WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED

Transcription

1 Philosophical Studies (2005) 125: Springer 2005 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED ABSTRACT. This paper gives an up-to-date account of we-intentions and responds to some critics of the author s earlier work on the topic in question. While the main lines of the new account are basically the same as before, the present account considerably adds to the earlier work. For one thing, it shows how we-intentions and joint intentions can arise in terms of the so-called Bulletin Board View of joint intention acquisition, which relies heavily on some underlying mutually accepted conceptual and situational presuppositions but does not require agreement making or joint intention to form a joint intention. The model yields categorical, unconditional intentions to participate in the content of the we-intention and joint intention (viz. shared we-intention upon analysis). The content of a we-intention can be, but need not be a joint action. Thus a participant alone cannot settle and control the content of the intention. Instead the participants jointly settle the content and control the satisfaction of the intention. These and some other features distinguish we-intentions from action intentions, viz. intentions that an agent can alone settle and satisfy. The paper discusses weintentions (and other aim-intentions ) from this perspective and it also defends the author s earlier account against a charge of vicious circularity that has been directed against it. I. INTRODUCTION You and I may share the plan to carry a heavy table jointly upstairs and realize this plan. In this case we both can be said to have the joint intention jointly to carry the table upstairs: the content of the intention here involves our performing something together and the pronoun we of course refers to us, viz. you and me together. In my earlier work I have often taken joint intentions to be expressible by means of locutions like We will do X, where the word will is used conatively (rather than predictively, in the future tense) and X is a joint action type (cf. Tuomela, 1984, 1995, 2000a, b; Tuomela and Miller, 1988). However, as joint intentions can also have other contents, I will in this paper speak of the jointly intending agents jointly seeing to it (jstit) that a state or event obtains. They can thus

2 328 jointly see to it that they jointly build a house, that one of them builds it, or that some outsiders are hired to do the job, and so on. I have chosen jstit as my umbrella term as it covers many kinds of activities e.g. jointly performing actions in a direct or in an indirect sense, jointly bringing about states, jointly maintaining states, and so on (cf. Sandu and Tuomela, 1996; Belnap et al., 2001). Notice however, that in the context of joint intention the actions in question can be of various kinds, as just mentioned, and they can be nonequivalent (e.g. jstit does not entail direct performance nor is the converse true). I take jstit to be a necessarily intentional notion. This fits well with its appearance in the content of joint intention as one cannot non-intentionally satisfy an intention. For some agents jointly to perform an action there must of course logically be an opportunity for them to do it. Thus they cannot open a window if it is already open. Let us call the state of the world where the window is open the result state of the action of opening the window. Seeing to it that the window is open expresses intentional control over the state of the window s being open and requires success (viz., the agents have not seen to it that the window is open unless it is open). The following cases of intentional activity fall under an agent s seeing to it that the window is open: The agent opens the window (by his own direct actions), if it is closed; he keeps it open, if some other agent or something else tries to close it; the agent gets some other agent to open the window, if it is closed; he refrains from preventing another agent from opening the window (see Sandu and Tuomela, 1996; also cf. Belnap et al., 2001, for stit and jstit.) The content of a joint intention has, as it were, two parts. In the case of single-agent intention I take the intention to have the form A intends, by his actions, to perform X or A intends, by his actions, to see to it that X. Analogously with this, we have corresponding to the second alternative in the case of joint agency (here the dyadic case) A and B jointly intend by their actions to perform joint action X or A and B jointly intend to see to it jointly that X (or, from theirperspective, Wewillperform X together ). Accordingly, I suggest that we take the joint intention now to be about jstiting something. This could be also called the first part of the content of the joint intention. What is to be jstited constitutes the second,

3 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 329 variable part of the content, and this part need not be performed as a joint action. The first part is the same in all joint intentions. It indicates that the joint intention is oriented towards joint action. We can add that jstiting involves that each participant of joint intention is in principle actionally involved: he has a share or part in the participants jstiting that X. I accordingly claim that the structure of the joint intention here can be expressed by the following in the dyadic case: Agents A and B jointly intend to see to it jointly that X. Here X can be the participants joint action, somebody else s action, some other agents joint action, a state in the world (like that a house is painted or the window is open). Consider the special but central case in which X is a joint action to be performed by A and B. Then my formula becomes, using jstit for joint action allover: A and B jointly intend to see to it jointly that they jstit X, which due to the collapsing property of jstit amounts simply to A and B jointly intend to see to it jointly that X. All intentions are necessarily related to one s own actions. This applies also to joint intentions. In the single-agent case, an agent may intend to see to it that his car is fixed. This intention has as its satisfaction condition that the agent by his own actions sees to it that his car becomes fixed e.g. he can get a mechanic to fix the car or fix it himself. Similarly, in the case of joint intention with the jstit content the participants have to see to it jointly by their actions that the intended state or event comes about. If the intention concerns the direct performance of an action (e.g. when an agent intends to open the window) the agent must himself bring about the satisfaction solely by his own action. This kind of intention I will call (direct) action intention. A minimal rationality condition for an action intention, at least a prior intention, is that the agent must at least lack the belief that it is impossible for him to perform the action. Assuming that at least a prior or future-directed intention involves commitment to the content of the intention, we can ground the previous claim by saying that if he would not so believe it would be pointless for him to commit himself to his task. An action intention contrasts with an aim-intention. In the latter case it is not required that the agent believes that he with some likelihood can alone bring about or see to it that the action or its result event comes about. The kind of aim-intention that will

4 330 concern us in the present paper is we-intention. A we-intention is a participant s slice of their joint intention, so to speak. Or the other way round, it can technically be said that a joint intention consists of the participants we-intentions about the existence of which the participants have mutual belief. Even if we assume that a joint intention is (ontologically) composed of the agents we-intentions about which there is mutual knowledge (or belief), these we-intentions are different from ordinary action intentions not only in being aimintentions but also in that they conceptually depend on the joint intention in question. A we-intention is a special kind of aim-intention involving that the agent we-intends to bring about a state jointly with the other participants or we-intends to perform an action jointly with the others or, to use my general formulation, to see to it jointly with the others that a certain state or event comes about. Considering the joint action case where the agents jointly intend to perform a joint action together, the central condition of satisfaction of the we-intention is that the we-intending agent should intend to participate in the joint action in question. That is, he should intend by his own action, his part or share, to contribute to the joint action. Thus the agent s having the we-intention to perform a joint action entails his participation intention, which is an action intention in my terminology. (This matter will be discussed in detail in Section VI.) An obvious rationality constraint on we-intention is that an agent cannot we-intend unless he believes not only that he can perform his part of their joint action X, but also that he together with his fellow participants can perform X jointly (can jstit X with them) at least with some nonzero probability. The jointly intending agents must believe that the jstit opportunities for an intentional jstiting of X are (or will be) there at least with some probability. Yet another property of a we-intention is that in each participant s view it must be mutually believed by the participants that the presuppositions for the (intentional) jstiting of X hold or will hold with some probability. The formation of a joint intention (and hence we-intention, a personal slice of the joint intention) requires that the participants jointly make up their minds to jstit something, thus exercising joint control over the possible courses of action and settling for a particular content of jstiting. The formation of a joint intention (or plan)

5 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 331 is based on their various personal and, especially, joint desires and mutual and other beliefs. In this sense a joint intention can be said to summarize or reflect the motivation underlying joint action. Of course, this final motivation underlying the joint intention need not be anything like an aggregation of private motivations but may instead be a compromise based on discussion, negotiation, or bargaining. In contrast, joint desires and wants do not similarly involve making up one s mind and do not lead to intentional jstiting, to attempts to function rationally in a coordinated way, so as to fulfil the already formed plan; and desires and wants do not require success beliefs as their normal (or normal-rational ) accompaniments. Joint intentions (and hence shared we-intentions) entail collective (or, here equivalently, joint) commitments to action, and this joint commitment also includes that the participants are socially committed to each other to perform their parts of the jstiting. The notions of stiting and jstiting clearly cover more than direct action performance, and this is one reason for employing these notions. Another reason is that they serve to make the structure of joint intention more perspicuous, as seen. Thus they help us to see that joint intentions typically involve not one but two kinds of activity. There is the activity in which the participants see to it that the (second part of the) content comes about and there is the very activity that makes the content obtain. Thus the participants might hire some other agents to build a house. Here the first kind of activity is hiring the agents and monitoring their work; and building the house (performed by the hired agents) is the second kind of activity. Having made these points, I will, however, mostly in this paper speak as if the content of joint intention were a joint action (directly) performed by the jointly intending agents. This is because speaking in terms of jstit becomes rather clumsy. Section II, The Bulletin Board View of Intention Formation, of this paper discusses the conceptual and structural aspects of joint intention formation. While it in part draws on published material, the ideas of this section are extended and deepened later in Section III, We-Intentions and Joint Intentions Analyzed. This section gives a summary account of my theory of joint intention and adds some new aspects to the account. Section IV discusses in more detail the

6 332 epistemic and normative bonds between jointly intending participants. Taken together II IV give an up-to-date theory of joint intention and we-intention. Another central task of this paper is to answer some criticisms directed against my account by Seumas Miller and John Searle. These criticisms relate to the issues of what one really can intend and whether my original (viz and 1988) account of we-intention is viciously circular. These problems are assessed, respectively, in Section V, Collective Ends and We-Intentions, and Section VI, On the Alleged Circularity of the Concept of We-Intention. The concluding section VII summarizes the main achievements of the paper. II. JOINT INTENTION FORMATION In joint-intention formation each participating agent accepts to participate in the participants seeing to it jointly that some state or event X obtains. Concentrating on the central case in which X is a joint action, the agents jointly intend, as a group, to see to it that they perform X jointly. Here each participant accordingly is assumed to intend with a we-perspective together with the others. What does this involve? The agents jointly intend as a group to further the content of the joint intention that they have accepted as the group s intended goal (broadly understood). I have elsewhere used the term we-mode, contrasting with the private or I-mode, to describe the present kind of thinking as a group member or thinking with the weperspective and have offered the following analysis of a we-mode intention (Tuomela, 2002b, p. 30): (WM) Agents A 1,...,A m forming a group, g, share the intention to satisfy a content p (e.g. in our example p = X is jointly performed by the participants) in the we-mode if and only if p is collectively accepted by them qua group members as the content of their collective intention and they are collectively committed to satisfying p for g. Here functioning as a group member entails for our example that the participants function so as to satisfy their shared intention to perform X together (and in more general cases function to further the group s constitutive or main interests, goals, beliefs, and standards). Collective commitment in the joint intention case need not

7 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 333 be stronger than what joint intention conceptually entails: When our agents jointly intend X (e.g. a joint action) they must collectively bind themselves to X and what its satisfaction requires. This I call the instrumental sense of collective commitment. This sense is intention-relative and, strictly speaking, non-normative. (In this sense my non-normative account sides with Bratman and Miller against Margaret Gilbert; see Bratman (1999, p. 125ff.), Miller (1995, p. 64), and Gilbert (1990, p. 6f.).) In all, the we-mode in the case of joint intention amounts to saying that the participants must have collectively accepted We together will do X (or one of its variants) for their group, and they must have collectively committed themselves to doing X. Here We together will do X applies to each participant, and in the case of a single participant it expresses his we-intention. An agent s we-intention then is his slice or part of the agents joint intention, and conversely a joint intention can, upon analysis, be said to consist of the participants mutually known we-intentions. The collective acceptance of an intention as the group s intention entails the satisfaction of the so-called Collectivity Condition. Applied to satisfaction, the Collectivity Condition says, roughly, that necessarily, if the joint intention (goal) is (semantically) satisfied for one of the participants, then it is satisfied for all participants. (For a more detailed recent discussion of the we-mode versus the I-mode or individual mode, see Tuomela (2002b, c); note that I-intentions, viz. personal intentions, can be either in the we-mode or in the I-mode.) In the joint intention to perform a joint action X, it is precisely the content of the intention that is shared, viz., the content of doing X jointly is shared. Each agent tokens this content, and because a necessarily act-relational intention is involved this amounts to his intention to perform his part or share of X. The basic argument for assuming that each participant must intend to perform his part of the joint action is that the joint intention can only be satisfied if each participant performs his part for only then will the intentional joint action satisfying the joint intention come about. The part performance must be intentional, of course, and thus based on the agent s intention. In the general case, each agent can be taken to accept We together will jointly see to it that X (or its equivalent) and I

8 334 will participate in, or contribute to, our jointly seeing to it that X, while in the case of directly performable joint action the ( variable ) content of a we-intention can accordingly be taken to be to perform X together, entailing a participation intention for each participant. A we-intention is not by itself an action intention but an aim-intention involving that the agent intentionally aims at X and is aim-committed to X, while his action commitment is to performing his part of X. The agent s intention to perform his part of the joint action accordingly is a proper action intention, thus something the agent believes he can, at least with some probability, satisfy by his own action (given, of course, that the others perform their parts). In this section I will consider the presuppositions of joint intention and the central conceptual elements involved in joint intention formation. I will focus on plan-based joint intentions which express jointly intending as a group and which are public in a group context. A central subclass of such joint intentions is formed by joint intentions based on the participants (explicit or implicit) agreement to act jointly. The making of an agreement in the full sense (viz., accepting a jointly obligating plan) is a joint action which is necessarily intentional. The point about emphasizing this kind of case is obviously that it is conceptually central and also common in actual social life (see Tuomela (1995, Chapter 2; 2002a), on which I will draw below). What does this kind of plan-based joint intention presuppose? Firstly, it must obviously be required of the participants that they understand at least in some rudimentary sense that a joint action in some sense, however weak, is being proposed. The joint action must be taken to include a slot for each participant s intention. In general, all the relevant generic action concepts need to be possessed to a relevant extent by the participants a kind of hermeneutic circle is at play. Thus the notion of joint action opportunity needs to be available. Secondly, there is much other background knowledge, most of it culture-dependent, that is presupposed. Thirdly, and this is most significant, there is situation-specific information that must be presupposed. If the performance of a joint action, X, in a situation, S, is at stake, the concept of X must be possessed by the potential participants, and they must also understand what S

9 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 335 involves concerning the performance of X. It is also required that each participant believes that the participants mutually believe that the joint action opportunities for X hold in S (cf. the third clause in my analysis (WI) of we-intentions below in Section III). Some direct or indirect communication (or signaling) between the participants is needed for the reason that the participants are autonomous agents who, nevertheless, must make up their minds depending on what the others are thinking and doing. More concretely, communication is required for them rationally to arrive at unconditional intentions (we-intentions as well as intentions to perform one s part of the joint action). The indirect communication may be previously codified and may relate to certain specified types of situations (cf. in situation S we always form a joint plan of a certain kind and act together ). We can view the joint intention formation in intuitive terms from the group s angle and say in functional terms that we want to have unified group action as a result of a group s intention being properly satisfied. This involves that the group members actions must be suitably bound together and coordinated with each other. Part of this will have to take place at the level of the group s plan of action, assuming that we are dealing with intentional action. The bond here is due to the group s intention to act and its ensuing commitment to action, which makes the members collectively or jointly committed to the action. In cases of jointly intending as a group and thus being collectively committed as group members, the participants are also socially committed to each other to participate. Viewing the matter from the jointness level, viz. on the level of the group members, jointly intending as a group amounts to jointly intending to realize a joint plan. Intuitively, the participants must be suitably bound together for proper collective action purporting to realize the shared plan to come about (and accordingly for their acting as a group). As seen, this activity in general requires public exchange of information between them if it is to lead to mutually known (and not only mutually believed) unconditional participation intentions. Another philosophical reason for publicity in a group context is that such central social notions as the speech acts of agreement making, promising, commanding, and informing all relevant

10 336 to joint-intention formation are in their core sense not only language-dependent but public. The view to be developed below takes all this into account. It presupposes that the participants understand in a colloquial sense what acting together and a plan (or an agreement) to act together are. I will below analyze the conceptually central elements in the formation of a full-blown joint intention to act together and do it in terms of a metaphor, the Bulletin Board metaphor. The resulting Bulletin Board View (BBV) bases joint intentions on a publicly shared plan of joint action and thereby emphasizes the epistemic publicity (the public availability of relevant information) of fullblown joint intention, as will be seen. While publicity is central in this view, in principle one can also formulate a similar view without the publicity requirement (see below). Suppose that one of us comes up with the idea of cleaning a park. This is the proposed joint action content. That person may publicly communicate this to other group members. We may conceptualize and illustrate the present situation in terms of the following Bulletin Board View of joint intention formation. The initiating member s or organizer s proposal (or, more generally, plan for joint action) can be thought to be written on a public bulletin board: Members of group g will clean the park next Saturday. Those who will participate, please sign up here. Here will in the latter sentence is taken to express intention and not only prediction. Supposing that the ensuing communicative signaling of acceptance to participate (under the presupposition that sufficiently many others participate) results in a wide uptake and whole-hearted acceptance (signing) of this proposal, then given (communication-based) mutual knowledge about this there will be an adequate plan involving a joint intention to clean the park. The participants whole-hearted acceptance is assumed to entail that the participants form the intention to participate in joint action. As seen, this is a two-faced intention, so to speak. There is, firstly, each signed-up participant s we-intention to clean the park, and, secondly, his intention to carry out his part or share of the cleaning (qua his share of it). Furthermore, the participants because of having expressed their personal participation intentions have jointly exercised control over what to do together

11 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 337 and made up their minds to clean the park. Thus their joint intention to clean the park has come into existence. In a slightly stronger case the participants not only accept a shared plan of joint action but in effect make an explicit or implicit agreement (made up of interdependent promises) to perform it (cf. the discussion in Gilbert, 1993; Bach, 1995). Here it holds, on conceptual grounds, that making an agreement in this sense gives each participant a reason for action, viz., his promise. Furthermore, promising also gives a reason for the other participants to normatively expect that the other participants indeed will participate. Thus, we can say that here a participant has the right to expect that the others will perform their parts and is also obliged to respect their analogous rights. In this sense they are normatively socially committed. The central thing about BBV is of course its general conceptual content, although I have in part used concrete and partly metaphorical language in stating the view. From a conceptual and theoretical point of view, the present model of joint intention formation involves the following elements. First, the content of the joint intention must be brought to the participants attention. I call this the topic problem. There may be an initiator who proposes the topic, or the participants may arrive at the topic by means of their negotiation or joint decision making. They might thus consider their preferences for the different action alternatives and arrive at a joint decision by a suitable decision rule, e.g. the majority vote. In this kind of case the participants of course, so to speak, sign the bulletin board proposal only after the topic has been decided upon. In other cases, the topic may be suggested to them by their shared history or background knowledge in conjunction with some relevant contextual information. For instance, the participants may share the standing want to keep the park clean and when they learn that a garbage collector will arrive the next morning they may gather that the park cleaning is the thing to do tonight. In BBV this element can be indicated by the appearance on the bulletin board of the description of the topic (here park cleaning). The set of potential participants will be the members of a group, g, and this must be knowable to the potential participants. The actual participants or at least a suitable subset of them sufficient to get

12 338 the joint action initiated and under way will have to be publicly named or indicated. The central element again is the public availability of the information about the intention to participate; this aspect is also relevant concerning newcomers and persons who have to change plans for some reason. The participants will pick up that information and this will lead them to believe that those signed up will participate. What is more, they will also be able to acquire mutual knowledge (or minimally mutual true belief) about this, for they will come to know that the others know that those persons will participate; and this can be iterated if needed. The publicity requirement in BBV is a kind of public communication requirement in the sense discussed earlier. It is a particular contingent feature of BBV that the information gathering and delivery is centralized so that, e.g., pairwise communication is not needed. However, this is a practical feature that is not conceptually essential and can easily be changed. But publicity in group context is still philosophically central in that it creates a quasi-objective realm, viz.,arealm which is objective for the participants,and which is more prone to lead to actual objective knowledge than weaker views (as the participation intentions are objectively out there as stated on the bulletin board). There is thus a kind of group-relative objectivity both ontically and epistemically involved here. Furthermore, as compared with less public methods, in the case of large groups, new participants, and participants that have changed their intentions, etc., knowledge can then better be gathered and checked. In our metaphor, there may be information written on the board and there is also information in a special box beneath the board called Presuppositions and Background Knowledge. Typically only situational information is written on the board, and the rest, viz., general background assumptions and maybe some obvious kind of situational information is available in the presuppositions box. Somewhere there should also be information about whether the participants only are forming a shared plan for joint action based on publicly expressed intentions or are also making a full-blown agreement (in terms of interdependent promises) to act jointly and in this thick normative sense accept a joint plan (see Section IV). The present approach has several virtues. Firstly, it gives categorical joint intentions (without the problems concerned with decondi-

13 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 339 tionalization or with change of view see Tuomela, 2002a). BBV is not concerned with proper conditional intentions at all (although extendable to deal with them as well). The belief that sufficiently many participate can be regarded as a presupposition rather than a (contingent) condition, and this is of course a presupposition binding all the participants (a collectivity condition is at play here). A participant thus categorically commits himself when signing up, although he may retract his commitment if he comes to believe that a relevant presupposition is not satisfied. Secondly, there is no need for a prior joint intention to form a joint intention, as mere personal intentions are enough for entering one s signature on the board. Thirdly, the view can treat the participants either symmetrically or asymmetrically, depending on the demands of the situation (e.g., Bach s (1995) offer-acceptance model concerns pairwise communication and is asymmetric). Fourthly, BBV is capable of yielding epistemically strong (if not the strongest) joint intentions in the sense that all the information that so to speak goes into the joint intention is publicly available and publicly checkable. The BBV covers all public joint intentions to act jointly or, for that matter, to jointly see to it that a state or event obtains. Thus it covers all publicly indicated and accepted joint intentions, be the acceptance thick or thin, and all group-public cases subsumable under the label jointly intending as a group. In such cases it will typically also be correct in general to attribute the joint intention to the group in question and to say that the group intends to perform the action in question see Tuomela (1995, Chapter 5) for some qualifications. However, in contrast to the public BBV spoken above, one can also formulate and deal with a purely intersubjective and nonpublic BBV in which everything is based only on beliefs and mutual beliefs viz., beliefs about who are potential and actual participants and beliefs about the topic of the joint intention and about the participants participation intentions, about their shared background knowledge and situational information. Thus, if the participants accept a content (intention content or belief content) which they purport to be for the group, if they are collectively (and socially) committed to the content, and if there is mutual belief (but perhaps not mutual knowledge about the participants accept-

14 340 ances), then the group intersubjectively intends as a group e.g. the account in Tuomela and Miller (1988), allows for this possibility. (In the case of the merely intersubjective kind of BBV the metaphorical bulletin board will exist only in the minds of the participants or believed participants, and no communication is required.) Between the epistemically full-blown BBV and the purely subjective BBV there are various intermediate views or models, depending on what is assumed about objectivity and about the reasons for the participants beliefs (see the discussion in Tuomela, 2000, 2002b). III. WE-INTENTIONS AND JOINT INTENTIONS ANALYTICALLY ELUCIDATED In accordance with the grounds presented in the previous section, I will next discuss we-intentions and joint intentions in a more analytical and precise fashion. These analyses will be needed not only for the sake of clarity but also for the sake of our discussions later in this paper. I will start with my earlier analysis of we-intention to act jointly. Such a we-intention is expressible by We together will do X jointly. The analysis of core we-intention is assumed to apply also to the mutual belief-based case which is not is not (fully) public (cf. my treatments in Tuomela, 1984, 1995, 2000a, b; Tuomela and Miller, 1988). This analysis, formulated for the case of X being a joint action, can summarily be stated as follows for a collective assumed to consist of some agents A 1,...,A i,..., A m : (WI) A member A i of a collective g we-intends to do X if and only if (i) A i intends to do his part of X (as his part of X); (ii) A i has a belief to the effect that the joint action opportunities for an intentional performance of X will obtain (or at least probably will obtain), especially that a right number of the full-fledged and adequately informed members of g, as required for the performance of X, will (or at least probably will) do their parts of X, which will under normal conditions result in an intentional joint performance of X by the participants;

15 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 341 (iii) A i believes that there is (or will be) a mutual belief among the participating members of g (or at least among those participants who do their parts of X intentionally as their parts of X there is or will be a mutual belief) to the effect that the joint action opportunities for an intentional performance of X will obtain (or at least probably will obtain); (iv) (i) in part because of (ii) and (iii). I have assumed that the participants actually exist, but I allow that a participant might in principle be mistaken in his beliefs (ii) and (iii). 1 Thus a single agent can in principle have a we-intention, although of course this is an exceptional case. In such a case a weintention is not a slice of a joint intention but at best of a believed joint intention. Below I will mostly use formulations which presuppose that the beliefs (ii) and (iii) indeed are true and, what is more, that all the agents in question really have the we-intention and that we in this sense are dealing with genuine we-intentions. (Notice that intentional performance of X, dealt with by (ii) and (iii), can in some cases come about without all the participants having the we-intention.) I will not here argue for the present analysis except that its clause (i) will be discussed later. The presupposed beliefs, expressing the minimal rationality of the we-intender, and condition (iv) accordingly will not be commented on here (see the mentioned references, especially Tuomela and Miller, 1988, for justification). It is presupposed by my analysis that a minimally rational weintender should in the standard case of direct joint action be disposed to reason in accordance with the following two schemas (W1) and (W2) of practical inference (or in terms of their variants): (W1) (i) We will do X. Therefore: (ii) I will do my share of X. (W2) (i) We will do X. (ii) X cannot be performed by us unless we perform action Z (for instance, in the case of an action type X, teach agent A, who is one of us, to do something related to his performance of actions required of him for X).

16 342 (iii) We will do Z. Therefore: (iv) Unless I perform Y we cannot perform Z. Therefore: (v) I will do Y (as my contribution to Z). The first of these schemas in an obvious way connects weintending to the we-intender s own action to his performance of his part or share of the joint action X. The second of the schemas applies to all normally rational we-intenders, too, but of course only when the contingent clauses (ii) and (iv) apply, and it is to be exhibited by the we-intenders dispositions to reason in appropriate circumstances. This schema expresses a part of what is involved in saying that a we-intention involves a joint commitment to contribute to the realization of the content of the we-intention. This joint commitment also involves social commitment, viz. that the participants are committed to one another to participation in the joint performance of X. Accordingly, (W2) clearly makes we-intentions cooperative to a considerable extent and shows that in they require interaction between the individuals or at least disposition to interact. 2 Supposing that joint intentions can be expressed by We together will do X or its variants, in order to cover also standing intentions in addition to action-prompting intentions, we must also take into account dispositions to we-intend, as argued in Tuomela (1991). The following, elucidation of the notion of joint intention in the direct joint action case can now be given: (JI) Agents A 1,...,A i,...,a m have the joint intention to perform a joint action X if and only if (a) these agents have the we-intention (or are disposed to form the we-intention) to perform X; and (b) there is a mutual belief among them to the effect that (a). In the case of joint intention the conatively used We will do X is true of each participant A i. I would like to emphasize that my analysis of joint intentions and we-intentions is conceptually non-reductive, although it is ontically individualistic or, better, interrelational (cf. Tuomela, 1995, Chapter 9, also cf. Section VI below). These notions presuppose at least a pre-analytic notion of joint intention viz. one involved in the

17 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 343 participants minds when engaged in joint intention (and joint plan) formation such as expressed by simple exchanges of the kind: (i) Let s go swimming ; (ii) OK (recall BBV and cf. Section VI below). Thus the full concept of a person A s we-intention to do X entails that he we-intends to do X and hence intends to do his part of X in accordance with and because of the agents endorsed plan, thus preanalytic joint intention, to do X together. A central argument for this kind of partial reflexivity is based on the view that an intention, firstly, cannot be fulfilled non-intentionally. If A does his part of X accidentally e.g. does something that unbeknownst to him turns out to be describable as his part of X that does not qualify as fulfilling his we-intention to do X: A intended to perform his part intentionally and not unintentionally. Indeed, secondly, not only must A act intentionally in the right way, he must act on the basis of the agents preanalytic joint intention to do X. Otherwise the participants would not properly satisfy their joint intention in terms of their intentional joint action (cf. the analogy with the single-agent case). Another argument for the reflexive nature of joint intention comes from the requirement that the participants must accept the joint intention (goal) as their joint intention. The upshot of our present analysis is this. In the direct joint action case, joint intentions are intentions that several agents among themselves have, and they are expressible by an intention-expression of the form We together will do X endorsed by these agents. We can say, using the terminology that Mathiesen (2002) suggests, that the intentional subject of a we-intention is we while the ontological subject of a we-intention is a single person (or more generally, an agent, if we consider the possibility of groups as agents). 2 IV. WHAT CONTEXTUALLY DIFFERENT KINDS OF JOINT INTENTION ARE THERE? As seen, joint intentions can involve bonds of different strength between the participants. They can be bound by explicit or implicit agreements, by public acceptances of joint plans involving joint intentions or even only by mutual beliefs about joint plans. In this section I will discuss these matters at some length under the assumption that the analyses of joint intention and we-intention given in

18 344 Section III still hold true in the different contexts and cases to be covered below. Thus, in a sense there is only one kind of joint intention, but it can so to speak appear in different contextual guises. These have to do with the normative and epistemic connections that hold between the participants either due to their voluntary choice or due to environmental factors. In the full-blown case of joint intention we speak of thick, normative acceptance of a plan (or intention) of joint action. My analysis thus distinguishes between thick, normative acceptance of a plan (or intention) to perform X and a thin, non-normative acceptance of a plan. For instance, if the participants have made an agreement (consisting of mutual, interdependent promises) to perform X together, they accept the intention in the thick, normative sense. This can be called the full or fullest case of joint intention. As claimed, in the case of accepting an intention to participate in a joint action a participant can be taken to accept We together will perform X jointly. Taken in the thick sense he here makes the promise to perform X together with the others. If only the thin sense is involved, he merely expresses his intention to take part in the joint action X. In the case of thin acceptance a participant merely forms the intention to participate, without promising to do it or accepting publicly to do it (cf. below). Generally speaking, our present distinction relies on the distinction between the promise family and the intention family of concepts. To the promise family belong agreements and acceptances of plans (when acceptance is understood in the thick, normative sense of I accept to do this together with the others ) and to the intention family belong plain intentions, be they language-based acceptance intentions or mere intentions of the lower kind applicable also to children and possibly chimpanzees and the like. In the collective case the promise family involves a joint obligation to the agreed-upon content while this is not the case for intentions and intention-based notions. The possibility of thin, non-normative acceptance of a plan is indicated by the legitimacy of statements such as I accept to participate in this plan but cannot promise to do it. The Bulletin Board View explicates intention formation both in the case of thick and thin acceptance. In the case of thick, norma-

19 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 345 tively accepted (e.g. agreement-based) joint intention BBV serves to explicate the central idea in the practice of forming a joint plan of action in the intersubjective public space. If agreement making is in question, there will also be a publicly existing social (or, if you like, quasi-moral ) obligation to participate in joint action. This entailment of an obligation can be regarded as a conceptual truth about the notion of agreement. An agreement consists of mutual interdependent promises, and a promise involves putting oneself under an obligation. Each signed participant is taken to endorse the obligation in question and to be committed to the agreed-upon joint action and to his share of it. That he is thus committed will show up in the practical reasoning he may engage in. Such reasoning will have a content that may be described by him, roughly, by locutions like On the basis of our agreement I am socially obligated to do my part of the joint action and hence I think I ought to do it. The participant cannot be released from this obligation merely by changing his mind (as he can in the mere mutual belief-based account) because of the interdependence involved in agreement (cf. the discussion e.g. in Gilbert, 1993; R. Tuomela and M. Tuomela, 2003). To summarize the case of a thick, agreement based joint intention to joint action, there are the following conceptual elements in an accepted, effective agreement, assumed to be mutually believed by the participants: (1) An intersubjective obligation to fulfill the content, say X, of the agreement, and (2) a joint commitment to X by the participants in virtue of their accepting (1). The joint commitment (2) entails that each participant is (i) committed to the participants collectively performing X, thus sharing the participants collective responsibility to perform X, and (ii) committed to performing his part of X (this is expressible roughly as thoughts of the form I will perform my part of X because of (1) ), and that (iii) each participant is suitably persistent but also flexible in his performance of his part of X. Relative to the joint intention to perform X and the joint commitment to X, (iv) in virtue of (ii) each participant is also committed to intending to perform his part (and not only committed to performing it), as this intention is conceptually part and parcel of the joint intention in question. The joint intention to perform X here basically consists of the participants we-intentions (and non-private personal commitments) to perform X

20 346 (cf. singing a duet), and therefore a participant is committed to both intending to perform his part of X and to performing it. Furthermore, there is also (v) a social commitment by the participants to each other concerning their part-performances based on the endorsement of the intersubjective obligations concerning the partperformances entailed by (1). This social commitment involves that each participant is committed to responding to the others normative expectations related to his performance and is thus responsible to the others for performing of his part. Correspondingly, he is also entitled to expect that the others perform their parts. Here are some examples of joint intentions involving only thin, non-normative acceptance falling within the standard BBV. Firstly, there is the park cleaning example discussed earlier. It can have tokens satisfying BBV, even if only some kind of behavioral indication of togetherness is involved (e.g., the participants show by their behavior which area they leave to the other). Next, there could be a large number of people sharing the joint intention to push a broken bus up the hill without a socially grounded obligation to do it. The joint intention could be based on only the participants mutual knowledge about the others pushing action being expressive of the intention to participate in joint pushing (rather than of their explicit agreement). Here the bus pushers jointly intend as a group and act as a group. A third example is provided by a group of people going out for a drink after a talk. There might be some leaders or, better, operative members who agree about joint action, but many others merely follow suit. In this asymmetric case only (and at most) the operative members would be obligated to perform the joint task. 3 In these kinds of thin cases there are joint or collective commitments generated by joint intentions. These commitments are intention-relative and instrumental concerning the satisfaction of the joint intention. There are no (or need not be) intrinsic obligations for them either to keep their intentions (we-intentions and intentions to perform their parts) or to participate in the joint action and hence to perform their part actions. These joint we-mode commitments are appropriately persistent and are not properly consummated before the agents have jointly achieved what they we-intend or have achieved relevant consensus about the unachievability of the intended goal (or if some other mutually recognized revocability

21 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 347 condition comes to apply). Note, furthermore, that the agents can of course collectively change their mind, and thus joint commitments are changeable. To end this section, I will summarize my classifications of the different cases that BBV allows. While the characterization of joint intention in Section III explicates what a joint intention is, the classification below concerns various contexts of jointly intending. The cases below are claimed to exhaust jointly intending as a group to perform a joint action: (1) Joint intention in a thick, normative context. There are two cases: (a) Agreement-based joint intention, a strong case of BBV involving agreement making in conditions of mutual knowledge or group-knowability. (b) Expressed acceptance of plan in conditions of mutual knowledge. Here the acceptance is normative, thick acceptance. (This case requires the analysans of the bridge principle of Tuomela (1995, Chapter 3) to hold true. 4 ) In (a) the participants make an agreement to act jointly; for instance, the participants make an agreement to paint a house together tomorrow. In contrast, (b) includes the somewhat wider kind of case where the participants can sign up for joint action. (Thus, if sufficiently many persons sign up e.g. to go for a bus tour next Sunday, then joint intention is created and, normally, action ensues.) In general terms, case (1) is (strongly) normatively group-binding on the basis of a joint obligation and collective commitment. (2) Joint intention in a weakly normative context. In these cases there are normative participation expectations based on an agent s leading the others to expect normatively that he will participate in the joint action in question. When all the agents do the same, there will be a base for the participants mutual belief about collective commitment to participate and thus about the others participation intentions. We may speak of this case as being based on mutual weak promises to participate. Example: By expressing by his words or by his actual action that he will help to clean a park an agent leads the others normatively to expect that he will participate in the joint action. When this kind of weak promise is mutual (and understood to be mutual among

22 348 the participants) a weakly normative joint intention to participate is at stake. Each of the participants is committed to this joint task under conditions of mutual belief, and thus we have collective commitment here. (Recall, however, that there can be a joint intention to clean the park, etc., also in a non-normative sense.) (3) Joint intention in a non-normative context. In this case there is a publicly shared plan-based joint intention which falls short of being even a weak promise in the sense of case (2). In this case there, because of the publicity requirement, will be an expression of intention, which nevertheless is based on nonnormative, thin acceptance (cf. I intend to participate but I do not promise that I will). In all we can say that this type of case of BBV is based on mutual-knowledge -based explicitly expressed intention to share a plan (involving a non-normative acceptance of the plan). The participants will be collectively (or jointly) committed to the plan partly because of the mutual knowledge that they share a plan, and thus intention. (4) Non-standard cases of joint intention not satisfying the publicity requirement. This is the weakest case of joint intention. While the publicity requirement is not satisfied and while there thus are no public participation expressions, there must still be a mutual belief concerning participation and this creates intersubjectivity sufficient for joint intention and collective commitment. This case thus falls outside the standard BBV (but not the mentioned merely intersubjective version of it). For instance, a participant may be personally collectively committed, I say we-committed, to the joint action in question on the grounds that he will not achieve his goal that the joint action comes about without the others performing their parts properly; thus he and the others commit themselves to the action at least in an instrumental sense based on mutual belief. (Think here e.g. of the Roman military where the soldiers in a military unit were punished or rewarded collectively.) This case is not normatively group-binding in a sense allowing for justified criticism of violation (for such justified criticism would have to be based on public facts, e.g. public intention expressions).

23 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 349 In all, cases (1) (4) entail group-binding intentions, and thus group-binding group action can and normally will ensue. Cases (1) and (2) are normative cases while in (3) only mere joint intention formation (e.g. joint decision) is involved. In (4) joint intention formation cannot even be based on a joint decision but must be based on some kind shared implicit understanding of the situation and the other participants relevant mental attitudes. 5 V. COLLECTIVE ENDS AND WE-INTENTIONS It is often claimed that one can intend only one s own actions. Recently, Baier (1997), Velleman (1997), Stoutland (2000), and S. Miller (2001) have presented versions of that view. I will below discuss this thesis, which at least seemingly is a criticism against my notion of we-intention as an aim-intention. As Seumas Miller has explicitly criticized my account concerning this point in his 2001 book, I will discuss primarily his formulations. The considerations in this section seem not to be sensitive to the distinction between the use of different action concepts such as performing, bringing about or jstit. I will therefore mainly speak of performance or bringing about, as they fit best the joint action case involved here. Furthermore, I will use the words collectively and jointly interchangeably. I take Seumas Miller to claim that in the case of joint social action the participants can only have as their collective end that the action in question (or, alternatively, its logically inbuilt result event or state) comes about but that no participant of joint action can intend that the action or its result comes about (see Miller, 2001, p. 64). 6 Let me state this as: (1) When intentionally performing a joint action no participant can (on conceptual grounds) intend the action, or its result event, to be brought about by the participants. In contrast, I claim this: (2) When intentionally performing a joint action every participant must intend, viz. we-intend, the action, or its result event, to be brought about by the participants.

24 350 (1) and (2) contradict each other. (1) is based on Miller s stipulation, but when the stipulation is removed there is no incompatibility. We-intentions, viewed as aim-intentions, are perfectly acceptable intentions. Intentions are conations and so are collective ends in Miller s sense (by his own admission). The main idea involved in conation is intentional striving towards a goal ( content ) to which the agent has bound himself. If an intention is rational, the agent must believe that there is some chance that the intended content will be realized not necessarily due to the person s own action but e.g. due to his group s action. However, Miller claims that an end is a conation but not an intention. This I find a conceptually impossible combination. Conation is an old-fashioned term for intention (and striving) and that is at bottom all there is to the matter, fine distinctions apart. According to Miller, collective end is not only a conative notion but even the intentionality of action seems to be analyzable in terms of ends (cf. Miller, 2001, p. 112). This strongly suggests to me that ends form a kind of aim-intentions (rather than that a new account of the intentionality of action is being proposed). I accordingly claim that basically collective end in Miller s account has, and must have for it to work, the same function as it has in my account, except that in my account collective intentions (in the sense of Section III) explicitly deal with the strong notion of jointly intending as a group. Let us now apply the above ideas to the case of a group of participants who collectively or jointly intend to perform an action, X, jointly or to jointly bring about a certain end, E. We can say that jointly bringing about E amounts to performing a joint action, X. (In the case of E being a collective end, it is not in general required that E be brought about by the agents joint action, but here I will assume this for the sake of exposition.) The following now holds: (3) The participants can ( can in at least a conceptual and metaphysical sense) rationally jointly intend to achieve E if and only if they mutually believe that E can with some probability be brought about by it. Rationality here only means that there is a subjective success condition involved: the intention is realizable with some probability. In order not to lose the collective conation that (3) involves we must here require that each individual has the conation in ques-

25 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 351 tion, because otherwise we cannot arrive at intentionally performed joint action when the joint intention is realized. Furthermore, I will require that intentions are reflexive in the sense that successful satisfaction of intention must take place as intended (see Searle (1983, Chapter 8) and Tuomela (1995, Chapter 3) for arguments and discussion). Moving to the individual level corresponding to the collective level, we arrive at we-intentions: (4) When some participants jointly intend E each individual participant must we-intend E and consequently action intend to participate in the bringing about of E, viz. to perform his share or part of the participants joint action to bring about E. Seumas Miller adopts the view that one can only intend what one can bring about by means of one s own actions. Thus, according to him, one can only intend one s bodily actions and their direct consequences. But this is a stipulation and a not a very happy one, although it contains the acceptable core idea that intentions are actrelational (viz. always related to one s actions, see below). I have claimed that one can strive for ( conate ) and thus intend that a joint action, X, or a state, be realized by the participants collective action. One can claim this while accepting that intentions also concern one s own actions. Thus: (5) Individual agent A intends to perform an action X together with the other participants only if A intends by means of his actions to bring about some result such that when all the other participants similarly perform their part actions, a performance of X is intentionally generated at least with some probability. An intention of the present kind I have called an aim-intention in contrast to an action intention (viz. basically the only kind of intention that Miller accepts in his theory). An aim-intention can be satisfied without the aim-intending agent alone satisfying the intention, whereas in the case of an action intention the agent must believe, if rational at all, that he can (with some probability) satisfy the intention by means of his own actions. An aim-intention can in typical cases be rendered as agent A intends, by his actions,

26 352 to bring about state or event E, where E can in principle (viz. on conceptual grounds) be any kind of (non-contradictory or nontautological) state (including another agent s mental state of his having an intention). While, trivially, nobody can (directly) intend another person s actions, one can still depending on the circumstances and one s success beliefs intend to bring about, by his actions, e.g. that another person comes to intend or to perform a certain action. 7 An aim-intention can be called an end (or goal) in the sense that its content E is an end that the agent has. In the context of a joint action the end is collective. A collective end according to my view is, roughly, one that the agents have collectively accepted as their collective end, assumed to satisfy the Collectivity Condition (recall Section II). It is essential that there is an individual conation (intention) in the present context concerning also E (or X) and not only one s part action. An intention involves commitment, and the crux is that in the case of joint intention required of intentionally performed joint action there must be collective and, consequently, also individual-level commitment concerning end E (recall the discussion in Sections II and IV). For instance, you and I can intend and be committed to some joint activity, e.g. you and I can jointly intend to build a bridge together. This joint intention consists of our weintentions to build a bridge. Each we-intention is an aim-intention but it entails a participation intention in the case of each participant: I intend to participate in our building the bridge, and similarly for you, provided the right presupposition beliefs are present. As emphasized in Section III, the we-intending participants are accordingly entitled to infer according to schemas (W1) and(w2). While the participation intentions are personal intentions, they are not private intentions but we-mode intentions, thus intentions qua group members. To summarize, Seumas Miller has not succeeded in showing in his 2001 book that intentional joint action can be based on collective ends which are not intentions. I agree of course that collective ends need not be action intentions. However, aim-intentions must be present. The collective end that Seumas Miller speaks about (but does not sufficiently clarify in the book) is an aim-intention, more specifically an intention satisfying the intention expression We

27 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 353 together will bring about E accepted basically by all participants in this context. Miller says that his notion of an end is a conative notion and bases the intentionality of action on it. This indicates that it is an aim-intention, for conation involves striving for an end to which one has bound oneself. The conflict here is partly if not completely terminological, as collective ends are conative states (intentions at least as I understand conation). Furthermore, collective ends are in any case on a par with intentions in that one can ask how one can have ends that one cannot by one s own actions reach. The answer is that ends and intentions at bottom concern one s own acting, although it cannot be required that one alone make the end state realized. To end this section, I will discuss the problem at hand in somewhat more general terms. Bratman s account of shared intention (reprinted as Chapter 6 in his 1999 collection) has been criticized e.g. by Velleman (1997), and Stoutland (2002) on the ground that his notion of a person s intending that we (his group) perform a joint action, J, or briefly I intend that we J is not an intention notion at all. This discussion of course is closely related to the issues considered above. The following principles have been suggested for single-agent intentions (see Bratman, 1999, pp ): (1) Own action condition (OA): One can intend only to do something herself. (2) Control condition (C): One cannot intend what one does not take oneself to control. (3) Settle condition (S): One can only intend what one believes her so intending settles. The settle condition entails that for me to intend that we J I must...see my intention as settling whether we J (p. 149). There is also an additional principle that Stoutland (2001) suggests: (4) Responsibility condition (R): To intend to do something is to commit oneself to do X so as to thereby commit oneself to take full responsibility for having done X (if and when one does X). I take conditions (1) (4) to be on the right track and (almost) acceptable for action intentions. (I say almost, because at least the control condition seems somewhat too strongly formulated

28 354 less than full control will suffice and full responsibility in (4) also needs relaxation.) Leaving a more detailed discussion of (1) (4) for another occasion, we can notice that these conditions clearly do not not at least without modification apply to aim-intentions (such as we-intentions). Assuming for simplicity s sake that the presupposition beliefs (ii) and (iii) in the analysis (WI) of we-intention in Section II are true, our discussion in that section (and Section II) then warrants the following claims in the case of we-intentions, remembering that we-intentions are personal slices of joint intentions: (1J) (2J) (3J) (4J) Our action condition (WA): A person A i, can we-intend to perform something X (if and) only if he is one among some persons A 1,...,A m who jointly intend to perform X together such that his action intention is to participate in these agents joint performance of X. (If we were dealing with the irrational case with false beliefs (i) and (ii) in (WI), the analysans here would have to be relativized to A i s belief.) Joint control condition (JC): Some persons A 1,...,A m cannot jointly intend to perform an action X jointly and cannot we-intend to perform X in this case unless they mutually believe that they can control X to a substantial degree (at least these agents should mutually believe that their performing X together is not impossible in the circumstances in question). Joint settle condition (JS): If some persons A 1,...,A m we-intend to perform X under conditions of mutual belief, they must also mutually believe that their so intending (psychologically, not perhaps in an overt action sense) settles that they will perform X together. Joint responsibility condition (JR):ForapersonA i to weintend to do something X is in part to commit himself to X (in a context where some agents A 1,...,A m,of which A i is one, jointly intend to perform X), so as to thereby commit himself to take partial responsibility for their having performed X together and to take responsibility for his having participated in the performance of X (if and when he actually does participate). (Cf. (1J) for

29 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 355 the qualification concerning the case of false beliefs (i) and (ii).) A joint intention to perform X together requires that the participants believe that they will perform X intentionally, indeed as jointly intended (as seen above, in contrast to what Bratman, 1999, says on p. 147). This may seem viciously circular, but I will below in Section VI argue that the conceptual situation is not that bad. As to the functionality of joint intentions and their component we-intentions, they lead to the right kind of reasoning (recall the schemas (W1) and (W2)) and to the right kind of action intentions and consequent actions (recall my above discussion and emphasis on the conceptual and factual dependence on X of a we-intention). VI. ON THE ALLEGED CIRCULARITY OF THE CONCEPT OF WE-INTENTION In this section I will consider the charge, made against my account by Searle (1990) and S. Miller (2001), that the notion of we-intention is circular in an unacceptable sense. 8 Let me start by quoting Searle: We are tempted to construe doing his part to mean doing his part toward achieving the collective goal. But if we adopt that move, then we have included the notion of a collective intention in the notion of doing his part. We are thus faced with a dilemma: if we include the notion of collective intention in the notion of doing his part, the analysis fails because of circularity; we would now be defining we-intentions in terms of we-intentions. If we don t so construe doing his part, then the analysis fails because of inadequacy. (Cf. also S. Miller, 2001, pp ) I will argue below that there is in fact no vicious circularity of any kind in the account presented in Section III above. To begin my response, consider an agent A and assume that he we-intends to perform X (or, alternatively, to bring about or see to it that X) together with some other agents. It seems that this must be taken to presuppose that A believes that these participants jointly intend to perform X; and as A s we-intention at bottom is in a constitutive sense just a slice of the joint intention (recall Section III), we have circularity. (In normal cases the belief is a true one, of course.) But things are not so simple. As will be seen, in the

30 356 preanalytic, common-sense case a rather meager notion of weintention is shown to be psychologically and functionally sufficient, and my response will rely on this. In particular, it is not required that joint intentions in this preanalytic account be taken to consist of shared we-intentions. According to my analysis of strong we-intention (WI) (in Tuomela, 1984; Tuomela and Miller, 1988, etc., and section III above) A we-intends to perform a joint action X (or to perform X together with the others) if and only if (i) he intends to perform his part of X as his part of X in part because he (ii) believes (presupposes) that the joint action opportunities for X obtain (e.g. that there are sufficiently many participants for an intentional performance of X to come about, if there is that kind of numerical requirement, and they actually perform their parts of X) and also (iii) believes (presupposes) that there is mutual belief about the obtaining of the joint action opportunities. The central requirement (i) involves that he intends to perform his part of X (an action intention) and intends to perform X together with the others (or put more technically, intends that X will be performed by them). To recapitulate in somewhat more explicit terms, we have: (1) A we-intends to perform X if and only if (a) A intends to perform his part of X as his part of X, and (b) the aforementioned presupposed beliefs (ii) and (iii) are in place and function as partial reasons for (i). Next, I suggest that we can give a preanalytic, common-sense account of (1)(a) by: (2) A intends to perform his part of X as his part of X if and only if (a) A intends to perform his part of X, and (b) A intends to perform X with the others in part because (of his belief that) the others intend to perform their parts of X and intend to perform X with the others. (2) and especially its clause (b) can be viewed as preanalytic in the sense that ordinary people can well be assumed to actually think in these terms. (2) thus views the matter from the ordinary agent s rather than from the theoretician s point of view. In conditions of mutual belief (cf. (1)(b)), the present account gives a functionally

31 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 357 adequate solution to the problem of joint intention concerning what the agents need to have in their minds when jointly intending to perform X together. We can say more colloquially that in the present situation A intends to participate and takes the others to be in a similar position as he is with respect to X. The analysans in (2) does not (directly) refer to a we-intention or joint intention and thus it does not make (1) nor (WI) viciously circular. However, while the preanalytic account does not, to quote Searle again, construe doing his part to mean doing his part toward achieving the collective goal, it might still be argued, from a theoretician s point of view, that underlying (2) there is implicit reference to joint intention. This is because in (2) A s intention to perform his part of X as his part of X can be satisfied only if the participants intentionally jointly perform X and because such intentional joint performance may be argued upon analysis to depend on the joint aim or intention to perform X. I will grant that the preanalytic account presupposes intentional joint performance of X, but this does not yet entail circularity. Even if it thus is granted that the preanalytic account presupposes intentional performance of X it does not take a stand on what precisely the latter notion involves, and still it works perfectly well in actual practice. However, when a theory of joint intention adds an analysis of intentional joint action referring to joint aim or intention, some amount of circularity comes about. While this need not be an unavoidable move, this view applies to the Tuomela and Miller 1988 paper where (on p. 377) it is required that the agent A should intend to perform his part of X and perform it with the (general) purpose of the action X coming about. In Tuomela (1995, p. 140 ff.), a similar requirement is made that the agent aim at, and be committed to, the realization of X. Analogously, Mathiesen (2002) defends the account by Tuomela and Miller (1988) against Searle s criticism by imposing what can be regarded as an equivalent requirement that A intend to perform his part of X in order for the participants to successfully intentionally perform X. 9 In accordance with what was just said, I can go along with my critics to the extent that doing one s part in a sense presupposes collective (or joint) intention but only in an implicit and unanalyzed sense of aiming at the joint action. I deny that this sense creates

32 358 vicious conceptual circularity which commits me to define weintentions in terms of we-intentions. Recall that my analysis is not meant to be reductive but is rather meant to elucidate the irreducible notion of we-intention in a functionally informative way, and this is what the analysantia of my (WI) and (2) help to do without strictly relying on the concept of we-intention even if some amount of circularity will be there. To recapitulate, by the preanalytic account of joint intention or aim I mean (cf. (2)) our somewhat vague and fuzzy way of accounting for ordinary joint intention formation, cf. We will go swimming this afternoon, We intend to carry this table upstairs. This common-sense idea was above expressed by (2). To put this more theoretically in terms of joint intention, the agents jointly intend to do something X together in the sense of the preanalytic account (at least in first approximation) if and only if they intend to participate in doing X together with the others and believe that the others intend similarly. Here the agents do have to understand the right hand side of the statement, but they need not at least consciously think that it amounts to the participants having a joint intention on which their we-intentions and participation intentions are based. However, their having a joint intention in the sense of the preanalytic account will functionally have to amount to their reasoning and acting in the right ways (cf. the end of this section). Account (2) makes this possible; and when the participation intentions are satisfied the joint action will come about, the world permitting, just as if the participants had functioned in terms of an explicitly formulated joint intention. There is no direct conceptual circularity here. Furthermore, I claim that from the point of view of the participants in joint intention there is no psychological and functional circularity, because they can understand the account (2) and operate on its basis, viz. properly satisfy their participation intentions with the result that an intentional joint performance of X results. Considering this issue in more detail, (2)(b) can be taken implicitly to entail the following, assuming that X must here be intentionally performed (even if the participants of we-intention need not consciously think of it): A intends to perform X with the others, believing (presupposing) that this happens in accordance with and

33 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 359 because of their (pre-analytically understood) joint intention or aim to perform X together (cf. schema (W1) of practical inference assumed to be satisfied by we-intenders). At least in this case, A s intention content is something he believes. So there is presuppositional doxastic dependence on the joint intention to perform X. But this dependence is only to a preanalytically understood joint intention. Furthermore, it need not be required that we-intenders think of this dependence or even use the notion of joint intention at all. Recall that according to my analytic account of Section III the participants have the joint intention to perform X if and only if they share the we-intention to perform X (and mutually believe so). While a we-intention is seen to doxastically depend on a joint intention (as argued earlier) and while, as just said, a joint intention amounts to a shared we-intention (about which there is mutual belief), there might seem to be circularity relative to a belief context. For an agent s we-intention might thus seem to depend on his belief about the participants sharing a we-intention. Furthermore, there would be the consequence that the belief content here would again depend on a belief that the participants share the we-intention, and so forth; and regress would be on. However, this kind of circularity fails to exist. The circularity claim is based on a failure to distinguish between (i) joint intention or aim in the sense of the preanalytic, surface account and (ii) joint intention in the theoretician s analytic account defining joint intentions in terms of we-intentions. The common-sense account is somewhat vague but not at least explicitly circular, as it only requires of the participants that they satisfy the above clauses (1) and (2) and thus intend to perform X together with the others, involving that they perform their parts of X appropriately with the purpose of X getting performed, and believe that the others intend (and believe) similarly. In the analytic account, in turn, joint intention simply is taken to amount to shared we-intention (in my technical sense) about which there is mutual belief, and the concept of we-intention in my theoretical analysis may be argued to depend conceptually on intentional joint performance of X and this in turn on a general aimintention (minimally a commitment) or purpose towards X. If these dependencies are granted, it must also be granted that there is some implicit conceptual circularity. However, this is not vicious circu-

34 360 larity, for in the preanalytic, common-sense account of we-intention which can be regarded as functionally equivalent to the analytic account there is no direct reference to we-intention (under the term we-intention or any conceptually equivalent phrase). From the participants psychological point of view a we-intention depends doxastically, viz., within a belief context only, on preanalytically understood joint intention, but not on joint intention as shared weintention, viz. (ii). Thus there is no vicious psychological circularity either. Let me emphasize that the analytic account of joint intention is deeper and more precise than the preanalytic one. It lays bare some presuppositions (e.g. that intentional performance of X is presupposed for satisfaction and that that relies on some kind of joint aim), but both result in the right kind of intention-satisfying action. (This completes my basic defense against Searle s and Miller s claim of vicious circularity.) In general terms, jointly intending participants have collectively committed (bound) themselves to jointly seeing to it that X is directly or indirectly brought about by them. 10 We may understand A s part of X or slice of the participants performance (or jstiting) of X to be whatever the agent is required (by the very concept of a joint action and his collective commitment to it) to do, including his helping, pressuring, and so on, in the course of the participants performance of X (cf. schema (W2) and social commitment more generally). Put differently, even when there is an antecedently understood part for A, the success of the collective enterprise in question may require A to do more. Furthermore, because of the participants collective commitment to perform X it can be also in A s interest to do more, on social and not only instrumental grounds, than originally required, when the need arises. There is (potential) social pressure: A is socially committed to the other participants and must be responsive to their legitimate demands concerning his activities related to X. If A we-intends to perform X, but does not participate in the collective commitment to X and thus does not intend to do what it takes for the participants to jointly do X, he does not properly we-intend to perform X and is in general criticizable for that (except in the case of joint intention which has not been publicly expressed). The antecedently specified part is his default action here. Performing it will suffice, if things work out as antecedently

35 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 361 expected. The conditionally required extra activities are concerned with new problems that arise in the case that other participants face great difficulties in their part performances jeopardizing the whole joint enterprise or simply ask for help on lesser grounds, or if there is some overall new problem threatening the joint action opportunities in question. (Note, however, that if the participants have made a detailed antecedent agreement concerning their parts, this agreement needs to be respected, and in such a case extra actions cannot be required.) As emphasized, a proper we-intender A must accept to infer, on the proper occasions, in accordance with the inference schemas (W1) and, especially, (W2) (recall Section III) and thus to participate in suitable ways, possibly only potentially, up to the point when X has been performed (or taken mutually by the participants not to be performable, after all, e.g. due to the hostility of the environment). So given his aim-intention (2)(b), what he may need to have or acquire in addition is special action intentions relevant to the coming about of X or relevant to his participation in the participants jointly seeing to it that X. Still, an aim-intention is not reducible to the mentioned kind of action intentions, for it its content is what unites them in the present kind of situation. The aim-intention is thus an irreducible guiding umbrella intention that cashes out as relevant action intentions of the kind discussed. VII. CONCLUSION My original (1984) analysis of we-intention (presented in Section III) is not and was not meant to be reductive but it was meant to elucidate we-intentions in an informative way. My analysis in this paper has shown that conceptually there is (at most) partial circularity relative to a presupposed underlying commonsense idea of joint aim or purpose. This is not vicious circularity. Furthermore, there is no serious psychological circularity, as agents can perfectly well we-intend and function in terms of a vernacular, preanalytic notion of joint intention (and we-intention). To summarize the latter, functionality part, we know sufficiently well (i) what an action intention to perform one s part amounts to and we know (ii) what one s being we-committed to X amounts

36 362 to. The role of schema (W2) and similar reasoning schemas that the participants are supposed to use at least in some implicit way serve to clarify (ii) and the social commitment involved in collective commitment. More generally, the participant is committed to participating in the participants jointly seeing to it that X and thus, unless otherwise agreed by the participants, he must be prepared to do more than his preaction default part involves. 11 When all the participants carry out their participation intentions (in the sense of (2)), intentionally performed joint action results. My overall conclusion concerning the criticisms by Miller (and others) that we-intentions cannot be regarded as intentions and the criticism (made by e.g. Searle) that the concept of we-intention is viciously circular is that these criticisms are not warranted and that my non-reductive notion of we-intention also is functionally adequate. 12 NOTES 1 This is how the analysis looks like in what I have called the general case: (WI) A member A i of a collective g we-intends to see to it that X jointly with the other participants if and only if (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) A i intends to do his part of the participants seeing to it jointly that ( jstiting ) X (as his part of X); A i has a belief to the effect that the joint action opportunities for intentional jstiting X will obtain (or at least probably will obtain), especially that a right number of the full-fledged and adequately informed members of g, as required for the jstiting X, will (or at least probably will) do their parts of the participants jstiting X, which will under normal conditions result in successful jstiting X by the participants; A i believes that there is (or will be) a mutual belief among the participating members of g to the effect that the joint action opportunities for jstiting X will obtain (or at least probably will obtain); (i) in part because of (ii) and (iii). 2 It should be noted that the analysandum in (WI) is a future- or present-directed we-intention. Such a we-intention is assumed to purposively cause relevant part action in accordance with schemas such as (W1) and(w2) (see Tuomela (1977, Chapter 9, 1984, Chapter 4, 1995, Chapter 2), for my purposive causal account of action). In our present kind of case, every part action will involve a we-willing by the agent. It will cause the relevant bodily behaviors required by the part action to come about.

37 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 363 Let me give a quick account of the central content of a we-willing, which is an act-relational notion (cf. Tuomela, 1995, Chapter 2). Consider an agent A i s we-willing to do X: A i wills to do (in the jointly intended way), by his behavior, anything which he believes is required of him for them (viz., A 1,...,A m )to do X jointly. Disregarding the reflexive reference to the joint intention, we here get basically this: (Y) A i wills that (if he believes it is required of him for us to do X jointly that (Ey) (he will now perform y & y is a Y), then (Ez) (he will now perform z & z is a Y)). Here Y ranges over bodily actions (here: voluntary behaviors) and occurs in a de re position. It follows that, although A i need not have the concept of any action Y* that Y ranges over, he wills of Y that it is required in the specified sense. The requiredness above is at least partly causal, and thus we-willing typically involves causal production. Here we can say after the action that A i s we-willing was about a particular piece of behavior, say b: he willed, by b, to perform his part of X. 3 While the present paper concentrates only on we-mode collective or joint intention, let me summarize here the most central features distinguishing properly collective intentions (to X) from collective intentions as aggregated private intentions (see Tuomela, 2000b, for discussion): (i) there is a difference concerning the commitments and control concerning the intention-content (private versus collective, respectively); and (ii) a difference in mode (I-mode versus we-mode) and accordingly the indexicality (I-indexicality versus we-indexicality) related to the achievement process, and there is also (iii) a difference related to the satisfaction conditions of the intention content itself. The satisfaction matter (iii) is clear enough a private intention content does not satisfy the Collectivity Condition while a collective intention content satisfies it. This condition entails collective acceptance, and we have the following difference: (iv) A collective intention is collectively accepted by the participants as their collective intention, whereas this is not true of private intentions. As to the indexicality concerning the achievement process and the involved X-related commitments (ii), there is I-indexicality in both cases, but in the private case the I-indexicality concerns the whole content X. In the case of a collective intention to perform X together the intender accepts that the participants ( we ) by acting together will try to satisfy X and believes that they at least with some probability can do it. Here I-indexicality in a personal but non-private sense is involved in that the intender must intend by his own action to contribute to X. The above features (i) (iv) are interconnected. Thus it can be said that collectively intending something X in the we-mode is truth-equivalent to collectively accepting for the participants use that they will X, with collective commitment to X.

38 364 4 Here is a revised and improved summary account of the bridge principle of Tuomela (1995), Chapter 3, that purports to connect plan-language with agreement language in the case of joint intention: (JIP*) Some agents (say A 1,...,A m ) have formed the (agreement-based) joint intention to perform X jointly if and only if each of them (a) has accepted a plan to perform X jointly, (b) has communicated this acceptance to the others, and (c) it is a true mutual belief among A 1,...,A m that they are jointly committed to performing X and that there is or will be a part or share (requiring at least potential contribution) of X for each agent to perform that he accordingly is or will be committed to performing. Here the agents reason for their aforementioned mutual belief is (a) and (b). On the right hand side of the analysis acceptance must be understood in a normatively group-binding sense involving an obligation for the analysis to be right. While this bridge principle then is not very informative from the normative point of view, it still shows how strongly the plan language must be understood to result in equivalence. Of course, if acceptance is understood in a weaker sense which is perhaps the more normal sense then the agreement account remains the stronger of the two. 5 Note that in the Tuomela-Miller (1988) account we can speak of collective intending as a group in an intersubjective sense (by the participants collectively considered and also by each individual participant) by some agents A 1,...,A m and also by each A i. When knowledge about participation intentions is required to have been communicated, we can have collective intending in the strong sense of these persons intending as a collective both in the intersubjective and in a fully objective sense. In this case the participants fully jointly control the settling of what to do and, given that the environment cooperates, doing what has been settled. Some other philosophers have also discussed joint intentions. Among them are, to mention some recent references, Bratman (1999), Gilbert (2000), Mathiesen (2002), Searle (1990), and Velleman (1997). See my extensive critical comments on some of these authors, especially Velleman, in Tuomela (2000b). 6 Seumas Miller s (1992, 2001) account of the notion of collective end in his 1992 paper is as follows (p. 285): A state of affairs E is a collective end in a group g if and only if (1) everyone in the group g has E as his end; (2) everyone intentionally performs the appropriate action; (3) everyone believes that if everyone performs that action then the end will be realized; (4) there is a mutual belief among the participants that (1), (2), and (3). (I have understood that Miller allows everyone to be replaced by almost everyone or, in the 2001 book, even most in the above analysis.) Consider an example: Suppose you and I decide jointly to steal some apples from a garden and figure out that you, because of your small size, are the only one who is physically capable of getting into the garden (say, through a hole in

39 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 365 the hedge). In this example both of us intend (and have as a goal) that we jointly steal apples. This end can be reached by one (but not both) of us actually acting, although in a broader sense we are acting together to realize the goal. This shows that Seumas Miller s analysis of a collective end is not right, for in his analysis clauses (2), (3), and (hence) (4) are accordingly seen to be false. According to Miller, a joint action consists of at least two individual actions directed to the realization of a collective end. Thus, individual actions x and y performed by agents A and B (respectively) in situation s, constitute a joint action if and only if (1) A intentionally performs x in s (and B intentionally performs y in s); (2) A x-s in s if and only if (he believes) B has y-ed, is y-ing or will y in s (and B y-s in s if and only if (he believes) A has x-ed, is x-ing or will x in s); (3) A has end e, and A x-s in s in order to realize e (B has end e, and B y-s in s in order to realize e); (4) A and B each mutually truly believes that A has performed, is performing or will perform x in s and that B has performed, is performing or will perform y in s; (5) each agent mutually truly believes that 2) and 3). (Although this formulation says nothing about collective ends, I take it to be an underlying requirement that e must be a collective end in (3).) Miller s notion of joint action here is mutual belief-based joint action with the additional requirement that B s action is both a necessary and sufficient condition for A s acting, and conversely. I argue that his analysis is both too strong and too weak, in part because he seems not to take into account voluntarily created dependence. In his analysis the dependence between the participants actions, which are means actions towards their shared collective end, derives from the nature of the collective end. I would say that Miller s view of joint action amounts to a sophisticated aggregative view: joint actions are aggregated individual actions directed towards a shared collective end together with some interdependence between the actions. But this collective end is an end that the both only have as their individual end (it is an I-mode collective end but not a we-mode one, to use my standard terminology). The nature of the end state is simply such that it creates dependence between the actors and thus gives the appearance of a group end, viz. and end that the agents acting as a group have chosen as their end, but the end is not one that the agents have accepted as their joint end or group end. The analysis thus seems too weak, if taken to be able to capture acting jointly as a group. The basic element that is missing is full-blown intended group end something that the agents have accepted as their collective end, viz. for their group, and that involves their collective or joint commitment to it. (As seen, in my theory the joint commitment ensues essentially from the participants full collective endorsement of intention expressions of the kind We will do X together.) On the other hand, the analysis is also too strong. We may consider Miller s (2001) example on p. 56 about two persons traveling from Oxford to London where one has a car and enough gas for the trip and the other one has some money (to pay for his share of the consumed gas) but not enough to get to London alone. According to Miller, this is not a joint action, because the car owner is not relevantly dependent on the other person. But I claim that it can be e.g. if the agents agree to travel together to London. Similarly, we can take a walk

40 366 together but equally well walk alone we voluntarily decide whether or not to make ourselves relevantly dependent on each other. So in this sense the above analysis is too strong. (See also Mathiesen (2002, p. 195), for somewhat different kinds of examples against both the necessity and the sufficiency conditions.) 7 Within my account one can prove that an agent must intend that the others also intend to perform their parts: (1) We will, by our joint actions, see to it jointly that X (e.g. a joint action) [joint intention]; (2) I aim-intend X [aim-intention] and hence I intend to perform my part of our seeing to it that X [action intention]; (3) I aim-intend that you (or the others, more generally) intentionally participate in our seeing to it jointly that X [aim-intention involving collective commitment]; (4) I aim-intend (to see to it) that you aim-intend X. [aim-intention, collective commitment, and the assumption that intentional collective action requires aim-intention]; (5) I aim intend to see to it that that you action intend to perform your part of our seeing to it jointly that s [aim-intention and the view that (your) aim-intention requires action intention for its satisfaction]. Conclusion (5) shows that my account also requires a participant s aimintention towards another participant s aim-intention and action intention. The view that joint intention entails collective commitment is the basic premise in the above argument. Joint intention thus entails collective commitment, and collective commitment again entails joint persistence (also cf. my schema (W2)). Thus joint intention in my sense involves both collective (and hence social) commitment and joint persistence. 8 Searle (1990) criticism is directed in particular against the analysis of weintentions presented in Tuomela and Miller (1988). He presents an example in which a person (a member of a group of businessmen influenced by Adam Smith s theory of the invisible hand) is assumed to intend to help humanity by pursuing his own selfish interests. This agent accordingly forms the intention to pursue his own interests and believes it to be his part in helping humanity. Searle claims that this example can be made to fit our analysis (viz., the analysis (WI)), even if there actually is no we-intention involved. But he is mistaken here; his criticism is based on a misunderstanding of our paper. We explicitly require in our paper that the we-intending agent must be assumed to intend to perform his part (here: pursuing his selfish interests) as his part of the joint action X (helping humanity). Clearly, however, this requirement is not satisfied by Searle s example, which thus is not a counterexample to our analysis. Let me note, too, that Searle incorrectly assumes in his paper that (conceptual) reduction of we-intentions to personal intentions and mutual beliefs was attempted in our paper (cf. our contrary desideratum on p. 367). To see this, one in fact need only to study (WI) and what has earlier been said about its analytic concepts.

41 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 367 Searle also states in his paper that if, on the other hand, the notion of doing his part is understood in a sense which is adequately strong, then it will include the notion of collective intention, creating a circularity problem. However, as will be shown in Section VI, this is a false claim. (For further points related to Searle s criticisms, see Tuomela, 1995, note 6 to Chapter 3.) 9 Mathiesen s (2002, p. 192) precise formulation is this: A intends to perform her part of X in order that the participants succeed in doing X. 10 Intention entails commitment (at least in an instrumental sense), and joint intention entails joint commitment. Accordingly, using commitment language, (2)(a) entails that A is we-committed to performing his part of X and (2)(b) entails that he is we-committed to X (viz. to X getting performed, if it is a joint action, or brought about if it is a state). Here we-commitment means being committed as a team or group member, the group consisting precisely in those who participate in performing X together. (We can analyze minimal person-level we-commitment as follows: A is committed to X as a joint project and believes that the others are and that this is a mutual belief among them.) Christopher Kutz (2000) has recently argued that in a minimal joint action the participants need not share a collective end but need only have a participatory intention, viz., an intention to do one s part in joint action (accompanied by the belief that the part action indeed will contribute to the collective end or goal). See my critical remarks, focusing on the lack of collective commitment to the end in Kutz s analysis, in Tuomela (2000b, pp. 386f.). 11 Let me finally make a comment on weak we-intentions defined on the basis of the we-attitude account discussed most recently in Chapter 2 of Tuomela (2002b). We recall that in the case of a strong we-intention (WI) the agent A intends to participate in accordance with and partly because of the participants joint intention to perform X (or to jstit X). Thus he believes that there is such a joint intention, but this belief might be false. This is even more perspicuous in the case of weak we-intentions and here I consider especially reason-based weak we-intentions. According to this kind of weak we-intention with joint action content, A we-intends to participate in jstiting X if and only if he intends to participate and does it in part because he believes that the others also so intend and that this is mutually believed by them. We can say that, put together, we have a joint intention: each participant intends in the present reason-based sense to participate in jstiting X a partial reason for this being that he believes that the others (and indeed all the participants, including himself) so intend and that this is mutually believed by them. Thus the joint intention is there: it consists of the agents shared reason-based we-intention in the present sense. It should be clear that the notion of a reason-based weak we-intention is not directly circular, as a joint intention here at most refers to an agent s belief about the existence of a joint intention and, as emphasized, the joint intention is one understood only in a preanalytic sense. 12 I wish to thank Pekka Mäkelä, Kaarlo Miller, Hans Bernhard Schmid, and Maj Tuomela as well as my audience at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Florida for comments.

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43 WE-INTENTIONS REVISITED 369 Tuomela, R. (1995): The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions, Stanford Series in Philosophy, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Tuomela, R. (2000a): Cooperation: A Philosophical Study, Philosophical Studies Series 82, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Tuomela, R. (2000b): Collective and Joint Intention, Mind and Society 1(2), Tuomela, R. (2002a): Joint Intention and Commitment, in G. Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Collective Intentionality, in German Library of Sciences, Philosophical Research, vol. 1 (pp ), Frankfurt: Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen AG (earlier announced to be published in Grazer Philosophische Studien). Tuomela, R. (2002b): The Philosophy of Social Practices: A Collective Acceptance View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tuomela, R. (2002c): The We-Mode and the I-Mode, in F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social Reality (pp ), Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Tuomela, R. and Miller, K. (1988): We-Intentions, Philosophical Studies 53, Tuomela, R. and Bonnevier-Tuomela, M. (1997): From Social Imitation to Teamwork, in G. Holmström-Hintikka and R. Tuomela (eds.), Contemporary Action Theory, Vol. II: Social Action (pp. 1 47), Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Tuomela, R. and Tuomela, M. (2003): Acting As a Group Member and Collective Commitment, Protosociology 18, Velleman, J. (1997): How to Share an Intention?, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXII, Department of Social and Moral Philosophy University of Helsinki University of Helsinki Finland [email protected]