DCMA had assessed the current skills and competencies of the agency as well as future requirements identified by its customers to determine the agency s personnel shortfalls. Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response A.1. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics: a. Revise DOD Instruction , Operation of the Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Workforce, Education, Training, and Career Development Program, December 21, 2005, to require Defense agencies to develop guidance to identify acquisition workforce requirements including the number of military and civilian personnel needed to support their acquisition and contracting operations. Management Comments The Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, responding for the Office of the USD(AT&L), agreed with the intent of a draft report recommendation to revise DOD 9

17 Instruction However, the Director stated that DOD Instruction was being cancelled and that DOD Instruction would instead be revised to require Military Departments and Defense agencies to develop guidance to identify acquisition, technology, and logistics workforce requirements in accordance with DOD Instruction , volume 250, Civilian Strategic Human Capital Planning; DOD Instruction , Guidance for Determining Workforce Mix; and DOD Financial Management Regulation R, volume 2B, chapter 19. The Director noted that the revised DOD Instruction would be completed by June 30, Our Response The Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, comments were responsive. No additional comments are required. b. Perform quarterly reviews of the Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan requirements of the Defense Contract Management Agency s Southwest Asia acquisition workforce. Management Comments The Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, responding for the Office of the USD(AT&L), agreed, stating that the Office of the USD(AT&L) will ensure that DCMA executes these reviews to determine the appropriate DCMA manning level needed to support Contingency Contracting Administration Services (CCAS). However, DCMA should not be performing these quarterly reviews in place of the U.S. Central Command. The Director noted that DCMA is responsible for providing CCAS support to the U.S. Central Command, and the U.S. Central Command is responsible for giving DCMA authoritative direction regarding U.S. Central Command s CCAS requirements to support its military operations. The Director stated that DCMA then provides by-name reporting of deployed personnel to U.S. Central Command on at least a quarterly basis. The Director also noted that the Office of the USD(AT&L) formed and conducted a separate joint working group and senior leadership management oversight team to discuss the DCMA CCAS role and responsibilities and the Services future role in CCAS. Our Response The Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required. A.2. We recommend that the Director, Defense Contract Management Agency, develop a written plan within 90 days from the date of this report defining civilian and military acquisition workforce requirements needed to support contracting operations in Southwest Asia. Management Comments The Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, responding for the Director, DCMA, agreed, stating that although DCMA lacked a documented policy, DCMA 10

18 collaborated with organizations providing contract delegations and performed resource requirements analyses in a dynamic contracting support atmosphere. In addition, the Director stated that DCMA has continuously refined its military and civilian human capital resource plan and requirements to ensure that it deploys qualified personnel and meets its delegated theater contract oversight support obligations. The Director noted that DCMA prepared a draft CCAS concept of operations that provides a concept for executing the CCAS mission. However, the Director stated that the specific skill sets and staffing structure required for the CCAS mission is situation-dependent, mission-focused, and warfighter-requirements driven. The Director noted that DCMA will continue to use its existing contract receipt and review process to identify and define the required military and civilian acquisition workforce requirements to support delegated acquisition support operations in SWA and that DCMA has proactively integrated itself with the theater leadership command structure to identify, define, and help focus future workload requirements. The Director noted that once the concept of operations is published, DCMA will be in compliance with the intent of Recommendation A.2 to establish written procedures that define civilian and military acquisition workforce requirements needed to support current and future CCAS missions. The Director also noted that DCMA will review the current (draft) concept of operations to ensure that the intent of the recommendation is addressed. The Director stated the DCMA review would be completed by January 15, Our Response The Director s comments were partially responsive. In subsequent discussions, DCMA management agreed that the January 15, 2010 date to develop a written plan defining civilian and military acquisition workforce requirements to support SWA operations had not been met, and that DCMA was in the process of adjusting the completion date. We request that Director, DCMA, provide verification or a date when the recommended action will be completed. 11

19 Finding B. Defense Contract Management Agency Workforce Qualifications DCMA SWA personnel did not have the proper training and certification for contingency contracting positions in SWA. Specifically, of the 221 DCMA personnel training records for FY 2004 through FY 2009 reviewed from a universe of 1,170 personnel deployed to SWA: 103 DCMA personnel were not fully qualified for the position occupied, and 57 quality assurance representatives (QAR) supporting contingency contracting operations did not have or could not produce proof of DAWIA certification. In addition, of the 75 position descriptions DCMA provided, 30 position descriptions used to support contingency contract operations did not have proper DAWIA certification levels or contain any requirement for certification. The lack of fully trained personnel in SWA occurred because: DOD guidance allows 24 months for an individual assigned to a designated position to meet the training and certification requirements even though the typical assignment in SWA is only 6 months, DCMA combat support personnel did not verify applicants work experience and DAWIA certification before offering or allowing individuals to accept an assignment in SWA when the applicants did not require a warrant, and the DCMA acquisition workforce in SWA is transitory. As a result, a major part of the DCMA workforce deployed to SWA was not qualified to support contracting operations in SWA, putting the Government at higher risk for fraud, waste, and abuse, and the warfighter at higher risk for injury. Acquisition Workforce Training and Certification Criteria Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act The 1990 Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) (section , title 10, United States Code) was enacted to improve the effectiveness of the civilian and military acquisition workforce through enhanced education, training, and career development, and thereby improve the acquisition process. DAWIA requires DOD to establish career paths for those people who want to pursue careers in acquisition. DOD Training and Certification Guidance DOD Instruction designates and identifies: AT&L positions; position requirements; maintenance of competencies through education, training, and experience; management of the Defense Acquisition Corps; 12

20 selection and placement of personnel in acquisition positions; and workforce metrics. Section 4 states:... the primary objective of the AT&L Workforce Education, Training, and Career Development Program is to create a professional, agile and motivated workforce that consistently makes smart business decisions, acts in an ethical manner, and delivers timely and affordable capabilities to the warfighter. Section E2.2.7 defines certification, and section E describes the various levels of certification. Certification recognizes the level to which a member of the AT&L Workforce has achieved functional and core acquisition competencies required by a specific career field. DOD Components certify members of the AT&L Workforce using the uniform DOD certification standards.... These functional and core acquisition competencies have been divided into three levels: basic (Level I); intermediate (Level II) and advanced (Level III). DCMA Southwest Asia Workforce Training and Certification DCMA SWA personnel did not have the proper training and certification for contingency contracting positions in SWA. The DCMA workforce supporting contracting in SWA is composed of five major positions, 5 which consists of the commander, contract administrator, property administrator, administrative contracting officer, and the quality assurance representative. Civilian and military personnel from various occupational series fill these positions. DCMA Training and Certification Levels Certification is a means of determining whether personnel are properly trained and qualified for a specific job. The DAWIA certification process includes basic or core competencies that acquisition workforce personnel must complete and also includes functional competencies tailored to specific career fields. The basic, core, and functional competencies include the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to facilitate business decisions to support DOD in delivering goods and services to the warfighter. A person in an acquisition workforce position is expected to possess the competencies to perform in their current assignment and develop their potential for career progression. DCMA adopted the training and certification levels established in the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Career Field Certification and Core Plus Development Guides for its 5 Contracting officer representatives and contracting officer technical representatives are provided by the Military Service and not assigned to the DCMA acquisition workforce. 13

21 acquisitio n workforce. Ther e i s a guid e fo r eac h caree r fiel d a t eac h level : Leve l 1 (Entry), Leve l I I (Intermediate), an d Leve l II I (Advanced). Eac h guid e i s als o divide d int o a t leas t fou r majo r sections : Type s o f Assignments, Cor e Certificatio n Standards, Uniqu e Positio n Trainin g Standards, an d Cor e Plu s Developmen t Guide. Althoug h DA U ha s develope d a curriculu m t o mee t DAWI A requirement s an d provide s specialize d trainin g fo r contingenc y operations, i t doe s no t gran t DAWI A certification. T o achiev e certification, a membe r o f th e acquisitio n workforc e mus t mee t cor e acquisitio n training, functiona l training, education, an d experienc e standard s befor e applyin g fo r certificatio n throug h hi s o r he r DO D Componen t processes. Member s o f th e acquisitio n workforc e hav e 2 4 month s fro m th e tim e the y assum e a n acquisitio n positio n t o mee t thes e standards. DCMA Workforce Qualification and Certification DCM A di d no t consistentl y ensur e tha t individual s wer e full y qualifie d an d certifie d fo r thei r jo b series. Similarly, th e DCM A Comba t Suppor t Cente r di d no t alway s re-evaluat e qualification s befor e assignin g thes e sam e individual s t o contingenc y contractin g vacancie s i n SWA. W e wer e abl e t o determin e tha t 10 3 o f th e 22 1 personne l record s tha t w e reviewe d di d no t hav e an y o r ha d inadequat e documentatio n o f trainin g o r certificatio n a s summarize d i n Tabl e 2 below. Se e Appendi x D fo r a detaile d discussio n o f th e sampl e methodology. Tabl e 2. Result s o f Sample d Personne l Record s Reviewe d AC O administrativ e contractin g office r Admi n administratio n suppor t C A contrac t administrato r C O commande r OP S operation s suppor t P A propert y administrato r QA R qualit y assuranc e representativ e DCM A QA R Position s i n Southwes t Asi a W e compare d 8 1 QA R position s i n SW A wit h 2 8 DCM A QA R positio n description s fo r SWA. Thos e positio n description s describ e th e dutie s o f th e positio n an d th e leve l o f experienc e desire d an d required. Fo r 2 1 o f th e 2 8 QA R positio n descriptions, DCM A di d 1 4 Sample Categories QAR ACO CO CA OPS PA Admin Total No documentation Inadequate certification for position No certification 3 3 Subtotal Sufficient documentation No certification required Total

22 not list a requirement for a specific DAWIA certification level. DAWIA Level II certification was the minimum requirement for the remaining seven position descriptions. The lack of consistency with regard to position certification levels may contribute to a DCMA SWA acquisition workforce staffed with personnel not fully qualified to occupy certain positions. At the request of DCMA officials, we performed a trend analysis to determine whether DCMA was improving from one year to another in eliminating the number of training and certification deficiencies of personnel used to fill its acquisition workforce positions in SWA and, in particular, the QAR positions from FY 2004 to FY DCMA officials stated that policies implemented in FY 2007 had improved procedures for filling these vacancies. 6 Our analysis confirmed that the number of deficiencies in FY 2007 had decreased but in FY 2008, the deficiencies had again increased as shown in the figure. In the first quarter of FY 2009, the number of QAR deficiencies was higher than the total number of deficiencies reported in FY Training and Certification Deficiencies Deficiencies All QAR Deployments DCMA Position Descriptions DOD Instruction states that the heads of DOD Components must design policies and processes to ensure that the best qualified persons are selected for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics positions. The position descriptions are significant tools used to hire a person that possesses the desired skills to perform specific duties. Therefore, the position descriptions should be complete, accurate, and correspond with DAU guidance. 6 Our analysis covered the first quarter of FY 2004 through the first quarter of FY In FY 2007, we identified 6 QAR deficiencies out of 11 total deficiencies. For the lst quarter of FY 2009, we identified 8 QAR deficiencies out of 11 total deficiencies. 15

23 However, of the 75 DCMA SWA-related position descriptions we reviewed, 30 did not contain all of the elements for the specific certification level as outlined in the Career Field Certification and Core Plus Development Guides. Contrary to DAU guidance, 17 position descriptions did not specify a certification requirement. DOD Guidance and Filling Southwest Asia Vacancies The lack of DCMA personnel with appropriate certifications in SWA occurred because: DOD guidance allows an incumbent 24 months to meet the training and certification requirements, DCMA officials did not verify the work experience and DAWIA certification of applicants not requiring a warrant before offering or allowing an individual to accept an assignment in SWA, and the DCMA acquisition workforce is transitory. 24-Month Exception DOD Instruction allows an individual assigned to a designated position 24 months to meet the training and certification requirements even though the typical assignment in SWA is only 6 months. DOD Components are responsible for ensuring that individuals have met the requisite competencies to attain certification requirements in a timely manner. The core competency areas are: acquisition training, functional training, education standards, and experience standards. An individual must meet all these elements before applying for a certification through the respective DOD Component or organization. When an individual is placed in an acquisition workforce position, the organization must either document that the appropriate training has been acquired and that the certification level has been met or establish a plan for these requirements to be accomplished in 24 months. DCMA Process to Fill Vacancies in Southwest Asia DCMA Combat Support personnel did not verify the work experience and DAWIA certification of applicants not requiring a warrant before offering or allowing an individual to accept an assignment in SWA. The DCMA Deputy Director, Combat Support Center, stated that when he received a request to fill a billet in SWA, he did not always verify that the selected individual possessed the appropriate training and certification before assigning the individual to the position. DCMA officials stated that the process for filling those positions varied according to the position itself. According to the Deputy Director, the process for filling an administrative contracting officer (ACO) position was to select a candidate from the lists of volunteers, request the warrant package from DCMA headquarters, and ensure the person met all the necessary criteria to be warranted. This was done carefully by DCMA personnel because a person with a warrant can administer and oversee Government contracts. According to the Deputy Director, the selection process for other SWA positions was not as thorough. For example, when a QAR position was filled, there was no additional verification of the candidate s qualifications. As a result, for the 81 QARs we reviewed 16

24 that supported contingency contracting operations during FY 2004 through FY 2009, DCMA did not have or could not produce proof of DAWIA certification for 57. Consequently, DCMA had no assurance those personnel were qualified to perform their duties effectively. DCMA QARs in SWA are typically the Government liaison responsible for facilitating interaction and coordination between Military organizations, other Government agencies, and prime/sub-contractor management on QAR issues. DCMA QARs are considered part of the DOD Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics workforce (which is defined as those individuals who occupy AT&L positions in the DOD). The QARs deployed to SWA provide a wide range of contract management services within a harsh environment. These services include developing quality assurance surveillance plans, implementing and assessing the effectiveness of the contractor performance, and overseeing the surveillance activities of the contract officer representatives. Even though ACO duties and responsibilities vary slightly by region and assignment, the main focus of an ACO is to administer, monitor, and perform contract oversight that is critical to the warfighter in a contingency environment. See Appendix E for more information on the duties of the ACOs in SWA. Similarly, the warfighter is relying on the QARs to provide the same level of support, and these individuals should be highly trained and skilled. Transitory Acquisition Workforce DCMA does not use permanent billets for SWA operations. Rather, DCMA officials stated that SWA personnel are deployed for 6-month temporary duty assignments in support of contracting operations. The DCMA acquisition workforce in SWA is transitory and changes every month with personnel arriving and departing when their 6 month temporary deployment has expired. In addition, 30 to 45 percent of DCMA International s civilian workforce leaves the agency every year. We believe a transitory acquisition workforce increases the risk of inconsistent contract oversight and administration. DCMA has made recent efforts to take into account knowledge management for its SWA operations. For example, on August 29, 2009, the Commander, DCMA Northern Iraq, established a template for an econtinuity book as a reference for DCMA Northern Iraq personnel to share relevant information concerning duty positions. The template includes information such as points of contact, duties and responsibilities, how to accomplish common tasks, document examples, equipment information, and the status of work in progress. Development and continuation of a revised DCMA approach to knowledge management for its transitory acquisition workforce is needed to reduce the risk that DCMA will not be able to ensure continuity of SWA contracting operations. Conclusion DCMA did not ensure that its workforce in SWA had the proper training and certification to provide contract management and oversight in a contingency operation. In our sample, 17